Documents 151-188

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Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Arms Control and Disarmament

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Documents 151-188

151. Editorial Note

On March 13, 1962, Acting Secretary of State George Ball sent a reply to the January 2 letter of U.N. Acting Secretary-General U Thant to the U.S. Government on U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1664 (XVI). Regarding this resolution, see footnote 3, Document 97. In his letter, Thant had asked for U.S. views "as to the conditions under which countries not possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to enter into specific undertakings to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such weapons and to refuse to receive in the future nuclear weapons on their territories on behalf of any other country."

Ball's reply divided the question of the proliferation of nuclear weapons into two categories: "(1) the manufacture or ownership of nuclear weapons, and (2) the deployment of nuclear weapons." Concerning the first, Ball reviewed U.S. legislation precluding the transfer of ownership or control of information about nuclear weapons. This policy, he added, was reflected in the U.S. comprehensive disarmament proposal submitted to the U.N. General Assembly on September 25, 1961, and subsequently incorporated with U.S. "full support" in General Assembly Resolution 1665 (XVI). Regarding the second, Ball emphasized "the firm belief of the United States that the only sure way to remove nuclear weapons, wherever located, from national defense establishments is through realization of a program of general and complete disarmament under effective international control." The United States, he added, believed that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee was the proper forum for resolution of this problem.

For text of Ball's letter, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, volume I, pages 87-90. Regarding Resolution 1665 (XVI), see footnote 5, Document 83.

152. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, in Geneva/1/

Washington, March 13, 1962, 8:06 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-1362. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and initialed by Fisher (ACDA) and cleared by Kaysen (White House), Nitze (Defense) (by Fisher), and Navez (S/S).

Tosec 26. For Sec and Foster. At White House suggestion this telegram is to set forth armament decisions of March 9, 1962 as supplemented by further discussion. It has been approved by the President.

1. The United States will propose an across-the-board cut of 30 per cent in both strategic and conventional weapons in increments of 10 per cent a year over a three-year period. In presenting this position there should be no indication, without further specific authorization by the President, that the reduction of strategic delivery vehicles can be separated from other disarmament measures for the purpose of being negotiated as a separate measure.

2. With respect to strategic weapons this cut is to be both in numbers and in total destructive capability, of which total full loaded weight is a possible yardstick. Since the distinction between intercontinental and less than intercontinental is still under study, some more general formulation should be used such as that strategic weapons will be divided into categories which reflect the realities of the military situation.

4. On armaments other than strategic delivery vehicles reductions will be according to categories specified in the March 3 memorandum to the President./2/ Reductions within certain of these categories will be by numbers and by total weight and any description of the proposal should leave room for either or both of these methods of reduction being applicable as later decided to be appropriate.

/2/See footnote 4, Document 146.

5. Because inspection for the stockpiles of nuclear warheads and weapons of chemical and biological warfare are now considered so difficult these weapons are not included in the proposed reductions of 30 per cent. To deal with these two groups of weapons the U.S. will propose at an appropriate time that two international experts commissions be established along the lines indicated in the March 3 memorandum to the President.

6. The United States should continue to press the proposal of 2.1 million force levels. The United States would be prepared to proceed at least through the first stage in the absence of the Chinese Communists although the possibility of a defeasance procedure (comparable to that in the test ban) should be examined.

7. Inspection is the subject of a separate detailed telegram, Todis 44./3/

/3/Todis 44 to Geneva, March 13, transmitted a suggested text for Secretary Rusk's statement on verification to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-1262) Rusk's statement to the committee on March 15, however, touched on the verification issue only in general terms. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 142-149.

8. The United States will propose that, contingent on agreement on the cut-off of fissionable material for use in weapons, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. each transfer 50,000 kg. of U-235 to peaceful purposes. FYI. Study is being given to whether we should propose a proportional transfer of U.S. 60,000 kgs. to U.S.S.R. 40,000 kgs. of U-235 and what would be the effects of transfers of various sizes and in various other proportions. End FYI.

9. The United States will propose that the reduction of armaments proposed for Stage I be applied in the same general ratio for Stages II and III.

Ball

153. Editorial Note

During 1962, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee held three sessions in Geneva: March 14-June 15, July 16-September 8, and November 26-December 20. Chairman of the U.S. Delegation was Arthur H. Dean, whom President Kennedy appointed on March 6. Text of the White House press release announcing the appointment is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Atomic Energy-Armaments. For text of the Department of State statement, March 9, naming the principal U.S. advisers to the U.S. Delegation, see Department of State Bulletin, April 2, 1962, page 536.

Secretary Rusk headed the U.S. Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee during his March 10-27 visit to Geneva. He participated in preparatory meetings mainly with the British and other NATO delegates but also with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and representatives of the other nations on the committee. For a memorandum of conversation of one meeting with Home and Gromyko, see Document 154. In addition to his comments during the plenary sessions of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Secretary Rusk made two formal statements to the committee on March 15 and 27. For texts of these statements, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, volume I, pages 142-149 and 190-199.

The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (and its subcommittees) addressed three major issues during the year: general and complete disarmament, the discontinuance of nuclear testing, and confidence-building measures to decrease international tensions (e.g., cessation of war propaganda, creation of "nuclear-free" zones, measures to prevent nuclear proliferation, prohibition of nuclear explosions in outer space, and measures to reduce the possibility of accidental war).

Major initiatives during the 1962 sessions included a Soviet draft treaty (U.N. doc. ENDC/2), March 15; an eight-nation (Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic) joint memorandum (U.N. doc. ENDC/28), April 16; a U.S. treaty outline, April 18 (U.N. doc. ENDC/30), and revisions (U.N. doc. ENDC/30/Corr.1, April 25, and U.N. doc. ENDC/30/Add.1, August 6, and Add.2, August 8); and a revised Soviet draft treaty (U.N. doc. ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Corr.1), September 22. Texts are ibid., volume I, pages 103-127, 334-336, and 351-382, and volume II, pages 718, 728-730, and 913-938, respectively.

For text of the first interim report by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Disarmament Commission, May 31 (U.N. doc. ENDC/42), see ibid., volume I, pages 577-581. A second interim progress report, September 8 (U.N. doc. ENDC/62), is ibid., pages 865-871. A summary of the work and accomplishments of the three sessions is in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1962, pages 5-14.

Documentation on the Geneva committee meetings is in Department of State, Central Files 396.12-GE, 397.5611-GE, 600.0012, and 700.5611. Verbatim transcripts of the committee sessions are in U.N. doc. ENDC/PV.1-95.

154. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Geneva, March 14, 1962, 10:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-1462. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on June 14. The meeting was held at the British Mission, Villa la Fenetre.

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The Secretary
Mr. Foster
Ambassador Dean
Mr. Stelle
Mr. Spiers
Mr. Akalovsky

United Kingdom
Lord Home
Mr. Godber
Mr. Shattuck
Sir Michael Wright
Mr. Samuel/2/
/2/Ian Samuel, Principal Private Secretary to Lord Home.
Mr. Lambert
Maj. Gen. Riddell
Mr. Russell

USSR
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Zorin
Mr. Tsarapkin
Lt. Gen. Gryzlov
Mr. Sukhodrev

SUBJECT
Disarmament

Lord Home opened the meeting stating he believed it would be useful for the three delegations to exchange views on how the conference should proceed and on disarmament matters in general. He invited Sir Michael Wright to report on the results of the consultations among the representatives of the three delegations on conference procedures.

Sir Michael Wright stated that the group had had several meetings to discuss procedure and that he was happy to say that agreement had been found upon proposals to be put before the other delegations.

After some discussion of the arrangements for the opening meeting, as well as the subsequent meetings of the conference the three principals agreed that limitation on publicity as agreed among the US, the UK and USSR delegations would apply only to the conference as a whole and that each delegation would be free to act at its discretion as far as making its views known through its own media. The UK also stressed the importance of the role the Co-chairmen would play, particularly as a steering committee.

Lord Home observed he was encouraged that this conference would open under the conditions of US-USSR agreement on principles. He noted that the disarmament principles developed earlier by the Commonwealth Conference/3/ were very similar to those agreed by the US and USSR. Thus, he thought, the conference had a good start.

/3/At the conclusion of the tenth conference of British Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London March 8-17, the Prime Ministers issued a nine-point statement outlining the principles to be followed in bringing about general and complete disarmament, with effective inspection and control.

Referring to the question of verification, Lord Home particularly emphasized the problem of verifying unidentified events in the nuclear test context and the question of verifying the levels of armaments remaining during the process of general disarmament. He said it would be helpful for the conference if the US and USSR stated their views on these two matters, which were likely to be the central difficulties in the conference work. He observed that his opening speech would deal primarily with these two problems, noting that it would not contain any propaganda but merely the suggestion that these problems be studied objectively./4/

/4/The text of Lord Home's speech is in U.N. doc. ENDC/1.

Mr. Gromyko responded by saying that he would not object even if Lord Home's speech contained some propaganda, provided that there were different kinds of propaganda.

Mr. Gromyko then made a prolonged exposition of USSR views, stressing that the US, the UK and the USSR carried the main burden of responsibility for the solution of the disarmament problem. The reasons for this were obvious and certain conclusions from this should be drawn as far as the committee's work was concerned. He noted that this conference was to take place in a city where representatives of the three countries had made many speeches as far back as during the days of the League of Nations, although the US had not been a formal member of the League of Nations. No practical solution had been found at that time and he wondered whether the three powers could not now use their authority and prestige in order to further the cause of disarmament and peace. As far as the USSR was concerned, its representatives had come to Geneva to contribute to the solution of disarmament. In this connection, Mr. Gromyko recalled Mr. Khrushchev's proposal that the conference be opened at the heads-of-government level and regretted that no agreement had been reached on that proposal./5/ Mr. Gromyko went on to say that the main requirement for the solution of the problem was the desire on the part of all participants to reach agreement; negotiations were only a means of reconciling differences.

/5/Khrushchev first formally advanced this proposal in his February 10 message to President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan; for text, see vol. VI, Document 31, or Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 32-36.

Mr. Gromyko continued that the USSR believed that the solution of the disarmament problem should be sought on the basis of general and complete disarmament, i.e., on the basis of decisions already adopted by the UN General Assembly. He contended that such an approach would eliminate many difficulties presented by partial approach. He observed, however, that the solution of general and complete disarmament could not be implemented by simply pressing a button. This was why the Soviet proposals provided for sufficient time and several stages. He stressed the need for an agreed over-all time limit, time limits for the implementation of each measure and stage, as well as on the allocation of disarmament measures among the different stages, and contended the USSR was aroused by proposals not providing for specific obligations in this respect.

Referring to the problem of control, Mr. Gromyko observed that much had been said on this issue, both in the League of Nations and in later disarmament negotiations. Perhaps many aspects of this problem were still unclear, but much of what had been said attested to a lack of desire on the part of certain states to resolve the problem. He contended that the Soviet Government was not against control; on the contrary, it was for strict and effective control. The other participants in the Committee would see during the negotiations that the USSR was indeed in favor of such control and was not merely paying lip service to it. However, the USSR was in favor of control over disarmament and not over armaments. The USSR was for control over disarmament measures up to and including all-embracing control after the completion of the process of general and complete disarmament. He contended that the USSR, taking into account past experience, could not rely on verbal pledges in the disarmament field; it believed that international control was important and therefore there was no need to convince it on that point.

Observing that the present discussion was only in general terms, Mr. Gromyko said, however, that he wished to touch upon a specific issue which had been raised in past negotiations. He recalled that in post-war disarmament negotiations, as well as during the US-USSR bilateral exchange of views, some participants, and particularly the United States, had mentioned the need for the establishment of the necessary arrangements and international institutions, both during and after the process of general and complete disarmament, to prevent aggression and ensure security of all states during as well as after the disarmament process. He said that the USSR would not object to such agreed arrangements and perhaps some international institutions to maintain peace and prevent aggression. He claimed that the Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament took this problem sufficiently into account and that Soviet statements in the committee would make that evident.

The Secretary stated that the U.S. Delegation had come to Geneva with every intention to work seriously and hard in order to make headway in the disarmament field. Observing that more than 30 active discussions of this problem had taken place in the past, the Secretary expressed the view that the time had come to make a breakthrough toward progress. He indicated he intended to stay in Geneva some ten days, but expressed readiness to return at any time when his participation was required to advance progress. In any event, the US would have a strong delegation in Geneva at all times. The Secretary stressed the President's personal interest in the Conference and stated the President would follow it on a daily basis. In this connection, he referred to the President's statement with regard to the possibility of a Heads-of-State meeting if the situation warranted such a meeting./6/

/6/In his March 2 address, President Kennedy had stated that if the Soviet Union would accept a treaty in the opening month of talks, he and Prime Minister Macmillan would meet Khrushchev at Geneva to sign the treaty. See ibid., p. 74.

The Secretary then said that the US was encouraged by the US-USSR Joint Statement of Agreed Principles and by the fact that that statement had been welcomed warmly throughout the world. He expressed the view that our task was now to give reality and life to those principles.

Referring to the question of verification, the Secretary expressed the hope that the USSR would give careful thought with regard to what the US meant and what it did not mean in the field of verification. He stressed that it was important to give assurance to all parties that agreed measures were indeed carried out, and observed that confidence and trust were based on knowledge, whereas ignorance bred suspicion and fears. He emphasized that the US had no desire to intrude in the life of other countries or interfere with their activities any more than it was necessary only to verify compliance with the obligations assumed under a disarmament agreement. The US was prepared to sit down and discuss, within the context of specific disarmament measures, methods of verification which would involve minimum intrusion. He expressed the view that this problem should not affect over-riding strategic considerations in the first stages, since the US and USSR knew enough about each other to inflict great damage even today. He also thought that there was no need to worry about minor tactical problems or espionage. The main problem before us was to stop the armaments race.

Referring to the problem of nuclear tests, the Secretary recalled the distinction drawn by the Soviet Union between "inspection of disarmament" and "inspection of armaments". He wondered whether the Soviet Union could accept cessation of nuclear weapon tests as disarmament and noted that a test ban would involve not a partial but a total elimination of tests. He expressed the view that nobody should say his final word now on the various problems we faced; rather, a thorough examination of those problems should be undertaken to see what could be done to resolve them, so that general and complete disarmament should become a reality instead of remaining merely an aspiration.

Lord Home inquired whether Mr. Gromyko's reference to special international institutions to maintain the peace also covered the organization to verify the implementation of obligations during the disarmament process.

Mr. Gromyko replied that this meeting had not been convened for the purpose of detailed discussion. However, he said he would be prepared to engage in such a discussion at any time. He went on to say that certain measures to keep the peace were needed. The Soviet Union believed that establishment of an international force was one of the possible ways of resolving the problem.

Turning to the question of control, Mr. Gromyko expressed the view that there must be an organization to deal with control on a daily basis. Such an organization must be agreed in advance and must encompass an agreed system. He said the Soviet Union would set forth its detailed views on this subject at a later date, perhaps also in written form. He expressed the hope that the West would do the same, provided its efforts were aimed at disarmament. He went on to say that the most decisive factor in determining the state of peace was disarmament as such. In fact, he was inclined to believe that disarmament accounted for some 99 per cent. As to whether there would be aggression if general and complete disarmament was implemented, Mr. Gromyko expressed the view that it would be difficult to provide a complete guarantee against such a possibility; after all, wars had taken place even in the ancient times, and Hanibal had waged war against Rome. Nevertheless, the Soviet proposal provided for guarantees in that respect too.

The Secretary stated he did not believe that disarmament was a hopeless problem and expressed the view that we should be able to find a solution to it. However, any solution should be based on Aristide Briand's precept that disarmament should be such as would leave no one a dupe or victim. He said he understood the nervousness some people might have with regard to the possibility of strangers wandering in their country during the disarmament process. Our task was to find a solution to this problem and to define the job of verification personnel in such a way as to limit it only to actual verification functions.

Lord Home expressed the view that it should be possible to combine the provision for an international disarmament organization in the US program with the idea of creating an international institution for maintaining peace as mentioned by Mr. Gromyko. He also observed that it should not be beyond our imagination to develop a method of verifying that the arms reduced are not being replaced. He suggested that all the participants should think about these problems and perhaps meet again at a later date.

Mr. Gromyko said he wanted to make one additional point. He stated that he understood that all the participants in the conference would work on general and complete disarmament in accordance with U.N. decisions and that the Committee's task should be to translate those decisions into specific obligations of states.

Outlining his general conception of the Committee's work, he said that the following should be done: (1) spell out obligations for general and complete disarmament as a whole; (2) allocate specific measures to appropriate stages; and (3) spell out commitments with regard to time limits both for the over-all program and the individual measures and stages. Finally, he contended that U.S. proposals thus far had not included some of these very important problems.

The Secretary expressed the belief that the Committee should deal with general and complete disarmament on a comprehensive basis and that it should stay in session until agreement on a total program was reached. He agreed that stages were necessary but noted that some immediate steps could be found which could be implemented as soon as agreed and which would help us move forward in the broader disarmament field. He expressed the view that as the work of the Conference proceeded, it might be necessary to establish subcommittees, particularly when specific obligations were spelled out.

Lord Home stated he was in basic agreement with the method of work as outlined by Mr. Gromyko, i.e., general and complete disarmament should be attained at the earliest possible time and concluded by stages, with each stage containing measures of physical disarmament and an appropriate control machinery to verify compliance with obligations. During each stage, the operation of the next stage would be planned in great detail. He stressed the need of starting with actual physical destruction of weapons, since this was what mankind desired. Reverting to the question of verification, he stressed the importance of having assurances of compliance during the disarmament process so that the ultimate outcome of that process be not prejudiced. In this connection, he reiterated the need for the creation of an appropriate organization.

155. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher)/1/

Washington, March 14, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Memoranda, 2/62-4/62. Confidential. The source text does not indicate to whom this memorandum was sent. An earlier March 13 draft, identical in most points to the text printed here, was sent to Kaysen. (Ibid., Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Position Papers, 2/62-4/62) See the Supplement.

SUBJECT
U.S. Position on Disarmament Measures at Geneva Negotiations

The following paper amplifies and supersedes the Memorandum for the File of March 9, 1962 from William C. Foster./2/ It consists of the basic disarmament positions of the United States, as authorized by the President and as discussed by the Committee of Principals, and the status of current work regarding the further development of these positions.

/2/Foster's memorandum for the file, March 9, summarizes decisions on disarmament made at the meeting with the President that day. Several of the points contain handwritten question marks in the margins. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Position Papers, 2/62-4/62)

2. With respect to strategic weapons this cut is to be both in numbers and in total destructive capability, of which total full loaded weight is a possible yardstick. The cuts in strategic delivery vehicles are to be in two categories: the present thinking is to divide them between intercontinental systems and less than intercontinental systems. However, since this distinction is still under study, the U.S. delegation at Geneva has been instructed to use a more general formulation such as: the strategic delivery vehicles "will be divided into categories which reflect the realities of the military situation." To develop the above a paper is in preparation which deals with the definitions of the intercontinental systems and the less than intercontinental systems, including what weapons come under each category./3/ The paper also deals with the use of gross weight as a measure of the destructive carrying capacity of each United States and Soviet vehicle to be included in the above two categories. Included in this paper will be tables of what reductions might look like when the double 30 per cent is applied to all vehicles in the above two categories.

/3/See Document 164.

3. Production of strategic delivery vehicles and other armaments would be limited in Stage I to some percentage of the number of vehicles and armaments in the inventories of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. at the beginning date of Stage I. In preparation is a paper on the limitation on production using (a) 5, 10, 15, and 20 as possible percentages of inventory in the category, and (b) numbers of systems in the category./4/ Some data on DOD planned production rates has been obtained, but its completeness and long-term validity is doubtful. Also, NASA is being asked to furnish ACDA with planned rates for use of vehicles for peaceful uses and exploration of outer space. The Federal Aviation Agency will be asked to supply certain information in the event we need to make statements regarding the production of aircraft for peaceful purposes. Finally, ACDA is preparing a paper on the extent to which the testing of missiles, aircraft, and other armaments would be permitted in connection with the various schemes for limiting and halting production./5/ With respect to all of the above, the present U.S. position is that all production of new and improved armaments and testing of new and improved armaments would be halted in Stage II. Included in the production study by ACDA will be recommendations regarding the extent to which the same percentage formulas for limiting strategic delivery vehicle production can be applied to limitations on the production of other armaments.

/4/See Document 164.

/5/See Document 164.

4. On armaments other than strategic delivery vehicles reductions will be according to categories specified in the March 3 Memorandum to the President./6/ Reductions within certain of these categories will be by numbers and may be by total weight and any description of the proposal should leave room for either or both of these methods of reduction being applicable. ACDA is preparing a paper in elaboration of the reductions in these categories of armaments./7/

/6/See footnote 4, Document 146.

5. Because inspection for the stockpiles of nuclear warheads and weapons of chemical and biological warfare are now considered so difficult these weapons are not included in the proposed reductions of 30 per cent. To deal with these two groups the U.S. will propose that two international experts commissions be established along the lines indicated in the March 3 Memorandum to the President. ACDA is now preparing papers regarding each of these proposed experts commissions and also ways in which stockpiles of such weapons might be reduced under effective verification./7/

/7/Not further identified.

