Washington, June 20, 1962.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 12/1/61-6/30/62. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on June 26.

Meeting with the President on Wednesday, June 20, at 5:15 p.m., attended by Secretary of Defense, Chairman of AEC, Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, McCone, and others to discuss the status of the nuclear test program./2/

/2/Bundy also wrote a memorandum summarizing the President's decisions at this meeting. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing) See the Supplement.

1. It was decided that all scheduled Nevada underground tests and the scheduled [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] above ground tests and the large crater test should be made./3/

/3/Reference presumably is to the final Nevada tests in Operation Nougat and the Nevada tests in Operation Storax I, the first of which was a 104-kiloton thermonuclear crater test on July 6. (Announced United States Nuclear Tests, pp. 20-24)

2. It was agreed that all of the remaining tests in the Pacific should be made.

3. It was agreed that two high altitude effects tests should be made and these would be completed if no slippage or failure occurs, about July 20./4/

/4/Starfish Prime, the first high-altitude nuclear shot in the Dominic series, took place on July 8. Bluegill Prime, July 25, and Bluegill Double Prime, October 15, both misfired during the launch phase and had to be destroyed. (Operation Dominic I--1962, pp. 232-241)

4. It was agreed that the outer space test desired by the AEC would, in all probability, be cancelled. However, Dr. Seaborg was to discuss this subject with the President at a later date./5/ The problem was that one test would extend the operation into August and this was considered undesirable.

/5/At a meeting with Seaborg, Wiesner, Keeny, and McGeorge Bundy on July 10, the President approved preparations for Urraca, a high-altitude shot, to take place about August 6. (Seaborg, Journal, Supplement, pp. 19042-19043) This event was cancelled before this date, however, to avoid further damage to orbiting satellites. High-altitude shots Checkmate (October 19), Bluegill Triple Prime (October 25), Kingfish (November 1), and Tightrope (November 3) were later conducted successfully as part of the Dominic series. (Operation Dominic I--1962, pp. 236-247)

The President agreed to all of the above.

John A. McCone/6/

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

190. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

SET/MC/29

London, June 24, 1962, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Kohler and approved in S on June 28. The meeting was held at Carleton Gardens. The Secretary was in London during a visit to several European capitals June 18-28.

SECRETARY'S EUROPEAN TRIP

June 18-28, 1962

United States
Secretary of State
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Kohler

UK
Prime Minister Macmillan
Lord Home,
Foreign Minister Edward Heath
Lord Privy Seal Sir Harold Caccia
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Mr. Ian Samuel

SUBJECT
Nuclear Tests

Lord Home opened this phase of the discussion by asking what possibilities the Secretary saw for new moves in the nuclear test field. The Secretary replied that we were studying the possibilities for an atmospheric test ban. However what were referred to as national detection capabilities were in fact not national at all on our side. Rather they depended on arrangements with other countries and if we were to consider an atmospheric ban, agreements would have to be made with other peripheral countries which would enable us to be sure that the system would be continued. We could not, for example, be entirely confident of our present arrangements with a country like [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. In any case, we would never be able to agree to an underground ban without verification.

The Prime Minister commented that even when he had met the President in Bermuda he had felt that the important aspect of the nuclear question was the possibility of development of an anti-missile missile. This development could not take place on the basis of underground tests. Consequently he had felt that we could risk a completely unpoliced ban, perhaps for a period of three to five years. He felt that this was the only way that could stop other countries from nuclear development. The only hope was to have a complete ban and thus be able to put diplomatic pressure on other countries to join in.

The Secretary commented that we were not seeking to stay in a nuclear race. Our objective was just to be sure that everybody gets out of the race. Following up on the Prime Minister's remarks, Lord Home wondered whether it would not be possible to agree on an atmospheric ban for perhaps a period of one year, during which it would be agreed that there should be a joint study of the problem of underground tests. The Secretary replied that we could consider this possibility depending on the result of our present analysis of the problem. If the Soviets had really wanted a nuclear test agreement it was difficult to understand their motives in turning down our March proposals. They could then have had a test ban at a great bargain. Speaking on a personal basis, the Secretary commented that perhaps it would be possible after the conclusion of our current tests to approach the Soviets again privately--though not publicly--on this problem.

191. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

SET/MC/42

London, June 25, 1962.

/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen and approved in S on July 3. The meeting was held after lunch in the British Foreign Ministry.

SECRETARY'S EUROPEAN TRIP

June 18-28, 1962

United States
The Secretary
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Kohler (for the beginning)

Great Britain
Lord Home
Sir Harold Caccia
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Mr. Joseph Godber
Mr. Ian Samuel
[Ramsbotham, Mason]/2/

/2/Brackets in the source text.

SUBJECT
Testing and disarmament

After lunch, Lord Home, Mr. Godber, Mr. Samuel, the Secretary, Ambassador Bruce, and Mr. Bohlen met to discuss testing and disarmament. The British point seemed to be primarily that they should have something new to offer at the resumed session of the Geneva conference. On testing, Lord Home and Mr. Godber expressed great interest in the possibility of a moratorium on atmospheric testing, to which the Secretary pointed out that it would be necessary to have something on the underground tests, since the United States is not prepared to rely solely on national detection systems. Mr. Godber said he thought it would be useful to have a gathering of scientists, if only to explode the Soviet theory, pointing out that the Russians were always challenging the West, citing United States and other Western citizens to support their contentions.

The Secretary mentioned the question of Chinese involvement, pointing out that some of the Soviet-Chinese installations were near the Chinese border and would be difficult to tell where a suspicious explosion had taken place.

Mr. Godber said that China was very much like France in that all recognized that in any serious nuclear arrangement, the Chinese would have to be in, and the Russians said the same thing about the French.

The Secretary reported that Couve de Murville had told him in Paris that one of the biggest French problems was the question of nuclear disarmament./3/ Lord Home said that it would be well to find out whether any future French tests would be underground. Mr. Godber inquired whether there was any possibility of getting the French into Geneva. The Secretary replied that he felt there was a greater chance of getting them into the Berlin discussions.

/3/Secretary Rusk discussed disarmament with Couve de Murville in Paris on June 20. (Memorandum of conversation, June 20; Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)

Lord Home said that the British Government was very interested in the possibility of an atmospheric moratorium, leaving the underground matter for future considerations. The Secretary repeated that we felt more than national verification was necessary for underground detection. He said the Soviets counted ninety-eight percent on publicity and two percent on espionage, whereas we must rely on international cooperation for both atmospheric and underground testing.

Lord Home said the meeting in Washington in July might well examine which countries we would need for cooperation in an adequate system of tests. There ensued some discussion as to the procedure during the Geneva conference, which might be followed after the recess.

Mr. Godber was in favor of starting with the Eight-Power proposal and then when that was rejected, then turning to the atmospheric tests. He repeated again the necessity of having some positive move to make in this field. The Secretary said that our people were studying the matter and they would have to await the results. Lord Home then raised the question of the inspection of "the remainders" under the first phase thirty percent cut. The Secretary said that we could not get the American people to support anything based on trust in people who were out to do us in. The British pointed out that from their point of view, there would not be much to trust in phase one, since there would be inspection of that which was destroyed. Mr. Godber said that the main criticism of the Western proposals was the fact that phase one and two seemed to involve little disarmament, whereas in phase three there was no fixed figure for the amount of nuclear destruction. He could not understand why we could not put in something more specific in phase three.

Lord Home was of the opinion that the way to handle the phases was to only start on one when the preceding phase had been fully completed, which would not necessitate any veto. He also could not see why we could not put in some specific amount. The Secretary pointed out that this was a very major political matter in the United States and that there was one decision of President Kennedy to the effect that we would not put forth any proposition that we could not live with, no matter what impression is created.

Mr. Godber argued that appearance was equally important if only to smoke out the Russians. He said the introduction of some fixed figure in phase three would help very much the presentation. Then ensued discussion on the question of presenting lists in the various phases which would be favorable to one side as against another, with particular reference to the superiority of the West in nuclear weapons and the superiority of the Russians in conventional. Mr. Godber seemed to be particularly concerned about the effect on the neutrals and on world public opinion.

Lord Home raised the point as to whether we would be better off without any nuclear weapons at all. The Secretary mentioned that the United States was only vulnerable to nuclear attack. Mr. Godber said there was no means of being absolutely sure that no nuclear weapons would be concealed, even in the event of complete and total disarmament, and wondered whether the whole exercise was worthwhile.

The Secretary said that while he doubted if any great and general disagreement would ever be achieved, there were a certain number of peripheral things which would reduce instability and have a dampening effect on tensions. He had in mind surprise attack and the danger of some madman, on either side, starting a weapon on its way. Mr. Godber said that the discussions at Geneva had more or less been stopped by the Russian double cross on Russian propaganda, but felt that when we returned to Geneva we should have some new initiatives to make.

The Secretary said that he could not agree that it should always be up to the West to make new initiatives when the Russians stood pat. Mr. Godber said that this was why he thought it would be valuable to take initiative since this would provide the neutrals with ammunitions to bring pressure to bear on the Russians. The Secretary questioned this thesis, pointing out that neutrals usually occupy a point midway between the Soviet and the West, no matter what these positions are and that experience had shown us that this was not a very true basis on which to act.

The Secretary mentioned that he was having a study made which would permit immediate reference to the Security Council in the event of any action, identical nuclear explosion, before the chain was set off.

Mr. Godber inquired whether President Kennedy would go to the Security Council if a bomb exploded in New York. The Secretary pointed out that it might be a bomb in transit and, anyway, worthwhile looking into arrangements which might prevent the chain reaction to the ultimate catastrophe. Mr. Godber said that at Geneva the plans seemed to be to talk until the General Assembly and then after a brief discussion there, to come back to Geneva. He repeated the importance of taking some Western initiative.

Lord Home agreed with him that the absence of any figures in stage three put the West in a bad position. He repeated that in his view each stage hinged on the proper completion of the preceding one. Mr. Godber, in reply to the Secretary's question, said he was thinking of neutral and UN opinion rather than domestic British opinion. The discussion was, in general, inconclusive, with the Secretary merely saying that some of these matters were under discussion and would be considered in the July meeting in Washington, with the British pressing for new initiatives, even though the Russians had made no move at all in their position.

