Docs 221-254
November 1961-February 1962: Search for a Coalition Government; Support for Souvanna Phouma; Pressure on Phoumi Nosavan
221. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, November 6, 1961, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-661. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated priority to Vientiane eyes only for Ambassador Brown.
Confe 823. Eyes Only for the President and the Secretary from Harriman.
Agree with Department's deep concern expressed in Deptel 421 to Vientiane./2/ Reports of hostile activity close to Vientiane, enemy military movements generally, continued exploitation Xieng Khouang shelling, and warning in Souvanna's latest message to Boun Oum, all give appearance of laying ground for holding RLG responsible for breakdown cease-fire and resumption hostilities. Throughout the reports of Phoumi's private and public statements in recent weeks, one cannot fail to gain increasingly impression that he has little or no intention of negotiating in good faith. I am of course particularly impressed by his recent allegation to King and Phoui that I did not urge him to negotiate for coalition government.
/2/In telegram 421, November 3, the Department informed Brown that it was "deeply disturbed" at the RLG's decision not to meet Souvanna in Luang Prabang and instructed Brown to "continue to lose no opportunity bring home RLG importance of moving forward with constructive negotiations." (Ibid., 751J.00/11-361)
I believe it is time for Ambassador Brown to use tough line which he was authorized to use shortly after I left Vientiane mid-September./3/ I was already disturbed then that Phoumi had and would continue to fail to act in good faith. Phoumi, either from inertia or by adroit, deliberate action is leading US to war in Laos.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 189.
Indications here lead me to be convinced ChiComs will intervene if SEATO troops enter Laos. Chinese food situation will not affect ability for major military effort. After all, her industrial capacity is now vastly superior to 1950. Although negotiations here seem to give conclusive evidence of Soviet desire for peaceful settlement Laos, Soviets will support with most modern materiel needed any ChiCom engagement with US, regardless of Communist Party differences at Moscow meeting.
It is fantastic that General Phoumi, who is entirely US creation, should be permitted to continue to dictate American policy. Time is running out fast.
Souvanna cannot be expected to turn from his Xieng Khouang supporters until there is reasonable evidence that we will support him if he turns our way. RLG must also show him their intention to support him and not undercut him again if coalition formed.
I recommend that Ambassador Brown be instructed to send at once competent Embassy officer to make contact with Souvanna in Xieng Khouang. The Russians don't hesitate to send their Ambassador to Vientiane if it suits their purpose. The effect on Phoumi can only be added evidence of the seriousness of our intentions. Phoumi should now be told that we expect him to go to Plaine des Jarres for proposed meeting with Souvanna with or without Boun Oum. With the best of good will, there are difficult negotiations ahead among the Princes, both on composition of government and integration forces, but if Phoumi will engage in serious negotiations, present suspicions of bad faith on our part as well as Phoumi's can be allayed and cease-fire thereby maintained./4/
/4/At 6:45 p.m., November 6, Bowles telephoned Ball to discuss Harriman's telegram. The transcribed telephone conversation reads:
"Bowles mentioned Harriman's cable regarding Phoumi's efforts to sabotage what is going on there. Bowles understands the President pushed this hard this afternoon with Alex, and Alex is seeing the Secretary at 7. Ball said he was going to be there. Bowles said he wanted to register his vote to be tough about this. We can't let these fellows start a war. Ball agreed." (Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Cambodia)
There is no record of the President meeting with U. Alexis Johnson on November 6. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) Secretary Rusk met with Ball, Johnson, Cleveland, McConaughy, Cottrell, Hilsman, and Jordan at 7:05 p.m. to discuss Vietnam and Laos. At 8:36 p.m. all but Johnson and McConaughy left the meeting. There is no indication when these two men departed, nor has any other record been found of this meeting. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)
222. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/
Vientiane, November 7, 1961, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-761. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Geneva eyes only for Ambassador Harriman.
680. Department Eyes Only for Secretary. Ref: Deptel 429 and Confe 823./2/
/2/In telegram 429 to Vientiane, November 6, the Department asked for Brown's views on Confe 823, Document 221.
I have communicated Department's and Amb. Harriman's concern, which I agree, to Phoumi (Embtel 676)/3/ and to King (Embtel 678)/4/ with, I believe, some results, following similar assault by Australians and British. I have also attempted lay foundation for future pressure by persuading Souvanna through Sen to present proposition impossible for Phoumi to refuse (Embtel 679)./5/
/3/Dated November 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-761)
/4/Dated November 7. (Ibid.)
/5/Dated November 7. (Ibid.)
I am not too concerned at reports of hostile activities close to Vientiane since they are minor patrol actions, some probably in retaliation to Xieng Khouang shelling, and General Boyle has returned from visit to front with Colonel Kouprasith encouraged at improved military situation in Vientiane region (SitRep Nov. 6, ML-5376)./6/ Enemy movements generally in recent weeks basically continuation general war of movement and manuever for position being carried on by both sides. Xieng Khouang incident was unfortunate error by our side which Communists would naturally exploit and which RLG handled very badly. I would agree with Amb. Harriman that ChiComs would intervene at least in north of Laos if SEATO troops entered southern Laos. I do not think, however, enemy likely in immediate future engage in general resumption hostilities.
/6/Not found.
Tough line I was authorized by Deptels 287/7/ and 295/8/ to use with Phoumi does not really give me any more effective leverage with him than I had already been exercising, since it still does not put me in position to withdraw support from him if he remains recalcitrant. I do not see any way in which I could "convince Phoumi that he personally not indispensable to US" in absence of any other person we could support. I remain convinced, as I said in Embtel 507,/9/ that we cannot effectively tell Phoumi we will not support him until we have made final decision to support Souvanna and tell Phoumi so. This would involve abandoning our bargaining position with Souvanna. We are obviously not ready to do this yet.
/7/See footnote 2, Document 189.
/8/In telegram 295 to Vientiane, September 28, the Department suggested that the Embassy make an effort to convince Phoumi that he was "not indispensable" to the United States and would lose "by not cooperating and will gain if he does play ball with us." (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9-2561)
/9/See footnote 3, Document 189.
I am not prepared to accept as fully accurate Phoui's statement that Phoumi told King Amb. Harriman did not urge him to negotiate for coalition government, since Phoui's relations with Phoumi, despite recent surface indications of reconciliation, still fundamentally hostile and Phoui would undoubtedly love to displace Phoumi as US chosen instrument if he could.
I have told Phoumi, as Amb. Harriman suggests, that we expect him to go to Plaine des Jarres under conditions I suggested (Embtel 651)./10/ British, Australians, Commission and I are making concerted effort to bring this about.
/10/See footnote 7, Document 216. Dated
I propose see Phoumi after Sen returns from Plaine des Jarres, possibly tomorrow morning, and press him further. I have told King that RLG's willingness go there on conditions I proposed will be considered test of its sincerity.
I see little to be gained in terms of influence on Phoumi by sending officer to see Souvanna at this juncture and continue to feel this action premature (Embtel 668)./11/
/11/November 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-461)
I am slightly encouraged by my Nov. 6 meeting with Phoumi and King's agreement that Boun Oum at least ought to go to Plaine des Jarres.
I therefore recommend that we continue to endeavor work things out along lines I am now pursuing./12/
/12/The Department stated in telegram 440 to Vientiane, November 9, that it agreed that Brown should continue to work along the lines he was pursuing for the present. (Ibid., 751J.00/11-761)
Brown
223. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
Washington, November 10, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Cross and approved in S on November 26.
SUBJECT
Laos
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Sir David Ormsby-Gore, British Ambassador
R.T.D. Ledward, Counselor of British Embassy
Charles T. Cross, Officer-in-Charge Laos Affairs
The British Ambassador, who was acting under instructions, called on the Secretary to express British concern over the recent developments in Laos. The Ambassador said that we are now within sight of coming to an agreement in Geneva, but that in order to complete our agreement, a coalition government must be formed in Laos in order to give assent to the decisions of the Conference. Therefore, everything would seem to hinge on how the three princes come to terms in Laos itself. World opinion believes that Phoumi's reluctance to meet with Souvanna Phouma is the primary cause of holding up the agreement in Laos and the British themselves feel that Phoumi, by using the same excuses he did in 1960 when he refused to join Souvanna in stabilizing the situation in Laos, is contributing to a dangerous situation. There have been breaches of the cease-fire and evidence of increasing military action. There will be a crisis in Geneva unless there is progress in Laos. The Ambassador said that if negotiations collapse under these circumstances and hostilities break out, the UK would have difficulty in intervening militarily and presumes that the US would also. The British wonder whether the time has not come to tell Phoumi bluntly that if hostilities occur, he can expect no US or SEATO support. The next few days are vitally important.
The Secretary replied to this presentation by pointing out that we have gone to considerable lengths in pressing Phoumi to negotiate and to go to the Plaine des Jarres, but we have not seen very much evidence on the other side of any desire to negotiate themselves. He asked whether it was the British view that Phoumi should merely surrender at this point. For example, is the UK content with the 8-4-4 ratio which Souvanna Phouma is proposing? On our part, we do not see how a neutral Laos could come out of Souvanna Phouma's formulation which does not provide for independent neutral representation from outside of Xieng Khouang. The issue of the non-Xieng Khouang neutrals in the central group actually goes to the heart of the problem of Lao neutrality.
Furthermore, there is the fact that Souphanouvong has not even been willing to make the gesture of going to Luang Prabang. We are taking some chances in pressing Phoumi hard to negotiate and to go to Xieng Khouang. If something happened to him in Xieng Khouang, it would not be the first time the Communists have captured or attacked representatives sent into their area. We are doing what the British would wish to have us do in trying to move negotiations forward, but we must not underestimate the strength of the opposition on the other side.
The Secretary asked whether London felt that, if Souvanna Phouma stands adamantly on the type of slate he has proposed so far, Phoumi must accept. The Ambassador replied cautiously that the British do not regard Souvanna Phouma's slate as disastrous nor as indicative of a surrender to the other side. The Secretary then said that if Phoumi's unwillingness to accept this slate as proffered was regarded by all as a demonstration of unwillingness to negotiate on his part, then we are in difficulties. Of course, if he accepted the slate automatically, he could solve everything by merely sending a cable to Souvanna saying so. Finally, the Secretary noted that we would have difficulty in accepting an agreement which we cannot believe would produce a neutral Laos. US public opinion is a very strong factor in our considerations, and how could we go to the US people on such a basis? We might even rather "leave the party" which would mean starting down the slippery slope of forgetting about Southeast Asia.
The Ambassador returned several times to the question of whether or not Phoumi was planning to have negotiations fail so that if hostilities resumed, he could maintain his position with US support. The Secretary replied that this was not the actual choice facing Phoumi. Phoumi must decide whether it was worthwhile from his point of view to play the game further or throw in the sponge. We have pressed Phoumi as hard as we have pressed anyone recently, and he should be under no illusions that we will support him whatever his decision.
In response to the Ambassador's comments that the Soviets apparently wish for a rapid settlement in Laos and Geneva to avoid hostilities and future embroilment in the area, the Secretary said that after the events of the past spring, the Soviets probably are not overafraid of US intervention.
The Secretary closed with the remark that despite what he said of difficulties and problems involved, the US is actually doing what the British wished in pushing Phoumi forward on negotiations.
224. Editorial Note
In a November 10 letter, Chairman Nikita Khrushchev responded to the Laos portion of President Kennedy's letter of October 16. (See Document 207) Khrushchev recalled the agreement at the Vienna summit for a "really independent and neutral" Laos and for a Souvanna Phouma coalition based on the 4-8-4 formula. Khrushchev complained that the United States was pressuring "the Boun Oum-Phoumi group" to demand that some of their representatives be included in the group of eight neutralist supporters of Souvanna Phouma. Khrushchev characterized these demands as groundless and dangerous to a coalition government, an attempt "to bind Souvanna Phouma by feet and hand." The composition of the future coalition, according to Khrushchev, was an internal matter for Laos. He did not think it proper that he and President Kennedy should chose individual ministers. The only proper approach was to stop making demands on Souvanna and let him form a government.
Khrushchev then complained that "the Boun Oum group" was attacking the neutralist forces of Souvanna and Pathet Lao troops. Khrushchev assumed Kennedy was aware of this and he trusted that he would use his influence to stop the attacks.
Turning to South Vietnam, Khrushchev stated that the cause of the present tension there "is the policy of merciless terror and mass reprisals carried out by the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem which has absolutely no support among the people." How could the United States support such a regime or consider sending U.S. troops there, Khrushchev asked. Sending troops to suppress a national-liberation movement could only complicate the situation in Southeast Asia. Khrushchev ended with a reaffirmation of the Soviet peoples' desire to live in peace and friendship with other countries, including the United States, on the basis of peaceful coexistence. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163)
Kennedy's November 16 reply, which deals mostly with South Vietnam, is printed in volume I, pages 636-638.
225. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos /1/
Washington, November 12, 1961, 2:58 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-961. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Queneau, Cross, and Rusk; cleared by Anderson; cleared in draft by U. Alexis Johnson and Harriman; and approved and signed by McConaughy. Repeated to Geneva for Fecon, Bangkok, London, Paris, Saigon, and CINCPAC.
450. Your 692, 693./2/
/2/In these telegrams, November 9, Brown reported that he had tried hard to persuade Phoumi to respond to Souvanna's call for a meeting of the three Princes on the Plaine des Jarres on November 17. Brown suggested that Phoumi and Boun Oum attend on the condition that future meetings would be held in Luang Prabang. (Both ibid.)
Stand you took with Phoumi (reftel 693) and planned talks with Boun Oum, Phoui and Somsanith completely in line our present thinking. View here is that all possible be done to impress on RLG necessity their responding positively to Souvanna invitation. In light discussions in Washington we regard it essential make every effort encourage formation soonest of coalition government under Souvanna and nomination new Lao government delegation to Geneva. You should continue speak in insistent terms.
In expectation three-Princes meeting will take place PdJ believe it appropriate review basic principles with respect composition of coalition govt and position RLG should take.
1. As stated earlier Deptels and most recently in your 679/3/ number of posts in cabinet of relatively less importance than individuals and posts they receive. There is some advantage in greater flexibility that would be afforded by enlarging cabinet particularly since Souvanna apparently adamant in having seven of his principal supporters in government and thus far indicated he prepared include only one outsider, non-leftist but fairly weak RLG Ambassador to Tokyo Outhong Souvannavong. Whatever the formula Lao agree upon we would wish to see included as many non-XK neutrals as possible. USG remains convinced that there must be strong independent center group of neutrals to enhance Souvanna's capacity resist PL pressures and Communist attempts erode country's neutral status and win elections. Phoumi should be induced negotiate diligently to this end.
/3/See footnote 5, Document 222.
2. We do not believe that US can or should attempt direct negotiations with respect to allocation portfolios. Since our chief objective is to keep Pathet Lao out of such critical ministries as Defense, Interior, Finance, Foreign Affairs and Justice, this could affect Phoumi's bargaining position regarding his own role. However, if key ministries could be distributed among XK neutrals, non-XK neutrals and RLG, Phoumi as Vice Premier could still serve as rallying point of non-PL forces in government. Thus balancing Phoumi with PL Vice Premier would be manageable. If he were in position of Vice Premier where he could have comprehensive view activities various ministries, he and the King and other non-Communist elements could be assured that US attitude toward Souvanna government would be strongly influenced by their assessment as to whether genuine neutrality is present or whether PL takeover is in process.
3. Assuming Souvanna will keep Defense and Interior for himself or a close associate, PL as you have previously reported apt demand FonAff and Finance. Neither Foreign Affairs nor Finance should be in PL hands and one or both might well go to non-XK neutrals.
4. Choice of individuals for Vientiane and non-Xieng Khouang neutral slots of such critical importance in situation where country's future so patently at stake that Phoumi must be made understand there no room today for nepotism. Selections will thus have to be made on basis of competence available. Since Phoui Sananikone most valuable of all Vientiane elements and since PL will certainly not accept him as "neutral" only way of ensuring his inclusion is to place him in RLG contingent. Without attempting impose ready-made slate, we would also hope such figures as Somsanith, Khamphan Panya, Keo Viprakone (possibly as SecState for Rural Development), Inpeng, Sisouk, Oun Heuan, Thao Leuam Rajasombath, Nhouy (if "health" permits) and possibly Phagna Bouasy be taken into consideration.
5. Of other matters which Souvanna reportedly intends place on 3-Prince agenda (Embtel 681),/4/ we adhere to tripartite Paris understanding on necessity completing armed forces demobilization and integration before elections, and on delaying latter until govt well in control of country. On National Assembly issue Souvanna mentioned, we can presume he and Souphanouvong will demand present legislature be recessed once new govt takes office. Again Phoumi might concede this to improve chances of winning on more crucial matters.
/4/In telegram 681, November 7, the Embassy reported that Souvanna at Khang Khay had told news reporters that before the formation of the new government, the Princes must agree on not only names and portfolios in the future government, but also on a cease-fire, military integration, general elections, and the future of the National Assembly pending new elections. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-761)
6. To provide favorable climate for 3-Prince talks, Vang Pao should be given order to cease attacks especially in area Xieng Khouang town. In return Phoumi should request Souvanna use his influence to get PL similarly stop harassing Meo positions and himself issue parallel instructions to Kong Le forces. Repetition of recent Xieng Khouang episodes could well be disastrous at this stage.
7. Since Souvanna questions our good faith (Nov 10 press conference Xieng Khouang) as result RLG foot-dragging,/5/ he must be reassured that US wishes support him if (1) he forms government so composed as to provide maximum possibility of maintaining country's neutral status and (2) gets PL agreement on completion of integration and demobilization on priority basis and certainly prior elections.
/5/Telegram 699 from Vientiane, November 10, contains a second-hand account of Souvanna's news conference at Khang Khay on November 10. (Ibid., 751J.00/11-1061)
We believe most appropriate channel for passing this message to Souvanna is Addis with whom we know you are working closely. In discussion with Addis you should point out to him that US and RLG have already made a major and far-reaching concession in agreeing to Souvanna as Prime Minister and that we have seen no compensating concessions in Souvanna's attitude. Further you should tell Addis for his own information that it will be extremely difficult for USG on any fraudulent basis to sign Geneva Agreements and pretend that Laotian coalition government is neutral. We have been talking about genuine neutrality. Therefore Addis should exert his best efforts with Souvanna to insist upon type of coalition government which could be genuinely neutral as response to attitudes Kennedy Administration and not one strongly biased towards Peiping and Moscow simply because of past history of support by those two capitals for Souvanna as an individual.
We suggest Addis see Souvanna ASAP after Phoumi's acceptance Souvanna's invitation and before Nov 17 meeting. He could reiterate US conditions for supporting Souvanna and add following points which we think should be made: (1) Essential that Souvanna enter into meaningful negotiations with Phoumi. We consider there room for improvement negotiating attitude on both sides at this critical juncture. Addis could describe strong pressure US exerting on Phoumi to go PdJ as indicative need for forthcoming attitude on Souvanna's part. (2) Desirability Souvanna entering into quiet informal talks with Phoumi alone to see if they could get farther without Souphanouvong's inhibiting presence. (3) Necessity holding further meetings away from PL dominated territory and indicate that should such meetings take place in LP or other location, talk with Amb. Brown could be arranged. We believe talk between Souvanna and Brown highly desirable.
8. We expect to discuss paragraph 7 with British here.
Rusk
226. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State /1/
Geneva, November 12, 1961, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-1261. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, London, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Saigon, Vientiane, and Moscow.
Confe 847. For Harriman. Weekly Evaluation.
MacDonald made some progress in discussions with Pushkin over last week-end/2/ and during early part of week; but at end this week he came up against strong Soviet objections to Western positions on two of the still unresolved issues.
/2/November 4-5.
Pushkin agreed to some drafting changes in the articles on investigations and inspections which improved the provisions on investigations and majority and minority views somewhat by making them more clear. Pushkin also agreed during the week to insert as a separate subparagraph in the neutrality declaration the undertaking of the signatories not to use Lao territory for interference in affairs of other countries. This of course Pushkin insists is conditional upon satisfactory SEATO formula.
MacDonald also proposed to Pushkin during the week that the two co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference send a message to the parties in Laos calling upon them to reach agreement promptly in order to ensure the success of the present conference at Geneva and establish a genuinely neutral, independent and peaceful Laos. Pushkin was non-committal, saying only that he would refer it to Moscow. MacDonald believes that Soviets reluctant join in such message because it would be entirely impartial, making no implications against RLG. While we consider desirable send such impartial message, continued Soviet refusal to do so would at least provide opportunity place onus on them for unwillingness encourage Lao agreement.
Following Ambassador Harriman's departure for Washington on November 8, USDel received authorization from Washington to submit revised wording on voting, to drop provision for logistics stations on grounds that ICC would set these up anyway under its normal procedures, and to give Pushkin drafts on armaments and time limits for withdrawals. On November 10 MacDonald gave these drafts to Pushkin after meetings with Western and friendly Asian delegations. Also gave him copies of our article on access and wording giving ICC role of assisting in implementation of neutrality declarations. These texts had previously been given to Pushkin in early October but Pushkin had not yet responded to them in any definitive way.
MacDonald informed us that the discussion with Pushkin was on whole most unpleasant. Pushkin of course agreed with the elimination of the wording on logistics stations, agreed to study the revised wording on voting and the drafts on armaments, and, after initial objection, the draft on time limits for withdrawal of foreign military personnel.
However, MacDonald said Pushkin blew up over access article and provision for ICC assisting in implementation of neutrality declarations. He attacked MacDonald saying these proposals indicated we still trying have ICC control neutrality of Laos and that we didn't want an agreement.
MacDonald told Pushkin there was also still the question of private armies and need to have something in the Lao Declaration on that subject. Pushkin replied that idea of having this matter handled by conference was absolutely unacceptable.
On SEATO MacDonald told Pushkin that other four SEATO capitals had not yet responded regarding proposed SEATO formula. Explained that it takes time to negotiate all the arrangements. Pushkin remarked that he was beginning not to believe that we were really going to produce an acceptable formula.
Soviets apparently had subsequent talk with Indian Delegate Lall because he called MacDonald on morning Nov 11 to say that he thought the access article and the wording on ICC assisting in implementation neutrality declarations unnecessary. Lall also told MacDonald that ChiComs planning to ask for a plenary session of conference. MacDonald had heard nothing of this from Pushkin however. If Pushkin raises it, MacDonald intends to oppose the idea. In any event because of necessity 4 day advance notice for use interpreters and other facilities, session could not be held before Friday Nov 17.
MacDonald told Western delegations he feels conference prospects have dimmed in past three or four days because of Pushkin's suspicions about SEATO formula and his violent reaction to resubmission of our wording on access and ICC assistance in implementation of neutrality declarations.
227. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/
Washington, November 13, 1961, 3:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-1361. Secret; Niact. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Johnson, Steeves, and the President. Repeated niact to Geneva and London, priority to Paris, and to Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, New Delhi, CINCPAC, and Ottawa.
451. Eyes Only for all addressees. Personal for Ambassador Brown from Secretary.
Believe it imperative Mayrand not take letter of refusal to Xieng Khouang./2/ Please give Phoumi personal message from me that refusal to have either Boun Oum or Phoumi fulfill commitment about meeting Xieng Khouang would create situation not covered by his talks with us in Washington and that we would be forced consider whether we have any further useful role to play in Laotian affairs./3/ It must be obvious to RLG that breakdown of negotiations on issue of location of meeting would make it impossible to get international sympathy and support for RLG.
/2/In telegram 703 from Vientiane, November 12, Brown reported he tried at length to persuade Phoumi to go to the Plaine des Jarres and informed Phoumi that a "crisis was developing in relations between himself and the United States." Brown reminded Phoumi that Washington could "not allow its policy to be determined by another Government." Brown commented to the Department that mere statements that the United States was losing confidence in him would not impress Phoumi. (Ibid., 751J.00/11-1261)
/3/In telegram 709 from Vientiane, November 14, Brown reported that he saw British official Maynard who agreed to stall in delivering the RLG letter to Phoumi. Brown also delivered Rusk's message to Phoumi. Brown reported that afterwards Hasey had discussed the message with Phoumi who asked if the Secretary's threat was "serious" and stated that while U.S. support was crucial to their government, they could not go to the Plaine under threat of war. Instead they were asking Souvanna for another site for a meeting. (Ibid., 751J.00/11-1461) In telegram 711 from Vientiane, November 15, Phoumi officially told Rusk that he and Boun Oum were refusing to go to Plaine des Jarres, but that in no way constituted a breaking off of the negotiations. (Ibid., 751J.00/11-1561)
Rusk
228. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/
Vientiane, November 15, 1961, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-1561. Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Geneva for Fecon, niact to London, priority to Paris, and to Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, New Delhi, Ottawa, and CINCPAC for Polad.
712. Eyes Only all addressees. Personal for Secretary from Ambassador. Ref: Deptel 451 and Embtel 711./2/
/2/See Document 227 and footnote 2 thereto.
Boun Oum's letter to Souvanna (Embtel 706),/3/ while containing some disingenuous statements, is on the whole conciliatory, gives some tenable reasons why Plaine des Jarres is an unsuitable meeting place and states that Boun Oum sincerely wishes national reconciliation and the speedy formation of a government of national union. In it Boun Oum promises his support to Souvanna in trying to accomplish this.