6. The U.S. should continue to press the proposal of 2.1 million force levels. The U.S. would be prepared to proceed at least through the first stage in the absence of the Chinese Communists although the possibility of a defeasance procedure (comparable to that in the test ban) should be examined. ACDA is completing for government clearance its position paper on the relationship of Communist China to disarmament and the Geneva disarmament negotiations./8/

7. The U.S. disarmament delegation has been authorized to present to the Conference the concept of an inspection system based on sampling techniques accompanied by progressive zonal techniques. With respect to the entire matter of inspection ACDA is preparing a paper with details, given current knowledge, on the type of inspection which would probably be required for the various disarmament measures in the U.S. plan./8/ These include inspection for remaining agreed levels of strategic delivery vehicles, remaining agreed levels for other armaments, production facilities (declared and any clandestine) for strategic delivery vehicles and other armaments, production facilities (declared and any clandestine) for fissionable material production, reductions in armed forces, monitoring the testing of missiles, and the establishment of internationally supervised depots for inspection of the destruction of vehicles taken from inventories. Attached to this memorandum is an outline of a verification system based on the progressive zonal concept, which the U.S. delegation may draw as needed.

8. The U.S. will propose that, contingent on agreement on the cut-off of fissionable material for use in weapons, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. each transfer 50,000 kgs. of U-235 to peaceful purposes. ACDA is preparing a paper to determine whether we could agree to a proportional transfer of U.S. 60,000 kgs. to U.S.S.R. 40,000 kgs. of U-235 and what would be the effects of transfers of various sizes and in various other proportions./8/

/8/Not further identified.

9. The U.S. will propose that the reduction of armaments proposed for Stage I be applied in the same general ratio for Stages II and III.

10. ACDA is preparing additional details on other features of the U.S. disarmament plan including: relationship of military bases and missile sites to reductions in strategic delivery vehicles; means by which reductions can be made in weapons of other NATO and Warsaw Pact countries; and extent to which research and development can be monitored./9/

/9/The papers have not been found.

Attachment

OUTLINE OF A VERIFICATION SYSTEM BASED ON THEPROGRESSIVE ZONAL CONCEPT

A basic position of the U.S. is that whatever measures are agreed to must be subject to verification in order to determine whether the agreed measures are in fact being carried out. It will be apparent that this is the only manner in which disarmament can proceed with the certainty that no state will obtain military advantage during the disarmament process.

A major problem of past general disarmament negotiations has been that there has been no opportunity to explore the key question of verification thoroughly, objectively, and constructively. This Conference provides such an opportunity, and, for its own part, the U.S. is willing to consider seriously any proposed verification system in the light of the degree of assurance of compliance that it would provide and in the light of the significance of possible violations.

For its own part, the U.S. would be prepared to accept from the outset, if others also agreed, a verification system involving total access to all parts of its territory. However, the U.S. has concluded that it may be possible to design an adequate verification system based on the concept that although all parts of the territory of a state should be subject to possible verification from the outset, the extent of the territory actually inspected in any step or stage would bear a relationship to the amount of disarmament and to the degree of risk involved in particular disarmament measures. Under such a system, a program of disarmament might be initiated with limited actual territorial access for verification purposes as long as retained armaments were adequate to provide security against the effects of possible violations. However, assurance that violations were not being committed would have to increase as retained armaments were reduced. Consequently, as disarmament proceeds, actual territorial access would necessarily have to increase.

The U.S. believes that this concept could be implemented by a system of zonal inspection which would be generally applicable to measures limiting or reducing armaments and forces. Such a system might incorporate the following principal features:

1. At the outset of disarmament, each state would declare existing levels of armaments, forces, and activities covered by agreed Stage I measures.

2. Verification of reductions would be conducted at agreed depots. The U.S. contemplates, as a general matter, that the location of such depots might be selected by the host state.

3. Verification of limitations on certain types of activities (such as production) would be carried out at the declared locations of such activities wherever they may be located within the territory of a state.

4. Verification of retained armaments and the search for undeclared armaments or clandestine activities would be accomplished on the following basis:

a. Each state would divide itself into an agreed number of appropriate internal zones and during each step of disarmament would declare the total level of armaments, forces, and specified types of activities subject to verification within each zone. The exact location of armaments and forces within each zone would not need to be revealed.

b. One or more of these internal zones would be subject to unannounced complete inspection in an agreed period of time. During the verification process, arrangements would have to be made to provide assurance against undeclared movements of the objects of verification to or from the zone or zones being inspected. Both aerial and mobile ground inspection would be employed within the zone being inspected. In so far as agreed measures being verified are concerned, access within the zone would have to be free and unimpeded, and verification would have to be carried out with the full cooperation of and without harassment from the state being inspected.

c. Once a zone had been inspected it would remain open for further inspection while verification was being extended to additional zones.

The U.S. believes that if agreement could be reached on a verification system incorporating the features such as the foregoing, such a system should satisfy the interests of all concerned:

First, from the standpoint of the state being inspected, the extent of its territory actually inspected during the early phases of disarmament would be limited. Moreover, although a number of inspectors would be required in the zone or zones being inspected, the total number of inspectors stationed on the territory of the inspected state would, throughout the disarmament process, be far less than the number that would be required to verify the implementation of disarmament simultaneously in all parts of its territory from the outset.

Second, at the same time, from the standpoint of effective verification, such an approach would make possible full verification of reductions, full verification of limitations on declared activities (such as production), and, as disarmament proceeds, increasing assurance that no undeclared armaments or forces were retained and that no clandestine activities were being pursued.

The U.S. is prepared to explore at this conference the possibility of designing along the foregoing lines a verification system applicable to an agreed program of disarmament.

156. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy/1/

London, March 14, 1962.

/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, M-K, 1961-1962. Top Secret.

Dear Friend, As I promised in my message of March 13,/2/ I am now in a position to send you my further thoughts elaborating the proposals made in the latter half of my message of March 9./3/ I am very glad that you feel able to accept our scientific team in Washington at the end of this week, when they will be able to discuss the scientific assessment with your people./4/

/2/President Kennedy suggested in a March 10 message to Macmillan that British and U.S. scientific experts convene in Washington to exchange views on the status of scientific data regarding detection of underground seismic data. (Ibid., K-M, 1961-1962) In accepting the invitation in his March 13 letter to President Kennedy, Macmillan proposed to send a junior group of experts on March 14 to be followed by Sir William Penney and Sir Solly Zuckerman. (Ibid., M-K, 1961-1962) For text of both letters, see the Supplement.

/3/In his March 9 message to Kennedy, Macmillan wrote that if it could be justified by the scientists, "we might accept a much simpler treaty based on national detection systems alone, but with the very important proviso that these shall be supported by an international authority (as provided for in our 1961 treaty) but responsible in the main for two primary functions." These two functions were: "(i) to collate and evaluate seismic data from all over the world, and (ii) to have under its control mobile inspection teams, who could be sent to investigate without hindrance any suspected violation of the treaty in any country." Macmillan believed that the latest British scientific advice seemed to suggest that this would give acceptable coverage, and he hoped U.S. and British scientists might be able to come to "a rapid joint assessment" on the question. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, M-K, 1961-1962) See the Supplement.

/4/British scientists headed by Sir Solly Zuckerman met with their U.S. counterparts in Washington March 17-18; see Document 159.

Our United Kingdom scientists believe that they have made important improvements to instrumentation and they believe that substantial amounts of information could now be obtained from seismic measurements at distances of about 1,500 to 2,000 miles from an underground explosion. This would be in what I understand is called the third seismic zone and remoter areas. The British scientists are therefore considering urgently the technical aspects of a detection and location system which would be manned only by the nationals of the country in which the posts were situated. This suggestion requires a full technical appreciation of the possibilities of detection and accurate location from measurements in the third zone and beyond. The data which we have obtained causes us to think that the conclusions derived, both as regards detection and location, are much less influenced by anomalies in the geology of the test site than are those in the first zone. No doubt you have a great deal of data relating to the third zone and beyond which you will have derived from the recent shots in Nevada and our scientists would be particularly interested to test their ideas against these data. We believe that from measurements in the third zone and beyond we can locate an event within a radius of better than five miles. This would mean pin-pointing the event in an area of something less than 75 square miles. We recognize, however, that it may be more difficult to diagnose whether the event was natural or an explosion if the measurements are only made from these distant stations. We therefore believe that if the West is to rely on measurements made from outside Russia in monitoring a test ban, more inspections may be necessary than if the original Geneva ideas were followed. This is, of course, on the basis that if either side attempted a violation, they would try to falsify records from stations under their control.

If our fall-back position proves to be of a nature which does require more inspections within the U.S.S.R. than the original Geneva proposals, we may have to consider whether there are any possible further modifications on the political or administrative side which would make the inspections more acceptable to the Russians. There are two possible modifications which might be worth further thought--

(a) The composition of inspection teams

We might consider adding a neutral element to the United States/United Kingdom teams which, under our present draft treaty text, verify doubtful events in the U.S.S.R. This is, I know, not wholly a new proposal, since we put forward ideas on these lines at Geneva last August when the Russians ignored them.

(b) Our right to demand inspections

So far, we have said that inspections in the U.S.S.R., whether within our quota or on a sliding scale above it, should all take place at our own demand. If the total number of inspections is likely to be increased, we might think of a fixed quota of inspections at our request, for which we would ask, plus a sliding scale of further inspections, in proportion to doubtful events, each to take place at the request, not of ourselves, but the majority of the Control Commission.

Both these points would need further detailed consultation, but it seems to me that we should be able to make an offer on them which looked reasonable but did not endanger our essential position.

I see from the preliminary reports from Geneva that you may have doubts about the reliability of detection posts outside United States/United Kingdom territory. This is, of course, a point of serious examination. But if we were to move to a national detection system, we could presumably overtly increase the existing number of stations by general agreement. As a check, we might consider continuing some covert stations of our own, on the present pattern. We would certainly be prepared to examine whether there are any new areas where the United Kingdom could profitably help. And if the national stations were overt it seems to me that the risk of disturbances to them because of a change of regime would be much less great.

In the penultimate paragraph of my message of March 9, I suggested that the Russians would need a series of tests if they were to cheat for any worthwhile purpose. A single 100-kiloton shot could not possibly provide the basis for any sort of breakthrough. This could only be given by a series of shots; I am advised that the very least would be one or more low-kiloton shots, followed by one with a yield in the megaton range. Even then, it is really only development of a successful anti-missile-missile that could seriously disturb the validity of the deterrent. Even such a development would have more of an effect in principle than in practice, since I believe that the construction and deployment of a defence system likely to reduce the scale of damage to a supportable level would be so vast as to be beyond Soviet capacity.

The more I think about this, the more I feel certain that we cannot afford to let the hopes of the world for a nuclear test ban be dashed at Geneva without a further public effort which would be demonstrably fair and will catch the imagination. Of course, if the Russians are forced finally to a position in which they refuse all form of inspection on their territory then we shall fail, but if we can get them into this position, we should have world opinion on our side.

With warm regard,

Yours ever,

Harold Macmillan/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

157. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, March 15, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, 18-Nation Committee, Geneva, March 62. Confidential.

Dear Mr. President: As you know, the Atomic Energy Commission is hopeful that it will be possible to negotiate and sign a nuclear test ban treaty that will appreciably slow down the arms race and at the same time not jeopardize national security. We are concerned, however, that certain aspects of the proposed treaty could, in our opinion, adversely affect that security.

Our major concerns arise from the obvious danger that, having signed the treaty and thus having forestalled our atmospheric test series, the Soviets will later abrogate it and again mount a secretly-prepared test series. Unfortunately, we have little or no capability of detecting preparations now, and, in our opinion, the anti-preparation measures visualized for the inspection system will not appreciably improve that capability. In view of the impossibility--so well expressed in your March 2nd speech/2/--of our maintaining any real state of readiness to test during a moratorium or treaty, a repetition of their 1961 action by the Soviets could result in their making an even larger and possibly a decisive step forward relative to our nuclear weapons capability.

/2/See Document 143.

In view of this danger, the Commission deeply regrets the apparent necessity of continuing the offer of a moratorium on testing below the 4.75 threshold, since--with all testing suspended immediately--our weapons development capability would soon deteriorate to a very low level and our response to a new Soviet series would be even less effective, and appreciably slower, than if it were possible to continue low level underground testing.

Also, we are concerned by the proposal that abolition of the 4.75 threshold be substituted for the moratorium and that testing at all levels be permanently forbidden by the treaty, thus perpetuating the restraints on our laboratories. Admittedly, this change, which would extend inspection below the 4.75 threshold, would be technically attractive if we could assume that inspection would be introduced much sooner than the draft treaty now requires, and if we must make the further assumption that a moratorium would not actually end as planned after the three-year period. However, on the much more likely assumption that the Soviets will not cooperate in drastically speeding up preparations for inspection, no inspection will be possible during most or all of the three-year period (which will start with treaty signature), so that little or no technical or security advantage would be gained by abolition of the threshold now.

The Commission therefore respectfully urges that the threshold be retained, since--even with the moratorium--we would have the possibility of testing below some threshold after the three-year period, whereas abolition of the threshold now would not only limit our future action, but--by its finality--would add to the immediate adverse psychological effect on our laboratories. Even if a resumption of low level underground testing is ultimately found to be undesirable or not feasible and we then concede abolition of the threshold, little or no practical advantage will have been lost by postponement of the decision to abolish the threshold.

Respectfully yours,

Glenn T. Seaborg

158. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State/1/

Geneva, March 15, 1962, 10 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/3-1562. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London and Moscow.

Disto 30. Dean and Godber (UK) called on Tsarapkin 5:00 pm for informal discussion test ban treaty.

Dean said US prepared grant one point to which Sovs had apparently attached importance, namely, to drop 4.75 threshold and make treaty comprehensive on banning all tests in atmosphere, outer space, underground and in oceans. Noted this change would do away with need for US proposals in August for scientific review of threshold after research program or for re-examination treaty to lower threshold by increasing number of control posts or inspections. We would retain sliding scale of 12 to 20 inspections, retain same number of control posts (19), retain our offer to remove administrator by vote of 7 to 11 in commission, and retain offer to place neutrals on inspection teams. We would be prepared to sign April 18 treaty as fully comprehensive with only two additions:

(a) Would want to see if in some way we could have the head of state certify there were no preparations for tests and work out agreed rights for preparatory commission to inspect, certain number of times per year, declared test sites.

(b) Would want to shorten time for control installation to something like six months and would be prepared contribute mobile control posts toward this end. We would in addition be willing to allocate agreed limited number of inspections within inspection quota to zones which had normally little seismic activity. A large seismic zone covering heartland of Soviet Union might thus be allocated only very small number inspections; possibly three.

Dean handed Tsarapkin informal aide-m?moire (text separate tel) covering these points./2/

/2/For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, p. 150.

Following indication by Godber of concurrence in proposal, Tsarapkin said could tell us even without careful study of proposal that it does not coincide completely with Soviet position which has been submitted to US and explained to us November 28/3/ and on subsequent occasions. Under now existing situation, idea international control is completely unacceptable to USSR. Only basis for agreement possible is national control. Dean proposal is quite different approach. This document based on previous positions now out of date. It is impossible come to agreement now on any proposal based on this approach.

/3/Reference is to the Soviet draft agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear and thermonuclear tests (U.N. doc. GEN/DNT/122, December 11, 1961), November 28, 1961; for text, see ibid., 1961, p. 664.

Dean stated that without trying be argumentative, seemed should be some way work out agreement on basis international control. Asked Tsarapkin his reaction to US proposal for comprehensive treaty contained aide-m?moire. Tsarapkin said if US desired comprehensive treaty it could have comprehensive treaty on basis Sov Nov 28 proposal. USSR could not accept US proposal contained in aide-m?moire even if first two paras (inspection for preparation and speeding up installation control) were dropped.

Godber asked whether there was any way to combine approaches of national and international control. Even if tests could be detected by national systems some control posts and some inspections would be necessary to locate and verify violation. Tsarapkin said if we would sign agreement there would be no violators; could not understand approach of signing treaty and then violating it. USSR not against control but under very difficult situation between East and West it is impossible admit agents other side under whatever color of international inspectorate. We should know that. But if West wanted control, Sov November 28 proposal would give it. Scientific advances are such as to make national control adequate; international control might have been required five years ago but not now.

Dean said our scientists do not agree national control adequate. Asked if USSR nevertheless wished stand on Nov 28 proposal; Tsarapkin said Sov position is readiness come to agreement now on tests on basis Nov 28 proposal. Without waiting for GCD USSR also willing accept any reasonable way settling matter within GCD framework.

Godber said even if we could or might in future be able to detect tests, Tsarapkin had given us no way clear up dispute on whether events detected were natural phenomenon or test. Gromyko this morning had expressed, in conference, Sov willingness accept control./4/ Even relying upon national detection as provided Sov Nov 28 proposal it would seem essential, if not to accept control posts, at least to accept inspection teams. UK has no position to put toward on this; was merely looking far ahead. Moreover Godber would have thought that since Sovs were prepared accept controls up until they began tests in September, they might surely find it advantageous to their country to do so at this point in time after test series. Frankly could not understand reason for change Sov position. Tsarapkin replied that speaking equally frankly, he thought we knew very well what had happened to cause change. International situation changed sharply and USSR now had to concern itself with problem of military reconnaissance so could not accept international control which permitted such reconnaissance. If we three sign treaty in bona fides there would be no need for inspection. Godber said there could be need in case of dispute over event. Tsarapkin said if such need should arise we could perhaps exchange data and conduct consultations. He deeply convinced such consultations would resolve any misunderstanding. Agreement could be found on basis Nov 28 proposal. Godber inquired meaning of the term "basis". Tsarapkin said no hidden meanings should be read into that phrasing--by November 28 basis he meant national systems and no international control. Inspectors could be espionage agents. Godber reminded Tsarapkin UK ready accept inspectors.

/4/In his statement to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on March 15, Gromyko said, "the Soviet Union is ready to accept any proposals on control over disarmament put forward by the Western Powers if they will accept Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament." For text of his statement, see ibid., 1962, pp. 94-103.

Dean said Tsarapkin should sleep on it and perhaps we could have further talks. Tsarapkin said he ready. Would be happy if we could come to agreement on basis November 28 proposal or to settle in connection GCD. Dean said we wanted agreement now. Tsarapkin replied agreement now would be acceptable without waiting for GCD./5/

/5/Dean supplemented his report of this meeting as follows: "I should like to add that in course our discussion of comprehensive treaty, I specifically asked Tsarapkin whether he would accept April 18 treaty if threshold were dropped to zero and additional safeguards proposed paras 1 and 2 of informal aide-m?moire were dropped. He replied categorically that he would not and would only negotiate on their November 28, 1961 proposal." (Disto 35 from Geneva, March 16; Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/3-1662)

159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee/1/

Washington, March 18, 1962, 4:17 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/3-1862. Secret. Drafted by Goodby (ACDA) and cleared by Long (ACDA). Repeated to London.

Todis 57. Verbatim text. Following is text of agreed conclusions of US-UK technical meeting on nuclear test detection held here March 17-18:

Begin verbatim text

1. That Western unilateral detection systems can currently detect seismic events in the USSR of magnitude 4.75 or slightly less. This will lead on the average to detection of about 125 shallow seismic events per year within the USSR.

2. That the proposed Geneva system is predicted to detect seismic events down to 3.75 magnitude, which implies detection of about 1,000 shallow events per year in the USSR. This system could not be available much before 1965.

3. That improvements of detection by unilateral systems to perhaps magnitude 4.2 in the USSR is a reasonable technical goal for 1965. This we now believe implies detection of 300 shallow seismic events per year within the USSR. Among the research areas of particular promise are use of deep hole detection systems and correlation of data from phased arrays.

4. That a unilateral system can currently locate detected seismic events to within a radius of from 10 to 20 km.

5. That, with utilization of data from an improved internal USSR seismic detection system for the purpose of calibrating the external system, the location capability of an external unilateral system might improve to the point where location to within a radius of ten km. or less in seismic areas would be feasible. This conclusion is predicated on the assumption that the USSR data are not falsified.

6. That at present it is impossible unilaterally to identify shallow seismic events in the USSR as earthquakes, excepting at large magnitudes but that future improvements, in particular ones involving processing of data from large arrays, offer hope of reducing the magnitude at which identification of some earthquakes is possible down to about magnitude five. There does not appear to be any prospect of identifying a given event as an explosion by seismic means alone.

7. That if a unilateral system (for example a non-Soviet system for detecting events within the USSR) is to be used as a basis for initiating inspections, it will be necessary to agree on objective criteria which will determine eligibility for inspection and to establish a mechanism for certifying the eligibility of a given event. Although these problems were discussed no specific proposals have been formulated./2/ End verbatim text.