192. Editorial Note

On June 28, 1962, Adlai Stevenson sent President Kennedy a 6-page letter on current disarmament problems. The letter is printed in full in The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson: Ambassador to the United Nations, 1961-1965, volume VIII, pages 265-269. Attached to a copy of the letter in the Kennedy Library is a June 29 memorandum from Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. to Carl Kaysen that reads, "You may wish to consider the attached letter from Governor Stevenson--and also how best to answer it." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, General, 6/61-12/62) No response to the letter has been found.

193. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, July 5-6, 1962.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/7-662. Confidential. Drafted by Marie deGunzburg (ACDA/IR). The meetings were held at the British Embassy.

SUBJECT
US-UK Bilateral Discussions on the Nuclear Test Ban Issue

PARTICIPANTS
(See attachment)/2/

/2/The list of 17 participants at the July 5 meeting and 13 participants at the July 6 meeting is not printed.

The following three ACDA papers were under consideration at the meetings: "Possibilities for a Nuclear Test Detection System which Responds to Basic Ideas of the Eight-Nation Proposal" by Dr. Franklin Long, a draft atmospheric test ban proposal, and a draft comprehensive test ban treaty. (The references in the text are to the fifth revision of this draft.)/3/

/3/A copy of the fifth revision of the comprehensive test ban treaty, dated June 18, is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 23, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. The other two ACDA papers have not been found.

Morning Session, July 5, 1962

Ambassador Dean opened the meeting by calling on Dr. Long to discuss his new paper. Dr. Long explained that he had concentrated on the technical problem of seismic detection by use of national stations. He then described the system proposed in his paper. In estimating the system's capability, Dr. Long stressed the possibility that a country could "spoof" by a variety of technical means, for example, by delaying on the time scale, in order to conduct clandestine tests. Less attention had been paid to detection of high altitude and outer space tests although some of the core stations could have the necessary technical equipment. However, core stations chosen for their seismicity might not be as useful for outer space detection and it might therefore be necessary to separate the two. He explained that more detailed studies of the system were being made, that the national stations would be effective for detection, but much less so for identification, and that the necessity for on-site inspection would remain.

Amb. Dean pointed out that there was still the problem of the international commission's right to determine the necessity of on-site inspection if identification were impossible. Dr. Long agreed. This would be an "internationally operated national system." The advantage would be in having an integrated system under the control of the international commission. The nationals operating the stations would be under firm obligation to the commission to do correct detecting. In answer to a question from Amb. Stelle, he added that distance location would not be very much downgraded and that a ten kilometer radius would still suffice for inspection.

Amb. Dean asked whether the distant stations would be able to confirm an event inside the Soviet Union if that country refused a commission's request to inspect. Dr. Long answered that "spoofing" had not yet been studied in depth, but that the data from a country which was suspected of spoofing would have to be discounted. Responding to Sir Michael Wright's query as to whether atmospheric tests in the Soviet Union could be established without the use of special air over-flights, he said that it would not be possible to locate very small tests, but that there existed a finite possibility of identification which might act as a deterrent. There would be a problem of locating the event if the time element were uncertain.

Less consideration had been given to underwater testing, but a nuclear event could be identified by sampling ocean currents for radioactive debris. For weapons effects tests, underwater testing would be very important, especially in regard to submarine warfare. On the whole, the April 18th, 1961 treaty would be downgraded in every mode by this new system.

Sir Michael Wright asked about the importance of the "series" concept in detection. The UK had felt that in calculating the capabilities for the April 18, 1961 treaty, full justice had not been given to the fact that one was really looking for a series and not an isolated test. Dr. Long said that in principle there was no reason why a series could not be separated in space and time and for certain developments, such as the "neutron" bomb, single tests were useful. However, there was a very good case for the importance of a series.

Amb. Dean inquired about the United States Government's position in regard to the national detection system. Mr. Adrian Fisher replied that there was, to date, no government position on the matter. Underground tests were again considered to be quite important and there was no indication that the government would accept a national detection system as a treaty basis at this time. Dr. Long confirmed that a large majority of the recent Nevada tests would not have been detected if the data from American stations had been discounted. However, as each station sees tuff signals at different magnitudes, there was a pretty good possibility that of 20 stations some would see a test as bigger than 4.5 kiloton and thus detect some of the smaller tests which might be a useful deterrent.

Amb. Dean asked whether this study would be completed by July 16 and how long it would be before a new treaty on this basis could be tabled. Dr. Long said that he would have a better picture of the seismic possibility of this new system by the 16th after a discussion with British scientists in London./4/ Amb. Dean pointed out that even if the US and the UK agreed to pursue this system further there was still no evidence that the Soviet Union would agree to on-site inspection. He questioned whether it was worth presenting a new system less effective than that of April 18, 1961 if the Soviet Union would still not accept inspection. Sir Michael Wright stressed that the 8-nation memorandum fell into three parts: (1) an internationally coordinated detection system based on national control posts; (2) an international scientific commission and (3) verification. The US and UK had interpreted the third point as providing for obligatory on-site inspection and seven of the eight neutrals had stated their agreement with this interpretation. He felt that a major round would be lost if a new proposal based on the 8-nation memorandum were not presented. The system described by Dr. Long for detecting underground tests would probably necessitate more on-site inspection. Tactically it would be better to meet the neutrals on the detection and commission points, while taking a harder line on on-site inspection. A second point, however, was to determine how much value our governments attached to underground testing. If they did not find it very important it was not worth foundering the project on it. Dr. Long stated that the AEC would not agree to leaving the underground tests uninspected.

/4/A summary of the record of these Washington meetings, transmitted in Todis 417 to Geneva, July 6, reads in part: "US and UK scientists (including Long of ACDA) would meet in London next week and discuss technical aspects new US ideas and that outcome this discussion would be relevant re further tactical planning." (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/7-662) In his journal, Seaborg briefly refers to a meeting of the President's Science Advisory Committee on July 16 at which Wiesner described the previous week's meetings with the British on "test detection, permissive links, and general disarmament." (Seaborg, Journal, vol. 4, pp. 41-42)

The meeting proceeded to a discussion of the ACDA draft atmospheric treaty. Amb. Dean pointed out that the draft was not yet cleared and not ready to be tabled at the conference. Furthermore, he wondered whether it would be wise to offer an atmospheric treaty if we still wanted a comprehensive treaty as there might be pressure from the neutrals and the USSR to omit on-site inspection from all types of treaties.

Afternoon Session, July 5, 1962

The discussion of the atmospheric draft treaty resumed in the afternoon.

Sir Michael Wright recalled that our offer of an uncontrolled ban on September 3, 1961 was on the record and he asked whether the renewed offer would include aircraft sampling. Mr. Fisher explained that the inspection provisions in the draft were almost nonexistent. Inspection was purely invitational although each country was committed to maintaining qualified observers who represented a type of ad hoc commission. There was no provision for over-flights. The country charging a violation would be responsible for the observation costs. He added that it would be necessary to consider the observation of peaceful explosions to insure that they were not weapon tests. Sir Michael Wright asked whether this would not give away the principle of on-site inspection in terms of underground tests and disarmament. Amb. Dean agreed that to some extent the draft did expose us to the invitational principle advanced by the USSR on underground tests and that it also omitted the commission principle. Amb. Stelle pointed out that it reopened the possibility of pressure for a moratorium on underground tests. Mr. Fisher replied that the principle of inspection could be stated in such a way that one would request as much international inspection as was needed. Answering a question of Sir Michael Wright's he added that the application of this draft to underwater and outer space tests had not even been tentatively decided.

Sir Michael Wright had serious reservations about Article VII on Withdrawal and Denunciation which sanctioned withdrawal for reasons of national security. This was not very different from the Soviet November 28, 1961 proposal to which we had objected because of its provision for withdrawal on the basis of national rather than international determination. He suggested that the wording of Article 22 in the April 18, 1961 treaty might be better. He hoped that it would be possible to have a statement less blunt on the question of national security. Amb. Stelle remarked that the duration article in the 1961 treaty was fairly satisfactory in regard to violations of the treaty, but not in regard to non-party violations. It would perhaps be possible to use the non-party formula in this draft treaty and the 1961 formula for non-fulfillment. Mr. Goodby and Mr. Spiers pointed out that the International Conference procedure had been included to make it as difficult as possible to withdraw. This was especially important when there were no control conditions.

Sir Michael Wright asked whether the International Court of Justice would be called upon to determine questions of fact or of law. Mr. Fisher observed that it was not very important as it was unlikely that many legal matters would arise and the Court was not an especially good body for establishing fact. Article IV was not intended as a substitute for Article VII. Proceeding to Article VI, he explained that the US experience during the moratorium had shown the difficulties of maintaining a readiness to test unless the right to do so was spelled out. It was simply a recognition of the fact that it was impossible to prevent preparation for testing, but the matter had not yet been decided. Amb. Dean pointed out that nothing in the treaty prevented a country from being ready to test. Sir Michael Wright, Amb. Stelle, and Mr. Fisher agreed that the article did look a little strange.

Turning to a discussion of a draft comprehensive test ban treaty, which he felt the neutrals would certainly favor, Sir Michael Wright remarked that paragraph 1 of Article 9 seemed a step back from the Geneva system by making "a" seismic event eligible for inspection. This would seem to make it possible to request inspection of an earthquake simply because it was in a sensitive area which we wanted to inspect. He suggested substituting "a seismic event suspected of being a nuclear explosion."

In regard to the reverse quota system, Sir Michael Wright asked whether it would not be preferable to allow the Commission to request inspection of all unidentified events. Mr. Goodby remarked that the quota protected both sides. The commission could determine the necessity of an inspection if the objective criteria were spelled out in detail. However, we would want to use all possible information and we might have more available than the commission did. The reverse quota giving the Soviet Union the possibility of conducting 15 free tests within a three-year period would meet the Soviet charge of espionage and at the same time might protect us from inspection of some very sensitive areas. Moreover, a refusal of inspection on the Soviet side would in itself be a very informative fact.

Amb. Dean had serious reservations about the reverse quota which could in effect be a license to test. Amb. Stelle did not think that the reverse quota would remove the Soviet fear of espionage. He thought it better to maintain the classic position that everything would be done to remove the possibility of espionage rather than to spell out this possibility in a treaty.