/3/Dated November 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-1461)
Phoumi's answer to your message states that this letter was in no way intended as a rupture of negotiations, nor implies any stiffening of position on the part of the RLG.
As a result of your message, these points are now confirmed to you in writing and constitute an engagement to which the RLG can be held.
Phoumi told Hasey this morning that if Souvanna should propose a meeting anywhere except PdJ or in PL territory, the RLG would accept.
Specifically, they would go to Hin Heup.
If the Commission succeeds today in getting Souvanna to make this proposal, the negotiations will be able to proceed. U.S. desire to see them pursued in good faith has certainly been incontrovertibly established in Phoumi's mind by your message.
I therefore recommend a) no further action on our part until we see how Souvanna reacts/4/ and b) if a meeting place is agreed, that I release the funds for FAR November expenses which I have thus far withheld.
/4/On November 17, Souvanna accepted Boun Oum's and Phoumi's reasons for not going to the Plaine des Jarres and suggested that the next meeting of the three Princes should be held in Vientiane. Phoumi was elated and Brown reminded him that he should not think of it as a victory, but rather a demonstration of reasonableness by Souvanna. (Telegram 722 from Vientiane, November 17; ibid., 751J.00/11-1761)
Brown
229. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/
Vientiane, November 16, 1961, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-1661. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Geneva for Fecon and to London, Paris, Bangkok, and Saigon.
718. Reference: Deptel 450./2/
/2/Document 225.
I have following comments on timely guidance contained reftel with respect position RLG should take in forthcoming negotiations with Souvanna and Souphanouvong:
1. Most important problem is obviously composition of govt which contains potentially explosive issue of Phoumi's personal position. Basic principle with which PL will enter talks is that they should have absolute equality with RLG in number and importance portfolios. Basic principles with which Souvanna will negotiate are that Defense and Interior should be held by center group which should include his six principal companions in exile. Almost sine qua non in Phoumi's eyes is that he should hold Defense or Interior (probably only former if police and or gendarm[rie remain in Defense) since army and police when organized are only real sources of physical power.
2. I think it can be taken for granted, short of convincing demonstration that U.S. is prepared to fight or remain in status quo if it is impossible obtain one of these positions for him, and possibly not even then, that Souvanna and PL will never agree to Phoumi's holding either Defense or Interior. Therefore, if we wish an agreed government on national union, we will, despite our feeling that he should hold one of these posts (Embtel 543/3/ and Deptel 322),/4/ almost certainly, at some point, have to yield on this and advise Phoumi to do so. This is position taken in reference telegram.
/3/Dated October 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10-361)
/4/See footnote 3, Document 203.
3. We should be clear, however, as to risks involved in taking this position. Phoumi will certainly have to be forced into it and this will not leave him much stomach for hard bargaining with Souvanna on other points. (He said to me other day (Embtel 703)/5/ that fact Souvanna insisting on keeping Defense for himself and Interior for Pheng Phongsavan rendered negotiations fruitless.) Effect of US acquiescence in Phoumi's accepting a position of lesser importance, indeed pressure on him to do so, will certainly lead him, and others in Laos and neighboring countries, to wonder as to reliability of US support and could lead to considerable demoralization among conservative leaders, army officers and officials, with consequent temptation to come to terms with what would appear to them to be the winning side. Phoumi might even regard this as last straw in long series of concessions US has forced him to make and, although we might feel we could live with total package Souvanna proposes, Phoumi might refuse to accept it and withdraw from political scene into exile or take the gamble of unsupported withdrawal to the south (Embtel 92)./6/ Another potential hazard in this connection, though I consider it unlikely, is that Phoumi might be able to induce King, who has final say in composition of new government, to refuse accept slate proposed by Souvanna. US would then be in invidious position of having to apply strong pressure not only to Phoumi but to King to force them to accept government which in their judgment likely soon come under Communist domination. Consequences of this in terms of demoralization conservative elements and adverse repercussions in neighboring countries would be obvious.
/5/See footnote 2, Document 227.
/6/Document 137.
4. Therefore we should certainly not advise Phoumi to concede on Defense or Interior unless and until we are satisfied that proposed package is such that he in combination with others can have reasonable chance of keeping government from PL domination, and in which matters of elections and integration are satisfactorily dealt with.
5. CHMAAG, CAS COS, ARMA and Dir USIS feel that unless US willing support Phoumi as MinDef, or some alternative arrangement which Phoumi himself considers provides equal safeguards for conservative beachhead in Souvanna government, it must be prepared witness rapid disintegration and demoralization of RLG, FAL, bureaucracy, and of loose but so far durable support of other independent political leaders for present RLG as only acceptable alternative to XK regime headed by Souvanna and dominated by Pathet Lao and Vietminh. This demoralization of conservative and independent political elements and new power and psychological realities which would then prevail, namely crumbling of US position in Laos on the one hand, and on the other, the clear-cut political and military victory of the PL, with the Vietminh in immediate reserve, will result in inevitable communization of Laos. This result, with its dangerous consequences for US prestige in the rest of Southeast Asia, probably all of Asia, and the fact that communization of Laos will facilitate Viet Cong use of south Laos corridor into South Vietnam, leads them to conclusion that it better now accept risk of war in Laos, which is inherent in strong US support of Phoumi as MinDef than to accept communization of Laos which in their judgment will result in withdrawing US support from Phoumi on this issue.
6. Foregoing emphasizes importance of overall composition of new govt if we are to have chance of keeping it from being dominated by PL. Indeed best chance of persuading Phoumi and other leading con-servatives to participate will lie in degree to which we hold to our positions that center must be representative, that PL must not hold major portfolios and that non-XK neutralists should be given significant posts. Person chosen as Secretary of State for Defense would be important. While I do not believe that US can or should take position of breaking off negotiations or obstructing formation of govt of national union on sole issue of Phoumi's having Defense or Interior, we would be on sound ground in basing judgment of support or non-support on overall composition of government.
7. It seems to me that Information, Education and Cults are all more important Ministries than Justice. I agree that Phoumi [Phoui] should be included and will probably have to come in as RLG nominee.
8. Re numbered para 1 reftel and in particular statement that "whatever formula Lao agree upon we would wish see included as many non-XK neutrals as possible," we should still advise Phoumi to enter negotiations this matter on basis position set forth numbered para 1(a) Embtel 543--i.e. that he should insist initially on 4-4 division of center group of eight and be prepared to fall back from this position to enlargement or other formula only in exchange for concessions from other side. Extent to which he should be prepared fall back should depend in final analysis on composition of entire "package" he would be able to work out with Souvanna, particularly matter of who gets what posts.
9. Re number para 5 reftel, I believe Souphanouvong likely insist on dissolution Assembly with consequent constitutional requirement elections within 90 days. I do not see how Phoumi could yield on this point.
10. Re para 6, Vang Phao has already, at my insistence, given orders cease attacks on Xieng Khouang Ville, XK Ville-Khang Khay road, and the two roads leading east and south respectively from XK Ville within five kms of XK Ville. Sen, at my request, has asked Souvanna get PL stop harassing Meo positions. No results so far.
11. Re para 7 reftel, I have already discussed substance of problem with Addis and believe he will be prepared cooperate fully along lines indicated.
Brown
230. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, November 18, 1961, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-1861. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Bangkok and Vientiane and to London, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Saigon, and Moscow.
Confe 864. Weekly Evaluation.
Pushkin started week with successful effort stir up neutrals against Western drafts on free access and ICC assistance in implementation of neutrality declaration. Co-chairmen Pushkin and MacDonald met with neutrals (Burmese, Indian, Cambodian and three Lao Dels) in series of morning and afternoon meetings on November 13 and 14. Pushkin delivered tough and clever propaganda speech which gained support of neutrals for bloc position, despite MacDonald's well directed efforts gain neutral support for our drafts.
Pushkin continued oppose idea of impartial message from co-chairmen calling on three Princes reach prompt agreement. He charged at neutrals meeting that trouble clearly lies with Boun Oum and Phoumi.
Things seemed by Wednesday morning (Nov 15) to have come to impasse. Pushkin was warning that ChiComs pressing for plenary session that might have disruptive effect on conference and he was showing no sign of taking initiative for another private meeting of two co-chairmen. MacDonald thought situation would not have developed so badly if we had had agreement in principle from SEATO Council Reps to make appropriate statement and if, more importantly, new meeting of three Princes had been scheduled.
Suddenly on Wednesday afternoon, Pushkin asked for meeting with MacDonald same evening. Pushkin gave him drafts on investigations, introduction of armaments, time limits on withdrawal, voting, and corridor. Draft on voting was identical with last previous Sov version, but the others were revisions of earlier US or Sov drafts. For most part they represented some slight movement in direction our positions.
MacDonald at this meeting and Pushkin revised Western drafts on inspection teams and on co-chairman which included, respectively, our new formulations on access and ICC functions re neutrality declaration which Dept had approved earlier in week. Pushkin seemed impressed by speed with which we had prepared revisions. Expressed dislike of drafts but said would consider them. Pushkin suggested meeting of six dels (US, UK, USSR, ChiCom, French and Indian) as soon as possible after return Amb Harriman. MacDonald speculates this might be Pushkin counter to ChiCom desire for plenary session.
As week ended prospects for SEATO Council Reps action on SEATO formula seemed better and news was received by various dels here that agreement had apparently been reached on site of next meeting three Princes. Another favorable development was Indian Del Lall's views expressed in separate conversations with MacDonald and with US Del Rep, that new Western drafts on access and ICC function re neutrality declaration seemed to him quite reasonable.
We seem to be back into status of serious negotiations and some further progress seems possible, although we are now dealing with some of the most difficult issues of conference.
231. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, November 19, 1961, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-1961. Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Vientiane and to Bangkok, London, Paris, and Saigon.
Confe 866. From Harriman. Reference: Vientiane 718 to Dept Geneva 468./2/
/2/Document 229.
Supplementing the verbal comments I made to Steeves and Cross on telephone Friday,/3/ I want to state emphatically that in my judgment it would be unsound negotiating tactics and counter-productive for Phoumi to start his negotiations with Souvanna on the old and already rejected basis of (1) demanding Defense or Interior for himself, and (2) demanding half of center eight for non-Xieng Khouang neutrals. This would be interpreted by Souvanna and others to mean that US was not seriously attempting to come to agreement. A new negotiating position should be taken from which we can hope to obtain desirable results. Souvanna is determined to control both Defense and Interior, and will not give them up to Pathet Lao or Phoumi. He does not trust the Pathet Lao or Phoumi, who has made no effort to follow our advice to compose his differences with Souvanna and gain his confidence. Souvanna knows Phoumi as the man who was responsible for turning him out. We cannot successfully insist that he be in one of the two posts, capable of upsetting Souvanna's government. Souvanna has been consistently insisting on including in govt six of his Xieng Khouang followers. He has made it clear that he wants these men in govt in whom he personally has confidence will continue to support him. He has suggested, however, additions cabinet which might give up to four places to non-Xieng Khouang neutrals. I suggest that this be made an area of trading, both in numbers and quality, as well as entire range of composition cabinet posts. Our only hope of successful neutrality and independence for Laos is in strengthening Souvanna against Pathet Lao, not attempting to undermine him. Incidentally, I believe that Phoumi is an inadequate instrument to further US policy in a government of national unity. If agreement is reached, we are out militarily, but can plan an important and perhaps decisive role politically and economically. In these areas Phoumi has little value. In addition to Souvanna, our relationship should perhaps be developed with Phoui and other political leaders.
/3/No other record of this telephone call on November 17 has been found.
I recognize difficulties of negotiating with Souvanna through Phoumi, and Ambassador Brown should give consideration to alternatives if Phoumi fails to battle for our objectives. In this complex situation, Ambassador Brown should be given considerable latitude in methods he uses to obtain President's objectives. He can draw upon guidance given him in Deptel 450 to Vientiane./4/ Risks of supporting a Souvanna govt are obvious but these risks can be reduced if we gain Souvanna's confidence in our intention to support him provided he maintains independence from Commie domination. Then we would be in a better position to convince him of need to bring in right type of associates in various important positions.
/4/Document 225.
232. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/
Washington, November 19, 1961, 5:22 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-1661. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Cross and Queneau; cleared by Cleveland, Anderson, and Steeves; and approved and signed by McConaughy. Also sent priority to Geneva as Fecon 601 and repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Phnom Penh, New Delhi, Saigon, and CINCPAC.
481. Embtel 718./2/
/2/Document 229.
Following is elaboration Deptel 450/3/ which remains your basic guidance for forthcoming three Princes negotiations.
/3/Document 225.