Ball

/2/In responding to a query from the delegation in Geneva about specific paragraphs in these agreed conclusions, transmitted in Disto 48 from Geneva, March 19 (ibid., 700.5611/3-1962), the Department concluded: "UK may attempt use joint report to reinforce their views on unilateral control systems. However, agreed conclusions indicate no significant changes in capabilities of unilateral detection systems as previously understood by both US and UK." The telegram concluded: "in short, we believe US-UK agreed conclusions indicate no reason for making change in previously agreed view of need for international control system for monitoring underground tests." (Todis 61 to Geneva, March 19; ibid., 700.5611/3-1862)

160. Memorandum From the Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission (Haworth) to the Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Long)/1/

Washington, March 20, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 2/17-4/4. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is a memorandum from Haworth to McGeorge Bundy, March 20, which reads: "It occurred to me that you might be interested in the enclosed memorandum I have written to Dr. Long in connection with the UK-US technical meeting last weekend."

Our meeting with the British on March 17 and 18 clearly brought forth a number of points which, for differing reasons were not explicitly stated in the written conclusions./2/ I have listed them below adding, for context sake, some points that were included in the memorandum.

/2/See Document 159.

1. The data and interpretations presented by the British constitute an interesting and useful advance in the technique of observing seismic events. In my opinion, however, they do not represent a major improvement over methods that have been projected in our own plans for the future; certainly they do not, at least at this stage, constitute a "breakthrough."

2. Using these and other projected methods, an external system can probably be made adequate for detection and localization purposes after a few years. There is, however, no real evidence that such systems will have any appreciable identification capability except possibly at the upper end of the yield range of interest.

3. Of crucial importance is the fact that, as stated in the memorandum, there appears to be no prospect of being able to identify an event as an explosion by seismic means alone. At best, seismic systems can merely reject certain events as being earthquakes, leaving a substantial fraction of the observed events uncertain as to origin. External systems alone would, so far as can be foreseen, leave this fraction very large. It is, therefore, abundantly clear that on-site is an absolute requirement for any system.

4. The technical possibilities of cheating are such that no dependence can be placed for identification and inspection purposes on data derived from stations manned only by nationals of the country under observation. Hence, proposals in which the criteria for inspection would be based on Geneva (or any other) networks manned by Soviets inside the USSR are completely unacceptable.

5. The only national system arrangement that could conceivably be satisfactory would be one in which inspections could be demanded on the basis of data acquired from external stations with no veto power resting in the country under observation. (In this connection it should be noted that it is technically possible to manufacture data on which to base a claim for inspection rights.) That the Soviets would grant such unilateral inspection rights to us seems inconceivable even though they might not fear that we would cheat for intelligence reasons. Indeed it is not clear that we should grant such rights to them.

6. Any system using internationally manned external stations to determine the eligibility of events for inspection would, if used both ways, be the mirror image of the Geneva plan and therefore unacceptable to the Soviets.

7. Suggestions that data from nationally manned stations be submitted to international groups to evaluate in terms of inspection eligibility criteria are impractical for many reasons, including the difficulties of agreeing on satisfactory criteria and the possibilities of doctoring the original data.

Although I did not take time to show this memorandum to the other Commissioners, we have thoroughly discussed the subject and are in complete agreement on the substantive points that I have made./3/

Leland J. Haworth/4/

/3/In a March 20 memorandum to McNamara, Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, similarly concluded that in the meetings "no technical results were presented by either the U.K. or U.S. scientists to indicate that the problems of underground test detection had been solved"; and he recommended that McNamara oppose any move toward a test ban agreement with only national systems for control. A draft of the agreed conclusions reached at the meeting is attached to Brown's memorandum. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Atomic 000.01-400.112, 1962) See the Supplement. In a March 20 memorandum for the record, Herbert Scoville, Jr., Deputy Director for Research at the Central Intelligence Agency, noted that Sir William Penney visited the CIA on March 19 to discuss the recent weekend meetings with U.S. scientists. Penney reported that "preliminary data" revealed in the meetings "gave considerable hope of eventually improving the ability to detect nuclear explosions," but no data was presented indicating that these new techniques "could specifically identify explosions." Scoville concluded that "the data is still very preliminary and considerable research will be required before any change in the present US/UK negotiating position would be warranted." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI, ER Subject Files)

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

161. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/

Washington, March 20, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Disarmament. No classification marking. Transcribed in Ball's office.

Ball: . . . to know that.

President: We don't have historically the argument that well, we could have gotten an agreement but the United States stopped it. Why don't they let the British go ahead and ask Tsarapkin if he would agree to--even with their proposal, just informally, of national inspection rather . . . I don't . . . I think even the British plan provides for inspection, if there is an event, doesn't it?

Ball: That's right.

President: We don't want to have just for the record that an agreement could have been reached, but we bitched it up, because I think that everybody there is going to be against us. I don't think there is anybody that takes our position. They're all going to be with the British. You see, you got the neutrals; you got the pro-Communists; you got us and the British. I just hate to let the thing go and look like they could have gotten a deal, the British could have, but we stopped it because I think that would really be a . . . and I don't think they can get a deal.

Ball: Well, he seemed to feel pretty confident that they were going to be able to get all the other delegations to understand the implications of this thing; that they are doing a big educational job.

President: Well, it may be if the British don't put forward a formal proposal to them, they ought to ask if they would agree to a part of any program in inspection after the event. It ought to be possible to get that question put by the British and just have it on the record, because we keep getting the scientists say it could be done. I don't want to be like Eisenhower was in '59 when he cranked up the deal, but didn't. I don't want them to be able to always say "Well . . . "

Ball: Course this meeting of the scientists over the weekend really undercut the Macmillan position a lot on that.

President: Yes, but, George, I think there must be some way without making it a formal proposal to put it on the record and maybe it is already on the record, that he would not agree to inspection following an event, even after there was a suspicious one.

Ball: Let me see if we can't get that point made.

President: And then at least Macmillan is not able to say "Well, the British . . . " We got to get the deal there. You know Adlai will be up in arms, and we will have a lot of heat that we could have gotten a deal, but we didn't. They don't want to break up that way.

Ball: Sure.

President: Because I don't think they will give them a deal, even on the British plan.

Ball: No, I don't think they will either. The problem I know the Secretary is worrying about is that we don't want to get ourselves in a position where we are beginning to bargain from the starting point of the British plan.

President: I agree with you.

Ball: I am going to talk to him a little later on the secure line, and I will see what we can do along that line.

President: Yes, just take a look at the British plan. Somebody over there is an expert. Put the toughest part of it. Somewhere I would like to find out when this portion of discussion seems to be impossible by saying "Would you even accept this?" Then if Tsarapkin says "No", then say to the British "Even your plan doesn't go". Otherwise, I am sure Macmillan will have a lot of political problems at home and if then he blamed it on us, we will look like we have lost a great moment.

Ball: All right. Let me try that with him and see what he can do there.

President: What else do you have?

Ball: Oh, I don't think much. This Argentine business is nasty, of course./2/

/2/Not further identified.

President: Here is Mac now. He has something. Oh, did you get any place on Berlin?

Ball: No, I don't know whether you saw the cable that came in late last night./3/

/3/Reference presumably is to Secto 65 or Secto 67, both messages on the Berlin question which Secretary Rusk transmitted from Geneva on the night of March 19-20 to the President and Acting Secretary Ball. See vol. XV, pp. 48-50.

President: Yes, he is giving it to me.

Ball: It is pretty discouraging. They are meeting again tonight.

President: That is why I don't think they will take anything of the British plan, either. And I think just for the record we've got to get it made.

Ball: Okay.

162. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Kennedy/1/

New York, March 20, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 2/17-4/4. Confidential. Attached to the source text is a March 20 cover note from Stevenson to McGeorge Bundy, in which Stevenson wrote: "I hesitate to prolong this discussion, but I wonder if you would be good enough to consider the enclosed letter and pass it along to the President."

Dear Mr. President: I told you the other night that I had some further ideas about nuclear testing./2/ I am sending them along now and would be happy to discuss them if you cared to.

/2/This conversation has not been further identified.

1. Now, before the tests, is the most reasonable time there has ever been for the US and the USSR to make a test ban treaty, because any arms control is most practicable between near equals in the categories controlled.

2. The argument is both familiar and persuasive that by testing in April we will be doing the Soviets a big favor, because their fallout can be expected with the spring rains and we will have to take at least a share of the blame, since it would be impossible to convince the skeptical that it is not our fallout. The arrogance with which they conducted their tests and broke off negotiations may, indeed, have been intended to induce us to do our atmospheric testing soon, so as to mitigate the effects of their abuse of world opinion.

3. The Soviets probably see some military disadvantage in our resumption of atmospheric tests. The prospect of our testing thus does act as a lever to pry an agreement out of them. However, if we test at the height of the spring fallout, it will probably nullify this effect and the prospect of the April tests will apply no leverage at all. Thus, unless we postpone the resumption by about two months, we fail to take advantage of the opportunity mentioned as point 1.

4. I have had an uneasy feeling that the tests scheduled in April may not yield as indispensable technical information as they would if there were a little more time for preparation. If that is so, the inconvenience of maintaining the task force longer would be compensated by an increase in the scientific results.

If there was adequate reason for postponement, I doubt if we would "lose face," even though the announcement has already been made for April. Colonel Glenn's superb flight has recently reminded the public that delays are not abnormal or unwise./3/ Also I suspect we are only now beginning to feel at Geneva the impact of the basic anti-testing feeling of the neutrals, and further evidence of our anxiety to make a treaty before resuming would be helpful.

/3/Colonel John Glenn's successful orbital flight in a Project Mercury space capsule on February 20 had been delayed mainly because of bad weather.

Such a delay would bring the period of testing uncomfortably close to the General Assembly. And I have, you may recall, felt that if we were going to test we should do so, after a suitable interval for the Russians to reach an agreement, as far in advance of the General Assembly as possible. However, on further thought, I have concluded that any embarrassment at the General Assembly would be outweighed by the advantage of not taking the blame for the Soviet fallout.

I submit the foregoing with little thought that it presents anything original.

Sincerely yours,

Adlai E. Stevenson

163. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/

Washington, March 22, 1962, 6 p.m.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Disarmament. No classification marking.

Ball: I just had a talk with Dean Rusk/2/ and I wanted to give you the burden of it. He said that at dinner tonight Gromyko had shown a certain amount of interest in the modus vivendi, which he had given him early this afternoon./3/ He's holding out and putting off talking about it seriously; instead of coming back Monday evening he might wait and continue it a day or two. He just has to play it by ear.

/2/A transcript of Ball's telephone conversation with Secretary Rusk on March 22 at 5:20 p.m. is ibid.

/3/Reference is to a modus vivendi on the problem of Berlin.

The President: Right.

Ball: [Here follows discussion of Berlin.] On the nuclear test business, he is going to make his statement tomorrow./4/ He is going to highlight the things that you had in mind. We are sending him over a text tonight which has already been telephoned over and which is being cabled over to follow./5/ It attempts to emphasize that. I might just read you what . . . It is very short. It's the verbatim text of the written speech: "The essential element upon which we must insist is that there be an objective international system for assuring that the ban against testing is being complied with. This means that there must be an international system for distinguishing between natural and artificial seismic events. The April 18 treaty provided for such a system. Last week the United States and the United Kingdom made some modifications of that proposed treaty in a way calculated to meet Soviet objections. I have described these modifications. These proposed modifications were rejected almost immediately by the Soviets on the grounds that international verification was not necessary. This refusal to accept any form of international verification strikes at the very heart of our effort to guarantee the world against the resumption of nuclear tests. The key element in the position of the United States is that there must be effective international verification of the obligation undertaken in any such treaty. The United States will consider any proposal which offers such effective international verification, but the United States will never settle for anything less."

/4/Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 167-176.

/5/The proposed final paragraphs of the Secretary's statement were transmitted in Tosec 114 to Geneva, March 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/3-2262)

The President: Why don't we say "cannot" rather than "will never".

Ball: "Cannot"

The President: Well, "cannot settle for anything less."

Ball: OK. He is going to cable over tonight a long appreciation of the situation./6/

/6/The text cited in footnote 5 above includes the phrase "cannot settle for anything less," as the President suggested.

[Here follows discussion of Berlin.]

164. Letter From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

Washington, March 22, 1962.

/1/Source: Department of State, Special Group (CI) Files: Lot 68 D 451, 1/1/62-7/31/62. Confidential.

Dear Mr. Secretary: As you know, a series of meetings during the week preceding the departure of the U.S. Delegation to the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference resolved a number of questions related to the initial U.S. proposals to be presented to the Conference, but left other questions undecided. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has been reviewing those issues not fully resolved within the U.S. Government in order to arrive at recommendations which could form the basis of a U.S position.

The purpose of this letter is to transmit to you for your comments the tentative views and recommendations of ACDA on several of the unresolved issues. As ACDA prepares its views on other issues these will also be submitted to you for comment and clearance.

Categorization of Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles. It has been tentatively agreed that we should divide strategic nuclear delivery vehicles into two categories. We believe these two categories should be termed long-range and medium-range. In considering the criteria to be used to distinguish between these two categories, it is recognized that it is possible to arrange the limiting criteria in a U.S. proposal so as to provide us certain advantages by virtue of the characteristics of weapons peculiar to our current inventory and theoretically to prevent the Soviets from having the same advantage. However, as a practical matter, we cannot expect that the Russians will be taken in by such tactics. Therefore we should decide whether it is more advantageous to us to have a plan which permits a conversion between medium weight bombers and long-range systems within the framework of a total reduction, the Russians having the same option, or whether it will be better to preclude such a conversion on both sides. In view of the decision to continue some modernization of our forces, we believe it would be best to distinguish between the two categories of strategic missiles on a basis that would permit conversion between medium weight bombers and long-range systems.

Therefore, we believe that long-range delivery vehicles should be defined as including all armed combat aircraft over 30,000 kg empty weight, all missiles over 5,000 km in maximum range, and all submarine-launched missiles and air-to-surface missiles with ranges over 300 km. This would place the following delivery vehicles in the long-range category:

1. Long Range

U.S.: B-52, B-58,/2/ B-47, Titan, Atlas, Minuteman, Polaris, Regulus, Hound Dog, Skybolt.

/2/Though not within the weight range, it is recommended that the B-58 be included in the long-range category to retain consistency with regard to mission. [Footnote in the source text.]

U.S.S.R.: Bison, Bear, Badger, Blinder, SS-6, SS-7, SSN-4, SSN-5, AS-3, AS-4.

2. Medium Range

U.S.: B/RB-66, A3J, A3D, P3V, P2V, P5M, Mace, Matador, Pershing, Redstone.

U.S.S.R.: Madge, SS-5, SS-4, SS-3, SS-2.

All missiles between 300 km and 5,000 km maximum range and all aircraft between 15,000 kg and 30,000 kg empty weight would fall in the medium range strategic delivery vehicle category except as noted above.

Criteria for Determining Destructive Capability. It has been agreed that in reducing strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, a dual criteria will be used: numbers plus some measurement related to destructive capability. We believe that total gross loaded weight (maximum designed take-off weight for aircraft) is probably the most reasonable measurement to use for total destructive capability. Such a limitation would, we believe, inhibit the Soviets from trading smaller delivery vehicles for larger delivery vehicles or from building considerable numbers of larger missiles to carry 100 megaton warheads. Such an additional limitation is obviously advantageous for the long-range category of missiles since otherwise there would be no limit on the size of vehicles that the Soviets might build. Although in the medium-range category there will be weight and range limits on individual aircraft and even probably on individual missiles as a result of engineering criteria, the medium-range category still confronts Western Europe with a potential threat of vast destructive capability. While the requirement for a dual criteria may be considered less necessary in the medium-range category, we believe it is still desirable for political as well as technical reasons to limit this category by total gross loaded weight as well as numbers.

Reduction Criteria for Armaments Other Than Strategic. The question remains open whether a criterion in addition to numbers should be applied in determining reductions of tactical nuclear and conventional armaments. We are inclined to believe that, with the possible exception of the 5-300 km missile category, an additional criterion such as total weight would simply complicate the verification process without achieving any additional meaningful limitation. There may be some advantage in placing an additional weight limitation on the 5-300 km missile category. However, the range limitation of 300 kilometers itself may provide all the limits we would need. To summarize, we believe it advisable to reduce the above categories solely on the basis of numbers.

Categories of Non-Strategic Weapons. We believe the categories of non-strategic armaments which were listed on page 13 of the March 3 memorandum for the President/3/ are appropriate with two exceptions:

/3/See footnote 4, Document 146.

a. We would suggest that category (4) might be changed to read:

"Surface-to-surface and air-to-surface ballistic and air-breathing missiles and free rockets with range capabilities from 5 to 300 kilometers."

This change is intended to permit the exclusion of such missiles as the Bullpup, which are in reality ordnance for fighter bombers.

b. We suggest that a new category encompassing surface-to-air missiles, but excluding AICBM's be added as Category (7). The inherent short-range characteristics of this category distinguishes it from the anti-missile missile category. Reductions in armaments in this category, and limitations on production and testing, should be treated in a similar manner to that adopted for other non-strategic weapons.

Production Limitations. It has been previously agreed that production of strategic delivery vehicles and other armaments would be limited in Stage I to some percentage of the numbers of vehicles and armaments in the inventories of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. at the beginning date of Stage I. However, upon re-examination, we believe there are some serious difficulties which would result from applying limits on production based upon an agreed percentage of existing inventories of each category of weapons. As far as strategic nuclear delivery vehicles are concerned, this method would affect the U.S. and U.S.S.R. about the same since inventories on both sides will be roughly equal. The problem of basing production quotas on inventory of agreed categories becomes more serious in the non-strategic category. In some of the non-strategic categories of armaments, particularly land weapons, the vastly superior Soviet inventories would permit them to produce at far greater rates than the United States.

In each category, this apparent asymmetry can be adjusted by basing the annual production limitation for both sides on a percentage of that national inventory which is the smaller. Thus, in those categories where the USSR is numerically superior, e.g., tanks, the U.S. inventory would be the basis for limiting production for both sides, and vice-versa. For the strategic categories, inventory would be determined by the product of the numbers of units and their respective gross load weight. For armaments other than strategic, numbers of units in each category would constitute the inventory. Further, we believe that consistency with an overall disarmament program indicates the desirability of establishing permitted production rates for Stage I below past production rates in those cases in which there has been substantial production (e.g., strategic delivery vehicles). However, we recognize that in certain categories, such as armaments for ground forces, past production in the U.S. has been so low, as compared to that in the U.S.S.R., that, in these cases, establishment of production limitations on the basis of past production may present serious problems. There are the bases of ACDA's recommendations on the question of production. ACDA is not at this time recommending the specific percentages that should be proposed.

It is our present thinking that permitted production rates should be required to absorb any replacements required as a result of accidental loss of any type of armament as well as production for testing and training. However, production for peaceful purposes, e.g., space vehicle boosters, would have to be declared and verified but would be permitted within specified limits and safeguards. ACDA is also studying the problem of how production limitations would affect sales or grants of armaments from the major powers to smaller powers.

Testing of Weapons Systems in Categories Proposed for Reduction or Control. The U.S. is committed by the September 25 Plan/4/ to proposing that testing of agreed categories of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles should be limited or halted in Stage I. The U.S. is not committed to halting or limiting the testing of other armaments.

/4/For text of the U.S. program for general and complete disarmament submitted to the U.N. General Assembly on September 25, 1961, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 475-482.

We believe the U.S. should take the following position in elaboration of the September 25 proposals on testing in Stage I:

a. As general principles:

(1) As long as some production is permitted some testing should be permitted.

(2) In Stage I, testing would be allowed only for those armaments for which production of operational units was planned prior to the end of Stage I. However, this restriction should be subject to abrogation if the period of transition from Stage I to Stage II is delayed excessively.

b. Limitations on testing should apply to strategic missiles, but not to other strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Strategic missiles, defined as those having a maximum range of 300 kilometers or more, would thus be the agreed category referred to in the September 25 Plan. For each stage concerned, an annual quota of strategic missile tests should be established. For the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. the quota should be fixed at a figure which bears the same proportion to the permitted annual production of strategic missiles that the number of tests of such missiles now considered necessary bears to current production of such missiles.

c. Within the quota, either new types of vehicles or newly-produced units of older types could be tested.

d. Delivery vehicles produced for peaceful purposes could be tested outside the quota figure, but within specified limits and safeguards and subject to inspection to insure that the vehicles were in fact being utilized for peaceful space exploration purposes rather than for military tests.

e. The testing of anti-missile systems is covered in the succeeding paragraph.

AICBM: Concerning AICBM's, the memorandum to the President stated that "restrictions be placed in Stage I on production, deployment and testing of anti-missile missiles by the U.S. and U.S.S.R." ACDA believes that these restrictions should be such as to reduce to zero any existing AICBM's and to prohibit any production or testing of such weapons. This recommendation is premised on the assumption that agreement would be reached prior to any Nike-Zeus systems becoming operational in the U.S. Once these systems become operational in the U.S., we, of course, would have to re-examine our position. Our recommendation is based on our strong belief that the destabilizing effects of technological breakthrough in this area pose such a potential threat that we should prohibit these weapons as far as practical, i.e., destruction of existing weapons and prohibitions on all production and testing.

We will make available draft staff studies which were taken into account in formulating this letter.

I believe that after you have had an opportunity to review these subjects it would be appropriate to form a joint task force of DOD and ACDA representatives to discuss and consider the above views and recommendations, and any others which the Department of Defense may wish to advance. If this idea meets with your approval, I would appreciate your designating Defense representatives to meet with me with a view to early establishment of an agreed U.S. position on these matters for use of the U.S. Delegation in Geneva.