On the matter of tactics for the Geneva conference, Amb. Dean predicted that the Soviet Delegation would come with a treaty text based on 100% national systems with invitational inspection. Sir Michael Wright hoped that an allied document would be available which would not have to have every paragraph filled in but could be very general. He preferred a comprehensive draft treaty to an atmospheric treaty. Mr. Spiers said that the draft comprehensive treaty would not be ready by July 16 although we would be in a better position to estimate if and when it would be ready after the scientific talks in London. Amb. Stelle expressed reluctance to proceed with the atmospheric treaty if the possibility of a comprehensive treaty had not been ruled out. The inspection principle had now gathered some support and the introduction of an atmospheric treaty now might politically preclude the possibility of agreement on a comprehensive treaty for several years. Amb. Dean also felt that it would be better to risk waiting for a comprehensive treaty.

(End of Meeting--July 5)

The meeting resumed with a detailed discussion of the two draft treaties.

Sir Michael Wright stated that although we had to accept the fact that no comprehensive treaty text based on the 8-power memorandum could be tabled on July 16, he had recommended to London that no atmospheric or underwater test ban treaty be tabled until we were forced to give up on a comprehensive treaty. He urged that such a draft treaty be ready as soon as possible. Amb. Dean agreed that our optimum goal would be to have the "Long version of the 8-power proposal" and a draft treaty ready in a few weeks. If this were impossible we should then decide on an alternative in order to avoid a detailed disarmament discussion in the General Assembly and a possible General Assembly decision that the 18-nation conference was not productive.

Sir Michael Wright stated that London accepted in general both US draft treaties, but had some specific questions and suggestions. In the comprehensive draft treaty in Article I, paragraph 1, he proposed changing the last sentence to "place subject to its jurisdiction or by any person subject to its control." He asked whether in Article III the Commission's duties of collecting data and reporting on all seismic events could be more clearly stated and questioned whether the quota should be exercised unilaterally rather than by the Commission. London thought that the neutrals would object and that it would be better if the decision rested with the Commission. Amb. Dean recalled our earlier thinking that if we thought an event had occurred in the USSR we would not want to argue over this with the Commission. Amb. Stelle remarked that in our past attempts to establish objective criteria with the USSR we had been forced to fall back on location criteria. Mr. Spiers pointed out that the exercise of the quota by either side had been originally a USSR proposal and if the Soviet Union ever accepted the quota again it would probably be on this basis.

Sir Michael Wright remarked that the quota system could perhaps operate on a national basis but if the treaty were to include unlimited inspection, the decision should be left to the Commission. Moreover, even if the treaty included unlimited inspection on the basis of a Commission decision, the reverse quota system could still apply. He further commented on the provision in Article III for periodic visits by the Commission to all elements of the system. He recognized the necessity of this paragraph but suspected that the USSR would object to an inspection of its detection posts. Mr. Goodby said that it had been hoped that the Soviet Union would allow the Commission to construct new posts on its territory.

Sir Michael Wright asked whether it would be desirable in Article IV to spell out that the members of the Commission should be scientists. Amb. Stelle cautioned that non-scientists should not be excluded from the Commission's work which was, after all, of a political nature.

Sir Michael Wright suggested that the word "possible" be inserted before the words "nuclear explosions" in paragraph 1 of Article VII. He also stated that in Article VIII, paragraph 5, "back-scatter radar" was not negotiable. He repeated his previous remark that in Article IX the non-qualified "a seismic event" would cause complications. He asked about the 10 kilometer radius in Article IX, paragraph 4, and with regard to paragraphs 7 and 8, of the same Article, wondered whether special aircraft sampling flights for detection of atmospheric tests would be included. He remarked that under the Geneva system, the host country had been responsible for the transportation and necessary equipment mentioned in paragraph 8.

Amb. Stelle stated that 10 kilometers was a compromise between the 8 and 12 mentioned in the Geneva system.

Mr. Goodby explained that over-ocean flights rather than flights over territories had been contemplated.

Sir Michael Wright stressed that Article XIV worried the UK the most. In this treaty as opposed to the atmospheric treaty, there was a Commission and there existed thus a stronger argument for giving the responsibility of finding a breach to the Commission rather than allowing withdrawal on the basis of national determination. Mr. Baker proposed that if withdrawal were permitted as a result of identification of an explosion anywhere by the Commission, both the problems of a treaty violation and of testing by a non-party to the treaty, could be met.

Sir Michael Wright stated that he now had an official reaction from London on the atmospheric treaty. A comprehensive test ban treaty was considered to be preferable, but if we were able to offer only an atmospheric treaty, it should be a simple one. As the Soviet Union would probably reject it, it would be as effective as possible for world public opinion. For the sake of simplicity, London had queried the value of Articles IV and V and had been unenthusiastic about Article VI which seemed to throw doubt on the sincerity of the treaty. There had also been objection to the Withdrawal Article (VII) and a suggestion had been made to take the relevant Article of the April 18, 1961 treaty plus a provision for withdrawal if testing, other than underground, were conducted by another party. He added that he had meanwhile sent to London the rationale for Article IV, namely, to make frivolous denunciation more difficult.

Amb. Dean pointed out that the structure of Article VII depended on whether its purpose was to make it difficult for the other party to contract out of the treaty.

Mr. Spiers said that it had been felt that there were only two possible reasons for denouncing the treaty and the necessity of calling a conference would make it difficult to withdraw. Sir Michael Wright said that the article should provide the right of withdrawal if another country conducted a nuclear explosion. In an atmospheric treaty this could take place after a finding by observers. Who should make the finding in a comprehensive treaty was still a debatable point. He would ask the Foreign Office to propose some alternatives. Mr. Wilkinson questioned a possible inconsistency between paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article VII, since paragraph 2 seemed to annul the value of paragraph 1 by providing an alternative exit from the treaty without a conference. Mr. Goodby remarked that if a party to the treaty resumed testing there would be little need for a conference.

On the subject of tactics for the resumed session of the 18-NDC, Amb. Dean predicted that the Soviet delegation would have a draft treaty, that if we did not also table a draft treaty, the eight neutrals probably would. Hopefully, we would have a treaty to present and it would then be better to undergo an uncomfortable first two weeks. If we could not table a comprehensive treaty, he asked whether we should table an atmospheric treaty before the General Assembly convened. We could not maintain the position of the April 18, 1961 treaty indefinitely. If the scientific problems of the new comprehensive draft could be solved, we might have something more workable and more realistic despite the downgrading of the identification process. Sir Michael Wright pointed out that the new system would enable detection and identification to start within 6 months whereas the Geneva system could not have been put into operation for 4 years.

Amb. Stelle suggested another alternative. The real decision was whether we could proceed on the basis of national detection systems, which would give us a new basis for agreement. It might be simpler to present a skeleton working paper at Geneva on what we were prepared to accept without entering into details. If we were starting on a new basis we would probably want to abandon the historical wording of the April 18th treaty.

Mr. Beam commented that whereas we could commit ourselves by tabling a treaty, the presentation of a working paper would have more leeway for discussion. Mr. Neidle/5/ remarked that this procedure had been used in the early stages of the Antarctic Treaty. Amb. Dean stressed that the actual drafting of the treaty probably presented the least problem. The important thing was to have the fundamentals cleared. Mr. Spiers said that it would be possible to prepare such a working paper a little more quickly than a draft treaty but that its primary advantage would be as a better negotiating technique allowing greater flexibility.

/5/Alan F. Neidle (ACDA/GC)

Sir Michael Wright recalled that the US disarmament treaty had been called an outline and that it might have been better to put forth a fuller paper. The small print in the test ban treaty was also very important. It would be better to think this over. He reported that London was very much in favor of Padilla Nervo's proposal for a time lapse between the signing and coming into force of a treaty./6/ He then asked about the possibility of tabling the two alternative treaties simultaneously. Mr. Beam felt that we would gain greater moral credit if we started with the comprehensive treaty. We would then have the atmospheric treaty as a fall-back.

/6/Reference presumably is to the proposals of Luis Padilla Nervo, Mexican Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, for an end date for atmospheric testing. On June 14, for example, he said that the agreed date might be January 1963. See Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 479-484.

Amb. Dean commented that it was hard to put verification meas-ures into the atmospheric treaty. If both were advanced simultaneously the Soviet Union would always play one off against the other and thus preclude the possibility of agreement on inspection. It would be better to fall back on the atmospheric treaty.

Recapitulating his preferences, Sir Michael Wright listed first, a full treaty text on a comprehensive test ban; secondly, a full treaty text on an atmospheric test ban as a fall-back position; and thirdly, a skeleton working paper.

194. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, July 12, 1962, 4 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-1262. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on July 13. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

SUBJECT
Nuclear Tests

PARTICIPANTS
Anatoli Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR
Georgi M. Kornienko, Counsellor of Soviet Embassy

The Secretary
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary
Martin J. Hillenbrand, Director, Office of German Affairs

During a discussion devoted mainly to Berlin/2/ Dobrynin referred to the need of the Soviet Union to be militarily prepared in view of what he described as provocative American statements about a possible attack on the Soviet Union. As to nuclear tests, the Soviet Union had felt that the United States had been ahead. It had then caught up, and now the United States was testing again. This was a vicious circle. The Secretary said that an announcement was being made that the Christmas Island phase of the tests had ended./3/ Dobrynin observed that we would still be testing on Johnson Island and in Nevada. He asked if there were any deadlines on these tests. The Secretary said that he thought they would end soon. Dobrynin asked if he meant in one or two months. The Secretary responded that it would probably be in that range, but he could give no commitment on this since he was not in charge and such matters as weather could affect timing. However, if Dobrynin wanted a base of reference we had said that we would make fewer tests than the Soviets had made in their last series. Hence the Soviets could do a certain amount of calculating on their own.

/2/The memorandum of conversation on Berlin is printed in vol. XV, pp. 215-222. Regarding their discussion of other subjects, see vol. V, Document 127.

/3/The Atomic Energy Commission made this announcement on July 12. (The New York Times, July 13, 1962)

Dobrynin observed that newspaper reports indicated we had obtained good results from our underground tests. The Secretary commented that the Soviets should have sent their people as observers. Dobrynin said that the tests seemed to be proving the Soviet point. The American press had indicated detection as taking place over 3000 miles. The Secretary said this applied to certain kind of events only. Although a full report was not yet available, we believed that some control points and inspections would still be required. Some improvement had been achieved. If the Soviets felt that their scientists had instruments which went all the way, this was a matter which should be discussed between the scientists of both countries.