1. Phoumi and Min Def or Interior. You are correct that rather than break off negotiations and obstruct formation government of national union, or be faced with PL matching Phoumi in either Defense or Interior, you are authorized at appropriate time to advise Phoumi to yield on Ministries Defense and Interior. Agree this is potentially explosive issue with far-reaching implications. Department notes other members of Country Team believe it better to accept risk of war in Laos than withdraw support for Phoumi on this issue, and that failure support him will lead to communization of Laos. Although we do not underestimate dangers involved we maintain that overall composition of cabinet will be more important in determining direction Souvanna Government will take than Phoumi's own position in it. We would rather keep PL out of critical ministries than get one of latter for Phoumi.
Foregoing does not mean Phoumi should not commence by negotiating for Defense or Interior although we suspect his bargaining position weakened by Souvanna and Souphanouvong's dramatic concession (in agreeing meet Vientiane) in matter of face which they undoubtedly expect recoup in matters of substance. One of Souvanna's messages to Boun Oum (Embtel 721)/4/ clearly indicates Souvanna and PL will be tough and will take full advantage their access world press in Vientiane. We also expect that once three Princes get together situation will evolve rapidly. Under these conditions delicate matters of timing and negotiating tactics left your discretion and you have authority to advise Phoumi if and when necessary that he should yield on Defense/Interior.
/4/Dated November 17. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-1761)
2. Para 7 reftel. Concur it most important keep Info, Education, Religious Affairs out of PL hands, notwithstanding importance of Justice portfolio. Would also be highly desirable that Youth and Rural Development go to center or RLG elements. Re Phoui, you might in your discretion remind Phoumi of our conviction Phoui's presence in coalition government is essential non-Communist counterweight to PL.
3. Cabinet Formula. Agree on tactical advice you propose giving Phoumi in negotiating on formula for cabinet composition. Greatest difficulty will lie in determining when moment has come for fall back on Phoumi's part. Much will depend on his skill in getting Souvanna and PL to lay cards on table sufficiently early in game so that total package possibilities can be assessed leaving ample time for any necessary RLG maneuvers.
4. Recessing Assembly. Fully agree RLG must not yield to any PL demand for "dissolution" of Assembly. This was why we purposely used term "recessed" in para 5 Deptel 450. Believe however RLG may have to accept "recessing" of present Assembly in order to win on other issues.
5. Contact with Souvanna. Department pleased British will cooperate on approach to Souvanna. If you concur we believe Addis should see Souvanna ASAP and convey points suggested Deptel 450 with changes necessitated by new meeting place. It most important British and French understand that much depends on advice and pressures they put on Souvanna. Whether US finally accepts Souvanna depends on overall package and we do not consider unilateral series of concessions by Phoumi with no corresponding ones by Souvanna can be termed genuine negotiations likely to lead to truly neutral Laos. We will stress this with British and French here.
In summation, guidance now is to put forth maximum effort convince Souvanna Phouma as well as Phoumi that US Government stands ready to support and fully cooperate with government of genuine unification if Souvanna Phouma will give us the opportunity to do so. Decision is largely in his hands. If he comes forth with reasonable package, we should encourage present RLG to respond in same spirit. This should be reflected in your conversation with him as well as transmitted through Addis if he sees him prior to Vientiane meeting in order to precondition him to be receptive.
In these delicate negotiations US team must speak as one./5/ While we appreciate differences of opinion which may exist in minds of some there must be no question with regard to compliance with policy line under your direction.
/5/In telegram 751 from Vientiane, November 24, Brown assured the Department that all elements in the Mission at Vientiane would "speak as one." (Ibid., 751J.00/11-2461)
If negotiations prove fruitless and Souvanna Phouma proves during these negotiations he not worthy our trust this policy will have to be reviewed but all effort now must be directed toward making a reconciliation possible.
Rusk
233. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, November 21, 1961, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-2161. Secret. Repeated niact to Vientiane eyes only for Ambassador Brown.
Confe 870. Eyes Only for the President and Secretary from Harriman. Reference: Deptel 481 to Vientiane rptd Geneva Fecon 601./2/
/2/Document 232.
My Confe 866/3/ evidently crossed reftel. Urgently request that Brown's instructions be amended taking into account my recommendations contained therein. There is no doubt that other side looks upon this next Princes' meeting as critical test of the seriousness of US Govt's desire to negotiate settlement which will avoid renewal hostilities. Time is running short. Pushkin yesterday underlined importance they place on this meeting and implied that they responsible for Souphanouvong's agreement go Vientiane. They will not believe that Phoumi is uncontrollable and is not speaking for the US.
/3/Document 231.
Khrushchev himself has knocked down the demand for four of center eight for Vientiane neutrals. Most effective negotiating tactic is, I believe, to hit what we're after from a different angle. The best one, I believe, is the one I proposed, which can obtain four of this category through expanding the center, although this will probably result in giving Souvanna six of his Xieng Khouang followers.
I don't feel quite as strongly about Phoumi's asking for Defense for himself, providing he indicates willingness fairly soon to back away from it on the condition that other posts will be satisfactorily filled. I still believe we would be better off if Phoumi would say he is giving up Defense, which he considers he has every right to hold, in order to cooperate in reaching agreement, but in return he demands other important posts for his group and Vientiane neutrals and downgrading Pathet Lao.
In addition, I am concerned by implication of last paragraph suggesting that Souvanna Phouma be judged by his negotiations with General Phoumi. Aside from Phoumi's general unreliability, no one has confidence in his political judgment. Even Sarit will confirm this. He is an inheritance of the mistakes of the previous administration, partially due to their permitting him to force their hand. He should not be permitted now to stand in the way of achieving the President's objectives. We cannot depend on Phoumi to negotiate for these objectives as we know that he wants to force US into military intervention. Therefore, I urge that Brown be encouraged to talk things over directly with Souvanna in order to come to an understanding of mutual confidence which is essential regardless of detailed arrangements.
Our gamble is on Souvanna and the men around him. It is difficult for me to believe that Phoumi will be effective in the kind of political battle new govt will have to wage against Pathet Lao infiltration. Other leaders such as Phoui, who is already thinking about organizing effective party machinery, can have important influence.
I fully agree with statement that all efforts must be directed towards making reconcilitation possible. By reconciliation, I assume we have in mind a reconciliation with our concepts, and not with Phoumi personally. As you know, I have been recommending for a long time that Phoumi attempt to achieve this, but at this late date I hardly think we can afford to have success of negotiations depend on this.
Fully agree with other points Dept's telegram which I feel are excellently presented.
234. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Conference on Laos/1/
Washington, November 22, 1961, 9:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-1961. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Cross; cleared by Queneau, Cleveland, and Anderson; and approved by McConaughy. Repeated priority to Vientiane.
Fecon 610. We believe there are no basic contradictions between Confe 866/2/ and overall line taken in Department's most recent instructions (Deptels 450 and 481)./3/ Brown has full authority to advise Phoumi on negotiating tactics and is free when he deems it necessary to inform Phoumi we will not support him further for Defense or Interior. Brown is not precluded from taking this step even before negotiations begin but there would appear serious danger that Phoumi's reaction to this advice, if given prematurely, might prevent any negotiations.
/2/Document 231.
/3/Documents 225 and 232.
Brown has same authority in relation to negotiations on important center issue. We believe that in absence concrete proposals from Souvanna it may be useful for Phoumi to begin by asking for three or four of center seats for non-XK neutrals. We agree that probably only way of getting non-XK neutrals into cabinet would be through expanding center. Brown has authority to recommend this to Phoumi when appropriate.
Intent last para Deptel 481 was to underline necessity that all members US team devote their efforts to goal of negotiated settlement and reconciliation not only between Souvanna and the US but between all non-Communist Lao elements. While Phoumi's shortcomings fully understood here, Souvanna needs all the support he can muster to strengthen him in his dealings with PL, including all elements RLG, as well as that of US and other friendly countries. Discussions with Souvanna as and when Brown considers them appropriate should certainly contribute to restoration of confidence.
Rusk
235. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, November 26, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, FE/SEA (Laos) Files: Lot 69 D 169, 324, Military, Laos 1961. Secret. Drafted by Bruns and cleared by Queneau, Cleveland, Anderson, and U. Alexis Johnson.
SUBJECT
Estimate of RLG Military Capability
In response to the President's request to Mr. U. Alexis Johnson for the United States Country Team's assessment on the military capability of the Royal Lao Government if hostilities were to resume, I am forwarding you the following information.
On October 27, General Boyle, Chief MAAG, Laos, discussed this subject with General Maxwell Taylor in Bangkok. General Boyle made it clear that the morale and capacity of the FAR had improved so that at least they could cope with any purely Lao forces deployed against them. However, he considered that the enemy could take over all of Laos at any time it wished in view of the presence of Viet-Minh cadres and units and the capacity of the opposition to increase the number of Viet-Minh forces rapidly at will. (Vientiane's Despatch 95, November 7, 1961)/2/
/2/Ibid., Central Files, 120.1151K/11-761.
Ambassador Brown informed the Department on November 25 (Vientiane's 755)/3/ that this assessment has the concurrence of the Country Team. In his message the Ambassador added:
/3/Ibid., 751J.5/11-2561.
"The enemy has the capability of reinforcing his forces rapidly along the multiple covered routes at numerous places along the 800 miles of frontier with North Viet-Nam. It must also be accepted that he can similarly reinforce with Chinese `volunteers' or units along an additional 200 miles of frontier of Communist China. Against this flexible force, and with a porous frontier of approximately 1,000 miles, FAR has only an Army of about 67,000. When this is compared against the situation in South Viet-Nam with its relatively well-equipped and well-trained Army of 170,000 as well as a Civil Guard of approximately 100,000, where the enemy is estimated to have a force numerically smaller than PL-KL forces and where there is only about 300 miles of unfriendly frontier to guard, limitations of FAR combat capability would appear fairly obvious."
L.D. Battle/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. A handwritten note on it indicates that it was sent. Johnson himself sent Bundy a shorter memorandum under his own name, November 27, which attached a copy of telegram 755 from Vientiane and summarized this situation as follows:
"In summary, Ambassador Brown and other members of the Country Team concur that, although there has been an improvement in the morale and the capacity of the Lao armed forces (FAR) which would enable them to cope with the Pathet Lao and Kong Le forces only, in view of the presence of Viet Minh cadres and units and the capacity of the Viet Minh to reinforce, the enemy still maintains the capability of defeating the FAR and taking over all of Laos." (Ibid.)
236. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, November 27, 1961, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-2761. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Vientiane and Bangkok, and to London, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Saigon, and Moscow.
Confe 896. From Harriman. Weekly Evaluation.
In week of concentrated negotiations at successive meetings of six (US, UK, French, Indian, USSR and ChiCom Dels) conference has moved closer to agreement on all remaining issues except that of private armies. Discussions, which were sometimes heated, made clear that Pushkin is far more flexible than are ChiComs on these issues. This particularly clear in respect ChiComs' tough opposition to provisions which they interpret as ICC supervision and control of Lao neutrality.
ChiComs particularly adamant in their opposition to ICC function with respect Neutrality Declarations. Pushkin took sharply contrasting line in meeting of six that it was obvious ICC would have to inform co-chairmen of any violation of any of the undertakings of the signatories and that ICC will of course report to co-chairmen in event of any threat whatsoever to Lao neutrality. He proclaimed, however, that since this so obvious, it unnecessary to include any specific provision in protocol covering this.
In subsequent private conversation with MacDonald, Pushkin reiterated to MacDonald that of course ICC will report on violations of both the Lao Neutrality Declaration and the responsive declaration with undertakings of thirteen other signatories. He urged however that it not be written into Protocol so explicitly as Western Dels were proposing. Asked that we not make so public an issue of it. Pushkin further reiterated to MacDonald Soviet determination to see to it that bloc signatories observe their obligations and asked MacDonald be sympathetic with his (Pushkin's) problems, presumably with ChiComs.
There were three meetings of six during week, on November 21st, 22nd and 24th interspersed by several private meetings between co-chairmen, MacDonald and Pushkin.
All Western Dels agreed, and this seemed especially apparent to MacDonald from his private talks with Pushkin, that one of Pushkin's principal objectives in these meetings of six was to bring ChiComs directly up against Western positions so that they could gauge for themselves whether or not Pushkin was doing best he could.
In consideration this aspect of situation I was particularly firm and blunt in pressing our positions. Subject of private armies appears be ChiComs particular bete noire, with Chang belligerently proclaiming he will not discuss subject. Pushkin of course has agreed that any hostile action of a private army would be breach of cease-fire and therefore automatically come under supervision and control of ICC.
At the Nov. 21st meeting Pushkin announced that Commie bloc had agreed to our final drafts on armaments and rearranged corridor provisions. At subsequent meetings we discussed SEATO, voting, inspection teams, amendments to co-chairmen article and French presence. As result these meetings, talks between co-chairmen and discussions among heads Western Dels, Western committee of experts have agreed on package of amended drafts which have been cabled to Dept for approval. These amendments revolve around voting provisions, access and function for ICC in connection Neutrality Declarations.
