1. National Intelligence Estimate/1/

NIE 4-61

Washington, January 17, 1961.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part: "Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission." The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on January 17. The Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

PROBABLE SHORT-TERM REACTIONS TO U.S. RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR TESTS

The Problem

/2/We have not attempted to estimate in this paper the long-term impact of these reactions on US foreign relations, or the exact value to the USSR's military establishment of resumed Soviet testing in response to the US program. A judgment on the military or scientific value to the US of such a program is beyond the purview of an Intelligence Estimate. [Footnote in the source text.]

Assumptions

/3/The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, note that the results of these future Geneva negotiations, the conditions under which the US would make such a decision, and the effect of possible actions which the US could take prior to such resumption of nuclear explosions, cannot now be fully assessed. They consider, for example, that the consequences of a period of intensive probing at the negotiations by the US in an attempt to reach reasonable agreement, and of explanation at the highest level as to the reasons for the contemplated US action, would have an important effect on any reactions and therefore on this estimate. However, appropriate assumptions with respect to these factors cannot now be developed. [Footnote in the source text. The Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, comprising delegations from the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, reconvened on March 21.]

/4/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the present Assumption is so stated that it presents to its users an incomplete perspective within which to judge the effects of the probable reactions to resumption of US nuclear testing. He believes that a number of other considerations such as the following are necessary prerequisites to a US resumption of testing:

(a) That the US resumes nuclear tests only after further negotiations at Geneva have demonstrated the failure of US efforts to obtain an adequate inspection system to safeguard Western security;

(b) That such resumption of tests is accompanied by a comprehensive information program to acquaint other governments and peoples with US requirements for these tests;

(c) That the information program also includes a full explanation that such US underground or space detonations would not create fallout hazards;

(d) That the US program of testing for peaceful application and improvement of detection techniques is fully publicized and that an announced standing offer is made to cease testing upon Soviet acceptance of an effective inspection system. [Footnote in the source text.]

The Estimate/5/

Introduction

1. World opinion tends to recoil from nuclear weapons, submerging logical consideration of the subject in an emotional reaction of dismay. This attitude, cultivated although not created by Communist propaganda, regarded the test explosions conducted by the US, the UK, and the USSR up to the fall of 1958 as an important part of the East-West arms race which in turn was likely to culminate in a general nuclear holocaust. Lively fears of health hazards resulting from fallout associated with these tests aggravated this reaction. Thus the unilateral undertakings of the three powers in the fall of 1958 to suspend testing were greeted with universal relief. Similarly, the Geneva negotiations aimed at making this suspension permanent have been viewed as inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries and as a hopeful portent of disarmament, relaxation of tensions, and peace./6/

/6/The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, agree that these reactions have been generated as a result of past detonations. They point out, however, that past detonations have been solely for weapons development purposes, many have been of very large yield, and most have been conducted above ground. They therefore, do not believe that future detonations, under different conditions, will necessarily produce such reactions. [Footnote in the source text.]

2. Between the present time and the date of any US announcement of resumption of a program of nuclear explosions, several factors might act to alter these attitudes. The stage reached in the Geneva negotiations, and the opinions formed concerning the merits of each side's position, is one such factor. Another is any program which the US might develop to inform world opinion about the various purposes and characteristics of different kinds of test programs. A third is the general world picture of Soviet behavior in international affairs during this period.

Reactions in the Non-Communist World /7/

/7/The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, consider the evaluations of reactions presented in this section to be primarily directed toward reactions to resumption of weapons development tests only, and to underestimate the results which would be achieved by a vigorous and intensive program of public information initiated by the President. They consider that this would be particularly true if the US action is the undertaking of detonations for detection improvement and that public reaction would be considerably influenced by world scientific opinion which will understand the basic reasons for such action. [Footnote in the source text.]

3. Given present attitudes, a new US program of nuclear explosions would be regarded by most peoples and many governments as likely to lead the USSR to resume testing; they would fear that the East-West arms race had begun to accelerate and was once more heading towards war. No matter how conducted, renewed US testing would also stimulate fears concerning health dangers from fallout. The US would be severely criticized in many quarters; there would be a tendency on the part of some to regard US policy as insufficiently dedicated to peace. A resolution calling for cessation of nuclear explosions would win widespread support in the UN, and its adoption would be almost certain if the tests were announced as being for weapons development.

4. Adverse reactions could be mitigated in several ways. Insofar as international opinion could be persuaded that the US had earnestly sought agreement in the Geneva talks but had been rebuffed by Soviet unreasonableness, renewed testing would be met with greater understanding. Also, to the extent that the program could be convincingly presented as designed to improve the prospects for test detection and, ultimately, an agreed ban, or to serve other nonmilitary purposes, it would draw less criticism. A very short test series, for example, with Soviet and other observers invited, would dilute some of the negative reaction.

5. It must be recognized, however, that because of the complex technical issues involved, a clear-cut and credible justification on these or other grounds would be very difficult to convey to world opinion. Such attempts at justification would have a greater influence on opinion already aligned with the US than on neutralists, less educated populations, and newer states. In general, however, these explanations would not go far toward neutralizing the critical popular reaction, which would spring in large part from emotional attitudes not readily accessible to rational argumentation. In the minds of many, for example, fallout is so closely associated with any kind of nuclear explosion that large segments of opinion would be impervious to the fact that underground detonations carry no dangers of this sort./8/

/8/The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, agree that the factors mentioned in this paragraph must be regarded as serious problems to be faced, but note that world opinion on the need for a seismic detection improvement program and on the fact that underground testing does not involve fallout hazards depends heavily on the manner in which the US initiates any program of nuclear explosions. They therefore consider that the general evaluation contained in this paragraph could be mitigated, as mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 4, by certain courses of action open to the US. [Footnote in the source text.]

6. Reactions would vary among different countries and areas, as well as in accordance with what were believed to be the purposes of the US program. Some NATO governments would approve, particularly those which would welcome an improved American nuclear capability. France would also be glad to have criticism deflected from its own nuclear weapons program. Most West European governments would probably take a public position which, while deploring further explosions, sought to quiet adverse reaction by sympathetically noting the considerations which had prompted the US to take this step. In taking this stand, some of these governments would find it hard to allay the anxieties of their public. The task of justification would be especially difficult in Great Britain, where the issue would be seized upon by the popular press and large segments of the Labor Party. The Canadian Government would oppose any tests which it believed had military purposes.

7. In Japan, opposition would probably be so intense as to produce anti-American demonstrations and a formal protest by the government as well. Some other Asian nations, particularly India and Indonesia, would be highly critical. However, Asian governments closely aligned with the US would be inclined to accept the US action and might be induced to approve it publicly./9/ Renewed testing would be very unfavorably received in Africa and the Arab states, and it would be particularly exploited by governments already critical in varying degrees toward the US. The Latin American governments would not regard the issue as of primary importance to themselves; their positions would vary in accordance with what they judged to be expedient in terms of other interests; most could probably be induced to support the US position.

/9/The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that this sentence should read:
"Government leaders in Asian countries closely aligned with the US would be more inclined to accept the validity of US motivations but, with one or two possible exceptions, they would find it difficult to rally public support." [Footnote in the source text.]

8. US resumption of nuclear testing, particularly for weapons purposes, would tend to weaken one of the inhibitions upon other Free World countries considering independent development of a nuclear weapons capability. This inhibition would not be completely removed, however, and other military, political, and economic considerations affecting this decision would continue to exist. Thus, while renewed US tests would tend to revive this question in Sweden and elsewhere, they are not likely, in and of themselves, to be decisive factors. However, if these countries were confronted by a situation in which both the US and the USSR had launched extensive test series, the chances that they would embark on independent nuclear weapons programs would rise.

Sino-Soviet Bloc Reactions

9. No matter what purposes the US announced or what safeguards it offered in embarking on a unilateral program, Bloc spokesmen would charge, as part of a major propaganda campaign, that the explosions were in fact for military purposes. Almost certainly the USSR would reject any invitation to observe the explosions and would withdraw its negotiators from Geneva. It would almost certainly call for a special session of the General Assembly to condemn the US, demand abandonment of the planned tests, and insist on speedy conclusion of an agreed ban.

10. The USSR would reaffirm its public position that US nuclear explosions of any type freed the USSR to resume testing. However, Moscow probably would refrain from overt testing for an initial period, lest it compromise its diplomatic and propaganda efforts to indict the US. We estimate that the USSR has technical incentives to conduct nuclear tests, chiefly in order to increase the yield-to-mass ratio of its weapons, to make them more efficient in the use of fissionable material, to develop improved low-yield weapons for tactical and air defense purposes, and to obtain very-high-altitude effects data for antimissile applications. These incentives probably would continue to exist whether or not the USSR had conducted clandestine tests since 1958. The Soviets might consider that they could improve their relative military position if both sides resumed overt testing, and in any event the incentives would grow stronger as the US conducted additional tests. Thus we believe that, if the US resumed, the USSR would in time follow suit.

11. Soviet representatives have on several occasions expressed the view that the USSR would be quick to undertake testing in the atmosphere if the US should resume testing of any sort. We believe that the Soviets would delay a decision on atmospheric testing pending an assessment of reactions to US testing, the success of their anti-American charges, and other developing factors. It is possible that, on the basis of this assessment, they would limit themselves to tests underground or in space in order to avoid the charge of contaminating the atmosphere. Indeed, they might even conduct tests underground or in space without public acknowledgment, calculating that this would enable them to maximize their political gains and that, in the event of exposure, the excuse of prior US testing would neutralize most of the opprobrium.