The Secretary observed that he had been sorry to see that Khrushchev, in his recent speech, had come back to the point that any kind of inspection was tantamount to espionage./4/ This was not in accord with the facts of what would really happen under international inspection. It was difficult to put this development into correct prospective, since up to a year or a year-and-a-half ago, the Soviet were talking of international inspection. In the last year or so, however, the Soviet Government has maintained that all inspection is unacceptable because it is equivalent to espionage. Inspection was not really capable of producing espionage, and this question had no relation anyway to the techniques of modern war.

/4/In the course of a long speech to the World Congress on Disarmament in Moscow on July 10, Khrushchev said that the U.S. control proposal was "designed to set up a legalised system of international espionage for the benefit of a potential aggressor." (Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II, pp. 642-643)

After a rather obscure reference to a 1957 proposal for control posts and air inspection which had been rejected, Dobrynin admitted that a year ago the Soviet had changed its position because its security was involved. He wondered why the US so strongly insisted on inspection in connection with a test ban. Since detection can take place without inspection, this insistence merely increased Soviet suspicions. The Soviet Union was fully aware that the US had adequate facilities in adjacent countries to detect Soviet tests. The Secretary said that this would not apply to underground and small tests. Dobrynin said that perhaps tomorrow American scientists would announce that they could detect explosions 5000 miles away. The Secretary responded that, if Soviet scientists had such a capability in their instruments, why were they not willing to talk about it. Dobrynin asked why, if American scientists were so sure, the US did not sign the treaty. The Secretary observed that our scientists were not sure of the possibility of effective detection and identification at such great distances. The full technical analysis was not yet completed, and perhaps the Vela Tests would help to solve the problem, but they would not eliminate the need for inspection.

Dobrynin said signature of the treaty would eliminate distrust and provide progress, which so far had not been made. The Soviet Government felt strongly about this and the need to discuss these disarmament questions. All tests could be detected. Only underground tests had been in question. Now even US scientists were convinced, as British scientists previously had been. Soviet scientists were convinced. Why did the US have to be so stubborn and continue saying that it must have posts in the USSR? The Secretary said that, even on the basis of the Vela Tests, national systems would not suffice, but scientists from the various countries might discuss the question and see if they could not come to some conclusions.

195. Editorial Note

On July 7, 1962, the Department of Defense released to the public some of the preliminary results of its seismic research program, known as Project Vela. (Press Release No. 1150-62, printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1962, volume II, pages 633-635) As summarized by Glenn Seaborg, among the technical conclusions of this project were: 1) the possibility of improved detection by properly placing and reinforcing instruments; 2) the promise of ocean-bottom seismometers; 3) the large variation in signal strength of underground explosions depending on the medium surrounding the shot place; and 4) the existence of many fewer earthquakes in the Soviet Union that might be mistaken for nuclear explosions than had previously been estimated. (Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban, page 162)

U.S. officials had earlier learned about the Vela findings and their implications for U.S. insistence on control posts in disarmament, but this knowledge had not yet resulted in any change in policy. Nevertheless, when Ambassador Dean arrived at the airport in Geneva on July 14, he reportedly said that the Vela findings suggested that international detection stations inside the Soviet Union might not be necessary if the United States could get non-nuclear nations to cooperate.

When Secretary Rusk learned of Dean's statement, he telephoned ACDA Deputy Director Adrian Fisher (Foster was away), and together the Secretary and Fisher sent a message to Dean, which reads in part:

"A Reuters dispatch from Paris quotes you as having said 'Perhaps we could do without them' referring to control posts in the Soviet Union and that you may be able to cut down the number of on-site inspections but it is too early to tell. While we have no way of knowing whether or not this is an accurate quotation of what you said, you should know that there has been no decision on the part of the U.S. Government, in its position on a test ban, authorizing a change, and that my position and the position of the Department and ACDA, when asked, will continue to be that, while the recent results of the Vela Program are promising and are being evaluated, the evaluation to date has not led to a decision to abandon necessity of control posts in the Soviet Union or reduce the number of on-site inspections. Your position should be the same. Whether and to what extent U.S. position should be revised, based on new data now under active consideration in Executive Branch and in consultation with Congress, and speculation as to possibility of a change can only prejudice this consideration." (Todis 432 to Geneva, July 14; Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-1462)

The Secretary and Fisher also wrote a statement emphasizing that the conclusions of the Vela program were preliminary and "do not demonstrate the possibility of doing away with control posts and on-site inspections to determine the precise nature of suspicious events." As a result of further evaluation of the Vela findings, the statement continued, the United States "will make in the near future whatever modifications in its present position as seem possible." This statement was given to the press on July 16. (Department of State Bulletin, August 6, 1962, page 234)

Fisher later recalled President Kennedy's reaction to Dean's statement:

"Now I didn't discuss this with the President directly, but I talked with Mac Bundy about it. And frankly, the President was very upset. He liked to have things done well. And the idea that we had made a proposition and we were saying something else: he had a rather adverse reaction to that, to put it mildly. So he passed the word down: 'Now look, let's get this thing straight. Either we've got a position or we don't have.' (Frank Sieverts, interview with Adrian S. Fisher, May 13, 1964, page 34; Kennedy Library, Oral History Program)

The Embassy in Moscow reported on July 19: "Soviet press predictably seizes on US press stories that Ambassador Dean publicly corrected by Department following his alleged July 14 statement Vela tests might make it possible for US to accept national control system. Pravda describes Dean statement as constituting 'certain retreat from former US position' but asserts even this hint at change 'created panic in Washington.' New York Times Finney article quoted at length to bolster Soviet contention US obstructing test ban agreement." (Telegram 178 from Moscow, July 19; Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/7-1962)

John W. Finney's feature article on the Soviet and U.S. nuclear tests and on the impasse in the Geneva negotiations for a nuclear test ban treaty was published in The New York Times, July 15, 1962.

196. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, July 20, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 4/5-7/30/62. Secret. Copies were sent to Bundy and Wiesner.

SUBJECT
New Data on Detecting Underground Nuclear Explosions

1. You asked last week how long the Defense Department had known the new figures on the basis of which they made their announcement about the change in our ability to detect underground nuclear tests in the Soviet Union a little while ago./2/ There is no simple answer to this question in terms of time. In one sense the Department of Defense did not know that they had the new information until they were asked by Disarmament (ACDA) on 15 June to give an evaluation of the proposals that the neutrals had been making in Geneva./3/ These proposals rested on the proposition that we could reliably detect underground nuclear tests in the Soviet Union without requiring seismic stations inside the Soviet Union. But in the course of looking up the answer to this question they looked at all their earlier figures and thought about them anew. This led to a realization, by 3 July,/4/ that the previous estimates of how many small earthquakes per year of a given size occurred on the average in the Soviet Union were too high by a significant factor.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 204.

/3/This ACDA request has not been further identified.

/4/Reference presumably is to an interagency meeting on July 3 at which the Vela findings were discussed in some detail. John McNaughton summarized the consensus at the meeting in a July 3 memorandum to Nitze. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/AE Files: FRC 69 A 2243, 97 USP, Nuclear Test Suspension/Geneva (1960-1962)) See the Supplement. See also Document 204.

2. However, the answer that we first knew the new figures on 3 July is an over-simplification. In fact, the scientists in the Air Force who run the detection system for nuclear explosions (AFTAC) suspected as early as 1958 that their current interpretation of their measurements might be incorrect. The Hardtack shot at the end of 1958 raised this suspicion. However, we changed our official estimates in the opposite direction. In the summer of 1961 the first half-year report from one of the new accurately-instrumented and specially organized stations in the Vela program led to further doubt about the validity of our previous estimates. These doubts remained no more than doubts until February of this year. Then this data on the Soviet tests made the suspicion stronger. Our measurements on the French test of 1 May and our measurements on the Aardvark shot in our own underground test series of 12 May changed suspicion to new knowledge./5/ The inquiry by ACDA crystallized the new knowledge into a new estimate.

/5/Aardvark was an underground shot with a yield of 40 kilotons in the Nevada test series. (Department of Energy, Announced United States Nuclear Tests, p. 19)

3. The essence of the problem lies in the fact that our previous measurements rested on the observations of the world-wide system of existing academic and governmental seismic stations. These stations had two shortcomings. First, their instruments were not carefully calibrated against each other or a known standard. Second, they were chiefly useful in measuring relatively large earthquakes in which seismologists were interested for scientific purposes. When we created the Atomic Energy Detection System of stations operated by the AFTAC, we got the first set of stations with high quality, uniformly calibrated instruments directed toward measuring small underground shocks, such as arise from underground nuclear tests. These stations were designed to measure a different kind of seismic shock than the others, namely the underground or body wave as opposed to the surface wave which was used to measure large earthquakes. The problem has always been: what is the relation of the two kinds of measurements? It is only on the basis of this relation that we are able to interpret our observations to make an estimate of the number of earthquakes of given magnitude in the Soviet Union. What the events I have summarized above did was lead the scientists in AFTAC to conclude that the old formula for relating these two sets of measurements was wrong, and that a new formula was needed.

4. The estimates of the frequency of small shocks/6/ in the Soviet Union which we presented at the Geneva Experts Conference/7/ were challenged by Soviet scientists. Their figures differed from our figures by roughly the amount of the correction factor which we have now accepted. Thus our new figures are about the same as those the Soviets offered in 1958. We still do not understand whether this is a coincidence, which is what the AFTAC scientists say, or whether the Soviets did have a better understanding of the real relation between the two sets of measurements. We cannot simply say that the Soviets had the right formula, because the nature of their argument about the difference between these two sets of figures was not couched in these terms. Frank Press, one of the leading seismologists in the country, who is a member of your Scientific Advisory Committee, does not accept the explanation that the identity of our new result and the Soviet figures in 1958 is just a coincidence. However, he is still unsure of just what the relation between the two sets of figures is. The important practical fact, of course, is that we have changed our figures to look more like the Soviet figures, whatever the reason.

/6/The word "shots" has been crossed out and the word "shocks" inserted by hand.