Thus all remaining unsettled issues are now under specific negotiation here. We have given Pushkin draft on subject private armies and will go after the bloc hard on this issue after we conclude with voting, access, and neutrality package. We will hold in abeyance further discussion on SEATO until favorable reply obtained from Manila that Philippines join in affirmative SEATO resolution associating SEATO with undertaking four SEATO powers at Geneva to respect Lao wish not recognize protection of any coalition or military alliance. Believe issue of French presence can be resolved insofar as instructors are concerned, provided French are ready agree unequivocally end French base at Seno.
General attitude of Soviet Del is that we ought to be able come to agreement promptly on all issues except private armies. Even this latter may not be as serious a problem as ChiComs make it because of Pushkin's attitude on agreed ICC function with respect cease-fire as noted above and because Pushkin is pressing hard for an early conclusion here. I think undue delays on our part in responsive negotiations would be prejudical to our interests.
Also during week Pushkin agreed with MacDonald's earlier proposal for a message from co-chairmen calling on three Princes reach prompt agreement. However, Soviet draft message as initially proposed was not as impartial type of message we would approve. Pushkin is now wrangling with MacDonald over our proposed changes in wording.
237. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)/1/
Washington, November 28, 1961.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Laos 7, T-028-69. Secret.
SUBJECT
Strengthening a Souvanna Phouma Government in Laos
Monday afternoon I attended a working-level meeting to discuss the State paper on the "Souvanna Phouma Solution."/2/ The following major points emerged from the discussion.
/2/See footnote 7, Document 220.
1. There appears to be a difference of view between State on the one hand and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Defense on the other with respect to the extent, if any, to which we should continue to provide support to Phoumi. The State paper somewhat straddled this issue. While it clearly contemplated switching almost all of our support to Souvanna, it did suggest that it might be possible to help Phoumi "modestly in strengthening and consolidating his position in southern Laos while not giving him the means to challenge Souvanna or Souvanna's government in Vientiane". Some of those present--primarily State people--were of the view that it would be impossible to provide "modest" support to Phoumi without encouraging him unduly and risking the possibility that he might take actions that would seriously endanger our relations with Souvanna. On the other hand, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] it would be possible to support Phoumi just as we might support other local politicians who have some power in various sections of Laos--for example, the Sananikones in Vientiane. I believe that the dominant State view will be reflected in the revision of the paper. In general, State believes that we will have to push Phoumi as far as we can in the negotiations leading to a Souvanna government, but that we will before long reach the point where we will have to "saw him off" and put all our chips on Souvanna.
2. The section of the paper on support for political organization raised a number of questions without answering them. As a result of the discussion, the paper will, I believe, be revised to reflect the following definite conclusions:
a. That we should work for a single party organization under Souvanna, rather than help somebody like Phoui create a political party in order to strengthen the bargaining position of the non-neutralist leaders in their political dealings with Souvanna.
b. That in Laos the only practical type of non-Communist political organization is one based upon a coalition of elite elements who control, through village headmen and others, the votes in various sections of the country. I suggested that, if possible, we attempt to combine this type of organization with a more grassroots organization to compete with the PL where that is necessary.
c. That, in accordance with a proposal I made on the basis of your suggestion, the recommendations would call for a careful, detailed study of how to organize to win the election.
3. [7-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
4. There was disagreement between FE and AID over our approach to future budget support. The argument was somewhat complicated, but, briefly, it ran as follows. FE favors a minimum of U.S. control over funds provided although, as I understood it, FE would be prepared to see some sort of budgetary review by the U.S. prior to decisions on aid levels. AID, on the other hand, wishes to have precise agreements on the specific uses to which U.S. funds will be put. AID's views arise out of its concern for Congressional reaction to uncontrolled aid. State, on the other hand, believes that too much U.S. control could pose some very difficult problems that would have at least as severe political consequences in the U.S. Thus, for example, the Lao budget will support Pathet Lao forces during the transition period prior to full integration of the military forces; Souvanna may have other commitments to his Xieng Khouang allies; and he should have money to bribe PL forces away from the PL. AID believes that this problem can be solved, in part at least, by limiting U.S. support specifically to those activities which do not pose such political problems and thus releasing other Lao resources for such political purposes. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
5. There had been a discussion at a meeting in the morning, which I did not attend, of the problem of supporting Lao police forces. One aspect of this problem was discussed at the meeting. It was suggested that, perhaps, the best approach to the training of the police might be to rely upon a third country from the area, such as Malaya or Indonesia, with the former much to be preferred over the latter.
6. I raised the question of whether the proposed reduction in army salaries, which was expected to hasten the exodus of marginal and irregular troops, would have the effect of forcing out more members of the FAR than of the PL. I asked, more generally, whether the political consequences of the proposal had been carefully analyzed. I was assured that the effects would be about equal on both sides.
7. As a result of my suggestion it was agreed that there should be added a recommendation that we search for a well qualified non-Communist economist to serve as a personal economic advisor to Souvanna. It was also agreed that the paper should include something on the ICC and how we can make it work more effectively.
8. [9-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
At the end of the discussion there was some consideration of the question of the next steps in the work on this paper. State in introducing the paper had indicated that it had been prepared largely at White House (our) request. State also indicated that, following revision, the paper would be discussed in a higher-level interdepartmental group. I suggested that the question of where the paper should go following consideration in a higher-level interdepartmental group could be determined by the higher-level group itself. Specifically the question of whether this warranted Presidential consideration should be decided by such a group. I also urged that, consistent with our practice on task force reports, the paper be revised by State to take account of the recommendations of other agencies only to the extent that State was prepared to accept them.
It is obvious that the State Department considers that it is preparing this paper in response to White House request and indeed it was our pressure that initiated the whole exercise. I therefore think it important that we continue to show a very active interest in the project. State's view tends to be that all of these proposed actions are moving forward and are being decided on a day-to-day basis in the drafting of telegrams. State therefore tends to discount the importance of the paper. I believe, however, and so stated in the meeting, that there is a real utility in achieving high-level interdepartmental understanding of the over-all approach that we plan to take to a Souvanna government.
It is obvious from this discussion that there are still some rather important unresolved issues. If these issues are resolved in the high-level meeting, I would recommend that the paper be sent by the Secretary of State to the President simply for his information. It implements a policy line that he has already laid down in general terms. If, on the other hand, there continue to be real differences of view, these should probably be submitted to the President for consideration, preferably in a meeting with his principal advisors.
Robert H. Johnson/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
238. Editorial Note
On November 30, the U.S. intelligence community approved SNIE 13-3-61, "Chinese Communist Capabilities in the Far East." The estimate envisioned probable Chinese reaction to Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) or United States combat forces being deployed in the defense of Laos or South Vietnam. The drafters of the estimate concluded that the Chinese would initially increase their aid to the Pathet Lao and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam while deploying substantial forces along the south China border. Should SEATO or U.S. action constitute a threat that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's forces could not counter, the Chinese would "almost certainly" intervene overtly. The estimate concluded that the Chinese would "probably" intervene even if the threat was directed against the Pathet Lao position in northern Laos. (Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates)
239. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/
Washington, December 4, 1961, 9:24 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12-161. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Cross; cleared by Anderson, Cleveland, Steeves, in substance with McGhee, and in draft with Harriman; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Paris, London, Geneva, Saigon, Bangkok, and CINCPAC POLAD. On November 29, W. Averell Harriman replaced Walter McConaughy as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and Walt Rostow became Chairman of the Policy Planning Council and Counselor of the Department of State. George Ball replaced Chester Bowles as Under Secretary of State. See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, pp. 670-671.
524. Embtel 789./2/ Following are comments and instructions on points raised your 789 and related messages:
/2/In telegram 789, December 1, the Embassy reported that Phoumi had been "singularly unresponsive" to persuasion or veiled threats of withdrawal of U.S. support. Brown suggested that Phoumi had three courses of action: to withdraw from the political scene, to move south to Savannakhet with his followers and fight on, or to continue to obstruct negotiations for the coalition. The last course of action appeared most likely to the Embassy. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12-161)
1. If Phoumi under circumstances you describe withdraws or threatens to withdraw from political scene entirely, we would make best deal we could with Souvanna on coalition government. Our final acceptance of Souvanna government would still be conditioned by its overall composition and we would expect certain members of the present RLG or non-Xieng Khouang elements (such as Phoui, Ngon Sananikone, Ouan Heuan, Oudom Souvannavong, Tiao Souk Bouavong and conceivably Nhouy Abhay) would be successful in making arrangements with Souvanna. We might even find, given opportunism most Lao politicians, that all we would lose would be Phoumi himself and his closest followers.
2. Agree that we should attempt forestall any unilateral move by Phoumi to move RLG to southern Laos; we cannot allow him involve us in military action contrary to US policy and decision. Request niact any intentions Phoumi's part. Depending on circumstances we could withdraw all MAAG assistance, suspend air flights for his troops, cease delivery supplies to FAR, and hold back financial payments to RLG. Phoumi should be under no illusion that he can take us with him to south Laos.
3. Agree that Phoumi most likely to follow third course of obstruction and delay you describe since it gives him room for maneuver where he could avoid giving us clear-cut issue on which to act. Moreover as you point out Souvanna unlikely present package which we can accept enthusiastically; thus Phoumi would expect some uncertainty on our part which he could turn to his advantage.
Your most recent telegrams indicate we may need take positive steps very shortly in order break present impasse between Princes. We propose for your comment following course of action in case meetings fail materialize in next few days:
You would see Phoumi, and Boun Oum if necessary, point out meeting of Princes encountering constant delays over technicalities and you have been instructed by your government to explore possibilities of settlement with Souvanna directly. You would explain this would not mean that we any less desirous that three Princes actually meet and negotiate, but that we believe situation has reached stage where we must know what Souvanna is thinking.
In your conversations with Souvanna you would urge him to announce make-up of his government as rapidly as possible, submitting his proposal to King for approval. You would warn Souvanna that in urging him take this step you emphasize absolute necessity of naming a cabinet which will justify support which all friends of Laos are anxious and waiting to afford him. Souvanna must realize that US can continue assistance to Laos only on basis genuine neutrality of government and policy. You would not hesitate to make positive suggestions in order assist him in making decisions. From our standpoint, positive statement that he intended invite Phoui and others of similar persuasion to join his government would be indication that he intends maintain proper balance within it. It would obviously help if he could go as far as naming Phoumi to Vice-Premiership or some other reasonably responsible cabinet post in order solicit his cooperation and avoid his open opposition or attempt to launch separatist movement in south. If Souvanna can come forth with suitable package to which positive support can be given it would short circuit endless process of negotiation and we would then have proposition with which we could go to Phoumi and ask his cooperation.
If package Souvanna produces is acceptable to us or at least one which we feel offers real basis for discussion we would so inform Phoumi. If he then refuses negotiate further with Souvanna or if negotiations once commenced founder because Phoumi fails follow our guidance, you would be authorized inform Phoumi that we no longer able work with him.
Extent to which we would combine this ultimate move with suspension aid to RLG depends upon Phoumi's reaction. In general we would prefer accomplish change without disrupting whole civil and military apparatus thus keeping useful principle that our assistance is to legal RLG rather than individual Lao. However this would be delicate, tactical matter which we would leave to your judgment. In any case to complete our break with Phoumi we would envisage immediate reassignment of your liaison officer with him.
If we break with Phoumi it probable we would have to negotiate directly with Souvanna ourselves but we would wish to leave room open if possible for another Lao political figure to speak for Vientiane elements. Our choice for this spokesman would be Phoui but bringing him in some formal way would involve serious procedural and constitutional problems which could complicate and delay settlement. Request your suggestions on how Phoui might be brought into picture.
Rusk
240. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/
Washington, December 9, 1961, 1:04 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12-861. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Cross, cleared by Anderson and Steeves in draft, and approved by Harriman. Repeated to Geneva, London, Paris, Bangkok, Saigon, Moscow by pouch, New Delhi, and CINCPAC POLAD.
534. Embtel 820./2/ In view complex and rapidly developing situation/3/ you face Department wishes provide you maximum flexibility in pursuing general lines US policy, of which our immediate objective is to bring three Princes together in Vientiane. Therefore you authorized to approach Souvanna in Plaine des Jarres at you discretion. Line you would take with Souvanna would depend upon immediate situation but we would hope you could follow guidance contained Deptel 524./4/ We believe your talk with Souvanna could go farther than mere exploration. You could and should query Souvanna on his "package". This would not require on your part any comments as to merit or demerits of any individual named by him. You could, however, raise with him any clear imbalance distribution among groups. In going Plaine des Jarres you would meet with Souvanna but of course not with Souphanouvong.
