Documents 1-50
Arms Control and Disarmament
1. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
NIE 4-61
Washington, January 17, 1961.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part: "Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission." The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on January 17. The Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
PROBABLE SHORT-TERM REACTIONS TO U.S. RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR TESTS
The Problem
To estimate the major probable short-term reactions to US resumption of a program of nuclear explosions for purposes of weapons development, or improvement of detection techniques, or peaceful applications./2/
/2/We have not attempted to estimate in this paper the long-term impact of these reactions on US foreign relations, or the exact value to the USSR's military establishment of resumed Soviet testing in response to the US program. A judgment on the military or scientific value to the US of such a program is beyond the purview of an Intelligence Estimate. [Footnote in the source text.]
Assumptions
We assume in this estimate that the US unilaterally resumes nuclear tests, but not until some time after the reconvening of the Geneva negotiations on a nuclear test ban./3/ We further assume that the US announces that its explosions will be limited to underground or extra-atmospheric detonations and states their purpose to be weapons development, or improvement of detection techniques, or peaceful applications./4/
/3/The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, note that the results of these future Geneva negotiations, the conditions under which the US would make such a decision, and the effect of possible actions which the US could take prior to such resumption of nuclear explosions, cannot now be fully assessed. They consider, for example, that the consequences of a period of intensive probing at the negotiations by the US in an attempt to reach reasonable agreement, and of explanation at the highest level as to the reasons for the contemplated US action, would have an important effect on any reactions and therefore on this estimate. However, appropriate assumptions with respect to these factors cannot now be developed. [Footnote in the source text. The Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, comprising delegations from the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, reconvened on March 21.]
/4/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the present Assumption is so stated that it presents to its users an incomplete perspective within which to judge the effects of the probable reactions to resumption of US nuclear testing. He believes that a number of other considerations such as the following are necessary prerequisites to a US resumption of testing:
(a) That the US resumes nuclear tests only after further negotiations at Geneva have demonstrated the failure of US efforts to obtain an adequate inspection system to safeguard Western security;
(b) That such resumption of tests is accompanied by a comprehensive information program to acquaint other governments and peoples with US requirements for these tests;
(c) That the information program also includes a full explanation that such US underground or space detonations would not create fallout hazards;
(d) That the US program of testing for peaceful application and improvement of detection techniques is fully publicized and that an announced standing offer is made to cease testing upon Soviet acceptance of an effective inspection system. [Footnote in the source text.]
The Estimate/5/
/5/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, and the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, nonconcur in the entire estimate. The reasons for their nonconcurrences are set forth on page 5. [Footnote in the source text.]
Introduction
1. World opinion tends to recoil from nuclear weapons, submerging logical consideration of the subject in an emotional reaction of dismay. This attitude, cultivated although not created by Communist propaganda, regarded the test explosions conducted by the US, the UK, and the USSR up to the fall of 1958 as an important part of the East-West arms race which in turn was likely to culminate in a general nuclear holocaust. Lively fears of health hazards resulting from fallout associated with these tests aggravated this reaction. Thus the unilateral undertakings of the three powers in the fall of 1958 to suspend testing were greeted with universal relief. Similarly, the Geneva negotiations aimed at making this suspension permanent have been viewed as inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries and as a hopeful portent of disarmament, relaxation of tensions, and peace./6/
/6/The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, agree that these reactions have been generated as a result of past detonations. They point out, however, that past detonations have been solely for weapons development purposes, many have been of very large yield, and most have been conducted above ground. They therefore, do not believe that future detonations, under different conditions, will necessarily produce such reactions. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. Between the present time and the date of any US announcement of resumption of a program of nuclear explosions, several factors might act to alter these attitudes. The stage reached in the Geneva negotiations, and the opinions formed concerning the merits of each side's position, is one such factor. Another is any program which the US might develop to inform world opinion about the various purposes and characteristics of different kinds of test programs. A third is the general world picture of Soviet behavior in international affairs during this period.
Reactions in the Non-Communist World /7/
/7/The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, consider the evaluations of reactions presented in this section to be primarily directed toward reactions to resumption of weapons development tests only, and to underestimate the results which would be achieved by a vigorous and intensive program of public information initiated by the President. They consider that this would be particularly true if the US action is the undertaking of detonations for detection improvement and that public reaction would be considerably influenced by world scientific opinion which will understand the basic reasons for such action. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Given present attitudes, a new US program of nuclear explosions would be regarded by most peoples and many governments as likely to lead the USSR to resume testing; they would fear that the East-West arms race had begun to accelerate and was once more heading towards war. No matter how conducted, renewed US testing would also stimulate fears concerning health dangers from fallout. The US would be severely criticized in many quarters; there would be a tendency on the part of some to regard US policy as insufficiently dedicated to peace. A resolution calling for cessation of nuclear explosions would win widespread support in the UN, and its adoption would be almost certain if the tests were announced as being for weapons development.
4. Adverse reactions could be mitigated in several ways. Insofar as international opinion could be persuaded that the US had earnestly sought agreement in the Geneva talks but had been rebuffed by Soviet unreasonableness, renewed testing would be met with greater understanding. Also, to the extent that the program could be convincingly presented as designed to improve the prospects for test detection and, ultimately, an agreed ban, or to serve other nonmilitary purposes, it would draw less criticism. A very short test series, for example, with Soviet and other observers invited, would dilute some of the negative reaction.
5. It must be recognized, however, that because of the complex technical issues involved, a clear-cut and credible justification on these or other grounds would be very difficult to convey to world opinion. Such attempts at justification would have a greater influence on opinion already aligned with the US than on neutralists, less educated populations, and newer states. In general, however, these explanations would not go far toward neutralizing the critical popular reaction, which would spring in large part from emotional attitudes not readily accessible to rational argumentation. In the minds of many, for example, fallout is so closely associated with any kind of nuclear explosion that large segments of opinion would be impervious to the fact that underground detonations carry no dangers of this sort./8/
/8/The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, agree that the factors mentioned in this paragraph must be regarded as serious problems to be faced, but note that world opinion on the need for a seismic detection improvement program and on the fact that underground testing does not involve fallout hazards depends heavily on the manner in which the US initiates any program of nuclear explosions. They therefore consider that the general evaluation contained in this paragraph could be mitigated, as mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 4, by certain courses of action open to the US. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. Reactions would vary among different countries and areas, as well as in accordance with what were believed to be the purposes of the US program. Some NATO governments would approve, particularly those which would welcome an improved American nuclear capability. France would also be glad to have criticism deflected from its own nuclear weapons program. Most West European governments would probably take a public position which, while deploring further explosions, sought to quiet adverse reaction by sympathetically noting the considerations which had prompted the US to take this step. In taking this stand, some of these governments would find it hard to allay the anxieties of their public. The task of justification would be especially difficult in Great Britain, where the issue would be seized upon by the popular press and large segments of the Labor Party. The Canadian Government would oppose any tests which it believed had military purposes.
7. In Japan, opposition would probably be so intense as to produce anti-American demonstrations and a formal protest by the government as well. Some other Asian nations, particularly India and Indonesia, would be highly critical. However, Asian governments closely aligned with the US would be inclined to accept the US action and might be induced to approve it publicly./9/ Renewed testing would be very unfavorably received in Africa and the Arab states, and it would be particularly exploited by governments already critical in varying degrees toward the US. The Latin American governments would not regard the issue as of primary importance to themselves; their positions would vary in accordance with what they judged to be expedient in terms of other interests; most could probably be induced to support the US position.
/9/The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that this sentence should read:
"Government leaders in Asian countries closely aligned with the US would be more inclined to accept the validity of US motivations but, with one or two possible exceptions, they would find it difficult to rally public support." [Footnote in the source text.]
8. US resumption of nuclear testing, particularly for weapons purposes, would tend to weaken one of the inhibitions upon other Free World countries considering independent development of a nuclear weapons capability. This inhibition would not be completely removed, however, and other military, political, and economic considerations affecting this decision would continue to exist. Thus, while renewed US tests would tend to revive this question in Sweden and elsewhere, they are not likely, in and of themselves, to be decisive factors. However, if these countries were confronted by a situation in which both the US and the USSR had launched extensive test series, the chances that they would embark on independent nuclear weapons programs would rise.
Sino-Soviet Bloc Reactions
9. No matter what purposes the US announced or what safeguards it offered in embarking on a unilateral program, Bloc spokesmen would charge, as part of a major propaganda campaign, that the explosions were in fact for military purposes. Almost certainly the USSR would reject any invitation to observe the explosions and would withdraw its negotiators from Geneva. It would almost certainly call for a special session of the General Assembly to condemn the US, demand abandonment of the planned tests, and insist on speedy conclusion of an agreed ban.
10. The USSR would reaffirm its public position that US nuclear explosions of any type freed the USSR to resume testing. However, Moscow probably would refrain from overt testing for an initial period, lest it compromise its diplomatic and propaganda efforts to indict the US. We estimate that the USSR has technical incentives to conduct nuclear tests, chiefly in order to increase the yield-to-mass ratio of its weapons, to make them more efficient in the use of fissionable material, to develop improved low-yield weapons for tactical and air defense purposes, and to obtain very-high-altitude effects data for antimissile applications. These incentives probably would continue to exist whether or not the USSR had conducted clandestine tests since 1958. The Soviets might consider that they could improve their relative military position if both sides resumed overt testing, and in any event the incentives would grow stronger as the US conducted additional tests. Thus we believe that, if the US resumed, the USSR would in time follow suit.
11. Soviet representatives have on several occasions expressed the view that the USSR would be quick to undertake testing in the atmosphere if the US should resume testing of any sort. We believe that the Soviets would delay a decision on atmospheric testing pending an assessment of reactions to US testing, the success of their anti-American charges, and other developing factors. It is possible that, on the basis of this assessment, they would limit themselves to tests underground or in space in order to avoid the charge of contaminating the atmosphere. Indeed, they might even conduct tests underground or in space without public acknowledgment, calculating that this would enable them to maximize their political gains and that, in the event of exposure, the excuse of prior US testing would neutralize most of the opprobrium.
12. We believe that Communist China has for some time been pressing the USSR for considerably greater assistance in the attainment of a nuclear capability than the USSR has been willing to grant. In justifying its position, the USSR may have been arguing the net advantages to the Bloc of an agreed test ban. If so, resumed US testing would undermine this argument. In any event, the Chinese Communists would probably exploit such a US resumption and any subsequent Soviet testing to renew and step up their pressures for aid, and it would be more difficult for the USSR to maintain its position. Since the Soviet leaders have other strong reasons for resisting Chinese demands, we believe that renewed US tests probably would not substantially alter the Soviet attitude.
13. The Soviet leaders, and particularly Khrushchev, are eager to assess the attitudes and policies of the incoming US Administration on such matters as defense, disarmament, and East-West negotiations. They will look upon the US attitude toward testing as one of the major indicators in such an assessment./10/ Their general conclusions concerning the new Administration, however, will be based not only upon this matter, but upon the stance which the US adopts on general disarmament issues and the entire range of foreign policy issues.
/10/The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the following sentence should be inserted at this point:
"If the Soviet leaders concluded from US unilateral testing that the US was abandoning its interest in a negotiated ban, they would be inclined to infer that, with respect to other East-West issues, negotiations had become a less promising course of action." [Footnote in the source text.]
STATEMENTS OF NONCONCURRENCE
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur with the estimate as written even with the assumptions as stated in the text. He believes the estimate overplays the negative reactions to the US resumption of nuclear testing and fails to reflect the following:
That the US resumption of nuclear weapons testing is inseparably related to the conditions under which testing is to be resumed.
That the unfavorable reaction by most people and many governments at the outset of nuclear testing would lessen with time following a comprehensive diplomatic and information program.
That most pro-US governments would approve or at least remain aligned with the US should we resume testing.
That the Soviets are likely to conclude from US unilateral testing that the US could no longer be ensnared in inconclusive negotiations and Soviet stalling techniques.
The Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, nonconcurs in this entire estimate. He considers the estimate to be erroneous in the following major aspects:
a. It imputes an exaggerated importance to a nebulously defined "world opinion" as a factor in reaching a major US policy decision vis-?-vis nuclear testing.
b. It credits too little effectiveness to possible US programs to acquaint "world opinion" with non-fallout facts associated with the types of nuclear testing assumed.
c. It denigrates the capability of pro-Western governments to recognize the nuclear testing facts as well as their courage and ability to guide public opinion in their nations.
d. It fails to examine the full scale of pressures on the USSR which would come about if the US resumed testing. While one result might be renewed USSR testing--as this estimate states--another possibility would be that the Soviets would feel compelled to accept the US position on controls for verification of test suspensions. A good case can be made for this as an outcome--but it is completely neglected in this document.
The Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, considers that the suggestions summed up in a through c above are unsupported by the evidence available; that they mistakenly credit the USSR with invulnerability, in the world political arena, to the very factors to which the US is exaggeratedly viewed as hyper-vulnerable; and that omission of point d is a major gap in the appraisal. He concludes that the estimate should be rejected for policy use because it is one-sided, misleading, and in large measure irrelevant.
2. Letter From President Kennedy to His Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy)/1/
Washington, January 27, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.0012/1?2761. No classification marking.
Dear Mr. McCloy: In accordance with our previous discussions, I am hereby designating you as my adviser on the problems of disarmament and arms control, including the nuclear test bans. I will expect you to make recommendations regarding the formulation of U.S. policy in these areas, and the organization of the United States Disarmament Administration and related activities. In carrying out your work, the staff of the United States Disarmament Administration will be available to you, as well as such other personnel from other agencies as may be needed./2/
/2/McCloy worked closely with the USDA staff but had offices in the White House and the Department of State.
The task which you are undertaking I consider to be of the highest priority. It is firmly linked to our foreign policies, to our national security and to our desire for peace. As such, it will have the constant attention and full support of my Administration. I am asking all departments of the government to cooperate fully with you and to advise you of their views.
I will expect you to work in particularly close association with the Secretary of State, who will be responsible for the conduct of negotiations with foreign countries and for whom you shall also serve as adviser, and with the Secretary of Defense. I want the most diligent possible effort made on this somber problem in the period ahead.
With every good wish,
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy
3. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy /1/
Washington, February 9, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, February-April 1961. Top Secret.
Seaborg, Wiesner, and I have asked for a short meeting on Friday./2/
/2/February 10.
The problem is this: in the last year of the Eisenhower Administration, AEC conducted a series of ingenious and illuminating experiments involving explosions of a few hundred pounds of chemicals, with very small--but rapid--nuclear reactions as one element of them. These nuclear reactions were miniature versions of a real atomic explosion, but with a force not to exceed ten pounds of chemical explosives--and in fact the actual levels involved have been of less than one-pound force. Still, because it was felt that these experiments might be denounced by the Soviets--or others--as clandestine "atomic tests," their existence was kept very secret. And to give you a free hand in the matter, they were suspended on January 18th.
Seaborg and Wiesner think they should be renewed. Rusk and McCloy concur, and so do I. These experiments may lead to real improvements in nuclear weapons--in particular they may help to improve the range or power of such a weapon as Polaris by showing the safe way to a more efficient warhead. It has always been the U.S. position that weapons development must continue actively even while atomic tests were suspended, and we do not believe that these small explosions, overwhelmingly chemical in character, can properly be called atomic tests in the common meaning of the phrase--there is no mushroom cloud here, by a long sight.
There does exist the possibility that news of this activity will leak out, and we believe it will be important, in this event, to explain the matter promptly, accurately, and with no sense of guilt. The attached statement/3/ aims to produce this result, and we think it should be held for use by Seaborg as needed.
/3/Not printed.
At the same time, we think the very hush-hush atmosphere around these experiments should gradually be lifted; it is not sound to act as if this were a guilty secret when our conviction is that it is an innocent one. We also believe it should become a part of our Geneva position to urge that "atomic explosions" be clearly defined as involving a lot more power than such experiments as these. This matter is under discussion with McCloy.
The only real alternative is to stop these experiments for many months, because if we do not start them before Geneva, it will probably be politically unwise to make a new decision to approve them while Geneva talks are going on. But if we put them off--till fall--we not only slow up possible improvements in needed weapons, we also discourage the talented group of research men at Livermore, perhaps to the point of breakup, and we increase the chance that some disgruntled weaponeer will leak the story in a damaging way.
We do not pretend that our recommendation is without risk. These experiments will be attacked by some ardent disarmers in our own country if they become known, and the Soviet Union will be able to join in if it chooses. But on balance we think the course we suggest is right--the alternative looks worse./4/
/4/According to a journal kept by Seaborg, he, Bundy, and Wiesner discussed the matter with the President at a meeting in the White House on February 10, and "obtained the President's approval for continuation of the experiments that we were interested in." (Glenn T. Seaborg, Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1961-1971, vol. 1, pp. 11-12. Seaborg kept a handwritten journal that he edited into a typescript in 1985. It is the edited, typed version that appears in the published Journal.)
McG. B./5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
4. Editorial Note
On March 4, 1961, the President met a number of officials to discuss resumption of the test ban talks at Geneva, scheduled to begin March 21. Seaborg's journal entry for this meeting reads as follows:
"From 10:35 a.m. to about 11:45 a.m. I attended a meeting with the President to discuss the U.S. position on the forthcoming test ban negotiations to be held in Geneva. It was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House and present were: President Kennedy, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Fisher, Mr. Arthur Dean, Mr. McCloy, Mr. Paul Nitze, General Lemnitzer, Mr. Dulles, Dr. Wiesner, Mr. Spurgeon Keeny, Mr. Rusk and myself.
"Mr. McCloy made the opening statement by saying that there had been general agreement on the instructions to be given to the U.S. Delegation, as brought out in a meeting of the Principals, and others (total people present, according to Mr. Bundy, were 32), held on Thursday, March 2nd; however, a difference of opinion had developed on the point of the number of on-site inspections, with the AEC holding a different point of view from the others, and we thought this was important enough for the President to resolve.
"Mr. McCloy proceeded to explain the present U.S. position, with its formula of a minimum of ten on-site inspections and the possibility of ten more with a proportionality factor of one per five suspected events to a maximum of 20. In the course of this he mentioned the AEC position, although I had the impression that he referred to it more in the way of opposition to an upper limit, rather than to AEC preference for strict proportionality with no ceiling.
"Mr. Bundy and Dr. Wiesner, and others, supported the point of view of 10 minimum, plus 10 additional on a proportional basis; Mr. Bundy made the point, supported by statistical arguments, that if you inspected some 10 or 20 events, even though each had a probability of only one in three or four of uncovering a clandestine operation, after you had done 10 or 20 of them, the chance that you had missed a true event is very small.
"The President asked General Lemnitzer for his point of view, and he said, but not very forcefully, I thought, that he thought the Joint Chiefs of Staff would prefer the concept of strict proportionality with no ceiling.
"Mr. Nitze made some comments, but they were not of the nature that threw much light on the subject of on-site inspections. He said that the Department of Defense didn't regard the matter of on-site inspections of paramount importance, but they were more concerned with the composition of the Control Commission and the methods by which certification of an event for inspection was made. DOD sees loopholes there that might negate the purposes of the treaty.
"I then said that I wanted to be sure that the difference of point of view of the AEC and the rest of the group was completely understood: that we felt that the position of settling on some arbitrarily negotiated number like 20, 3, 10, or 17 was a political solution; that we thought a more logical and scientific basis existed for adopting the principle of proportionality throughout, and that this would lead to more support by the American public, by Congress, and by scientists. I said that the average number of detectable seismic events per year appeared to be about 100. On the basis of an inspection ratio of one to five, this would result in 20 inspections. But this varies from year to year by something like a factor of 2; that is, you might have as few as 50, or as many as 200 detectable seismic events. Therefore, according to our formula, in some years, there would be less than 20 inspections.
"As the discussion began to move into other channels, Mr. McCloy brought it back to the issue of the differences on the number of on-site inspections, and the President then said that he thought that we should stay with the position of 20, as defined.
"At this point, and also at various times earlier, there was discussion of the importance of approaches to the Members of Congress. In this connection I mentioned specifically the great importance of correct approaches and approaches at the right time to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. I mentioned specifically the difficulty last summer when a discussion with them revealed their stand that they would require reciprocity, whereas the present U.S. position is unilateral disclosure in connection with seismic experimentation.
"Mr. Bundy pointed out that there was a luncheon set up for next Tuesday on this matter to discuss it with a number of Democratic Members of Congress. The President asked whether it wouldn't be better to include Republican members. In answer to Mr. Bundy's observation that this would make the group unmanageably large, the President suggested that it could be divided into two luncheons.
"In the discussion of who might attend--and I am not particularly sure who will attend which of the two luncheons--the names of Holifield, Pastore, James Van Zandt, Anderson, Jackson and Hickenlooper of the JCAE were mentioned, as well as other key members of Congress, such as Mansfield, John McCormack, Charles Halleck, etc.
"This was followed by a discussion of the question of the duration of the negotiations. The President, and many of us, had noticed the article in this morning's Washington Post by Murray Marder, pointing out that President Kennedy was departing from his campaign promise that he would set a definite time limit on the negotiations. The President observed that the article was rather vague on this point. It seemed to be agreed that there wouldn't be any hard and fast time limit; but, on the other hand, the negotiations would, in effect, come close after a reasonable time.
"There was also discussion here, as well as at other times during the meeting of the John Finney article (New York Times, March 3, 1961, 'U.S. Easing Stand on Atom Test Ban') and of the Marder article, in which discussions of the U.S. position, including the statement that we had decided to fall back to 17 inspections, were disclosed. There was much speculation as to the origin of these leaks. These articles indicated that a high official in the State Department had made these statements.
"Mr. McCloy then went on to describe very briefly the Fisk Report, and raised the question of whether it should be made available to the JCAE, pointing out the need for keeping them informed if their subsequent support is to be forthcoming. President Kennedy said he would like to study the Fisk Report over the weekend before deciding on this matter.
"The President then remarked on the time remaining before Mr. Dean's departure for Geneva, and therefore, on the need for rapid progress. He asked Mr. Dean who was going with him to Geneva, and Mr. Dean mentioned, among others, Messrs. Stell, Popper, Doyle Northrup, etc.
"The President asked whether Mr. Dean had passed on to Dr. Fisk his request that he (Fisk) be with the delegation. Mr. Dean replied that Dr. Fisk has requested that he come after the start of negotiations, on invitation, as needed, so that if he couldn't remain for the entire time, it wouldn't appear that he had lost interest in the negotiations.
"After the meeting I took Mr. McCloy and Mr. Dean aside and said there were three broad areas of possible pitfalls, or at least potential points of public attack upon the treaty that I think they should call to the President's attention even before he met with the Members of Congress. These are areas which I would have identified at the meeting had the opportunity presented itself.
"I pointed out that the upper limit of 4.75 (on the seismic detection scale) in the treaty, below which there would be a moratorium on testing, left the possibility of cheating in the development of small weapons, and even of rather large ones in the event decoupling was resorted to. I told him I thought this would be a matter of much public comment.
"I pointed out what was basically a point of illogicality in the treaty in the area of high altitude explosions. I said that here we have in the treaty itself a prohibition for which there are in certain cases no enforceable safeguards, and hence we have deviated from a principle which might come back to plague us. I pointed out that a way out of this might have been to have a moratorium for explosions above a certain altitude, below which we could definitely police the treaty provisions.
"I pointed out that some people, and I cited Teller as an example, would disagree with the statements made earlier in the meeting that a treaty of this sort couldn't place the U.S. in a very vulnerable position with respect to its future existence vis-?-vis the Soviet Union because only certain small changes, factors of 2 or 3, could be made in relation to yields, weight ratios, etc. I said that there are those who would disagree with this, that there is the possibility of the next large step--or possibly you might call it the third stage of weapons development--namely, that in the course of a few years such weapons systems as the Polaris-carrying nuclear submarine might be negated (for example, by the Soviets having a sufficient number of submarines to put them on the tail of each of ours, in cooperation with surface ships, and effectively rendering them inoperative). Concomitant with such steps to negate our striking power, the Soviets would continue to develop new concepts which could, in fact, take the next step as breakthrough in a decisive way in their ability to wage war on us." (Seaborg, Journal, volume 1, pages 58, 60-62)
Seaborg's published Journal is an edited typescript prepared in the mid-1980s, based on handwritten notes recorded daily during Seaborg's chairmanship. An account of the methodology of this transcription appears in the preface to volume 1. A briefer account of this meeting appears in Glenn T. Seaborg with Benjamin S. Loeb, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban, pages 44-45.
The Committee of Principals had been established by President Eisenhower in 1958 to coordinate review of U.S. arms control and disarmament policy. It originally comprised five members: the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Science Adviser to the President. Kennedy added the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, and, later in 1961, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
A memorandum by James Goodby of the U.S. Disarmament Administration of the Principals' meeting held March 2 and the Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on the Technical Capabilities and Implications of the Geneva System (the Fisk Report), comprising 62 pages plus amendments and charts are in the Supplement. Kennedy did release the Fisk Report to the JCAE. Other accounts of the Principals' March 2 meeting and a description of the March 7 meeting with the congressional leaders are in Seaborg, Journal, volume 1, pages 65 and 70-72, respectively, and Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban, pages 38-43 and 46-48, respectively.
5. Memorandum From the President's Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy) to President Kennedy /1/
Washington, March 8, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Fisk Report. Top Secret; Restricted Data. Attached to a March 9 note from Bundy, which reads: "This is a paper from McCloy--you are not the real target--Joint Committee is. It is part of the effort to present the whole story without asking for approval yet."
SUBJECT
Fisk Report
I am transmitting herewith the report of the Fisk Panel on Technical Capabilities of the Geneva System./2/ This Panel was established to study, review and bring up to date the technical considerations bearing upon the conclusion of an agreement for the discontinuance of nuclear tests. This report, in my judgment, from a technical standpoint buttresses the conclusion that it is in the overall interest of the national security of the United States to make a renewed and vigorous attempt to negotiate a test ban agreement along the lines now contemplated.
/2/See Document 4. The Fisk Report is in the Supplement.
The consensus of scientific thinking and analysis contained in this report indicates that a test ban agreement along the lines of the Geneva system involves certain risks from the point of view of potential nuclear weapons development. General Loper, one of the members of the Panel, has expressed his separate views/3/ as to these risks. Some of these risks are due to the inhibiting effect which the agreement might have on some areas of weapons development which may be more important to the U.S. than to the U.S.S.R. This is not true in all cases; the reverse situation exists in some. Some of these risks are due to the possibility of undetected testing by the U.S.S.R. either by underground tests which produce a seismic signal of less than 4.75 or by tests at high altitude. It is proposed to undertake further research in these fields which may increase the ability to detect such tests. In the present state of knowledge, however, it must be recognized that the effect of the agreement is to make undetected testing more difficult and expensive but that a determined evader could probably evade the technical detection system if it were to put enough of its national effort into the attempt. The increased effort would make detection more likely, however, by conventional intelligence methods.
/3/Attached to the Fisk Report. Loper's views were endorsed by the JCS in a March 4 memorandum to McNamara. The Chiefs stated that Section VII of the Report did not give sufficient emphasis to the consequences of a major breakthrough by either side in the nuclear field, to the need for testing to ensure weapons safety and reliability, or to the "urgent military requirement for obtaining of weapons effect data in various environments." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926, 388.5 1961)
These risks should not be disregarded; neither should they be overstated. They must be evaluated in light of our total military effort and plans. They must be appraised in the light of all the courses and risks facing the United States in its endeavor to reduce the likelihood of war and to promote strong conditions of peace. When so evaluated and appraised, they are, in my judgment and on balance, worth taking in order to achieve this first step towards a workable agreement on arms control.
Taking a first step in the field of arms control in the present world situation involves some risks but there are also real risks in not taking the first step. Moreover, the first step may well have such significance as to lead to the adoption of further advances toward the relief of tensions and the avoidance of war and its concomitant, a devastating nuclear catastrophe.
A test ban agreement, along the lines now contemplated, would be a significant step in the field of arms control. It would establish a control organization which will give experience in the problems of control and inspection which can be expanded and adapted to handle other measures of arms control. Installation of the high altitude control system will provide an opportunity for joint U.S.--U.S.S.R. cooperation in the exploration of outer space of the type suggested by you in your State of the Union message. The system contains the possibility of difficulties and irritations but, on balance, provides a useful mechanism for getting past a stage in the international control of arms which has proved impassable until this time.
A test ban agreement along the lines now being considered might well contribute to better and more stable relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and thus help ease general international tensions. Moreover, by stationing Americans and other foreigners at control posts and on inspection teams it could contribute to the development of a more open Soviet society. It would involve the acceptance by the U.S.S.R. of the principle that inspection and control is a necessary and integral part of any agreement in the field of disarmament.
A second reason for supporting a test ban agreement is that it could be helpful in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities among other countries. By establishing an international legal order, to which nations would be asked and expected to join, it will tend to restrain the present non-nuclear powers from obtaining nuclear capabilities. The test ban agreement is certainly not sufficient in itself to prevent this spreading of nuclear capabilities. It will have to be followed by the negotiation of other measures. If the present nuclear powers are engaged in nuclear weapons testing, the possibility of effective agreements restricting the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities will have been severely limited.
The final reason for supporting a test ban agreement results from a comparison of the political gains which would accrue from a successful test ban negotiation, on the one hand, with the political disadvantages which would be presented by a resumption of testing, on the other. A workable test ban agreement, honestly sought by the United States, would gain credit for the United States in responsible world opinion which could conceivably firm up its alliances and produce a better atmosphere, both in the United Nations and elsewhere, for conducting further negotiations with the Soviet Union. If, on the other hand, the United States were to break off the test ban talks and resume testing, without a new and serious attempt to negotiate an agreement, it would, in my judgment, alienate world opinion, not only in the underdeveloped countries but among our major allies as well. Discussions during the past summer with officials from the United Kingdom illustrate how seriously even a staunch ally as the British would regard such an action. The damage to the stature of the U.S. in world affairs and the effect on U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations which might result if the U.S. were to fail to take reasonable steps necessary to reach a satisfactory test ban agreement, and then resume testing, would be serious. This consideration, and the other considerations which I have referred to, affect the security of the United States and make me feel that they outweigh the risks which are involved in the test ban agreement and which the Fisk Panel has identified.