/7/Regarding the conclusions of this conference, which met in Geneva July 1-August 21, 1958, see Report of the Conference of Experts To Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office), Miscellaneous No. 11 (1958). Additional documentation on the conference is in Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, volume III.456

5. It is still too soon to say precisely what the significance of the new figures is for our position on a test ban treaty. The interested people will be discussing this in the coming week, and you will probably get an evaluation by the end of the week or early the following week.

6. I think there is one significant moral to be drawn from the story. It is the fact that the accurate data which AFTAC collected on its new system was highly classified and its existence in detail was unknown to all except a few scientists inside the Government. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the technical people who had produced the original set of figures, did not quickly leap to the thought that the discrepancies which they had observed, and the questions which others had raised, based on the small amount of public data and the Russian figures, might be explicable in some other way than as mistakes in public or Soviet data. If the AFTAC figures had been made more widely available, or if AFTAC's activities had been reviewed in detail more frequently by outside scientists, the change in understanding and evaluation might have come a good deal more quickly. It is fair to say, of course, that this is a speculation. How hard and how long a man has to look at new figures before he sees that they are inconsistent with an old theory remains one of the inscrutable mysteries of science.

CK/8/

/8/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

197. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

USMC/5

Geneva, July 21, 1962, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Kohler. The meeting was held during luncheon at the British Mission. Secretary Rusk was in Geneva July 19 for sessions of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, which reconvened on July 16, and for the signing of the Laos Accords on July 23.

SECRETARY'S GENEVA TRIP

July 19-26, 1962

United States
The Secretary
Mr. Kohler

United Kingdom
Lord Home
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Sir Michael Wright
Mr. Price, Ministry of Defense/2/

/2/Benjamin Terence Price, Chief Scientific Officer, British Ministry of Defense.

SUBJECT
Nuclear Tests

Lord Home brought in Sir Michael and Mr. Price for this phase of the discussion with the Secretary. He opened with the question as to when the US expected to have new proposals in the nuclear testing field. The Secretary replied that he hoped we would be able to develop our conclusions by next week. He would comment as regards the Vela tests that they had produced entirely new data which needed a considerable amount of further analysis. As Lord Home knew, the President was prepared to go as far as was technically possible. However another factor was that considerable education would be necessary for key Congressional leaders, especially in the Senate. From what he had learned to date, though he had not been fully briefed, the Secretary thought that the Vela results would certainly not do away entirely with the need for on-site inspections and would probably not entirely obviate the need for some control posts in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Price gave a brief review of the consultations with the President's Science Adviser, Jerome Wiesner, in London/3/ and commented that these had come to considerably more optimistic conclusions than those voiced by the Secretary.

/3/Regarding these London meetings, see footnote 4, Document 193.

Sir Michael commented that if the Vela results enabled us to have satisfactory assurances on the basis of 25 posts mainly around the periphery of the Soviet Union rather than inside, we could be in business within six months. This contrasted with the present plan under which it would take six years to build the control posts called for, and since there would not be enough to be effective at all for at least two years, we would in fact be faced with a two-year moratorium for the Soviets.

This part of the conversation terminated with the Secretary saying that we would push ahead on this matter and that he would give it his personal attention after his return to Washington.

198. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

USMC/20

Geneva, July 24, 1962, 1:25 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-RU/7-2462. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and Akalovsky on July 26. The meeting was held at the Soviet Mission.

SECRETARY'S GENEVA TRIP

July 19-26, 1962

United States
The Secretary of State
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Akalovsky

USSR
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Mr. Ilyichev/2/
Mr. Kovalev
Mr. Sukhodriev

/2/Ivan Ivanovich Ilyichev, Chief of the Third European Division, Soviet Foreign Ministry.

SUBJECT
Disarmament and Related Topics

While drinks were served, Gromyko contended he had made two new proposals in his speech during the morning at the Disarmament Conference./3/ The Secretary replied he was very much interested in Mr. Gromyko's remarks on the question of force levels. Gromyko said that, since some delegations at the conference had mentioned the possibility of splitting up the difference between the US 2.1 level and the Soviet 1.7 level, the Soviet Union thought that the 1.9 million level might be a good compromise. The Secretary then observed that, when he got back to Washington he would see what could be done to get for Ambassador Dean instructions to follow up on the conversation Mr. Gromyko and he had had earlier on the subject of nondiffusion./4/

/3/For text of Gromyko's remarks to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on July 24, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II, pp. 681-688.

/4/Reference is to a private dinner meeting between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko, probably on July 22. No full report of their conversation on that occasion has been found, but see footnote 7, Document 201.

During the luncheon discussion between the Secretary and Gromyko, there was an exchange on the relationship between disarmament and the solution of other problems. The Secretary made the point that the lowering of tensions which would result from solution of some of these other problems would undoubtedly have its affect on progress in disarmament. Gromyko at first seemed to think that the Secretary was claiming that progress in disarmament could not be made without first resolving these other problems and said that, while the USSR recognized a certain relationship between solution of disarmament and other problems, it objected to making solution of one question dependent on solution of the other. That would create a vicious circle. The Secretary then pointed out that we wanted to go ahead with disarmament and to make progress in this field, but as Khrushchev himself had said, there was an obvious relationship between disarmament and other political problems. The Secretary thought that the US could not agree to reduce its military capabilities before the Berlin problem was settled. He also called attention in this context to the relationship between the increased pressures on Berlin last summer and the acceleration of US military preparations and increased arms expenditures. Gromyko said we could not expect that he could accept this was a justified result. The Secretary responded that he was merely referring to an obvious fact and called attention to what Khrushchev had told President Kennedy in Vienna./5/ Khrushchev had mentioned the pressures his military and scientists were putting on him to increase arms expenditures which were put in terms of matching US capabilities; then when the Soviets increased their expenditures, pressures were applied to President Kennedy to increase US expenditures, and a chain reaction ensued.

/5/Documentation on the Vienna summit June 3-4, 1961, is printed in volumes V and XIV.

Gromyko stressed the need by the US to control its official spokesmen who made belligerent and threatening public statements. The Secretary pointed out the fact that under the American system the Executive required public and Congressional cooperation in order to obtain appropriations, something that was different from the situation in the Soviet Union. The Soviets could divert resources from one area to another purely by executive action whereas this was not possible under our system. Hence, there was a need to convince public opinion and this required speaking about the subject.

Gromyko also stressed the point that the US was wrong in thinking that it could bankrupt the Soviet Union through the arms race. The Soviet Union was doing very well and its seven-year plan for economic development was being greatly overfulfilled. Gromyko emphasized he was mentioning this latter point only in passing, and not for any special purpose. The Secretary said we were aware the USSR was a great power with large resources and assured Mr. Gromyko that there was no theory in the US of making the USSR bankrupt through the arms race.

The Secretary recalled the remarks by the Canadian Minister of External Affairs at the Disarmament Conference this morning, in which Mr. Green had expressed the view that there should be no recess of the Disarmament Conference during the General Assembly./6/ The Secretary observed this thought was a new one and that he personally felt that there would be at least some break in the Conference during the GA, particularly since many of the delegates to the Conference were the obvious persons to discuss disarmament in the GA. Mr. Gromyko said that only 17 nations were participating in the Conference and that, therefore, other nations should have the chance of expressing their views on disarmament at least once a year, i.e., at the General Assembly. While a recess had its pros and cons, the USSR felt that some recess during the GA would be in order. As to the Secretary's remarks that the delegates at the conference table would be the logical persons to discuss disarmament, Mr. Gromyko said this was of course something to be decided by each individual country and that he personally did not want to be deprived of the opportunity to speak on that subject. The Secretary denied that he had any intention in this respect.

/6/Green's statement is in U.N. doc. ENDC/PV.60.

199. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

USMC/22

Geneva, July 25, 1962, 10:30-10:50 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-RU/7-2562. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Kohler and approved in S on July 31. The meeting was held at the Soviet Mission.

[Here follow a list of participants and a paragraph on Germany and Berlin.]

Mr. Kohler said the second point was connected with a long private discussion between the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko at dinner the other night on the question of nondiffusion of nuclear weapons and the possibility of finding a formula which would be acceptable to both sides./2/ The question had been posed by Mr. Gromyko as to whether the wording, "direct or indirect," could be accepted from the Soviet formulation on this question but which, as the Secretary had explained, would apply only to assistance to national nuclear capabilities. The Secretary wanted Mr. Gromyko to be informed that he would consider and work on this after his return to Washington and would be in touch with Ambassador Dobrynin on the subject. Mr. Gromyko replied that this was a question for discussion. Wording must be found which would ensure that there were no loopholes. The Soviet Government wanted an agreement on this subject. However, as he had stressed to the Secretary, if there should be any delay in reaching a broader agreement on the subject, this should not entail any delay in reaching an arrangement on this point with respect to the two German states. The Soviet Union was opposed to making one problem dependent on another.

/2/See footnote 4, Document 198.

[Here follows discussion of other U.S.-Soviet issues.]

200. Editorial Note

Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson had a 2-hour conversation with Chairman Khrushchev in the morning of July 25, 1962, followed by a 3-hour conversation with him the same afternoon at Khrushchev's dacha. These conversations covered several subjects in U.S.-Soviet relations. Records of their discussions on Berlin are printed in volume XV, pages 252-255. Following a discussion of military matters, Thompson reported, "Throughout conversation K made many references to U-2." Thompson continued:

"In discussing disarmament I said I could not understand why Soviets had not given serious consideration to our zonal plan of inspection. I said this was serious effort on our part to meet their preoccupation with secrecy and to meet their insistence that amount of inspection be related to amount of disarmament. Our whole effort in this field seemed breaking down because of Soviet obsession with secrecy which I believe based on outmoded analysis. I cited Telstar as latest evidence world shrinking and said whatever advantage they had from secrecy wasting asset. K responded it might be true they gave too much attention and importance to secrecy but said on our side our military obsessed with desire acquire ever more information. He said of course every country had spies but sending U-2 across frontier was essentially act of war. We wanted to know where their rocket bases were but these like anything else could be camouflaged. I said it was natural human trait to fear unknown but pointed out this not to their advantage since it caused our military to prepare to meet threats which might not exist. K said he was more concerned now with use of outer space than with planes but said his own people had shown him photos (not clear whether from planes or satellites but I inferred latter) showing airfield or factories and even planes on field, but not showing what purpose of planes was or what factories produced. Always possible conceal essential information.