12. We believe that Communist China has for some time been pressing the USSR for considerably greater assistance in the attainment of a nuclear capability than the USSR has been willing to grant. In justifying its position, the USSR may have been arguing the net advantages to the Bloc of an agreed test ban. If so, resumed US testing would undermine this argument. In any event, the Chinese Communists would probably exploit such a US resumption and any subsequent Soviet testing to renew and step up their pressures for aid, and it would be more difficult for the USSR to maintain its position. Since the Soviet leaders have other strong reasons for resisting Chinese demands, we believe that renewed US tests probably would not substantially alter the Soviet attitude.

13. The Soviet leaders, and particularly Khrushchev, are eager to assess the attitudes and policies of the incoming US Administration on such matters as defense, disarmament, and East-West negotiations. They will look upon the US attitude toward testing as one of the major indicators in such an assessment./10/ Their general conclusions concerning the new Administration, however, will be based not only upon this matter, but upon the stance which the US adopts on general disarmament issues and the entire range of foreign policy issues.

/10/The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the following sentence should be inserted at this point:

"If the Soviet leaders concluded from US unilateral testing that the US was abandoning its interest in a negotiated ban, they would be inclined to infer that, with respect to other East-West issues, negotiations had become a less promising course of action." [Footnote in the source text.]

STATEMENTS OF NONCONCURRENCE

That the US resumption of nuclear weapons testing is inseparably related to the conditions under which testing is to be resumed.

That the unfavorable reaction by most people and many governments at the outset of nuclear testing would lessen with time following a comprehensive diplomatic and information program.

That most pro-US governments would approve or at least remain aligned with the US should we resume testing.

That the Soviets are likely to conclude from US unilateral testing that the US could no longer be ensnared in inconclusive negotiations and Soviet stalling techniques.

The Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, nonconcurs in this entire estimate. He considers the estimate to be erroneous in the following major aspects:

a. It imputes an exaggerated importance to a nebulously defined "world opinion" as a factor in reaching a major US policy decision vis-à-vis nuclear testing.

b. It credits too little effectiveness to possible US programs to acquaint "world opinion" with non-fallout facts associated with the types of nuclear testing assumed.

c. It denigrates the capability of pro-Western governments to recognize the nuclear testing facts as well as their courage and ability to guide public opinion in their nations.

d. It fails to examine the full scale of pressures on the USSR which would come about if the US resumed testing. While one result might be renewed USSR testing--as this estimate states--another possibility would be that the Soviets would feel compelled to accept the US position on controls for verification of test suspensions. A good case can be made for this as an outcome--but it is completely neglected in this document.

The Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, considers that the suggestions summed up in a through c above are unsupported by the evidence available; that they mistakenly credit the USSR with invulnerability, in the world political arena, to the very factors to which the US is exaggeratedly viewed as hyper-vulnerable; and that omission of point d is a major gap in the appraisal. He concludes that the estimate should be rejected for policy use because it is one-sided, misleading, and in large measure irrelevant.

2. Letter From President Kennedy to His Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy)/1/

Washington, January 27, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.0012/1–2761. No classification marking.

Dear Mr. McCloy: In accordance with our previous discussions, I am hereby designating you as my adviser on the problems of disarmament and arms control, including the nuclear test bans. I will expect you to make recommendations regarding the formulation of U.S. policy in these areas, and the organization of the United States Disarmament Administration and related activities. In carrying out your work, the staff of the United States Disarmament Administration will be available to you, as well as such other personnel from other agencies as may be needed./2/

/2/McCloy worked closely with the USDA staff but had offices in the White House and the Department of State.

The task which you are undertaking I consider to be of the highest priority. It is firmly linked to our foreign policies, to our national security and to our desire for peace. As such, it will have the constant attention and full support of my Administration. I am asking all departments of the government to cooperate fully with you and to advise you of their views.

I will expect you to work in particularly close association with the Secretary of State, who will be responsible for the conduct of negotiations with foreign countries and for whom you shall also serve as adviser, and with the Secretary of Defense. I want the most diligent possible effort made on this somber problem in the period ahead.

With every good wish,

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy

3. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy /1/

Washington, February 9, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, February-April 1961. Top Secret.

Seaborg, Wiesner, and I have asked for a short meeting on Friday./2/

/2/February 10.

The problem is this: in the last year of the Eisenhower Administration, AEC conducted a series of ingenious and illuminating experiments involving explosions of a few hundred pounds of chemicals, with very small--but rapid--nuclear reactions as one element of them. These nuclear reactions were miniature versions of a real atomic explosion, but with a force not to exceed ten pounds of chemical explosives--and in fact the actual levels involved have been of less than one-pound force. Still, because it was felt that these experiments might be denounced by the Soviets--or others--as clandestine "atomic tests," their existence was kept very secret. And to give you a free hand in the matter, they were suspended on January 18th.

Seaborg and Wiesner think they should be renewed. Rusk and McCloy concur, and so do I. These experiments may lead to real improvements in nuclear weapons--in particular they may help to improve the range or power of such a weapon as Polaris by showing the safe way to a more efficient warhead. It has always been the U.S. position that weapons development must continue actively even while atomic tests were suspended, and we do not believe that these small explosions, overwhelmingly chemical in character, can properly be called atomic tests in the common meaning of the phrase--there is no mushroom cloud here, by a long sight.

There does exist the possibility that news of this activity will leak out, and we believe it will be important, in this event, to explain the matter promptly, accurately, and with no sense of guilt. The attached statement/3/ aims to produce this result, and we think it should be held for use by Seaborg as needed.

/3/Not printed.

At the same time, we think the very hush-hush atmosphere around these experiments should gradually be lifted; it is not sound to act as if this were a guilty secret when our conviction is that it is an innocent one. We also believe it should become a part of our Geneva position to urge that "atomic explosions" be clearly defined as involving a lot more power than such experiments as these. This matter is under discussion with McCloy.

The only real alternative is to stop these experiments for many months, because if we do not start them before Geneva, it will probably be politically unwise to make a new decision to approve them while Geneva talks are going on. But if we put them off--till fall--we not only slow up possible improvements in needed weapons, we also discourage the talented group of research men at Livermore, perhaps to the point of breakup, and we increase the chance that some disgruntled weaponeer will leak the story in a damaging way.

We do not pretend that our recommendation is without risk. These experiments will be attacked by some ardent disarmers in our own country if they become known, and the Soviet Union will be able to join in if it chooses. But on balance we think the course we suggest is right--the alternative looks worse./4/

/4/According to a journal kept by Seaborg, he, Bundy, and Wiesner discussed the matter with the President at a meeting in the White House on February 10, and "obtained the President's approval for continuation of the experiments that we were interested in." (Glenn T. Seaborg, Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1961-1971, vol. 1, pp. 11-12. Seaborg kept a handwritten journal that he edited into a typescript in 1985. It is the edited, typed version that appears in the published Journal.)

McG. B./5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

4. Editorial Note

On March 4, 1961, the President met a number of officials to discuss resumption of the test ban talks at Geneva, scheduled to begin March 21. Seaborg's journal entry for this meeting reads as follows:

"From 10:35 a.m. to about 11:45 a.m. I attended a meeting with the President to discuss the U.S. position on the forthcoming test ban negotiations to be held in Geneva. It was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House and present were: President Kennedy, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Fisher, Mr. Arthur Dean, Mr. McCloy, Mr. Paul Nitze, General Lemnitzer, Mr. Dulles, Dr. Wiesner, Mr. Spurgeon Keeny, Mr. Rusk and myself.

"Mr. McCloy made the opening statement by saying that there had been general agreement on the instructions to be given to the U.S. Delegation, as brought out in a meeting of the Principals, and others (total people present, according to Mr. Bundy, were 32), held on Thursday, March 2nd; however, a difference of opinion had developed on the point of the number of on-site inspections, with the AEC holding a different point of view from the others, and we thought this was important enough for the President to resolve.

"Mr. McCloy proceeded to explain the present U.S. position, with its formula of a minimum of ten on-site inspections and the possibility of ten more with a proportionality factor of one per five suspected events to a maximum of 20. In the course of this he mentioned the AEC position, although I had the impression that he referred to it more in the way of opposition to an upper limit, rather than to AEC preference for strict proportionality with no ceiling.

"Mr. Bundy and Dr. Wiesner, and others, supported the point of view of 10 minimum, plus 10 additional on a proportional basis; Mr. Bundy made the point, supported by statistical arguments, that if you inspected some 10 or 20 events, even though each had a probability of only one in three or four of uncovering a clandestine operation, after you had done 10 or 20 of them, the chance that you had missed a true event is very small.

"The President asked General Lemnitzer for his point of view, and he said, but not very forcefully, I thought, that he thought the Joint Chiefs of Staff would prefer the concept of strict proportionality with no ceiling.

"Mr. Nitze made some comments, but they were not of the nature that threw much light on the subject of on-site inspections. He said that the Department of Defense didn't regard the matter of on-site inspections of paramount importance, but they were more concerned with the composition of the Control Commission and the methods by which certification of an event for inspection was made. DOD sees loopholes there that might negate the purposes of the treaty.

"I then said that I wanted to be sure that the difference of point of view of the AEC and the rest of the group was completely understood: that we felt that the position of settling on some arbitrarily negotiated number like 20, 3, 10, or 17 was a political solution; that we thought a more logical and scientific basis existed for adopting the principle of proportionality throughout, and that this would lead to more support by the American public, by Congress, and by scientists. I said that the average number of detectable seismic events per year appeared to be about 100. On the basis of an inspection ratio of one to five, this would result in 20 inspections. But this varies from year to year by something like a factor of 2; that is, you might have as few as 50, or as many as 200 detectable seismic events. Therefore, according to our formula, in some years, there would be less than 20 inspections.