This does not mean that the U.S. must continue to refrain from testing indefinitely and acquiesce in what is, in effect, a test ban with no safeguards during a period of unduly protracted negotiations. If reasonable and timely progress is not made in the test ban talks, the national interests of the U.S. may well require the resumption of testing. This should be done, however, only after the U.S. has exhausted reasonable steps to obtain a satisfactory agreement.
John J. McCloy/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
6. Airgram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Geneva /1/
Washington, March 8, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/3-861. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Goodby and cleared by Ronald I. Spiers, Director of the Political Office of USDA. Copies were sent to Secretary McNamara, Allen Dulles, Seaborg, and Wiesner.
A-161. Subject: Presidential Letter to Ambassador Dean. Following is the text of a letter dated March 4, 1961, from the President to Ambassador Dean:
"Dear Arthur:
I am delighted that you have accepted the heavy responsibility of representing the United States in the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. You are outstandingly qualified to conduct these negotiations with the wisdom, energy and seriousness of purpose which they demand.
The deliberations which you are about to undertake could lead to the first international arms control agreement of the nuclear age. Such an agreement might not only help to contain the danger of a nuclear arms race, but might also be the prototype of other far-reaching agreements. At the very least, it would furnish practical experience for cooperative effort in arms control. The United States is prepared to make a vigorous effort to reach an agreement which would be to the advantage of both sides and which would promote disarmament and strengthen world security.
The main obstacle heretofore has been the lack of agreement on the establishment of an effective control system. You should, therefore, seek to discover whether a reasonable basis for accord can be found which provides adequate controls and is consistent with the security of the United States. On this could depend the answer to the larger question of whether progress towards more comprehensive disarmament will be advanced or retarded.
Undue delay in these negotiations would tend to decrease the possibility of reaching agreement, for the present uncontrolled suspension of nuclear tests is a condition which must inevitably give rise to increasing concern. Accordingly, the negotiations should be conducted in such a way as to make it clear within a reasonable period whether it is possible to proceed to the consummation of a treaty. While it is not in our hands alone to determine the outcome of the conference, whatever we can do to ensure success by negotiating openly and in good faith should be done. To this end, you have my wholehearted confidence and support.
With best wishes,
/Sgd./ John F. Kennedy
The Honorable Arthur H. Dean
Department of State
Washington 25, D.C."
The above letter will not be released or otherwise made public. You are, however, authorized to show the text to the Soviet Delegation on a confidential basis./2/
/2/In Supnu 1426 from Geneva, March 23, Dean reported that he had that day given the President's letter to Tsarapkin, who stated that he did "not intend to make any comment until our position had been completely developed." (Ibid., 397.5611-GE/3-2361)
Rusk
7. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy /1/
Washington, March 14, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, General 1-3/61. Secret.
SUBJECT
Instructions for Governor Stevenson for his Talks with Gromyko on the Question of Timing of Future Substantive Negotiations on Disarmament and the Forum in which such Negotiations Would Take Place
During this past weekend we have developed, in concert with Governor Stevenson, the attached cable for your approval on the above subject./2/ If you approve the instructions, Governor Stevenson would see Gromyko and propose: (a) that disarmament negotiations be resumed on or before August 1, 1961, in Geneva; and (b) that the forum for such talks be the 10-Nation group, augmented by either two or three officers from the smaller powers. If agreement is reached on the foregoing with the USSR, this would be incorporated in a resolution to be submitted to the resumed session of the General Assembly. In his discussions with Gromyko, Governor Stevenson would also indicate our willingness to have bilateral substantive talks with the Soviets in early summer prior to the opening of negotiations in the more formal 10-Nation group, as augmented.
/2/Not printed. The draft cable was sent unchanged as telegram 1703 to USUN, March 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-1461) See the Supplement.
Mr. McCloy has approved the attached instructions. We have discussed the general lines of this cable with Mr. Bundy, who has seen a preliminary draft. We have also consulted with Mr. Nitze, who has made several suggestions which have been incorporated in the draft instruction, but in light of the need for urgent instructions, it has not been possible for him to discuss the attached cable either with the Secretary of Defense or with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Nitze regrets, as I do, that we are having to deal with this essentially tactical matter before knowing more concretely where we wish to go on the substantive aspects of the U.S. position on disarmament. This underscores the need for early decisions on our substantive position in light of studies which are now in process.
Dean Rusk
8. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the U.S. Disarmament Administration (Gullion) to Secretary of State Rusk /1/
Washington, March 15, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/3-1561. Confidential. Drafted by Spiers.
SUBJECT
Instructions for Nuclear Test Delegation
Discussion:
Attached for your approval are the instructions for the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests./2/ These instructions have been drafted to reflect the decisions of the Committee of Principals and of the President. Information copies of this draft have been sent to all members of the Committee of Principals and to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The draft has been approved by Mr. Dean and Mr. McCloy. The Department of Defense has advised us of their concurrence. There are, however, three points in which the AEC has not concurred, as follows:
/2/Not printed.
1) The AEC staff continues to feel that no upper limit of 20 should be placed on the escalator formula for on-site inspections (para. 3(d), pages 4-5);
2) The AEC staff believes that we should explicitly state that the seismic research program should begin before signature of the treaty (para. 3(b), page 3);
3) The AEC staff feels that the Control Commission should not be given authority to alter Phase I components of the system (para. 5(f), page 9).
We have reviewed the specific issues with Mr. McCloy, who feels as we do, that we should proceed with the instructions as drafted in view of their acceptability to the other agencies involved and in view of the primary responsibility of the State Department on the matters to which the AEC staff has taken exception.
With respect to the AEC's first point, which is the only major one, we feel that the nature of the escalation proposal has been thoroughly considered by the Committee of Principals and that the proposed position has been approved by the President. Furthermore, we have advised the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the proposed position.
With respect to the AEC's second point, we have pointed out that our proposed position does not preclude the starting of the seismic research program prior to the signature of the treaty, if this can be agreed. However, we object to making it mandatory that the research program be launched before the treaty is signed.
With respect to the AEC's third point, we are simply applying to Phase I a principle which has been proposed by the U.S. and accepted by the USSR for Phase II and III. We regard this as entirely a political matter.
Recommendation:
That you approve the attached instruction for the U.S. Delegation to the nuclear test talks./3/
/3/Rusk's stamped signature and date indicate that he approved the draft instructions that day. They were sent, apparently unchanged, to Geneva as Nusup 1083, March 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/3-1561) Dean outlined the joint U.S.-U.K. position at the reconvened Geneva Conference on March 21, and the U.S.-U.K. draft treaty was tabled on April 18. See Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 55-65 and 82-126, respectively. Extensive documentation on the coordination of the U.S.-U.K. position on the draft test ban treaty is in Department of State, Central Files 600.0012 and 397.5611-GE for January-April 1961.
9. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara /1/
JCSM-182-61 Washington, March 23, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112, 23 Mar 61. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A stamped notation on the source text reads: "SecDef has seen."
SUBJECT
Nuclear Arms Control Measures (U)
1. Current international and domestic interest in arms control matters indicates a probable need for early policy decisions on issues which confront the United States in this field. US arms control policy decisions probably will require coordination with at least major NATO Allies in order to gain Western support for policies which are compatible with US national security requirements. Anticipating these needs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have re-examined the issues which, in their view, warrant priority consideration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that certain extremely important arms control issues arise in connection with those proposals which would affect the nuclear capabilities of the United States. This memorandum sets forth the policy decisions which the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend be made concerning these issues.
2. In their re-examination of pressing arms control issues, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken the following factors into consideration:
a. "The basic threat to US security is the determination and ability of the hostile Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes to direct their political and ideological influence and their rapidly growing military and economic strength toward shifting the power balance away from the West and, ultimately, toward achieving world domination.
b. "The chief elements of this threat lie in (a) the Soviets' possession of rapidly growing nuclear capabilities (which have made the Soviet leaders feel freer to adopt an aggressive posture in peripheral areas) as well as large conventional forces; (b) the Soviet regime's ability and willingness to identify itself with various forms of political and social discontent and popular opposition to the status quo; to support subversive elements, including legal political parties, within free societies; to apply substantial resources for the purpose of fostering and exploiting various kinds of weakness and instability in all parts of the Free World; and, particularly in the neutralist and less developed societies, to take advantage of pressures for economic and social change; (c) the extent to which the totalitarian Communist leadership is able to act ruthlessly and rapidly and to repudiate agreements without being subject to moral restraints."
c. The United States is in fact engaged in a life-or-death struggle with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Leaders of the Bloc recognize this by repeatedly stressing their objective of securing domination of the world and emphasizing that their ultimate task is the subjugation of the US. Sino-Soviet techniques for attaining their objective include subversion; the creation and exploitation of chaos; economic warfare; blackmail through threats to employ their military power; the outright use of their military power when risks to their own security are not great; the development, maintenance and improvement of their military strength and capabilities far in excess of any apparent requirements for internal security; a constant campaign to degrade the US position as leader of the Free World; and a constant campaign to reduce and eliminate US nuclear warfare capabilities which constitute the primary Free World obstacle to the Bloc use of major aggression to achieve world domination. Employment of the foregoing techniques has proven successful in many cases: Since World War II, the USSR base of the world Communist movement has been expanded to encompass Eastern Europe, mainland China, Tibet and parts of Korea and Indo-China; significant political and economic influence by the Bloc has been achieved in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America; there is a broad base of support for the Soviet campaign to stigmatize and inhibit possible US use of its nuclear weapons capabilities even for self-defense; many Free World spokesmen have joined the chorus in support of Soviet efforts to disarm all nations, especially the United States, and thus to eliminate the obstacle to Sino-Soviet ambitions which is posed by US military capabilities.
d. The US military posture is determined by the need to protect the security of the United States and to carry out our collective security responsibilities; it is not designed for aggression. However, the Soviet leaders probably realize that there is a serious risk of self-destruction if they attempt to destroy US military capabilities. They probably recognize also that they would risk the initiation of general nuclear war, and their own destruction, if they were to expand significantly the area under their domination. They would consider the risks to be very great if areas considered vital by the United States to its own security arrangements were involved. Thus, programs to attain their objective of world domination without incurring the risk of self-destruction are supported by their efforts to disarm the West through their campaign for "general and complete disarmament".
e. Basic to the security of the United States and to its collective security arrangements is a capability to deter a nuclear attack on the United States. This requires sufficient numbers of strategic nuclear weapons and means for their delivery which are sufficiently invulnerable to be able at least to absorb an initial nuclear attack and still retain the capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the attacker. The active defense of the North American continent against manned aircraft and missile attack requires the use of nuclear weapons. A similar defense requirement exists for US forces on the seas and overseas. Also, US forces overseas must possess at least sufficient stocks of nuclear weapons and means for their delivery to operate effectively if Sino-Soviet forces initiate nuclear attack or in case the use of nuclear weapons is authorized by the President for other reasons.
f. To meet US requirements for nuclear weapons, and those required in support of US collective security arrangements, it is anticipated that allocation of the bulk of planned US special nuclear materials production will be needed at least through the 1960's.
g. In accordance with national policy, the US military posture over a period of years has been based on progressive modernization of all military forces, with emphasis on nuclear capability, and on the assumption that nuclear weapons would be used "when required to meet the nation's war objectives" and when authorized by the President. If directed, the time between a decision to change the US military posture and the availability in operational units of the weapons systems required both qualitatively and quantitatively to support the new posture may in many cases be as long as eight to ten years. Such a change would necessarily have to consider many factors not the least of which would be substantial increases in US defense expenditures in making the change-over.
3. In light of the situation which confronts the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that US national policy be established as follows relative to nuclear arms control measures currently under consideration for possible negotiation independently of each other and independently of other disarmament measures:
a. Cessation of Nuclear Weapons Testing:/2/
/2/See Appendix A hereto. [Footnote in the source text. This 5-page appendix is not printed.]
(1) The United States should seek to conclude the Conference on Cessation of Nuclear Weapons Tests not later than 1 June 1961 with an agreement which will prohibit those tests which the agreed control system is capable of detecting and identifying.
(2) Following 1 June 1961, and pending an enforceable international agreement to cease the testing of nuclear weapons, the United States should resume the testing as soon as possible of nuclear weapons in environments in which the release of radioactive material to the atmosphere can be controlled, i.e., outer space, underground and underwater.
(3) The United States should agree to cease only those nuclear weapons tests for which an effective international detection and identification system is feasible. In this case, the United States should reserve the right to resume such tests in the event of violation of any part of the agreement, including that part which prescribes the installation and continued effective operation of the detection and identification system on a world-wide basis.
b. Cessation of Production of Fissionable Materials for Use in Weapons:/3/
/3/See Appendix B hereto. [Footnote in the source text. This 15-page appendix is not printed.]
(1) The United States should not implement an agreement to halt its production of fissionable materials for use in weapons until:
(a) Its requirements for nuclear weapons indicated in paragraph 2 e above have been met;
(b) All States within the Sino-Soviet bloc have implemented an agreement to limit numerically their armed forces personnel and armaments to levels which would not reduce, and preferably would improve, the relative military capabilities of the US and its Allies vis-?-vis the USSR, Red China and the remainder of the Sino-Soviet bloc;
(c) The implementation of these limitations on armed forces personnel and armaments by the Sino-Soviet bloc has been and continues to be verified and inspected to the satisfaction of the United States and its Allies throughout the Sino-Soviet bloc;
(d) A system by which the US and its Allies can verify and inspect compliance by the Sino-Soviet bloc with an agreement to halt the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons is installed and operating effectively throughout the Sino-Soviet bloc; and
(e) The Sino-Soviet bloc simultaneously ceases production of fissionable materials for use in weapons.
(2) The United States should not agree to halt the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons on a reciprocal plant-by-plant basis with the Sino-Soviet bloc unless the conditions listed in paragraphs 3 b (1) (a), (b), (c) and (d) above, have been met.
(3) The United States should not agree to halt the production of non-fissionable materials, such as tritium, which are essential to the effectiveness of US stocks of nuclear weapons, nor to halt the production of fissionable materials for non-weapons uses, including nuclear propulsion.
(4) The United States should not agree to halt the fabrication of nuclear weapons from stocks of nuclear materials available when a cessation of the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons becomes effective, nor to halt the refabrication and maintenance of its nuclear weapons.
c. Transfer of Fissionable Materials from Past Production to Non-Weapons Uses:/4/ The United States should not agree to transfer fissionable materials from past production to non-weapons uses unless:
/4/See Appendix C hereto. [Footnote in the source text. This 5-page appendix is not printed.]
(1) The quantity to be transferred by the United States is matched by the USSR, there is effective international control of the quantities transferred, and the quantity transferred by the United States does not reduce US stocks of nuclear weapons; or until
(2) The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons has been halted under the conditions specified in paragraph 3 b above and its subparagraphs, the quantities transferred by the United States are matched by the USSR, and there is effective international control of the quantities transferred.
d. Declaratory Prohibition of Nuclear Sharing:/5/
/5/See Appendix D hereto. [Footnote in the source text. This 3-page appendix is not printed.]
(1) The United States should continue to abstain from commitment to the provisions of UN Resolution 1576 (XV), 20 December 1960. This resolution calls upon nuclear powers to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons or information necessary for their manufacture to non-nuclear powers, and calls upon non-nuclear powers to refrain from manufacturing or attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. Although the United States abstained when this resolution (commonly called "the Irish Resolution") was voted upon, it was approved by the General Assembly.
(2) The resolution, if now subscribed to by the United States, would constitute a moral commitment which could impose limitations on the Free World in efforts by its members to provide for their individual and collective self-defense; moreover, because it is not enforceable, it would not bar nuclear sharing by the USSR with other Communist countries. Furthermore, the declaratory approach of the resolution would establish a precedent which could undermine the position of the United States and its Allies that arms control agreements must be accompanied by effective verification and inspection.
e. Application of IAEA Inspection Machinery to Restrictions of Fissionable Materials to Peaceful Uses:/6/
/6/See Appendix E hereto. [Footnote in the source text. This 5-page appendix is not printed.]
(1) Implementation of the arms control measures in paragraph 3 b and c could result in relatively large quantities of fissionable material becoming available for non-weapons purposes. The United States could agree that use be made of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to insure that fissionable material made available to the IAEA for peaceful uses is not diverted to military uses providing the following are met:
(a) The Statute of the IAEA is revised and strengthened to ensure against inspection veto by possible evaders.
(b) An effective inspection system is developed.
(c) The IAEA's inspection and safeguards staff is appropriately expanded and includes adequate US representation.
(d) All fissionable material becoming available for peaceful purposes as the result of arms control measures is placed under the IAEA's control.
(2) Inspection and verification systems for monitoring arms control measures, such as the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, should be separate and distinct from the IAEA. Experience gained by the IAEA with respect to inspection and safeguards, however, could be useful in the development of arms control verification and inspection systems.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to stress that they are concerned about and recommend strongly against any reduction of our nuclear warfare capabilities, unless the conditions specified in paragraph 3 above have been met. They consider that it would be premature in the foreseeable future to initiate any negotiations or undertake a commitment to adhere to any of the measures listed in paragraph 3 above, with the exception of an effectively safeguarded cessation of nuclear weapons tests, in isolation or related only to other nuclear measures.
5. In making the foregoing recommendations concerning nuclear arms control measures, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the requirement to balance nuclear and non-nuclear measures and reaffirm their previously stated views that:
a. "The US negotiations effort must ensure that in the post-arms control agreement era, the United States will be able to maintain at any stage an adequate response to the entire spectrum of the remaining Sino-Soviet bloc threat; namely, an evident, secure nuclear retaliatory capability and an evident, flexible capability for military operations short of general nuclear war.
b. "The United States must always be able to back up its Allies with forces to a degree which will make our willingness to fight with or without nuclear weapons, credible both to our Allies and our enemies."
6. There are other important issues in the arms control field which may require national policy decisions on which the military advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be furnished as the need arises. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the policies set forth in paragraph 3 above involve arms control issues of immediate importance to the security of the United States. Decisions on these policies will have major effects on the national strategy of the United States and on US military capabilities and long-range programs. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the foregoing views be transmitted to the Adviser to the President on Disarmament Affairs and that decisions at the national level be reached on these policies./7/
/7/In a memorandum to Bundy dated April 10, Komer described this paper "as an example of how the Chiefs still sign off on such disarmament comments as made the last general in the White House almost come to ignore their views." Komer believed that the paper failed to take into account the effect on the Soviet Union of U.S. actions regarding atomic weapons, and pointed out that the Soviets were currently in the process of reducing conventional forces to 2.5 million, "where we are," by 1962. "True, this still somehow gives them a lot more divisions than we have, but the disparity will no longer be so great as to be an absolute bar." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies, ACDA Disarmament General, April 1961)
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L.L. Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
10. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State /1/
New York, March 25, 1961, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-2561. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Moscow.
2626. Lunch with Gromyko. I had lunch with Gromyko alone on Friday, March 24, at his request. He asked for a meeting with the President, explaining that he had planned to return to the Soviet Union on Saturday, March 25, but would stay over a few days. He reminded me that he had suggested such a meeting during his talk with Secretary Rusk on March 18/2/ and had received no reply. I promised to arrange a meeting if possible and asked him when he wanted it. His response was as soon as possible./3/
/2/A memorandum of this conversation drafted by Alexander Akalovsky, Officer in Charge of General Disarmament Negotiations at ACDA, is ibid., 611.61/3-1861. It is printed in vol. V, Document 33. Nusup 1095 to Geneva, March 20, contains an extract of this conversation pertaining to disarmament. (Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/3-2061) See the Supplement.
/3/Kennedy met with Gromyko and other officials on March 27; see vol. V, Document 36.
I asked about his reaction to the President's TV program and proposals on Laos,/4/ and he replied that the Soviet Government wanted a neutral and independent Laos and that he was hopeful that a solution was possible.
/4/For text of the President's remarks on Laos at a news conference held March 23, see Department of State Bulletin, April 17, 1961, p. 543.
I submitted our last draft resolution on disarmament./5/ He said he wanted me to tell the President that they had taken our views very seriously and appreciated our difficulties and were studying the situation. But the resolution was unsatisfactory; they could not accept the proposal for an additional 3 neutrals (India, Mexico and one unnamed) to be added to the committee as chairman and vice chairmen respectively. They would have to insist that the neutrals be added with equal rights to participation in all respects. In view of the fact that we could make no other suggestions besides the Disarmament Commission itself, perhaps any further discussion of the paragraph on principles was unnecessary.
/5/Text not found. According to telegram 2615 from USUN, March 24, the text was similar to that transmitted in telegram 2588 from USUN, March 22, except that the United States was willing to accept the addition of three rather than two "neutral" powers to the former 10-nation Disarmament Committee. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-2461 and 600.0012/3-2261, respectively) Documentation on U.S. efforts to reach a compromise with the Soviet Union on its proposal made in September 1960, one of a series of "troika" initiatives, to expand the 10-nation Committee to 15 by adding 5 neutral nations is ibid., 600.0012 for February and March 1961.
After further discussion we agreed that in these circumstances the best thing to do would be to have no resolution, announce that we had agreed to resume negotiations by the end of July and meanwhile would have some bilateral talks in June and July on disarmament, including the composition of the forum, and recommend that all pending resolutions be deferred until the next GA. He agreed to my suggestion that perhaps any reference to bilateral talks on the subject of the composition of the forum might be omitted, and he preferred to make a statement before Committee I instead of issuing a joint communiqu?. I asked him to draft what he had in mind saying. This draft was transmitted to the Department by telegram today./6/ He said that any statement I cared to make would be satisfactory with him. He thought a reference to deferring pending resolutions might be desirable to avoid possibility of committee consideration of any other items proposed by other countries.
/6/Telegram 2622 from USUN, March 25. (Ibid., 600.0012/3-2561)
In the course of our conversation he said he had a message from Mr. K. to deliver to the President orally. We discussed Soviet-US difficulties, and he complained that the Soviet Union had been misunderstood following the war and charged improperly with designs on the independence of Europe. On disarmament, he said in the USSR there has been a feeling that "some influential circles" in the US continued to be suspicious of the USSR. Until that dissipated, mutual trust was impossible. He wished that the US would believe in their sincere anxiety for general and complete disarmament under international control, and a disarmed world. He repeated that in Moscow they felt that influential circles in the US did not want disarmament, and implied that this suspicion about our sincerity was extensive.
As to Berlin, again he emphasized its importance and expressed the fear that there was some under-estimation of its importance in the US.
On the Congo, he said he regretted that we were so far apart. He said the Soviet Union wanted nothing--no investments, no land--and felt the Congo should be independent. The Soviet Union was indignant about Lumumba's murder. He said he had known Lumumba personally and he was a clever man.
Stevenson
11. Report of the Panel on the Cutoff of the Production of Fissionable Materials for Weapons /1/
Washington, April 1, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 23 Mar 61. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A table of contents is not printed. This Panel, appointed by the USDA, was known as the Perkins Panel after Chairman Dr. James Perkins. Other members were Manson Benedict, Marion Boyer, Spurgeon Keeny, General Herbert Loper, Donald Musser, George Quinn, Isidor Rabi, Louis Roddis, Herbert Scoville, Walter Singlevich, and William Webster.
INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSIONS
The "Panel on Cutoff" submits this report on the problems involved in an international agreement for the cutoff of production of fissionable materials for weapons. The cutoff was studied as a single isolated disarmament measure. If it were to be linked with other measures (e.g., stockpile reduction) it should be re-examined in the new context.
Before presenting our findings, we must emphasize that we were not asked and we make no recommendation as to the advisability of negotiating a cutoff agreement. Such a decision would, of course, require the consideration of matters not included in this study.
We present the following conclusions:
1. A cutoff would have a profound effect on both US and USSR plans for the use of nuclear weapons. Presently planned uses will quickly exceed the prospective stockpile existing as of the cutoff date studied (July 1, 1963).
2. A cutoff of future tritium production would have a particularly serious effect on the weapons stockpiles since, if unreplenished, fifty percent of the tritium in the stockpile would decay in twelve years time. This would result either in the progressive reduction of important weapon systems or in the redesign of the systems with degraded performance. A reduction in tritium would probably be more serious to the US than to the USSR in view of existing US and USSR weapon systems. For the purpose of this report, it has been assumed that a cutoff agreement would allow production of tritium to the extent necessary to maintain the tritium stockpile existing at the time of the cutoff. The proposed inspection system includes provisions for monitoring such production.
3. The larger US stockpile of weapons materials (possibly several times that of the USSR) suggests a US advantage in a stockpile freeze. However, it is impossible to draw any final conclusions as to the net effect of cutoff until the appropriate net military evaluations are completed. We note with deep concern that an appropriate study of the net military effect of such a proposal is not available, and urge that this deficiency be rectified as a matter of high priority.
4. Without attempting to judge the net military significance of a cutoff, it does appear that the US can maintain a very substantial second-strike retaliatory capability by allocating 25 to 50 percent of the 1963 stockpile to strategic systems. We do not know what levels of Soviet fatalities are required to deter the USSR from initiating an attack nor are we suggesting, by the use of certain examples, that a deterrent strategy based on population kill is a proper strategy for the United States. We note, however, that estimates, based on the assumption, among others, that the USSR will not develop an effective AICBM, indicate that these US systems will cause from 20 percent to 40 percent fatalities in the Soviet Union even after a large surprise Soviet attack with no warning. We note also that whereas cutoff of fissionable material production in 1963 would limit the ability of the USSR to expand its strategic forces, the population kill capability of the US systems is relatively insensitive to a Soviet missile expansion beyond the credited 1963 level. The cutoff would also limit the ability of the US and the USSR to undertake massive AICBM or ASW programs. The amounts of material that the USSR could divert by evasion of the proposed control system would have very little effect on the US-USSR strategic balance.
5. An inspection system to cover the USSR would cost about $10 million a year and would involve about 450 technical personnel, 350 of whom would have to be in the USSR. In addition to monitoring declared production facilities, this system would require a limited number of peremptory inspections. A high degree of access, not only to declared plants, but also to sites suspected of clandestine activity, is indispensable if the system is to be effective.
This recommended inspection system, when supported by a strong US intelligence effort, should provide a high level of confidence that Soviet evasion could not exceed about 2 percent per year of their 1963 stockpile, which is considered to constitute a relatively small military risk. Adding inspection system requirements for the US and UK would about triple the above cost and personnel figures.
6. Production by other countries, including the Chinese Peoples Republic, is estimated to be relatively small during the next decade and would not constitute a direct danger to either the US or the USSR if their remaining stockpiles are not reduced.
7. The economic consequences of a cutoff of fissionable materials production in itself, while significant, would not be so damaging as to be a serious negative factor in the overall determination of the advisability of a cutoff agreement.
[Here follows the body of the 19-page Report.]
12. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests /1/
Washington, April 4, 1961, 4:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/4-461. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Shepard Stone, Special Assistant to McCloy; cleared by McCloy, Fisher, and EUR/SOV; and approved by Spiers. Also sent to USUN and Moscow.
Nusup 1123. Upon invitation of Winiewicz, Head of the Polish UN Delegation and presumably at request of Gromyko, McCloy had two hour conversation night March 30 at Polish Mission New York with Soviet Foreign Minister. Others present were Zorin-USSR, Ambassador Lwandowski and Professor Lachs of Poland and Shepard Stone.
Prior to discussion more specific problems, McCloy described role as Adviser on Disarmament. McCloy stated he had not come to Washington to maneuver or to engage in tactical exercise but to help bring about agreement with Soviet Union on disarmament. President had made it crystal clear to McCloy that such was his objective. McCloy stated agreement with Soviet Union was imperative and it now remained to find items of common interest and to begin.
Gromyko asked many questions about economic aspects of disarmament. McCloy pointed out based on experience with U.S. industry and banking that though disarmament would mean readjustments and in a very few cases some dislocation, overwhelming emphasis U.S. industry and business was non-military and eager to expand non-military production. Economic problems were not a barrier to U.S. disarmament and Soviets should abandon myth that U.S. could not afford to disarm. Gromyko appeared to show interest in views outlined and said he accepted and gave credit to statement.
In answer to Gromyko question as to barriers in way of GCD, McCloy outlined his views on negative aspects of Soviet secrecy and need for inspection and controls so that both sides would gain mutual experience and overcome suspicions and fears. McCloy emphasized need for first steps which leading to growth of mutual trust would later accelerate to larger program. Throughout evening Gromyko emphasized what seemed to him American misunderstanding of Soviet proposals. He insisted Soviets agree on necessity inspection and controls and that at end of each stage of disarmament Soviet proposals contemplated a review of situation before going on to next stage. GCD objective necessary because partial steps taken independently without overall program would create disequilibrium. He implied that partial steps proposed by U.S. were aimed at weakening Soviet Union. McCloy argued against practicability of Soviet proposal and re-emphasized need to take first steps and build on them. Gromyko asked what first steps were contemplated. Without trying outline appropriate sequence, McCloy mentioned: (a) necessity to reach test ban agreement in Geneva, (b) cut-off of production fissionable materials to be followed later by decreases in stockpiles, (c) ban on bombs in orbit, (d) common efforts to work out measures to prevent accidental warfare and surprise attack, (e) common efforts in peaceful uses atomic energy. Gromyko asked for repetition this list two or three times and seemed to be interested. He was told we would welcome Soviet proposal as to first step but important matter was to get started.