/2/In telegram 820, December 8, Brown reported the latest information on the ongoing correspondence between Souvanna and Boun Oum over the next meeting of the three Princes (see footnote 3 below). Brown reported that he had taken Phoumi to task for insisting upon conditions that he knew Souvanna would not accept and telling him that Souvanna was not up to forming a government. However, when asked by Brown, Phoumi assured the Ambassador that he would accept Souvanna's conditions for coming to Vientiane. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12-861)
/3/On December 1, Souvanna had agreed to come to Vientiane, provided he and Souphanouvong were allowed to bring 110 security troops and 30 civilian aides each. On December 4, Boun Oum countered that he would go to the Plaine des Jarres without military escort if Souvanna and Souphanouvong would do likewise in future Vientiane meetings. Souvanna responded on December 6 that Boun Oum should come to the Plaine with a 110-man escort. On December 8, Boun Oum reiterated his December 4 offer to go unescorted to the Plaine des Jarres with Souvanna doing the same in Vientiane meetings, and implied that if Souvanna could not form a government, he should stop trying.
/4/Document 239.
Rusk
241. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/
Washington, December 9, 1961, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12-961. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Cross, cleared by Anderson and Steeves, and approved by Harriman.
535. For Ambassador only from Harriman.
In your 811/2/ you raised difficult hypothetical question of what actions we would take if Souvanna stuck on package unacceptable to us or RLG and King refused to agree to package we found acceptable. The most immediate question is whether Phoumi can ever be induced to negotiate in good faith. Implications of these questions of course go to heart of problem we face in Laos. Directly stated the problem is to find Laos solution which would not involve on the one hand putting in US forces or on the other allowing Laos to be overrun in the absence of these forces. It is clear that all "solutions" (such as partition) which envisage military action ultimately would require putting US forces into Laos. It is also clear that if full scale hostilities break out again in Laos and we do not put in forces, Laos would be overrun. Our policy then must be to avoid facing the President with either of these extreme alternatives. This concept has been behind instructions you have been receiving and is the reason why we have been trying to provide you with as much flexibility and authority as we can.
/2/Dated December 6. (Ibid., 751J.00/12-661)
I would like to have your thoughts and recommendations on any other measures we can take to carry out such a complex task. To achieve this objective we must be prepared consider drastic steps such as bringing about Phoumi's departure from Govt. Particularly valuable would be your judgment as to whether any of your instructions are at variance with this policy. Please cable urgently if you feel that you need further authority.
Rusk
242. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/
Vientiane, December 10, 1961, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12-1061. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department.
824. For Assistant Secretary Harriman only from Ambassador. Reference: Deptel 535./2/
/2/Document 241.
I greatly appreciate your 535 which I think completes the framework of policy within which I am to operate by confirming that we are willing to dispense with Phoumi if necessary to get a coalition government. I appreciate also the very full authority given me and do not feel that I need anything further for the moment. I consider my instructions consistent with the policy set forth in your 535.
I agree that renewal of hostilities or any effort at formal partition would almost certainly require commitment of US forces at some stage, even though not necessarily heavy fighting, unless we would be prepared to accept military defeat of the FAR and effective military control by the enemy of all of Laos except a few of the large cities which the enemy might prefer not to attack.
The present uneasy stalemate and de facto partition might be maintained. But this would be at the option of the other side and could also be upset against our wishes by Phoumi.
A coalition government would almost certainly avoid Laos being overrun militarily by the other side. But given Souvanna's weaknesses and that of other conservatives likely to be in the government, it would be no guarantee against conquest sooner or later by subversion and/or perhaps terrorism. (cf: SNIE 53-3-61)/3/
/3/SNIE 53-3-61, September 28, "The Situation and Short Run Outlook in Laos." (Department of State, INR Files)
Thus to avoid a situation in which the other side could at any moment confront the President with the choice with which we do not want him to have to be faced, we must go for a coalition government, even if it is less satisfactory than we would wish, and will in all probability be a weaker instrument than we would like upon which to rely to prevent Communist takeover.
I do not think that Phoumi will negotiate for or agree to a coalition government headed by Souvanna under present circumstances if he can possibly avoid it.
For sixteen months, ever since August 1960, we have been trying in various ways and under widely different circumstances, to find a solution of the Laos problem through some combination of Phoumi and Souvanna and to avoid a clear cut choice between them. They could, if both were willing and adequately supported, be a very effective combination. To this day, however, our efforts have been unsuccessful. The reasons for this failure have differed on each occasion. Some have been our fault. Some have been caused by obstinacy of the other side and their greater willingness to accept the risk of military action. But the pattern of failure is so consistent as to suggest that the obstacles to success of their marriage are fairly fundamental.
A basic fact now (for a complex variety of reasons) is that Phoumi wants no part of Souvanna. Nor does the King, but this is less important. Moreover, Phoumi does not believe in a government of national union under Souvanna and including the Pathet Lao, especially when we will not insist on his having Defense or Interior. It is just possible that we can force him into it. But he will be an unwilling participant.
Nevertheless, we must, and I will, push this solution for all it is worth. We may succeed.
But in maneuvering or forcing Phoumi into a coalition, I may have to use such measures as will diminish or even effectively destroy Phoumi's personal influence, or lead to his resignation, or both. I cannot use pressure effectively unless I know that we are prepared to accept this if necessary and thereafter to rely on the best deal we can make with Souvanna, Phoui and others. I interpret my instructions, plus your 535 as giving me this authority.
Whenever possible, I will send information Department before acting drastically.
Brown
243. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
US/MC/1
Paris, December 11, 1961, 10:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1161. Secret. Drafted by L. Dean Brown of EUR and approved in S on December 12. The meeting took place at the Quai d'Orsay. Rusk was in Paris until December 16.
QUADRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING
Paris, December 10-12, 1961
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary
Ambassador Gavin
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Lyon
Mr. McNaughton
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Brown
French
M. Couve de Murville
Ambassador Alphand
M. Lucet
M. Laloy
M. Manac'h
M. Soutou
M. de Beaumarchais
M. Froment-Meurice
United Kingdom
Lord Home
Sir Shuckburgh
Sir Dixon
Sir Rumbold
Mr. Ledwidge
Mr. Samuel
Mr. Butler
SUBJECT
Laos
Lord Home opened by stating the news from Geneva is that an agreement with the Soviets may be achieved at any time. The problem is now to get the three Princes together. As co-chairmen, the UK and the Soviets could suggest to the Princes that they meet somewhere although it would be better if they did this on their own.
The Secretary said that there are indications there may be a meeting in Vientiane but no evidence that Souvanna Phouma and Souphannouvong are in a negotiating mood. We have been trying to get Phoumi to play but we should remember that essentially we are asking him to surrender. The composition of the future government worries us. We do not see how we can sign an agreement at Geneva if it is obviously a fraud.
Couve suggested we ask the three Princes to meet in Geneva under the co-chairmen as there seems to be no progress in Laos itself./2/ In Geneva they would be under some pressure to make decisions and would not have the security problem. This may create a problem with the King.
/2/A telephone conversation between Rusk and Ball, December 11, 9:10 a.m. Washington time, was transcribed as follows:
"Sec. said Ball might ask Harriman if it would make sense to get the three Princes invited to Geneva. Ball said he had been talking with Johnson. The feeling here is it would be more difficult to arrange it for them where it is taking place now because for quite obvious reasons they are reluctant to meet. It is not the geographic location. Sec. said another location may take away any . . . . Ball said we would explore that and see what might be done along that line. Ball asked about the possibility of Rangoon. Sec. said it may be it could be held at Delhi with their Chairman of ICC (?) Ball said we would explore that." (Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Laos; ellipsis in the source text)
The Secretary said there are signs that delegations from Xieng Khouang are in touch with the Chinese military mission in North Vietnam and may be preparing for a renewal of fighting. It might be useful to have a meeting in Geneva even as a delaying tactic. We should see if there has been any progress in the last day, which he doubted.
Lord Home said that Souvanna Phouma might ask some moderates to take part in the Government, perhaps Phoui. Despite the difficulty with the King, he thought there were advantages in a co-chairmen invitation. The matter could be put to Gromyko perhaps initially from MacDonald to Pushkin. In the meantime the British delegation would prepare a draft letter to the three Princes. The King could be informed that an agreement has been worked out in Geneva and that it has been suggested the three Princes meet there.
The Secretary said that some other site in Switzerland might be more acceptable. Geneva has a bad memory for the Lao Government.
Lord Home said he would go ahead with drafting. We could then look at the news from Laos. If there is no change, the letter could be sent.
Couve suggested that we inform the delegations in Geneva of this discussion and seek their advice.
This was agreed.
244. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Anderson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)/1/
Washington, December 19, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 851J.501/12-1961. Secret. Drafted by Bruns, cleared by Cross and Usher, and sent through Steeves and Peterson.
SUBJECT
Lao Internal Security Forces
We believe it would be desirable to provide Souvanna with a completely loyal and well-trained internal security force that would serve him as a force to deal with internal subversion and, if need be, as a counter weight to the integrated army. Several months ago we asked the French to join with us in working out an agreement on the organization, support and training of these forces after informal discussions disclosed that our planning needed to be carefully coordinated if we are to avoid the sort of friction that has marred past Franco-American efforts in Laos. The attached telegram (Tab A)/2/ outlines our views on the position Embassy Vientiane has proposed we take in discussions with the French on this subject.
/2/Not attached and not identified.
Our Embassy believes quite strongly that the civil police should be organized and trained according to the Ryan Plan/3/ which was drawn up by USOM/Laos security adviser Jack Ryan. This plan calls for a US trained civil police force in the Ministry of Interior that will eventually number about 6,000; this force will consist of urban, rural mobile and fixed units and specialized police. The French for their part have indicated that they will train the gendarmerie, some of whose functions duplicate those of the Ryan Plan's rural police.
/3/The Ryan plan is described in more detail in a memorandum from Anderson to Steeves, November 10. The plan envisioned a 3,200-man police force under the Ministry of Interior ultimately to number 6,000. The emphasis was on the countersubversive role of the provincial police in rural areas. A lightly armed village police would be reinforced by more heavily armed intervention units in each province, which would act as a strike force to counter armed terrorists. The United States would provide technicians, training personnel, and financial support for the police. (Department of State, Central Files, 851J.511/11-1061)
The Ryan Plan is well conceived and we have no objections to the Embassy's using it as an initial position in talking with the French, especially as the Embassy has made certain modifications that may be acceptable to the French. However, we doubt whether Souvanna will agree to the implementation of the plan and we have instructed the Embassy not to insist upon it if it is not fully acceptable to Souvanna and the French. Since the Embassy has worked closely with Souvanna's police adviser in the past and has good working relations with the French who are in contact with Souvanna now, we believe the Embassy is in the best position to determine what will be acceptable to all sides.
245. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Economic Affairs (Peterson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)/1/
Washington, December 19, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, FE/SEA (Laos) Files: Lot 65 D 169, Aid Program to Laos, Laos 1961. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
SUBJECT
Economic Aid to Souvanna Government
The attached memorandum and proposed telegram/2/ is a first step toward bringing into perspective the nature and direction of aid in Laos designed to substitute economic and social development for past support via the military.
/2/The proposed telegram was attached, but is not printed. It was sent with only minor changes as telegram 563 to Vientiane, December 22. (Ibid., Central Files, 751J.00/12-2261)
It does not give the size of the program, but in the remaining half of the current fiscal year I think it can be taken as assured that the rate of cash grant for budget support will certainly use up the $29 million now projected. My hunch is that if budget costs of demobilization arise concurrently with an upswing in road building, enlarged agricultural and health programs, etc., the needs for the fiscal year will approximate $40 million.
Previous briefings given me on the issue of cash grant versus a commodity import program and its attendant import and foreign exchange controls have been rather persuasive that the cash grant system is the best in Laos.
I recommend you approve the telegram to Vientiane to obtain country team comments and have at least a conditional proposition for Ambassador Brown to put forward to Souvanna.
Attachment/3/
Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Anderson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)
Washington, December 18, 1961.
/3/Secret. Drafted by Bruns, cleared by Cross and Usher, and sent through Peterson.
SUBJECT
Economic Aid to Souvanna Government
I am enclosing a draft telegram outlining our economic aid program to Souvanna that we propose to send to Ambassador Brown, first for his comments and then to be presented to Souvanna. It is the first of a series outlining our future relations with Souvanna.
In the telegram we have not specified how or when this program should be presented to Souvanna as these questions will be determined by events in Laos; it may be, for example, that we may wish to offer this program to Souvanna when he comes to Vientiane for the three Princes' meeting or it may be that we will want to postpone it for a while. In the same way we have made the program itself as flexible as possible and have focused on the immediate future rather than the unpredictable longer run.