Sincerely yours,

Adrian S. Fisher/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

165. Minutes of Meeting of the National Security Council/1/

Washington, March 28, 1962, 10:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 1962, No. 498, 3/27/62. Top Secret. The source text, which is dated March 29, bears no drafting information. A summary of this NSC meeting from Gerry Studds (S/S-S) to various Department of State and ACDA principals, March 29, and the NSC record of actions of this meeting, March 28, are both in Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council. A memorandum of discussion of this NSC meeting, March 28, was prepared by McCone. (Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President 12/1/61-6/30/62) See the Supplement.

The President opened the meeting by saying he was glad to have the Secretary of State and his team back;/2/ that they had done a good job and he had heard from the Secretary, in particular, of the helpfulness of Dr. Wiesner, Commissioner Haworth and Dr. Press.

/2/Secretary Rusk returned to Washington from Geneva on March 27.

The Secretary of State said he wanted to report on three topics: testing, general disarmament, and Berlin. On testing, it was utterly clear that the Soviets would accept no inspection in the USSR, in any way, shape or form. They had made this position plain in public and in private; Gromyko had told the Secretary privately that even one foreigner loose in the Soviet Union could find things out that could be most damaging to the USSR. There seemed no room to negotiate on this point, nothing to talk about and no Soviet proposal except a draft of November which contained no provision whatever for inspection. The Soviets had argued that inspection was not necessary, adding hints that they had special instruments which could provide all the necessary information, but they had refused the challenge of Lord Home to produce their instruments or to deal with the arguments of Western Scientists on this point.

Thus the problem was that of getting our position clear to other countries. The Secretary felt able to report that in Geneva at least two points had now been made clear. One was that the notion of espionage is nonsense. The Secretary referred to the paper, prepared for his use by the U.S. Delegation, which made clear the impossibility of serious espionage under the system of control and inspection of the April treaty. Secondly, he thought the Neutrals now understood the difference between detection and identification. In making this distinction clear, the support of the scientific group had been particularly helpful. As a result, the Burmese had told the Secretary that a secret vote on these issues would go 12-5 for us against the Soviet Union, although for political reasons many delegations could not make a public statement on our side. The Secretary thought Brazil and Mexico might be very helpful. But he thought we had much more work to do with the nonaligned countries in general.

The President asked whether we should plan to make a statement on these matters, and after some discussion it was agreed that a draft should be prepared for possible use in the President's press conference on Thursday, March 29th./3/ Such a statement might be based on a welcome to the Secretary and then go on to make some of these basic points in support of the U.S. position and in clarification of the adamant Soviet refusal to accept any inspection whatever.

/3/For text of the President's statement on nuclear test-ban inspection at his March 29 press conference, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 215?217.

The Secretary then pointed out that we would get pressure to delay our tests. Some delegations will urge us not to "wreck" the conference by testing. The Secretary remarked that Soviet testing had not wrecked discussion in 1961 nor had we received pressure from other countries not to talk to the Soviet Union because of its tests. We thought the Disarmament Committee's work would go on for a very long time indeed, although there would be interim points like the reporting dates scheduled for June 1st. He had looked at the forward calendar and it looked to him that there would never be a really good time for testing. We must resist such pressure for delay.

Turning to the problem of general disarmament, the Secretary remarked that the Soviets had brought in a complete treaty covering complete disarmament by stages./4/ But the Soviet position clearly allows only for inspection of disarmament and not of retained armaments. Gromyko had remarked to the Secretary that the attitude toward inspection which was evident on the testing issue would be multiplied many times in the field of general disarmament. The Secretary himself believed that the requirement for inspection would be much greater in the general disarmament field. There is thus no sign of an agreement on this critical point in the field of general disarmament.

/4/Reference is to the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (U.N. doc. ENDC/2) submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on March 15. For text, see ibid., pp. 103?126.

There remained what the conference had taken to calling "collateral points" on which some agreement could perhaps be reached: examples were outer space, surprise attack, and the nondiffusion of nuclear weapons. But in the latter case the Secretary foresaw complex and tough negotiations with respect to our possible need for a NATO deterrent force. Gromyko had said that we must not use third parties in order to provide weapons to Strauss. He also noted that the Soviets wished a non-diffusion agreement to be quite specifically limited to the two Germanies, perhaps because a more general agreement might collapse for reasons external to Europe, like a Chinese failure to conform.

Mr. Foster, in response to a request for a comment by the Secretary, said he had only two additional points to make; one was the moderation of the eight neutrals, which was in large part the result of the Secretary's own effective presentations. The second was that we did perhaps make a slight advance in keeping the conference on the procedural tracks we wanted instead of those desired by the Soviets. We have avoided making the Soviet treaty the main item on the agenda and we are securing agreement to our proposal to have two permanent co-chairmen, U.S. and USSR. On balance, the tone of the meeting was better than we had expected.

The Secretary then made the comment that from a number of sources the delegation had received the impression that Soviet armed forces may be significantly weaker than we think. Thus it had been argued that our proposal of a 30% reduction would create an imbalance against the Soviet Union, and some of the satellites had indicated that this imbalance would be produced because we were stronger in strategic forces than the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government also seemed embarrassed by our proposal for handing over 50,000 kgs. of nuclear materials because they did not wish to admit an inferiority of nuclear resources--so they had taken the strange course of asserting that 50,000 kgs. is an insignificant amount.

Mr. McCone asked the Secretary to comment on the difference between the present Soviet position of inspection and the position in favor of inspection that had been stated very plainly by Khrushchev in a letter to President Eisenhower in 1959. The Secretary said that the Soviets had clearly reversed themselves.

Then followed a discussion of means of influencing neutral opinion. It was suggested that one important forum was the UN, and Dr. Wiesner also urged visits to leaders of selected countries, because without face-to-face encounter one could not tell just what kind of ignorance or misunderstanding one might need to deal with.

[Here follows discussion of Berlin, space negotiations, British Guiana, Indonesia, and Laos.]

166. Letter From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan/1/

Washington, April 3, 1962.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/4?362. Top Secret. The source text bears a typed notation: "Send thru Department, night action, Eyes Only for Bruce for earliest delivery Wednesday a.m. (April 4) to the Prime Minister--from the President." The text was transmitted in telegram 5292 to London, April 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/4?362)

Dear Friend:/2/ Your letter of March 30/3/ raises again the question of a last appeal to Khrushchev on the test ban treaty. I agree with you that if we are ever to make a last statement on nuclear testing, the time is coming soon. I should think some time next week would be good.

/2/The salutation is written in an unidentified hand.

/3/Not printed. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, M-K, 1961?1962) See the Supplement. Secretary Rusk frankly expressed, "in a preliminary way," U.S. reservations to the proposals in Macmillan's letter at a meeting with Ambassador Ormsby Gore on March 30. (Memorandum of conversation, March 30; Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-3062) See the Supplement.

What needs to be said is familiar. The discussions in Geneva have done much to clarify in the minds of others what we have understood for some time, that detection and identification are two separate problems, and identification is the hard one. No matter how we arrange to detect seismic events that might or might not be nuclear explosions, the only way we can always verify the proposition that a given event is not a nuclear explosion is by on-the-spot inspection. Thus, some provision for on-the-spot inspection by international teams is a necessary part of a satisfactory treaty. If the Soviets continue to rule out any inspection as an element in any test ban treaty, further discussion of the subject at this time is useless. If Khrushchev should reverse the previous Soviet position on this point, it might just be possible to resolve whatever outstanding issues there are about the nature and location of detection systems in such a way as to get an effective treaty before our tests are scheduled to begin, and it would be worthwhile to try.

However, I must confess that I am not optimistic about the prospects of securing such a reversal of the Soviet position. It seems clear to me that the Soviets have decided both that they wish to test again and that they are not now prepared to accept any system of international inspection on their territory.

Nonetheless, I agree with you that it is useful to make a last statement, for whatever chance it may have of succeeding, and to keep our position clear to the end. I think it important that any statement should define the issue sharply enough in terms of inspection and verification that it offer Khrushchev no occasion to start a fruitless discussion on the subsidiary issues of location and ownership of detection stations.

Your proposed draft of March 24 appears to me to be a good basic document,/4/ although we have some suggestions which we will be discussing within the next 24 hours with David Ormsby Gore.

/4/Attached to a March 24 letter from Ormsby Gore to McGeorge Bundy is an undated draft text of a joint statement the two nations might issue on the nuclear testing issue. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, M-K, 1961-1962) See the Supplement.

I have written in terms of a statement and not of a joint appeal because I do not think that I myself can join in a renewed direct communication to Khrushchev on this matter. I do not quite share the view that the statements made by Soviet representatives cannot be taken as authoritative, and opinion in this country would not hold that a further appeal from me to Khrushchev was appropriate or constructive. On the other hand, I also do not share your feeling that an appeal from you alone will lack its own effectiveness, and I can even see some advantage in your taking this course, from the general Western point of view. I refer to a joint statement only because you have indicated that you would prefer not to act independently.

Sincerely

John F. Kennedy/5/

/5/The closing and President Kennedy's signature are written in an unidentified hand.

167. Teletype Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy/1/

London, April 5, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Joint US/UK Statement on Nuclear Testing 4/10/62, 3/62-4/62. Top Secret.

T 183/62. Message is in two parts. Part 1 begins.

Dear friend

Thank you very much for your message of April 3 about nuclear tests./2/ I have discussed the problem with my Cabinet colleagues today.

/2/Document 166.

We are all agreed that there should in any event be a joint statement by us both in the next ten days or so. The question as to whether I should in addition send another letter to Khrushchev is in their view nicely balanced.

I am not really so much concerned with the public opinion of Britain at the present time. In my experience that always stabilises itself in the long run behind what is right and sensible. But my colleagues are interested by your thought that there might be advantage in such an approach from the whole Western point of view. There is always the off chance that Khrushchev would accept the principle of on the spot verification. That of course would be an enormous advantage from the point of view of the future of the world even though it might, and I am sure you have thought of this, cause us both some immediate difficulty. If he did accept it would be almost impossible for you not to hold up the tests to see whether an effective treaty could be got. It would also, I think, imply that we might be forced to the position of agreeing that there would be no static stations on Russian soil.

Another possibility is that Khrushchev might ask for a summit for discussion either at Geneva or elsewhere. If he did so without clearly accepting verification by on the spot international inspection then we would stand firm and be in a strong position. But if he accepted verification and asked for a meeting on this basis it would be difficult to refuse.

In other words, if he accepts we are in the short run in some difficulty as to how to proceed but in the long run we will have secured an immense advantage which the whole of humanity will welcome. So, on the whole, I am inclined to send a letter on the lines of the attached draft./3/

/3/Not printed.

There is one subsidiary point which I think could easily be overcome. We would be asked why I wrote this letter and why it was not a joint one. My reply will be that since Bermuda we have been in the closest consultation about every step, and that it had been our practice sometimes to operate singly and sometimes jointly in our dealings with the Russians.

I would be grateful if you would think this over and send me your view either by this wonderful new teleprinter system or by telephone call.

With warm regard

Harold Macmillan

168. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, April 5, 1962.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/4-562. Secret. Drafted by William E. Gathright (ACDA/IR) and approved by Foster for ACDA on April 9 and by the Secretary on April 10.

SUBJECT
Meeting of Committee of Principals

PARTICIPANTS
See attached list/2/

/2/This 2-page list of the 34 participants at the meeting is not printed.

The Secretary noted that the tabling of a draft "treaty" by the Soviet Union had confronted us with a tactical problem and that although the fundamental barrier to negotiations was the negative Soviet attitude toward inspection, we should try to put in the hands of our delegation the materials they need for negotiating purposes. A treaty outline was being prepared for this purpose, and a number of questions needed to be answered.

Mr. McNamara said that he had wondered how soon this needed to be done, but the Secretary's statement that materials were needed for the present negotiations had answered that question. He also wished to ask what degree of detail was needed. He hoped that certain matters could be dealt with in general language.

Mr. Foster replied that we had to be more specific than heretofore and that although the complete details of our proposals could be unfolded gradually, we needed to give a sense of direction to the negotiations.

The Committee then turned to discussion of the specific issues posed in Mr. Foster's memorandum of April 4, 1962,/3/ for the Members of the Committee of Principals.

/3/Foster's 7-page memorandum to the Committee of Principals, April 4, which summarizes the issues for discussion at the April 5 meeting, is reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, vol. 3, pp. 369-369F.

1. Criteria for determining the dividing line between long- and medium-range strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

Mr. Foster recalled that Mr. McNamara had previously suggested that a distinction be drawn between vehicles of inter-continental and less than inter-continental range. He noted that a major problem was whether to consider the B-47 and Badger as falling in the inter-continental category. ACDA recommended that they should be treated as inter-continental. Treating them as less than inter-continental gave the United States such an advantage as to be non-negotiable. Admiral Parker reviewed the alternatives which had been considered calling attention to the fact that under the alternative recommended by ACDA, the numbers of vehicles in the inter-continental categories for the United States and Soviet Union were roughly equivalent.

Mr. McNamara questioned whether this was an accurate reflection of the true situation. He stated that for the Badger to achieve inter-continental range, part of the Badger force had to be utilized as tankers. Accordingly, although the Soviet Union did not now have an inter-continental force equivalent to that of the United States, it could achieve such a force under the proposed categorization by, in effect, trading tankers for missiles. He believed that the recommended categories would be disadvantageous unless tankers for the B-47 were also included. For similar reasons, he expressed his opposition to considering all strategic delivery vehicles in a single category. General LeMay agreed that the question of categories had to be looked at from the operational standpoint.

Dr. Wiesner commented that if both we and the Soviet Union try to maximize advantage through "juggling" categories, we would never get an agreement. He suggested that reductions should be by types across the board but that production should be by categories. Reductions should be by numbers alone, but destructive capability might have to be considered in connection with production limitations. Proposed reduction of a given type might be traded-off against allowed production. Mr. McNamara thought that this approach would meet Defense's problems.

Mr. Fisher asked whether this did not mean that we were not really reducing by types since, in view of continuing production, the effect of this approach would actually be an increase in certain types supposedly subject to reduction. He also asked how this approach would affect determination of retained levels. The Secretary requested further clarification of the proposal.

Mr. Foster reserved his position on the proposal and suggested that Dr. Wiesner work it out mathematically to show what was involved.

2. Criterion for Determining Destruction Capability.

Mr. Foster noted that ACDA recommended that destructive capability be measured by the gross loaded weight of the vehicle involved but that he understood there was some difference of opinion as to the appropriateness of this criterion. General LeMay said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were examining the matter. Mr. McNamara said that this was one matter which he hoped could be dealt with in general language. Mr. Beam stated that he thought it might be possible for a time to deal with the matter in general language.

3. Reduction Criteria for Non-Strategic Armaments.

Mr. Foster said that ACDA recommended that reductions in the non-strategic area should be by numbers only. He noted that weight might be of some importance in some categories but that reduction by numbers represented a simpler approach.

Dr. Wiesner suggested that reductions should be by numbers but that types rather than categories should be used in the non-strategic as well as the strategic area. He suggested a continuous list of armaments to be reduced in both areas.

4. Categories for Non-Strategic Armaments.

Mr. Foster recalled that with one exception the categories suggested for non-strategic armaments had been under consideration for some time, the exception being ACDA's proposal to add a new category for surface-to-air missiles other than anti-missile missile systems.

In response to a question by the Secretary, Mr. McNamara said that he was inclined to the belief that the larger the number of categories the better in the non-strategic as well as the strategic area. General LeMay believed that a larger number of categories would be needed in the non-strategic area than had been proposed. Mr. McNamara thought in particular that ships should be divided into more than a single category.

Dr. Wiesner renewed his suggestion that reductions in the non-strategic as well as the strategic area be by types and that production be by categories. He believed this approach would solve the problem pre-sented by the fact that the Soviet Union has so much to draw on. Mr. Nitze pointed out that there would be a problem in defining types.

Mr. Foster noted again that the issue had been under discussion for some time. However, Mr. McNamara stated that he was not prepared to give a final answer and that it would take some time to work the matter out. He was inclined to agree with Dr. Wiesner and wondered whether, if the suggested categories were to be used, they could not be described as "illustrative". The Secretary thought this approach might be possible.

5. Limitations on Production of Armaments.

Mr. Foster expressed the view that the issue of limitations would have to be resolved in connection with the determination of categories.

6. Limits on Testing of Strategic Delivery Vehicles.

Mr. Foster stated that the ACDA recommendation was based on relating past testing experience to new levels of production. He believed this would not present problems. Mr. McNamara agreed to this approach.

7. Anti-Missile Missile Systems.

Dr. Wiesner thought problems would arise from treating anti-missile missile systems differently from other types of armaments and that calling for prohibition of such systems might be interpreted as reflecting fear on our part. Mr. Wilson agreed that there might be a propaganda problem.

General LeMay expressed the view that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was doing well in this field but that we could beat them if we wished to do so. He thought we should not give up our chance of doing so.

The Secretary asked whether it was assumed that we would continue developments. Mr. McNamara affirmed that we could proceed with developments in every category in which we were allowed to produce. Dr. Wiesner believed that until the second stage of disarmament was reached, we had to be able to turn around.

Mr. McNamara suggested that one way to handle the matter would be to treat anti-missile missile systems as a separate category of non-strategic armaments. If any such systems had been produced, they would be reduced thirty percent. If none had been produced, no production would be allowed.

It was agreed to handle the matter in this manner.

8. Elimination of Armaments Intended for Reserve Forces.

Mr. Fisher noted that the Soviet Union had proposed the elimination of armaments for reserve forces and that ACDA believed that it would be advantageous to the United States to take the Soviet Union up on its offer. Mr. McNamara said that he had not had an opportunity to think the proposal through, that he did not know how armaments for reserve forces would be defined, but that the offer seemed advantageous. General LeMay stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted another look at the proposal. Mr. Foster urged that it be given serious consideration since it was hard to think the proposal was not to our advantage. Mr. McNamara was inclined to agree with Mr. Foster but was not certain how to ensure that it would be to our advantage.

9. Destruction of Nuclear Delivery Vehicles During Negotiations

Mr. Foster noted that the proposal that the United States and the Soviet Union destroy on a mutual basis between 10 and 30 B-47's and Badgers each month for a limited period during the negotiations had been discussed many times. He called attention to the proposal's value in reassuring others of our sincerity. Mr. McNamara stated that he could agree to the proposal but that he believed the number destroyed should not be above 15 vehicles a month.

The Secretary asked whether the proposal would jeopardize our position in the present confrontation with the Soviet Union. Mr. McNamara said that it would not. General LeMay, however, doubted that a Badger was worth a B-47.

Mr. Wilson commented that Mr. Murrow doubted that the proposal would have lasting psychological impact since we were phasing B-47's out anyway. Mr. Foster pointed out that we had decided to retain the B-47 longer than previously planned and that it remained a significant instrument of war.

Mr. Rostow feared that the proposal would prevent the neutrals from facing up to the problem of inspection and that trading bombers might offer the neutrals a soft way out. He wished to study the matter further and believed that every device should be used to make the neutrals confront the inspection issue. Mr. Bundy was concerned that the proposal would open a Pandora's box of bonfires.

No conclusion was reached respecting the proposal.

The Secretary asked that ACDA and Defense prepare a joint statement of issues for the President./4/

/4/Reference presumably is to Foster's April 6 memorandum to the President, summarizing the issues for imminent discussion at the meeting that day with the President. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Memoranda, 2/62-4/62) The issues still to be resolved after this Principals' meeting were also summarized in a memorandum from Kaysen to the President, April 5. (Ibid., Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, 18-Nation Conference, Geneva, 4/1/62-4/11/62) Both memoranda are in the Supplement.

Upon completion of the review of issues posed in Mr. Foster's memorandum of April 4, Dr. Wiesner raised the following questions regarding the Treaty outline that had been circulated: whether destruction of missile launching sites should not be subject to the thirty percent reduction; whether the proposed definition of "control" in connection with transfer of nuclear weapons might not be disadvantageous; whether the verification annex should not be placed in the body of the Treaty outline; whether the Treaty outline should not specify the Parties to the Treaty; and whether the Treaty outline did not give undue weight to experts commissions. It was agreed that these questions could be examined in connection with redrafting the Treaty outline. Dr. Wiesner also suggested that the thirty percent reduction factor might be applied to armed forces as well as armaments, but Mr. Foster and Mr. McNamara thought it wiser to leave the United States proposal in its present form.

169. Minutes of Meeting/1/

Washington, April 6, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, 18-Nation Conference, Geneva, 4/1/62-4/11/62. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. A list of 14 participants on the last page of the memorandum is not printed.

Minutes of Meeting with the President on April 6, 1962, on the ACDA Draft Outline of Provisions for a Basic Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament

Secretary Rusk stated there was an urgent need to provide the U.S. delegation at Geneva with an outline of our proposed treaty for general and complete disarmament. He noted that the Soviet delegation had already tabled a draft treaty and that there was considerable pressure on our delegation to begin a detailed discussion of the Soviet document. Therefore, unless the U.S. delegation can table a treaty outline by the end of next week, we will be faced with a serious negotiating problem. He suggested that there be another meeting with the President on Friday, 13 April, following a Principals' meeting on 11 April, to obtain final agreement on the treaty outline.