Gromyko said Soviet at Geneva was waiting to hear full U.S. proposals and hoped there would be new things to come out of our "bag." Soviet would make serious study proposals but was not impressed so far. Soviet Foreign Minister did not consider, for example 19 inspection stations in U.S.S.R. as against 21 as an important gesture but he did not labor the point. Gromyko insisted that three man administration was sticking point for Soviets admitting that Soviets wanted veto. He said he hoped we would not believe Soviet proposal was based on Soviet expectation that they would always get majority in control commission and he said that Soviets would be "reasonable" in the operation of the veto. McCloy emphasized that Soviet three-man suggestion had had serious negative effect in Washington and he hoped Soviets would reconsider. Gromyko admitted relationship of all this to the attack on UN.
Gromyko asked McCloy's views on where June-July talks should take place. McCloy emphasized this a matter for discussion with Stevenson and Rusk, not McCloy and that any views he expressed were personal and without official significance. McCloy said he personally not in favor of Swiss resort town or similar place because other nations would become suspicious of a separate conference and, therefore, McCloy preferred Washington and Moscow. Gromyko said his views paralleled those expressed and he mentioned Washington in June and Moscow in July.
On French testing, Gromyko stated without emphasizing point that U.S. could be using France, its NATO ally, to do its testing. McCloy emphasized U.S. had not given weapons or information to France and had no intention of doing so. Essential for US-USSR to sign Geneva agreement and at that time world opinion would make it difficult for France and we hoped China not to accede to agreement. Gromyko's only mention of China was to state that China like Russia favored GCD and wanted to bury all arms in a hole in ground.
The conversation was frank and friendly ranging from World War II memories of common effort to need for stopping and turning back arms race.
At his request Winiewicz met Shepard Stone at Century, New York on April 3 as follow-up Gromyko-McCloy conversation held at Polish Mission, New York March 30.
According Winiewicz, Gromyko, after McCloy and Stone departed, had stated conversation useful, productive and promising. Gromyko had gained impression of sincerity, frankness, and was returning to Moscow with belief U.S. launching serious disarmament effort. On other hand, Zorin, who had been present at conversation, had stated that first steps mentioned by McCloy were not new. Gromyko replied that steps were not new but that did not make them less important.
Apropos Geneva Test Ban talks, Winiewicz said that Gromyko had not been fully briefed on details and therefore had been somewhat reluctant to carry on discussions about Geneva. Winiewicz stated that he had impression from Gromyko, Geneva Test Ban negotiations would be "locked" with no real progress until after talks on comprehensive disarmament had started and showed some signs of advance.
Stone pointed out that failure of Russia to come to agreement at Geneva talks would have serious negative effect in U.S. in respect later comprehensive talks. Winiewicz said he thought U.S. had not made this point adequately clear to USSR and suggested that Ambassador Thompson ought to do so in Moscow.
Winiewicz put in a plea for previous Polish proposals, freezing of present arms situation in Central Europe and also for Rapacki Plan. He said that this would not mean Germany would have to withdraw from NATO, but that Germany and East European countries would not possess atom weapons.
In conclusion Winiewicz said major divisive point between US-USSR was position of Secretary General UN. As for Laos, he said "that is not a problem or conflict between U.S. and USSR, but it is a Moscow-Peking problem."
Dean Rusk
13. National Intelligence Estimate /1/
NIE 4-2-61
Washington, April 6, 1961.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Estimates 4, Arms and Disarmament. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part: "Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Agency." The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on April 6. The Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
ATTITUDES OF KEY WORLD POWERS ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES
The Problem
To assess the underlying motivations and objectives of key world powers--the USSR, Communist China, France, the UK, West Germany, and Canada--in the field of disarmament and arms control.
Scope
Disarmament, as used in this estimate, refers generally to all forms and degrees of arms limitation, controls, regulation or reduction, and is not restricted to the idea of abolition of armaments. Where useful or necessary, the terms "general and complete disarmament" or "arms control" will be specified in the discussion according to the context.
This estimate does not aim to present the detailed negotiating positions of the various powers on all disarmament issues, or to examine the merits of different technical proposals, but rather to inquire into the underlying motivations and factors affecting the general attitudes of these states.
Conclusions
1. It is clear that the Soviet leaders see, in agitation of the disarmament issue, a prime opportunity to further their political purposes in the non-Communist world. What is not so clear is the extent to which they may actually desire to conclude agreements on disarmament. In approaching this latter question, they are influenced in contrary directions by a variety of considerations.
2. Communist ideology sanctions the use of any means which is deemed expedient to advance its cause. Military power in various forms, including the delivery of arms, is one of these means, and the Communist leaders are using it to extend their control and influence. At the same time, Marxism-Leninism, while favoring and supporting "wars of liberation," teaches that the fundamental political, economic, and social forces at work in the world can bring about the eventual world-wide triumph of communism. And Communist doctrine enjoins the USSR to instigate and support subversive and revolutionary activities to accelerate final victory. One theoretically possible way to give revolutionary forces freer play would be by reducing or eliminating Western military force through agreements on disarmament. Marxism-Leninism therefore permits the Soviet leaders to consider that if the armed forces of their opponents were reduced or eliminated, the results might be worth limitations of their own military power, always provided the military power balance was not shifted to their disadvantage. (Para. 14)
3. The Soviets are also concerned by the consequences to them of general nuclear war. We believe that they continue to think that a complete ban on the use of nuclear weapons would be to their advantage. They also see advantages in some kinds of disarmament measures directed against the various ways in which nuclear war might break out. They are probably also attracted to disarmament measures as a possible means of achieving a military advantage by encouraging the West to cut its defense efforts even further than the terms of agreement, and of promoting a climate of relaxation favorable to Communist exploitation. (Paras. 16-19)
4. On the other hand, the Soviets perceive dangers and disadvantages in the prospect of substantial disarmament. They are deeply conscious of the impact which the image and the substance of their military strength have made upon the world, of the security which that strength has given them as compared with their exposed position in the past, and of the respect which it has compelled from other nations. Furthermore, the USSR would be reluctant to undertake measures which might endanger its control over Eastern Europe or alter the relationship of power, and hence of political weight, between itself and Communist China. (Paras. 21, 25)
5. From the Soviet point of view, the greatest difficulty in reaching disarmament agreements favorable to their ultimate world objectives is presented by Western requirements for inspection. A primary reason for the strong Soviet aversion to inspection is military: having developed secrecy into a major military asset, the Soviets are reluctant to impair and unwilling to relinquish secrecy until assured that the enemy has given up the forces which might use in an attack the knowledge acquired through inspection. Another is political: while the regime's anxieties concerning contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners are diminishing, the implications of an international inspectorate--cooperation with the enemy and recognition of a higher sovereignty in the control organization--remain inimical to the political outlook fostered by the Communist Party. Finally, the Soviets obviously oppose effective inspection because it would foreclose the option of evading the agreement. (Paras. 22-24)
6. Apart from these considerations, the Soviets have a most lively sense of the political uses of talking about disarmament. Realizing that the intricacies of the subject are little understood, they have hit upon their proposal for general and complete disarmament as a way to capture the universal yearning for peace and, at the same time, to label the West as "against" disarmament. It is not a proposal which they expect to have to make good on, but it is a highly potent instrument of political warfare. (Para. 31)
7. The Soviet leaders may conclude, however, that some more modest proposals offer sufficient advantages, in terms both of their particular effects and the impetus they would provide to general agitation of the disarmament theme, to justify entering upon serious discussions of limited measures. They expect their advocacy of general and complete disarmament to create a strong position for them in any such negotiations. To date, however, the disadvantages of limited measures, including the inspection they would entail, appear to have predominated in Soviet thinking. (Paras. 32-44)
8. The Chinese Communists approach the disarmament question in a different spirit. They are less concerned than the USSR with the dangers of war, and they regard the tactic of negotiation with the enemy as offering dubious prospects and tending to sap revolutionary fervor. Peiping's primary interest in disarmament, therefore, lies in the political gains--diplomatic recognition, the return of Taiwan, admission to the UN--which it hopes to extract when its participation in disarmament negotiations is sought. (Paras. 45-46, 48)
9. The Chinese leaders are determined to acquire a nuclear capability and appear to suspect (probably rightly) that Soviet disarmament policy is designed in part to delay or prevent this. They are anxious to forestall any agreements which might have this effect, such as the combination of a nuclear test ban and an agreement not to transfer nuclear weapons and technology to other countries. We believe that, as China's weight within the Bloc grows, certain arms control measures are becoming more attractive to the USSR, while at the same time Chinese pressures are impinging upon Soviet freedom of action. (Paras. 26, 47, 49)
10. The strongest support for disarmament comes from Canada, which is especially concerned with being caught up in a nuclear war and has attempted to create a role for itself as a leader of the "middle powers," urging the major contestants into serious negotiations. Another strong supporter of disarmament is the UK, which sees in arms control measures a chance to close the nuclear club and to initiate movement toward an East-West d?tente. In spite of a strong and genuine interest in disarmament both at the official and popular level, the government does not wish to jeopardize its relationship with the US by separating itself too far from US policies on disarmament. France, on the other hand, is determined not to be prevented from acquiring a national nuclear capability. French attitudes on disarmament will continue to be based on considerations of national prestige and the satisfaction of de Gaulle's desire for international status, even though his determination to acquire nuclear forces is not widely shared by other French political leaders or even by many military leaders. The West German attitude toward disarmament is marked by an intense preoccupation with the implications of any general disarmament agreement for the special security problems of the Federal Republic. As West Germany's national power increases, we believe that it will seek a more direct voice in disarmament matters. Both France and West Germany oppose regional schemes confined to Central Europe, fearing that these would discriminate against them and jeopardize collective security with the West. (Paras. 50-63)
[Here follows the 11-page "Discussion" section of the estimate.]
14. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara /1/
JCSM-221-61
Washington, April 8, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61. Top Secret; Restricted Data.
SUBJECT
Further Considerations Bearing on a Voluntary US Moratorium on All Underground Testing of Nuclear Weapons (U)
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted a cable from the Acting Secretary of State to the US Delegation to the Conference on a Nuclear Test Treaty in Geneva (State to Geneva--Nusup 1110, 29 March 1961)./2/ This cable indicated that the United States is prepared to continue the voluntary moratorium on all underground nuclear testing, including tests of small yields, for three years from the date of signing of a treaty on control of nuclear testing, if the United Kingdom and the USSR will do likewise. The Joint Chiefs of Staff remain of the belief that the continuation of a voluntary moratorium on tests which cannot be detected by any inspection system would be unwise at this time and could be seriously inimical to the continued security of the United States.
/2/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/3-2961)
2. There are several considerations bearing on this problem which the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe should be reviewed by the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense before irrevocable steps are taken in negotiations to commit the United States to the voluntary moratorium. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consequence, recommend that you request the President to hear a briefing in the near future at which scientific and military experts in the various fields mentioned below can set forth certain factual and potential factors affecting the problem. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would suggest such a briefing be attended, in addition to the President and such members of his staff as he desires, by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the AEC, the Director of the CIA, the Advisor to the President for Science and Technology, and the Honorable John J. McCloy./3/
/3/Gilpatric forwarded this suggestion to Bundy in a letter dated April 20. In a reply to Gilpatric of April 25, Bundy stated that the President had been briefed previously on both fusion weapons and the neutron flux problem. (Ibid.)
3. The several fields which the Joint Chiefs of Staff would recommend be covered in the proposed briefing of the President are as follows:
a. The possible development of pure fusion weapons--[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] or so-called "neutron bomb."
b. The lack of practical and authoritative data regarding the phenomenon of neutron-flux and x-rays outside the atmosphere.
4. It is only by considering the above subjects in their interrelationships that the possible serious impact on our national security of the continuation of an unpoliced moratorium on testing can be properly evaluated. In brief, these interrelationships, as seen by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are as follows:
a. The principle upon which a "neutron bomb" may be developed has been known to the Soviet Union, by their own admission, since 1952. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Inherent in the neutron bomb concept--a pure fusion weapon emitting very high intensities of neutrons--is that the only scarce nuclear component required is tritium [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].
b. The major characteristic of the neutron bomb is the extent and range of its lethal instant radiation effect and relatively small other effects as compared to the much larger blast, thermal and residual radiation effects of the fission weapons. This characteristic may make the neutron bomb highly efficient as an anti-personnel weapon without the other destructive characteristics, including radioactive contamination, which are associated with fission weapons. Thus, the new weapon might be classed somewhere between conventional and current nuclear weapons. Possibly more important, however, could be the potentially greatly higher efficiency of the pure fusion weapon in generating at very long distances a neutron-flux in adjacent nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, particularly in space or the higher atmosphere.
c. The Nike-Zeus, and presumably the anti-ICBM weapons which intelligence sources indicate are being developed by the USSR, depend among other effects on neutron-flux to "kill," i.e., render impotent, the warhead of the incoming ballistic missile against which the anti-missile is directed. If the Soviets have developed, or could develop by surreptitious and undetectable testing, an efficient pure fusion weapon which could "kill" enemy missile warheads at a considerable range, there could result a very high degradation to the credible nuclear deterrent posture of the United States. If the Soviets achieve this capability while the United States remains without it because of inability to test the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] devices, the result could be catastrophic.
d. Allied with the problem just alluded to is the fact that the United States has very little practical data on the intensities of instant radiation produced by fission or fusion explosions in rarefied atmosphere or space. The Orange and Teak shots in the US nuclear testing program just prior to the current moratorium on nuclear testing provided inadequate data for a full evaluation of this effect at very high altitudes. Additional technical information concerning intensities of radiation at very high altitudes might show that x-rays have a much greater lethal radius for "killing" missile warheads than neutrons. If this were to be the case, we would want to take measures to protect our own warheads and, at the same time, exploit this effect in our own anti-ICBM capability.
5. In sum, the United States plans to deter deliberate initiation of thermonuclear war by the USSR, over the next decade, by the maintenance of an adequately invulnerable nuclear retaliatory capability. If the USSR were able to develop and make practical tests of the effects of the pure fusion weapon, and if the USSR as a result or by other means could develop a highly effective and relatively cheap AICBM, the USSR could conceivably plan a nuclear attack upon the United States without fear of receiving retaliatory destruction to a degree which would be unacceptable to the Soviet leaders. Because the Soviet stockpile may well contain today [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] and because of US lack of tested experience in the several fields mentioned above, the continuation of a voluntary moratorium on testing the potential development of a US pure fusion weapon could seriously prejudice the national security.
6. In consequence of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:
a. The briefing referred to in paragraph 2 above be given the President and his senior officials at the earliest feasible date. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would be prepared to coordinate the preparation of this briefing if it is desired.
b. The United States not commit itself to a voluntary moratorium of underground testing below the level of test explosions which produce a seismic signal of less than 4.75.
c. Further research and development on the pure fusion weapon, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] or otherwise, be given urgent attention by the AEC.
d. The need for further testing on the pure fusion weapon and the phenomenon of radiation-flux in space be considered of such national importance that no further concessions be made towards extreme Soviet positions in future negotiations on a nuclear test treaty.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L.L. Lemnitzer/4/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.
15. Telegram From the Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests to the Department of State /1/
Geneva, April 21, 1961, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/4-2161. Confidential.
Supnu 1549. From Dean for McCloy. We are trying to bring out what basically lies behind the tactics Sov Delegation has adopted since our resumption March 21. Sovs have not only stood still on positions they have been maintaining since the summit meeting last spring, but have appeared to go to great pains to cross the T's and dot the I's of their stand-still position in great detail and to make it clear that they are not budging in even the most minute particular from previous positions.
At the same time, Sov Delegation appears completely relaxed, is in no hurry to get anything done, and provides no indication that any Sov initiative is forthcoming in the near future to break up the conference. Indeed, they go to some length to demonstrate ostensible concern that the West might take some such action which they apparently don't want to see happen.
We have tended to assume that the Sov Delegation's instructions were to make no significant move away from the general framework of their present position but to keep the conference going inconclusively for an indefinite period and in effect they have made all of their concessions and the next move is up to us. One might think that if these were their instructions, they might, in order to keep things going, make some very minor moves on their positions, pointing to these as great concessions and use them as a basis to refute the association which, as of now, is so clearly justified, that they have made no move at all.
We are wondering if the Department has any ideas as to what explanation might be given for the Sov tactics. Several possibilities have occurred to us:
(A) The Sovs may merely be waiting us out in the expectation that the West has not yet laid all its cards on the table in the field of concessions and hope to move us to further concessions by standing pat. This possibility seems somewhat unlikely since the Sovs must realize it would be improbable that we would move further without any motion on their part.
(B) The Sovs may be in a general stall in the expectation of carrying negotiations on until general disarmament discussions begin with the idea of merging these talks into those discussions this summer. They may not feel under any compulsion to move beyond their present positions at this time to achieve this purpose.
(C) The Sovs may be hoarding any minor moves which they are prepared to make until there are much stronger indications that the West is getting impatient and considering a break-off of negotiations or a resumption of testing. In that case they might be expected to make such minor moves at the eleventh hour in order to frustrate any indicated move of the West towards a break-off or resumption of testing.
(D) They may be waiting until the French test gives them a pretext for a walk-out or until they can see what the French really accomplish.
(E) The Sov absolute stand on their present position may be designed to provoke us into taking the initiative to break-off the negotiations or to resume testing, thus giving them a good pretext for ending the negotiations and to put the blame on us. As we have said above, the ostensible attitude is that they do not want the negotiations broken off but this, of course, does not remove the possibility that they do want them ended so long as the onus is placed on us.
(F) The Sov Delegation may have been instructed just to sit tight while Moscow took a look, not so much as to what the West has to offer in this particular negotiation as to the general political situation between the US and USSR and Moscow's basic decision on the conference here may not yet have been made.
We would appreciate any views the Department may have on what Sovs are up to./2/
/2/In Nusup 1192 to Geneva, April 26, drafted in EUR/SOV and D/P, the Department replied that evidence did not "warrant firm conclusion" that the Soviets were no longer interested in a test ban agreement, but that perhaps for them the degree of inspection demanded by the West was only acceptable in the context of an agreement on general disarmament. (Ibid.)
16. Airgram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests /1/
Washington, April 22, 1961, 8:10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/4-2261. Secret; Limit Distribution.
G-14. Nusup. Following is text memorandum from McCloy to be used as basis White House discussion next steps in nuclear test negotiations:/2/
/2/NSC Action No. 2408, taken at the 478th NSC meeting held April 22, reads: "The Geneva Test Ban Negotiations: [The NSC] noted and discussed an interim report by Mr. McCloy on the current state of negotiations in Geneva for a nuclear test ban. It was agreed that Mr. Dean will soon be recalled for discussion, and that a strong preliminary US-UK effort should be made to create an effective international environment for a possible show-down on these negotiations." (Ibid., S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
"MEMORANDUM ON POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION RELATING TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS
I. The Situation:
It now appears clear that the intent of the Soviet negotiators at Geneva is to avoid a prompt conclusion of a Test Ban agreement. Mr. Arthur H. Dean, our negotiator, will return sometime after the first of May to report. The indications are that the Soviet Union will not take the responsibility of breaking off negotiations, but will drag them along to a time when it would seem appropriate to suggest that they be merged into the comprehensive disarmament negotiations now set for July 31.
The best estimate is that the Soviets are trying to put the US in a position in which it goes into the July 31 talks with the present unenforceable moratorium still in effect, a position which would make it increasingly difficult for the US to exercise its freedom of action with respect to the resumption of testing.
At the outset of the negotiations on March 21, 1961, the Soviet negotiator proposed that there should be substituted for the concept of a single, impartial Administrator, to which it has previously agreed, a three-man Council with one representative each, for the Soviet Union, the Western powers, and the uncommitted countries. No action could be taken without the concurrence of all three. Moreover, the Soviet Delegation continues to insist on other provisions, tantamount to self-inspection, which could not be accepted. The Soviet position on the three-headed Council has now been re-affirmed and emphasized in several Soviet declarations, including Mr. Khrushchev's interview with Walter Lippmann./3/ The Soviet position is linked to its campaign in the UN against the single Secretary-General. As it is, in effect, a nullification of the concept of an independent inspection or verification system, it would have very far-reaching consequences. Not only does it critically affect the control system proposed for the nuclear Test Ban but it would also, if applied to controls for general disarmament, render these unreliable and unnegotiable. We could not accept such a concept without abandoning the fundamental Western positions on disarmament and permitting the foundation to be laid for a serious attack on the United Nations.
/3/Reference is to Lippmann's interview with Khrushchev at Khrushchev's dacha at Sochi on the shores of the Black Sea on April 10. Lippmann's published account of this interview is in The Coming Test With Russia (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961).
The attitude of the Soviet Union developed at Geneva presents a problem which has to be faced in the very near future. This Government has consistently taken the position that, though a serious effort was to be made to reach a Test Ban agreement as promptly as possible, it would have to review this position if it became clear that the Soviet Union was not disposed to enter into an agreement on terms reasonable and fair to all. The President of the United States (letter to Thomas E. Murray of October 10, 1960)/4/ has indicated that he would favor another serious attempt to conclude such a treaty, but that if it became clear that one could not be reached within a reasonable period of time, he would consider the resumption of underground tests in the field of peaceful uses, seismic research, and weapons improvement under such controls as may appear appropriate in the light of the situation then existing. Similar declarations and projections were made by Government officials before committees of Congress prior to the resumption of negotiations on March 21, 1961. The time has now come to consider what steps should be taken to give effect to these declarations.
/4/For text of Kennedy's letter to Murray, see Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 287-289.
II. Two questions must be decided:
A. Should the US decide now to resume nuclear weapons tests if the deadlock in Geneva continues for more than a few weeks in spite of further approaches direct to Khrushchev?
B. If not, should the US decide now to conduct nuclear detonations for seismic research programs, withholding a decision on weapons tests until this action has been taken?
III. Arguments Pro and Con Resumption of Tests:
A. Pro-Resumption
If we continue to negotiate on the present basis without bringing matters to a head, we shall be in the position of extending our moratorium on nuclear testing for a further indeterminate period without any control or inspection of Soviet tests. This not only creates a condition in which the Soviets may be conducting undetected tests while we are not, but it also weakens the whole emphasis on the vital importance of appropriate inspections and controls.
If we assume that the Soviet Union is engaging in clandestine tests and we do not test, we are not only excluded from testing for peaceful purposes and for perfecting the means of detecting clandestine tests, but also our failure to test weapons would eventually put us at a serious military disadvantage. Scientists differ as to the full significance of the continuance of this condition, but it must be recognized that continued testing on the part of the Soviet Union and a failure to test on our part would in time produce real weapon advantages for the Soviet Union. Moreover, there is a possibility, if not the probability, of achieving some major break-through which would never be disclosed to the non-tester.
A plan to resume testing, moreover, may be the only way to get an agreement since, otherwise, the USSR will be convinced that there is no need to accept controls. Finally, permitting an unenforceable moratorium to continue indefinitely (something we have said we would not permit) cannot fail to have an adverse effect on US credibility.
B. Arguments against resumption of Weapons Tests
We can be quite certain that any resumption of testing, particularly in the weapons field, would be attended by a heavy propaganda barrage on the part of the Soviet Union, as well as by unfavorable criticism on the part of many important sectors of world opinion on the grounds that the US was taking the first step in renewing the arms race. Although the American case as presented at Geneva has now received favorable support in world opinion, we should have to expect a substantial reversal of that opinion if we resumed tests, even if limited to underground tests. If the US did resume testing, the Soviet Union might either resume testing itself which presumably would be to its advantage, or prefer the psychological advantage it would gain by announcing that it would not engage in testing even if the US did.
A general and continued resumption of testing will make it almost impossible to prevent a proliferation of nuclear capability to other powers who do not now possess such a capability. If the great powers are themselves engaged in testing, their ability to dissuade other countries which have the means and incentive to test from doing so is seriously impaired.
Resumption of testing would result in a further deterioration in the relations between the USSR for which the US will be held responsible. It would relieve the USSR from the pressure to which their adherence to their position with respect to the tripartite administrator might otherwise expose them.
If both sides resume testing, moreover, the Soviets would at least have a renewed opportunity to overtake us in the fields in which we lead, a possibility which must be seriously regarded in view of the forward leaps in their technology. This opportunity would be given them without their having to take the trouble and risk of clandestine tests and without any political liability on their part from testing openly.
C. Possible Alternative Course of Action
A possible alternative is to decide, at this time, only on the detonation of nuclear devices in a seismic research program for the purpose of improving the ability to detect clandestine explosions, withholding a decision on weapons tests until this action has been taken. This might well tend to diminish the unfavorable results from a resumption of testing which have been mentioned above, especially if the detonations for seismic research were accompanied by appropriate safeguards. It would also be more consistent with our purpose of continuing to seek a treaty. If, however, the prospect of the US resuming testing in the weapons field is expected to exert any substantial pressure on the USSR to come to an agreement, this pressure would be diminished if the tests were limited to a seismic research program.
According to informal estimates of the AEC, the first of a series of seismic research tests could be conducted in about ten weeks after a decision to prepare for it was made. Weapons proof tests could be conducted in about the same time. It would be approximately a year before tests could be conducted which would look toward major improvements or radical changes in weapons design.
IV. Communication with Mr. Khrushchev
In accordance with the decisions taken with respect to the foregoing courses of action, and, in any case, in advance of any public announcement of a decision to resume tests, the President and Prime Minister should address a communication to Mr. Khrushchev, framed with a view to eventual publication. This exchange should, at the least, declare US and UK concern at the highest level with the implications of the tripartite control concept and its possible implications. In degree, depending upon the decisions reached with respect to resuming tests and to the kind of tests, it should foreshadow announcement of the decision which has been made.
The communication should give Khrushchev opportunity to alter his position or, if not, it should serve to marshall world opinion in support of Western attitudes toward inspection and control and the whole matter of international organization and peace-keeping machinery.
An exchange of this character between the Heads of State should probably precede any effort to proceed to detailed exchanges between Governments in regard to the constitution of the negotiating body and the site of the negotiations, or upon any statement of general principles upon which they might proceed after July 31, 1961.
Recommendation:
This paper is solely for the purpose of discussion. No recommendation is made at this time."
Rusk
17. Special National Intelligence Estimate /1/
SNIE 11-9-61
Washington, April 25, 1961.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part: "Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission." The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on April 25. The Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
THE POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING DURING THE MORATORIUM
The Problem
To estimate whether the Soviets have conducted clandestine nuclear tests during the moratorium which began in November 1958.
The Estimate
1. The USSR conducted a nuclear test series ending on 3 November 1958, and since that time has indicated that it, along with the US and the UK, was observing a moratorium on testing. In considering whether or not to conduct clandestine nuclear tests during this moratorium, the Soviet leaders would have had to weigh the importance of obtaining additional data for their nuclear weapons program, the possibility of being caught, and the costs of exposure.
Considerations Affecting the Soviet Position
2. Technical Motivations. Soviet nuclear weapon development activity has continued at a high level during the moratorium. Nevertheless, we believe that only limited improvements in Soviet weapons capabilities would have been possible without further tests. An analysis of Soviet weapons development indicates the following principal areas in which the USSR might have desired to conduct further tests since November 1958: (a) tests related to antiballistic missile effects; (b) tests of low yield, light weight devices; (c) tests directed toward increasing economy of fissile materials; (d) tests to improve the yield-to-weight ratio of all classes of nuclear weapons; (e) new areas of development, [2 lines of source text not declassified]. Of these, the Soviet requirement with regard to antiballistic missile effects probably is the most urgent.
3. The necessity for additional Soviet tests to optimize or improve existing weapons, or to develop new designs, depends heavily on Soviet strategy and on the character of future weapon systems. We believe that nuclear weapons are available for all the delivery systems which we know to be in the Soviet arsenal or which we estimate to have been under development. However, many of these weapons probably are not of optimum design, and serious gaps in the Soviet knowledge on weapons effects for certain military applications may exist. Almost certainly there have been pressures within the USSR for continued nuclear testing, on all the various grounds cited above.
4. Political Considerations. The Soviet leaders must have recognized that it would be a major blow to their public position if it were demonstrated to the satisfaction of the bulk of the Free World nations that they had been testing nuclear weapons covertly. They have set great store by their campaign to capture the "peace" theme in world opinion and to present themselves as the proponents, and the West as the opponents, of a halt to the arms race. In balancing the possible political costs against the considerations arguing for covert testing, we believe that the Soviet leaders would have required very high assurances that such testing could not be proved, or even plausibly charged, against them before entering on such a program. At a minimum, this consideration would have narrowed the choice of tests they might make; at a maximum, it would have inhibited them from testing at all./2/
/2/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that this paragraph overemphasizes the Soviet concern for a favorable international image. Further, there is little likelihood of the exposure problem arising since the Soviets can use, indeed probably have used, testing techniques that deny confirmation of violations. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. During the past year or so, some US statements have raised in the Soviet mind the possibility that the American side might soon openly resume testing. This factor probably gave increased weight to arguments within the USSR that it should not run the risk of being caught testing during this period.
Techniques Minimizing the Risk of Detection
6. If the Soviets attempted to conduct clandestine nuclear tests, they would have sought to minimize the risk of detection by doing so under conditions which did not put nuclear debris into the atmosphere./3/ Any such tests would have had to be conducted either underground or in space. The possibility that tests in space can be detected decreases as the distance from the earth is increased. Tests in either of these environments--underground or outer space--are within Soviet capabilities.
/3/[2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] We have no knowledge of Soviet development in this field, and the feasibility of such advanced concepts has not yet been conclusively demonstrated. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, considers that available evidence indicates [2 lines of source text not declassified]. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. At present, the US detection system has no capability to detect nuclear explosions occurring in outer space. However, intelligence does have a capability to direct attention to those missile/space activities which could be employed in such testing. Intelligence probably cannot establish whether nuclear tests in space have in fact taken place, although it might provide some basis for judgment.