"With regard to our zonal proposal K said there were only limited number of Soviet rocket bases and we knew where they are. It would therefore be simple for us to arrange to inspect them all. He did not seem convinced by my counterarguments that if disarmament were 30 percent in first stage, only 30 percent of zones could be inspected. He said essence of disarmament problem was that we wanted to take away weapon with which they could hit us while preserving our overseas bases for use against them. I pointed out that in our first stage they would retain 70 percent of their missiles but he said in order know what 30 percent reduction was we would have to know what their total strength was, and pushed aside my argument that this would not involve inspection of all of them.

"K began discussion of test ban by asking Sobolev whether their announcement of resumption had been published. When answered in affirmative he said they would begin about August 5 or 6--he could not remember exact date. Soviets had resumed testing only because of our actions in military field. He added however somewhat cryptically that he understood President's action. He hoped that as result of our experiments we would now be able to conclude test ban, implication being after their next series was completed. I observed there appeared to be hope that as result of our new studies it might be possible to agree not to have permanent observation posts but it would still be necessary to have verification of suspicious events. K brushed this aside saying that we could detect anything from outside and he cited fact that Soviets had conducted unannounced underground test in last series which we had detected and publicized. He said same true of French test which I gathered Soviets had detected. He said test agreement could be reached but he did not think Pentagon wanted it.

"From nature of conversation I gathered K has little hope that disarmament agreement can be reached.

"He said, for example, that greatest problem was fact that we have many invested interests in arms race and our monopolists would prevent agreement. I replied this was absurd and that what he called monopolists knew as well as anyone else that arms race was dangerous and war would hit them as well as anyone else. I added we had many interesting projects and needs which would require all our resources. It was true sudden disarmament would cause dislocations but we were confident we could deal with them. I expressed opinion military people on both sides responsible for security of country prudently always tended give other side maximum capability and worst intentions but it would be tragic if we let this determine our overall policy, and that arms race was not only vast economic waste but also cause of dangerous tensions.

"K said Soviet 7-year plan would be fulfilled whether or not there was disarmament and said plan had been based on assumption there would not be. If disarmament achieved they would probably complete plan by end of five years.

"I brought up subject of prevention war by accident or miscalculation saying we had taken many unilateral steps in this field but others called for which required cooperation of both sides and I hoped Soviets would pursue this problem with us. I indicated agreement but did not pursue matter." (Telegram 227 from Moscow, July 26; Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-2662)

On July 27, Thompson, who was to be replaced by Foy D. Kohler as Ambassador to the Soviet Union, left Moscow to return to the United States. During a stop en route in Copenhagen, Thompson transmitted further reflections on these talks. Following his comments on Berlin, Thompson added:

"(2) Even if we are willing to give up insistence upon having control posts inside Soviet Union I do not think Khrushchev will agree to more than one or two verifications of test ban a year and probably none. He is obsessed with idea we want to locate his missiles but probably more important he wants to conceal his relative weakness.

"(3) The mere fact that Khrushchev asserted he could achieve his seven year plan without disarmament convinces me that the opposite is the case but I doubt that we will get anywhere on real disarmament at this time. I got impression, however, that Khrushchev will be prepared seriously to consider steps to prevent war by accident or miscalculation. If we can get over the Berlin hump and then let him know our intelligence capabilities we might make progress on GCD." (Telegram 76 from Copenhagen, July 28; ibid., 762.00/7-2862)

201. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, July 26, 1962, 2 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Gathright and approved in S on August 16. McCone also wrote a memorandum for the record of this meeting, July 26. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Memos for Record 4/7/62-8/21/62) See the Supplement.

SUBJECT
Meeting of Committee of Principals

PARTICIPANTS
See attached list/2/

/2/The attached list of 23 participants is not printed.

Nuclear Test Ban

The Secretary asked Mr. Foster to present the issues for discussion.

Mr. Foster stated that findings reported by Project Vela and by AFTAC hold some hope for modification of the present U.S. position on a nuclear test ban. These findings have received intensive consideration. As the result of press coverage, Congress has been taking a substantial interest in the matter. Alternative approaches have been discussed with the Congressional committees, which have been informed that no decision has yet been made. The alternatives presented for consideration by the Principals have been reviewed by the scientists and by the Deputies./3/

/3/A meeting of the Deputies on July 20 discussed a draft nuclear test ban treaty. No record of this meeting has been found.

The fundamental question is whether, in contrast to continued "leap-frogging" of tests, the national interest is best served by taking advantage of technical improvements in order to propose a treaty that might be more acceptable to the Soviet Union. ACDA feels that two types of treaties might be more acceptable to the Soviet Union than present proposals while at the same time providing assurance that we would be able to catch any gross cheating.

ACDA considers that the most desirable approach would be to present a modified comprehensive treaty with no threshold and no right to test at all. There would be an "international-national" system involving fewer stations than previously proposed. The stations would be operated by nationals of the host countries and would feed data to an international commission, which would determine suspicious events and request on-site inspection. The alternative would be a ban on atmospheric, outer space, and underwater testing but not on underground testing; any party would be entitled to proceed with underground testing under conditions which would preclude venting outside of national borders. Both approaches seem technically possible. ACDA believes that we should first present the comprehensive treaty. If that fails, we should offer the atmospheric ban.

Technical presentations should be made at Geneva to prepare the groundwork and explain why it is still necessary to have on-site inspections.

The Secretary noted that the draft "U.S. Program"/4/ described the new findings as "tentative" and asked how tentative they were.

/4/"U.S. Program Regarding a Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons Tests", draft of July 25. [Footnote in the source text. The draft has not been found. A July 24 draft is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 23, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Regarding a July 26 draft, see footnote 3, Document 202.]

Mr. Fisher explained that in an appearance before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Doyle Northrup of AFTAC had described the findings in this way and that his view had been reflected in the Holifield-Jackson letter to the President./5/ On the other hand, Northrup had developed suggestions for an improved detection system based on the new findings. The findings do look very good, and we should make up our minds.

/5/Not further identified.

The Secretary thought we should interpret "tentative" as meaning that to the best of our present ability to know what is correct, this is the way things look.

Dr. Wiesner pointed out that there is enough certainty so that people are reasonably comfortable. His view was that the data will get better and that it is unlikely that there will be any retrogression. Present lack of agreement is largely over the subtleties of numbers.

Secretary McNamara thought there were two unknowns. The first was the level of the detection threshold and of undifferentiated events above the threshold. Knowledge of this is fairly certain; there is a degree of uncertainty, but not very great. The second unknown, about which there was greater uncertainty, was the amount of advancement in nuclear technology that can take place below the threshold.

Dr. Seaborg pointed out that the detection threshold differs as between tuff, granite, and alluvium, the threshold for the latter being 14 kt. If we accept the possibility that the Soviet Union can test below 14 kt, a lot can be done. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

Dr. Wiesner did not believe that one would dare conduct tests as large as 14 kt.

Mr. Foster pointed out that the Soviet Union would face the possibility of detection. By unilateral means, we would be able to detect tests in alluvium.

Secretary McNamara was prepared to believe that the actual threshold might be around 7 kt; testing below that level, however, might give substantial gains to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, although it seemed that the degree of risk from cheating was substantial, we also needed to know the risks of not having a ban at all.

Dr. Seaborg identified the principal purposes of tests below 10 kt./6/ However, he thought there was a more important question than that of the data that could be obtained from underground testing and explained that AEC's chief concern was the effect of stopping underground testing on the vitality of our laboratories. If we stopped but the Soviet Union continued to test underground, they would be prepared to resume atmospheric testing. Dr. Haworth stated the problem in a somewhat different way, pointing out that AEC's concern was that the Soviet Union might at a future time abrogate a comprehensive treaty with a big, all-out atmospheric test series. We couldn't forestall such a possibility completely, but we could minimize its effects. An atmospheric ban, with continued underground testing, would permit us to maintain a posture of readiness.

/6/Separate Memorandum of Conversation classified Secret-Restricted Data on file in ACDA and AEC. [Footnote in the source text. A memorandum from C.E. Conger (ACDA/D) to William H. Brubeck (S/S), August 10, attached to the source text, notes that because certain of Seaborg's remarks involved atomic energy restricted data, ACDA/D "summarized this part of Seaborg's remarks in a brief separate memorandum, copies of which will be on file in ACDA and AEC." This memorandum of conversation has not been found. A note from Brubeck to Emory C. Swank (S), August 13, also attached to the source text, notes that S/S would obtain a copy of the memorandum containing Seaborg's remarks "if the Secretary desires to read it." No response from the Secretary has been found.]

In response to a question by the Secretary, Mr. McNamara stated that he believed that if we could be certain that the Soviet Union would stop testing, we should do so. Dr. Seaborg had no reservations about this.

The Secretary then said that it is fundamental to the U.S. position that we should not put forward proposals for purely propagandistic or political reasons. Public statements on the Project VELA findings have built up great expectations, but we must be prepared to live with the proposals we advance. We are always under steady pressure, from those bearing less responsibility, to alter our proposals. The numbers (of detection stations and on-site inspections) we talk about are significant to us but less so to others. They will urge concessions and try to whack the numbers down still further. Unless we are prepared to state our position and stick with it, there will always be erosion.

There are two approaches we might take. We could go in with a fairly complete and tight comprehensive treaty, support it with the data we have, and be prepared to fall back to an atmospheric ban. On the other hand, the Soviet Union is categorically saying that it will accept no on-site inspection. Gromyko repeated this in personal conversations. Under these circumstances, our numbers are not particularly relevant. Changes in our numbers don't move us toward agreement. Perhaps we should say that we would like to work on a comprehensive treaty but that we are aware of the Soviet position on on-site inspection. So long as that position prevails, there is no point in playing a numbers game. For our own part, we want to make a start somewhere, so we propose starting with an atmospheric treaty and making it comprehensive as soon as possible. Since the rest of the world is primarily concerned with atmospheric tests and the effects of fallout, this approach should be well received.

Mr. McCone recalled that we had tried this approach twice before, once in 1959 and again in 1961.

Mr. Fisher, however, pointed out that the 1959 proposal had been an elaborate one whereas the present proposal was pared down. The 1961 proposal had been put forward under special circumstances and a time limit had been placed on its acceptance. We have not put forward a proposal for an atmospheric ban in the manner in which we would do so now.