"As the discussion began to move into other channels, Mr. McCloy brought it back to the issue of the differences on the number of on-site inspections, and the President then said that he thought that we should stay with the position of 20, as defined.

"At this point, and also at various times earlier, there was discussion of the importance of approaches to the Members of Congress. In this connection I mentioned specifically the great importance of correct approaches and approaches at the right time to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. I mentioned specifically the difficulty last summer when a discussion with them revealed their stand that they would require reciprocity, whereas the present U.S. position is unilateral disclosure in connection with seismic experimentation.

"Mr. Bundy pointed out that there was a luncheon set up for next Tuesday on this matter to discuss it with a number of Democratic Members of Congress. The President asked whether it wouldn't be better to include Republican members. In answer to Mr. Bundy's observation that this would make the group unmanageably large, the President suggested that it could be divided into two luncheons.

"In the discussion of who might attend--and I am not particularly sure who will attend which of the two luncheons--the names of Holifield, Pastore, James Van Zandt, Anderson, Jackson and Hickenlooper of the JCAE were mentioned, as well as other key members of Congress, such as Mansfield, John McCormack, Charles Halleck, etc.

"This was followed by a discussion of the question of the duration of the negotiations. The President, and many of us, had noticed the article in this morning's Washington Post by Murray Marder, pointing out that President Kennedy was departing from his campaign promise that he would set a definite time limit on the negotiations. The President observed that the article was rather vague on this point. It seemed to be agreed that there wouldn't be any hard and fast time limit; but, on the other hand, the negotiations would, in effect, come close after a reasonable time.

"There was also discussion here, as well as at other times during the meeting of the John Finney article (New York Times, March 3, 1961, 'U.S. Easing Stand on Atom Test Ban') and of the Marder article, in which discussions of the U.S. position, including the statement that we had decided to fall back to 17 inspections, were disclosed. There was much speculation as to the origin of these leaks. These articles indicated that a high official in the State Department had made these statements.

"Mr. McCloy then went on to describe very briefly the Fisk Report, and raised the question of whether it should be made available to the JCAE, pointing out the need for keeping them informed if their subsequent support is to be forthcoming. President Kennedy said he would like to study the Fisk Report over the weekend before deciding on this matter.

"The President then remarked on the time remaining before Mr. Dean's departure for Geneva, and therefore, on the need for rapid progress. He asked Mr. Dean who was going with him to Geneva, and Mr. Dean mentioned, among others, Messrs. Stell, Popper, Doyle Northrup, etc.

"The President asked whether Mr. Dean had passed on to Dr. Fisk his request that he (Fisk) be with the delegation. Mr. Dean replied that Dr. Fisk has requested that he come after the start of negotiations, on invitation, as needed, so that if he couldn't remain for the entire time, it wouldn't appear that he had lost interest in the negotiations.

"After the meeting I took Mr. McCloy and Mr. Dean aside and said there were three broad areas of possible pitfalls, or at least potential points of public attack upon the treaty that I think they should call to the President's attention even before he met with the Members of Congress. These are areas which I would have identified at the meeting had the opportunity presented itself.

"I pointed out that the upper limit of 4.75 (on the seismic detection scale) in the treaty, below which there would be a moratorium on testing, left the possibility of cheating in the development of small weapons, and even of rather large ones in the event decoupling was resorted to. I told him I thought this would be a matter of much public comment.

"I pointed out what was basically a point of illogicality in the treaty in the area of high altitude explosions. I said that here we have in the treaty itself a prohibition for which there are in certain cases no enforceable safeguards, and hence we have deviated from a principle which might come back to plague us. I pointed out that a way out of this might have been to have a moratorium for explosions above a certain altitude, below which we could definitely police the treaty provisions.

"I pointed out that some people, and I cited Teller as an example, would disagree with the statements made earlier in the meeting that a treaty of this sort couldn't place the U.S. in a very vulnerable position with respect to its future existence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union because only certain small changes, factors of 2 or 3, could be made in relation to yields, weight ratios, etc. I said that there are those who would disagree with this, that there is the possibility of the next large step--or possibly you might call it the third stage of weapons development--namely, that in the course of a few years such weapons systems as the Polaris-carrying nuclear submarine might be negated (for example, by the Soviets having a sufficient number of submarines to put them on the tail of each of ours, in cooperation with surface ships, and effectively rendering them inoperative). Concomitant with such steps to negate our striking power, the Soviets would continue to develop new concepts which could, in fact, take the next step as breakthrough in a decisive way in their ability to wage war on us." (Seaborg, Journal, volume 1, pages 58, 60-62)

Seaborg's published Journal is an edited typescript prepared in the mid-1980s, based on handwritten notes recorded daily during Seaborg's chairmanship. An account of the methodology of this transcription appears in the preface to volume 1. A briefer account of this meeting appears in Glenn T. Seaborg with Benjamin S. Loeb, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban, pages 44-45.

The Committee of Principals had been established by President Eisenhower in 1958 to coordinate review of U.S. arms control and disarmament policy. It originally comprised five members: the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Science Adviser to the President. Kennedy added the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, and, later in 1961, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

A memorandum by James Goodby of the U.S. Disarmament Administration of the Principals' meeting held March 2 and the Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on the Technical Capabilities and Implications of the Geneva System (the Fisk Report), comprising 62 pages plus amendments and charts are in the Supplement. Kennedy did release the Fisk Report to the JCAE. Other accounts of the Principals' March 2 meeting and a description of the March 7 meeting with the congressional leaders are in Seaborg, Journal, volume 1, pages 65 and 70-72, respectively, and Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban, pages 38-43 and 46-48, respectively.

5. Memorandum From the President's Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy) to President Kennedy /1/

Washington, March 8, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Fisk Report. Top Secret; Restricted Data. Attached to a March 9 note from Bundy, which reads: "This is a paper from McCloy--you are not the real target--Joint Committee is. It is part of the effort to present the whole story without asking for approval yet."

SUBJECT
Fisk Report

I am transmitting herewith the report of the Fisk Panel on Technical Capabilities of the Geneva System./2/ This Panel was established to study, review and bring up to date the technical considerations bearing upon the conclusion of an agreement for the discontinuance of nuclear tests. This report, in my judgment, from a technical standpoint buttresses the conclusion that it is in the overall interest of the national security of the United States to make a renewed and vigorous attempt to negotiate a test ban agreement along the lines now contemplated.

/2/See Document 4. The Fisk Report is in the Supplement.

The consensus of scientific thinking and analysis contained in this report indicates that a test ban agreement along the lines of the Geneva system involves certain risks from the point of view of potential nuclear weapons development. General Loper, one of the members of the Panel, has expressed his separate views/3/ as to these risks. Some of these risks are due to the inhibiting effect which the agreement might have on some areas of weapons development which may be more important to the U.S. than to the U.S.S.R. This is not true in all cases; the reverse situation exists in some. Some of these risks are due to the possibility of undetected testing by the U.S.S.R. either by underground tests which produce a seismic signal of less than 4.75 or by tests at high altitude. It is proposed to undertake further research in these fields which may increase the ability to detect such tests. In the present state of knowledge, however, it must be recognized that the effect of the agreement is to make undetected testing more difficult and expensive but that a determined evader could probably evade the technical detection system if it were to put enough of its national effort into the attempt. The increased effort would make detection more likely, however, by conventional intelligence methods.

/3/Attached to the Fisk Report. Loper's views were endorsed by the JCS in a March 4 memorandum to McNamara. The Chiefs stated that Section VII of the Report did not give sufficient emphasis to the consequences of a major breakthrough by either side in the nuclear field, to the need for testing to ensure weapons safety and reliability, or to the "urgent military requirement for obtaining of weapons effect data in various environments." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926, 388.5 1961)

These risks should not be disregarded; neither should they be overstated. They must be evaluated in light of our total military effort and plans. They must be appraised in the light of all the courses and risks facing the United States in its endeavor to reduce the likelihood of war and to promote strong conditions of peace. When so evaluated and appraised, they are, in my judgment and on balance, worth taking in order to achieve this first step towards a workable agreement on arms control.

Taking a first step in the field of arms control in the present world situation involves some risks but there are also real risks in not taking the first step. Moreover, the first step may well have such significance as to lead to the adoption of further advances toward the relief of tensions and the avoidance of war and its concomitant, a devastating nuclear catastrophe.

A test ban agreement, along the lines now contemplated, would be a significant step in the field of arms control. It would establish a control organization which will give experience in the problems of control and inspection which can be expanded and adapted to handle other measures of arms control. Installation of the high altitude control system will provide an opportunity for joint U.S.--U.S.S.R. cooperation in the exploration of outer space of the type suggested by you in your State of the Union message. The system contains the possibility of difficulties and irritations but, on balance, provides a useful mechanism for getting past a stage in the international control of arms which has proved impassable until this time.

A test ban agreement along the lines now being considered might well contribute to better and more stable relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and thus help ease general international tensions. Moreover, by stationing Americans and other foreigners at control posts and on inspection teams it could contribute to the development of a more open Soviet society. It would involve the acceptance by the U.S.S.R. of the principle that inspection and control is a necessary and integral part of any agreement in the field of disarmament.

A second reason for supporting a test ban agreement is that it could be helpful in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities among other countries. By establishing an international legal order, to which nations would be asked and expected to join, it will tend to restrain the present non-nuclear powers from obtaining nuclear capabilities. The test ban agreement is certainly not sufficient in itself to prevent this spreading of nuclear capabilities. It will have to be followed by the negotiation of other measures. If the present nuclear powers are engaged in nuclear weapons testing, the possibility of effective agreements restricting the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities will have been severely limited.