8. Fully contained underground tests, like space tests, provide no airborne radioactive debris which would provide positive identification of a nuclear event. However, there are limits to the yields of devices (up to about 100 KT) which can feasibly be tested in this manner, although many of the principal areas of development in which the USSR might have desired to conduct tests since November 1958 (as indicated in paragraph 2, above) could have been accomplished by underground tests of a few kilotons. Moreover, the signals produced by such tests may be detectable by seismic means, although such detected signals cannot be distinguished from natural seismic events. The capability of the seismic component of the US detection system can be significantly degraded by conducting the test in a hard medium, such as granite or salt, or by decoupling. An even greater reduction could be achieved by a combination of these techniques--decoupling in a hard medium. However, the scale of operations required for carrying out decoupling tests is such that other intelligence techniques would have an increased opportunity for detecting them.
Evidence of Possible Testing
9. Proof that nuclear weapons tests have occurred is difficult to obtain without collection of debris, since the other indicators of testing activity are susceptible to alternative explanations. Conversely, proof that tests have not occurred has not been possible. Since 3 November 1958, the US has collected no nuclear debris or other conclusive evidence that the Soviets have conducted nuclear tests. Each year a large number of seismic events are detected in the USSR; some of those occurring during the moratorium could have been the result of nuclear explosions, but none could be identified as such. There are indications from other intelligence sources which have raised the possibility of Soviet evasion of the moratorium by means of contained underground testing, but these also are susceptible to alternative explanations. Each suspected event, or plausible indication, must be examined separately and exhaustively.
10. Accordingly, we have made an intensive survey of all the evidence, from all sources and all regions of the USSR, bearing upon possible Soviet nuclear testing during the moratorium. The most suspicious evidence relates to Southern Turkestan, in particular around Osh, and to Semipalatinsk. The data are most consistent with the thesis that the Soviets had conducted one or more large HE explosions near Osh in the winter of 1959-1960 as a part of their seismic improvement program or to study methods of clandestine nuclear testing, but the conduct of an actual nuclear test cannot be ruled out. Nuclear testing in other areas of Southern Turkestan appears less likely than in the case of the Osh area. The Semipalatinsk proving ground area has remained active since the moratorium, and photography in April 1960 shows evidence of additional but not recent low-yield, venting tests since the previous coverage in August 1957. Evaluation of all evidence indicates it is more likely that these tests occurred between 1957 and the commencement of the moratorium in November 1958 rather than during the moratorium period. An apparent ground zero area outside the fenced shot area was under construction in 1960, but it is probable that this ground zero has not yet been used. There is even less evidence relating to possible testing in areas outside of Southern Turkestan and Semipalatinsk./4/
/4/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the evidence relating to Southern Turkestan and the Semipalatinsk area closely follows a pattern of activity indicative of nuclear testing and that this testing probably took place since November 1958. [Footnote in the source text.]
11. On technical grounds, we cannot exclude the possibility that tests in contained underground environments or, less likely, very low-yield, vented explosions have occurred. However, the political costs of exposure have probably been regarded by the Soviets as high enough to deter them from any kind of nuclear testing which had an appreciable chance of being detected, and we doubt that the technical advantages to be gained from very low-yield tests would have been sufficiently great in the Soviets' mind to justify their conducting them. The conclusion that the Soviets have conducted nuclear tests since 3 November 1958 cannot be drawn from the available evidence./5/-/6/
/5/The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, although concurring that a conclusion as to whether or not the Soviets have been conducting clandestine tests cannot be drawn from the available evidence, considers that the technical advantages to be gained from very low-yield tests could have been sufficiently great in the Soviets' mind to justify their conducting them. He also believes that very low-yield tests conducted underground would almost certainly not be detected. [Footnote in the source text.]
/6/The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, do not support the conclusions reached in this paragraph. They would substitute the following:
The evidence is such that we cannot conclusively establish that the Soviets have or have not tested. The USSR has considerable knowledge of our nuclear detection capabilities. Because of this knowledge and because a high degree of conventional security could be maintained, the Soviets are no doubt aware that but negligible risk of detection is associated with low-yield contained underground, or very low-yield atmospheric tests. Many of the principal development objectives for which the USSR might have desired to conduct tests since November 1958 could have been accomplished by underground tests of a few kilotons. In particular, we believe that the need by the USSR for data on antiballistic missile warhead effects has been critical in the period since November 1958. This need could have been at least partially satisfied by low-yield contained underground testing. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] In the light of the evidence, their technical need to have tested during the period since November 1958, coupled with the negligible risks involved, we conclude that a strong possibility exists that the Soviets have tested since 3 November 1958. [Footnote in the source text.]
18. Letter From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy /1/
London, April 27, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, M-K, 1960-1961. Top Secret.
Dear Mr. President: David Ormsby-Gore is back here after consultations and I believe that Dean is returning to Washington and will no doubt be telling you the same things. It looks as though the Russians have quite lost interest in the Geneva talks and that it is pointless to try to press Tsarapkin further there. The question is what to do.
In the ordinary way I think that you and I might address simultaneous letters to Khrushchev expressing the great importance that we attach to these negotiations and the serious consequences that would flow from their failure. The object would be to engage Khrushchev personally and publicly in the success or failure of the Conference and make it a test of his good faith in the whole disarmament field. If we adopted this course the messages might go in about two weeks' time and meanwhile we would have to consider carefully their exact content and our future action should they meet with a dusty answer. My own feeling is that the Russians will only be induced to reconsider their present negative policy when they have been made to understand that this attitude if maintained will lead to a resumption of testing, the consequent spread of nuclear weapons, and will make renewed negotiations on general disarmament valueless. Just how we should get this across to Khrushchev and how we should play the hand thereafter could no doubt be worked out between our people.
However, I am writing to you personally on this because of your message about your possible visit to Khrushchev. I do not know what your present intentions are, and of course I have kept this news to the smallest possible circle here and the staffs in the Foreign Office know nothing of your intentions. It has occurred to me that, as an alternative to our sending these open letters, you could perhaps put emphasis in any message to Khrushchev on the importance of the Tests Negotiation. You might say that you are very disappointed by the lack of progress and express the hope that, if sufficient progress can be made in Geneva meanwhile, your meeting might be made the occasion if not for signature of the agreement at least for final discussions about it. I do not know what your estimate of the position is, but I suppose that such a course might involve you in publishing the fact of your meeting fairly soon in order to explain why you were prepared to continue negotiating patiently at Geneva and why you were not authorising an early resumption of United States testing. I imagine that it might be unwise to put Khrushchev publicly on notice that the subject of tests was the one important matter which you would particularly wish to discuss with him, because then he would no doubt say that Berlin was something that he would regard as of particular importance.
I should be very interested to hear what you think about this./2/
/2/In a draft reply dated May 16, Kennedy stated that he might be meeting with Khrushchev. Since he did not wish to single out the test talks as the primary object of his discussions with Khrushchev, he also did not believe "we" should write letters to him on that subject before the meeting. Kennedy stated as a "preliminary thought" that if the United States did not "conduct a test prior to the resumption of disarmament negotiations in August of this year, the difficulties of our doing so thereafter would be much increased." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, General 4-5/61) See the Supplement. No final version of this reply has been found.
Yours very sincerely
Harold Macmillan
19. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the President's Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy) /1/
Washington, April 28, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/4-2861. Secret. A copy was sent to Secretary Rusk. The first attachment to this letter, a forwarding memorandum from Burke to McNamara dated April 26, is not printed.
Dear Jack: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have commented on your "Memorandum on Possible Courses of Action Relating to Negotiations with the Soviets on Test Ban Negotiations,"/2/ which you presented to the National Security Council meeting on 22 April. Their views are set forth in the attached memorandum which they have recommended that I forward to you.
/2/See Document 16.
I agree in general with the views expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, except for their suggestion that weapons tests be conducted on a classified and unannounced basis and if detected, these tests, regardless of type, be related directly to the seismological research program. In our open society, I doubt the practicality and wisdom of attempting weapons tests under the cover of the research program. Rather, I would favor announcing that preparations were under way, with the actual announcement of the weapons test to be made shortly before it happens. Also, it is my understanding that it may not always be technically practicable to use nuclear weapons tests for the rather exacting detonation requirements of the seismic research program in which the yield must be accurately forecast.
It is my view that the President should announce that the seismic research explosion program, including nuclear detonations, will begin at an early date, and that preparations will be made to conduct nuclear weapon tests which will produce relatively insignificant radiation effects. At such future time as the nuclear weapon test program has been formulated and preparations for the first detonation have been completed, the President could then announce the actual resumption of nuclear weapon tests a few days before the first shot.
The course recommended above would permit prompt implementation of Project Vela Uniform, for which preparations are well advanced. It would also allow the necessary lead-time to prepare for a carefully considered and profitable nuclear weapon test program.
Sincerely,
Roswell L. Gilpatric/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Gilpatric signed the original.
Appendix/4/
/4/Secret. The source text is marked "Draft" and has no date.
Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President's Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy)
SUBJECT
Memorandum on Possible Courses of Action Relating to Negotiations with the Soviets on Test Ban Negotiations (U)
1. In accordance with our agreement, following the special NSC meeting on 22 April 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied your memorandum on special courses of action relating to negotiations with the Soviets on test ban negotiations. They feel that you have made an excellent analysis of the present situation and have come directly to the heart of the problem. They are generally in accord with the questions you pose, and the various courses of action as you depict them.
2. Your evaluation of the Soviet intentions with reference to dragging out the test ban negotiations in order to combine them with the comprehensive disarmament negotiations are believed to be well founded. Perpetuating current tactics appears to be directed toward inhibiting further development of US technological and military capability and causing harassment and embarrassment to the United States through propaganda media.
3. On numerous occasions in the past and as recently as 18 March 1961,/5/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated that valid and pressing military requirements exist to resume nuclear weapons testing. They have also reiterated their concern as to the current self-imposed moratorium which in no way insures that the military power relations between the United States and the USSR have not deteriorated to the advantage of the USSR.
/5/Apparent reference to Document 9.
4. While it appears to be prudent that announcement of future tests in the sensible atmosphere not be made, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with you that it is now timely to decide upon underground tests, which offer the advantage of both weapon improvement and increased seismic research knowledge. In this light, it appears it would be prudent to announce the resumption of testing to begin at an early date, with particular emphasis on the scientific research program. Weapons tests could be conducted initially under 4.75 seismic equivalent and on a classified and unannounced basis. If detected, these tests, regardless of the type, may be related directly to the seismological research program.
5. The opportunity for the USSR to propagandize this action by the United States is recognized in your memorandum. However, it appears that a carefully conceived and implemented program by the United States could well result in derogatory effect on the Soviets. For example, the fact that the Soviets have repeatedly refused to agree with participation in an over-all seismic research program should offer room for exploitation. Resumption of testing itself may either induce the Soviets to negotiate a treaty, or expose them as merely interested in propaganda objectives.
6. In the absence of any real progress towards agreement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm the requirement that nuclear testing be resumed without further delay in the interest of national security.
20. Editorial Note
At its 482d Meeting on May 2, 1961, the National Security Council discussed the Geneva test ban negotiations. NSC Action No. 2419, approved by the President on May 16, reads:
"a. Noted and discussed a report by the Adviser to the President on Disarmament and the U.S. Representative, Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Test, on the progress of the negotiations in Geneva for a nuclear test ban.
"b. Agreed that the Adviser to the President on Disarmament, with the assistance of an interdepartmental group, should prepare recommendations on future U.S. policy with respect to nuclear testing.
"c. Noted that the Department of Defense would make a presentation to the President on the military factors involved in the resumption of nuclear weapons testing." (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, 1961) Concerning followup to paragraph c., see Document 24.
The account of the NSC meeting in Seaborg's journal reads as follows:
"At 5:15 p.m. I met with the National Security Council at the White House. The President, Vice President, McNamara, Gilpatric, Bell, Rusk, Edward Murrow, Bundy, Wiesner, Dean, McCloy, Dulles, Admiral Burke, Zuckert, Nitze, Fisher and others were also in attendance.
"McCloy gave a brief summary of the present situation and ended by suggesting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff might want to brief the President on the possible accomplishments of testing with the Secretary of State and me present.
"Arthur Dean then gave a status report. He said that he had presented the complete U.S. test ban proposal and expanded upon it from day to day and finally tabled the complete text of the treaty on April 18th. He told them that President Kennedy would recommend to Congress necessary legislation to allow inspection of the devices in connection with the seismic and peaceful uses aspects of the program. He said that for the first time many newspapers in Europe were commending our stand and our action in tabling the complete text. Tsarapkin continues to say that they would be reasonable if they had the tripartite method of administration and he says we want to conduct the decoupling shots in order to learn how to cheat. We have agreed to the possibility of veto of the overall budget, but not on individual items. We are still demanding 20 inspections and they are only offering three.
"In answer to the President's question as to what Dean recommends, Dean said that he wouldn't break off negotiations now, but that he should go back and continue and perhaps the President and Prime Minister Macmillan should send a letter to Khrushchev pinpointing some of the difficulties and suggesting they get down to brass tacks. We probably can't give in on the tripartite demand because this would be giving in on their attack on Dag Hammarskjold. Perhaps the Kennedy-Macmillan letter should be sent about May 22nd, allowing ten days to two weeks for a reply. During that time we could work out a policy as to what the contingencies are. Maybe the President should then announce that we intend to start nuclear weapons testing. This would bring us to about June 15th.
"The interested agencies should prepare for the President a comparison of the relative United States-Soviet gain from testing. The President said that we might state publicly that we have evidence that the Soviets are testing. Dulles, when asked, said that we can't exclude the possibility on technical grounds that they are conducting underground tests, but he doubts they are, due to the risk; the Air Force dissents from this point of view. Bundy suggested that McCloy and an interdepartmental group should work up a statement of the pros and cons of our resuming nuclear weapons testing. The President wondered whether he should make any statement before Dean returns to Geneva and Dean thought that he should highlight the problem. It was concluded that the President might express a hope for progress, etc., at his Friday press conference." (Seaborg, Journal, volume 1, pp. 238, 241. Page references are not continuous owing to interpolated materials in the journals as published.)
For the President's statement on the Geneva Conference at his news conference on May 5, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pages 142-143.
21. Record of Meeting /1/
Washington, May 4, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA Disarmament General, 4-5/61. Top Secret. Drafted by Komer.
RECORD OF MEETING ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN ISSUE 4 MAY 1961
PRESENT
The President, Secretary Rusk, Mr. Bundy, Mr. McCloy, Dr. Wiesner, Mr. Dean, Mr. Komer
The first subject taken up was Mr. McCloy's draft press conference statement for this Friday./2/ The President wanted the significance of the new Soviet demand for a triumvirate spelled out a bit more, perhaps with an example. Certain other minor amendments were made.
/2/McCloy's draft is ibid. For Kennedy's statement at the May 5 news conference, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 142-143.
Mr. McCloy cited his talks with Walter Lippmann/3/ to buttress his view that the "triad" was a fundamental Soviet concept. The Soviets realized that the Secretary General had now acquired a major role and begun to operate; he just wasn't an administrative officer as was contemplated in 1945. McCloy could understand the Soviet position and felt that we too would have objected in 1945 if the Senate had thought the Secretary General would become such an important figure. The question of the triad runs across the whole spectrum of international issues--it is absolutely central to an effectively functioning UN as well as all sorts of disarmament measures.
/3/The talk is not further identified.
Mr. McCloy felt that this and other political issues were more important than the military arguments with respect to test resumption. The Soviets think that we don't have the nerve to test. Mr. McCloy felt that Moscow still wanted a test ban but on an essentially uninspected basis.
The President indicated that Mr. Dean must go back and see. We must also get the UK to say something. They consistently try to put us out in front. Mr. Rusk thought they would be reluctant to say anything positive.
Mr. Dean described how he had raised with Dr. Scoville of CIA the idea of his suggesting to Tsarapkin that the Soviets let us come in and see that they are not testing, say at Osh. Dr. Scoville was opposed on two grounds. First because the Soviets might ask to see our Nevada test site in return and second because if we went in and saw nothing the Soviets would get a big propaganda gain. The President opined that the Soviets wouldn't let us in anyway if they were testing. He regarded the resumption issue as a really tough one. The Soviets had us right on the propaganda hook. Our only hope for an agreement was if they feared proliferation enough. He felt that we have got to begin building our psychological case, and saying that we hope all those who favor disarmament will join us in putting pressure on the Soviets. Secretary Rusk felt that we should attempt to generate such pressure only in diplomatic channels for if we got public opinion stirred up it might turn on us if we resumed testing.
Mr. Bundy, replying to the President's query, urged that the President submit to the JCS briefing so that no one could say, especially on the Hill, that the military had not been fully consulted. The President agreed that the JCS should have their day in court./4/
/4/See Document 24.
Mr. Bundy outlined the need for an immediate and systematic analysis of test resumption options, bringing everybody into the act, and ending up with recommendations. He saw no harm if various departments took different positions. The President mentioned that if we must start testing, we might wait until some international event occurred, e.g. a Berlin crisis, which would appear to justify it. Alternatively, we could start with seismic tests only, contending that these tests were in fact devoted to the purpose of achieving an adequate verifiable test ban.
Mr. Dean brought up the need to decide this issue before the test ban talks got merged with the comprehensive negotiations scheduled to begin on 31 July. The President felt we might even say to the Soviets that we did not see much point in comprehensives unless the fundamental issue of the triad were settled. Mr. McCloy felt that we should vigorously probe the Soviets along these lines in the forthcoming bilaterals.
RWK/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
22. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the National Security Council /1/
Washington, May 15, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61. Secret; Restricted Data. A copy was sent to McCloy.
The Defense Department is scheduled to review with the National Security Council on Friday, May 19, certain data relating to the resumption of atomic weapons testing.
Attached for your information is a copy of the material to be presented to the Council. The document reflects the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Defense Research & Engineering,/2/ Mr. Gilpatric, and myself.
/2/Harold Brown.
Robert S. McNamara
Enclosure
Paper Prepared by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Brown)
QUESTIONS BEARING UPON THE RESUMPTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS TESTING
Answers to the following questions are pertinent to the position which should be taken by the United States with respect to the resumption of atomic weapons testing.
(1) What evidence do we have that the Soviets are continuing to test?
Answer: We have no proof that the Soviets are testing, nor do we have any proof to the contrary. Since the beginning of the moratorium in 1958, there has been a continuing and vigorous association between development laboratories and individuals known to have been associated with testing programs prior to the moratorium and activities at sites which are particularly suitable for underground testing. It is questionable whether this evidence can support a firm belief that the Soviets are doing nuclear testing. The proper conclusion to reach from this situation, however, is that under present circumstances intelligence indications cannot in fact produce any conclusion about whether or not the Soviets are testing which is firm enough so that national policy can be based upon it.
The Soviets evidenced great interest in pure fusion devices as early as 1952, and in 1958 produced scientific papers on experimental work dating back to the earlier days, which had been done in a related area. The work done at that time involved very low levels of fusion reaction and was far from constituting an explosion, although the Soviets mentioned possible explosive uses as a conceivable future development. [12-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
(2) What does the Department of Defense consider to be the military objectives (or information) to be attained through the resumption of testing?
Answer: The objectives of resuming testing are important, numerous, and varied. The following are indicated as the ones of most importance and interest to the Department of Defense:
(a) To pursue the development of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] pure fusion weapons. These are particularly applicable to limited warfare, but if successfully developed, also for general application to the whole spectrum of defensive and offensive weapons systems. Such weapons provide anti-personnel effects over a well defined radius without wholesale physical destruction or radioactive fallout. [5 lines of source text not declassified]
[12 lines of source text not declassified] Its effects on limited war could be very great.
On the other hand, it should be pointed out that the U.S. has some tactical nuclear weapon capability [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. If no cutoff of fissile material production takes place, tens of thousands of such weapons using [4 lines of source text not declassified] could be made available without unacceptable diversion from other uses. By exploding them at a height above the ground of several fireball radii, the military problem of fallout is avoided although there may still be a substantial psychological problem. These fission weapons would, however, be considerably less effective (covering perhaps 1/20 of the area) for a given yield, and the yield would tend to be the limiting factor with regard to acceptable blast or thermal effects.
(b) To develop a spectrum of reduced size and weight weapons, without undue sacrifice of yield, for particular application to strategic missile systems for the purpose of improving survivability and penetrability. This development affords the prospect of strategic missile warheads in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] (i) for use singly in lightweight missile systems capable of high mobility and a high degree of invulnerability at relatively low cost or (ii) for cluster warheads in present or future systems to improve penetrability against an anti- missile defense. The development of these weapons would proceed through straightforward extension of the present state of the art.
The effect of the availability of such weapons of lower weight on our deterrent capability depends on how marginal that capability is otherwise considered to be. It is clear that going from [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Advances in the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] pound range are likely to have a smaller influence, since the U.S. already has a considerable degree of mobility in its retaliatory force, and could get greater and more diversified mobility even without nuclear tests.
Developments of small strategic weapons certainly will enable us to create new systems which plug soft spots in our arsenal of second-strike weapons, by allowing us to use smaller missiles which are thereby made easier to deliver from mobile (land, sea, or air) launchers, or by increasing the multiplicity of warheads and thus saturating possible defenses, or by any combination thereof. It is also possible to reduce such weaknesses by developments in other areas of weaponry. But cutting off nuclear tests clearly inhibits the U.S. from developments toward reduced vulnerability in what has been one of the most rapidly changing areas (reduction of warhead weight).
(c) To determine the lethal ranges for various kill mechanisms against ballistic missile re-entry vehicles for warheads. The range of some of these mechanisms is fairly well known against specific warhead designs. There are others whose existence is known but whose range is not. In view of the frequency with which such mechanisms have been found, it is likely that there are still others, whose nature is still unknown, with perhaps still larger lethal radii. Knowledge of this kind is important both in examining U.S. possibilities for defense against ballistic missile attack, and in deciding how our ballistic missile attacks (including the nature of the re-entry vehicle, degree of saturation, and the necessary separation between warheads) must be planned if the Soviets should begin to deploy an AICBM system of their own.
On the other hand, considerable work can be done without nuclear explosions to reduce the uncertainties in the lethal radius for those effects whose nature is known. The uncomfortably large factor between the large value we must assume for possible lethal radii against our own warheads and the small lethal radius which we must assume our own AICBM's would have against Soviet warheads is a result of four factors. One of them is the lack of nuclear tests which could provide more precise lethal radii produced by a given warhead against a re-entry vehicle. Another is our uncertainty about the nature of the Soviet re-entry vehicle which is probably not matched by a corresponding uncertainty on their part about ours. A third is that we do not know the yield of possible AICBM's which the Soviets might deploy, and the lethal radius goes up with the square root of the yield. The fourth is that we must deal with a Soviet first strike against us, and consider a second strike by us against the Soviets; under these circumstances we are talking about our small warheads, which tend to be more vulnerable, and Soviet larger ones which can be made very much less so.
Only one of these factors of uncertainty can be reduced by nuclear testing. However, nuclear testing might conceivably disclose other effects which could create very large lethal radii, which are now unknown and therefore not subject to examination in terms of past nuclear experiments. Furthermore, it is possible that very cheap and very light warheads might allow a barrage approach to AICBM at acceptable cost. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Much of the nuclear testing of use in this connection would be underground. Some of the more complex phenomena might have to be examined in outer space.
It should be added that some nuclear tests could disclose smaller lethal radii than had been expected. Such nuclear tests by either side would tend to increase stability, since it is hard to think of anything more dangerous than an AICBM system which was believed to work but actually did not.
(d) To provide adequate assurance that new weapons entering stockpile to meet our most critical needs will function properly. A number of important weapons under development or in production have not been tested as finally designed (e.g., warheads for Polaris, Minuteman, and Skybolt). Functional tests can be performed underground at yields which are small fractions of the design yields.
Though these weapons have not been tested in their operational configuration, it should be understood that they have been certified by the AEC as having the same assurance of functioning as those which have been tested. By testing them in this way, however, more precise predictions of their full yield may be made.
(3) What would be the relative advantages to the United States and the USSR of testing by both sides?
Answer: Assuming both sides test and disregarding the effect, if any, of a treaty or a continued uncontrolled moratorium on nth power acquisition of strategic weapons, it appears that the strategic situation would be stabilized by the development by either or both sides of smaller thermonuclear warheads. Our development of such weapons would enhance our deterrent capability much more than Soviet development of large or small thermonuclear weapons would improve their first-strike capability. Correspondingly, their development of small thermonuclear weapons would degrade our counterforce capability.
This last point is relevant only if counterforce is otherwise a feasible U.S. strategy. What has made counterforce unattractive to the U.S. even from the purely military point of view has been Soviet secrecy which has been able to keep the location of even quite large missiles hidden from the U.S. So long as this continues the Soviets have no particular need for smaller warheads.
How important this increase in stability is likely to be will depend on whether our deterrent strategy now or at a later time has severe soft spots, in terms of such things as vulnerability of our missiles either before launch or to Soviet AICBM, etc.
It is generally assumed that the U.S. knows more about the effects of nuclear explosions in space and the upper atmosphere than the Soviet Union. If one believes that the Nike-Zeus warhead is the right AICBM warhead, then it is probably true that the corresponding Soviet warhead would either weigh more or give less yield. This argues that resumed testing by both sides would enable the Soviets to "catch up". On the other hand, despite our "lead" in these areas, we have not been able to develop a satisfactory AICBM system. This argues strongly that to "catch up" in nuclear warheads will not produce such a system for the Soviets either. If in fact they do deploy an AICBM system of the terminal interception Nike-Zeus type, it indicates either they know more about suitable nuclear (or non-nuclear) AICBM warheads than we do or that they are making a mistake. Both of these results would be cause for great concern, which a continued moratorium would in no way remove.
It may be that some of the new warhead developments [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] or effects which are unknown or about which we know little could have a large influence on AICBM. Any such possibility depends on knowledge about nuclear weapons and their effects which we do not possess, and therefore resumed testing by both sides is unlikely to make our relative position any worse.
One may also want to consider the situation in which residual military forces have an important effect on the nature and condition of the nation, and on the termination of the war. Then quantitative improvement by a factor of three to ten in weight of strategic offensive weapons could be an important influence on both sides. In very light strategic weapons (below 2000 pounds) the Soviets appear to be somewhat behind the U.S., and might therefore gain more than we if both sides resume testing and eventually become equal. Of course, their relative gain would be still greater if they test clandestinely and the U.S. does not test.
When it comes to the matter of nuclear weapons for limited war, we know much less about the Soviet program than about their strategic weapons. In particular, in the case of the pure fusion bombs, there is no way of telling whether the Soviets are ahead of us or behind us, and if both sides test in this area there is no particular reason to expect alteration in relative capability. It may be argued that the U.S. has a greater need of these than the Soviet Union in order to overcome a disparity in conventional armament. This asymmetry might well instead be overcome by a free-world build up in conventional armament (and anti-guerrilla capability), but it is a fact that the asymmetry now exists and will persist for some time. Even if the pure fusion bombs are developed, it may not be possible to use them in many areas of the world without fear of escalation. Whether threats of such escalation would deter a side which had sole possession of such weapons cannot be foreseen.
All the above has been on the basis that both sides resume testing. In view of the answer to question (1) above, which indicated that U.S. intelligence can in fact not provide convincing evidence either that the Soviets are or are not testing in the low-yield range, the situation in which only one side tests must be offered for comparison. Recognizing these limitations of intelligence under a continuing moratorium or under a treaty of the kind the Soviet Union now insists on, the Soviet Union could if it so desired carry out low yield underground tests without fear of U.S. acquisition of information on which we could act. There would thus be no deterrence to Soviet clandestine testing.
[3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The precise military effects of such a situation are difficult to evaluate, but the Soviets would clearly be able to gain in the strategic areas, and might produce a very dangerous unbalance in AICBM. [2 lines of source text not declassified] In any event, under such circumstances they could do far more than "catch up".
(4) What specific devices would be tested in the near future?
Answer: This question is best answered by the Atomic Energy Commission since the Commission would design the test program to meet the objectives outlined above and other important goals. The attached list, however, indicates a number of the devices which we understand would be readied for testing within the next year.
(5) How do the above conclusions compare with those of the Fisk Panel?
Answer: Although this document weighs the various factors differently than does the Fisk Panel Report, the technical evaluations are consistent with those in that report. Several new factors have appeared which change the situation somewhat, although not drastically.
The first is the further development of the pure fusion work in the AEC laboratories. This makes the achievement of such weapons appear quite likely, although the Fisk Panel Report already assumed that they were possible.
The second is that further study indicates the likelihood of larger lethal radii against U.S. ICBM's than previously has been believed to be the case. Although nuclear tests would resolve some of the most important questions about these lethal radii, much can be done by non-nuclear experiments and calculations. The relative importance of nuclear tests and non-nuclear tests and calculations is subject to the usual debate. Whatever the merits of this argument, the existence of larger lethal radii against existing warheads narrows the margin of strategic deterrence. It thus tends to make possible advances in strategic nuclear warheads a more critical item in the deterrent balance.
A third and perhaps more important factor is that the Fisk Report assumed that even small-scale violations would be subject to some risk of detection in case of acceptance of the U.S. draft Treaty. Therefore, although it considered a variety of cases, it predicated its approach on the basis that the Soviets would have to weigh their possible gains against the consequences of being caught and a real risk of detection. The Fisk Panel Report therefore evaluated the military situation by comparing the case in which both sides test and that in which we do not and the Soviets do some cheating, with the situation in which neither side tests. As the political situation is now evaluated, there will be either no treaty, or if there is a treaty the control system will be virtually powerless. The deterrence of violation would appear to be either very much weakened or non-existent. The case in which both sides refrain from testing probably can no longer be the standard to which one refers the other cases for comparison.