In essence we are prepared to provide Souvanna with an enlarged project program--roads, rural development, etc.--and a continuation of the present rate of budget support. Our only conditions are: 1) that he join with us to establish procedures that will insure the effective use of the aid; and 2) that we undertake a joint review of the means of providing the aid. Details of our aid program, the type and number of projects, the personnel that will be required, and the amount of money needed are now being worked out by AID and State and will soon be sent to Vientiane.
We have had lengthy discussions with AID about this telegram, occasioned largely by their desire to change from a cash grant program to a commodity import program which would be put on a competing basis with that of the U.S.S.R., i.e., we would tell Souvanna that we will match the Soviets' commodity gifts. While we agree that the cash grant system should be reviewed to see if there is not a more efficient and productive method of providing our aid and that other nations should make aid available to Souvanna, we certainly do not believe that we should take an active role in inviting the Soviets into Laos. These subjects will be discussed in later telegrams.
246. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, December 20, 1961, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12-2061. Secret. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, and Vientiane.
Confe 977. For Harriman from Sullivan.
I had two hour private session with Pushkin this morning in effort gauge his views re immediate conference future and re events Laos. He was cordial, frank, and relaxed.
A. Re Laos, he maintained at some length that only problem was "Nosavan clique" and its supporters, among which he listed US military advisers, who were counseling stubborn resistance rather than cooperation. He had confidence in Kennedy, Harriman and Brown, but was not sure they were in full control. He advised pressure be brought on Phoumi by curtailment US financial assistance.
I replied that US would use what influence it had, through means its own choosing, counsel Boun Oum and Phoumi reach honorable compromises. We expected hard bargaining prevail at Vientiane and had no way knowing what position shadowy Pathet Lao figures such as Kaysone and Nouhak would take but had seen no compromise from them in past. Would not presume suggest means by which Soviets should influence these men reach compromise, but trusted Abramov would be helpful. Suggested latter stay in touch with Brown. As for allegations military obstructionists, every country had its Stalinists, but I could assure Pushkin Brown was in control our policy Laos.
B. Re conference, I said ChiCom speech in Dec. 18 plenary had caused me concern because it appeared foreclose any possibility settlement either SEATO or private armies issues. I would appreciate Pushkin's interpretation.
Pushkin attempted minimize importance ChiCom speech by saying it merely reflected bad relations between US and China. Went on at some length describe sequence events re SEATO and ended by saying formula which MacDonald had presented (i.e. reciprocal note taking by SEATO Council Reps and conference plenary) was satisfactory solution. He considered SEATO settled.
As for private armies he regretted fact that US persisted raising this issue. It could be settled only in Laos. Argument then followed course familiar to you, but ended on a note which I consider significant. This was Pushkin's rather carefully phrased statement that he would not "turn formal logic into a matter of principle," and would not reject entirely concept that language might be developed for inclusion in our documents "provided it did not violate principle of non-interference in internal administrative problems of Laos."
He said that "all five" American texts which he had seen on this subject violated this principle. He listed five texts as (1) original American draft of Protocol, (2) draft given him by Harriman and (3), (4), and (5) those variations given him by MacDonald. When I pressed him for the sort of language which might be acceptable, he replied that such proposals were US problem; he preferred no language at all.
I did not carry conversation further, since I do not believe it would be fruitful at this juncture. However, I did repeat my understanding that he would be willing consider possibility including some language in documents if, in his interpretation, such language did not violate principle non-interference internal Lao administration. He nodded agreement.
247. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)/1/
Washington, December 27, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, FE/SEA (Laos) Files: Lot 65 D 169, Souvanna Phouma paper, Oct. 61. Secret. Sent through Battle.
Before Walt Rostow left the White House, he had started one or two inquiries in town about ways and means of strengthening a Souvanna government, when we finally get one. It appeared from preliminary soundings that there might be considerable differences of view between the State Department on the one side and Defense [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on the other. We did not press the matter sharply in November because of the indefiniteness of the problem, and now that you are on the job I would much rather put it in your hands directly and entirely. But I know that the President has been much interested in the ways and means of keeping a Souvanna regime from going down the slippery slope, and accordingly we would like to give you any help we can in making sure that we are ready to move on all appropriate fronts as soon as it becomes possible. It may be quite important to get it across to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Defense, and AID that we will be meaning business in developing a strong line of policy for this next phase in Laos/2/.
/2/On December 21, Robert Johnson sent Bundy a memorandum concerning a talk with Cross, the drafter of the initial version of a paper on strengthening the Souvanna Phouma government; see footnote 2, Document 208. Cross had legitimate problems, according to Johnson, with pushing the idea at this time: creating a political organization to support Souvanna should wait until the coalition was formed; there were strong inter-agency differences on the whole concept; and the issue was one that could be better resolved by the President when he assessed the coalition and the Geneva settlement. Johnson suggested Bundy ask Harriman for a substantive progress report coordinated with other agencies and policy recommendation when the coalition was formed and the Geneva conference reached an agreement. (Department of State, FE/SEA (Laos) Files: Lot 65 D 169, Souvanna Phouma paper, Oct. 61)
McG.B.
248. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/
Washington, December 27, 1961, 7:41 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12-2761. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Harriman and Cross, cleared by Koren in draft, and approved by Rusk. Repeated priority to Bangkok.
571. Eyes Only from Secretary.
Assume you will be seeing Souvanna at first appropriate opportunity in order to move forward negotiations with or without direct participation RLG, and that you will also be concerting your efforts with British and French.
This telegram confirms that you have full authority to take action necessary to bring about formation of coalition government we can accept. This means that if you find Souvanna is prepared to negotiate for a reasonable composition of government and if Boun Oum and Phoumi continue their obstructive tactics, you are free to take such action as you may consider necessary to achieve our objectives, even to the point of informing Boun Oum and Phoumi that we will no longer support them and so inform the King, urging him to call for their resignation and appoint a new Prime Minister prepared to carry on negotiations in good faith.
Rusk
249. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12-2761. Secret; Niact. Repeated priority to Geneva for Fecon, priority to London and Paris, and to Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, New Delhi, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
Vientiane, December 27, 1961, 11 p.m.
891. Embtel 890./2/ I called on Souvanna at his request at 1900. He said he was physically well but psychologically depressed. He had called on Boum Oum with a view to starting three Prince discussions and had been met with a position that the government should be divided four PL, four Vientiane, four Vientiane neutrals and four Xieng Khouang neutrals with defense and interior to remain with Vientiane. This was stated by Boun Oum to be his "last position." It was not negotiable. Boun Oum had nothing to discuss. Souvanna said he found it difficult to conduct a negotiation in the face of such a position.
/2/In telegram 890, December 27, the Embassy reported that the three Princes' Meeting in Vientiane got off to a shaky start. Souvanna and Souphanouvong met with Boun Oum at his residence on December 27 at 3:15 p.m. Boun Oum denigrated the three Princes' meeting concept and said it was time to get to work and stop talking. He reiterated demands for RLG control of half the "neutrals" in the future Souvanna government and also claimed the Defense and Interior Ministries. Souphanouvong claimed these two ministries for the NLHX and threatened to leave the Vientiane that evening. Boun Oum replied that was fine with him. Souvanna tried to calm both sides down, but with little success. The meeting adjourned and the quarrel continued in press conferences. (Ibid.)
I said it was only to be expected that Boun Oum's initial negotiating position would be tough. Moreover, Boun Oum was very angry at Souphanouvong's airport speech which had been exceedingly disagreeable and critical of Boun Oum as well as of Americans. Souvanna said he had not listened to the speech, having been talking with others while it was being delivered. I suggested that he read it.
Souvanna said that if this was Boun Oum's position there was really no possibility of discussion and they might as well go back to Xieng Khouang. I said that it would be easier to have a discussion if there were two positions to discuss and while I hesitated to advise anybody as to how to negotiate, especially in a foreign country, I should think thing for him to do was to put up his position in detail as he had promised to do. Since Boun Oum had said that there was no need for a "three Princes meeting," I suggested that Souvanna ask Boun Oum to come to the cease-fire committee building tomorrow for "consultations." Apparently the idea of a formal opening of the "three Princes meeting" was repugnant to Boun Oum, but Boun Oum had said he was willing to consult. If Souvanna simply invited him for consultations it would be more difficult for Boun Oum to refuse. Moreover, if Souvanna should in fact consult with other groups in the capital, this would also make it more difficult for Boun Oum to refuse further discussions and would also probably be beneficial. Souvanna said he had this in mind. I suggested that he announce this tomorrow.
I said that US was still, as Ambassador Harriman had told him, sincerely anxious to be able to support a government led by him. I could assure him that I would do my utmost to bring about a genuine discussion. As to the merits of his position, he would understand if I were to reserve my decision until I had seen and considered it. He said he fully understood this. I said that the principles which Ambassador Harriman had outlined to him were still the position of the US. These were that the center of the government should be truly neutral and representative of different parties and regions in the country. Souvanna said he had this definitely in mind. The figure of 16 was not a fixed figure. He was quite prepared to add "three or four" neutrals from Vientiane. But he must maintain "five or six or seven" of his own people. I said that the six people he had in mind from Xieng Khouang were all from the north. In view of north/south feeling in Laos and the importance of unity in the country it would understandably be desirable if his group could be so constituted as to bridge gap. Souvanna said he also had this in mind. Souvanna's idea of procedure was for the three Princes to meet, since they were the three major forces in the country, to put forward their different propositions and then refer various aspects of them to sub-committees as had been done at Ban Hin Heup. In view of Boun Oum's refusal to discuss, it was not possible. However, he promised to try anew in the morning. He said he was quite prepared to go out to lunch anywhere but did not want to go out at night. I also told Souvanna that I had heard he had spoken to journalists about divided counsels in the US Government. I could assure him that these reports were not true and that the US was speaking with a united voice. He said he was comforted to hear this.
Comment: Souvanna was personally very cordial. He gave no impression of anger, but rather simply of frustration and disappointment. I got the impression that he was willing to go a little further with respect to the composition of the center than he has previously indicated. I made it clear to him that we could not really help him until we had a proposal from him that we could wholeheartedly support. As I left I told him that I was at his disposal for further discussions at any time.
Brown
250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/
Washington, December 30, 1961, 4:34 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12-3061. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Queneau and Cross, cleared by Koren and by Rusk in draft, and approved by Harriman. Repeated to Bangkok, Paris, London, Saigon, Phnom Penh, New Delhi, Geneva for Fecon, and CINCPAC and pouched to Moscow.
578. Embtel 911./2/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 251.
Tentative overall package as described by Souvanna as generally acceptable with following specific comments for your guidance in further negotiations:
1. Numerical formula of 4-5-5-4-plus Souvanna proposed by Phoumi and apparently agreed to by Souvanna if neutrals held Defense and Interior. Acceptable.
2. Souvanna concurrently holding Defense with three SecState mentioned Embtel 901./3/ Acceptable.
/3/According to telegram 901, December 29, the Secretaries of State and Defense would include Royal Lao Government representative Bounleut, Pathet Lao representative Phoune, and Houane of Souvanna's neutral group. (Ibid., 751J.00/12-2961)
3. Pheng Phongsavan in Interior acceptable provided SecState reliable and competent non-communist individual as possible such as Soukhan.
4. Since Finance more important than Foreign Affairs, suggest switching Finance to Vientiane neutrals with Foreign Affairs to best of XK neutrals, particularly as information available here is that Khoun One is considered incompetent and none of others from XK appear qualified for Finance. Consider it important to select most capable and reliable individual from available Vientiane neutrals, e.g., Thao or Impeng.
5. Khamphan Panya for Education seems good.
6. No objection Khamsing for Public Works.
7. Leuam Insisiengmay satisfactory in Religious Affairs.
8. Justice for Quinim better than Information.
9. Ngon all right for National Economy.
10. Public Works with Army Engineers under him should be attractive to Phoumi in addition to Vice-Premiership.
11. Min of Plan appears least dangerous possibility for Souphanouvong.
On basis above arrangements we believe you are in strong position to insist to Phoumi and Boun Oum that they must yield Defense and Interior to neutrals and that they must agree to further negotiations with Souvanna. With no lack of appreciation difficulty of task, our preferred result is suitable Phoumi participation in government without growls from him or Boun Oum about being let down. In event they adamant against some such solution as above, you may in your judgment exert such pressures as previously authorized.
You may feel free to go to Khang Khay if necessary and desirable to carry forward negotiations.
Rusk
251. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/
Vientiane, December 30, 1961, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12-3061. Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Geneva for Fecon, priority to London and Paris, and to Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, CINCPAC for POLAD, Moscow, and New Delhi.
912. For Assistant Secretary Harriman from Ambassador Brown. Ref: Embtel 911./2/
/2/In telegram 911, December 30, Souvanna told Brown that Phoumi had proposed to him a government of 19 (4 from each wing and a center composed of Souvanna and 5 Xieng Kouang and 5 Vientiane neutrals). Souvanna countered that Defense and Interior would have to go to the center. Phoumi asked to think about it. Brown also noted: "Souvanna said that in any ministry that had Secretaries of State, if there were a PL minister he would be balanced by Vientiane Secretary of State and vice versa. Deputy Prime Ministers would be Phoumi and Souphanouvong. Each would have a portfolio of his own." (Ibid.)