The final reason for supporting a test ban agreement results from a comparison of the political gains which would accrue from a successful test ban negotiation, on the one hand, with the political disadvantages which would be presented by a resumption of testing, on the other. A workable test ban agreement, honestly sought by the United States, would gain credit for the United States in responsible world opinion which could conceivably firm up its alliances and produce a better atmosphere, both in the United Nations and elsewhere, for conducting further negotiations with the Soviet Union. If, on the other hand, the United States were to break off the test ban talks and resume testing, without a new and serious attempt to negotiate an agreement, it would, in my judgment, alienate world opinion, not only in the underdeveloped countries but among our major allies as well. Discussions during the past summer with officials from the United Kingdom illustrate how seriously even a staunch ally as the British would regard such an action. The damage to the stature of the U.S. in world affairs and the effect on U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations which might result if the U.S. were to fail to take reasonable steps necessary to reach a satisfactory test ban agreement, and then resume testing, would be serious. This consideration, and the other considerations which I have referred to, affect the security of the United States and make me feel that they outweigh the risks which are involved in the test ban agreement and which the Fisk Panel has identified.

This does not mean that the U.S. must continue to refrain from testing indefinitely and acquiesce in what is, in effect, a test ban with no safeguards during a period of unduly protracted negotiations. If reasonable and timely progress is not made in the test ban talks, the national interests of the U.S. may well require the resumption of testing. This should be done, however, only after the U.S. has exhausted reasonable steps to obtain a satisfactory agreement.

John J. McCloy/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

6. Airgram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Geneva /1/

Washington, March 8, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/3-861. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Goodby and cleared by Ronald I. Spiers, Director of the Political Office of USDA. Copies were sent to Secretary McNamara, Allen Dulles, Seaborg, and Wiesner.

A-161. Subject: Presidential Letter to Ambassador Dean. Following is the text of a letter dated March 4, 1961, from the President to Ambassador Dean:

"Dear Arthur:

I am delighted that you have accepted the heavy responsibility of representing the United States in the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. You are outstandingly qualified to conduct these negotiations with the wisdom, energy and seriousness of purpose which they demand.

The deliberations which you are about to undertake could lead to the first international arms control agreement of the nuclear age. Such an agreement might not only help to contain the danger of a nuclear arms race, but might also be the prototype of other far-reaching agreements. At the very least, it would furnish practical experience for cooperative effort in arms control. The United States is prepared to make a vigorous effort to reach an agreement which would be to the advantage of both sides and which would promote disarmament and strengthen world security.

The main obstacle heretofore has been the lack of agreement on the establishment of an effective control system. You should, therefore, seek to discover whether a reasonable basis for accord can be found which provides adequate controls and is consistent with the security of the United States. On this could depend the answer to the larger question of whether progress towards more comprehensive disarmament will be advanced or retarded.

Undue delay in these negotiations would tend to decrease the possibility of reaching agreement, for the present uncontrolled suspension of nuclear tests is a condition which must inevitably give rise to increasing concern. Accordingly, the negotiations should be conducted in such a way as to make it clear within a reasonable period whether it is possible to proceed to the consummation of a treaty. While it is not in our hands alone to determine the outcome of the conference, whatever we can do to ensure success by negotiating openly and in good faith should be done. To this end, you have my wholehearted confidence and support.

With best wishes,

/Sgd./ John F. Kennedy

The Honorable Arthur H. Dean
Department of State
Washington 25, D.C."

The above letter will not be released or otherwise made public. You are, however, authorized to show the text to the Soviet Delegation on a confidential basis./2/

/2/In Supnu 1426 from Geneva, March 23, Dean reported that he had that day given the President's letter to Tsarapkin, who stated that he did "not intend to make any comment until our position had been completely developed." (Ibid., 397.5611-GE/3-2361)

Rusk

7. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy /1/

Washington, March 14, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, General 1-3/61. Secret.

SUBJECT
Instructions for Governor Stevenson for his Talks with Gromyko on the Question of Timing of Future Substantive Negotiations on Disarmament and the Forum in which such Negotiations Would Take Place

During this past weekend we have developed, in concert with Governor Stevenson, the attached cable for your approval on the above subject./2/ If you approve the instructions, Governor Stevenson would see Gromyko and propose: (a) that disarmament negotiations be resumed on or before August 1, 1961, in Geneva; and (b) that the forum for such talks be the 10-Nation group, augmented by either two or three officers from the smaller powers. If agreement is reached on the foregoing with the USSR, this would be incorporated in a resolution to be submitted to the resumed session of the General Assembly. In his discussions with Gromyko, Governor Stevenson would also indicate our willingness to have bilateral substantive talks with the Soviets in early summer prior to the opening of negotiations in the more formal 10-Nation group, as augmented.

/2/Not printed. The draft cable was sent unchanged as telegram 1703 to USUN, March 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-1461) See the Supplement.

Mr. McCloy has approved the attached instructions. We have discussed the general lines of this cable with Mr. Bundy, who has seen a preliminary draft. We have also consulted with Mr. Nitze, who has made several suggestions which have been incorporated in the draft instruction, but in light of the need for urgent instructions, it has not been possible for him to discuss the attached cable either with the Secretary of Defense or with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Nitze regrets, as I do, that we are having to deal with this essentially tactical matter before knowing more concretely where we wish to go on the substantive aspects of the U.S. position on disarmament. This underscores the need for early decisions on our substantive position in light of studies which are now in process.

Dean Rusk

8. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the U.S. Disarmament Administration (Gullion) to Secretary of State Rusk /1/

Washington, March 15, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/3-1561. Confidential. Drafted by Spiers.

SUBJECT
Instructions for Nuclear Test Delegation

Discussion:

Attached for your approval are the instructions for the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests./2/ These instructions have been drafted to reflect the decisions of the Committee of Principals and of the President. Information copies of this draft have been sent to all members of the Committee of Principals and to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The draft has been approved by Mr. Dean and Mr. McCloy. The Department of Defense has advised us of their concurrence. There are, however, three points in which the AEC has not concurred, as follows:

/2/Not printed.

1) The AEC staff continues to feel that no upper limit of 20 should be placed on the escalator formula for on-site inspections (para. 3(d), pages 4-5);

2) The AEC staff believes that we should explicitly state that the seismic research program should begin before signature of the treaty (para. 3(b), page 3);

3) The AEC staff feels that the Control Commission should not be given authority to alter Phase I components of the system (para. 5(f), page 9).

We have reviewed the specific issues with Mr. McCloy, who feels as we do, that we should proceed with the instructions as drafted in view of their acceptability to the other agencies involved and in view of the primary responsibility of the State Department on the matters to which the AEC staff has taken exception.

With respect to the AEC's first point, which is the only major one, we feel that the nature of the escalation proposal has been thoroughly considered by the Committee of Principals and that the proposed position has been approved by the President. Furthermore, we have advised the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the proposed position.

With respect to the AEC's second point, we have pointed out that our proposed position does not preclude the starting of the seismic research program prior to the signature of the treaty, if this can be agreed. However, we object to making it mandatory that the research program be launched before the treaty is signed.

With respect to the AEC's third point, we are simply applying to Phase I a principle which has been proposed by the U.S. and accepted by the USSR for Phase II and III. We regard this as entirely a political matter.

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached instruction for the U.S. Delegation to the nuclear test talks./3/

/3/Rusk's stamped signature and date indicate that he approved the draft instructions that day. They were sent, apparently unchanged, to Geneva as Nusup 1083, March 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/3-1561) Dean outlined the joint U.S.-U.K. position at the reconvened Geneva Conference on March 21, and the U.S.-U.K. draft treaty was tabled on April 18. See Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 55-65 and 82-126, respectively. Extensive documentation on the coordination of the U.S.-U.K. position on the draft test ban treaty is in Department of State, Central Files 600.0012 and 397.5611-GE for January-April 1961.

9. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara /1/

JCSM-182-61 Washington, March 23, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112, 23 Mar 61. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A stamped notation on the source text reads: "SecDef has seen."

SUBJECT
Nuclear Arms Control Measures (U)

1. Current international and domestic interest in arms control matters indicates a probable need for early policy decisions on issues which confront the United States in this field. US arms control policy decisions probably will require coordination with at least major NATO Allies in order to gain Western support for policies which are compatible with US national security requirements. Anticipating these needs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have re-examined the issues which, in their view, warrant priority consideration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that certain extremely important arms control issues arise in connection with those proposals which would affect the nuclear capabilities of the United States. This memorandum sets forth the policy decisions which the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend be made concerning these issues.