Harold Brown
Attachment
Tentative and Partial List of Weapons Tests To Be Undertaken Within the Next Year
1. [1 line of source text not declassified]
2. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
3. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
4. [1 line of source text not declassified]
5. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
6. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
7. [1 line of source text not declassified]
23. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of Defense McNamara /1/
Washington, May 17, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/AE Files: FRC 69 A 2243, 97 USP Nuclear Test Suspension/Geneva (1960-1962). Secret; Restricted Data. A copy was sent to Philip J. Farley.
SUBJECT
Future U.S. Policy Regarding Negotiations with the Soviets on the Test Ban
Mr. McCloy is contemplating a meeting of the Committee of Principals on Monday, 22 May,/2/ to discuss a memorandum which he has prepared on the above subject./3/ The memorandum has not yet been transmitted formally to the Principals.
/2/The meeting was held on May 23; see Document 26.
/3/This 24-page memorandum was attached but is not printed.
A briefing paper and an advance copy of Mr. McCloy's memorandum are attached for your use at the proposed meeting.
William P. Bundy/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Bundy signed the original.
Enclosure
BRIEFING PAPER
FUTURE UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON THE TEST BAN
Mr. McCloy has forwarded a memorandum on this subject (copy at Tab A) for discussion at an early meeting of the Committee of Principals, which he has proposed for Monday, 22 May. This memorandum, with more emphasis on the political aspects, covers the same ground as Dr. Harold Brown's memorandum to you of 13 May 1961, Subject: Department of Defense Policy on Resumption of Nuclear Weapons Tests.
Mr. McCloy's memorandum sets forth accurately the current situation at Geneva, and states it is clear that the intent of the Soviet negotiators is to avoid a prompt conclusion of a test ban agreement. He poses two questions to be decided:
A. Should the U.S. sometime in June or July of 1961 indicate that it is preparing to resume nuclear tests?
B. Should the U.S. actually detonate a nuclear device prior to July 31, 1961, and, if so, what sort of a nuclear device should be detonated?
The memorandum then covers objectively the arguments for and against the resumption of nuclear testing. Mr. McCloy concludes that if, after a final approach to Mr. Khrushchev by the President and Mr. Macmillan, there is no significant change in the Soviet approach, the United States, acting in concert with the United Kingdom, should indicate that it is preparing to resume nuclear weapons tests, at the same time indicating the U.S. does not propose to test on the surface of the earth, in the ocean or in the sensible atmosphere. (This answers Question A.)
The memorandum then explores arguments for and against the detonation of a nuclear weapon or other device before July 31, 1961, and implies that a test of a nuclear weapon before that date would not be in our best interests. A nuclear detonation in the seismic research program (Vela Uniform) is indicated to be preferable. (This states an implied answer to Question B.)
Mr. McCloy then makes seven detailed recommendations (Section V, pages 22-24). These appear generally consistent with the recommended Defense position on resumption of nuclear weapon testing which was submitted by DDR&E on 13 May 1961 for the Secretary's approval, and can be supported by Defense subject to the following comments:
a. Recommendations 1 and 2 state in substance that if, after a high level approach to Mr. Khrushchev, no significant change ensues in the Soviet attitude, the U.S. should decide to resume nuclear weapons testing. Although not stated in the recommendations, the text of the memorandum (top of Page 11) states that "the U.S., acting in concert with the U.K., should indicate that it is preparing to resume nuclear weapons tests." In view of the past reluctance of the U.K. in this matter, the U.S. should be prepared to proceed unilaterally if necessary.
b. Recommendation 4 states that the announcement would indicate that the U.S. "considers itself free to resume weapons testing and that it plans to do so as soon as this will afford it an advance in weapons development of major military significance." Perhaps the U.S. in a public announcement should not be this specific, but should state the testing is essential to U.S. national security.
c. The last sentence of Recommendation 4 states that it should be indicated the U.S. has no plans to test on the surface of the earth or in the sensible atmosphere, while the text of the memorandum (second paragraph, Page 11) also includes "in the ocean." Defense would prefer the less restrictive language in the recommendation, and preferably some more general language regarding "tests which will produce relatively insignificant radiation effects."
24. Editorial Note
At its 484th meeting on May 19, 1961, the National Security Council discussed military considerations involved in the resumption of nuclear testing. NSC Action No. 2426, approved by the President on May 19, reads:
"Noted and discussed a presentation by Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, based on a paper circulated to the members of the National Security Council on May 15 which reflects the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense." (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, 1961)
The account of the meeting in Seaborg's journal reads as follows:
"From 3 p.m. to 4 p.m. I attended a meeting of the National Security Council at the White House. Present at the main table were: President Kennedy, Messrs. Dulles, Wiesner, Bell, Dillon, Bundy, Harold Brown, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, McNamara, Chester Bowles, McCloy, me. At the side tables were: Fisher, Gullion, Curtis LeMay and a large number of military people. The purpose of the meeting was to hear a briefing by Harold Brown on questions bearing upon the resumption of atomic weapons testing. McNamara introduced Brown who then gave his presentation. After this briefing, there was general discussion. The President asked what the Russians needed most from testing, and the answer was that they did not need bigger strategic warheads, but most likely needed lighter, more maneuverable ones. The President asked LeMay, that if we made a strike, would we have enough to prevent retaliation; LeMay said we probably would not. LeMay suggested that both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. probably should go the route of the development of smaller missiles. The President asked further questions, such as the degree of reliability of the Atlas and Polaris, etc., and LeMay gave some estimates.
"The President said that the reactions from our embassies around the world all gave the estimate that the reaction to our resumption of testing would be very adverse. The President said that all factors must be weighed and, if the decision appears to be a close one, perhaps we should wait for a time before resuming testing; but if the answer seems clear, we should begin immediately to think of the public steps that should be taken.
"Bundy made the point that better evidence on the question of whether the U.S.S.R. is testing is very important. Dulles said that the evidence simply is not and cannot be good in the range of low yields, and whether we get the answer through Intelligence is just a matter of luck.
"The President then raised the question of our immediate course of action in view of the impending meeting between himself and Khrushchev on June 3rd. One possibility seemed to be that an announcement might be made Monday that the President was asking Arthur Dean to come back from Geneva, and thus the President could see him before he leaves for Paris at the end of the week. Another possibility might be to issue a statement over the weekend and have Dean come back in time for the Meeting of the Principals on Monday (May 22nd). He asked Mr. McCloy and Mr. Murrow to think about a course of action here. This course of action should also contemplate building up public attention to the problem posed by the Russian position. The President raised the question of where we should do the testing and on what time scale it should be announced if he does decide to resume." (Seaborg, Journal, volume 1, pages 275, 282. Page references are not continuous because of interpolated materials in the journal as published.) Documentation on the inquiries to Embassies abroad and their replies is in Department of State, Central Files 600.0012 and 397.5611-GE for March-May 1961.
Seaborg states that at the President's birthday dinner held May 27, Kennedy gave him the impression that he doubted there was any need for testing nuclear weapons at that time. (Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban, page 66)
25. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
Washington, May 19, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Test Ban Negotiations 4-6/61. Secret.
SUBJECT
Comments on McNamara Briefing Paper on Nuclear Test Resumption/2/
/2/Document 22.
Neither this paper nor the Fisk Report/3/ alters my conviction that there is no great military gain to us from resumption of nuclear tests if the Soviets also resume. While nuclear technology is one area where we are probably well ahead, and we have many interesting new weapons possibilities, these presumably would also become available to the Soviets in time. Indeed, much of the DOD case is that if we don't resume the Soviets may pull ahead.
/3/See Document 4.
Thus to me the guts of the military case is not that we gain so much from testing, but that if we do not do so we run a growing risk of Soviet clandestine testing, which could result in a growing security disadvantage. While intelligence cannot demonstrate that the Soviets are or are not testing, the important thing is that their technical motivations for doing so are growing over time (just like ours). Presumably their ability to test clandestinely also increases with the time available for study and preparation. Thus our worries will grow with time.
DOD's strong argument that advanced versions of present weapons [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] will permit us to produce cheaply thousands of nuclear weapons is highly inconsistent with our new strategic thinking. Even though the new models were smaller, cheaper, more economical, and less dangerous in fallout terms, they just wouldn't give us a whole new capability beyond what we already have. The same argument seems to apply to smaller ICBMs. Sure they would be swell, but is there an imperative need for them?
The AICBM argument has more to it, but this is an unknown area where we have no assurance that testing will produce anything new.
In sum, I still feel that political arguments, rather than military, make the real case for test resumption. Given the history of US/USSR competition in military technology, we are kidding ourselves if we think that we can gain a real jump on the other guy (or he on us) if both test. However, I grant the military argument that if we continue to observe a voluntary, unpoliced moratorium at a time when clandestine testing by the enemy (if not already underway) becomes increasingly likely, we may find ourselves in a real box.
Bob K
26. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
Washington, May 23, 1961, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies, ACDA, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, 3/61-11/63. Secret; Restricted Data. Drafted by Goodby and approved by Rusk on May 25.
SUBJECT
Meeting of Committee of Principals on Nuclear Test Negotiations
PARTICIPANTS
(See Tab A)/2/
/2/The list of 28 participants from 6 agencies is not printed.
Meeting of Committee of Principals, May 23, 11 A.M.
Secretary Rusk put four questions to the Committee of Principals for a discussion of the nuclear weapons test negotiations. The four questions were:
1. Is there any real prospect that a treaty to ban tests will result from the present negotiations in Geneva?
2. Is there a real and serious national defense interest in testing nuclear weapons?
3. On political grounds, can we accept the notion of an uncontrolled ban on tests?
4. If we must resume nuclear weapons tests, what are the political considerations involved in doing so?
For an answer to the first question, Secretary Rusk turned to Ambassador Dean, who said that in his view the prospects for agreement were pretty dim at the present time. Ambassador Dean did not, however, wish to exclude entirely the possibility of agreement. He went on to say that the Soviet Union had been dissatisfied with the organization of the United Nations and that the Soviet Union clearly did not intend to let any organization have the independent power to influence matters in which the Soviet Union had a strong interest. For this reason, Ambassador Dean was inclined to think that the Soviet's proposal for a tripartite Administrative Council was rather fundamental as a part of the Soviet over-all position. There nevertheless was a possibility--and this had been mentioned to Ambassador Dean by Mr. Krishna Menon--that the Soviet Union might be impressed by the lack of support for the tripartite proposal in the United Nations. But to sum up, Ambassador Dean could only report that the prospects for agreement in Geneva appeared "pretty dim".
Secretary Rusk remarked that he could confirm the fundamental nature of the tripartite or "troika" proposal in Soviet thinking. Gromyko had told him that the security interests of the Soviet State must not be affected by decisions made by other people. The Secretary continued that the desire for general disarmament might also be fundamental in Soviet thinking. If the Soviet Union discovered that the "troika" was a bar to reaching agreements on disarmament, it was possible that the Soviets might conclude that it was more important to achieve disarmament than to retain the "troika" concept. At present, however, it was clear that the Soviets were promoting both disarmament and the "troika" idea with equal vigor.
Secretary Rusk then asked Ambassador Dean whether there was any doubt that the "troika" would paralyze the inspection machinery for the test ban treaty. Ambassador Dean replied that there was no doubt about it and he pointed as an example to the procedures for getting inspection teams quickly to the sites of suspicious events. If a single administrator were to be replaced by a debating society, the procedures for rapid implementation of the treaty would break down. Ambassador Dean thought some face-saving gesture to the Soviet Union might be made, such as offering to set up a three-man seismological advisory group to advise the Administrator on the eligibility of seismic events for inspection; the U.S., however, should not give in on the substance of this question.
Summing up discussion on the first question he had posed, the Secretary stated that all seemed in agreement that there was little present prospect for achieving a treaty in the test ban negotiations. There was no dissent from this.
The Secretary then turned to his second question, i.e., what was the national defense interest in testing?
Secretary McNamara said that he felt the gross advantage to the U.S. from a resumption of testing was substantial. In the first place, there would be a reduction in the costs of warheads which would be reflected even more importantly in the reduction of costs of delivery vehicles. This saving might amount to tens of billions of dollars over a period of years. Dr. Wiesner said he thought the savings would not begin to be realized until four or five years from now. To this, Secretary McNamara replied that in obligational terms this was not so far ahead.
In the second place, Secretary McNamara continued, there was a potential for the development of pure fusion weapons. [12-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The end result would be that within a well defined circle it would be possible to knock out enemy troops while just outside this area, friendly troops would not be harmed. He noted that with ordinary nuclear weapons it was difficult to know just what the total effects would be, because of variations in meteorological conditions at the time of their use. [7 lines of source text not declassified]
Secretary McNamara concluded that it was possible, although it could not be guaranteed, that an effective anti-ICBM weapon could be developed if testing were resumed. He felt there was much to learn and much to gain in this field.
In response to a question by Secretary Rusk, Dr. Brown said that testing in the atmosphere probably would not be necessary to determine the kill radius of anti-ICBM weapons.
As to the net results to be expected from testing by the U.S., plus testing by the Soviet Union, Secretary McNamara stated that he could not give a very satisfactory answer. It was his personal opinion that the differential in weapons capability between ourselves and the Soviet Union would be at least as great in the future as it was today if both sides resumed testing. He concluded by stating that he strongly urged the resumption of nuclear weapons testing.
A discussion ensued as to the Soviet interest in nuclear weapons in relation to its objectives in the nuclear test ban conference. Secretary McNamara remarked that it was possible, of course, that the Soviet Union did not want a test ban. Dr. Wiesner said that the Soviet Union might have a different assessment from ours of whether nuclear weapons would be used in the future. Dr. Scoville noted that there was evidence that the Soviet Union had tested tactical weapons and Secretary McNamara said there was strong evidence that the Soviets were working vigorously on anti-ICBM weapons.
Dr. Wiesner noted that an asymmetry between the Soviet Union and the United States had developed in the ICBM field because the U.S. had developed small warheads which were more vulnerable to anti-ICBM efforts than were the larger warheads used by the Soviet Union. On the ground, the U.S.'s ICBMs were less vulnerable than the Soviets?, but on re-entry, they were more vulnerable. Secretary McNamara said that the Polaris and Minuteman missiles could be improved by further testing and that decoys could then be used more extensively. Dr. Wiesner said he believed the anti-ICBM problem was one of our most difficult technical questions and one which was least likely of being successfully solved. Dr. Brown agreed that it was extremely difficult to meet a strong, sophisticated and decoyed attack.
General LeMay added that one of the things wrong with missiles was their unreliability. If we could make warheads, and hence, missiles smaller we could afford to test more of them and thus increase their reliability. Secretary McNamara agreed that again a question of cost was involved.
Mr. McCloy asked Dr. Brown for his view of the results of resumed testing by both the Soviet Union and the United States. Dr. Brown replied that in the long run, since both sides have approximately the same capability, testing by both sides would result in the Soviet Union and the United States achieving approximate parity. However, which side needed nuclear weapons most was another question. For example, if both the Soviet Union and the United States were to develop smaller missiles, this would help the United States more than it would help the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union to begin with had an easier job of hiding its missiles. Dr. Scoville added that the Soviet Union might be behind the United States in the area of nuclear testing related to defense against ballistic missiles.
Returning to the question of the economic impact, Dr. Wiesner said he wished to make clear his belief that the savings which had been referred to would be realized several years ahead and not in the 1964-65 period. He finally wished to note that if the Soviet Union tested clandestinely, which it probably could, and the United States did not test, it would be bad for the United States both in terms of economics and in terms of the military situation.
Secretary Rusk asked whether the Department of Defense was worried about the Nth country problem. Secretary McNamara replied that he was concerned about the Nth country problem, but he could not see a clear relation between the test ban and this problem. What did concern Secretary McNamara was the possibility that some other country could develop [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
Ambassador Dean inquired whether testing limited to underground was acceptable or whether it might not be necessary to test in outer space. Dr. Brown said he felt that tests generally could be limited to underground although some of the more esoteric types of experiments might best be conducted in space. Dr. Wiesner said he felt the important consideration was that any United States? testing should not produce fallout. Mr. McCloy asked whether underground tests involved the possibility of venting and whether the radioactivity had to be washed out from the site of the underground explosion. Dr. Brown said the possibility of venting was negligible if the site was properly chosen and the test occurred sufficiently far underground. As regards washing out the radioactivity, it was not necessary to do that. He noted that over the years since the Rainier tests, the radioactivity from that test had migrated distances measured only in tens of feet.
Turning to the third question which he had posed, namely the political acceptability of the notion of an uncontrolled ban on tests, Secretary Rusk said he felt there was a disadvantage in continuing a moratorium without control. Our position on the need for controls would be eroded if an uncontrolled moratorium were permitted to continue and we would be under increasing pressure to accept agreements without control. Mr. McCloy agreed with this assessment. With respect to the world reaction from a resumption of testing, Secretary Rusk said he felt there was an important difference between testing which would produce fallout and testing which would not produce fallout. The latter, Secretary Rusk stated, was a manageable political problem.
The Secretary then inquired how much could be done underground in the way of weapons development. Secretary McNamara said he thought a great deal could be done underground. Ambassador Dean asked about outer space tests, and Chairman Seaborg said we would not be ready for such tests within two years.
Dr. Wiesner said it was his opinion that the military considerations involved were so long range in nature that the political considerations should be the determining factors in timing the resumption of testing. Secretary McNamara said he would agree only if it were understood that a delay in resumption of testing would not mean an indefinite and perhaps permanent postponement of testing.
Secretary Rusk thought that tests should not be conducted for purely political reasons. If a test were conducted, it should be because of its military significance. Furthermore, he did not see much difference in the public reaction that could be expected as between seismic research detonations and a weapons test. He did not see much sense in "easing" into the testing of weapons. Secretary Rusk then inquired what the time lag was between instructions to prepare for testing and the actual test.
Chairman Seaborg replied that there was a continuous gradation in importance of individual weapons tests; there was no discontinuity between the more and the less important. Proof testing could begin ten weeks from the time the laboratories were asked to start preparations.
Ambassador Dean said he felt the United States should decide on which were the most fruitful tests and that these should be conducted first. It should be recognized that political repercussions could be expected from testing and if it were decided that the military importance of resuming tests was overriding, then the United States should resume tests in the most meaningful way possible. Chairman Seaborg noted that there was a weapons test [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] which could be conducted in about ten weeks. He felt that perhaps all the possible tests might not be carried out at the end of the ten-week period because, to a certain extent, they interfered with each other. The test holes would be used up if all three shots were fired at about the same time.
Secretary Rusk then referred to his fourth question for discussion; the problem of working out the political considerations involved in resumption of tests. Mr. Murrow stated that nothing which had been said in the meeting would be very persuasive in convincing public opinion around the world of the need for U.S. resumption of tests. The public would not find convincing the argument that testing should be resumed because it will cut costs or because the kill radius could be increased or because there were some possible, but perhaps unlikely, improvements which might be made in anti-ICBM defenses. The only possibility of convincing the public in other countries of our need for testing would be if the President could say that the national security and indeed the national survival of the United States was at stake. Furthermore, the Soviet Union might even say that it would not test nuclear weapons and then proceed to test clandestinely. Mr. Murrow said he felt Ambassador Dean and Mr. McCloy had made great progress in selling the world on our proposals and on our appetite for the treaty. Secretary Rusk said our position should be built on the idea that the United States would stop testing if the Soviet Union modified its impossible positions in the test negotiations. Secretary McNamara agreed to the importance of this point.
(At this point Secretary Rusk left the meeting.)
Mr. McCloy said that we could not blink the fact that the reaction of the public around the world would be bad. There would be a worsening of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. This might make the world more unstable and result in less security for the United States. There was a dilemma in this because while there were many political reasons for not testing, it was also true that an uncontrolled moratorium on testing might pull the whole rug out from under us on other disarmament matters. One thing was clear and that was that we could not let the conference drift.
Mr. McCloy said he had thought we might tell the Soviets that we would not discuss disarmament with them on July 31 nor would we table any disarmament plan until the question of the troika was settled. If the Soviet Union wished to take the question to the UN, this would be fine with the United States. We could say that the Soviet general and complete disarmament proposal is phony because what the Soviets are proposing is this tripartite Administrative Council which makes control futile.
Ambassador Dean remarked that the United Kingdom has been trying to persuade the United States to announce tests as a bluff. Ambassador Dean felt it was important, however, that the United States not announce tests until it is actually ready to conduct a nuclear test. Otherwise he felt UK support would vanish during the interim between announcement and actual test due to internal pressures in Britain.
Mr. McCloy asked how long a time would be required to prepare for weapons tests to improve the weight yield ratio or for tests like [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Chairman Seaborg said it would take longer than ten weeks to prepare for such tests. Ambassador Dean wondered whether tests in November or December might be an appropriate target date. This would be after the General Assembly discussions. Secretary McNamara said if a delay in tests meant that no test would occur for a long time and possibly not at all, he would have to oppose such a delay.
Dr. Wiesner stated that in his opinion the United States had begun to enjoy a good position in the nuclear test talks only recently and that we should capitalize on this. Before the present administration took over, few people were convinced that the U.S. really wanted a treaty. He saw no reason why the United States should not wait until November or December to conduct weapons tests if a public affairs buildup over that time were desirable. Secretary McNamara said that if it were decided to resume tests and if this were a definite intention, then whether the tests were held in July or December would make no difference. Mr. McCloy said he thought the Soviets needed a stimulus to show them they could not have the best of all worlds with things as they are. For this reason he would not mind having it known that the United States is preparing to resume tests even though we did not announce it. Mr. Kohler asked what would happen if a decision to test were made and then the Soviet Union said they would sign the Western treaty. Mr. McCloy and Ambassador Dean replied that the United States would be prepared to sign the treaty under those circumstances and to stop testing.
Secretary McNamara asked what would happen if a UN debate on nuclear testing took place and world opinion were mobilized against a resumption of tests. The United States might then decide to postpone resumption. It was this kind of possibility which worried him about delaying the resumption of tests. Dr. Wiesner said he assumed the United States would be able to use time to swing opinion to our side. Mr. Nitze said he felt we would not gain ground from the public opinion standpoint on resuming tests, but that we might gain ground on the troika question. Mr. Bundy said that a resumption of tests would probably mean the troika issue would be lost, also.
Mr. McCloy said he did not suppose a decision could be made today. The forthcoming meeting between President Kennedy and Khrushchev would, of course, be important in this connection.
Mr. McCloy then asked for opinions on his idea of not resuming disarmament negotiations until the Soviets dropped the troika proposal. Dr. Wiesner replied that we must distinguish between general and complete disarmament and reciprocal arms control measures. In some arms control measures only bilateral observation would be involved. In the general disarmament area, however, the troika proposal would become very important.
Ambassador Dean then referred to his original instructions of March 1961 and said that he had then been authorized to submit the "escalator" proposal on numbers of on-site inspections. He had not submitted the "escalator" proposal but recently the Soviets had been saying more seismic events occurred annually in the United States than in the Soviet Union, yet the United States asked for the same number of inspections for both the Soviet Union and the United States. Ambassador Dean said he felt it would be good negotiating tactics to emphasize to the Soviets at this point that we are willing to relate the number of on-site inspections to the number of events which actually occur, so that if twice as many events occur in the United States as in the Soviet Union, twice as many inspections would take place in the United States. We would then introduce our escalator proposal which would combine the fixed figure for inspections with the feature of adjusting the number of inspections to the number of events which actually occurred. It was generally agreed that this would be a helpful move.
The meeting adjourned at 1:00 p.m.
27. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
Washington, May 24, 1961, 4:57-6:32 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5-2461. Secret. Drafted by Cleveland and approved by Manfull (S/S) on May 25. A typed note reads: "Not cleared by the President or the Secretary." The meeting was held at the White House. The times are taken from the President's Appointment Books. (Kennedy Library)
SUBJECT
Disarmament
PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson
Assistant Secretary Harlan Cleveland
The following is a summary of consensus and action and not a detailed record of a meeting which lasted about an hour and a half, covering several subjects.
In a review of next steps on the disarmament negotiations, the following points were highlighted:
a. The agreed date is June 19th. The Secretary said that the Russians had originally proposed June 5, but when the date of the 19th was mentioned the Soviet instructions evidently were made in agreement on the latter date, since the Soviet negotiator accepted June 19th on the spot. The chief Soviet delegate for these talks will evidently be Valerian Zorin, Soviet Ambassador to the UN. The U.S. Delegate has not yet been selected.
b. Ambassador Stevenson expressed the view that the bilateral stage of negotiations was at least as important as the later broader negotiations in whatever forum was agreed. The agenda for the bilaterals will be an attempt to agree on the composition of the forum for the later talks beginning in August, and the general "principles" that should guide the disarmament discussions. Ambassador Stevenson said it should be possible to develop a general objective that met the Soviets? proposals for "general and complete disarmament" on their own terms and at their own level of generality. The President asked whether we could go for general and complete disarmament with adequate inspection controls; Governor Stevenson thought that agreement about general principles would make it possible then to get on with questions of phasing, first steps, and details. In this connection Governor Stevenson said that the U.S. line at Vienna/2/ could well be very simple indeed, saying to Khrushchev in effect: We want disarmament as much as you do, quite possibly more than you do; you should not delude yourself that we would have any trouble reallocating to peaceful purposes the resources released in our economy by a real disarmament program; let us get on with it, but with controlled devices that are international and effective, which means of course they cannot have a built-in veto on executive action.
/2/The President met with Chairman Khrushchev for talks in Vienna June 3-4.
On the question of forum, the President asked whether we could not accept five neutrals. After some discussion, the President reconfirmed the present negotiating position, involving two or three neutrals added to the ten present members of the disarmament negotiating body.
Ambassador Stevenson handed the President a memorandum on the forthcoming discussions with Chairman Khrushchev and President de Gaulle,/3/ and expressed the opinion that the Soviets may mean business on disarmament. There was some discussion of past history of disarmament negotiations and U.S. positions in that field, some of which Ambassador Stevenson described as mistaken. The President said he felt the need for more information on the history of disarmament negotiations with the Russians, before he meets with Khrushchev in Vienna. There was general agreement that the matter of nuclear test bans, and particularly the administrative control arrangement for a nuclear test ban, should be a major item on the Vienna agenda.
/3/Kennedy was in Paris for a State visit to France and a meeting of the North Atlantic Council May 31-June 3.
Ambassador Stevenson reported that Zorin had recently called him expressing his readiness to talk about arrangements for discussing outer space.
28. Editorial Note
On May 25, 1961, Secretary Rusk signed a memorandum to President Kennedy suggesting that he inform Chairman Khrushchev, during their Vienna meeting, that the United States proposed to install a direct telephone connection between the Department of State and the Embassy in Moscow. An attached memorandum from John McCloy to Secretary Rusk indicated that the proposal resulted from the work of a panel that "recently studied measures to reduce the risk of war by miscalculation." A memorandum from McGhee to Kohler identified the panel as one convened by McCloy and headed by Thomas Schelling of Harvard University. McGhee noted that President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev did not discuss the telephone link. These memoranda are in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, USSR. Secretary Rusk's May 25 memorandum is printed in volume V, Document 53.
29. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State /1/
New York, May 26, 1961, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/5-2661. Secret; Priority.
3200. Nuclear testing. Department telegram 2306./2/
/2/Dated May 24. (Ibid., 397.5611-GE/5-2461)
1. We believe that political groundwork has not yet been established which would permit us to resume nuclear tests without suffering severely damaging political reaction throughout world. We are not in position to judge defense requirements which may favor early resumption of testing but we question whether these requirements are sufficiently compelling and immediate to warrant resumption testing without further political preparation and clear demonstration in and to UN that US has exhausted every reasonable possibility of negotiation.
2. We believe one key to estimating public reaction lies in demonstrated ability Soviets to stimulate public condemnation on such issue through leftist groups and public media over which they have influence; if Soviets choose exercise this influence, which we confident they will, reaction will be severe. For past decade Soviets have attempted with considerable success to mold public opinion against nuclear explosions whatever their purpose. While UN resolutions have always been carefully restricted to nuclear "weapons" tests, resumption of any kind of testing would be viewed with alarm by many UN members because of fear it only first step to resumption weapons tests, either by US or by USSR. In our view resumption US underground tests now, whether for weapons or for seismic research or peaceful purposes, could provide pretext to Soviets both for effective worldwide anti-US campaign and for resumption of weapons [tests] on their part if they wish, while leaving blame on US. If we resumed peaceful explosions only (seismic tests to improve inspection capabilities would perhaps be distinguishable), and if we included appropriate international supervision of devices and tests we could probably prevent resolution but would nevertheless anticipate great difficulties in debate and that US would be in defensive position, especially if Soviets used this as pretext free selves from their restraint on weapons testing. As replies from field have shown, public opinion reaction in most countries would not distinguish between weapons and non-weapons tests and we think this public reaction would be heavily reflected here. Should atmosphere testing be resumed, fear of radiation, whether rational or not, would further magnify reaction. In short we do not see any advantages from resumption any type nuclear testing at this time which would offset undoubted adverse political reactions.
3. We assume that greater lead time would be required for weapons test than for other types of underground shots. If this is case, and if decision is taken that we must resume weapons testing in absence change Soviet position, we believe intervening time should be used to prepare political groundwork in hope of minimizing damaging reaction when testing actually takes place.