The President asked if interagency agreement on all controversial points in the treaty could be obtained by April 13 so that the document could be tabled in Geneva at that time. Mr. Foster responded that agreement could not be expected by that time on all points. The JCS had, for example, asked for more time to consider the military issues involved in the treaty. After the U.S. delegation received the document, it would also have to coordinate it with other delegations. In addition, it was estimated that at least an additional week would be necessary to coordinate the document with the North Atlantic Council. Secretary Rusk stated that he wished to be able to table something in Geneva as soon as possible even if we have to leave some portions of the document in general terms.

The President asked why it was that we were not further along with the treaty draft at this point since we presumably had been working on it for the past several months. Mr. Gilpatric stated that the DOD would have to share some of the blame with ACDA since they had been slow in replying on some policy issues.

Mr. Foster, referring to the attached memorandum to the President,/2/ stated that the most basic substantive issue to be resolved was the manner in which reductions of armaments and limitations on production could be controlled. He noted that there were now two alternative proposals: (1) percentage reductions by broad categories and limited production within the same categories: (2) percentage reductions by specific types of armaments and limited production within broad categories. He stated his strong preference for the first approach. Mr. Gilpatric stated that the DOD considered the second approach, i.e., reduction by types and production by categories to be the preferable approach. General LeMay said that he was not sure of the consequences of either method, and wanted to reserve judgment pending study. Dr. Wiesner stated that he also endorsed the second alternative. He noted that reduction by types provided a simple, direct approach to the basic problem of treaty which would continue through all stages leading to general and complete disarmament and avoided dangers that might arise from the definitions of categories that we do not at present entirely understand. At the same time, the use of broad categories for limited production in the first stage would permit some flexibility but would not become a matter of over-riding importance in the treaty. Mr. Fisher provided a numerical example of the two approaches and pointed out that from the negotiating point of view he preferred categories since the total number would be progressively reduced for the entire category while under the second approach the total number of items of certain specific types would increase. Dr. Wiesner pointed out under either alternative the total number of items in certain types would increase and that paper categories would not obscure this in the eyes of world opinion. He further emphasized that since production would presumably only take place in the first stage, this would not be a continuing problem.

/2/Not attached, but it was probably Foster's April 6 memorandum to the President; see footnote 4, Document 168.

Mr. Kaysen pointed out that the use of categories was further complicated by the requirement that "destructive capability" as well as numbers be considered in determining reductions and limitations on production. General LeMay commented that the essential problem was to cut the combat potential of both sides and he was not sure how to measure this; it was not simply a counting matter. Dr. Wiesner observed that, considering the problems we were having defining categories within our own government, it would be most difficult to obtain mutually satisfactory definitions with the Soviets since they would obviously try to modify the category definitions to their maximum advantage. Mr. Gilpatric stated that it was his conclusion that, for both the purposes of ourselves and our allies, we should stick to the concept of reduction by types and base continued limited production on some form of categories. Secretary Rusk stated that he continued to feel that the position based on the reduction by types and production by categories would present problems to the negotiators. The President stated that on the basis of what he had heard that, if he had to make a decision today, he would pick the second alternative of reduction by type and production by categories. Dr. Wiesner observed that it was his opinion that this approach was to our advantage from the point of view of security. Mr. Foster stated that he could not accept this conclusion. Mr. Gilpatric stated that alternate drafts covering both approaches be prepared.

Mr. Foster recommended that we incorporate a provision in our treaty calling for the destruction of conventional armaments intended for reserve forces since this provision was included in the Soviet draft treaty of March 15 and would, he believed, be substantially to our advantage. While this would affect our mothball fleet, it would have an even more significant effect on the very large Soviet stockpiled tanks and artillery. Mr. Gilpatric said that the DOD was willing to accept this as an item for bargaining at Geneva.

Mr. Foster recommended that consideration be given to the earlier ACDA proposal to deposit a certain number of B-47's for destruction provided the Soviet Union deposit an equal number of medium jet bombers. Mr. Gilpatric said that the DOD would go along with this proposal if it were incorporated in the U.S. position. General LeMay objected to a one-for-one trade of B-47's for Badgers, but agreed that some other ratio might be acceptable. He also raised the question of whether this did not accept the Soviet position on verification of disarmament. Mr. Wilson stated that Mr. Murrow felt that this proposal was actually very transparent since it was generally known that we were going to destroy the B-47 aircraft in any event. The President agreed that this proposal could be made if it were subsequently decided to be desirable in connection with the Geneva negotiations.

The President asked that a small interagency task force be formed to prepare a final draft of the treaty. It was decided that the drafting committee be made up of representatives of ACDA, Defense, JCS and White House.

Mr. Kaysen observed that the present treaty draft makes very extensive use of the mechanism of the so-called experts commission. He considered this undesirable since it focussed undue attention on secondary problems such as BW-CW and implied a lack of general knowledge on the subjects in question. He suggested that it would be more appropriate to give the IDO general powers in the treaty to study the problems and to discuss any commissions and annexes or appendices to the treaty outline. The President stated that the drafting committee should deal with this recommendation.

Dr. Wiesner stated that the present draft did not specify the states that would have to be party to the treaty in order for the first stage to come into effect or the states that would have to adhere to the treaty as a prerequisite to the transition from Stage I to Stage II. Mr. Foster agreed that this was an important point that had not yet been dealt with in the treaty. The President asked whether adherence of China was a requirement for the second stage. The Secretary said he felt it most certainly should be. Dr. Wiesner suggested that the original parties should include all of the NATO and Warsaw Pact members although it might be adequate to have only the U.S. and USSR as initial parties to the treaty.

170. Editorial Note

On April 9, 1962, the U.S. and British Governments sent a joint statement on nuclear testing to the Soviet Government, and a day later Prime Minister Macmillan sent a short letter to Chairman Khrushchev, asking Khrushchev seriously to consider the proposal set forth in the U.S.-U.K. statement.

Both the joint statement and Macmillan's letter were developed in a series of personal letters and telephone calls between Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy and meetings between Kennedy's aides and British Ambassador David Ormsby Gore in Washington. The suggestion of a joint appeal to Khrushchev was contained, for example, in Macmillan's March 20 letter to President Kennedy, which also contained a draft text for such a message. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204) See the Supplement. Regarding the draft text, see footnote 3, Document 166. Additional documentation on the preparation of this joint statement is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Joint US/UK Statement on Nuclear Testing, 4/10/62, and Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, M-K and K-M, 1961-1962.

The joint statement reiterated the British and U.S. view that international inspection or verification inside the Soviet Union was required in any nuclear test ban treaty in order to determine the nature of unexplained seismic events which might be nuclear tests. The statement asserted, "For nearly three years this need was accepted by the Soviet delegation at Geneva," but in the most recent negotiations had been "repeatedly rejected" by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Zorin, the Soviet representative at the talks. The joint statement also rejected national detection systems as adequate protection against clandestine tests. "In the present state of scientific instrumentation," it continued, "there are a great many cases in which we cannot distinguish between national and artificial seismic disturbances as opposed to recording the fact of a disturbance and locating its probable epicenter." The statement concluded with the hope that the Soviet Government might reconsider its position and accept the principle of international verification; but if there was no change in its position, "the [U.S.] test series scheduled for the latter part of this month will have to go forward." For text of this statement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, volume I, pages 292-293.

Macmillan's April 10 letter personally appealed to Khrushchev "to give the most earnest consideration to our proposal. After all, the object of verification is not to increase suspicion, but to dispel it, to identify an event as a natural one so that confidence may not be threatened. I feel sure that once the principle of international verification is accepted, there will be a real chance of reaching an early agreement as to its application." For text of the letter, see ibid., page 294.

171. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

JCSM-269-62

Washington, April 10, 1962.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 3470, McNamara Records, NATO-NSC Meeting. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World (ACDA Draft of April 9, 1962)/2/ (U)

/2/Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 23, Eighteen Nation Committee)

1. The subject draft treaty has been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their views and comments are contained in the Appendix and Annexes A, B and C hereto./3/

/3/A 16-page Appendix entitled "Specific Comments" and Annexes A, B, and C are not printed.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note with satisfaction that the current draft treaty in several respects is more nearly in consonance with their previously expressed views than earlier drafts. Of grave concern, however, is the expansion of previously expressed proposals concerning the untested, controversial and inadequate concept of inspection by random sampling. The recent history of disarmament negotiations with the Soviets has hinged in large measure on the critical issue of inspection. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that provision for complete inspection is a requirement that must be met as part of any agreement to a reduction of armaments. They consider that the security of the United States is contingent upon this principle. Any proposals which are deliberately designed to be "unintrusive" and therefore, acceptable to the Soviets are a hazard to the security of the country.

3. Other objectionable features of the proposed draft treaty are listed as follows:

a. No provision for inclusion of Communist China or other militarily significant states in Stage I.

b. No provision for establishing an International Disarmament Organization prior to start of Stage I reductions.

c. Reduction of armaments by categories which could be disadvantageous to the United States.

d. Complete elimination of armaments for reserve forces in Stage I. (While this is a problem affecting all the Services, it particularly strikes at the 480 ships in the US reserve fleets which have no Soviet counterpart.)

e. Inclusion of launching pads as an item of armament.

f. Limitation on production during Stage I tied to armaments inventory.

g. Prohibition on replacement of military personnel by civilians.

h. Provision for compulsory jurisdiction of an International Court of Justice in Stage I.

Changes recommended in the Appendix would make the draft treaty satisfactory to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. It is recommended that the appended views be used as the basis for establishment of Department of Defense position, and that vigorous efforts be made to influence interdepartmental agreement toward this end.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

172. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, April 11, 1962.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/4-1162. Secret. Drafted by Gathright and approved in ACDA by Foster on April 16 and in S by Emory C. Swank on April 20.

SUBJECT
Meeting of Committee of Principals

PARTICIPANTS
See Attached List/2/

/2/The list of 17 participants is not printed.

The Secretary asked Mr. Foster to present the issues for discussion.

1. Methods of Reducing and Limiting Production of Armaments

Referring to the ACDA draft "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World" (April 11, 1962),/3/ Mr. Foster noted that differences between ACDA and Defense proposals respecting methods of reducing and limiting production of armaments had been substantially narrowed as a result of Defense's modified presentation of its proposal. However, ACDA continued to regard its proposal of reduction and production by categories of armaments as preferable to Defense's proposal that armaments be reduced by types and produced by categories.

/3/Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 23, Eighteen Nation Committee)

Mr. Foster saw two advantages in the ACDA proposal. First, it permitted greater freedom to "vary the mix" of armaments during the uncertain first stage of disarmament. Second, it avoided negotiating problems which would arise from the Defense proposal which, although proposing reductions by types, would, as a result of production allowances, lead to increases in certain types. Defense's presentation of its proposal had been improved, but the negotiating problem remained essentially the same.

The Secretary thought it unlikely that the two sides would wish to turn each other loose to make their own "mix" and that the "mix" would probably have to be negotiated. He asked Mr. Gilpatric whether Defense would be comfortable letting the Soviet Union make its own "mix".

Mr. Gilpatric believed that by 1963, the earliest time a disarmament program such as that being discussed could realistically be initiated, our own "mix" of inter-continental weapons would be good and that Defense would prefer to freeze the "mix" at that point. Defense considered a production allowance in Stage I as primarily important from the standpoint of being ready to turn around if Stage I did not work. If a way could be found to keep production lines ready to go again and to allow only the production of parts during Stage I, Defense would prefer to hold the "mix" on the 1963 basis rather than to reduce and produce by categories which would permit a change in the "mix".

Mr. Foster asked whether by 1964 the "mix" would not be further improved from our viewpoint. Mr. Gilpatric affirmed that this was so but thought the 1963 "mix" a good one and considered it preferable to negotiate and inspect on the basis of "knowns" rather than "unknowns".

Dr. Wiesner agreed with Mr. Gilpatric and thought that reduction by types was a more understandable approach, one that the neutrals could be expected to understand.

Mr. Foster doubted that either approach was simple and commented that, on the basis of experience to date at Geneva, it would be necessary to explain matters time and time again. Referring to the problem of maintaining the readiness of production lines, he recalled that Mr. McCone had pointed out that production could be resumed more quickly in a controlled economy than in a free economy. Mr. Foster thought the problem needed to be weighed.

The Secretary recalled that Mr. Gilpatric had expressed the view that perhaps production during the first stage could be limited to production of parts. From the standpoint of disarmament, small production during the first stage would be better than large production. However, as Secretary of State, he also had to be interested in the combat capability of the retained 70 percent of armaments. He wondered how a small production allowance would affect this.

Mr. Gilpatric replied that production of parts would be required throughout disarmament in order to maintain the retained armaments. In so far as maintaining production in readiness to turn around was concerned, he believed we had learned a good deal from experience during the past decade about how to control the flow of military production. We should not stop every wheel from turning during Stage I, but he did not think a large production allowance was needed to maintain production lines.

The Secretary reaffirmed his view that it would in fact be necessary to negotiate the "mix". Vast increments of power could not be applied on a free-wheeling basis.

Mr. Kaysen believed that reduction by types would provide a tighter framework and that the variation of the "mix" resulting from production would be smaller than in an approach based on reduction and production by categories. Reduction by types tended to control shifts resulting from subsequent production although the degree of control was sensitive to the amount of production allowed.

Mr. Foster stated that he would agree with Mr. Kaysen if he were certain that security during disarmament could be preserved by maintaining the same relationship among types. Reductions by categories would ensure that higher quality armaments could be retained during the uncertainties of Stage I. Moreover, there were new armaments we would want to produce.

Mr. Gilpatric, however, thought it safer to freeze the "mix" at a known point. He said Defense was willing to look at the question of what specific production allowance should be provided and was willing to keep production low but not cut it out.

Dr. Wiesner wondered whether in view of the foregoing discussion agreement could not be reached on the Defense proposal. However, the Secretary and Mr. Foster believed that although it would be appropriate to include the Defense proposal in the next draft of the "Outline", the President should be acquainted with the basic issues and that ACDA's proposal should also be presented for this purpose./4/

/4/See Document 173.

Dr. Wiesner asked whether it would not be desirable to advise Ambassador Dean of what limits on production the U.S. contemplated.

Mr. Foster thought the percentage should be small but that it was difficult to decide.

The Secretary asked whether Ambassador Dean could be authorized to say that production would be not more than 10 percent a year? This should be sufficient for maintenance.

Mr. Kaysen noted that this would make the production allowance equal to the proposal percentage for reductions. Although any additional production would be carried out within the ceilings established by the reductions, it would be good to have two figures with the figure for production substantially lower than that for reductions.

Dr. Wiesner recalled a suggestion made by Dr. Haworth on another occasion that production might be limited to ten percent over a three year period.

After some discussion of a formulation to the effect that production would be "substantially lower than 10 percent a year", the matter was left unresolved.

2. Application of percentage reductions to launching pads

Mr. Foster then called attention to Dr. Wiesner's proposal that fixed launching pads as well as missiles should be subject to reduction during Stage I. The proposal was a recent one, and there had been no opportunity to examine it in detail. Although the proposal concerned fixed launching pads, Mr. Foster wondered how, for example, Polaris submarines would be counted and noted that since they were already included within a category of armaments subject to reduction, there was danger that they might become subject to a double reduction. He also understood that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were troubled by the proposal/5/ and feared that it might lead to opening up the issue of foreign bases in Stage I whereas it was now proposed to discuss their reduction as a Stage II measure.

/5/See Document 171.

Mr. Gilpatric thought there were definite advantages in getting the concept of reducing launching pads in at the beginning. The availability to the Soviet Union of higher yield missiles magnified the value of their launching pads. Moreover, he thought it easier to inspect the destruction of launching pads than missiles.

Gen. Lemnitzer did not see how Polaris could logically be excluded from a discussion of launching pads and confirmed Mr. Foster's understanding that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned about the possibility that the foreign bases issue might be raised if the U.S. proposed a Stage I reduction of launching pads.

Dr. Wiesner acknowledged that the proposal had been advanced only recently. However, it had been realized that we had left a loophole, which he thought it important that we should try to close. It was his understanding that at least in the case of medium-range missiles, the Soviet Union had produced back-up missiles for each launching pad. Consequently, if missiles alone were reduced, the Soviet Union could merely keep filling up the launching pads, and no effective reduction of their capability would take place. He believed that the fact that Polaris submarines were already subject to reduction would eliminate them from consideration in connection with the launching pad problem.

The Secretary saw some advantages in destruction of fixed launching pads if Polaris submarines were not subject to double-counting. He thought that it was desirable to move targets such as launching pads away from populated areas and out to sea and did not understand the point of view of some of the Europeans who apparently felt more comfortable living by the side of strategic targets. Development of the concept of open cities might be one way to save the human race from destruction. He wondered how CIA felt about the matter.

Mr. Marengo responded that unless the proposal were adopted, we would seek to control only missiles, which were easier to hide than launching pads. He confirmed Dr. Wiesner's understanding that the Soviet Union did keep more than one missile per pad. Consequently, Soviet salvo capability might be untouched by a reduction of missiles alone.

The Secretary concluded that, on balance, the proposal to reduce fixed launching pads should be accepted.

3. Elimination during Stage I of armaments for reserve forces

Mr. Foster noted that the Soviet Union had introduced a new proposal calling during Stage I for the elimination of armaments for reserve forces. ACDA did not feel too strongly about the matter but believed that it might be advantageous to take the Soviet Union up on its offer.

Gen. Lemnitzer recalled that he had at an earlier time been concerned about what might be done with respect to Soviet reserve forces. The new proposal might be a way of getting at this problem, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff were worried about its practicability. They did not see any clear way of determining what amounts of armaments were for reserve forces.

The Secretary thought the matter was complicated by the fact that certain reserve stocks are maintained for active forces. He thought it would be difficult to differentiate between such stocks and other stocks for reserve forces.

Gen. Lemnitzer agreed and said that he did not know how this could be done.

Mr. Gilpatric recognized that since the Soviet Union had raised the issue, it was bound to come up. However, he thought it undesirable for the United States to put the proposal in its own "Outline." Since the matter would come up, it should be studied further.

Mr. Foster agreed not to put the proposal in the "Outline" but noted that we would have to be prepared to respond to the Soviet proposal.

4. Restraints on replacement of armed forces by civilian personnel

Mr. Foster noted that the Soviet Union had proposed that civilian personnel be subject to the Stage I reduction of force levels. The United States could not accept this, but at the same time in view of the greater flexibility of the Soviet Union in replacing military personnel with civilians, it did not seem desirable to leave the matter untouched. ACDA had proposed language which was intended to restrict the replacement of military personnel by civilians.

Mr. Fisher commented that we did not wish to leave room to change the "mix" of civilian and military personnel.

Mr. Gilpatric thought a restriction of this character would prove difficult to police, but he considered the ACDA proposal acceptable.

5. Stage II production

Mr. Foster pointed out that ACDA had proposed that Stage II production be limited to replacement in kind on a one-for-one basis and that Defense had proposed that parts only be produced. ACDA was prepared to accept the Defense proposal if Defense had concluded that production of parts only would meet needs during Stage II.

Mr. Gilpatric confirmed that this was Defense's conclusion.

The Secretary and Mr. Webb departed at this point.

Mr. Fisher called attention to the fact that in order to provide an opportunity for the President to examine the "Outline" before the meeting scheduled for the next afternoon, it would be necessary to make a revised draft available to the White House by 10:00 a.m. in the morning. Accordingly he requested that any additional comments on the present draft be made available to ACDA as rapidly as possible. In this connection, he inquired whether AEC had had an opportunity to review the language on Stage II proposals respecting nuclear weapons which had been revised in the light of staff level discussions (the proposals referred to appear on p. 48 of the draft of April 11). Dr. Haworth confirmed that the new language was acceptable to AEC and asked, with respect to another matter, whether language respecting the coming into force of the Treaty could not be modified to preclude the possibility that failure of a single state (other than the United States or the Soviet Union) to ratify the Treaty would delay its coming into force. Mr. Fisher agreed to modify the language to preclude this possibility.

Mr. Kaysen then summarized the results of the meeting as follows:

1. Both the Defense and ACDA approaches to the problem of reducing and producing armaments would be presented to the President. In this connection, the question of how to handle the B-47 and the Badger continued to be in disagreement. It should be made clear to the President that the size of the production allowance plays a central role in the merits of the two proposals. If the production allowance were large, there was little difference between the two approaches.

2. Fixed launching pads would be subject to reduction during Stage I.

3. Reduction of armaments for reserve forces would not be proposed but the matter would be studied.

4. Restraints on replacing military personnel with civilians would be proposed in Stage I.

5. Stage II armaments production would be limited to production of parts.

In closing the meeting, Mr. Foster noted the Delegation's desire that "will" rather than "would" be used in the "Outline". He thought the drafting and clearances of the "Outline" had proceeded to the stage where it was difficult to adopt the Delegation's suggestion.

173. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, April 12, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Memoranda, Memorandum to the President 4/12/62. Secret. Copies were sent to Bundy and Wiesner.

SUBJECT
Disarmament Issues

1. The attached draft outline treaty, the final result of a long process of discussion between ACDA and other interested agencies, is submitted for your approval. (Tab B)/2/ It is now all agreed; except for one major issue left for your decision.