2. In their re-examination of pressing arms control issues, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken the following factors into consideration:

a. "The basic threat to US security is the determination and ability of the hostile Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes to direct their political and ideological influence and their rapidly growing military and economic strength toward shifting the power balance away from the West and, ultimately, toward achieving world domination.

b. "The chief elements of this threat lie in (a) the Soviets' possession of rapidly growing nuclear capabilities (which have made the Soviet leaders feel freer to adopt an aggressive posture in peripheral areas) as well as large conventional forces; (b) the Soviet regime's ability and willingness to identify itself with various forms of political and social discontent and popular opposition to the status quo; to support subversive elements, including legal political parties, within free societies; to apply substantial resources for the purpose of fostering and exploiting various kinds of weakness and instability in all parts of the Free World; and, particularly in the neutralist and less developed societies, to take advantage of pressures for economic and social change; (c) the extent to which the totalitarian Communist leadership is able to act ruthlessly and rapidly and to repudiate agreements without being subject to moral restraints."

c. The United States is in fact engaged in a life-or-death struggle with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Leaders of the Bloc recognize this by repeatedly stressing their objective of securing domination of the world and emphasizing that their ultimate task is the subjugation of the US. Sino-Soviet techniques for attaining their objective include subversion; the creation and exploitation of chaos; economic warfare; blackmail through threats to employ their military power; the outright use of their military power when risks to their own security are not great; the development, maintenance and improvement of their military strength and capabilities far in excess of any apparent requirements for internal security; a constant campaign to degrade the US position as leader of the Free World; and a constant campaign to reduce and eliminate US nuclear warfare capabilities which constitute the primary Free World obstacle to the Bloc use of major aggression to achieve world domination. Employment of the foregoing techniques has proven successful in many cases: Since World War II, the USSR base of the world Communist movement has been expanded to encompass Eastern Europe, mainland China, Tibet and parts of Korea and Indo-China; significant political and economic influence by the Bloc has been achieved in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America; there is a broad base of support for the Soviet campaign to stigmatize and inhibit possible US use of its nuclear weapons capabilities even for self-defense; many Free World spokesmen have joined the chorus in support of Soviet efforts to disarm all nations, especially the United States, and thus to eliminate the obstacle to Sino-Soviet ambitions which is posed by US military capabilities.

d. The US military posture is determined by the need to protect the security of the United States and to carry out our collective security responsibilities; it is not designed for aggression. However, the Soviet leaders probably realize that there is a serious risk of self-destruction if they attempt to destroy US military capabilities. They probably recognize also that they would risk the initiation of general nuclear war, and their own destruction, if they were to expand significantly the area under their domination. They would consider the risks to be very great if areas considered vital by the United States to its own security arrangements were involved. Thus, programs to attain their objective of world domination without incurring the risk of self-destruction are supported by their efforts to disarm the West through their campaign for "general and complete disarmament".

e. Basic to the security of the United States and to its collective security arrangements is a capability to deter a nuclear attack on the United States. This requires sufficient numbers of strategic nuclear weapons and means for their delivery which are sufficiently invulnerable to be able at least to absorb an initial nuclear attack and still retain the capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the attacker. The active defense of the North American continent against manned aircraft and missile attack requires the use of nuclear weapons. A similar defense requirement exists for US forces on the seas and overseas. Also, US forces overseas must possess at least sufficient stocks of nuclear weapons and means for their delivery to operate effectively if Sino-Soviet forces initiate nuclear attack or in case the use of nuclear weapons is authorized by the President for other reasons.

f. To meet US requirements for nuclear weapons, and those required in support of US collective security arrangements, it is anticipated that allocation of the bulk of planned US special nuclear materials production will be needed at least through the 1960's.

g. In accordance with national policy, the US military posture over a period of years has been based on progressive modernization of all military forces, with emphasis on nuclear capability, and on the assumption that nuclear weapons would be used "when required to meet the nation's war objectives" and when authorized by the President. If directed, the time between a decision to change the US military posture and the availability in operational units of the weapons systems required both qualitatively and quantitatively to support the new posture may in many cases be as long as eight to ten years. Such a change would necessarily have to consider many factors not the least of which would be substantial increases in US defense expenditures in making the change-over.

3. In light of the situation which confronts the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that US national policy be established as follows relative to nuclear arms control measures currently under consideration for possible negotiation independently of each other and independently of other disarmament measures:

a. Cessation of Nuclear Weapons Testing:/2/

/2/See Appendix A hereto. [Footnote in the source text. This 5-page appendix is not printed.]

(1) The United States should seek to conclude the Conference on Cessation of Nuclear Weapons Tests not later than 1 June 1961 with an agreement which will prohibit those tests which the agreed control system is capable of detecting and identifying.

(2) Following 1 June 1961, and pending an enforceable international agreement to cease the testing of nuclear weapons, the United States should resume the testing as soon as possible of nuclear weapons in environments in which the release of radioactive material to the atmosphere can be controlled, i.e., outer space, underground and underwater.

(3) The United States should agree to cease only those nuclear weapons tests for which an effective international detection and identification system is feasible. In this case, the United States should reserve the right to resume such tests in the event of violation of any part of the agreement, including that part which prescribes the installation and continued effective operation of the detection and identification system on a world-wide basis.

b. Cessation of Production of Fissionable Materials for Use in Weapons:/3/

/3/See Appendix B hereto. [Footnote in the source text. This 15-page appendix is not printed.]

(1) The United States should not implement an agreement to halt its production of fissionable materials for use in weapons until:

(a) Its requirements for nuclear weapons indicated in paragraph 2 e above have been met;

(b) All States within the Sino-Soviet bloc have implemented an agreement to limit numerically their armed forces personnel and armaments to levels which would not reduce, and preferably would improve, the relative military capabilities of the US and its Allies vis-à-vis the USSR, Red China and the remainder of the Sino-Soviet bloc;

(c) The implementation of these limitations on armed forces personnel and armaments by the Sino-Soviet bloc has been and continues to be verified and inspected to the satisfaction of the United States and its Allies throughout the Sino-Soviet bloc;

(d) A system by which the US and its Allies can verify and inspect compliance by the Sino-Soviet bloc with an agreement to halt the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons is installed and operating effectively throughout the Sino-Soviet bloc; and

(e) The Sino-Soviet bloc simultaneously ceases production of fissionable materials for use in weapons.

(2) The United States should not agree to halt the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons on a reciprocal plant-by-plant basis with the Sino-Soviet bloc unless the conditions listed in paragraphs 3 b (1) (a), (b), (c) and (d) above, have been met.

(3) The United States should not agree to halt the production of non-fissionable materials, such as tritium, which are essential to the effectiveness of US stocks of nuclear weapons, nor to halt the production of fissionable materials for non-weapons uses, including nuclear propulsion.

(4) The United States should not agree to halt the fabrication of nuclear weapons from stocks of nuclear materials available when a cessation of the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons becomes effective, nor to halt the refabrication and maintenance of its nuclear weapons.

c. Transfer of Fissionable Materials from Past Production to Non-Weapons Uses:/4/ The United States should not agree to transfer fissionable materials from past production to non-weapons uses unless:

/4/See Appendix C hereto. [Footnote in the source text. This 5-page appendix is not printed.]

(1) The quantity to be transferred by the United States is matched by the USSR, there is effective international control of the quantities transferred, and the quantity transferred by the United States does not reduce US stocks of nuclear weapons; or until

(2) The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons has been halted under the conditions specified in paragraph 3 b above and its subparagraphs, the quantities transferred by the United States are matched by the USSR, and there is effective international control of the quantities transferred.

d. Declaratory Prohibition of Nuclear Sharing:/5/

/5/See Appendix D hereto. [Footnote in the source text. This 3-page appendix is not printed.]

(1) The United States should continue to abstain from commitment to the provisions of UN Resolution 1576 (XV), 20 December 1960. This resolution calls upon nuclear powers to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons or information necessary for their manufacture to non-nuclear powers, and calls upon non-nuclear powers to refrain from manufacturing or attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. Although the United States abstained when this resolution (commonly called "the Irish Resolution") was voted upon, it was approved by the General Assembly.

(2) The resolution, if now subscribed to by the United States, would constitute a moral commitment which could impose limitations on the Free World in efforts by its members to provide for their individual and collective self-defense; moreover, because it is not enforceable, it would not bar nuclear sharing by the USSR with other Communist countries. Furthermore, the declaratory approach of the resolution would establish a precedent which could undermine the position of the United States and its Allies that arms control agreements must be accompanied by effective verification and inspection.

e. Application of IAEA Inspection Machinery to Restrictions of Fissionable Materials to Peaceful Uses:/6/

/6/See Appendix E hereto. [Footnote in the source text. This 5-page appendix is not printed.]

(1) Implementation of the arms control measures in paragraph 3 b and c could result in relatively large quantities of fissionable material becoming available for non-weapons purposes. The United States could agree that use be made of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to insure that fissionable material made available to the IAEA for peaceful uses is not diverted to military uses providing the following are met:

(a) The Statute of the IAEA is revised and strengthened to ensure against inspection veto by possible evaders.

(b) An effective inspection system is developed.

(c) The IAEA's inspection and safeguards staff is appropriately expanded and includes adequate US representation.

(d) All fissionable material becoming available for peaceful purposes as the result of arms control measures is placed under the IAEA's control.

(2) Inspection and verification systems for monitoring arms control measures, such as the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, should be separate and distinct from the IAEA. Experience gained by the IAEA with respect to inspection and safeguards, however, could be useful in the development of arms control verification and inspection systems.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to stress that they are concerned about and recommend strongly against any reduction of our nuclear warfare capabilities, unless the conditions specified in paragraph 3 above have been met. They consider that it would be premature in the foreseeable future to initiate any negotiations or undertake a commitment to adhere to any of the measures listed in paragraph 3 above, with the exception of an effectively safeguarded cessation of nuclear weapons tests, in isolation or related only to other nuclear measures.

5. In making the foregoing recommendations concerning nuclear arms control measures, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the requirement to balance nuclear and non-nuclear measures and reaffirm their previously stated views that:

a. "The US negotiations effort must ensure that in the post-arms control agreement era, the United States will be able to maintain at any stage an adequate response to the entire spectrum of the remaining Sino-Soviet bloc threat; namely, an evident, secure nuclear retaliatory capability and an evident, flexible capability for military operations short of general nuclear war.

b. "The United States must always be able to back up its Allies with forces to a degree which will make our willingness to fight with or without nuclear weapons, credible both to our Allies and our enemies."