4. Chief requirement in preparation for resumption of tests is public belief that US has made and continues to make sincere reasonable efforts to reach agreement with Soviets at Geneva test talks with parallel appreciation of obstacles which Soviets have placed before such an agreement. This requires far greater dissemination and understanding of key issues at Geneva than is case to date. Pressure "neutral" opinion might, for example, be used in our interests in this case; Presidential letters to chief neutrals such as Nehru, Nkrumah and Tito might warn them in advance that we feel testing talks about to break down because of failure Soviets to agree on reasonable inspection. And, since so many governments are properly fearful of leftist-organized public demonstrations and since public opinion so widely opposed to nuclear tests, this understanding must reach level of man on street. It follows that a major propaganda effort would have to be launched well in advance of any testing. Even break in negotiations without immediate resumption testing would require much more public opinion preparation both through Washington and elsewhere than has yet been made if we are not to suffer political reactions.
5. Presumably nuclear test talks in Geneva would be broken off sometime after decision reached to resume tests, yet well ahead of actual tests. To bolster our posture of reasonableness and of desiring make every conceivable effort to reach satisfactory agreement with Soviets, we should, simultaneously with breakoff at Geneva, bring matter on our initiative to UN. (It would be highly important to beat Russians to the punch.) Forum would depend somewhat on time of year; if break comes during fall we could introduce item in GA, if it comes in summer we could put it either in DC or SC, or we could put it on GA agenda for fall while pursuing other means in summer, e.g., in disarmament talks or bilaterally. Our purpose in referring matter to UN would be to build support for our contention that Soviet negotiating position has prevented an agreement by which weapons tests could be stopped with any real assurance of compliance by all parties. We believe it is only by taking political offensive in this manner that we could prevent Soviets from getting resolution passed against resumption of tests which would further extend present uncontrolled moratorium or increase political cost for us if it then went ahead with tests. And it is only in this manner--i.e., after having exhausted world's top political forum in effort to produce agreement--that we can build maximum political atmosphere which would put blame for failure negotiations and resumption of tests on USSR.
6. Although we recognize that initiative along these lines is not without risk, we believe Soviet positions, such as tripartite administrative council, limited number of on-site inspections, staffing and criteria proposals, could not successfully be defended under spotlight of world attention.
7. With these views in mind, and believing that we must make every effort to gain world public support on an issue of this magnitude and gravity, we believe decision to resume tests before political groundwork had been laid would critically isolate us with serious repercussions to our foreign policy objectives.
Stevenson
30. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State /1/
Vienna, June 4, 1961, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/6-461. Confidential. Repeated to Geneva.
Secto 15. In conversations at Ambassador's residence in Vienna following President's luncheon for Khrushchev Secretary and Gromyko turned to discussion of disarmament./2/ Secretary referred to so-called bilateral disarmament talks beginning in Washington June 19 and said perhaps agreement could be reached particularly on proposals regarding forum for broader disarmament discussions. Gromyko said he had made to Ambassador Stevenson number of reasonable proposals as to composition. Secretary pointed out Ambassador Stevenson had made some reasonable proposals on our side as well.
/2/A memorandum of this June 3 conversation is ibid., 397.5611/GE/6-361. It is printed in vol. V, Document 61; see also the Supplement. Complete documentation on the Vienna summit meeting is in volume V.
Gromyko said US was always talking about control. Khrushchev had spoken at length of Soviet willingness accept control in UNGA last fall but no other delegation made any mention this proposal. Secretary stated this question could be discussed endlessly on purely theoretical basis. In this connection wanted say frankly US very much taken aback by Soviet position in resumed nuclear test negotiations in Geneva. Without replying directly to Secretary Gromyko entered into history disarmament negotiations over past 15 years saying endless discussion of partial measures had led to absolutely no results. All Soviet proposals in this field had been rejected on ground they would change balance of power in favor Soviet Union. It was now time tackle GCD instead of starting up new round of discussions of partial measures which could go on for another 10 years.
Secretary stated Soviet Union could not both maintain its policies of military secrecy and achieve disarmament. These two policies, and he was willing grant Soviets really wanted disarmament, were incompatible. Secretary said there were only as he saw it two roads to disarmament. First would be prior settlement of political problems which might make possibilities of broader disarmament agreement. Second would be step-by-step basis with full inspection and control of each step. Gromyko said US ally Adenauer had said repeatedly no solution of political problems possible unless there was first progress on disarmament.
Secretary said for nearly 30 years one disarmament conference after another had taken place and proceeded in merely ceremonial fashion. He felt it time be realistic about this problem. The immediate action required was in conference in Geneva. In broad field of disarmament this was simple matter but it was vital test.
Gromyko referred to US adoption word "troika" to describe new Soviet proposals. Gromyko said troika was good word and good idea. It was to protect Soviet Union's natural rights. They were only asking for one-third, not two-thirds. They had a right to one-third. Any decision against Soviet, or indeed against US interests, would be excluded. He did not want to use word "demand" which was too strong, but Soviets were very firm on this. If troika adopted US would be even better off than USSR because other one-third would side more often with US than USSR. Secretary commented real question that of veto. Gromyko replied if there were no veto Soviet proposal would not make sense.
Secretary stated if adequate number investigations seismic events could not be agreed test ban would become improbable. Gromyko replied, after some uncertainty as to whether he had said two or three, that three investigations would be acceptable.
Secretary said troika proposals were block to any progress in disarmament field. If they were maintained would be waste of time even to discuss disarmament since no disarmament would be possible if any one country could block inspection. Gromyko referred to Roosevelt proposal for veto in UN Security Council as precedent. Gromyko said under present circumstances GCD only way out. Secretary asked when Soviets had adopted troika proposal. Gromyko said UN operation in Congo had made them realize importance this proposal. Referred at length to US long years? domination UN by mechanical voting majority. President Roosevelt's veto proposals for UN Charter adopted realistic approach. US since that time had invalidated many provisions of Charter and emasculated Security Council. It was deviations from UN principles that had caused trouble. Secretary said troika proposal would run against every principle of arbitration and conciliation. Gromyko said always, even in ICJ, voting reflected state of affairs in world, therefore arbitration and conciliation were not solution. Gromyko said there were two sides to troika proposal: three-sided arrangement plus unanimity of most powerful countries. US wants order by which it could impose its decisions on USSR. Gromyko asked how he could convince us this not possible. If two sides were not able reconcile their interests it was better not to have decision.
Ambassador Thompson stated this might be true in important political decisions but not in disarmament. If two men have revolvers and decide to give them up they must be able to check whether another revolver is hidden under vest of second party. Gromyko said if general and complete disarmament treaty concluded all pockets could be examined. Even trousers could be taken off.
Nitze asked how you get through intermediate stages. Gromyko said they did not propose GCD like rocket shot. They had done their best to fit out stages with controls. Until complete disarmament was reached there naturally would not be complete control. Degree of control would be in accordance with degree of disarmament.
After discussion how troika would prevent inspection by veto in specific cases, Gromyko asked why build in such an abundance of doubts. He asked Secretary directly, do you think we are exploding atomic bombs now? Secretary replied we have no evidence Soviets are testing but it very difficult prove negative proposition. Gromyko stated vigorously that Soviets think US is sure Soviets not testing.
Gromyko said Soviets would resume testing if US did and other countries would also. He emphasized Soviets would not lose more than we by resumption. Everybody would lose but Soviets not more interested in testing agreement than was US.
Rusk
31. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
Vienna, June 4, 1961, 10:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Talks, Vol. I (President). Secret. Drafted by Akalovsky. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy. The full text of this memorandum of conversation is printed in vol. V, Document 62.
SUBJECT
Meeting Between The President and Chairman Khrushchev in Vienna
PARTICIPANTS
US
The President
The Secretary
Ambassador Bohlen
Ambassador Thompson
EUR
Mr. Kohler
D
Mr. Akalovsky, (interpreting)
USSR
Chairman Khrushchev
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Mr. Dobrynin, Chief, American Countries Division, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Menshikov
Mr. Sukhodrev, Interpreter, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
[Here follows discussion of Laos.]
Mr. Khrushchev then addressed himself to the question of nuclear weapon tests. He said he would not go into any details because the positions of the two sides were well known. Furthermore, he was not familiar with all the details of this intricate problem. However, there were two basic questions: (1) the number of suspicious events to be inspected and (2) organization of control. The Soviet Union cannot accept such controls as have been suggested so far. The events in the Congo taught the Soviet Union a lesson. Before those events the Soviet Union might have signed a treaty like the one suggested. However, the events in the Congo indicated that the UN appears to be able to act against the interests of individual states. The Congo had invited UN troops and those troops acted against the interests of the Congolese Government. So if there is a single chairman of the control commission (Mr. Khrushchev was obviously referring to the administrator) he will be able to set the policy. The US would not agree to having a Communist chairman and that is understandable. If it did then the Soviet Union could accept a single chairman (administrator). But the Soviet Union cannot accept a neutral chairman; after all, Hammarskjold is also a neutral and an intelligent one at that. He is not the worst neutral possible. One should try to imagine a situation, Mr. Khrushchev said, where he, as Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, would have to subject his actions to such a commission (administrator). The people of the Soviet Union would never accept such a situation and if the United States wants him to be fired then it should pursue this line. The Soviet Union does not seek control over the control organization but it does not wish the United States to have such control either. This is why the USSR has proposed a three-man body. Such an arrangement would not be prejudicial to any of the sides. Mr. Khrushchev said that he believed that the work of other international organizations should be organized along the same lines. He said that the United States was now in the majority in the UN, but times may change--one cannot say when--and the US may find itself in a minority. The UN is not a parliament, it is an international organization and the majority rule has no place there. Each group of countries should be equally represented, so that a balance of forces be established and that no one be able to pursue a policy prejudicial to any other side. Referring to the number of inspections, Mr. Khrushchev said that three inspections a year would be sufficient. A larger number would be tantamount to intelligence, something the Soviet Union cannot accept. Mr. Khrushchev then said that he wanted to link the question of nuclear tests with disarmament. If agreement could be reached on disarmament, then the USSR could agree to any controls and it would then drop the troika arrangement and the requirement for unanimity. The Soviet position on disarmament is well known; it was stated at the UN and the USSR still proceeds on that basis. Under the conditions of general and complete disarmament control must be most extensive so that no country could arm itself clandestinely. If there were general and complete disarmament there would be no question of espionage because there would be no armaments. Then there would be no secrets and all doors must be open so that complete verification could be ensured. This would include nuclear plants. In view of the fact that apparently no agreement can be reached on the question of nuclear tests, this question should be linked to disarmament. The disarmament group should combine the two questions and work out a general plan. Given good will, two years should be sufficient to develop an agreement on general and complete disarmament. Mr. Khrushchev said that he could give the President an aide-m?moire setting forth the Soviet position on this question. (The aide-m?moire was received from the Soviets after the meeting.)/2/
/2/Dated June 4; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 3, 1961, pp. 22-24, and Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 162-166.
The President said that he wanted to ask Mr. Khrushchev whether he believed it to be impossible to find any person that would be neutral both to the US and the USSR.
Mr. Khrushchev replied in the affirmative.
The President then said that the result of the Soviet proposal could be compared to a situation where if he were living in this room and Mr. Khrushchev in the adjacent room, they could not go to each other's rooms without the consent of the occupant. Under such conditions, how could any of the two be certain that nothing suspicious is going on in his neighbor's room. The President then said that a treaty along such lines could not be confirmed by the Senate. In sending any treaty to the Senate the President would have to give assurance that the treaty provides if not for a fool-proof control system, at least for a reasonable deterrent against violations. However, if the Soviet proposal were accepted, no such assurance could be given. Likewise, how could Mr. Khrushchev give such assurance to those people in his country who may think that the United States is testing clandestinely. True, Mr. Khrushchev is in an advantageous position because of the open way in which the United States acts.
Mr. Khrushchev smiled and said: "But what about Allen Dulles? Isn't that secret?" The President replied he wished it were. Furthermore, the President continued, how can we inspect events in the Soviet Union if any such inspection would be subject to Soviet approval? Under such an arrangement any party that might have tested clandestinely would simply refuse to accept inspection in the area where the test had occurred.
Mr. Khrushchev referred to his statement about three inspections a year to verify suspicious events and also noted that the President had failed to address himself to his statement regarding the dropping of the troika proposal if nuclear tests were linked with disarmament. If this arrangement were adopted, then full control could be exercised any time and at any place. Mr. Khrushchev went on to say that a nuclear test ban alone would not be very important to the national security of the people. The danger of war would remain, because the production of nuclear energy, rockets, and bombs would continue full blast. What people want is peace. Therefore, agreement should be reached on general and complete disarmament. Then the troika would be dropped and the USSR would subscribe to any controls developed by the US, even without looking at the document.
The President said that he agreed that a nuclear test ban would not of itself lessen the number of nuclear weapons possessed by the USSR and the US. Nor would it reduce the production of such weapons. However, a test ban would make development of nuclear weapons by other countries less likely, although, of course, no one can guess what will happen in the future. At this time, the United States and the USSR possess great stocks of nuclear weapons; Great Britain possesses certain quantities of such weapons and France is also getting some capability. If we fail to reach agreement on a nuclear test ban then other countries will undoubtedly launch a nuclear weapons program. While a nuclear test ban would be no certain guarantee against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it would certainly impede such proliferation. If no agreement is reached, then in a few years there might be ten or even fifteen nuclear powers. So in considering this question of what Mr. Khrushchev calls espionage one should balance its risks against the risks involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If we are successful in reaching agreement on a nuclear test ban then it will certainly at least put a brake on the spread of nuclear weapons.
Mr. Khrushchev agreed that there was some logic in the President's position and said that this was why the Soviet Union had entered the negotiations. However, practice has demonstrated that this logic is not quite correct because while the three powers are negotiating in Geneva, France simply spits at them and goes on testing. Thus if there is no link between a nuclear test ban and disarmament other countries may say that they are in an unequal position and might act like France. Other countries may say that if the great powers possess stockpiles of nuclear weapons they should also acquire such stockpiles. On the other hand, if there were disarmament, then nuclear weapons would be eliminated and other countries would be in an equal position and would not have to spend money on the development of nuclear weapons. General and complete disarmament is the most radical means of preventing war. The Soviet Union has always regarded the question of a nuclear test ban merely as a small step toward general and complete disarmament. But let us now begin with the main issue and include the test ban in it.
The President said he agreed that a test ban would not be a basic part, but it would be a most important part. He said that the treaty as drafted now provides for abrogation of the treaty if any country associated with any party to the treaty should conduct tests. The United States does not support French testing. We hope that once a treaty has been concluded most other countries will join in it. The question of a nuclear test ban is a relatively easy problem to resolve because the controls required are based on scientific instrumentation, such as seismographs, etc. So why not start with this relatively easy question. The President then inquired whether the Soviet conception was that if we used the term general and complete disarmament--or general and comprehensive disarmament as used by us last year--the process would be carried out step by step with the necessary parallel inspection. Or is it the Soviet view that we would simply announce that goal as an objective of national policy and countries would carry out inspection on their own.
Mr. Khrushchev replied he wanted to make a complaint: The President apparently had not read the Soviet proposals with sufficient attention. Otherwise, he would know that the Soviet proposals provide for disarmament in stages and for control in stages.
The President then inquired whether this was to be understood that, if both sides accepted general and complete disarmament and agreed to reduce their armed forces, the number of their aircraft or submarines, or to disarm outer space, the Soviet Union would accept inspection any place in the USSR.
Mr. Khrushchev replied in the affirmative, using the word "absolutely".
In other words, the President inquired further, if general and complete disarmament were accepted as a commitment of national policy and a nuclear test ban were included in the first stage, would that mean that the test ban would be subject to inspection without a veto?
Mr. Khrushchev replied that in that event he would try to persuade the President not to start with this measure because it is not the most important one.
In response to the President's question what should come first, Mr. Khrushchev replied that any other measure would be acceptable, such as, for instance prohibition of nuclear weapons, prohibition of the manufacture of such weapons, or elimination of military and missile bases. (At this point Mr. Gromyko corrected the interpreter saying that Mr. Khrushchev had not mentioned prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear weapons. However, Mr. Khrushchev confirmed that he had mentioned this item.) The Soviet proposals on disarmament contain all the details and there is logic in those proposals. The proposals also provide for complete control. In any event, both sides should try to reach agreement on the priority of individual measures so that neither side would have its interests prejudiced by the other.
The President said that Mr. Khrushchev appeared to feel that a link should be established between a nuclear test ban and disarmament and that these two questions are inter-related and should be discussed together. We, on the other hand, believe that a nuclear test ban would be if not the most important step, at least a very significant step and would facilitate a disarmament agreement. There is a Chinese proverb saying that a thousand-mile journey begins with one step. So let us make that step.
Mr. Khrushchev rejoined by saying that the President apparently knew the Chinese very well but that he too knew them quite well. To this the President replied that Mr. Khrushchev might get to know them even better. Mr. Khrushchev retorted that he already knew them very well.
Referring to the President's statement about the significance of a nuclear test ban, Mr. Khrushchev said that the USSR could agree to a nuclear test ban provided it was subject to the troika arrangement.
The President then said that it appeared to him that the conversation was back where it had started. Therefore, he wanted to conclude this discussion by saying that the United States is greatly concerned by the uninspected moratorium that has been going on for three years in connection with the negotiations. This indicates how long it takes to reach agreements. The prospect of an indefinite continuance of a moratorium without controls is a matter of great concern to the United States. Therefore, it is difficult to envisage how the question of nuclear tests could be included in disarmament negotiations, which we hope will be successful but which will probably require a long time. Perhaps it would be best to go back to Geneva to make another effort and to see what each of us should do in this matter. Perhaps then the conference might be recessed or some other action taken. Whether or not there is agreement on nuclear tests we would start our discussions on disarmament on June 19.
Mr. Khrushchev replied that he was agreeable to conducting negotiations in Geneva and said that there was a Soviet representative there. However, the Soviet Union could not accept such controls as would be tantamount to espionage if weapons themselves were not eliminated. This, in effect, is what the Pentagon has wanted all along. Eisenhower's open skies proposal in 1955 was a part of that scheme. Now ground posts are envisaged and this is also reconnaissance. The Soviet Union has agreed to negotiate on a nuclear test ban in the hope of reaching agreement and proceeding to general and complete disarmament. If the US refuses to accept general and complete disarmament then the Soviet Union cannot agree to accept such an arrangement. The Soviet Union cannot accept a situation where controls would prejudice its national security and where the Soviet Government would be subject to the will of a third party and would not be free to act on its own.
The President said that it was obvious that if controls should turn out to be prejudicial to the national interest of any of the parties to an unreasonable degree, the treaty could be abrogated. The President reiterated that we would begin our discussions on disarmament on June 19, which will be in effect a continuation of the discussions Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Stevenson had had in New York.
Mr. Khrushchev inquired whether the President would agree to tie together the question of the test ban and disarmament.
The President replied that he would not unless there was assurance that agreement on disarmament could be reached speedily. He referred to the fact that negotiations on a nuclear test ban had been in process for three years. The President emphasized that the problem of espionage mentioned by Mr. Khrushchev paled if compared with the problems which would result from the development of nuclear capabilities by other countries. This is bound to affect the national security of our two countries, and increase the danger of major conflicts.
Mr. Khrushchev said that if we agreed on general and complete disarmament that problem would not only pale but would completely disappear.
[Here follows discussion of Germany and Berlin.]/3/
/3/Following this meeting, Khrushchev gave a lunch for the President at the Embassy. During the lunch, Khrushchev "said he had heard pressure was being brought to bear on the President to resume nuclear weapon tests. He said that he was under a similar pressure; however, the USSR will wait for the US to resume testing and if the US does resume the USSR will follow suit." (Memorandum of conversation by Akalovsky; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Talks, Vol. I (President))
32. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
Washington, June 6, 1961, 4:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, France, Vol. I. No classification marking. The memorandum is dated June 7, but no drafter is indicated.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP
PRESENT
The Vice President, Senators Mansfield, Humphrey, Russell, Fulbright, Dirksen, Saltonstall, Hickenlooper, Wiley
The Speaker, Congressmen McCormack, Albert, Vinson, Morgan, Arends, Chiperfield, Hoeven, Byrnes (Wisconsin)/2/
/2/Michael J. Mansfield of Montana, Senate Majority Leader; Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, Senate Majority Whip; Richard B. Russell of Georgia, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee; J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois, Senate Minority Leader; Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts, ranking minority member of the Senate Armed Services Committee; Bourke B. Hickenlooper of Iowa, a minority member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin, ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; Sam Rayburn of Texas, Speaker of the House; John McCormack of Massachusetts, House Majority Leader; Carl Albert of Oklahoma, House Majority Whip; Carl Vinson of Georgia, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee; Thomas E. Morgan of Pennsylvania, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; Leslie C. Arends of Illinois, House Minority Whip; Robert B. Chiperfield of Illinois, ranking minority member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; Charles B. Hoeven, ranking minority member of the House Agriculture Committee; and John W. Byrnes of Wisconsin, Chairman of the Republican Policy Committee.
[Here follows discussion of the President's visit to France and his talks with Chairman Khrushchev on Laos and the Middle East.]
On Sunday the discussion began with nuclear testing and Mr. Khrushchev had insisted on the Troika, stating that there was no such thing as a neutral person. Control in such circumstances was a form of espionage. There could be no serious control or inspection until after the decision for complete and general disarmament had been accepted. Mr. Khrushchev had urged that the President should agree to a merger of the test talks with disarmament, and the President's conclusion was that either from Chinese pressure or for other reasons the Soviets have lost interest in a test ban agreement. The President replied that in his view it would be wrong to merge the test ban with general disarmament since for fifteen years discussion of the latter subject had gotten nowhere. Khrushchev said that when we start to test, he will start to test. The main question now was how to disengage from these negotiations. Macmillan and the President had talked about this matter, which was a hot issue in England. Gaitskell had also expressed his hope that we could wait until the autumn, until after his own contest for control in his own party, which he expected to win. This was a problem in Canada, too, and in general a major question of propaganda values. The question was how to break it off so that the Soviets would seem to be responsible.
[Here follows discussion of Germany and Berlin.]
33. Memorandum From the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk /1/
Washington, June 8, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/6-861. Secret. Sent through Kohler who initialed, and a copy was sent to McCloy. Thompson was in Washington for consultations.
SUBJECT
Handling of Nuclear Test Problems
I believe we should immediately initiate consultations with the British, and possibly the French, with a view to renewing formally in the Geneva Test Ban Conference our proposal for a ban on atmospheric and under-sea tests./2/ I suggest our original proposal be modified to provide for the absolute minimum of control posts we consider necessary. I should think one on the Chinese border and one other would suffice. The Soviets would doubtless again raise the question of under-ground tests and we should state that we have no present plans for testing but will be guided by what we consider to be the security interests of the United States and that we no longer feel obliged to give notification of test resumption. This would put the Soviets in a position of turning down a reasonable proposal to prevent pollution of the atmosphere and if they did resume testing in the atmosphere the onus would fall on them and they could have the pleasure of dealing with organized demonstrations in Britain and elsewhere. If we do resume testing ourselves, I suggest that even if the tests are generally known we do not either deny or admit them but stick completely to the "no comment" position.
/2/The first in this series of proposals is contained in President Eisenhower's letter to Khrushchev, April 13, 1959; for text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, vol. II, pp. 1392-1393.
As a prelude to taking this position, we should state in the Geneva Conference that we can neither accept "Troika" nor an indefinite prolongation of the moratorium which we cannot control. There is the slight possibility that the Soviets would actually accept a ban on atmospheric and under-sea tests.
34. Telegram From the Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests to the Department of State /1/
Geneva, June 12, 1961, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/6-1261. Secret; Limit Distribution.
Supnu 1652. Reference: Nusup 1257,/2/ Supnu 1639./3/ We believe there might be disadvantages in actual tabling of treaty language in renewal of proposal re banning atmospheric tests. Our suggestion in Supnu 1639 was that there might be no harm and possibly some advantage in event we resume testing in repeating U.S. willingness to negotiate on basis proposed in 1959 for banning tests in readily policed environments such as atmosphere and ocean. But actual tabling or publication of treaty language for such a limited proposal might compete with and actually confuse picture of U.S. standing ready to sign treaty draft tabled on April 18th and detract from effectiveness of our tabling of comprehensive proposals which are being widely circulated. Actually, we would recommend that we do no more than say that the 1959 limited ban offer still stands as an alternative basis of negotiation and that we not put forward treaty language on this basis.
/2/This telegram, June 8, transmitted to the delegation the text of a draft memorandum from McCloy to the President recommending that the United States recall Dean from Geneva and commence preparations for a resumption of testing. The memorandum also recommended that the United States propose, together with the United Kingdom, an accord on atmospheric and underwater testing. Concurrently, the United States would announce that it considered itself free to resume testing until a comprehensive test ban treaty was agreed on. (Ibid., 397.5611-GE/6-761) See the Supplement.
/3/Dated June 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/6-661)
35. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy /1/
Washington, June 12, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, General 6/61. Secret.
Mr. McCloy wishes to meet with you and the Secretary of State--if not with a wider circle--on Tuesday or Thursday/2/ of this week. He has a New York engagement on Wednesday/3/ which he would cancel if Wednesday is your only possible opening.
/2/June 13 or 15.
/3/June 14.
His items of business are these:
1. He must meet next Monday with the Russians on a bilateral basis. Before that time, he wishes you to clear his position, including especially the position that general and complete disarmament can only be achieved in a world of law. This is the fundamental proposition which he would set against the Soviet proposition that general and complete disarmament is, in itself, the objective, and that until general and complete disarmament is achieved, inspection and control must be on the basis of veto by the USSR.
2. He wishes to go over with you and Mr. Rusk his reply to the Soviet aide-m?moire on the test ban treaty./4/ He states that he will have a better draft tomorrow morning than the one that was sent to you at Palm Beach.
/4/See footnote 2, Document 31.
3. He wishes a decision on what to do with Dean in Geneva. After Vienna, there is evidently little for him to do. The newspapers are beginning to mock the whole exercise. If we leave him there, we are also in the danger of falling into the Soviet trap of merging the test ban talks with the disarmament talks which begin on July 31.
4. He wishes to begin consideration of the effect of the Vienna meetings on what proposals we make for disarmament at the meetings which begin on July 31.
I called Mr. McCloy's attention to the attached cable of June 9 from New York./5/ Yost believed the USSR has overplayed its hand and is vulnerable to attack because it had bluntly stated that international controls are impossible without veto prior to "general and complete disarmament."
/5/Telegram 3290 from USUN, not found attached. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/6-961)
I suggested that McCloy consider two fundamental principles in the design of his disarmament proposals: first, that we are prepared to proceed by steps towards general and complete disarmament in which the degree of effective international control would be proportioned to the degree of disarmament actually achieved; second, that we emphasize, as he proposes, that general and complete disarmament does demand effective international rules of law. I emphasized that we might wish to avoid the trap of being like the Russians in merely debating what the end of the road would look like and not proposing principles for moving along that road.
I also suggested that he consider using the problem of guerrilla war and its effective international control as an illustration of why general and complete disarmament requires not merely the destruction of arms, but the substitution for sovereignty of effective and enforceable rules of international behavior.
36. Memorandum for the Record /1/
Washington, June 13, 1961, noon.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament General 7/2/61-7/10/61. Confidential. Drafted by Fisher. The meeting was held at the White House.
SUBJECT
U.S. Reply to the Soviet Aide-M?moire
PARTICIPANTS
The President
Acting Secretary Chester Bowles
Mr. John J. McCloy
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Adrian S. Fisher
Mr. McCloy showed the President the June 12 draft of our aide-m?moire dealing with the nuclear test ban negotiations./2/ The President read it, made some specific suggestions as to its content, and said that it was a good paper and should be cleared with the British.
/2/Draft not found. For text of the aide-m?moire as delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow on June 17, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 189-195.
Mr. McCloy then stated his opinion that continuing to keep Mr. Dean at Geneva might result in an erosion of the U.S. position there. He pointed out that continuing a high level delegation, saying the same thing day after day, might result in some ridicule, and expressed his view that Mr. Dean ought to return promptly after the aide-m?moire had been delivered and read by him into the record. The President expressed his general approval of this course of action and indicated that Mr. Dean ought to stay at least a few days after the aide-m?moire had been read into the record before returning.
Mr. McCloy then showed the President the proposed memorandum of June 8, 1961./3/ The President read it and indicated that he was in general agreement with its contents but stated that he did not think we should now make a statement that we are actually preparing to test, and should be careful that no such statement should get around.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 34.
The problem of a ban on atmospheric testing was briefly discussed and the consensus was that Mr. Dean should not remain in Geneva to lay the foundation for this type of action but that it should be done by declarations made from Washington.
Mr. McCloy then advised the President that prompt action within the Administration on the proposed bill was essential. The President indicated his agreement, but after attempting to get in touch with David Bell and Elmer Staats on the telephone, and failing to reach them, said he would take the matter up at another time.
37. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy /1/
Washington, June 26, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, General 6/61. Secret.
I talked at length to McCloy on Saturday, and I feel a little less gloomy about the disarmament negotiations./2/ We have never planned to have any detailed proposals for June, and the Soviets acknowledge that. But their propaganda play is that we are stalling in our resistance to detailed discussions now, and they are unwilling to discuss the shape of the forum before they discuss "general views." Stevenson and McCloy believe that this attitude proves that they no longer feel--if they ever did--that anything serious can be accomplished.
/2/These negotiations between McCloy and Zorin Began in Washington on June 19. Eleven sessions were held, the last on the afternoon of June 30. In the course of the talks, which did not result in agreement on an appropriate forum for multinational general disarmament negotiations, the two sides agreed to reconvene in Moscow in mid-July. Documentation on these talks is in Department of State, Central Files 600.0012 for June 1961. Telegrams Circular 2042, June 17 (ibid., 600.0012/6-1761); Nusup 1275, June 19 (ibid., 600.0012/6-1961); and Nusup 1304, June 30 (ibid., 600.0012/6-3061), all dealing with various aspects of the talks, are in the Supplement.