/2/This attached draft, April 12, is not printed.

2. The open issue is the way which we specify for reducing armaments. The treaty draft (Stage I, Section A, pp. 8 through 13) is organized in terms of reduction by types and production by categories. This is the alternative preferred by all the principals save ACDA. Defense, JCS, AEC and the White House Staff prefer this alternative strongly. At the Principals Meeting yesterday,/3/ Secretary Rusk indicated that he shares this preference. CIA and USIA have indicated no strong position on this point. The ACDA method (Tab C)/4/ is drafted in terms of reduction and production by categories.

/3/See Document 172.

/4/Tabs C-E are not printed.

3. As you will remember, this is a problem which has been discussed at some length before, and specifically in your last meeting with the Principals on April 6./5/ In the first stage, reduction by types involves a 30% cut in the inventory of each individual type of weapon (e.g., B-52, Minuteman, Atlas, etc.). During this stage, there would also be a production allowance for each category (e.g., long-range strategic delivery vehicles, which includes all the types listed above). This allowance could be used to offset the reduction in, or even increase the numbers of, any type, provided that the numbers of some other type within the same category were reduced correspondingly to maintain the over-all 30% reduction for the whole category. In the second stage, when there is no production except for maintenance, reduction proceeds by types, and categories are no longer significant. The alternative formulation of reduction and production by categories means that the reduction of 30% is charged against a category as a whole, and can be taken in terms of any specific weapons within the categories, i.e., the whole reduction could be charged against a single type of weapon if it constituted 30% or more of the category. The production allowance is treated similarly. Tab A gives a model computation which illustrates the difference between the two methods./6/

/5/See Document 169.

/6/For text, see the Supplement.

The most significant difference between the two methods lies in the extent to which they permit a change in the mix of armaments. For any given rate of reduction (e.g., 30%) and any given production allowance (e.g., 10%), reduction by types permits a much smaller change in the mix than reduction by categories. Of course, the larger the production allowance, the less important this difference becomes, but all parties to the discussion agreed that we should be thinking in terms of a small production allowance. Further, under reduction by types, changes in mix cease after the end of Stage I, when production ceases except for maintenance requirements. Reduction by categories, however, permits the change in mix to proceed until complete disarmament is reached.

4. There are two arguments in favor of reduction by types. First, it is desirable to stabilize the mix of weapons on both sides, from the point of view of our security interests. A method which allows only small and relatively predictable changes in the mix leaves the military balance more or less where it is now. Even if we could foresee a balance of advantage in the game of changing the mix, that balance in fact is very sensitive to the boundaries of the categories. These would be a matter of negotiation and accordingly it is difficult to predict where we would come out. In yesterday's meeting, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer and Rusk all stated clearly that they considered a more or less stable mix more desirable than a situation in which each side tried to take advantage of its freedom to vary the mix substantially.

Further, despite the complications introduced by production allowances in Stage I, reduction by types, carried through the three stages of the treaty to the eventual goal, corresponds more nearly to the simple notion of disarmament across-the-board than does reduction by categories. Accordingly, it will be easier to explain and defend in Geneva./7/

/7/A summary of the Department of Defense views on reductions by types and categories as well as on other issues is in a memorandum from Gilpatric to McNamara, April 11. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 3470, McNamara Records, NATO-NSC Meeting)

5. On the other side, the arguments of ACDA for reduction by categories are also two. First, they assert it is an important strategic advantage to be able to vary our weapons mix considerably. Second, they fear that the problem of explaining reduction by types during the first stage, when there is a production allowance, is such that we might give the impression that our offer is deceptive. ACDA does agree that the present language on this point (see p. 8, A,I,a.) has minimized this problem, although they do not think it has disappeared entirely. USIA is of the view that there is no significant difference in ease of explanation between the two. It should be observed, however, that there is in fact more room for a large increase during the first stage in the numbers of a specific weapon, e.g., Polaris missiles, under the ACDA alternative than under reduction by types.

ACDA's presentation of its view on this point is attached at Tab D. Note that in the computation on page 3, they have included B-47's in the intercontinental strategic category, although their proposal (Tab C, pp. 1-2, items 2 a, b) put them in a separate category.

6. The treaty is long. The more important provisions which you might wish to scan are listed on the first page of Tab B. Those that are starred (*) are especially significant.

7. Tab E contains a brief chronology that I prepared of the steps to the agreed document.

Carl Kaysen/8/

/8/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

174. Editorial Note

The Committee of Principals met with President Kennedy in the Cabinet Room of the White House on April 12, 1962, from 5 to 6 p.m. Glenn Seaborg wrote the following summary of the discussion on disarmament:

"Rusk explained the reduction by category in comparison to reduction by type. He emphasized the key role of production in the decision between the two. He says that if production is not small, we would have a modernization program rather than a disarmament program. Foster said he thought there was more flexibility in reduction by category, and said he wanted the DOD to be sure that they saw the implications of reduction by type with small replacements. Rusk said he thought about 5% per year of production might be negotiable while Foster said it might be only 3%. The President decided to go ahead with reduction by types.

"Rusk again asked whether DOD understood the figures, and McNaughton answered in the affirmative. McNaughton said they want production by type so as to keep the plants warm, that is, keep them in good condition. The President pointed out that this presents a real problem from the standpoint of public relations in the disarmament negotiations. He wanted to know how we could explain the reason for keeping our plants warm. Wiesner said we needed to protect ourselves until we are sure of disarmament.

"The President asked if they agreed to inspection from the beginning, could we forego this. Kaysen said the explanation should be along the lines of saying that it is an honest plan and that the Soviet plan is not honest; that it is a complicated problem not to be solved by a radical change, and that serious people should think about starting cautiously. Wiesner also mentioned the need for economic turn-around time.

"The President then said OK, but we can back off from this insist-ence on production if we can get inspection from the very beginning and, of course, the success of our negotiating such a position depends on our skill in handling it. Rusk said the DOD must agree that the production should be low and McNaughton said they do so agree, and they can work out suitable language.

"Next, the question of the reduction of launch pads was considered. The representatives of the Chiefs of Staff said that the Chiefs can't agree to this because they haven't had enough time to study it. McNaughton said that he and McNamara and Gilpatric feel this should be included and that they see no defect in the argument for putting it into effect from the beginning. The representative of the Chiefs said it could be put in later, and Rusk pointed out it could also be put in at the beginning and dropped later.

"McNamara and Lemnitzer, who entered the meeting at this stage, both agreed that the reduction in launch pads should be put in the treaty from the beginning.

"The next question involved the reduction in reserve armament and Rusk suggested that it should not be in the treaty.

"The President asked who was going over to Geneva and was told that Foster and McNaughton were.

"Kaysen pointed out the problem of accepting jurisdiction of the international court under the treaty. Lemnitzer objected to the inclusion of the principle of zonal inspection in such definite language, and McNamara suggested that the language in the last sentence of page 27 of the April 12 draft could be made more conditional by including the phrase, `for example.' The President said that the more he looks at this problem, the more complicated it seems to be and, therefore, he appreciates the efforts of Foster, Fisher, McNaughton and the others who have worked on it." (Seaborg, Journal, volume 26, Supplement, pages 128-130)

The meeting then turned to preparations for the upcoming U.S. nuclear tests, the discussion of which Seaborg also summarized in his journal. (Ibid., pages 130-131)

175. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy/1/

London, April 17, 1962.

/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. Attached to the source text is a note from Ormsby Gore to the President, April 17, explaining that the Prime Minister asked him "to pass to you the enclosed message on the neutrals' proposals at Geneva on nuclear tests."

Dear Friend, Mr. Khrushchev has at last given a definite, if somewhat prolix, reply to my simple question on international verification./2/

/2/For text of Khrushchev's message to Macmillan, April 12 (U.N. doc. ENDC/27), see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 318-328. Regarding Macmillan's letter to Khrushchev, to which Khrushchev replied, see Document 170.

Now we have the problem of the eight well meaning neutrals./3/ I understand that after further discussion this morning it was agreed that the neutrals should clarify their proposals at a meeting on Thursday morning, April 19./4/ On the assumption that these remain substantially unchanged, I suggest that Dean and Godber should take this line. After referring to other difficulties, for instance that the right to initiate a verification in the neutrals' original proposal seems to lie not with the complainant nation but with the commission or even with the nation complained of; i.e. not the plaintiff but the court or even the defendant, they should say that there is still the vital point of Russian objection to any form of inspection on Russian soil. This point was made quite clear by the President and the Prime Minister in their joint statement and by the Prime Minister in his letter to Mr. Khrushchev who has turned it down flat. They should repeat that if the Russians will now, even at this late hour, accept the principle of international verification, negotiation becomes possible. If not, it cannot for the moment be fruitful. Therefore the tests must proceed.

/3/Reference is to the eight-nation memorandum on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (U.N. doc. ENDC/28) on April 16. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 334-336.

/4/For text of the statement by Acting Ethiopian Representative Petros Sahlu, who spoke on behalf of the eight delegations before the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on April 19, see ibid., pp. 394-395.23

One of my difficulties is that the House of Commons rises at 4 p.m. on April 19. My normal time for a statement would be at 12 noon that day. If this is the agreed line for Dean and Godber to take I could confine my statement to giving it to the House.

My reading of the situation is that the Russians are determined to have their own series of tests and are relying on yours as the excuse. Therefore I think it very unlikely that they will accept this principle which obviously must have the effect of, at any rate, postponing both your tests and theirs.

With warm regard,

Harold Macmillan/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

176. Editorial Note

Glenn Seaborg sent a letter to President Kennedy on April 12, 1962, requesting the President's approval of the proposed atmospheric testing program of 26 shots, plus 2 contingency shots. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing, 4/5/62-7/30/62) See the Supplement. The National Security Council met on April 18 from 12:15 to 12:45 p.m. in the Cabinet Room of the White House to review this proposal. A memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, April 18, presented the agenda for this NSC meeting and reviewed the issues for decision and the options available to the President. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 1962, No. 499)

Seaborg summarized the NSC meeting as follows:

"The President opened the meeting by asking Secretary McNamara to discuss the proposed Polaris and Atlas systems proof tests. The Secretary described the need for the Polaris test and the nature of the test, and said he recommended its inclusion. He said that the Atlas test presented some problems with respect to the possibilities of an abort and the effect that this would have on the public confidence in it as a system. He also said that there could be a small, but negligible, health hazard in connection with such a test. In view of this and other factors, he said that he would like more time to study the matter.

"Lemnitzer spoke in favor of the inclusion of both tests. He showed a number of charts which pictured the locale and described in some detail the nature of the Atlas and Polaris tests.

"I described briefly the safety considerations with respect to the Atlas test, indicating that it probably did not present a real health hazard but that there certainly were public relations problems involved.

"The President then asked me to discuss the proposed surface shot in Nevada. I said that this is a shot in which both DOD and AEC have an interest, that it is an effects test that has to be conducted in the atmosphere and has to be conducted over dry land because its aim is to meas-ure the effects of electromagnetic radiation on electronic instrumentation under possible operating conditions. I said that, in addition, the AEC has the aim of measuring the effect of weapons on weapon component parts.

"The President inquired as to the possibility of a photographer taking a photograph of a mushroom-like cloud and publishing it. He asked whether the cloud would be of that type. I said that it is difficult to describe it accurately in those terms; that some might call it a mushroom and others not. In answer to his further question, I said that it would rise to about 20,000 feet.

"Bundy and I indicated that there would have to be at least 24 hours' notice to the airlines and, hence, it would become publicly known so that possibly photographs could be taken. The President indicated that the shot should be placed at the end of the series, in view of these complicating factors.

"There was then a discussion of the starting date and proposed timing of the announcement. Foster felt that the starting date should not be next Monday (April 23rd) because this is the day of reconvening the group in Geneva, and it seems that Tuesday or Wednesday would, therefore, be indicated.

"Rusk suggested, and the President concurred, that the announcement should be by the AEC, and just at the time, without much lead time. I indicated that a definite time has to be set pretty soon, and Haworth added that 5 days lead time is needed, to which the President replied that we will be given a starting date with that much lead time." (Seaborg, Journal, volume 3, pages 421, 425)

NSC Action No. 2450, April 18, recorded the following decisions reached at this meeting;

"a. Discussed the spring 1962 nuclear atmospheric test series proposed by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission.

"b. Noted the President's approval of the tests in the attached list with the exception of the Atlas D (MK-49) weapons system test, which is not to be fired pending further study in the Department of Defense.

"c. Noted the President's desire that the 2 KT surface test in Nevada be fired toward the end of the test series.

"d. Discussed the timing and announcement of the test series and agreed that announcements of tests would be made in the lowest possible key by the Atomic Energy Commission."

The attachment cited in paragraph b listed 26 tests plus 2 contingency tests. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

In a memorandum for the record of the White House staff meeting on April 19, Colonel Ewell noted:

"i. Bundy laughingly referred to the NSC meeting, and said that it was rather pro forma, that the actual decision had been made five minutes before the meeting in a talk between the President and Mr. McNamara. The meeting itself just went through a ritual discussion of the problem, and I gather that the President made the decision that had already been agreed on. Bundy also said that Secretary Rusk expressed dismay at discussing such a sensitive subject in front of 30 or 40 people. Evidently Ambassador Stevenson had felt that this meeting would afford him a vehicle in which to sound off at length about atmospheric testing, and when it was cut off rather short Bromley Smith was left holding the sack of placating Ambassador Stevenson. This brings to mind the increasing tendency of late to obtain early decisions in the back rooms and corridors of the White House rather than on the floor in formal debate." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62)

The nuclear test series, called Dominic I, consisted of 36 detonations held in the Pacific Ocean area from April 25 to November 3, 1962. The first 27 were held in the vicinity of Christmas Island in the spring and summer. The remaining nine tests were conducted in the Johnston Island area during the fall. (Regarding the last nine shots, see Document 218.) These tests complemented other nuclear test shots, which had been resumed in the continental United States in September 1961. President Kennedy approved additional nuclear tests in the Pacific Ocean area and Nevada on May 8 (memorandum of decision, May 9; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 4/5/62-7/30/62) and June 20 (see Document 189).

On May 10, President Kennedy requested Prime Minister Macmillan's approval of two of the proposed tests in the Christmas Island area (memorandum from Bundy to Ormsby Gore, May 10; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 5/62), and Ambassador Ormsby Gore conveyed the Prime Minister's oral approval to Bundy on May 16. (Memorandum for the record, May 18; ibid., Additional Tests, 5/62) Bundy requested the Prime Minister's assent for another Christmas Island air drop shot on July 7. (Letter from Bundy to Ormsby Gore, July 2; ibid., 5/6-7/30/62) The British response has not been found, but presumably approval was given because the shot took place on July 11.

President Kennedy was also sensitive to world reactions to the U.S. test series. On June 13, for example, "The President urged Mr. Bundy to see what he could do about getting the nuclear tests outside the atmosphere speeded up and accomplished as fast as possible. He feels that there is too long a delay." (Memorandum for the record by Clifton, June 13; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, Dominic, 2/62-4/62) In a telephone call to Seaborg a day later to put a hold on an above-surface Nevada shot scheduled for June 26, Bundy remarked that "the President would like to have the other high altitude shots over with as soon as possible." (Seaborg, Journal, volume 3, page 605) And shortly before the June 20 meeting, "Bundy observed that the President is quite keen to end the series and would probably resist stretching it in order to get another high altitude shot." He added that "everyone but the President seemed to feel that radiation in milk was no real problem. However, the President, like Lincoln, constituted a majority of one in this case." (Memorandum for the record by Ewell, June 20; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings, May-Sep 62)

Most of the shots were airdrops, but two were conducted in the open ocean and five were high-altitude bursts launched by rockets. A history of the Pacific series, with emphasis on the participation of Department of Defense personnel, is Operation Dominic I--1962, DNA-6040F (Defense Nuclear Agency, 1983). The dates, location, type, purpose, and yield range of each shot are summarized in Announced United States Nuclear Tests, June 1945 Through December 1990, DOE/NV-209 (Rev. 11) (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office).

The Soviet Union resumed atmospheric nuclear testing in early August 1962.

177. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)/1/

Washington, April 23, 1962, 2 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/4-2362. Secret. Drafted by Secretary Rusk.

During my conversation with Mr. Dobrynin today we had a few words about nuclear testing. I pointed out to him that the President had more than once said that his principal disappointment since assuming office was the failure of the three governments concerned to reach a mutually acceptable agreement to ban nuclear tests. I pointed out that we had made strenuous efforts, beginning in March 1961, to meet what we understood to be the Soviet position and had continued these efforts at the present Geneva Conference. I pointed, as examples, to our proposals to eliminate the threshold and to ban tests in all environments (without an increase in inspection arrangements), and to locate control posts in the Soviet Union in direct relationship to seismicity. I outlined to him the principal points in my Geneva talk which led us to conclude that espionage could not be a serious question./2/

/2/In his statement to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on March 23, Secretary Rusk disputed the Soviet complaint that the test ban control system "would facilitate Western espionage against the Soviet Union." For text of his statement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 167-176.

I added that it now appears that we shall have to resume tests and, from what has been said in Moscow, we would assume that the Soviets will also test again. I said that it was a continuing policy of the United States to bring about a complete and permanent end of all testing on the basis of an agreement which would give reasonable assurance to the signatories that the agreement was being lived up to. I thought it important for our two governments to remain in contact with each other on this matter and to make every effort to bring to an end the kind of nuclear race in which we are now engaged.

He said he was concerned that the resumption of tests by the United States would lead to a worsening of relations between our two governments. He used the familiar arguments about the numbers of tests conducted by the West and by the Soviet Union and said he did not understand why we had not accepted the statement of the eight powers in Geneva as a basis for further discussion./3/ After a brief discussion of well known positions of both sides this portion of the conversation ended without a defined conclusion.

DR/4/

/3/See footnote 3, Document 175. For text of the U.S. paper submitted in response on April 17 (U.N. doc. ENDC/29), see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 336-338.

/4/Rusk's initials appear in an unidentified hand, indicating Rusk signed the original.

178. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, April 27, 1962.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/4-2762. Secret. Drafted by Kohler and approved in S on May 11.

SUBJECT
Nuclear Testing

PARTICIPANTS
Anatoli Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR
Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy

The Secretary
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary

The Secretary reviewed the vital interests of the West in the Berlin situation: the presence of our forces and of access to West Berlin and the freedom of West Berlin to have whatever arrangements with others which were important to its continued free life and viability./2/ These were the more immediate questions and then there were broader ones. He referred to Gromyko's comment on the fact that there is some interdependence between progress on disarmament and progress on Berlin. In this connection he wanted Mr. Dobrynin to know that the United States was very serious in its approach to the disarmament question; this was equally true as regards nuclear testing and the United States would be happy to sign a satisfactory agreement on this subject, for example, this afternoon. Other broader questions about which he had talked with Mr. Gromyko in Geneva included the questions of diffusion of nuclear weapons, of boundaries and of non-aggression. The American side had repeatedly said that if the question of the vital interests could be disposed of, we considered that the others would easily fall into place. He observed, however, that Mr. Gromyko had repeated a demand for an end to the Occupation as an essential condition and if this were so, then Mr. Gromyko's reference to obstacles in the way of an agreement was an understatement. On the question of access, both sides had put up proposals for an International Access Authority. Perhaps some progress could be made if these were discussed on the basis of the essential needs on both sides. He pointed out that the United States had tried to take into account the fact that the USSR had put forward over several years public positions with respect to Germany and Berlin. He pointed out that the United States had also made proposals. It was clear that these proposals on both sides were unacceptable and he had discussed with Mr. Gromyko in Geneva the question of how we manage a state of disagreement. This was why the United States had put forward its working paper on "Draft Principles" which had deliberately omitted certain points of interest to both sides but provided a means for continuing to try to talk out these disagreed matters./3/ The Secretary said frankly he did not see how we could be expected to go much further without knowing where we stand on the central issues. As he had told Mr. Gromyko, the matter of diffusion of nuclear weapons was a US national policy which we applied even to our own allies, with the single exception of the UK which had been an original partner with us in atomic development. In general, therefore, we found ourselves in a situation where the broader range of questions was subject to some movement and improvement. This brought us down to essential elements which were really, in the case of Berlin, the matter of our presence there and, in the case of disarmament, the question of verification. These were the keys which would unlock a whole series of possibilities. For the moment he would leave aside the disarmament aspect. He could, of course, repeat all that we had said in many conversations about our presence in West Berlin, but the Ambassador already knew our position. After the Ambassador confirmed that he did, the Secretary commented that since Mr. Dobrynin was a new participant in these talks perhaps he could bring some fresh air into them. Laughing, Mr. Dobrynin observed that he had his instructions. He then went on to say that he understood the Secretary was not directly linking the problems of Berlin and of disarmament. The Secretary confirmed this was the case and Dobrynin said that similarly the USSR was not linking the two. He said he thought the relationship between them had been made very clear in Mr. Khrushchev's statement. The Secretary agreed that this was essentially our own interpretation.

/2/A 7-page memorandum of the conversation on Berlin is ibid., 762.00/4-2762. A telegraphic summary is printed in vol. XV, pp. 121-122.