Phoumi fully confirms account his conversation with Souvanna contained reftel. He plans send message to Souvanna Monday January 1. Contents this message will be decided tomorrow morning. I congratulated him on concessions he had obtained from Souvanna in composition of center. He agreed this considerable advance. He is prepared advise Souvanna he ready discuss allocation positions of Defense and Interior in context total distribution of portfolios. He said his colleagues very tough on retaining Defense and Interior in Vientiane, but he would try persuade them. He said Souvanna had even indicated he might give Phoumi Interior. I said I thought this most unlikely in view attitude Souphanouvong. Phoumi said he had final fall-back position of Souvanna as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense with Phoumi as Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Defense. Phoumi clearly would rather have posts of Defense and Interior divided between PL and RLG than to have both in hands of weak center. He said he had suggested to Souvanna that if Vientiane could have these two posts PL could have either two to balance them but Souvanna had objected to PL having any key posts.
Phoumi said he was ready to have Souvanna and Souphanouvong return to Vientiane and meet "a six" with their advisors.
I said that RLG had been placed in extremely bad position by Boun Oum's presenting its position in form of ultimatum and stating he would not attend three-Prince meeting and that Zurich and Hin Heup agreements no longer valid. It was important for govt to recoup this position and make clear that it welcomed further three-Prince consultations. I said that I could not too strongly emphasize the importance U.S. attached to resumption of three-Prince discussions and speedy conclusion. Agreements reached at Geneva were considerable achievement and highly valuable for Laos. They had been achieved by great effort. They could not be kept indefinitely in suspense. It was essential that govt be formed quickly. Phoumi said he agreed. I said I hoped his message to Souvanna would clearly state that provided formula of nineteen he had suggested were acceptable, he was prepared to discuss allotment of Defense and Interior in context of total distribution of portfolios. I refined this by saying that I thought he should say that he was prepared to consider yielding Defense and Interior to center if satisfactory agreement reached on distribution of other ministries and secretaryships. In any case, he should make it clear that Souvanna and Souphanouvong were welcome in Vientiane for further three-Prince discussions. Phoumi indicated that he personally was willing at least to say that Defense and Interior were negotiable, although he had more difficulty with the concept of saying that he would yield them both to center if other disposition satisfactory. He still seems to think that Souvanna is on point of yielding on Interior, a belief which I personally consider wholly unfounded. I told Phoumi that in my conversation with Souvanna, after seeing him, Souvanna had still insisted firmly that Defense and Interior both be given center.
Phoumi said he felt that if he had seen Souvanna before he saw the King this morning, Souvanna would have stayed to continue discussions, but having asked King's permission to leave, he felt he could not do so. I stressed that it was absolutely essential that message sent to Souvanna be such as to induce him to return with Souphanouvong for further discussions. Phoumi agreed.
Phoumi meeting with cabinet 0900 December 31, then attending Diplomatic Corps presentation New Year's wishes to King. I will see him noon to discuss further proposed reply before it is dispatched January 1.
I would appreciate Dept's comments on above and on Souvanna's proposals contained Embtel 911 by 0900 Vientiane time December 31 if possible./3/
/3/In telegram 579 to Vientiane, December 30, the Department informed the Embassy that telegram 912 was received after Document 250 was sent. The Department believed that Document 250 covered the questions raised. It also fully agreed with the position that Brown took with Phoumi, particularly opposition as to the division of Defense and Interior between the RLG and the Pathet Lao, which would create a chaotic and dangerous condition. In the Department's view, the Pathet Lao should be limited to the least sensitive posts possible. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12-3061)
Brown
252. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/
Vientiane, December 31, 1961, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12-3161. Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Geneva for Fecon, priority to London and Paris, and to Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, CINCPAC for POLAD, Moscow, and New Delhi.
916. Ref: Embtel 915./2/ For Assistant Secretary Harriman from Ambassador Brown.
/2/In telegram 915, December 31, Brown reported on a conversation with Phoumi and noted that Phoumi was concerned about his ability to win acceptance from the rest of the Royal Lao Government for a coalition government even given the concessions that Brown believed Souvanna had made. (Ibid.)
When I left Phoumi after talk reported reftel Phoumi asked Hasey to call before afternoon Cabinet meeting, which Hasey did at 1600.
Phoumi said he was too deeply shocked by defeatist policy of US to carry on. US was treating RLG like a small child, saying just give in here (concede Souvanna only Prime Minister-designate) and then a little more here (do Souvanna work for him to form a govt) and then final straw (Defense and Interior for Souvanna). US policy is completely downhill into communism.
Phoumi said "I could not tell your Ambassador but I want you to prepare him for the worst. I do not believe I can swing the Cabinet. It will be interpreted as complete capitulation." Hasey told Phoumi that Ambassador had specific instructions and they are drastic. He urged Phoumi to do his best and understand that he had a lot to gain at the conference table but he must make up his mind that Defense and Interior would go to Souvanna group.
Phoumi said he was sure Cabinet would refuse to concede these two posts. He also said King would insist Defense and Interior remain with RLG. He said King had intimated this to Ambassador at last audience. (Comment: I have no recollection of this.) Hasey told Phoumi that if a message as suggested by me were not sent he risked losing US support. Phoumi said that he realized this but he really didn't see much use in US support if all it meant was giving in to the enemy.
Phoumi said "We will just ask you to leave with your support." The govt will resign and turn power over to King or National Assembly. They will have authority to negotiate with Souvanna. Either that or turn authority over to Souvanna and say "It is all yours and your Soviet friends. Laos is now Communist."
Phoumi said Boun Oum will never accept this. Be careful, Phoumi warned, that Boun Oum doesn't go back to "his" policy of secession. People like Bounpone, Kot, any many other military will go with him.
Hasey asked Phoumi what he would do. He said he didn't know yet but he would not join Boun Oum's movement. He thought he would leave the country. He said he was sending his wife and children to Savannakhet to "pack their bags." Also he said that he will not be caught again (like August 1960) without any money in the south.
Hasey urged Phoumi to be reasonable. He replied US is not being reasonable with RLG and their desire to keep Laos from going Communist.
Hasey asked to see Phoumi after Cabinet meeting but he said "You have the answer. I'll give it to your Ambassador tomorrow afternoon." Comment: It appears that the US position has now fully been comprehended by Phoumi. His reaction is understandable.
At my request Hasey informed Boun Oum this morning privately of risk of losing US support if RLG not willing cede Defense and Interior to center provided other portfolio distribution satisfactory.
I think it wise to let things simmer overnight.
Brown
253. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/
Vientiane, January 3, 1962, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1-362. Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Geneva for Fecon, priority to London, Paris, and CINCPAC for POLAD, and to Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and New Delhi.
932. For Secretary and Assistant Secretary Harriman from Ambassador Brown. Reference: Deptel 583./2/
/2/In telegram 583, January 2, the Department (Harriman was the drafter and Rusk approved the cable) instructed Brown not to initiate sanctions against the Royal Lao Government, but instead to use Souvanna's departure for Paris as a brief period of stocktaking. The Department also stated that it felt the Defense and Interior Ministries could not be obtained for the RLG, and if given up, the overall composition of the coalition appeared negotiable. (Ibid., 751J.00/1-262)
Hard facts of situation are as follows:
1) Present RLG will not yield on keeping defense and interior unless forced to do so and may well resign rather than yield on this point. Therefore under existing circumstances continuance of negotiations appears impossible.
2) King will do nothing to persuade government to change its position.
3) Though I have not yet ever told Phoumi, nor did I tell King this morning, that we would cut off aid, but have merely told Phoumi that we could not support him in position which he has taken and that he risked losing U.S. support, King believes and says government believes we have now cut off aid. Government may so advise press, or this is likely to leak to press from Lao sources. Then we will face public questions. We cannot hold this situation for long.
4) We are therefore forced to act and act fast if we are ever to convince Phoumi we have any independence of him, or to get him to yield on defense and interior, or resign instead. He may of course do neither, but sit tight, go to the brush, or adopt other extreme alternatives envisaged Embtel 709./3/
/3/In telegram 709, November 14, Brown reported that Phoumi stated that if the United States withdrew its support for the RLG, the Boun Oum government would fall and Phoumi himself would resign and go into exile. Phoumi had also offered to resign if someone else could be found to lead anti-Communist forces in Laos. (Ibid., 751J.00/11-1461)
5) Thus, for us to impose sanctions is very risky. It may not work. RLG may simply dig in and our sanctions will then have increasingly harmful effect on Lao people, army, economy. It will encourage PL and Communists and may result in new pressures by them which will worsen military situation and provoke hostilities without clear-cut demonstration as to who is responsible and thus put us in most difficult position. If, on other hand, we do not act, we fall deeper into Phoumi's hands and remain at impasse in negotiations for formation of government.
In this unenviable dilemma I regretfully renew my recommendation that we now suspend military deliveries into the country./4/ How we handle this with press will be subject of separate telegram. For military effect see ML OPT 16 January 2./5/ I would also like an answer to the question in the last paragraph of Embtel 924./6/ In case we are confronted by a sudden resumption of hostilities.
/4/In telegram 030422Z from Honolulu, January 3, CINCPAC stated that cutting military aid would cause the United States as much harm as it would the RLG. It could undermine an eventual neutralist solution and encourage Pathet Lao and Kong Le's forces, who continued to receive Soviet bloc military supplies, to assume the offense. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: Cables, 1/4/63-1/6/62)
/5/In this telegram, the Chief of MAAG indicated that a cut-off of U.S. military aid to the RLG would require 30 to 45 days before the impact was felt. The Lao Air Force could continue operations for at least 60 days with its petroleum, oil, and lubricants on hand. The MAAG Chief stated that calling in U.S. Military Training Teams should be a last resort since it would demoralize FAR and destroy good U.S.-FAR relations. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/1-262)
/6/In telegram 924, January 2, Brown reported that Boun Oum informed him that the RLG Cabinet agreed to send no message to Souvanna about future meetings of the three Princes. While he thought a resumption of hostilities unlikely, Brown asked for authority to suspend military supplies and withdraw U.S. military advisers should Phoumi initiate the fighting. (Ibid.)
Brown
254. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/
Vientiane, January 4, 1962, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1-462. Secret; Niact; Urgent. Repeated niact to Geneva for Fecon, priority to London, Paris, CINCPAC for POLAD, and to Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and Saigon.
937. For Secretary and Assistant Secretary Harriman from Ambassador Brown. Reference: Deptel 585./2/
/2/In telegram 585, January 3, the Department informed Brown that a cable from Sullivan in Geneva (Confe 994, January 3; ibid., 751J.00/1-362) described a campaign by Pushkin to have the 1954 Geneva Conference Co-Chairmen, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, invite the three Princes to meet in Geneva. The Department had instructed Sullivan to support the idea; and in telegram 585 to Vientiane it instructed Brown to use all pressures to get Phoumi and Boun Oum to accept the invitation when issued. (Ibid.)
1) I have no pressures left to use on Phoumi and Boun Oum.
2) I have made all the threats that words alone can convey. Though my words have been general, they have been interpreted as saying aid would be cut off.
3) These threats have been categorically defied, as was the Secretary's message of November 13./3/
/3/ Document 227.
4) What we need now is action and action on Phoumi where it hurts and where he still lingeringly hopes we will never desert him, namely in the military field.
5) It will be both futile, and embarrassing for U.S., for me to go to Boun Oum and Phoumi without our having backed up by some action what I have said to them and to King under the firmest instructions from the highest levels in Department.
6) If we did act, we would at least have the inducement of future resumption of aid.
7) Simply stated, if I follow the instructions contained reftel, the U.S. will be shown to the RLG to be in fact a paper tiger and our hope of ever being able to influence Phoumi will be even dimmer than before.
8) If Boun Oum is to be pressed to go to Geneva, it must therefore be done by representatives of the co-chairmen. The U.S. should not go to Boun Oum and Phoumi with a plea without having backed up our former pressures by concrete action.
9) Moreover, I wonder what good will it do, except perhaps gain some time, to get Boun Oum/Phoumi to Geneva if (a) they won't yield on the central point; i.e., Interior and Defense to center, and (b) we and Souvanna persist in our position that both Defense and Interior must go to center. Phoumi and Boun Oum will not concede both posts to center without a show of force by the U.S. demonstrated by action, if indeed they do agree.
10) I therefore repeat my recommendation in Embtel 932/4/ and strongly recommend that in the absence of such action by the U.S. pressures on Phoumi and Boun Oum to go to Geneva should be left to representatives of co-chairmen.
/4/Document 253.
Brown
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