Although not feeling at this point in a position to express a final preference, the Secretary had the impression that atmospheric tests seemed more important than underground tests and that it would be more desirable to seek an atmospheric ban than to go through a series of conflicts over numbers, both at home with the Congress as well as abroad.

Mr. Murrow agreed. He thought our posture would be good in terms of world opinion.

The Secretary then noted that we have supposed that the Soviet Union would not accept an atmospheric ban. However in view of Soviet concern over the proliferation of nuclear weapons, he thought that if we could move forward simultaneously with an atmospheric ban and something on non-proliferation, the Soviet Union might accept it./7/

/7/Separate Memorandum of Conversation classified Secret-Limited Distribution on file in ACDA and S/S. [Footnote in the source text. In his August 10 memorandum to Brubeck, Conger wrote that during the meeting "the Secretary requested that references to a recent talk with Gromyko be closely held." Thus this part of the Secretary's conversation was summarized in a separate, limited distribution memorandum. This separate memorandum, attached to the source text, reads: "Referring to recent conversations with Gromyko, the Secretary stated that he thought the Soviet Union was seriously concerned about the question of nuclear proliferation, particularly in the case of West Germany. Gromyko had suggested language to the effect that we would not help other countries 'directly or indirectly'. The Secretary had questioned whether the United States and the Soviet Union would interpret 'indirectly' in the same manner. However, he thought there was some possibility that we could develop mutually acceptable language on non-proliferation which would safeguard our position on a multi-national European nuclear force while assuring the Soviet Union that we would not assist any state in obtaining nuclear weapons for use on the basis of a national decision."]

Dr. Wiesner asked why we should use Soviet interest in non-proliferation to get an atmospheric ban. Why not try to get a total ban. Moreover, he thought that other countries were unlikely to agree to a self-denying non-proliferation agreement, if we ourselves retained the right to test underground.

With reference to the apparent impossibility of obtaining Soviet agreement to a comprehensive treaty with on-site inspection, Dr. Seaborg assumed that there was no disagreement in the U.S. regarding the need for inspection, and the Secretary asked whether it could be reported to the President that there was no opinion that zero inspection would be acceptable.

There was general agreement with this statement. Mr. McNamara added, however, that although he was not prepared to say that zero inspection was acceptable, he was also not prepared to say what risk would be involved in a continuation of testing. He thought that we should put down the risks that would arise from the Soviet Union's beating the system and put alongside these the risks involved in continuation of testing. His personal view was that the risks of continued testing were very serious if we looked ahead ten years. He was seriously concerned about the degree of proliferation that would take place in this period.

Mr. Murrow asked whether this did not argue against putting forward a specific number of required inspection. Mr. McNamara thought it might. He thought the Secretary's suggestion of associating an atmospheric test ban with a non-proliferation agreement was interesting, but he wondered whether we could get agreement.

Mr. Bundy thought this approach was so one-sided that we were unlikely to get agreement. Only those countries which now had nuclear weapons would be free to test. Dr. Wiesner supported this view, but Mr. Nitze disagreed. He thought that there was a certain inequity anyway and that if the Secretary's approach were followed, the situation would not be much more inequitable than at present. However, he suggested that we add to the atmospheric ban and nonproliferation proposals, an expression of our willingness to extend the ban to underground testing if the Soviet Union would agree to inspection. Mr. Foster agreed that the possibility of a comprehensive treaty should be part of the package.

The Secretary concluded that both the principal alternatives should be presented to the President. He continued to fear, however, that if we presented specific numbers in Geneva, we would generate much controversy at home and that such controversy would be purposeless in view of the Soviet position. If we don't go in with numbers, we will have more time to explain the situation to the Congress. We could say at Geneva that it would be possible to work the matter out on the basis of lower numbers but not prior to acceptance by the Soviet Union of the need for inspection.

Mr. Keeny cautioned that this approach would, in effect, invite the neutrals to present proposals involving very little inspection. Dr. Wiesner agreed and thought that by extrapolation, the old numbers would go way down in the light of the new findings. If we go forward with the findings but without the numbers we want, we may be compromising our own position. Mr. Foster noted that this did not seem to change the fundamental point which was that apparently the Soviet Union would not accept any numbers at all. We can say that if the Soviet Union will accept inspection, the number will be lower than 20.

Mr. Bundy agreed that it would not be fruitful to present precise numbers. As far as Congress was concerned, he thought we would have an additional problem with the question of "international-national" systems. It might be desirable to remain uncommitted on this point. Dr. Wiesner, however, pointed out that we had agreed to study the neutrals' proposal and that it would be strange if we said nothing. Mr. Foster thought this could be handled by stressing the use of national systems in support of an atmospheric ban. The Secretary hoped that we could clarify the term "international-national" and avoid any confusion with the Soviet interpretation.

Mr. McNamara stated his understanding that under the foregoing approach we actually would continue underground testing. Mr. Bundy noted that the second round has been approved with no time limit. Mr. Murrow asked whether there was any necessity of announcing completion of the current series. He noted that the beginning of each new series was always greeted with a poor reaction abroad. He wondered why we could not simply drag the present series out. Mr. Bundy said that was, in effect, what we were doing.

Mr. McNamara then asked whether, under an atmospheric ban, we would contemplate preparing for resumption of atmospheric tests to prepare for the contingency that the Soviet Union might do so. Mr. Bundy thought it would be important to be prepared, that we would need to maintain standby readiness through time. The Secretary pointed out that the kind of preparations we undertook would be affected by the question of whether preparations were initiated before or after an agreement. We should try to set up categories of preparations that would be desirable and acceptable after the signing of a test ban. Dr. Seaborg noted in this regard that Christmas Island presented a knotty problem. Mr. McNamara thought we could determine what things could be done without becoming known internationally.

Dr. Wiesner commented that we were probably taking too narrow an approach in considering countermeasures to possible resumption of testing by the Soviet Union. Rather than resume testing ourselves, we might, for example, say that we would double the size of our missile force. This might be a more effective deterrent to Soviet resumption.

(Note: In connection with the foregoing, no discussion took place respecting the texts of the draft treaties.)

Production During Stage I of Disarmament

Mr. Fisher explained that ACDA recommended that Stage I production of armaments be on the basis of one-for-one replacement by types./8/ Even under this approach, there would have to be an upper limit on production. As a basis for negotiation, we could say that the reduction should be at least 10 percent a year during Stage I but that it might be greater. A reduction on this basis would parallel the reduction of armaments, and we could take advantage of the Soviet proposal that armaments and production be reduced proportionately.

/8/See "Recommendation on Production Limits in Stage I", draft of July 23, 1962. [Footnote in the source text. A copy is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 23, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.]

Gen. Lemnitzer thought that much depended on the definition of "types". He asked whether a Minuteman could be substituted for an Atlas.

Mr. Fisher explained that all B-52's would be regarded as one type regardless of series but that Minuteman and Atlas represented different types.

Mr. McNamara stated that production by types was acceptable.

Gen. Lemnitzer expressed the view that there should be no ban on production of prototypes or on modernization of production facilities.

Mr. Foster, however, pointed out that there would be a need to show that we were prepared to go ahead with disarmament. Production of new prototypes would raise doubts about this. Moreover, the approach was based on the belief that by 1964 the U.S. would be in a good position and that it would be best to freeze types at that time. Dr. Wiesner added that we certainly would not want to permit new facilities for producing weapons to be established during Stage I.

The Secretary asked about the cut-off between production of items for military and for civilian use. Mr. Foster thought the dividing line was sufficiently clear for present negotiating purposes, but there would be problems later. He noted that this problem had been encountered in the JCS wargame on inspection and believed that it would be desirable to have additional wargames.

It was agreed that the recommendation on production should be presented to the President for approval.

Reduction of Military Bases in Stage I

Mr. Foster stated that the ACDA recommendation/9/ put discussion of military bases back toward the end of Stage I but did permit discussion. The U.S. would not accept the singling out of "foreign" bases but might be willing to begin a reduction of bases at some point in Stage I. It would be inconsistent to be unwilling to discuss this if progress were made on other points.

/9/"Stage I reduction of military bases", draft of July 23, 1962. [Footnote in the source text. This draft has not been found.]

The Secretary asked whether there will be any foreign bases we will be prepared to give up in the next few years. Mr. McNamara estimated that we would probably give up a small number in the next two or three years, perhaps 20-50 out of, say, 500 of the larger bases (not counting the many small installations). Mr. Murrow thought it might be useful to have a definition of "military bases" that would differentiate between large bases and small installations.

Gen. Taylor asked whether this presupposed redeployment. Mr. McNamara said that what he had in mind was some of the B-47 bases and other bases of that character. Twenty was not a large number. The Secretary pointed out that we do not redeploy in order to reduce bases; we reduce bases when we redeploy.

Mr. McNamara accepted the recommendation on military bases, and it was agreed that the recommendation should be presented to the President for approval.

Stage I Force Levels

The Secretary noted in view of the Soviet action accepting a Stage I force level of 1.9 million, there would be increased pressure for the U.S. to accept the same level. Mr. McNamara recognized that this would be the case. Mr. Foster requested that the force level study be expedited so that we might be able to say something before the next recess, which was expected in September. Mr. McNamara agreed that the study should be expedited. Mr. Nitze noted in this connection that the question of civilian personnel was of great importance.

202. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, July 26, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 7/27/62. Confidential. Attached to the source text is a note from McGeorge Bundy to the President that reads: "Here is a basic paper for tomorrow's testing-disarmament meeting--set for 10:15 AM. It puts the main issues clearly. The positions relating to the general disarmament treaty are easy--and unanimously agreed. The testing scenario is the hard one. My belief is that you will want to listen hard, and not decide, tomorrow morning."

SUBJECT
U.S. Program Regarding a Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapon Tests and Other Disarmament Proposals

The Committee of Principals met on July 26, 1962 to consider issues which are outstanding in the disarmament negotiations now going on in Geneva./2/ At that meeting, we considered alternative lines of approach with respect to negotiations for a ban on nuclear weapons tests. These lines of approach are based on a combination of technical and political developments which are described in the attached memorandum./3/

/2/See Document 201.

/3/Entitled "U.S. Program Regarding a Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons Tests," dated July 26, not printed.