/3/Reference is to a paper handed to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at Geneva on March 22; for text, see ibid., pp. 69-71.

The Secretary said he wanted to call Ambassador Dobrynin's attention to his statement at his press conference yesterday/4/ and to Ambassador Dean's statement in Geneva on nuclear testing./5/ He hoped that the Soviet side understood that this question is discussable every day and not just after the completion of the present series of United States tests. There must be some point at which the two sides could agree to acceptable terms on nuclear testing since he could see no interest to either of them in spending billions in a continuing nuclear race.

/4/For extracts of Rusk's remarks, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 462-464.

/5/In his statement to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on April 26, Dean explained the U.S. reasons for resuming nuclear testing in the atmosphere. For text, see ibid., pp. 456-457.

Ambassador Dobrynin said that the question was on what basis agreement could be reached. He referred to the Secretary's statement in reply to a question at his press conference about the possibility of an agreement to stop atmospheric testing. He said that the press had discussed this possibility and he had been asked to clarify whether this meant that the United States is disposed to conclude such an agreement limited to atmospheric tests.

The Secretary replied in the negative. He said that in replying to this question he had just not wanted to foreclose the possibility of future developments and to emphasize the importance that we should continue talking on this subject. For example, he said, Mr. Gromyko had told him that the Soviet scientists have improved the instrumentation capable of distinguishing between an underground explosion and an earthquake. Perhaps the Soviet scientists had something that we did not have and maybe it would be a good idea if our scientists could be brought together with them in this connection.

Ambassador Dobrynin said that he understood the Secretary's position. He had simply wanted to clarify the matter. As he understood it, both sides are ready today only to sign their own treaty proposals.

After indicating his acceptance of the Ambassador's formulation the Secretary said he wanted to add that we could not accept the Soviet charge that the minimal amount of verification in the US proposals amounted to "espionage." However, he concluded, if we continue talking all aspects of the matter can be further discussed.

179. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, April 28, 1962, 11 a.m.-12:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/4-2862. Secret. Drafted by Burdett (EUR) and approved by the White House on May 4. The meeting was held at the White House. Reference to "the afternoon meeting" in the penultimate paragraph indicates that the discussion of nuclear testing resumed in the afternoon. Macmillan visited Washington April 27-29 to discuss questions of common concern with President Kennedy.

Prime Minister Macmillan's Visit to Washington, April 27-29

SUBJECT
Nuclear Testing

PARTICIPANTS

US
The President
The Secretary
Under Secretary Ball
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. McGeorge Bundy, White House
Mr. Pierre Salinger, White House
Mr. William R. Tyler, Acting Assistant Secretary of State
Mr. William C. Burdett, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Mr. Joseph Sweeney, BNA

British
Prime Minister Macmillan
Sir Norman Brook, Secretary to the Cabinet
Ambassador Ormsby Gore
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, Deputy Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office
Mr. Harold Evans, Public Relations Adviser
Mr. M.A.M. Robb, Information Minister, British Embassy
Mr. John Thompson, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Philip de Zulueta, Private Secretary to Prime Minister

The President said he would like to review what the Prime Minister and he had discussed about nuclear testing. We should wait until after our tests which would take three or four months and the Soviet tests which we expected to follow. Then we should consider after analyzing the results whether we should make another offer limited to tests in the atmosphere or consisting of an entire treaty. We should be considering now what should be done. We would have to take into account pressures in our two countries and around the world.

The Prime Minister said he had been watching this matter for a long time. We are always on the point of agreement then, such is the ingenuity of our scientists, they think of something which makes agreement impossible. In fact we have steadily moved to less vigorous requirements. We always seem to miss the proper moment. We could have had an agreement some years back on what we are offering now. That is, assuming the Russians want an agreement. Years ago we never heard of underground testing. We ought to get our scientists together on this in the three or four months period available. They should work partly in light of world reactions and partly in the light of what might be acceptable to the Russians. A nuclear test agreement has its relations to the whole disarmament discussions. The Russians were saying that if we were prepared to disarm they would accept some control. We are only asking for an occasional team to look at some explosion.

The Prime Minister said that if we develop a new plan on nuclear testing we should present it directly to Khrushchev. We should not make it public. Doing so would only lead to propaganda. Ambassador Ormsby Gore thought that whatever offer is made on nuclear tests cannot be based on the 1958 treaty. Having turned it down completely all along the line, the Russians could not go back to the old treaty. We would have to say that our proposals were based on something new.

The President remarked that we could offer an atmospheric test ban. If we go further, however, we have to tread on old ground. Anyway we should have our scientists go to work.

Mr. Bundy commented on the importance of keeping the plan quiet. If the possibility of new proposals on tests was discussed in advance in this country it would be much more difficult to defend once it was presented. The President said he was sure we should not reveal that we were discussing another atmospheric test ban offer. After an analysis of the tests we may find that we cannot make one. The Secretary noted that our present offer involves only a farthing of inspection. If it is rejected by the Russians the prospects for general disarmament are most discouraging.

The Prime Minister pointed out that our position calls for episodic inspections or fixed controls. We have really exhausted all the arguments about the offer before we have even made it. Agreement will not come about as the result of a long elaborate process. We spend half our time defending offers before our own people. We did quite well at Geneva until right at the end. Then we did not do too well with the neutrals. The Secretary paid tribute to the way in which Lord Home had handled Gromyko at Geneva.

The Prime Minister recalled that when he sat down with Khrushchev he said to him that we might have three or four inspections or some agreed number. Khrushchev accepted. The Prime Minister had gotten into trouble with President Eisenhower over this suggestion. Khrushchev had tried to hold him to it. The point was that a formal, elaborate approach gets us into trouble.

The Prime Minister raised again the subject of nuclear tests in the afternoon meeting. He said he understood there had been one or two changes with respect to the systems tests. The President replied that the Atlas test had been cancelled. We were still thinking of carrying out the other systems tests. Mr. Bundy said that the other changes were marginal and technical in nature.

The Prime Minister explained that he wanted to be able to say that the President and he had worked out the question of tests together, that any changes were made together. Mr. Bundy said that the number of tests remained the same.

180. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, April 28, 1962, 11 a.m.-12:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/4-2862. Secret. Drafted by Burdett (EUR) and approved by the White House on May 4. The meeting was held at the White House.

Prime Minister Macmillan's Visit to Washington, April 27-29

SUBJECT
The Future of Disarmament Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS
[Here follows the same list as Document 179.]

The President noted that the Prime Minister and he had not discussed the future of disarmament negotiations. He understood that the talks at Geneva would continue until June. The Secretary said he anticipated only an interim report by June 1. We hoped to work out agreement on something. The disarmament conference, however, should stay in session. We might get a break-through on the point of inspection. The President said that was right. We should keep at it. He recommended continuing the conference beyond June 1. The Prime Minister asked whether we regarded the conference as a propaganda exercise or a real exercise. The Secretary replied that at the moment the Soviets were playing it as a propaganda exercise. It was important that we put forward only those proposals we believed in. The Russians talked of inspection of disarmament only, yet in the nuclear test field they refused to agree to inspection of a cessation of tests.

181. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, May 10, 1962.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/5-1062. Secret. Attached to the source text is a May 11 note from Stevenson to Secretary Rusk, indicating that the enclosed is "a copy of a letter I delivered to the President today."

Dear Mr. President: I believe the moment is approaching for us to make a new proposal for a test ban treaty which will stand a better chance of acceptance than anything we have yet put forward.

Such a proposal may offer the only method of preventing a non-stop series of competitive nuclear tests in the atmosphere. I have little doubt that if, as we expect, the Russian test in the near future, there will be strong pressure for a "follow on" series of American tests in 1963, to which the Russians will again respond. I do not believe we stand to benefit in the long run, either technically or politically, from unrestricted atmospheric testing. It is bound to result in a rising tide of protest all over the world.

I therefore recommend, along lines I proposed before we resumed atmospheric testing, that at the first useful opportunity we offer the Russians a test ban treaty providing for detection and location of nuclear explosions through existing systems, with a right to a limited number of on-site inspections for suspicious underground events. If accepted, such a treaty would stop atmospheric testing and provide some deterrent even to clandestine underground testing. Since underground tests now seem to be of only minor importance for security purposes, we should today be able to accept less stringent controls for underground shots than we have previously demanded.

I believe we should make this proposal at the first useful opportunity, certainly well before the beginning of the September 1962 General Assembly session. If the Russians refuse to agree to any on-site inspection by outside authorities--as they do today--we should then be prepared to offer a simple atmospheric test ban treaty without international controls.

An initiative of this kind is required not only to stop atmospheric tests, but also because we have not persuaded third parties that we really need the volume of international control on which we have been insisting for a test ban covering the most significant tests--namely, atmospheric and large underground explosions. It would be a pity if we were forced by outside pressures grudgingly to accept a stripped-down treaty after long resistance. Instead, we have an opportunity here to exercise real leadership, if we move in the right direction in time. And if our efforts should fail, there would be no question where the responsibility for continuing nuclear competition rested.

Turning to disarmament, I observe that after the opening flurry and the debate on testing, the Geneva Conference has tended to bog down. To maintain hopes for progress, and to demonstrate our continued interest in helpful initial steps, I suggest that:

a. We continue to press for Soviet agreement to take up the question of measures to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack. It seems to me that this is the most timely possible initial step, and we ought to push the Russians unmercifully on it.

b. We should accept the Russian proposal to start talking about measures to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons. Of course we may have to tangle with them on the precise terms of an agreement on this subject. We favor the "Irish resolution" formula, which would prohibit transfer to states but permit us to carry on with NATO-type arrangements for multilateral control of nuclear weapons;/2/ the Soviets may press for "Swedish resolution" arrangements precluding this type of transfer as well./3/ But I think we can be perfectly straightforward in justifying our position, and that we can gain considerable support for it. I believe it is in both the Russian interest and our own to prevent China and Germany from acquiring an independent nuclear capability. I am not aware that we have carefully explored the possibilities of using this factor to reach agreement with the Russians on the no-transfer problem.

/2/Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1665 (XVI), unanimously approved by the General Assembly on December 4, 1961; for text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 694.

/3/Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1664 (XVI), passed by the General Assembly on December 4, 1961; for text, see ibid., p. 693. See also Document 97.

c. I suggest a further look at the idea of agreeing to the establishment of denuclearized zones. I believe we should be able to distinguish between areas where nuclear defense is critically important to us and areas where it is not. We suffered badly in the General Assembly last Fall through our inability to agree to a resolution proposing a denuclearized zone in Africa. If the African states want one--and this is not entirely clear as regards all of them--I do not see why we should not support their wishes. The same is true of Latin America. We could logically demand inspection provisions to ensure compliance.

d. I believe we should make a specific proposal, apart from a full disarmament treaty, for an inspected agreement to bar weapons of mass destruction from orbit. This would involve inspection to ensure that no weapons of mass destruction were included in vehicles launched into orbit. There may be some risk in permitting international inspection of our launchings, but I should think, first, that inspection limited to this single purpose would not have to compromise most other classified information on vehicles, equipment, propellents, etc., and second, that we would gain at least as much from participating in inspection of the Russians as they would from inspection of our launchings. In any event, given the present Soviet phobia on inspection, I think we could get the advantage of a "no bombs in orbit" proposal without much probability that the Russians would ever agree--though if they did I think we would still be the gainers.

Finally, as regards the peaceful uses of outer space, I am happy to note that my earlier concern about our failure to report to the U.N. on short-term orbiting vehicles has now been largely dissipated. Beginning with our next report to the U.N. I understand we shall list in our reports vehicles which were launched and have decayed between successive reporting dates. This will include all of our reconnaissance satellites to date. We may be criticized because we shall not report the orbital characteristics of such vehicles. I believe we could do so in general terms without sacrificing any vital security interest. But at least our current position is a great advance over the situation which has hitherto existed.

Sincerely yours,

Adlai E. Stevenson/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

182. Memorandum of Meeting/1/

Washington, May 14, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Current, 5/62-8/62. Secret. Drafted by Kaysen. In a May 14 note to Bundy, attached to another copy of the memorandum, Kaysen wrote: "As you can see from the attached, Dean did nearly all the talking. I don't know whether the record makes clear the only impression I got from the thing: Dean's confidence that he is doing a great job is unlimited. The President was not very much interested and had relatively little to say. He expressed no opinion on any of the specific questions that Dean raised. (p. 2) Foster's purpose, I think, was to get Presidential support to deny all these requests. At the moment none of them is pressing although I think we will require some give in our position on the first three in order to continue the discussions." (Ibid., Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, 18-Nation Conference, Geneva, 5-6/62)

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT ON THE PROGRESS OF THE DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

Ambassador Dean and Mr. Foster called on the President to report on the progress of the disarmament negotiations at 10:00 A.M., Monday, May 14, 1962. Ambassador Dean gave his judgment that we are making good progress in Geneva. The eight neutrals are generally well disposed toward us, and we have convinced them that we have a serious commitment to disarmament. Our draft treaty has generally been very well received. The Indians are an exception: Lall/2/ has been undercutting us in every way possible. In response to the President's question as to whether Lall was a fellow traveler, Mr. Foster expressed the view that he was a Communist. Ambassador Dean indicated that he and Zorin had managed to hold their meetings as co-chairmen in a quiet, business-like and non-polemical key. On the time schedule, he indicated that we now plan to work on in Geneva until the 15th of Aug. and adjourn until the end of September, having overcome Soviet opposition to continuing the session.

/2/ Arthur S. Lall, Indian Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.

Ambassador Dean answered the President's question as to whether the delegates viewed disarmament as a real possibility, in the affirmative. He indicated his own reasons for thinking that the U.S. had to consider this as a real possibility in terms of the mounting costs of armaments. Zorin, on the other hand, clearly viewed the Geneva conference as merely an occasion for propaganda. It was Zorin's basic view that the West could not accept disarmament, because the Communists would succeed in their "wars of liberation" once we were disarmed. However, Ambassador Dean stated that in his judgment, the problems of cost and fear of falling behind the United States in the arms race would have an effect on Soviet thinking.

Ambassador Dean raised several problems he now has with our draft treaty outline in terms of certain repeated criticism from the neutrals:

1. Reductions by type and production by category in the first stage leaves open the possibility of a large change in the composition of weapons in favor of newer types.

2. Lack of a definite time limit in the third stage and thus lack of a time period for the achievement of General and Complete Disarmament. Mr. Foster commented on Senatorial opposition to a definite time limit.

3. Provision for a veto on transitions between stages by permanent members of the Security Council. Ambassador Dean suggested that a specification of conditions which must be met before transition could take place would be a desirable substitute for a veto.

4. The inability to discuss non-transfer of nuclear weapons. The Soviets were pressing hard on this issue, and the neutrals were much interested in it. The President indicated that he thought our present position on this matter was correct, and that we must save the issue for discussions in the Berlin context. Ambassador Dean indicated that he did not think the support for a denuclearized zone in Africa was strong. The Nigerians believed the South Africans would not accept it, and they certainly could not accept it if the South Africans did not.

The President commented that we could not discuss a denuclearized zone in Europe. Ambassador Dean indicated that he had received a personal letter from Segni,/3/ requesting that this matter not be brought up because if it were the Italian delegation would have to support it in order to maintain the support of the Socialists for the government.

/3/Antonio Segni, President of Italy.

Ambassador Stevenson's letter to the President of May 10/4/ was discussed. Ambassador Dean and Mr. Foster explained that we were already pressing points a. through d. of that letter. The question of a new test ban treaty was raised. It was agreed that now is not the time for a new offer. We should be prepared, however, to make a new offer after the Soviets tested. Mr. Foster indicated that he was examining with the interested agencies the possibilities of an atmospheric test ban treaty. The question of whether an atmospheric treaty was better than one which extended to other environments but with a less rigorous control system was raised, but left open. Mr. Foster undertook to prepare a response to Stevenson's letter.

/4/Document 181.

Mr. Foster indicated that the Business Council had received him cordially and supported the Administration's effort with respect to disarmament.

183. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, [date not declassified].

[Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171, May-June 1962. Top Secret; Restricted Data. Extract--6 pages of source text and the document number not declassified.]

184. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State/1/

Geneva, May 16, 1962, 10 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/5-1662. Confidential.

Disto 414. In course of continuing consideration of possible future policies on nuclear test ban question believe Dept should bear in mind effect of current situation in test ban discussions here, both on any new policy decisions and on method of their presentation.

For four weeks now since presentation 8-power memo/2/ USDel has addressed all statements on test ban in plenary and subcommittee primarily to that memo. We have of course been careful neither to abandon any portion of present US position on test ban nor to give appearance acceptance any suggestions in 8-power memo inconsistent with that position.

/2/See footnote 3, Document 175.

To do this we have carefully hedged all discussions of memo by putting them in guise of mere tentative explorations thereof. Nevertheless, we have drawn up long list of factors involved in test ban negotiations on which we have sought exchange of views as to how they would be handled under 8-nation plan.

By this tactic, we have been enabled meet Soviet move of claiming to accept memo as basis of negotiations, by creating impression that we too are seriously exploring its potentialities. We have taken line that Soviet acceptance is illusory because USSR only accepts its interpretation of memo and that this interpretation is almost same as Soviet position of Nov 28, 1961. Thus, we have made it appear that real issue is one of whose interpretation of terms of memo is correct, and co-sponsors have been deterred from involving themselves in this direct East-West quarrel by offering definitive interpretation of their own document.

This approach will continue to work as long as SovDel maintains current rigidity and insists that US commit itself to idea of "invitational inspection" (which we say is incorrect interpretation of memo) before SovDel will talk about working out any other details of treaty following 8-nation plan (such as inventory of national stations, composition of international scientific commission, etc.). However, if SovDel should begin to move from this, and, particularly, if SovDel should produce draft treaty allegedly implementing joint memo, we would be in difficult position which would require further instructions.

It would seem desirable to have foregoing tactical situation in mind in consideration of any new US moves. Whatever we may do, it should be, we believe, at least superficially, related to 8-nation proposals and related to recent conference discussions of test ban issue. Would also be useful for some official statements from Washington in near future to refer to joint memo, as indication of serious consideration which it is getting within US Govt.

185. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

JCSM-389-62

Washington, May 19, 1962.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Gen. 388.3, Jan-July 62. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Request for Comments on Aspects of the US Draft Disarmament Treaty Outline Tabled at Geneva on 18 April 1962 (U)

1. This memorandum is in response to memorandum I-4487/62, dated 17 April 1962, and I-5522/62, dated 8 May 1962, from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA),/2/ which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on seven issues relating to the draft treaty outline on disarmament. These views, along with comments on other related aspects, have now been formulated with one broad criterion in mind: What effect the measure, if implemented, would have on US National Security.

/2/Neither found.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that disarmament without full verification of retained armament would jeopardize our national security. They believe that verification can only be achieved by unhampered inspection. The fact that such inspection is anathema to the Soviets and will render negotiations more difficult does not warrant concession to a point that places the safety of the United States and of the West in question. There is no evidence that the zonal inspection system as presently conceived will fulfill security requirements. However, if this zonal system is so designed as to permit rapid and unimpeded inspection of any zone by a well trained inspection team which is fully loyal to the side desiring this inspection, the zonal system might be capable of insuring positive verification.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that since late 1961 there has been continuing pressure to negotiate the reduction of the US nuclear capability in isolation of other proposed disarmament measures. Success in this effort would seriously reduce the major military advantage we now enjoy and drastically alter our military posture. Further there is danger of US positions being weakened by proposals which have been submitted in attempts to make them more "negotiable" by approaching the Soviet positions (see Appendices D through I)./3/ Despite Presidential approval that reductions would be made on an across-the-board basis, there still appears to exist a continuing effort to single out the US nuclear capability for reduction in isolation. Dispatches from Geneva reveal that discussions now are centering on reduction of the nuclear "threat". Rather, the initial phase of a disarmament agreement should be regarded as an evaluation period in which the Soviets must conclusively demonstrate good faith prior to continuance by the United States. The degree of good faith demonstrated will determine the rapidity with which continued disarmament steps can be safely taken. Measures included in the latter part of Stage I or beyond should be contingent on this demonstration of good faith and a concomitant reduction of international tensions.

/3/None of the attached appendices, A-I, totaling 28 pages, is printed.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have grave misgivings as to the proposal that verification in reduction in armaments would be accomplished by the International Disarmament Organization. Our experience with the complete inability of international control organizations to function in Korea, Vietnam and in Laos raises questions regarding the effectiveness of such an organization.

5. It is recommended that the appended views on the seven issues contained in the memoranda from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) and two additional issues be used as bases for DOD positions relating to the draft treaty outline.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer/4/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.

186. Letter From President Kennedy to the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson)/1/

Washington, May 23, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, 18-Nation Conference, Geneva, 5-6/62. Secret. Regarding the drafting of this letter, see Document 182. A draft of this letter was prepared in ACDA, concurred in by Harlan Cleveland and Ambassador Dean, and transmitted under cover of a May 15 memorandum from Foster to Secretary Rusk for the Secretary's approval. The Secretary's initials indicating his approval appear on the memorandum. Also attached to this draft is a May 21 memorandum from William H. Brubeck (S/S) to McGeorge Bundy, indicating that the draft response, "which has the approval of the Secretary, Mr. Foster, and Mr. Cleveland, may be of use to the President in responding to the Ambassador." (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5-2462) The first, fourth, and fifth paragraphs of the text printed here are identical to the draft, but some minor differences appear in the second and third paragraphs. In a letter to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., May 15, in which he enclosed a copy of Stevenson's May 10 letter, Kaysen wrote that he would probably answer the letter. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Current, 5/62-8/62) No further documentation on the White House role in preparing this reply has been found.