McCloy is continuing to make the general arguments which you have heard from him, about the control problem and the Troika and disarmament in supervised stages. He does resist my repeated proposal that he go after the Soviet plan in detail. His argument is that any discussion in detail will bring a demand for counter-proposals and involve us in real trouble with our allies and the Pentagon and everybody else who is awaiting a new agreed position on our side. It is certainly true that we do not have such a position to discuss now, though I myself find the argument unpersuasive.
In the circumstances, McCloy is beginning to feel that we should not go on with the bilaterals very much longer. Obviously, the two sides have quite different views as to what they should be discussing, and we do have a strong position in saying that we never intended to discuss detailed plans in June. We could therefore say that since there is disagreement, we suggest that both sides go back to their governments. We could add that we, for our part, will go on working on a basic plan which will be ready, as we always said, by the end of July. We could add our regret that the Soviet UN seems unwilling to settle with us the forum of resumed discussion, express our readiness to face this question whenever they are ready, and wind up by stating that if no agreement can be reached on this point (which arises because the Soviets walked out of the last agreed forum), we will gladly meet them at the UN in the autumn.
One great advantage of closing out these talks quickly is that they are pre-occupying McCloy at a time when we really should be pressing for serious headway on an agreed disarmament plan. Another reason, I fear, is that the gossip at the second level is that we are not doing a very good job in this particular debate (this kind of gossip should be taken with some reservation, because it often means simply that our spokesman is not saying exactly what the gossip wishes he would). McCloy is our man, and we can't substitute someone else at this point. So the best way may be to let the talks end after a few more days.
One further thought--Foster is a serious administrator, and perhaps his first crash job could be to take the disarmament position and wrestle it into shape. I can press this with McCloy if you want.
McG. B./3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
38. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
Washington, June 30, 1961, 11:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/6-3061. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky. The meeting was held at the White House.
SUBJECT
US-USSR Exchange of Views on Disarmament
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The President
Mr. McCloy
D/P--Mr. Akalovsky
U.S.S.R.
Mr. V.A. Zorin, Deputy Foreign Minister of USSR
Ambassador Menshikov
Mr. I.G. Usachev, USSR Foreign Ministry
Mr. R.M. Timerbaev, Soviet Mission to the U.N.
General A.A. Gryzlov, USSR Ministry of Defense
The President opened the conversation by expressing his pleasure at meeting Mr. Zorin and his group and said that he understood that Mr. McCloy was going to the USSR.
Mr. Zorin replied that he was very happy to have this opportunity of meeting the President and that he considered this as evidence of the President's interest in disarmament. He said he hoped this meeting would contribute to a fruitful outcome of the talks he had been having with Mr. McCloy.
The President observed that he had sent to Congress draft legislation providing for the establishment of a new disarmament agency so that a more detailed research in this area could be done than we had been able to do heretofore.
Mr. Zorin said that he had had a rather extensive exchange of views with Mr. McCloy. However, frankly speaking, greater progress could have been achieved if a more definite discussion of specific programs had been conducted. He said that sooner or later we would have to deal with such programs.
The President replied that this was correct but said that our primary concern now was to arrange in this exchange of views a practical procedure for further negotiations. He said he was hopeful that a satisfactory conclusion on this matter could be reached so that we could then move to substance. This matter required coordination between many nations, including, on the Soviet side, the Chinese, who would have to be involved in any broad disarmament plan. Of course, our allies were also vitally interested in this problem. The President then expressed the hope that as a result of the talks between Mr. Zorin and Mr. McCloy, a conclusion could be reached with regard to the next step in negotiations; he also hoped that agreement could be reached on a forum that would be broad enough so that a structure could be established for a useful discussion. The President then said that although so far there had been no total conclusion as to how this could be done, he felt that the present talks had been extremely important.
Mr. Zorin responded by saying that the two sides had not wasted their time and had clarified many points in their respective positions, which, of course, would facilitate negotiations. However, the Soviet Union believed that progress in this matter of disarmament depended primarily on an understanding between the US and USSR on the basic questions of disarmament. In the absence of such agreement it would be hardly possible to have fruitful negotiations in the future. He said that experience had shown that it was difficult to make any progress in disarmament unless there was a rapprochement between the positions of the two principal parties. He expressed the hope that the United States would consider the Soviet position as set forth in the statement of the Soviet Government of June 27,/2/ so that agreement could be reached in Moscow and negotiations in a broader forum could take place.
/2/For text of this statement submitted during the bilateral talks, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 199-213. Text of a U.S. statement submitted at the outset of the talks is ibid., p. 196.
The President said that this matter of disarmament was of great interest to us but that it was a very difficult and complex problem. He recalled the efforts made in the League of Nations before World War II and said that in spite of the fact that conditions in those days had been perhaps easier than those prevailing today, those efforts had had only a limited success. He then said that it was a very complicated matter to find ways of increasing mutual confidence which was so necessary if we wanted to create a situation permitting reductions in armed forces of states. He observed that both the USSR and the United States were bearing a heavy burden of armaments and expressed the hope that perhaps a way could be found of using all that money for better purposes to the benefit of humanity. The President emphasized that we were very anxious to develop a system with the USSR and with other countries which would permit a lessening of the arms burden and noted that success in this endeavor would depend on further discussions. He stressed his personal interest in this matter and said that the legislation he had referred to earlier reflected the interest of many members of Congress and of our country at large. He expressed the hope that if no progress could be achieved in this matter immediately, perhaps it could be made in future negotiations.
Mr. Zorin replied that he believed that we must avoid the mistakes made in the League of Nations. The League of Nations had attempted to resolve major technical problems without first having resolved the major political problems involved. The major question was whether those participating in disarmament negotiations really wanted disarmament. If our two countries really wanted disarmament, then the Soviet program and any proposals the United States might have could be examined and could serve as a practical basis for future negotiations. The Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin said, was anxious to engage in practical discussions.
The President then expressed his disappointment over the lack of progress in the nuclear test negotiations. He said he had hoped that agreement in that area could set the stage for progress in the general field of disarmament. He felt that the nuclear test issue was rather easy to resolve and that agreement on that problem would have a very favorable effect not only on US-USSR relations but also on the world at large. The President said he believed that the respective positions of the two sides at Geneva were not very far apart and that agreement on a nuclear test ban could also make these discussions more profitable. Furthermore, it would show the world the usefulness of the US and the USSR's discussing these difficult matters. The President reiterated his disappointment but said that he was still hopeful that agreement could be reached at Geneva.
Mr. McCloy noted the difference of views between the two sides on the purpose of the present talks. He said that our interpretation of our mission differed from Mr. Zorin's interpretation but that in spite of that he felt that this exchange of views had been useful. He expressed the hope that both sides could agree on a proper forum and framework for negotiations and then engage in serious negotiations.
The President again expressed his pleasure at meeting Mr. Zorin and his group and said that he wanted to see all matters standing between the US and the USSR settled; therefore, he felt that any progress in these talks would be useful.
Mr. Zorin said he appreciated very much the President's willingness to devote his time to this meeting and said that he would, of course, inform his government of the wishes expressed by the President. However, he said, success could be achieved only as a result of efforts by both sides and not just one. Therefore, he hoped that Mr. McCloy would receive appropriate instructions so that in Moscow progress could be made on the basis of the views of both sides. As to the question of nuclear test talks, Mr. Zorin said that the only thing he could do was to refer the President to his conversation with Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna, where Mr. Khrushchev had clarified the Soviet position on that issue. Mr. Zorin said that the USSR had not lost hope that agreement could be reached in Geneva; however, if this should prove impossible then the only thing we could do would be to merge the test issue with the general disarmament problem. Mr. Zorin then again thanked the President for this meeting and wished the President every success.
The President replied that he felt it would be a mistake to merge the test talks with general disarmament negotiations. While we were on the verge of an agreement in the nuclear test area, disarmament was an extremely complicated problem requiring great efforts on both sides to build such confidence as would permit reduction in armed forces. The President reiterated his hope that failure at Geneva could be prevented. He then said that Mr. McCloy would have appropriate instructions when he went to Moscow. The main question now was to develop a method for future negotiations and this question would be discussed between himself and Mr. McCloy. The President recalled his statement of about three months ago to the effect that the United States would complete its analysis of the various aspects of the disarmament problem by July and expressed his hope that future talks between Mr. McCloy and Mr. Zorin would make it possible for us to start serious negotiations in an agreed forum.
After an exchange of amenities the meeting ended at 12:15.
39. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and Dean Acheson /1/
Washington, July 1, 1961, 10:46 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Transcribed by Phyllis D. Bernau, Rusk's Personal Assistant.
TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. ACHESON
The Sec returned the call and A said he had a visit from McCloy and Dean who were disturbed. They wondered whether there is a master-mind running affairs of the US and whether it is thought out re their mission to Moscow if it is the right thing to be doing when the other program is in mind which they discussed the day before yesterday./2/ How does it appear to people with whom we are talking there? Our friends? Our country? Are we going up and down at the same time. The Sec asked when they talked. A said till 6:30 or later. The Sec said he came in and made a flat statement he could not run out on this deal. The Sec called the Pres and told him that rather than have the Soviets in a position to say we ran out on this Jack and he felt he should go over and come back after 3-4 days. A said he/3/ is concerned about what he should be doing. The Sec said he wants to go down a track we don't want him to--he has been thinking he has to debate on some substantive issues on disarmament. The Sec will get hold of him because if he has misgivings he did not express them. A said he/4/ spent the afternoon with Zorin and talked with A until 7--then they went off and asked A to call the Sec which he thought they might have done. The Sec said if they have thoughts like these they should have expressed them before announcing they had to go to Moscow. The Sec will get Jack. A said Jack is salmon-fishing for two days with McNamara and Lemnitzer. The Sec said we talked about these problems but he was so flat on making good on this deal we went ahead. A thinks it can wait until they get back. The Sec said maybe we want to shift the Moscow date to a brief quardripartite mtg on the Forum--it was a quadripartite meeting which set up the Comm of 10. A thinks if the Sec turns it over in his mind until the 5th of July that will be plenty of time. They don't go until the 14th. A said they asked if it were discussed with him by the Sec or others and A said no--no reason that it should be. They wondered if it had been thought about fully. The Sec said it was thought about in connection with Berlin. They asked M to talk with Zorin--this is foolish when Berlin is as it is. But the Sec is not sure M did. The Sec is surprised he did not mention to A that he did talk about it with the Sec.
/2/Not further identified.
/3/Acheson is referring to Jack McCloy.
/4/i.e., McCloy.
40. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President's Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy) /1/
Washington, July 13, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, General 7/61-6/62. Secret.
I enclose a copy of a CIA analysis of the increase in the Soviet military budget. It shows that there may be more sound than fury in Khrushchev's announcement, but the figure of a 35% increase to be used over the next six months nevertheless makes a strong talking point on our side./2/
/2/The attachment has not been found. In a brief memorandum to Bundy dated July 10, Kennedy wrote in part: "What about the disarmament talks of McCloy, should we break them off using the recent Soviet increases as our argument and ask that the matter be taken to the UN? Stevenson thinks that the UN emphasis on disarmament is most important." (Ibid., ACDA, Disarmament General, 7/2/61-7/10/61)
The Department of Defense currently estimates that additional military expenditures attributable to this Administration will total about 700 million dollars in FY '61, and about 700 million dollars in FY '62. This makes an increase of about 1-3/4% in a total expenditure of about $43-44 billion dollars in each year. Even if we should now respond to Khrushchev's challenge by a substantial additional request for funds, the figures would not be comparable in percentage to what he himself has indicated.
The bald language of Khrushchev's reference to military budgeting is as follows:
"In these conditions is it right for us to continue the unilateral reduction of our Armed Forces? Taking into account the existing situation, the Soviet Government has been compelled to issue a temporary directive to the Ministry of Defense, pending a special order, instructing it to suspend the reduction in the Armed Forces planned for 1961. In connection with the increase in NATO member states' military budgets the Soviet Government has decided to increase defense allocations for the current year 3,144,000,000 rubles, which raises total military expenditure in 1961 to 12,399,000,000 rubles."
McGeorge Bundy/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
41. Editorial Note
On July 17, 1961, the U.S.-Soviet bilateral talks on disarmament reconvened at the Spiridovka House in Moscow with McCloy and Zorin continuing to represent their countries. Documentation on these talks, including memoranda of seven sessions held through July 29, is in Department of State, Central File 600.0012 for July 1961.
In telegram 205 from Moscow, July 20, McCloy reported that on the basis of meetings held so far he saw "little prospect" of reaching agreement on a set of principles to guide general disarmament negotiations or on a suitable forum for such negotiations. While he believed the United States had built a "reasonable record" on a number of contended points, he considered that there was "little point in continuing while Zorin talks about plans and I talk about principles," and wanted to suggest to Zorin winding up the meetings on July 26 or 27 and convening a meeting of the full Disarmament Commission in September. (Ibid., 600.0012/7-2061)
In telegram 231 to Moscow, July 22, the Department gave tentative assent to the tactic of convening a meeting of the full U.N. Disarmament Commission but cautioned McCloy against any abrupt breakoff of the current talks and suggested July 28 as a better date for concluding them. (Ibid.) On July 29, the United States submitted a memorandum that proposed four alternatives for the composition of a disarmament forum, one of which was the U.N. Disarmament Commission. For text, see Documents on Disarmaments, 1961, pages 271-273.
42. Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing /1/
Washington, July 21, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61 (Jun-Nov 61). Top Secret; Restricted Data. Attached to a July 28 letter from Wiesner to McNamara, which states that the Panel made a preliminary report on its findings to the President on July 21, and requested comments by August 4. The panel was known as the Panofsky Panel after its Chairman, Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky. Other members were William A. Baker, Hans A. Bethe, Norris E. Bradbury, James B. Fisk, John S. Foster, Jr., George B. Kistiakowsky, Frank Press, Louis H. Roddis, John W. Tukey, and Walter H. Zinn. Keeny served as Technical Assistant.
INTRODUCTION
At the request of the President, the Panel has considered the technical questions involved in a decision by the U.S. on the resumption of testing. The Panel's report is divided into two sections: (1) Present and future unilateral U.S. test detection capabilities and (2) Present and future U.S. and Soviet nuclear warhead capabilities. The status of intelligence of Soviet testing during the moratorium is considered in a separate supplement.
The Panel's task was facilitated by the recent report of the Fisk Panel to Mr. McCloy (2 March 1961),/2/ which covered these problems in the context of a possible test ban treaty. After reviewing such new information as had become available since the publication of the Fisk Report, the Panel found that it was able to endorse the relevant portions of the Fisk Report essentially without exception.
/2/See Document 4.
In submitting this report, the Panel hopes that it will clarify the technical issues involved in a decision on the resumption of testing. The Panel wishes to emphasize, however, that while these technical issues have an important bearing on this decision, the final decision on whether or not to resume testing also involves very important non-technical or military issues which have not been included in the Panel's considerations.
The Panel also wishes to express its concern over certain statements which have appeared in the press on the subject of resumption of testing. While some of these statements have been technically highly misleading, they have still given a great deal of information on U.S. programs to the USSR. At the same time, the Panel believes that these statements have seriously detracted from the political gains which have resulted from our constructive position in the Geneva Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations.
SUMMARY
We do not know whether or not the USSR has conducted any clandestine tests since November 1958. While some suspicious activity which might be connected with testing has been noted, this activity is equally compatible with other technical activities not involving nuclear tests. The USSR could have conducted underground nuclear tests without providing any intelligence information.
Despite future improvements in our unilateral detection capability, the USSR could still carry out a limited number of clandestine underground tests in the kiloton range which would very likely escape detection. The USSR could also carry out larger explosions, even up to yields in the megaton class, at an increasing penalty in time, cost and test effectiveness, and at increasing risk of detection. The greater the level of Soviet clandestine activity, the greater the possibility would be that it would be discovered through conventional intelligence, including [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
Improvements in the yield to weight ratios of strategic warheads that may be achieved through weapons tests would give added flexibility to the designs of U.S. strategic systems, in particular with regard to reduced vulnerability and increased mobility. Proof tests would also remove possible doubts concerning the reliability of certain warheads. The significance of these developments is in part dependent on whether future U.S. strategy will emphasize deterrence or counterforce capability. At the same time, the status of Soviet weapons technology is probably such as to create a strong incentive for Soviet weapons tests, especially if the USSR desires smaller, more mobile strategic weapon systems to compensate for the anticipated loss of security of their present missile force when [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] becomes operational.
The principal areas of weapon improvements in the tactical weapons field involve: a) economy in the use of fissionable materials; b) reduction in diameter to permit interchangeability with conventional ammunition; and c) enhancement of neutron radiation effects. However, it is difficult to evaluate the potential value of nuclear warhead improvements to either the U.S. or the USSR since there is no established doctrine on the use of tactical weapons.
Enhanced neutron radiation weapons which would be relatively more effective against personnel under certain circumstances may have significance in tactical warfare. A prototype [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] which would produce some enhancement in neutron radiation at a cost comparable to a conventional fission weapon, is available for test. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] If such devices can be developed in a militarily useful configuration, the most optimistic estimate for earliest availability of a first device for stockpile is 1965. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The date for operational availability would, therefore, not be appreciably affected by deferment of test resumption by a year or two. The significance of these developments is strongly dependent on the extent to which future U.S. strategy emphasizes the use of nuclear weapons in tactical warfare.
The present U.S. Nike-Zeus AICBM system is not limited by nuclear warhead performance or lack of knowledge on nuclear kill mechanisms but rather by the highly unfavorable exchange ratio of the cost of Nike-Zeus vs. increased number of enemy ICBM's, especially if the enemy employs decoys. The known vulnerabilities of U.S. ICBM warheads to potential Soviet AICBM defense can be reduced without additional effects tests; however, nuclear tests to search for overlooked sources of vulnerability may become advisable in the future. Increasing the yield to weight ratios of missile warheads is one method of improving the ability of our ICBM's to penetrate potential Soviet AICBM defenses by providing additional payload to incorporate measures to reduce warhead vulnerability or to carry penetration aids such as decoys.
One of the most important considerations in further technical developments is the possibility of surprises. In general, as far as yield to weight improvements is concerned, surprises are very unlikely in the strategic warheads beyond predicted developments. There could, however, be overlooked phenomena in weapons effects of various kinds. In the area of tactical nuclear weapons, where the room for invention is large, the possibility of important surprises is correspondingly great.
The range of weapon development tests which can be undertaken would not be seriously impaired if only underground tests were permitted. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that the restriction to underground tests would make some tests more difficult and costly. In addition, some weapons effects tests at high altitude of interest to (but on the basis of present knowledge not critical to) the AICBM problem could not be carried out if testing is only permitted underground.
In the absence of tests by either the U.S. or USSR, the U.S. would retain a degree of technological superiority in nuclear weapons for some time. If the U.S. continues to refrain from testing and the USSR engages in clandestine underground testing, the USSR could gain technological superiority in nuclear weapons to the extent discussed in the body of this report in as little as three to four years of extensive testing. If both the U.S. and USSR resume testing, the two countries will probably both approach the same general level of warhead technology in areas of interest in the relatively near future.
Although the limitations on our weapons progress imposed by lack of nuclear tests can to a considerable extent be compensated by efforts in other fields, such a self-imposed limitation would, in the long run, impair the rate of U.S. military progress. However, none of the specific weapons tests now discussed appear to be of such urgency from the technical and military point of view that a reasonable delay in reaching a formal decision on the resumption of nuclear testing would be critical. Therefore, any decisions in the near future concerning the resumption of nuclear testing can be governed primarily by non-technical considerations.
[Here follows the remainder of the 34-page Report.]
43. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the President's Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy) /1/
Washington, July 27, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Committee of Principals, 7/27/61-7/28/61. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A copy was sent to Bundy.
Dear Jack: Reference is made to your letter of June 2, 1961/2/ which requested that the Department of Defense make a study of the relative military consequences to the U. S. and the USSR of cut-off of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, and to our reply of June 10 which indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were undertaking this study.
/2/In this letter, McCloy asked that an evaluation of the net military consequence of a nuclear production cutoff be undertaken, as suggested by the Perkins Panel (see Document 11). (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 23 Mar 61)
Enclosed for your consideration and that of the Committee of Principals is a memorandum from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject: "Net Military Consequences of a Cessation of Production of Fissionable Material (U)", to which is appended the evaluation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff./3/ I am in general agreement with the views of the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed therein.
/3/Both dated July 21. (Ibid.)
As emphasized in General Lemnitzer's memorandum, there are certain principles which must be adhered to in negotiations on this subject in order to protect the security interests of the United States. These include a concurrent nuclear test ban, adequately enforced.
Of particular importance is the close relationship between the cessation of production measure and other arms control measures. I agree with the Chairman's recommendation that, because of this relationship, the enclosed study should be considered in conjunction with a report being prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which addresses the military impact on the United States of reducing its military forces to 1.8 million men. This report should be completed in a few days, and I expect to be able to forward it to you in the very near future.
It is noted from the enclosure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that "nuclear weapons and force levels are so closely related that they cannot be considered in isolation under any condition short of total and universal disarmament." In view of their firm opinion on this relationship, I believe that the Committee of Principals should await completion of the study on force reductions, before considering the resolution of whether or not the nuclear measures in the first stage of the U.S. draft negotiating paper should be linked to prior accomplishment of force reductions to 2.1 million men for the U.S. and the USSR.
Sincerely,
Bob/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
44. Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State /1/
Moscow, July 28, 1961, 11 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2861. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.
323. McCloy met with Khrushchev at latter's dacha in Putsunda, south of Sochi, July 26 and morning 27th. Most of conversation centered on Berlin although McCloy repeatedly emphasized he not in position discuss officially any subject except disarmament and could express views on Berlin only as private citizen. Khrushchev generally in good humor, displaying fits of temper only when he referred to what he called US threat of war over German peace treaty and to President's speech./2/ Fol highlights discussion both days. Memcon will follow as soon as available./3/
/2/Reference is to the President's speech on Berlin delivered the evening of July 25. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 535-540.
/3/This 25-page memorandum, dated July 31, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, General 7/11/61-7/31/61.
[Here follows discussion of Berlin, Germany, and Laos; for text, see volume XIV, pages 231-234.]
4. Disarmament (July 26 and 27). McCloy stressed strongly his personal and United States desire get to practical disarmament. Described background his appointment as President's Adviser on Disarmament and recalled his efforts develop such US position on test ban as would be acceptable to Soviets and his deep disappointment when negotiations assumed negative form primarily as result introduction troika proposal. Stated as result Geneva deadlock possibility resumption tests being discussed in US. No widespread enthusiasm for resumption discernible although present situation unverified moratorium and possible courses of action being seriously studied. Stressed if one side testing clandestinely and the other is not, point would be reached where national security involved; therefore wondered what could be done this area so that efforts made in Geneva would not be completely lost. Mentioned possibility ban atmospheric and under-water tests with extension ban when means of detecting tests underground and outer space improved. Emphasized significance reaching test ban agreement as first step toward agreement in broader disarmament areas. Said he searching for way to assure both sides no clandestine testing going on now. Referred to pressure exerted by some quarters on President to resume testing and said he assumed Khrushchev under similar pressure. Rejected Sov contention French testing for US and we assisting them. Wondered whether present Sov reluctance have test ban perhaps due Chinese pressure. Re general disarmament expressed concern how reality could be introduced in disarmament in light present Berlin situation. Congress asking questions why money should be appropriated for proposed new disarmament agency when President asking money for armaments. (Khrushchev interjected this logical question.) However, perhaps we should continue our efforts until sun shines again and attempt work out program for relieving ourselves of armaments and for bringing better life to world. Noted value contacts between two sides in spite fact some of our friends nervous about them and expressed belief contacts on this most important question should be left open. Re controls, emphasized strongly unacceptability troika and explained requirement verification levels remaining after reduction. Pointed out necessity arrangements impartial arbitrament disputes and some restriction sovereignty if horrors of war to be avoided and total disarmament achieved. Recalled US/USSR differences re purpose bilateral talks but stated discussions nevertheless useful.
Re tests, Khrushchev asserted Sovs not testing clandestinely and assured McCloy would not do it in future either. Said strong pressure on him to resume tests because many inventions and discoveries had accumulated and designers want test them This pressure now stronger in view Berlin situation and threat of war if peace treaty signed. Said he had been successful in resisting pressure so far but if US intensified its threats of war over peace treaty it would assist those in Soviet Union who want resumption. Stated Sov scientists believed 100 megaton bomb would be most economical cost-wise. Sovs have rocket capable of lifting such bomb. However, such bomb would require testing. Asserted he had told his scientists perhaps US would resume testing and thus help them test their bomb. Conceded no agreement in Geneva in sight since US would not agree to troika and Sovs could not abandon it. Reiterated Sov arguments re espionage and lessons of Congo events, as well as Sov position test ban would not resolve disarmament problem. Likewise, recited standard Sov line on French testing. Contended present Sov position test ban not due Chinese pressure and claimed no pressure on part anybody possible in socialist camp. Stated Chinese would of course eventually develop nuclear bomb but claimed ignorance when that would be.
Stated under general and complete disarmament troika would be dropped and would not be acceptable even if US should propose it. No troika would exist even in course process of GCD and control and inspection would not be subject to veto or any restriction. Comprehensive control must correspond to staged disarmament program because establishment control prior actual disarmament would mean control without disarmament; i.e., intelligence. After completion GCD process unrestricted and vetoless control established earlier would be permanently institutionalized. Sovs completely flexible as to what measures disarmament program should be started with; US should take its choice and Sovs would agree. Referred to elimination of means of delivery as possible first stage measure, although said perhaps it would be well start with conventional armaments so that both sides could retain rockets as deterrent. Also listed as possible first stage measures elimination foreign bases and complete withdrawal of foreign troops; gradual withdrawal of troops by stages with inspection to reduce danger of surprise attack; atom free zone along lines Rapacki Plan; establishment of observers at strategic points (major railroad stations, highway junctions, airfields and ports, but not launching sites because this would be possible only if rockets destroyed); non-aggression pact; and dissolution all military pacts. Stressed Sovs regard rockets and nuclear weapons their main weapon and expressed belief air force receding in history. Recent Sov air show may have been swan song of air force. Said President's intention increase orders military aircraft would result merely in good business for aircraft manufacturers. Asserted military bases have lost value with advent missiles./4/
/4/In telegram 304 from Moscow, July 27, the Embassy reported that at the end of his conversation with McCloy, Khrushchev stated that he had seen the text of a Soviet draft of a joint U.S.-Soviet statement on "Basic Principles of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament" and that it reflected his views. Telegram 304 transmitted a translation of this draft, which Zorin handed to McCloy on his return flight to Moscow. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-2761) A sightly different translation, dated July 28, is printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 267-269.
Thompson
45. Editorial Note
In telegram 305 from Moscow, July 28, 1961, the Embassy reported that the new Soviet draft statement of principles (see footnote 4, Document 44) "substantially improves Sov position and undercuts our argument that Sovs have blocked way to multilateral negotiations by refusal to discuss principles." The Embassy suggested three alternatives: submit a minimum number of amendments, which, if accepted, would make the draft a basis on which the United States would be prepared to resume multilateral negotiations; propose a recess, with resumption of negotiations in New York in a week to 10 days; or recapitulate major differences without offering amendments and propose moving directly to multilateral negotiations. The Embassy recommended the first alternative: "Consider it unlikely this would lead to agreement but likely to lead to alternative [three] on most favorable basis." Telegram 308 from Moscow, July 28, reported McCloy's agreement with this tactic. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-2861)
Telegram 295 to Moscow, July 28, marked "For McCloy from the Secretary," replied that Rusk had personally considered the three alternatives and chosen the first on several grounds: there was urgent need for McCloy to report to the President on his talks with Khrushchev; since further efforts to reach an agreement on principles were likely to be unsuccessful, it would be unfortunate to terminate them in McCloy's absence; a break in the negotiations would make possible full allied consultations on the matter; and discussions in New York, "looking toward followup action in the United Nations," would be preferable to further open-ended talks in Moscow. Rusk's "present thinking was that in the absence of agreement on forum and principles we should move to substantive discussion of our specific plan in the UNDC around August 29." (Ibid.) In telegram 333 from Moscow, July 29, the Embassy reported that McCloy had informed Zorin of the U.S. request for a recess. (Ibid., 600.0012/7-2961) All these documents are in the Supplement.
46. Memorandum by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
Washington, July 28, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-2861. Top Secret. A handwritten note at the top of the source text reads: "DR saw Sat" (July 29). A covering note from Lucius Battle to Secretary Rusk reads in part: "Mac Bundy called me today and stated that he was sending to me the attached memorandum of decision which grew out of conversations between the President and Mr. Arthur Dean. He said that you probably should have been present but that if you had any objection to the attached understanding it was not too late to make changes and that you should speak to the President." Another copy of this memorandum is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban General 4/61-8/61.
Memorandum of decision, July 27, 1961, test ban scenario
1. The Panofsky Panel Report/2/ will receive comment from the Joint Chiefs of Staff before August 4./3/ This Report, with JCS comment, will be presented to the National Security Council on August 8./4/ The President will review the advice of these bodies and if he does not change his present intention, he will then consult with Ambassador Dean and announce that in view of the Panel Report he is sending Mr. Dean back to Geneva for one last try. Before the President's announcement,/5/ but late enough to prevent leakage, selected members of the Panel (Panofsky, Bradbury, and Foster, preferably) will brief the JCAE.
/2/Document 42.
/3/Document 48.
/4/See Document 53.
/5/For text of the President's announcement of August 10, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 274-276. The President stated that Dean would return to Geneva on August 24.
2. Mr. Dean will return to Geneva about August 20; his main task will be to make one last effort to obtain Soviet agreement to the draft treaty as tabled. He will remain about a week, and if no progress is made he will return about August 28. The President will then announce that in the light of Soviet folly he now has concluded that no workable treaty is possible, and he may add that in view of the seriousness of the situation he proposes to put the matter, himself, before the United Nations. He will reserve further comment until that time.