There are two proposed alternatives which are described below. The members of the Committee of Principals are prepared to discuss the issues with you tomorrow to help you in making your determination as to which is most in the national interest.

1. Alternative One. The United States should simultaneously pursue the following five courses:

a. Atmospheric test ban. The United States should table an atmospheric-outerspace-underwater test-ban treaty.

b. Comprehensive test ban. With respect to a comprehensive treaty, we should not table one now./4/ We should declare a willingness to accept a comprehensive test-ban treaty involving no foreign-operated control posts on Soviet soil and involving fewer than 20 on-site inspections (but we should state that we see no point in suggesting or debating details or numbers until the Soviet Union agrees to at least some on-site inspections)./5/ We should at the same time provide the Conference with as much recent data as we can relating to detection, location and identification capabilities of internationally coordinated "national" systems. We should express our willingness to negotiate in any of these areas even though the Soviet Union commences an atmospheric test series.

/4/This sentence has been crossed out in the source text, presumably by the President. It is also crossed out by McGeorge Bundy on a carbon copy attached to the source text.

/5/This sentence contains the following markings presumably in the President's hand: "foreign operated" has been crossed out, and inserted in the margin are the words, "internationally monitored nation'l control posts"; "fewer than 20 on-site" has been deleted, and inserted by hand in the margin is "possible reduction in on site"; and from the word "but" to the end of the sentence has been placed in brackets. The first change is the same on Bundy's carbon copy; the second is the same except Bundy has not crossed out "on site" and has written in "a possible reduction in". Instead of brackets for the last clause in this sentence, Bundy has written in the margin: "reserved for discussion with Dean".

c. No-transfer agreement. The United States should press for a world-wide agreement banning the transfer or acquisition of nuclear weapons or nuclear technology. This course of action would be related practically, but not organically to the other courses of action.

d. Underground testing. We should continue our underground testing program./6/

/6/McGeorge Bundy wrote in the margin on the carbon copy: "no public announcement".

e. Readiness to test in the atmosphere. We should, to the extent feasible, maintain readiness to test in the atmosphere./7/

/7/Next to this paragraph on the carbon copy, Bundy wrote: "prepared to".

2. Alternative Two. The United States should pursue the following courses in the order indicated:

a. Tabling of data. The United States should provide the Conference with the recent data relating to detection, location and identification capabilities.

b. Comprehensive test ban. We should propose a comprehensive test-ban treaty involving the following changes:

(i) The total number of control posts in the USSR to be reduced from 19 to perhaps 5.

(ii) The control posts to be operated by nationals of the country where they are located but standardized and coordinated by an international organization. There would also be permanent international observers at these posts or periodic visits to them by such observers.

(iii) The number of on-site inspections in the Soviet Union to be reduced from the present range of 12 to 20 to a flat figure which might be less than the present minimum of 12.

c. Atmospheric test ban. We should be prepared to fall back to an atmospheric-outerspace-underwater test-ban treaty in the event that the Soviet Union is unwilling to agree to on-site inspections.

In discussing the problem of nuclear testing, the Committee of Principals agreed that two concurrent studies should be undertaken on an urgent basis: an assessment of the risks to U.S. security under the alternative types of test bans, and an assessment of the risks to U.S. security that would result from the indefinite continuation of testing of nuclear weapons by the U.S., the Soviet Union, and other countries.

In addition to considering questions related to cessation of nuclear weapon testing, the Committee of Principals also considered and recommends for your approval the following positions related to general disarmament negotiations:

Stage I production. The Committee of Principals proposes that production of armaments during Stage I should be limited to replacement and repair of existing armaments. Replacement would be "in kind." The amount of production would be reduced at least as much as the reduction of armaments. Production of new types of weapons, of prototypes, and of new armament production facilities would be prohibited.

Bases. The Committee of Principals also proposes that the United States should state at the Geneva Conference that it would be willing to discuss the possibility of a Stage I reduction of military bases but that any such discussion should take place only after substantial progress has been made toward reaching agreement on the central problems of reducing armaments and armed forces and on verification and other measures providing necessary safeguards in a disarming world.

William C. Foster

203. Memorandum of Meeting With President Kennedy/1/

Washington, July 27, 1962, 10:20 a.m.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 7/27/62. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. A list of the 19 participants at the meeting is in the President's Appointment Book. (Ibid.) McCone also prepared a summary memorandum of this NSC meeting. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI, ER Subject Files, NSC, 7/1/62-7/31/62) See the Supplement.

SUBJECT
Disarmament Proposals

Secretary Rusk introduced the Committee of Principals' proposals with respect to a nuclear weapons test ban and other disarmament measures. He said that we must proceed with prudence and that we must have reasonable assurances that the other side is not testing if we are to live with treaty provisions prohibiting our testing. He added that everyone was agreed that if we can get an acceptable treaty, we want a nuclear weapons test ban. He presented two alternatives:

(1) We can go all the way for a comprehensive all-environment ban, relying on a national protection system. This system involves neutral observers at each station, plus twelve on-site inspections in the Soviet Union. The Soviet inspection figure is zero. Thus, we are exposed to pressure from the neutrals to reduce our minimum figure of twelve. He noted that key Congressional leaders were not pleased with the thought that we would be putting forward to the Russians any new disarmament proposal.

(2) The second alternative is to start with a fallback position in anticipation of the Russians' refusal to accept any on-site inspection. The fallback position would involve a ban on atmospheric testing.

Secretary Rusk favored going to an atmospheric ban treaty now and move toward a comprehensive treaty just as soon as the Russians would accept on-site inspection. He saw no point in playing with the number of inspections when the Soviets had clearly told us that they would accept no inspection.

The President asked what happened when the Soviets renew their tests. He called attention to the fact that we might have to resume testing, depending on what the Russians do and what we think they have learned from their most recent tests.

Secretary Rusk said we would have to protect ourselves from a situation in which the Russians would be obtaining new information while we would be treaty-bound not to test.

The President asked whether we would hold off until the Soviets have finished their testing. He also asked what we would do if they made us an offer on, say, January 1, to henceforth cease all testing. Between now and January 1 we would be embarrassed to test even if we were in a position to do so.

Secretary Rusk said we must keep open the possibility of future U.S. testing until we know as much as we can about what the Russians had learned during their current series.

Mr. Murrow agreed that we should make every effort to avoid playing the numbers game with inspections. He suggested that we ask the Russians to hold off for eight months or as long as we did before resuming tests.

Dr. Wiesner said we would have to continue our tests for at least a month or six weeks.

The President asked why we chose twelve as the number of inspections. He noted that our latest information on the number of earthquakes was lower in percentage terms than the reduction in the number of U.S. inspections we said we wanted. He asked why we shouldn't put the number lower in view of the probability that the Soviets were going to refuse all inspection.

Mr. Bundy responded that Ambassador Dean's view is that he wants a fixed number of inspections so that he can resist pressure from the neutrals who are insisting that we be precise about our proposal.

Secretary Rusk replied that Dean must negotiate with the Soviet representatives and not with the neutral representatives.

Mr. Foster commented that we should not discuss merely the number of inspections but look at the entire inspection system we are proposing.

Dr. Wiesner noted that the national detection system being proposed is a British system now adopted by the neutrals. He stated his view that it is almost certain we can detect nuclear weapons tests by a system located entirely outside the USSR. The proposal is to go from nineteen international stations down to five national stations inside the USSR. He acknowledged that the new proposal involved a degradation of from one to two KT over the Geneva system. He noted that inspection outside the USSR would continue. He mentioned 70-plus events, thirty of them outside the Kurile Islands, with which we would have to deal. He thought that we could accept six to nine inspections.

Secretary McNamara said the number of inspections we were asking was lower because we had raised the threshold. He said the threshold was now one KT in granite.

Chairman Seaborg said what we were talking about was two KT in tuff.

Mr. Bundy intervened to state that we were not trying to reach a decision now because we don't know what our new data actually means. We haven't war-gamed the situation on the basis of the new data. For example, reconnaissance satellites might be in a position to photograph alluvial shots.

In response to the President's question, Dr. Seaborg said we could learn much from underground tests smaller than ten KT. In addition, underground tests would keep alive the laboratories and permit us to experiment with new ideas involving vulnerability of our weapons, weapons effects, primers, and the all-fusion weapons.

Director McCone said he favored underground tests but commented that other countries could conduct underground tests, thereby resulting in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He recalled that in April 1959 President Eisenhower had proposed a test ban very similar to the one now being considered. To do so again would involve repeating an idea previously turned down by the Russians. He read an extract from President Eisenhower's letter containing the test ban proposal. He said he was not proposing an atmospheric test ban but he did recall that the Soviets proposed such a ban immediately after they had finished their last test series and we, at that time, ridiculed their suggestion.

The President said that if we now propose such a ban, they would turn it down. He suggested that we may want to reserve this proposal for use after they complete their test series, if we believe they have learned little in this series.

Secretary McNamara said we are not in a position now to decide on the number of inspections. He saw the situation as involving the risks of continuing tests affecting the risks of the treaty ban. He suggested that we agree to an atmospheric test ban, a willingness to accept a simplified comprehensive test ban treaty, and an agreement prohibiting transfer of weapons but continuance of our underground testing program.

Mr. Bundy said he felt we were not yet ready to decide on a national detection system.

Secretary Rusk said what he had in mind was a national system which would include neutral observers at the national stations.

The President said it was reasonable for us to have neutral observers in the national stations. He suggested that we proposed this idea even if we had to give way on it later.

Secretary Rusk said that Congressional leaders were asking why we kept talking numbers of inspections in view of the fact that the Russians kept rejecting all inspections. He thought one way around this Congressional problem was to keep attention focused on an atmospheric test ban.

The President said that if we could get all tests stopped it would be very good. The danger of proliferation and the prospect that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] might acquire a nuclear capability offset the danger involved in possible Soviet cheating. He thought we should go to Congress with this argument.

Mr. Foster said he thought we could impress Congress with the new data which we have acquired. He said we could evaluate the risks of Soviet cheating as compared with the risks growing out of a continuation of the arms race.

Mr. Bundy said we need more information as well as more education of our negotiators in Geneva. He wondered if we could ask for a delay in negotiations. Secretary Rusk pointed out that we ought to brief our Geneva officials on the nature of the new technical data.

The President co