Dear Adlai: Thank you for your thoughtful letter of May 10 on disarmament and nuclear testing./2/ I found it most helpful and pertinent.

/2/Document 181.

I agree that the time may be approaching when we should make a new test ban proposal, and the alternatives you suggested are being examined by the appropriate people. I share your feelings about the consequences of round after round of tests, first by the Soviets and then by us. However, at the moment, I am reserving judgment as to what the timing of this initiative should be. There is every indication that the Soviets are prepared to begin a new series of tests shortly. It seems to me that an initiative at this moment would be rejected by the Soviets as an attempt to prevent them from responding to our test series, and this might not be the case after they began to test.

Three of your proposals on desirable initial steps in the disarmament field are now being pressed by our delegation in Geneva. We are asking for discussion of measures to reduce the risk of war as the next item on the agenda of the Committee of the Whole. We also contemplate having a discussion in the Committee of the Whole of measures to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons. However, as you know, discussion of this item in Geneva is complicated by our feeling that it would be preferable to discuss the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, with respect to Europe, in the context of the negotiations on Berlin. I am sure you will share my view that the importance of exploring any useful avenue on the Berlin problem justifies our holding off in Geneva if we can.

With respect to denuclearized zones, our delegation understands that if the countries in a given geographic area desire to establish such a zone, the United States should respect their wishes.

The last item you mention, an agreement to bar weapons of mass destruction from orbit, is also a subject which our delegation in Geneva has suggested as appropriate for discussion in the Committee of the Whole. So far, the Soviet Union has refused to accept this idea, even for discussion.

While the prospects for early agreement in any of these areas are not encouraging, I entirely agree that we must continue to do what we can to change the Soviet attitude towards these problems.

Sincerely yours,

John F. Kennedy

187. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, May 30, 1962, 10 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.6112/5-3062. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on May 31. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

SUBJECT
Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS
Anatoli Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR
Georgi M. Kornienko, Counsellor of Soviet Embassy

The Secretary
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary
Martin J. Hillenbrand, Director, Office of German Affairs

The Secretary said he would like to add some comments on one or two other problems affecting the general situation./2/ We did not fully understand why there seems to have been a tightening up of the situation. From our point of view, this seems to have been coming from the East, not from the attitudes or hopes of the West in these matters. Organically, there was no connection between Berlin and disarmament negotiations, but in the broadest political sense it was inevitable that these matters should influence each other. A crisis over Berlin would obviously have the gravest implications for disarmament. If there were movement on the one, there could be movement on the other in the sense that there would be mutual reinforcement for the effort to bring about normalization and reduction of tensions.

/2/A memorandum of the Secretary's conversation with Dobrynin on Germany and Berlin on this occasion is printed in vol. XV, pp. 161-172. A memorandum of their conversation on Laos is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks, Vol. I.

We have made, the Secretary continued, what we consider important disarmament proposals. The Soviets have also made certain proposals. These present many points of difference but they also contain some important points of agreement. We would hope that we could move towards actual disarmament. It was not clear how the Soviet Government planned to proceed in this matter if its idea was all or nothing. We still have the problem of how we move from where we are to general and complete disarmament. This was a highly complex question involving the factor of safety for both sides.

At a later point in the conversation, Dobrynin stated that his Government likewise felt the seriousness of developments in other areas. The Secretary was aware of how the disarmament situation stood. The two countries agreed on one thing, namely that the security of both countries had to be respected. The basic concept was that when the first stage of disarmament had been completed, there would be no relationship of advantage or disadvantage and both sides would have the same amount of security. He could agree that there was no direct connection between disarmament and the Berlin problem, but that they were related. The settlement of the Berlin question would obviously have an effect on disarmament in the situation. If the Secretary wished to discuss any matters arising out of the Zorin-Dean talks, or if the Secretary had any concrete proposals how these matters could be handled better, he would be prepared to engage in such discussions.

188. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, May 31, 1962.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5-3162. Secret. Drafted by Gathright and approved in S on June 8.

SUBJECT
Meeting of Committee of Principals, May 31, 1962

PARTICIPANTS
See attached list/2/

/2/The list of 20 participants is not printed.

The Secretary asked Mr. Foster to outline the issues before the Committee.

Mr. Foster noted that seven issues were being presented to the Committee for decision and two additional issues for discussion. He regarded the most important issues for decision as those concerned with the possibility of reducing military bases in Stage I; the question of a criterion for measuring "destructive capability" and application of the criterion to additional categories of armaments; and the problem of relating retained armaments to agreed force levels. Remaining matters for decision were concerned with the initiation of certain studies.

The Committee then turned to the discussion of specific issues.

1. Military Bases.

In response to a question by the Secretary regarding the extent of discussion of the bases problem at Geneva, Mr. Foster stated that this question had been discussed as much as any other single issue. As in past disarmament discussions, the Soviet Union has maintained that it is surrounded by U.S. "foreign" bases. The issue is particularly acute in present negotiations since, in view of our proposed 30 percent reduction of armaments and substantial reduction of armed forces, we probably would not need all bases. In view of other Stage I reductions, the non-aligned countries believe that bases should also be reduced. The ACDA recommendation is designed to blunt the Soviet attack on foreign bases by continuing our present position that no distinction can be made between foreign and domestic bases but opening the possibility of some reduction in bases both by the United States and the Soviet Union in Stage I. The Delegation believes it can defend this position.

The Secretary recalled that our foreign bases came into existence because of post-war Soviet pressures. These pressures produced not only bases but military alliances as well. If we placed ourselves in a situation where we could not bring support to our allies, we would confer military advantage on the Soviet Union. We have to maintain our capability to project our forces to the Eurasian land mass. A particular base may be regarded as crucial by certain allies. Therefore, it is difficult to discuss bases in general, and we will need to examine the problem in terms of specific bases.

The Secretary thought, however, that there were certain things that might be said about bases during the negotiations. We could call attention to the fact that we are in the process of eliminating some bases. Morocco and Dhahran, or other examples, might be cited, as appropriate. Moreover, some discussion of bases will be necessary in connection with surprise attack measures. But before we could agree to a formula for reduction of bases in general, we will have to look at bases one by one. Unless we can find some we would be willing to give up, we cannot agree to a reduction.

Mr. McNamara agreed that it would be all right to discuss actions we were already taking to reduce bases. However, he was reluctant to encourage discussion of the possibility of reducing bases in Stage I. He believed that the matter should be studied in relation to conditions that would exist in Stage I. What we might require in the way of bases may not vary directly with reductions of armaments and armed forces. For example, we might want even more dispersion of nuclear delivery vehicles, and our capability to project our forces might require a shifting rather than a reduction of bases. Moreover, there are problems of definition. We have some 6,700 installations we call "bases", 4,500 in the United States and 3,300 abroad. These range from listening posts to elaborate installations for B-47's.

The Secretary asked whether there should not be a cut-off point for the study of bases and suggested use of a restrictive definition which would limit the study to consideration of bases where combat forces are located.

Mr. Foster thought that the present study could be limited in this manner. With respect to the broader issue, he said that although he agreed with much that the Secretary and Mr. McNamara had said, he thought that as we built more hardened missile sites and Polaris submarines, we would probably reduce bases, such as those for B-47's. We ought to take advantage of this circumstance in the negotiations. He believed we could protect essential bases better by considering all bases together rather than by allowing the Soviet Union to single out foreign bases.

The Secretary expressed the view that if we could reach agreement on an otherwise satisfactory Stage I, we might consider a Stage I reduction of bases. But with the Soviet Union taking a rigid attitude on inspection and other issues, there did not seem to be much point in going through the agony of trying to reach agreement on bases. There are so many obstacles in the way of agreement, we ought to get some of the others out of the way first. He called attention to the Soviet Union's reversal of its decision on the proposed declaration on war propaganda/3/ and said that he considered this move interesting as an indication of Soviet tightening up of its relations with the Free World. He was inclined to place some stock in the report through the Polish representatives in Geneva that the Central Committee had overruled Gromyko in this matter in order not to show concessions to the United States at this time. He thought that we would see more pressure in other areas (Berlin and Southeast Asia) as well as in disarmament.

/3/Reference is to a proposed declaration against war propaganda, approved by the Committee of the Whole of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on May 25, which the Soviets refused to approve without several changes. For text of the declaration and statements on the issue by the Soviet, British, and U.S. representatives in Geneva, all on May 29, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 545-552.

Mr. Foster wondered whether we could not, as a matter of tactics, refer to the possibility of reduction of bases as needs change and offer the possibility that later in the negotiations we might consider doing something about bases in Stage I. Meanwhile, we should study the matter in detail.

Mr. Nitze thought there was a question as to what should be said before the study was completed.

The Secretary suggested that a page or two be prepared and cleared with the interested agencies.

Mr. McNamara agreed with the Secretary's suggestion that something be put down on paper. This might include reference to reductions already under way.

Mr. Kaysen questioned the tactics of trying to take credit for reductions already planned. He thought that if it had been concluded that we should for the present reaffirm our position, we should "take the heat" and inform ourselves by study. Calling attention to reductions already under way might simply reopen the issue.

Mr. Foster did not feel that it had been decided that we were precluded from discussing reduction of bases in Stage I if real progress were made in other areas.

The Secretary thought that bases were among the last items that should be discussed. We should see if what is agreed opens up possibilities for reducing bases. There may be some such possibilities.

Mr. McNamara agreed that there was no question that we would get rid of some bases.

The Secretary inquired whether we could get an urgent study of the bases problem. We should use a restrictive cut-off on the definition of bases and focus on installations where combat forces are located. He thought we should look at such bases from two standpoints: first, to see if even now there are some we plan to eliminate; and second, to determine the impact of other Stage I measures on the need for bases. In response to a question from General Smith regarding the status of NATO infrastructure bases, the Secretary stated that we would not necessarily call the presence of our forces on someone else's territory a determinant of a United States base.

Mr. McNamara agreed that a study of the problem should be undertaken.

2. Stage I Force Levels for the U.S. and USSR.

Mr. Foster noted that only a study had been recommended. ACDA felt that we didn't know enough about force levels of 2.1, 1.9, and 1.7 million to determine the acceptability of reductions below the proposal of 2.1 million level. We thought, however, that the 2.1 million level may have acquired a degree of undeserved sanctity. Although we were under pressure to accept a compromise at 1.9 million, we did not know whether a level of 1.9 million would enable us to meet essential requirements.

Mr. McNamara recalled that the Joint Chiefs had studied the force levels problem last summer and regarded their study as definitive./4/ Defense was prepared to study the matter further; however, they would like to take a somewhat different approach than that suggested in the ACDA memorandum. They would like to approach the problem from the standpoint of using their imagination to find ways of maintaining at the 1.9 and 1.7 million levels the same effective combat strength that would be available at the 2.1 million level. There might be ways of doing this.

/4/Not further identified.

The Secretary thought we would need very convincing reasons to support whatever level we decided to insist on. We ought to be able to distinguish clearly between levels of 2.1, 1.9, and 1.7 million in order not to go further down the slippery slope than we thought we should go. He recalled that he had been queried about this matter by certain of the Foreign Ministers in Geneva. He had offered two arguments in support of the 2.1 million level: first, we thought this figure could be accepted without the participation of Communist China; second, we thought this level would enable us to project our power to the Eurasian land mass if necessary. We will need to give as much content to our conclusions as we can.

Mr. McNamara considered it important to distinguish between two aspects of this matter: first, the implications of lower levels; second, the presentation of our conclusions. Defense was willing to study the matter.

3. Criterion for Destructive Capability and

4. Application of Destructive Capability to Other Categories.

Mr. Foster recalled that at a previous meeting with the President, ACDA had suggested that the full loaded weight of delivery vehicles seemed the simplest way to measure destructive capability./5/ The matter was not resolved at that time. Our further analysis had not turned up any simpler criterion. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom had raised the question of extending the criterion to categories which included smaller nuclear delivery vehicles. ACDA recommended the adoption of full loaded weight as the criterion for measuring destructive capability, the application of this criterion to categories 3 and 4 as well as to categories 1 and 2, and examination of the usefulness of this criterion in the case of other categories.

/5/See Document 174.

Mr. Fisher added that the destructive capability criterion had lost some of its criticality in view of the decision to propose reduction by types. However, it remained important in connection with production proposals.

Mr. McNamara stated that Defense had not found any more suitable index. Full loaded weight had some limitations. The Joint Chiefs were reluctant to accept it and suggested that the matter be studied by an international scientific commission at a later time. Mr. McNamara, however, thought there was a close enough correlation between full loaded weight and destructive capability to meet the objective he had had in mind when he had initially suggested the importance of a destructive capability criterion. He was satisfied that we could not find a better measure and thought it should be accepted. He agreed that the criterion should be applied to smaller nuclear delivery vehicles and that its application to other categories should be studied.

5. Stage I Production Limits.

Mr. Foster noted that ACDA recommended only a study. He recalled that in discussion of the matter with the President it had been suggested that production should not be over 5% annually. In order to explain what our production proposal means, it is important now to consider whether any changes should be made in the illustrative categories of armaments and what production limitation should be proposed for each category. Study of the matter should be based on two criteria: first, ensuring capability to resume production if a disarmament agreement were terminated; and second, ensuring the availability of replacements for weapons expended in test or training. Economic implications of production limits could be considered in the light of specific proposed limitations.

Mr. McNamara agreed that study of the matter was certainly warranted.

6. Relating Armaments to Regular Armed Forces.

Mr. Foster observed that this was a highly controversial issue. There was controversy within ACDA as well as between ACDA and other agencies. On balance, ACDA had decided to recommend an approach relating retained armaments to agreed force levels. The Soviet Union had raised the matter, and ACDA believed that on balance the recommended approach would be advantageous since it offered a means of cutting the Soviet preponderance of conventional armaments. Although the Soviet Union might seek parity in the strategic area, they were doing this anyway, and since we do not have strategic vehicles for reserve forces, the present recommendation would not directly affect our strategic weapons. Even recognizing that the recommendation might hit reserve naval forces and some air defense units, ACDA felt on balance that there would be net advantage in moving toward the Soviet proposal.

The Secretary recalled that he had felt we could go ahead under Stage I because our proposal would preserve our war-making capability to the extent that would be necessary without having achieved major transformations in the world political field. There is a critical dividing line at some point. When we move from Stage I to Stage II, we'll have to know a lot more about Soviet attitudes and about means of keeping the peace. Since we are prepared to undertake Stage I in a period of normal relations, the forces we retain will have to be fully effective. In Korea we were critically limited by the state of our reserve stocks. We should not permit that kind of situation. On the other hand, if you have adequate stocks for active forces, some of these stocks might be diverted to use by reserve forces. This posed something of a dilemma.

Mr. McNamara expressed his strong opposition to adoption of the recommendation at this time. He was willing to study the matter further and try to develop a formula although he doubted that this would be possible.

Mr. Foster maintained that the basic consideration involved is that we are trying to cut down the arms race. If we're going to keep such high levels of reserve stocks, we're not cutting down very much. Active armed forces should be fully equipped, but there are finite limits to this. It was Mr. Foster's understanding that the Soviet Union had small active units which are normally flattened out and then expanded. We ought to cut their ability to expand.

Mr. McNamara pointed out that we have 960,000 men in 16 divisions. The Soviet Union has 2 million men in 147 divisions. They would want to retain full armaments for divisions which are now staffed only with cadres. There would have to be complex adjustments and formulae to reach agreement.

Mr. Kaysen considered the principle of simplicity to be of importance. To implement the ACDA recommendation it would be necessary to get agreement on formulae; he found it hard to see how such matters could be settled as a workable item of agreement. He understood Mr. Foster's point of view that if it were possible to reach agreement on definitions, a major step forward could be taken. However, Mr. Kaysen thought the problem of definition was so difficult, that we wouldn't know what we were buying. If we can reduce along a fairly predictable path, we feel that our security can be protected. He recalled a statement by Mr. McNamara at a previous meeting that we would rather stick with what we know. The proposal to reduce reserve armaments invites a scramble, and the outcome of such a scramble would be uncertain in the absence of a hard and fast rule.

The Secretary believed that we have proposed in Stage I some important measures of disarmament, but retained forces must be combat capable. If we have too little back-up for our forces, we are actually reducing our effective forces below the agreed level.

General Decker thought this might result from the proposal.

Mr. Foster agreed that there had to be adequate back-up for our active forces.

Mr. McNamara thought it would be a serious error to advance the proposal but expressed willingness to study it further. He then departed.

Mr. Fisher pointed out that the proposal meant that armaments retained would be related to armed forces retained. Unless we can do something about Soviet superiority in conventional armaments, they could put a large force into the field more rapidly than we. Everyone had looked at what the proposal would do to us. We ought also to look at its effects on the Soviet Union. To a large extent the Soviet cadre system makes the 2.1 million level fictitious. We shouldn't negotiate ourselves into a position of continual inferiority in conventional armaments.

Mr. Foster noted that our present approach might actually encourage a build-up of reserves. The Secretary asked whether arrangements could be made to ensure that no one would use the 2.1 million level to flow through a large number of forces and build up reserves. Mr. Foster and Mr. Nitze agreed that it would be important to try to prevent this.

Mr. Kaysen commented that the theory behind our plan recognizes that we would have nuclear superiority and they would have conventional superiority. Mr. Keeny believed that if we proposed parity in conventional armaments we might have to discuss parity in nuclear armaments. Mr. Fisher thought we might have to do this in any case.

Without passing judgment on whether the proposal would be advantageous or disadvantageous, Mr. McNaughton thought it important to recognize that in effect the proposal would produce an entirely new plan. Our present approach is to freeze the existing situation and shrink it. The proposal would change the whole conventional side of our approach to an effort to active [achieve?] parity. Our present approach is to shrink all armaments 30 percent. The proposal means that conventional armaments would be reduced even more. These would represent basic changes.

The Secretary expressed the view that on its face the proposal appeared advantageous to us. Mr. Nitze believed that this depended on working out satisfactory definitions. We should work out the definitions first. Mr. McNaughton recalled that Mr. McNamara had expressed willingness to grapple further with this "elusive problem".

The Secretary and Mr. Foster departed at this point. The Secretary reaffirmed his view that a "crash" study should be undertaken of the bases problem.

7. Study of the Means of Verifying the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

Mr. Fisher noted that we had had to give up the idea of waiting until Stage I for an international examination of the problems involved in eliminating nuclear weapons, but we have not said what the timing of such a study should be. We should undertake an intra-governmental study now in order to be prepared for international study prior to the beginning of Stage I. We ought to get out of our present dilemma of saying that we can't enter into an international study because we don't know what our position is.

Mr. Kaysen thought there was nothing wrong with getting our own position clear but we should not commit ourselves on the timing of an international study.

Dr. Seaborg agreed that the matter should be studied. He thought that ACDA as well as AEC should participate in the study. Dr. Haworth believed that CIA had an interest. He noted that the problem was not a lack of information but rather that the information was negative.

Mr. Nitze expressed his view that the question of whether we should put forward the probable negative results of the study is a political question. Equipping of the UN Peace Force was involved.

Mr. Murrow wondered whether if the results looked negative, we should not make this known at an early time. Otherwise, the negotiations might appear to have been futile. Mr. Keeny pointed out, however, that the approach we were taking was to try to get hold of the problem by eliminating delivery vehicles. Mr. Kaysen thought that if we could make progress on the delivery vehicles question, the difficulties of eliminating nuclear weapons might not seem so important. There is a question as to when you should face up to a negative fact. If there are positive achievements, the negative fact may not be important.

Mr. Fisher asked whether an intra-governmental study would be a waste of time under the circumstances. Mr. Kaysen and Dr. Seaborg both thought the study was needed. Dr. Haworth urged that meanwhile we should not permit ourselves to be nudged closer to an international study. Mr. Keeny believed that if we were forced into an international study, it should be broadened to cover the delivery vehicles question. If pressures for an international study increase, we could send knowledgeable people to Geneva. Mr. Kaysen said that we may want to head off such pressures by exposing the facts informally and explaining why we don't want an international study now.

Mr. Fisher affirmed that we were not placing emphasis on undertaking an international study now, only on doing it before a treaty is signed.

Calling attention to the two issues on the agenda for discussion purposes but not decision (the questions of transition and nuclear weapons for a UN Peace Force), Mr. Fisher noted that most of those present had attended the earlier meetings of the Deputies of the Principals when these matters had been discussed./6/ Accordingly, it did not appear necessary to discuss these matters again.

/6/A memorandum of conversation of a meeting of the Deputies (or Sub-Principals) on May 23, drafted by Gathright, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Memoranda, 2/62-4/62. A memorandum for record of the same meeting, prepared by Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr. on May 25, which summarizes the main points made at the meeting, is ibid., Current, 5/62-8/62.

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