3. Early in the General Assembly Session, the President will make a major speech largely or wholly devoted to disarmament. He hopes to have a strong and imaginative general proposal to make, but he will also want to refer to the test ban (unless it still seems essential at this later date to keep the two subjects separate). At this stage, he may put forward the Thompson proposal.
4. The President may, at some appropriate point, reach a decision to authorize stand-by preparations for tests of nuclear weapons, such tests to begin not earlier than 1962. Such authorization will be as quiet as possible, and in the event of leaks it will promptly be made clear in backgrounding that these are stand-by preparations only.
5. Appropriate parts of this plan will be communicated by Mr. Dean to the JCAE, by Mr. Schlesinger to Ormsby-Gore, and by the President to Macmillan (Bundy to draft a letter)./6/
/6/Document 50.
6. Meanwhile, Mr. Dean will produce an imaginative disarmament plan, Mr. Schlesinger an eloquent white paper, and Senator Humphrey a statute for the new disarmament agency.
McG. B.
47. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the President's Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy) /1/
Washington, July 28, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Committee of Principals, 7/27/61-7/28/61. Top Secret; Restricted Data.
Dear Mr. McCloy: I recommend the Committee of Principals propose to the President that the United States initiate preparations to resume nuclear weapons testing.
The Department of Defense supports the recent series of U.S. actions to explore all reasonable means of reaching an acceptable agreement in the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, and is in accord with continuing the negotiations. It now seems evident, however, that the Soviet Union is not interested in a treaty to discontinue nuclear weapons tests except on terms unacceptable to the U.S. This was made clear in the Soviet aide-m?moire of 4 June/2/ and subsequently by the Delegate in the Conference. It therefore is timely to consider making a judgment on the resumption of testing, as the President indicated in his public statement of June 8.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 31.
In developing a recommendation, three sets of considerations must be examined:
A. The payoffs which the U.S. and U.S.S.R. may expect from testing.
B. The U.S.-U.S.S.R. comparative positions before and after U.S. resumption of tests.
C. The political implications of resumption of testing.
A. The payoffs which the U.S. and U.S.S.R. may expect from testing.
The following objectives of nuclear weapons testing are considered to be most critical for the U.S.:
1. Pure fusion weapons.
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] pure fusion weapons, which would be particularly applicable to limited warfare, but which with further development would have general application to the whole spectrum of offensive and defensive warfare. [13 lines of source text not declassified]
2. Weight-yield ratio.
Testing would result in a spectrum of reduced size and weight weapons, without undue sacrifice of yield, for particular application to strategic missile systems with improved survivability. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] They offer the prospect of low cost lightweight strategic missile warheads for delivery by mobile systems (land, sea, and air) and for cluster warheads to improve penetrability, thereby plugging possible soft spots in second strike systems and improving our deterrent posture. In turn this could improve the capability to limit and control nuclear conflict. This field of development has been one of the most rapidly changing areas of weaponry.
3. Weapons effects.
Tests would result in gaining more information on weapons effects, especially to determine the lethal ranges and characteristics of kill mechanisms to be used against ballistic missiles. Knowledge of this kind can be of critical importance both for examining possibilities for defense against ballistic missile attack and for developing penetration capabilities for use should the Soviets deploy an AICBM system. [1 line of source text not declassified] important to determine the kill mechanism for AICBM's and in deciding how our ballistic missile attacks must be planned including the nature of the re-entry vehicle, degree of saturation and the necessary separation between warheads. Other important objectives of effects tests are: The vulnerability of our own warheads and carriers to nuclear bursts; the effects of nuclear bursts on electronic equipment and radio and radar propagation; the acquisition of design data for hardening underground and other structures; and the kill radii and safe delivery ranges of our weapons.
4. Proof testing.
To assure that new weapons entering stockpiles to meet critical needs will function properly. Testing by functional tests underground at fractional yields will provide assurance that weapons not tested as finally designed will function properly, e.g., warheads for Polaris, Minuteman and Skybolt. Presently planned warheads have all been certified by the Atomic Energy Commission as having the same assurance of functioning as those which have been tested; further developments in the absence of testing could result in loss of confidence in the stockpile.
B. The comparative U.S.-U.S.S.R. positions before and after U.S. resumption of tests.
The situations before and after U.S. resumption of tests are difficult to compare because the U.S. does not know whether the U.S.S.R. is or is not now testing. Three situations, therefore, must be examined:
1. The proposed situation.
It is assumed that if the U.S. resumes tests the U.S.S.R. will also test. With both sides testing, there is no reason to expect U.S. weapons development to proceed on terms which are worse than even. Because of the asymmetry of the strategic positions of the two countries, it is likely that the advances made will be more important to the U.S. than to the U.S.S.R.
2. One view of the present situation: Neither side tests.
If neither side tests, weapons development in both countries will be hampered. The Soviets would be denied some developments useful to them (e.g., smaller high-yield warheads which could make a more mobile deterrent force, to the extent that they are interested in deterrence). The U.S. would be denied the developments listed in A above, which the DOD considers to be of great importance to U.S. strategic and tactical capabilities. Moreover, because of the differences in conditions of secrecy prevailing in the two nations, the Soviets would over time have an advantage in acquiring U.S. secrets. And, since the line between "laboratory experiments" and "testing" is not a clear one, the Soviets are less likely to refrain from significant "experiments" which the U.S. might call "tests". These factors could lead to weapons advantages for the Soviets.
3. A second view of the present situation: The Soviets test clandestinely while the U.S. abstains.
If the U.S. refrains from testing while the Soviets conduct clandestine tests underground and in space, the U.S.S.R. will make significant advances not available to the U.S. in the critical areas of weapons development mentioned in Part A above. The results of Soviet tests could be important and varied. If the U.S.S.R. achieved a major breakthrough, especially on the area of AICBM (where there have been indications of Soviet interest and activity), the U.S. might have its deterrent missile force emasculated with little warning. Similarly, a composite of developments of the kind which the Soviets might be reasonably expected to achieve through a program of clandestine testing could, in the absence of parallel development by the U.S., degrade or possibly even negate U.S. strategic capability based on present weapons technology. Further, a major even though not decisive advance by the U.S.S.R. could be a strong political asset and could give them a formidable advantage at the conference table. It may be argued that advances which the Soviets could make clandestinely in a few months or a year cannot unbalance the strategic situation. However, this question should be considered in the light of the almost three years during which the Soviets have been able to test clandestinely if they wished. In three years, one or even two new generations of weapons development have occurred in the past. In any event, this situation--in which the U.S.S.R. tests while the U.S. abstains--has grave implications for U.S. national security and for the security of our allies.
C. The political implications of resumption of testing.
The political issues involved in a decision to resume testing, while not the province of Defense, are clearly serious. The following political considerations deserve special mention:
1. The adverse reaction of some nations may be expected and must be evaluated and taken into account.
2. The resumption of tests will probably not have a significant effect on the Nth-country problem. At this time it appears that even the unlikely situation of the successful conclusion by the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. of a test ban agreement will not lead to the adherence of France and Communist China, unless these countries have previously achieved a nuclear weapons capability satisfactory to them. How many other countries would adhere that are otherwise likely to develop nuclear weapons is uncertain, but the number is probably small. On the other hand, in the absence of a treaty, it is doubtful that resumption of testing by the U.S. would cause proliferation of testing, especially if the U.S. maintains a consistent policy of discouraging diffusion.
3. Continuation of a voluntary and uncontrolled moratorium on tests puts the U.S. in a weak position to press for adequate controls in the disarmament negotiations and in connection with other arms control measures; it sets a bad precedent.
4. If there is any remaining chance of obtaining a satisfactory test ban agreement, resuming tests is more likely to help than hinder the chance. A continuing uncontrolled moratorium removes any incentive for the Soviet Union to conclude a treaty or to negotiate seriously on an acceptable control system.
5. Most important--especially in view of the impending Berlin crisis--is the role played by resumption of tests as a demonstration of U.S. resoluteness. The U.S. has stated that it would not continue indefinitely under an uncontrolled moratorium. This is an appropriate time to demonstrate that the U.S. means what it says.
D. Conclusions.
If the U.S. could be sure that the U.S.S.R. were not testing (and if all political considerations were set aside), the justification for resumption of testing would be weaker. However, the crucial fact is that the U.S. does not know whether or not the U.S.S.R. is testing. The U.S. does know:
--that the motive to test exists (it may be assumed that the possibilities for advancements along some or all of the lines mentioned in Part A above are open to and known to the U.S.S.R.);
--that there have been unexplained activities which could be indicative of testing at Soviet sites suitable for underground testing, and that there has been a continuing association between weapons development laboratories and Soviet organizations known to have been associated with testing programs prior to the moratorium;
--that underground tests could have been performed in the U.S.S.R. with next to no risk of detection; and
--that the Soviets have consistently rejected proposals for arrangements which would give reasonable assurance that they are not testing.
The first judgment therefore is that the U.S.S.R. may now be testing or may be planning to test clandestinely. The second is that the chances are substantial that such one-sided testing will lead to grave consequences for the security of the U.S. and her allies. And the third is that the risks involved in the resumption of tests are less than the risks involved in continuation of the unpoliced moratorium.
After consideration of all aspects of the problem, including the political factors, I recommend that the U.S. complete preparations to resume nuclear weapons testing, and collaterally prepare for a Vela program of underground shots for seismic research. The latter are essential if we ever are to achieve an improved underground detection and identification system, either national or international.
Assuming that the decision is made to resume testing, the timing of announcements, and of the actual shot schedule, will be significant. The AEC and Defense have developed a proposed program of tests, based on priority of need for the data and taking into account practical readiness dates for various shots. This is attached/3/ and discussed in more detail in Par. E-4.
/3/The enclosure, entitled "Proposed Test Program" is not printed.
E. Recommended sequence of events.
This proposed sequence consists briefly of the following steps:
1. An early announcement that preparations for nuclear tests will start at once, but that the decision to conduct tests will depend on the results of test ban negotiations over the next five or six months.
2. Physical preparations for underground tests at the Nevada Test Site and continuation of test ban negotiations.
3. If treaty negotiations are unsuccessful, announcement that tests are being resumed.
4. Early resumption of underground tests.
Each of these steps is discussed more fully below.
1. Announcement that preparations for tests have been ordered.
There should be an announcement, on, or shortly after, August 1, that the President has instructed the AEC and Defense to get nuclear test sites in readiness, as a decision to conduct underground tests may be required for reasons of national security.
The ground work for this announcement was laid in the U.S. reply (released June 17) to the Soviet aide-m?moire.
It is recognized that any announcement of preparations for resumption of testing should be accompanied by a continued intensive program by State and USIA to gain U.S. and world support. The announcement explaining U.S. preparations may well be short and to the point, along the following lines:
"The U.S. has done everything in its power to negotiate a treaty banning nuclear testing with adequate safeguards. The U.S.S.R. does not want a test-ban treaty and has not negotiated in good faith. They consistently reject proposals for arrangements which would give reasonable assurance they are not testing, and they may be testing. If the U.S. resumes testing, it will be because the irreducible minimum security needs of the free world require it. The AEC and the DOD have been instructed to make preparations for nuclear weapons tests as soon as possible. The first important tests cannot be conducted for five or six months, and the U.S. does not want to test except as national and free world security dictates. In the interim, the U.S. will continue to negotiate in Geneva towards reaching agreement on a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests. Should a satisfactory agreement be reached, preparations for testing will be discontinued. The U.S. is preparing sites for underground tests involving no fall-out hazard. The decision whether testing will actually be conducted will depend on events in the next few months."
The preparations to test should be announced publicly rather than kept secret for two reasons:
a. It is consistent with past policy of disclosure (and the news could probably not be suppressed anyway).
b. Such an announcement may be consistent with other steps being taken in connection with the impending Berlin crisis.
The separation of the decision to make preparations to test and the decision to test correctly implies that the latter decision is genuinely left open. The decision to test will depend on conditions at the later time.
2. Preparation for tests.
Detailed preparations for a schedule of tests along the lines of the attached program would of course immediately follow the announcement. The program by State and USIA to gain world-wide public support should be continued and intensified during the interval between announcement of preparations and resumption of testing.
The six months preparation period will cost the AEC about $25 to $30 million and the Defense Atomic Support Agency about $6 million, while the whole two-year series of tests, including preparation, would cost the AEC about $315 million and the DOD about $150 million, not including the cost of nuclear material in the various devices. More than half of the DOD's $150 million estimate represents the cost of high altitude and space tests, including the necessary boosters and instrumentation.
The first two weapons effects tests (Nos. 4 and 15 in the attached table) which are the responsibility of the DOD, have been studied in considerable detail. The Hard Hat shot (No. 4) will give engineering data on the design of hardened underground structures, on which we are now spending hundreds of millions of dollars without sufficient knowledge to insure that the engineering designs are adequate, and provide seismic data to replace one of the scheduled Vela shots. About $2 million has already been spent on Hard Hat in constructing a series of tunnels in hard rock, lined with different types of materials to be subjected to very high blast forces. Instrument and cable placement can begin about August 1st and will require several months' time and an additional $1 million. The data could be obtained by exploding 1,250,000 pounds of NE, but this would cost an additional $1 million and would not satisfy the Vela requirements.
The second effects shot (No. 15) must be nuclear, as it will give simulated data on X-ray and other nuclear kill mechanisms against ICBM warheads above the atmosphere, provide data on the kill radius of Nike Zeus, and test the response of nose cone and other materials to nuclear bursts. Many of the questions about ICBM effectiveness and vulnerability should be answered or greatly simplified by this and the preceding effects test. The tunnel and shaft are already constructed. An 800 ft. steel vacuum pipe should be ordered immediately, followed by design, construction and placement of the pipe, targets and instruments. An additional $5 million will be required.
No detailed estimates of the necessary preparations have been made by the AEC for their development shots, pending a decision to prepare for nuclear testing, but a total of about $25 to $30 million will be required during a six months preparation period. This would cover the digging of additional shafts and tunnels, the installation of cable, diagnostic firing and timing equipment and other preparations of a detailed nature that are now under study.
3. Announcement that tests are being resumed.
Assuming that conditions have not materially changed, there should be an announcement shortly before the first test is to be made, of the resumption of tests. It should be explained that the tests contemplated in the first series are underground and involve no fall-out hazard.
The announcement would be similar to the one made when preparations were begun. This time, however, it should conclude in the following vein: ". . . Time has run out. We said we could not abide an uncontrolled moratorium. And we will not. Underground tests will be resumed____."
4. Resumption of tests.
The first of the series of tests should be made very soon after the announcement, and a demonstrably significant series of tests should be carried out. The attached tables show such a proposed series of 44 development, effects and proof tests prepared by DASA in cooperation with the Division of Military Application of the AEC, and representing the best current judgment of what could and should be done over a period of about two years following a six month period of preparation. Certain changes may have to be made as the results of preceding tests become available. In addition, 10 underground safety, or "one point detonation" tests, are proposed which would produce little or no nuclear yield, and could therefore be carried out concurrently with the others, as convenient.
The first six months of actual testing would be carried out underground, with essentially no contamination of the surface or the atmosphere. Beyond that period, 10 tests (marked with an asterisk in the table) might be made in and above the atmosphere, on the surface of land or water and underwater, but designed to produce a minimum of radioactive contamination. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] These 10 shots are considered of lower priority than the others, and would be omitted if political considerations so dictate, but have been inserted in the list in logical time sequence. The last 6 shots would be either at very high altitude or in outer space. They are most important [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] and also to obtain information on radar and radio black-out caused by nuclear bursts at very high altitudes. The only two high yield shots of this nature, fired in the last test series, demonstrated the need for much additional information about these important and potentially serious phenomena. They have been scheduled last only because of the extensive preparations required for testing at very high altitudes or in outer space.
There is also attached the present schedule of Vela underground shots. The proposed weapons tests would delay the conclusion of the Vela Uniform program by 6 months to a year, and increase its cost by possibly $4 million. However, a considerable amount of seismic data could be obtained from the weapons shots. The DASA Hard Hat shot could eliminate the need for the Vela Lollipop event. In fact it is possible that during such a series of tests electromagnetic or other phenomena may be found that would prove superior to seismic effects as a means of detecting underground nuclear explosions. Alternative schedules involving a mixture of the two programs can also be carried out.
[2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] No specific test [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is listed because it could not be built until more data are available, but it would be tested as soon as possible.
Three other tests in this first six months series of 15 shots would be devoted to securing a higher yield-to-weight ratio in weapons producing [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] KT. The remaining seven shots would verify performance and prove the yield of new weapons going into stockpile where there is some doubt about the final design or where the yield is particularly important for small tactical weapons such as Davy Crockett and the air delivered missiles, Falcon, Terrier and Bullpup, where safe firing distances must be determined.
The remaining tests in the list would continue with advanced development and proof tests in about the same ratio as during the first six months, to answer questions that have arisen so far. Obviously other questions will become critical as the tests proceed.
While it is not contemplated that any tests in the first six months period would be in the atmosphere or underwater, the U.S. should not commit itself in any public statements to refrain indefinitely from testing in any environment. We should retain freedom of action, should the Soviet Union test in those environments, or should the military value of such tests later be determined to outweigh the possible adverse political effects of producing a small amount of local radioactive contamination.
The United States should continue to reaffirm the U.S. desire for an effective test ban treaty and should endeavor to keep negotiations going in Geneva.
I am sending copies of this letter to the Secretary of State, Chairman, AEC, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, Director, CIA, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director, USIA, and Chairman, JCS.
Sincerely,
Robert S. McNamara/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Secretary McNamara signed the original.
48. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara /1/
JCSM-517-61
Washington, August 2, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61 (Jun-Nov 61). Top Secret; Restricted Data.
SUBJECT
Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing (U)
1. Reference is made to:
a. Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President, dated 28 July 1961, subject as above./2/
/2/See Document 42 and the source note thereto.
b. Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 4 March 1961, subject: Fisk Panel Report./3/
/3/See footnote 3, Document 5, and Document 4.
c. Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 17 May 1961, subject: Department of Defense Policy on Resumption of Nuclear Weapons Tests (U)./4/
/4/In this memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated their approval of the position set forth in the enclosure to Document 22. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61 (Apr-May 61))
d. Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense, dated 22 June 1961, subject: Proposed Letter to the President on Resumption of Nuclear Weapons Testing./5/
/5/In this draft letter, McNamara set forth a position similar to that in Document 47. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 4613 (22 Jun 61)) McNamara's letter may have gone to the President on June 27 but was returned at Kennedy's request. See Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban, p. 69.
e. Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 29 July 1961, subject: review of Nuclear Test Plans (U)./6/
/6/Not found but see numbered paragraph 5.
2. By reference a, the Special Assistant to the President forwarded the Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing (Panofsky Panel) with the request that comments of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff be available for the President not later than 4 August 1961.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the Panofsky Report and agree with the panel that the report is essentially an updated Fisk Panel Report. In this connection, the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in reference b remain valid in relation to the Fisk Report. Of particular significance is the nonconcurrence of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy/7/ on the Fisk Report which contained views which were generally agreed to by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
/7/Major General Herbert B. Loper (Ret.).
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit the following comments on the subject report:
a. There are many points in the report which are considered to be inaccurate or which express opinions and military judgments with which the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not agree.
b. The report is based on unconfirmed intelligence estimates and therefore its conclusions with respect to Soviet capabilities are conjectural and subject to gross error. In this connection, the following are pertinent:
(1) United States intelligence sources cannot identify nor can they give specific information on a single stockpiled Soviet nuclear weapon.
(2) United States estimates of the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile are based entirely on analysis of Soviet nuclear tests with no confirmation from defectors or from other sources.
(3) Estimates of the Soviet nuclear material availability are better than estimates of the weapons stockpile; however, a margin of error of plus or minus 50% is assigned the 1963 materials estimate. No margins of error can be assigned subsequent estimates because of their dependence upon actual production which, in turn, is dependent upon Soviet plans, policies, and intentions.
c. From b, above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have serious reservations as to the validity of the conclusions concerning Soviet capabilities in development and production of nuclear weapons relative to capabilities of the United States. In the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile is essentially unknown both qualitatively and quantitatively.
d. The final conclusion loses a considerable amount of its validity when the report states that the possibility of new surprises in developments exists in the area of tactical nuclear weapons. The conclusion also overlooked phenomena in weapons effects of various kinds, and failed to evaluate the potential value of such break-throughs based on the erroneous conclusion that there is no established doctrine for the use of tactical weapons.
e. The Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot concur with the Panel's conclusion that from the military viewpoint there is little urgency connected with the US resumption of nuclear testing, and that decisions in the near future on resumption of nuclear testing can be governed primarily by non-technical considerations. Earlier Panel statements that the possibility exists of important surprises in overlooked weapons effects and tactical weapon developments invalidates this conclusion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that discoveries in these areas are potentially of sufficient importance that their unilateral achievement by the Soviets could result in a decisive Soviet military advantage. The fact that the US has refrained from pursuing these important discoveries by not testing since October 1958, while we have no assurance that the Soviets have likewise refrained from testing, makes the US resumption of testing a matter of great urgency. In the interest of national security the US cannot afford the risk of unilateral Soviet discovery of these important new achievements in nuclear technology.
5. An important element in the decision to resume nuclear testing is the psychological aspect associated with world-wide fallout. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would like to emphasize the conclusions of the Chief, Defense Atomic Support Agency,/8/ which are contained in reference e:
/8/Major General Robert H. Booth.
"The Chief of DASA desires to emphasize that world-wide fallout from past tests has not produced a biologic hazard. While contrary to some widely publicized statements, the above conclusion is based on a careful study of the problem. For many years DASA has conducted an extensive stratospheric sampling program. Data from this program coupled with extensive surveys of levels of radiation in soil, foods and directly in people have shown conclusively that the levels of radiation exposure to important areas of the body which have been created from past tests (including the radiation effects of ingested Sr 90, Cs 137 and C 14) are only a few percent (2 to 3%) of the natural radiation background. These are even smaller than the fluctuations in the background exposure as one moves from place to place on the earth. In light of these facts, it is believed that the testing philosophy of the United States should allow tests to be conducted in any environment for which information is required, including if necessary, all environments that have been employed in the past. As far as fallout is concerned, care should be taken, as can easily be done, to insure that local fallout does not descend into inhabited areas. The conduct of the above-ground tests, which are proposed, would increase the background radiation by less than 1/10 of 1%; consequently, any biological effects from world-wide fallout would be insignificant."
6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their views on the necessity for the resumption of nuclear testing which are summarized in reference c. It is requested that the views contained herein and those in reference c be brought to the attention of the President. It is further recommended that reference d be updated and forwarded to the President./9/
/9/A memorandum from the President to General Taylor, August 7, reads: "The Joint Chiefs took a very strong position against the Panofsky report on testing. I wonder who prepared their analysis. Was it done by one, two, or three men? Was it done outside of the Defense Department by a group of scientists, or what? This is particularly interesting in view of the fact that the Chairman of the AEC seems to find himself 'in general agreement [with] the findings and conclusions of the report.'" (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Panofsky Panel Report 7/21/61) Kennedy's quote is from Seaborg's August 4 letter to Wiesner, in which Seaborg emphasized maintaining a readiness to test "quite apart from the political decision whether or not to resume testing" and recommended increasing the limit on laboratory explosions to 1 ton. (Ibid., Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files, Nuclear Test Ban, 7/2/61-8/7/61)
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L. L. Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
49. Letter From the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Brown) to the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner)/1/
Washington, August 3, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing. Top Secret; Restricted Data.
Dear Jerry: In response to your letter of July 28, 1961,/2/ the Secretary of Defense has asked me, in view of the short time available for response, to reply for him. I am also enclosing comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff/3/ on the report of your Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing.
/2/See the source note, Document 42.
/3/Document 48.
I agree with the Panel that we do not have sufficient evidence from any source to determine whether or not the USSR has been conducting clandestine nuclear testing since November 1958./4/ For this reason, it seems prudent to assume that they may have been doing so. Accordingly, I would add to the Summary, at the end of the second sentence in the second full paragraph on page 5 the phrase, "from whenever they start(ed)," and to the end of the Summary, page 6, the sentence, "It should be noted that the time scale should take into account possible clandestine activities by the USSR since November 1958." The assessments of relative positions throughout the report, as on pages 15, 17, 24, 26, 27 and 32, seem to be accurate on the basis of 1958 data but do not indicate that the situation may be different now, as is clearly brought out in only one case on page 29.
/4/In a memorandum to Wiesner dated August 3, Allen Dulles stated that the Panofsky Report's conclusion that available intelligence permitted no conclusion with regard to Soviet clandestine testing was consistent with SNIE 11-9-61 (Document 17) and that "for the present we have no new important information to add to that presented in the Panel's report." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing)
The danger of closing off for a long period our own advances in nuclear weapons development, while the other side may continue, represents a greater risk if the arms race continues in other areas than it would if we could expect general arms limitation agreements. The Fisk Panel answered the questions about the technical and military effects of a test ban or a resumption of tests in the context that one possibility was a partially controlled agreement on nuclear testing, presumably to be followed by other agreements. Since the immediate prospects of arms limitation agreements seem more remote, the motivation for a Soviet violation of an unmonitored ban and consequent dangers to the U.S. appear greater.
Page 4 of the Summary points out that the significance of small pure fusion weapons depends on the extent to which future U.S. strategy emphasizes the use of nuclear weapons in tactical warfare. It also depends on future USSR tactics. If they emphasized such weapons and we did not have them, we could be at a distinct disadvantage, both militarily and politically.
On Page 4, also, the unfavorable cost ratio of Nike-Zeus to enemy ICBM's is stated to be more significant than warhead performance or lack of knowledge of kill mechanisms. This is true. However, Nike-Zeus was designed to rely on known and conservative kill mechanisms and expensive warheads. If we knew more about the probable longer range lethal effects, the system might be quite different, and possibly much less costly. Furthermore, effects tests might show us how to reduce the vulnerability of our own ICBM warheads to a greater degree than we now believe possible. Thus, though my outlook for ballistic missile defense, at least of cities, is pessimistic, I believe that nuclear testing (and consequent warhead development) and better understanding of effects would have an important influence on both our ICBM penetration program and our AICBM efforts.
In summary, I find a stronger technical case for the resumption of nuclear testing than appears in the Ad Hoc Panel's report. I would agree that delay of a few more months is unlikely to have a substantial military effect, but over the long run (including the nearly three years since October 31, 1958) possible Soviet gains from testing must certainly be considered an important military disadvantage to the U.S. Therefore, the position of the Department of Defense, as previously stated by Secretary McNamara, is that nuclear weapons testing underground should be resumed as soon as it is politically expedient. Secretary McNamara's views were set forth more fully in the letter to Mr. McCloy dated July 28, 1961./5/
/5/Document 47.
Sincerely,
Harold Brown/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that indicates Brown signed the original.
50. Letter From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan /1/
Washington, August 3, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1946. Top Secret. Transmitted to London in telegram 585, August 3, for delivery to Macmillan. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 72 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan 1960-1962)
Dear Mr. Prime Minister: We have been thinking some more about the test ban, and I have reached some conclusions I would like to share with you. We have come so far together that we want to be sure to keep as close as we can in the last stages of this effort.
I have had a study made of the possibility of clandestine tests by the Russians--and of the military importance such tests might have./2/ The preliminary findings indicate that what we have all feared is the fact: we simply cannot be sure, without a control system, that the Soviets are not testing, and if they are testing, they can be learning important things. The final judgment of probabilities depends on a political assessment of the way the Soviets would estimate their own gains and losses from such a program, and I know of no one who has a right to a wholly certain judgment. We don't know--but for the long run it is just this simple fact that is disturbing--in this field what we don't know can hurt us.
/2/Apparent reference to the Panofsky Panel report, Document 42.
Yet I remain most reluctant to take a firm decision to resume testing--the stakes are high and the consequences not easily predicted. So I propose to send Dean back to Geneva, about August 24, with instructions to make one more strenuous effort to move the Soviets. I do not see any need for a shift in our present negotiating position--it is clearer than ever that what is holding us up is the Soviet loss of interest in a treaty, as you pointed out back in April. But I think we ought to make one more try in Geneva just to bring home as well as we can the seriousness of the position the Soviets have created. I hope you may agree and that Ormsby-Gore may go back with Dean.
If Dean and Ormsby-Gore make no progress, we shall face the problem of further steps. We have already inscribed this question for discussion at the UN Assembly session, and I think we should use this and all other opportunities to press home the fact that the responsibility for failure rests with the Soviet Union. Incidentally, we shall shortly be publishing a paper on the test ban which has the same purpose./3/ And perhaps, if the Berlin environment allows it, you and I should write a last letter to Khrushchev.
/3/Not further identified.
Meanwhile, I shall be forced to consider a decision to resume testing. I am still reviewing the evidence, and in any event I do not expect that there need be any U.S. tests in 1961. But I am not very hopeful that it will be possible to wait much beyond the first of the year. If we do resume, it will be underground, unless and until the Soviets resume atmospheric tests.
We are considering one further possibility, which is that at the UN and in a general campaign for some time thereafter--and before we resume testing--we should offer to join in an unpoliced agreement to give up all tests which can cause fallout. We believe that it may be possible to get wide public understanding of "fall-out testing" as bad, and underground testing as reasonable--and this would give us the assurance of parity with the Soviet Union which cannot exist at present. May I hear how all this strikes you?
Let me repeat my warm congratulations on your common market decision, and let me thank you too for your support of my Berlin speech--I tried to frame the language on civil defense so as to awaken our people without frightening yours.
With warm personal wishes,
Sincerely,/4/
/4/Printed from an unsigned copy that indicates President Kennedy signed the original.
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