6. There are other important issues in the arms control field which may require national policy decisions on which the military advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be furnished as the need arises. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the policies set forth in paragraph 3 above involve arms control issues of immediate importance to the security of the United States. Decisions on these policies will have major effects on the national strategy of the United States and on US military capabilities and long-range programs. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the foregoing views be transmitted to the Adviser to the President on Disarmament Affairs and that decisions at the national level be reached on these policies./7/

/7/In a memorandum to Bundy dated April 10, Komer described this paper "as an example of how the Chiefs still sign off on such disarmament comments as made the last general in the White House almost come to ignore their views." Komer believed that the paper failed to take into account the effect on the Soviet Union of U.S. actions regarding atomic weapons, and pointed out that the Soviets were currently in the process of reducing conventional forces to 2.5 million, "where we are," by 1962. "True, this still somehow gives them a lot more divisions than we have, but the disparity will no longer be so great as to be an absolute bar." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies, ACDA Disarmament General, April 1961)

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

10. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State /1/

New York, March 25, 1961, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-2561. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Moscow.

2626. Lunch with Gromyko. I had lunch with Gromyko alone on Friday, March 24, at his request. He asked for a meeting with the President, explaining that he had planned to return to the Soviet Union on Saturday, March 25, but would stay over a few days. He reminded me that he had suggested such a meeting during his talk with Secretary Rusk on March 18/2/ and had received no reply. I promised to arrange a meeting if possible and asked him when he wanted it. His response was as soon as possible./3/

/2/A memorandum of this conversation drafted by Alexander Akalovsky, Officer in Charge of General Disarmament Negotiations at ACDA, is ibid., 611.61/3-1861. It is printed in vol. V, Document 33. Nusup 1095 to Geneva, March 20, contains an extract of this conversation pertaining to disarmament. (Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/3-2061) See the Supplement.

/3/Kennedy met with Gromyko and other officials on March 27; see vol. V, Document 36.

I asked about his reaction to the President's TV program and proposals on Laos,/4/ and he replied that the Soviet Government wanted a neutral and independent Laos and that he was hopeful that a solution was possible.

/4/For text of the President's remarks on Laos at a news conference held March 23, see Department of State Bulletin, April 17, 1961, p. 543.

I submitted our last draft resolution on disarmament./5/ He said he wanted me to tell the President that they had taken our views very seriously and appreciated our difficulties and were studying the situation. But the resolution was unsatisfactory; they could not accept the proposal for an additional 3 neutrals (India, Mexico and one unnamed) to be added to the committee as chairman and vice chairmen respectively. They would have to insist that the neutrals be added with equal rights to participation in all respects. In view of the fact that we could make no other suggestions besides the Disarmament Commission itself, perhaps any further discussion of the paragraph on principles was unnecessary.

/5/Text not found. According to telegram 2615 from USUN, March 24, the text was similar to that transmitted in telegram 2588 from USUN, March 22, except that the United States was willing to accept the addition of three rather than two "neutral" powers to the former 10-nation Disarmament Committee. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-2461 and 600.0012/3-2261, respectively) Documentation on U.S. efforts to reach a compromise with the Soviet Union on its proposal made in September 1960, one of a series of "troika" initiatives, to expand the 10-nation Committee to 15 by adding 5 neutral nations is ibid., 600.0012 for February and March 1961.

After further discussion we agreed that in these circumstances the best thing to do would be to have no resolution, announce that we had agreed to resume negotiations by the end of July and meanwhile would have some bilateral talks in June and July on disarmament, including the composition of the forum, and recommend that all pending resolutions be deferred until the next GA. He agreed to my suggestion that perhaps any reference to bilateral talks on the subject of the composition of the forum might be omitted, and he preferred to make a statement before Committee I instead of issuing a joint communiqué. I asked him to draft what he had in mind saying. This draft was transmitted to the Department by telegram today./6/ He said that any statement I cared to make would be satisfactory with him. He thought a reference to deferring pending resolutions might be desirable to avoid possibility of committee consideration of any other items proposed by other countries.

/6/Telegram 2622 from USUN, March 25. (Ibid., 600.0012/3-2561)

In the course of our conversation he said he had a message from Mr. K. to deliver to the President orally. We discussed Soviet-US difficulties, and he complained that the Soviet Union had been misunderstood following the war and charged improperly with designs on the independence of Europe. On disarmament, he said in the USSR there has been a feeling that "some influential circles" in the US continued to be suspicious of the USSR. Until that dissipated, mutual trust was impossible. He wished that the US would believe in their sincere anxiety for general and complete disarmament under international control, and a disarmed world. He repeated that in Moscow they felt that influential circles in the US did not want disarmament, and implied that this suspicion about our sincerity was extensive.

As to Berlin, again he emphasized its importance and expressed the fear that there was some under-estimation of its importance in the US.

On the Congo, he said he regretted that we were so far apart. He said the Soviet Union wanted nothing--no investments, no land--and felt the Congo should be independent. The Soviet Union was indignant about Lumumba's murder. He said he had known Lumumba personally and he was a clever man.

Stevenson

11. Report of the Panel on the Cutoff of the Production of Fissionable Materials for Weapons /1/

Washington, April 1, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 23 Mar 61. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A table of contents is not printed. This Panel, appointed by the USDA, was known as the Perkins Panel after Chairman Dr. James Perkins. Other members were Manson Benedict, Marion Boyer, Spurgeon Keeny, General Herbert Loper, Donald Musser, George Quinn, Isidor Rabi, Louis Roddis, Herbert Scoville, Walter Singlevich, and William Webster.

INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSIONS

Before presenting our findings, we must emphasize that we were not asked and we make no recommendation as to the advisability of negotiating a cutoff agreement. Such a decision would, of course, require the consideration of matters not included in this study.

We present the following conclusions:

1. A cutoff would have a profound effect on both US and USSR plans for the use of nuclear weapons. Presently planned uses will quickly exceed the prospective stockpile existing as of the cutoff date studied (July 1, 1963).

2. A cutoff of future tritium production would have a particularly serious effect on the weapons stockpiles since, if unreplenished, fifty percent of the tritium in the stockpile would decay in twelve years time. This would result either in the progressive reduction of important weapon systems or in the redesign of the systems with degraded performance. A reduction in tritium would probably be more serious to the US than to the USSR in view of existing US and USSR weapon systems. For the purpose of this report, it has been assumed that a cutoff agreement would allow production of tritium to the extent necessary to maintain the tritium stockpile existing at the time of the cutoff. The proposed inspection system includes provisions for monitoring such production.

3. The larger US stockpile of weapons materials (possibly several times that of the USSR) suggests a US advantage in a stockpile freeze. However, it is impossible to draw any final conclusions as to the net effect of cutoff until the appropriate net military evaluations are completed. We note with deep concern that an appropriate study of the net military effect of such a proposal is not available, and urge that this deficiency be rectified as a matter of high priority.

4. Without attempting to judge the net military significance of a cutoff, it does appear that the US can maintain a very substantial second-strike retaliatory capability by allocating 25 to 50 percent of the 1963 stockpile to strategic systems. We do not know what levels of Soviet fatalities are required to deter the USSR from initiating an attack nor are we suggesting, by the use of certain examples, that a deterrent strategy based on population kill is a proper strategy for the United States. We note, however, that estimates, based on the assumption, among others, that the USSR will not develop an effective AICBM, indicate that these US systems will cause from 20 percent to 40 percent fatalities in the Soviet Union even after a large surprise Soviet attack with no warning. We note also that whereas cutoff of fissionable material production in 1963 would limit the ability of the USSR to expand its strategic forces, the population kill capability of the US systems is relatively insensitive to a Soviet missile expansion beyond the credited 1963 level. The cutoff would also limit the ability of the US and the USSR to undertake massive AICBM or ASW programs. The amounts of material that the USSR could divert by evasion of the proposed control system would have very little effect on the US-USSR strategic balance.

5. An inspection system to cover the USSR would cost about $10 million a year and would involve about 450 technical personnel, 350 of whom would have to be in the USSR. In addition to monitoring declared production facilities, this system would require a limited number of peremptory inspections. A high degree of access, not only to declared plants, but also to sites suspected of clandestine activity, is indispensable if the system is to be effective.

This recommended inspection system, when supported by a strong US intelligence effort, should provide a high level of confidence that Soviet evasion could not exceed about 2 percent per year of their 1963 stockpile, which is considered to constitute a relatively small military risk. Adding inspection system requirements for the US and UK would about triple the above cost and personnel figures.

6. Production by other countries, including the Chinese Peoples Republic, is estimated to be relatively small during the next decade and would not constitute a direct danger to either the US or the USSR if their remaining stockpiles are not reduced.

7. The economic consequences of a cutoff of fissionable materials production in itself, while significant, would not be so damaging as to be a serious negative factor in the overall determination of the advisability of a cutoff agreement.

[Here follows the body of the 19-page Report.]

12. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests /1/

Washington, April 4, 1961, 4:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/4-461. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Shepard Stone, Special Assistant to McCloy; cleared by McCloy, Fisher, and EUR/SOV; and approved by Spiers. Also sent to USUN and Moscow.

Nusup 1123. Upon invitation of Winiewicz, Head of the Polish UN Delegation and presumably at request of Gromyko, McCloy had two hour conversation night March 30 at Polish Mission New York with Soviet Foreign Minister. Others present were Zorin-USSR, Ambassador Lwandowski and Professor Lachs of Poland and Shepard Stone.

Prior to discussion more specific problems, McCloy described role as Adviser on Disarmament. McCloy stated he had not come to Washington to maneuver or to engage in tactical exercise but to help bring about agreement with Soviet Union on disarmament. President had made it crystal clear to McCloy that such was his objective. McCloy stated agreement with Soviet Union was imperative and it now remained to find items of common interest and to begin.

Gromyko asked many questions about economic aspects of disarmament. McCloy pointed out based on experience with U.S. industry and banking that though disarmament would mean readjustments and in a very few cases some dislocation, overwhelming emphasis U.S. industry and business was non-military and eager to expand non-military production. Economic problems were not a barrier to U.S. disarmament and Soviets should abandon myth that U.S. could not afford to disarm. Gromyko appeared to show interest in views outlined and said he accepted and gave credit to statement.

In answer to Gromyko question as to barriers in way of GCD, McCloy outlined his views on negative aspects of Soviet secrecy and need for inspection and controls so that both sides would gain mutual experience and overcome suspicions and fears. McCloy emphasized need for first steps which leading to growth of mutual trust would later accelerate to larger program. Throughout evening Gromyko emphasized what seemed to him American misunderstanding of Soviet proposals. He insisted Soviets agree on necessity inspection and controls and that at end of each stage of disarmament Soviet proposals contemplated a review of situation before going on to next stage. GCD objective necessary because partial steps taken independently without overall program would create disequilibrium. He implied that partial steps proposed by U.S. were aimed at weakening Soviet Union. McCloy argued against practicability of Soviet proposal and re-emphasized need to take first steps and build on them. Gromyko asked what first steps were contemplated. Without trying outline appropriate sequence, McCloy mentioned: (a) necessity to reach test ban agreement in Geneva, (b) cut-off of production fissionable materials to be followed later by decreases in stockpiles, (c) ban on bombs in orbit, (d) common efforts to work out measures to prevent accidental warfare and surprise attack, (e) common efforts in peaceful uses atomic energy. Gromyko asked for repetition this list two or three times and seemed to be interested. He was told we would welcome Soviet proposal as to first step but important matter was to get started.

Gromyko said Soviet at Geneva was waiting to hear full U.S. proposals and hoped there would be new things to come out of our "bag." Soviet would make serious study proposals but was not impressed so far. Soviet Foreign Minister did not consider, for example 19 inspection stations in U.S.S.R. as against 21 as an important gesture but he did not labor the point. Gromyko insisted that three man administration was sticking point for Soviets admitting that Soviets wanted veto. He said he hoped we would not believe Soviet proposal was based on Soviet expectation that they would always get majority in control commission and he said that Soviets would be "reasonable" in the operation of the veto. McCloy emphasized that Soviet three-man suggestion had had serious negative effect in Washington and he hoped Soviets would reconsider. Gromyko admitted relationship of all this to the attack on UN.

Gromyko asked McCloy's views on where June-July talks should take place. McCloy emphasized this a matter for discussion with Stevenson and Rusk, not McCloy and that any views he expressed were personal and without official significance. McCloy said he personally not in favor of Swiss resort town or similar place because other nations would become suspicious of a separate conference and, therefore, McCloy preferred Washington and Moscow. Gromyko said his views paralleled those expressed and he mentioned Washington in June and Moscow in July.

On French testing, Gromyko stated without emphasizing point that U.S. could be using France, its NATO ally, to do its testing. McCloy emphasized U.S. had not given weapons or information to France and had no intention of doing so. Essential for US-USSR to sign Geneva agreement and at that time world opinion would make it difficult for France and we hoped China not to accede to agreement. Gromyko's only mention of China was to state that China like Russia favored GCD and wanted to bury all arms in a hole in ground.

The conversation was frank and friendly ranging from World War II memories of common effort to need for stopping and turning back arms race.

At his request Winiewicz met Shepard Stone at Century, New York on April 3 as follow-up Gromyko-McCloy conversation held at Polish Mission, New York March 30.

According Winiewicz, Gromyko, after McCloy and Stone departed, had stated conversation useful, productive and promising. Gromyko had gained impression of sincerity, frankness, and was returning to Moscow with belief U.S. launching serious disarmament effort. On other hand, Zorin, who had been present at conversation, had stated that first steps mentioned by McCloy were not new. Gromyko replied that steps were not new but that did not make them less important.

Apropos Geneva Test Ban talks, Winiewicz said that Gromyko had not been fully briefed on details and therefore had been somewhat reluctant to carry on discussions about Geneva. Winiewicz stated that he had impression from Gromyko, Geneva Test Ban negotiations would be "locked" with no real progress until after talks on comprehensive disarmament had started and showed some signs of advance.

Stone pointed out that failure of Russia to come to agreement at Geneva talks would have serious negative effect in U.S. in respect later comprehensive talks. Winiewicz said he thought U.S. had not made this point adequately clear to USSR and suggested that Ambassador Thompson ought to do so in Moscow.

Winiewicz put in a plea for previous Polish proposals, freezing of present arms situation in Central Europe and also for Rapacki Plan. He said that this would not mean Germany would have to withdraw from NATO, but that Germany and East European countries would not possess atom weapons.

In conclusion Winiewicz said major divisive point between US-USSR was position of Secretary General UN. As for Laos, he said "that is not a problem or conflict between U.S. and USSR, but it is a Moscow-Peking problem."

Dean Rusk

13. National Intelligence Estimate /1/

NIE 4-2-61

Washington, April 6, 1961.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Estimates 4, Arms and Disarmament. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part: "Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Agency." The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on April 6. The Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

ATTITUDES OF KEY WORLD POWERS ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES

The Problem

Scope

This estimate does not aim to present the detailed negotiating positions of the various powers on all disarmament issues, or to examine the merits of different technical proposals, but rather to inquire into the underlying motivations and factors affecting the general attitudes of these states.

Conclusions

2. Communist ideology sanctions the use of any means which is deemed expedient to advance its cause. Military power in various forms, including the delivery of arms, is one of these means, and the Communist leaders are using it to extend their control and influence. At the same time, Marxism-Leninism, while favoring and supporting "wars of liberation," teaches that the fundamental political, economic, and social forces at work in the world can bring about the eventual world-wide triumph of communism. And Communist doctrine enjoins the USSR to instigate and support subversive and revolutionary activities to accelerate final victory. One theoretically possible way to give revolutionary forces freer play would be by reducing or eliminating Western military force through agreements on disarmament. Marxism-Leninism therefore permits the Soviet leaders to consider that if the armed forces of their opponents were reduced or eliminated, the results might be worth limitations of their own military power, always provided the military power balance was not shifted to their disadvantage. (Para. 14)

3. The Soviets are also concerned by the consequences to them of general nuclear war. We believe that they continue to think that a complete ban on the use of nuclear weapons would be to their advantage. They also see advantages in some kinds of disarmament measures directed against the various ways in which nuclear war might break out. They are probably also attracted to disarmament measures as a possible means of achieving a military advantage by encouraging the West to cut its defense efforts even further than the terms of agreement, and of promoting a climate of relaxation favorable to Communist exploitation. (Paras. 16-19)

4. On the other hand, the Soviets perceive dangers and disadvantages in the prospect of substantial disarmament. They are deeply conscious of the impact which the image and the substance of their military strength have made upon the world, of the security which that strength has given them as compared with their exposed position in the past, and of the respect which it has compelled from other nations. Furthermore, the USSR would be reluctant to undertake measures which might endanger its control over Eastern Europe or alter the relationship of power, and hence of political weight, between itself and Communist China. (Paras. 21, 25)

5. From the Soviet point of view, the greatest difficulty in reaching disarmament agreements favorable to their ultimate world objectives is presented by Western requirements for inspection. A primary reason for the strong Soviet aversion to inspection is military: having developed secrecy into a major military asset, the Soviets are reluctant to impair and unwilling to relinquish secrecy until assured that the enemy has given up the forces which might use in an attack the knowledge acquired through inspection. Another is political: while the regime's anxieties concerning contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners are diminishing, the implications of an international inspectorate--cooperation with the enemy and recognition of a higher sovereignty in the control organization--remain inimical to the political outlook fostered by the Communist Party. Finally, the Soviets obviously oppose effective inspection because it would foreclose the option of evading the agreement. (Paras. 22-24)

6. Apart from these considerations, the Soviets have a most lively sense of the political uses of talking about disarmament. Realizing that the intricacies of the subject are little understood, they have hit upon their proposal for general and complete disarmament as a way to capture the universal yearning for peace and, at the same time, to label the West as "against" disarmament. It is not a proposal which they expect to have to make good on, but it is a highly potent instrument of political warfare. (Para. 31)

7. The Soviet leaders may conclude, however, that some more modest proposals offer sufficient advantages, in terms both of their particular effects and the impetus they would provide to general agitation of the disarmament theme, to justify entering upon serious discussions of limited measures. They expect their advocacy of general and complete disarmament to create a strong position for them in any such negotiations. To date, however, the disadvantages of limited measures, including the inspection they would entail, appear to have predominated in Soviet thinking. (Paras. 32-44)

8. The Chinese Communists approach the disarmament question in a different spirit. They are less concerned than the USSR with the dangers of war, and they regard the tactic of negotiation with the enemy as offering dubious prospects and tending to sap revolutionary fervor. Peiping's primary interest in disarmament, therefore, lies in the political gains--diplomatic recognition, the return of Taiwan, admission to the UN--which it hopes to extract when its participation in disarmament negotiations is sought. (Paras. 45-46, 48)

9. The Chinese leaders are determined to acquire a nuclear capability and appear to suspect (probably rightly) that Soviet disarmament policy is designed in part to delay or prevent this. They are anxious to forestall any agreements which might have this effect, such as the combination of a nuclear test ban and an agreement not to transfer nuclear weapons and technology to other countries. We believe that, as China's weight within the Bloc grows, certain arms control measures are becoming more attractive to the USSR, while at the same time Chinese pressures are impinging upon Soviet freedom of action. (Paras. 26, 47, 49)

10. The strongest support for disarmament comes from Canada, which is especially concerned with being caught up in a nuclear war and has attempted to create a role for itself as a leader of the "middle powers," urging the major contestants into serious negotiations. Another strong supporter of disarmament is the UK, which sees in arms control measures a chance to close the nuclear club and to initiate movement toward an East-West détente. In spite of a strong and genuine interest in disarmament both at the official and popular level, the government does not wish to jeopardize its relationship with the US by separating itself too far from US policies on disarmament. France, on the other hand, is determined not to be prevented from acquiring a national nuclear capability. French attitudes on disarmament will continue to be based on considerations of national prestige and the satisfaction of de Gaulle's desire for international status, even though his determination to acquire nuclear forces is not widely shared by other French political leaders or even by many military leaders. The West German attitude toward disarmament is marked by an intense preoccupation with the implications of any general disarmament agreement for the special security problems of the Federal Republic. As West Germany's national power increases, we believe that it will seek a more direct voice in disarmament matters. Both France and West Germany oppose regional schemes confined to Central Europe, fearing that these would discriminate against them and jeopardize collective security with the West. (Paras. 50-63)

[Here follows the 11-page "Discussion" section of the estimate.]

14. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara /1/

JCSM-221-61

Washington, April 8, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61. Top Secret; Restricted Data.

SUBJECT
Further Considerations Bearing on a Voluntary US Moratorium on All Underground Testing of Nuclear Weapons (U)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted a cable from the Acting Secretary of State to the US Delegation to the Conference on a Nuclear Test Treaty in Geneva (State to Geneva--Nusup 1110, 29 March 1961)./2/ This cable indicated that the United States is prepared to continue the voluntary moratorium on all underground nuclear testing, including tests of small yields, for three years from the date of signing of a treaty on control of nuclear testing, if the United Kingdom and the USSR will do likewise. The Joint Chiefs of Staff remain of the belief that the continuation of a voluntary moratorium on tests which cannot be detected by any inspection system would be unwise at this time and could be seriously inimical to the continued security of the United States.

/2/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/3-2961)

2. There are several considerations bearing on this problem which the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe should be reviewed by the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense before irrevocable steps are taken in negotiations to commit the United States to the voluntary moratorium. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consequence, recommend that you request the President to hear a briefing in the near future at which scientific and military experts in the various fields mentioned below can set forth certain factual and potential factors affecting the problem. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would suggest such a briefing be attended, in addition to the President and such members of his staff as he desires, by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the AEC, the Director of the CIA, the Advisor to the President for Science and Technology, and the Honorable John J. McCloy./3/

/3/Gilpatric forwarded this suggestion to Bundy in a letter dated April 20. In a reply to Gilpatric of April 25, Bundy stated that the President had been briefed previously on both fusion weapons and the neutron flux problem. (Ibid.)

3. The several fields which the Joint Chiefs of Staff would recommend be covered in the proposed briefing of the President are as follows:

a. The possible development of pure fusion weapons--[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] or so-called "neutron bomb."

b. The lack of practical and authoritative data regarding the phenomenon of neutron-flux and x-rays outside the atmosphere.

4. It is only by considering the above subjects in their interrelationships that the possible serious impact on our national security of the continuation of an unpoliced moratorium on testing can be properly evaluated. In brief, these interrelationships, as seen by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are as follows:

a. The principle upon which a "neutron bomb" may be developed has been known to the Soviet Union, by their own admission, since 1952. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Inherent in the neutron bomb concept--a pure fusion weapon emitting very high intensities of neutrons--is that the only scarce nuclear component required is tritium [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

b. The major characteristic of the neutron bomb is the extent and range of its lethal instant radiation effect and relatively small other effects as compared to the much larger blast, thermal and residual radiation effects of the fission weapons. This characteristic may make the neutron bomb highly efficient as an anti-personnel weapon without the other destructive characteristics, including radioactive contamination, which are associated with fission weapons. Thus, the new weapon might be classed somewhere between conventional and current nuclear weapons. Possibly more important, however, could be the potentially greatly higher efficiency of the pure fusion weapon in generating at very long distances a neutron-flux in adjacent nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, particularly in space or the higher atmosphere.

c. The Nike-Zeus, and presumably the anti-ICBM weapons which intelligence sources indicate are being developed by the USSR, depend among other effects on neutron-flux to "kill," i.e., render impotent, the warhead of the incoming ballistic missile against which the anti-missile is directed. If the Soviets have developed, or could develop by surreptitious and undetectable testing, an efficient pure fusion weapon which could "kill" enemy missile warheads at a considerable range, there could result a very high degradation to the credible nuclear deterrent posture of the United States. If the Soviets achieve this capability while the United States remains without it because of inability to test the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] devices, the result could be catastrophic.

d. Allied with the problem just alluded to is the fact that the United States has very little practical data on the intensities of instant radiation produced by fission or fusion explosions in rarefied atmosphere or space. The Orange and Teak shots in the US nuclear testing program just prior to the current moratorium on nuclear testing provided inadequate data for a full evaluation of this effect at very high altitudes. Additional technical information concerning intensities of radiation at very high altitudes might show that x-rays have a much greater lethal radius for "killing" missile warheads than neutrons. If this were to be the case, we would want to take measures to protect our own warheads and, at the same time, exploit this effect in our own anti-ICBM capability.

5. In sum, the United States plans to deter deliberate initiation of thermonuclear war by the USSR, over the next decade, by the maintenance of an adequately invulnerable nuclear retaliatory capability. If the USSR were able to develop and make practical tests of the effects of the pure fusion weapon, and if the USSR as a result or by other means could develop a highly effective and relatively cheap AICBM, the USSR could conceivably plan a nuclear attack upon the United States without fear of receiving retaliatory destruction to a degree which would be unacceptable to the Soviet leaders. Because the Soviet stockpile may well contain today [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] and because of US lack of tested experience in the several fields mentioned above, the continuation of a voluntary moratorium on testing the potential development of a US pure fusion weapon could seriously prejudice the national security.

6. In consequence of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. The briefing referred to in paragraph 2 above be given the President and his senior officials at the earliest feasible date. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would be prepared to coordinate the preparation of this briefing if it is desired.

b. The United States not commit itself to a voluntary moratorium of underground testing below the level of test explosions which produce a seismic signal of less than 4.75.

c. Further research and development on the pure fusion weapon, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] or otherwise, be given urgent attention by the AEC.

d. The need for further testing on the pure fusion weapon and the phenomenon of radiation-flux in space be considered of such national importance that no further concessions be made towards extreme Soviet positions in future negotiations on a nuclear test treaty.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer/4/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.

15. Telegram From the Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests to the Department of State /1/

Geneva, April 21, 1961, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/4-2161. Confidential.

Supnu 1549. From Dean for McCloy. We are trying to bring out what basically lies behind the tactics Sov Delegation has adopted since our resumption March 21. Sovs have not only stood still on positions they have been maintaining since the summit meeting last spring, but have appeared to go to great pains to cross the T's and dot the I's of their stand-still position in great detail and to make it clear that they are not budging in even the most minute particular from previous positions.

At the same time, Sov Delegation appears completely relaxed, is in no hurry to get anything done, and provides no indication that any Sov initiative is forthcoming in the near future to break up the conference. Indeed, they go to some length to demonstrate ostensible concern that the West might take some such action which they apparently don't want to see happen.

We have tended to assume that the Sov Delegation's instructions were to make no significant move away from the general framework of their present position but to keep the conference going inconclusively for an indefinite period and in effect they have made all of their concessions and the next move is up to us. One might think that if these were their instructions, they might, in order to keep things going, make some very minor moves on their positions, pointing to these as great concessions and use them as a basis to refute the association which, as of now, is so clearly justified, that they have made no move at all.

We are wondering if the Department has any ideas as to what explanation might be given for the Sov tactics. Several possibilities have occurred to us:

(A) The Sovs may merely be waiting us out in the expectation that the West has not yet laid all its cards on the table in the field of concessions and hope to move us to further concessions by standing pat. This possibility seems somewhat unlikely since the Sovs must realize it would be improbable that we would move further without any motion on their part.

(B) The Sovs may be in a general stall in the expectation of carrying negotiations on until general disarmament discussions begin with the idea of merging these talks into those discussions this summer. They may not feel under any compulsion to move beyond their present positions at this time to achieve this purpose.

(C) The Sovs may be hoarding any minor moves which they are prepared to make until there are much stronger indications that the West is getting impatient and considering a break-off of negotiations or a resumption of testing. In that case they might be expected to make such minor moves at the eleventh hour in order to frustrate any indicated move of the West towards a break-off or resumption of testing.

(D) They may be waiting until the French test gives them a pretext for a walk-out or until they can see what the French really accomplish.

(E) The Sov absolute stand on their present position may be designed to provoke us into taking the initiative to break-off the negotiations or to resume testing, thus giving them a good pretext for ending the negotiations and to put the blame on us. As we have said above, the ostensible attitude is that they do not want the negotiations broken off but this, of course, does not remove the possibility that they do want them ended so long as the onus is placed on us.

(F) The Sov Delegation may have been instructed just to sit tight while Moscow took a look, not so much as to what the West has to offer in this particular negotiation as to the general political situation between the US and USSR and Moscow's basic decision on the conference here may not yet have been made.

We would appreciate any views the Department may have on what Sovs are up to./2/

/2/In Nusup 1192 to Geneva, April 26, drafted in EUR/SOV and D/P, the Department replied that evidence did not "warrant firm conclusion" that the Soviets were no longer interested in a test ban agreement, but that perhaps for them the degree of inspection demanded by the West was only acceptable in the context of an agreement on general disarmament. (Ibid.)

16. Airgram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon