Document 189-249
189. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, June 20, 1962.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 12/1/61-6/30/62. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on June 26.
Meeting with the President on Wednesday, June 20, at 5:15 p.m., attended by Secretary of Defense, Chairman of AEC, Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, McCone, and others to discuss the status of the nuclear test program./2/
/2/Bundy also wrote a memorandum summarizing the President's decisions at this meeting. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing) See the Supplement.
1. It was decided that all scheduled Nevada underground tests and the scheduled [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] above ground tests and the large crater test should be made./3/
/3/Reference presumably is to the final Nevada tests in Operation Nougat and the Nevada tests in Operation Storax I, the first of which was a 104-kiloton thermonuclear crater test on July 6. (Announced United States Nuclear Tests, pp. 20-24)
2. It was agreed that all of the remaining tests in the Pacific should be made.
3. It was agreed that two high altitude effects tests should be made and these would be completed if no slippage or failure occurs, about July 20./4/
/4/Starfish Prime, the first high-altitude nuclear shot in the Dominic series, took place on July 8. Bluegill Prime, July 25, and Bluegill Double Prime, October 15, both misfired during the launch phase and had to be destroyed. (Operation Dominic I--1962, pp. 232-241)
4. It was agreed that the outer space test desired by the AEC would, in all probability, be cancelled. However, Dr. Seaborg was to discuss this subject with the President at a later date./5/ The problem was that one test would extend the operation into August and this was considered undesirable.
/5/At a meeting with Seaborg, Wiesner, Keeny, and McGeorge Bundy on July 10, the President approved preparations for Urraca, a high-altitude shot, to take place about August 6. (Seaborg, Journal, Supplement, pp. 19042-19043) This event was cancelled before this date, however, to avoid further damage to orbiting satellites. High-altitude shots Checkmate (October 19), Bluegill Triple Prime (October 25), Kingfish (November 1), and Tightrope (November 3) were later conducted successfully as part of the Dominic series. (Operation Dominic I--1962, pp. 236-247)
The President agreed to all of the above.
John A. McCone/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
190. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SET/MC/29
London, June 24, 1962, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Kohler and approved in S on June 28. The meeting was held at Carleton Gardens. The Secretary was in London during a visit to several European capitals June 18-28.
SECRETARY'S EUROPEAN TRIP
June 18-28, 1962
PARTICIPANTS
United States
Secretary of State
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Kohler
UK
Prime Minister Macmillan
Lord Home,
Foreign Minister Edward Heath
Lord Privy Seal Sir Harold Caccia
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Mr. Ian Samuel
SUBJECT
Nuclear Tests
Lord Home opened this phase of the discussion by asking what possibilities the Secretary saw for new moves in the nuclear test field. The Secretary replied that we were studying the possibilities for an atmospheric test ban. However what were referred to as national detection capabilities were in fact not national at all on our side. Rather they depended on arrangements with other countries and if we were to consider an atmospheric ban, agreements would have to be made with other peripheral countries which would enable us to be sure that the system would be continued. We could not, for example, be entirely confident of our present arrangements with a country like [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. In any case, we would never be able to agree to an underground ban without verification.
The Prime Minister commented that even when he had met the President in Bermuda he had felt that the important aspect of the nuclear question was the possibility of development of an anti-missile missile. This development could not take place on the basis of underground tests. Consequently he had felt that we could risk a completely unpoliced ban, perhaps for a period of three to five years. He felt that this was the only way that could stop other countries from nuclear development. The only hope was to have a complete ban and thus be able to put diplomatic pressure on other countries to join in.
The Secretary commented that we were not seeking to stay in a nuclear race. Our objective was just to be sure that everybody gets out of the race. Following up on the Prime Minister's remarks, Lord Home wondered whether it would not be possible to agree on an atmospheric ban for perhaps a period of one year, during which it would be agreed that there should be a joint study of the problem of underground tests. The Secretary replied that we could consider this possibility depending on the result of our present analysis of the problem. If the Soviets had really wanted a nuclear test agreement it was difficult to understand their motives in turning down our March proposals. They could then have had a test ban at a great bargain. Speaking on a personal basis, the Secretary commented that perhaps it would be possible after the conclusion of our current tests to approach the Soviets again privately--though not publicly--on this problem.
191. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SET/MC/42
London, June 25, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen and approved in S on July 3. The meeting was held after lunch in the British Foreign Ministry.
SECRETARY'S EUROPEAN TRIP
June 18-28, 1962
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Kohler (for the beginning)
Great Britain
Lord Home
Sir Harold Caccia
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Mr. Joseph Godber
Mr. Ian Samuel
[Ramsbotham, Mason]/2/
/2/Brackets in the source text.
SUBJECT
Testing and disarmament
After lunch, Lord Home, Mr. Godber, Mr. Samuel, the Secretary, Ambassador Bruce, and Mr. Bohlen met to discuss testing and disarmament. The British point seemed to be primarily that they should have something new to offer at the resumed session of the Geneva conference. On testing, Lord Home and Mr. Godber expressed great interest in the possibility of a moratorium on atmospheric testing, to which the Secretary pointed out that it would be necessary to have something on the underground tests, since the United States is not prepared to rely solely on national detection systems. Mr. Godber said he thought it would be useful to have a gathering of scientists, if only to explode the Soviet theory, pointing out that the Russians were always challenging the West, citing United States and other Western citizens to support their contentions.
The Secretary mentioned the question of Chinese involvement, pointing out that some of the Soviet-Chinese installations were near the Chinese border and would be difficult to tell where a suspicious explosion had taken place.
Mr. Godber said that China was very much like France in that all recognized that in any serious nuclear arrangement, the Chinese would have to be in, and the Russians said the same thing about the French.
The Secretary reported that Couve de Murville had told him in Paris that one of the biggest French problems was the question of nuclear disarmament./3/ Lord Home said that it would be well to find out whether any future French tests would be underground. Mr. Godber inquired whether there was any possibility of getting the French into Geneva. The Secretary replied that he felt there was a greater chance of getting them into the Berlin discussions.
/3/Secretary Rusk discussed disarmament with Couve de Murville in Paris on June 20. (Memorandum of conversation, June 20; Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)
Lord Home said that the British Government was very interested in the possibility of an atmospheric moratorium, leaving the underground matter for future considerations. The Secretary repeated that we felt more than national verification was necessary for underground detection. He said the Soviets counted ninety-eight percent on publicity and two percent on espionage, whereas we must rely on international cooperation for both atmospheric and underground testing.
Lord Home said the meeting in Washington in July might well examine which countries we would need for cooperation in an adequate system of tests. There ensued some discussion as to the procedure during the Geneva conference, which might be followed after the recess.
Mr. Godber was in favor of starting with the Eight-Power proposal and then when that was rejected, then turning to the atmospheric tests. He repeated again the necessity of having some positive move to make in this field. The Secretary said that our people were studying the matter and they would have to await the results. Lord Home then raised the question of the inspection of "the remainders" under the first phase thirty percent cut. The Secretary said that we could not get the American people to support anything based on trust in people who were out to do us in. The British pointed out that from their point of view, there would not be much to trust in phase one, since there would be inspection of that which was destroyed. Mr. Godber said that the main criticism of the Western proposals was the fact that phase one and two seemed to involve little disarmament, whereas in phase three there was no fixed figure for the amount of nuclear destruction. He could not understand why we could not put in something more specific in phase three.
Lord Home was of the opinion that the way to handle the phases was to only start on one when the preceding phase had been fully completed, which would not necessitate any veto. He also could not see why we could not put in some specific amount. The Secretary pointed out that this was a very major political matter in the United States and that there was one decision of President Kennedy to the effect that we would not put forth any proposition that we could not live with, no matter what impression is created.
Mr. Godber argued that appearance was equally important if only to smoke out the Russians. He said the introduction of some fixed figure in phase three would help very much the presentation. Then ensued discussion on the question of presenting lists in the various phases which would be favorable to one side as against another, with particular reference to the superiority of the West in nuclear weapons and the superiority of the Russians in conventional. Mr. Godber seemed to be particularly concerned about the effect on the neutrals and on world public opinion.
Lord Home raised the point as to whether we would be better off without any nuclear weapons at all. The Secretary mentioned that the United States was only vulnerable to nuclear attack. Mr. Godber said there was no means of being absolutely sure that no nuclear weapons would be concealed, even in the event of complete and total disarmament, and wondered whether the whole exercise was worthwhile.
The Secretary said that while he doubted if any great and general disagreement would ever be achieved, there were a certain number of peripheral things which would reduce instability and have a dampening effect on tensions. He had in mind surprise attack and the danger of some madman, on either side, starting a weapon on its way. Mr. Godber said that the discussions at Geneva had more or less been stopped by the Russian double cross on Russian propaganda, but felt that when we returned to Geneva we should have some new initiatives to make.
The Secretary said that he could not agree that it should always be up to the West to make new initiatives when the Russians stood pat. Mr. Godber said that this was why he thought it would be valuable to take initiative since this would provide the neutrals with ammunitions to bring pressure to bear on the Russians. The Secretary questioned this thesis, pointing out that neutrals usually occupy a point midway between the Soviet and the West, no matter what these positions are and that experience had shown us that this was not a very true basis on which to act.
The Secretary mentioned that he was having a study made which would permit immediate reference to the Security Council in the event of any action, identical nuclear explosion, before the chain was set off.
Mr. Godber inquired whether President Kennedy would go to the Security Council if a bomb exploded in New York. The Secretary pointed out that it might be a bomb in transit and, anyway, worthwhile looking into arrangements which might prevent the chain reaction to the ultimate catastrophe. Mr. Godber said that at Geneva the plans seemed to be to talk until the General Assembly and then after a brief discussion there, to come back to Geneva. He repeated the importance of taking some Western initiative.
Lord Home agreed with him that the absence of any figures in stage three put the West in a bad position. He repeated that in his view each stage hinged on the proper completion of the preceding one. Mr. Godber, in reply to the Secretary's question, said he was thinking of neutral and UN opinion rather than domestic British opinion. The discussion was, in general, inconclusive, with the Secretary merely saying that some of these matters were under discussion and would be considered in the July meeting in Washington, with the British pressing for new initiatives, even though the Russians had made no move at all in their position.
192. Editorial Note
On June 28, 1962, Adlai Stevenson sent President Kennedy a 6-page letter on current disarmament problems. The letter is printed in full in The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson: Ambassador to the United Nations, 1961-1965, volume VIII, pages 265-269. Attached to a copy of the letter in the Kennedy Library is a June 29 memorandum from Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. to Carl Kaysen that reads, "You may wish to consider the attached letter from Governor Stevenson--and also how best to answer it." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, General, 6/61-12/62) No response to the letter has been found.
193. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, July 5-6, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/7-662. Confidential. Drafted by Marie deGunzburg (ACDA/IR). The meetings were held at the British Embassy.
SUBJECT
US-UK Bilateral Discussions on the Nuclear Test Ban Issue
PARTICIPANTS
(See attachment)/2/
/2/The list of 17 participants at the July 5 meeting and 13 participants at the July 6 meeting is not printed.
The following three ACDA papers were under consideration at the meetings: "Possibilities for a Nuclear Test Detection System which Responds to Basic Ideas of the Eight-Nation Proposal" by Dr. Franklin Long, a draft atmospheric test ban proposal, and a draft comprehensive test ban treaty. (The references in the text are to the fifth revision of this draft.)/3/
/3/A copy of the fifth revision of the comprehensive test ban treaty, dated June 18, is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 23, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. The other two ACDA papers have not been found.
Morning Session, July 5, 1962
Ambassador Dean opened the meeting by calling on Dr. Long to discuss his new paper. Dr. Long explained that he had concentrated on the technical problem of seismic detection by use of national stations. He then described the system proposed in his paper. In estimating the system's capability, Dr. Long stressed the possibility that a country could "spoof" by a variety of technical means, for example, by delaying on the time scale, in order to conduct clandestine tests. Less attention had been paid to detection of high altitude and outer space tests although some of the core stations could have the necessary technical equipment. However, core stations chosen for their seismicity might not be as useful for outer space detection and it might therefore be necessary to separate the two. He explained that more detailed studies of the system were being made, that the national stations would be effective for detection, but much less so for identification, and that the necessity for on-site inspection would remain.
Amb. Dean pointed out that there was still the problem of the international commission's right to determine the necessity of on-site inspection if identification were impossible. Dr. Long agreed. This would be an "internationally operated national system." The advantage would be in having an integrated system under the control of the international commission. The nationals operating the stations would be under firm obligation to the commission to do correct detecting. In answer to a question from Amb. Stelle, he added that distance location would not be very much downgraded and that a ten kilometer radius would still suffice for inspection.
Amb. Dean asked whether the distant stations would be able to confirm an event inside the Soviet Union if that country refused a commission's request to inspect. Dr. Long answered that "spoofing" had not yet been studied in depth, but that the data from a country which was suspected of spoofing would have to be discounted. Responding to Sir Michael Wright's query as to whether atmospheric tests in the Soviet Union could be established without the use of special air over-flights, he said that it would not be possible to locate very small tests, but that there existed a finite possibility of identification which might act as a deterrent. There would be a problem of locating the event if the time element were uncertain.
Less consideration had been given to underwater testing, but a nuclear event could be identified by sampling ocean currents for radioactive debris. For weapons effects tests, underwater testing would be very important, especially in regard to submarine warfare. On the whole, the April 18th, 1961 treaty would be downgraded in every mode by this new system.
Sir Michael Wright asked about the importance of the "series" concept in detection. The UK had felt that in calculating the capabilities for the April 18, 1961 treaty, full justice had not been given to the fact that one was really looking for a series and not an isolated test. Dr. Long said that in principle there was no reason why a series could not be separated in space and time and for certain developments, such as the "neutron" bomb, single tests were useful. However, there was a very good case for the importance of a series.
Amb. Dean inquired about the United States Government's position in regard to the national detection system. Mr. Adrian Fisher replied that there was, to date, no government position on the matter. Underground tests were again considered to be quite important and there was no indication that the government would accept a national detection system as a treaty basis at this time. Dr. Long confirmed that a large majority of the recent Nevada tests would not have been detected if the data from American stations had been discounted. However, as each station sees tuff signals at different magnitudes, there was a pretty good possibility that of 20 stations some would see a test as bigger than 4.5 kiloton and thus detect some of the smaller tests which might be a useful deterrent.
Amb. Dean asked whether this study would be completed by July 16 and how long it would be before a new treaty on this basis could be tabled. Dr. Long said that he would have a better picture of the seismic possibility of this new system by the 16th after a discussion with British scientists in London./4/ Amb. Dean pointed out that even if the US and the UK agreed to pursue this system further there was still no evidence that the Soviet Union would agree to on-site inspection. He questioned whether it was worth presenting a new system less effective than that of April 18, 1961 if the Soviet Union would still not accept inspection. Sir Michael Wright stressed that the 8-nation memorandum fell into three parts: (1) an internationally coordinated detection system based on national control posts; (2) an international scientific commission and (3) verification. The US and UK had interpreted the third point as providing for obligatory on-site inspection and seven of the eight neutrals had stated their agreement with this interpretation. He felt that a major round would be lost if a new proposal based on the 8-nation memorandum were not presented. The system described by Dr. Long for detecting underground tests would probably necessitate more on-site inspection. Tactically it would be better to meet the neutrals on the detection and commission points, while taking a harder line on on-site inspection. A second point, however, was to determine how much value our governments attached to underground testing. If they did not find it very important it was not worth foundering the project on it. Dr. Long stated that the AEC would not agree to leaving the underground tests uninspected.
/4/A summary of the record of these Washington meetings, transmitted in Todis 417 to Geneva, July 6, reads in part: "US and UK scientists (including Long of ACDA) would meet in London next week and discuss technical aspects new US ideas and that outcome this discussion would be relevant re further tactical planning." (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/7-662) In his journal, Seaborg briefly refers to a meeting of the President's Science Advisory Committee on July 16 at which Wiesner described the previous week's meetings with the British on "test detection, permissive links, and general disarmament." (Seaborg, Journal, vol. 4, pp. 41-42)
The meeting proceeded to a discussion of the ACDA draft atmospheric treaty. Amb. Dean pointed out that the draft was not yet cleared and not ready to be tabled at the conference. Furthermore, he wondered whether it would be wise to offer an atmospheric treaty if we still wanted a comprehensive treaty as there might be pressure from the neutrals and the USSR to omit on-site inspection from all types of treaties.
Afternoon Session, July 5, 1962
The discussion of the atmospheric draft treaty resumed in the afternoon.
Sir Michael Wright recalled that our offer of an uncontrolled ban on September 3, 1961 was on the record and he asked whether the renewed offer would include aircraft sampling. Mr. Fisher explained that the inspection provisions in the draft were almost nonexistent. Inspection was purely invitational although each country was committed to maintaining qualified observers who represented a type of ad hoc commission. There was no provision for over-flights. The country charging a violation would be responsible for the observation costs. He added that it would be necessary to consider the observation of peaceful explosions to insure that they were not weapon tests. Sir Michael Wright asked whether this would not give away the principle of on-site inspection in terms of underground tests and disarmament. Amb. Dean agreed that to some extent the draft did expose us to the invitational principle advanced by the USSR on underground tests and that it also omitted the commission principle. Amb. Stelle pointed out that it reopened the possibility of pressure for a moratorium on underground tests. Mr. Fisher replied that the principle of inspection could be stated in such a way that one would request as much international inspection as was needed. Answering a question of Sir Michael Wright's he added that the application of this draft to underwater and outer space tests had not even been tentatively decided.
Sir Michael Wright had serious reservations about Article VII on Withdrawal and Denunciation which sanctioned withdrawal for reasons of national security. This was not very different from the Soviet November 28, 1961 proposal to which we had objected because of its provision for withdrawal on the basis of national rather than international determination. He suggested that the wording of Article 22 in the April 18, 1961 treaty might be better. He hoped that it would be possible to have a statement less blunt on the question of national security. Amb. Stelle remarked that the duration article in the 1961 treaty was fairly satisfactory in regard to violations of the treaty, but not in regard to non-party violations. It would perhaps be possible to use the non-party formula in this draft treaty and the 1961 formula for non-fulfillment. Mr. Goodby and Mr. Spiers pointed out that the International Conference procedure had been included to make it as difficult as possible to withdraw. This was especially important when there were no control conditions.
Sir Michael Wright asked whether the International Court of Justice would be called upon to determine questions of fact or of law. Mr. Fisher observed that it was not very important as it was unlikely that many legal matters would arise and the Court was not an especially good body for establishing fact. Article IV was not intended as a substitute for Article VII. Proceeding to Article VI, he explained that the US experience during the moratorium had shown the difficulties of maintaining a readiness to test unless the right to do so was spelled out. It was simply a recognition of the fact that it was impossible to prevent preparation for testing, but the matter had not yet been decided. Amb. Dean pointed out that nothing in the treaty prevented a country from being ready to test. Sir Michael Wright, Amb. Stelle, and Mr. Fisher agreed that the article did look a little strange.
Turning to a discussion of a draft comprehensive test ban treaty, which he felt the neutrals would certainly favor, Sir Michael Wright remarked that paragraph 1 of Article 9 seemed a step back from the Geneva system by making "a" seismic event eligible for inspection. This would seem to make it possible to request inspection of an earthquake simply because it was in a sensitive area which we wanted to inspect. He suggested substituting "a seismic event suspected of being a nuclear explosion."
In regard to the reverse quota system, Sir Michael Wright asked whether it would not be preferable to allow the Commission to request inspection of all unidentified events. Mr. Goodby remarked that the quota protected both sides. The commission could determine the necessity of an inspection if the objective criteria were spelled out in detail. However, we would want to use all possible information and we might have more available than the commission did. The reverse quota giving the Soviet Union the possibility of conducting 15 free tests within a three-year period would meet the Soviet charge of espionage and at the same time might protect us from inspection of some very sensitive areas. Moreover, a refusal of inspection on the Soviet side would in itself be a very informative fact.
Amb. Dean had serious reservations about the reverse quota which could in effect be a license to test. Amb. Stelle did not think that the reverse quota would remove the Soviet fear of espionage. He thought it better to maintain the classic position that everything would be done to remove the possibility of espionage rather than to spell out this possibility in a treaty.
On the matter of tactics for the Geneva conference, Amb. Dean predicted that the Soviet Delegation would come with a treaty text based on 100% national systems with invitational inspection. Sir Michael Wright hoped that an allied document would be available which would not have to have every paragraph filled in but could be very general. He preferred a comprehensive draft treaty to an atmospheric treaty. Mr. Spiers said that the draft comprehensive treaty would not be ready by July 16 although we would be in a better position to estimate if and when it would be ready after the scientific talks in London. Amb. Stelle expressed reluctance to proceed with the atmospheric treaty if the possibility of a comprehensive treaty had not been ruled out. The inspection principle had now gathered some support and the introduction of an atmospheric treaty now might politically preclude the possibility of agreement on a comprehensive treaty for several years. Amb. Dean also felt that it would be better to risk waiting for a comprehensive treaty.
(End of Meeting--July 5)
Morning Session--July 6, 1962
The meeting resumed with a detailed discussion of the two draft treaties.
Sir Michael Wright stated that although we had to accept the fact that no comprehensive treaty text based on the 8-power memorandum could be tabled on July 16, he had recommended to London that no atmospheric or underwater test ban treaty be tabled until we were forced to give up on a comprehensive treaty. He urged that such a draft treaty be ready as soon as possible. Amb. Dean agreed that our optimum goal would be to have the "Long version of the 8-power proposal" and a draft treaty ready in a few weeks. If this were impossible we should then decide on an alternative in order to avoid a detailed disarmament discussion in the General Assembly and a possible General Assembly decision that the 18-nation conference was not productive.
Sir Michael Wright stated that London accepted in general both US draft treaties, but had some specific questions and suggestions. In the comprehensive draft treaty in Article I, paragraph 1, he proposed changing the last sentence to "place subject to its jurisdiction or by any person subject to its control." He asked whether in Article III the Commission's duties of collecting data and reporting on all seismic events could be more clearly stated and questioned whether the quota should be exercised unilaterally rather than by the Commission. London thought that the neutrals would object and that it would be better if the decision rested with the Commission. Amb. Dean recalled our earlier thinking that if we thought an event had occurred in the USSR we would not want to argue over this with the Commission. Amb. Stelle remarked that in our past attempts to establish objective criteria with the USSR we had been forced to fall back on location criteria. Mr. Spiers pointed out that the exercise of the quota by either side had been originally a USSR proposal and if the Soviet Union ever accepted the quota again it would probably be on this basis.
Sir Michael Wright remarked that the quota system could perhaps operate on a national basis but if the treaty were to include unlimited inspection, the decision should be left to the Commission. Moreover, even if the treaty included unlimited inspection on the basis of a Commission decision, the reverse quota system could still apply. He further commented on the provision in Article III for periodic visits by the Commission to all elements of the system. He recognized the necessity of this paragraph but suspected that the USSR would object to an inspection of its detection posts. Mr. Goodby said that it had been hoped that the Soviet Union would allow the Commission to construct new posts on its territory.
Sir Michael Wright asked whether it would be desirable in Article IV to spell out that the members of the Commission should be scientists. Amb. Stelle cautioned that non-scientists should not be excluded from the Commission's work which was, after all, of a political nature.
Sir Michael Wright suggested that the word "possible" be inserted before the words "nuclear explosions" in paragraph 1 of Article VII. He also stated that in Article VIII, paragraph 5, "back-scatter radar" was not negotiable. He repeated his previous remark that in Article IX the non-qualified "a seismic event" would cause complications. He asked about the 10 kilometer radius in Article IX, paragraph 4, and with regard to paragraphs 7 and 8, of the same Article, wondered whether special aircraft sampling flights for detection of atmospheric tests would be included. He remarked that under the Geneva system, the host country had been responsible for the transportation and necessary equipment mentioned in paragraph 8.
Amb. Stelle stated that 10 kilometers was a compromise between the 8 and 12 mentioned in the Geneva system.
Mr. Goodby explained that over-ocean flights rather than flights over territories had been contemplated.
Sir Michael Wright stressed that Article XIV worried the UK the most. In this treaty as opposed to the atmospheric treaty, there was a Commission and there existed thus a stronger argument for giving the responsibility of finding a breach to the Commission rather than allowing withdrawal on the basis of national determination. Mr. Baker proposed that if withdrawal were permitted as a result of identification of an explosion anywhere by the Commission, both the problems of a treaty violation and of testing by a non-party to the treaty, could be met.
Sir Michael Wright stated that he now had an official reaction from London on the atmospheric treaty. A comprehensive test ban treaty was considered to be preferable, but if we were able to offer only an atmospheric treaty, it should be a simple one. As the Soviet Union would probably reject it, it would be as effective as possible for world public opinion. For the sake of simplicity, London had queried the value of Articles IV and V and had been unenthusiastic about Article VI which seemed to throw doubt on the sincerity of the treaty. There had also been objection to the Withdrawal Article (VII) and a suggestion had been made to take the relevant Article of the April 18, 1961 treaty plus a provision for withdrawal if testing, other than underground, were conducted by another party. He added that he had meanwhile sent to London the rationale for Article IV, namely, to make frivolous denunciation more difficult.
Amb. Dean pointed out that the structure of Article VII depended on whether its purpose was to make it difficult for the other party to contract out of the treaty.
Mr. Spiers said that it had been felt that there were only two possible reasons for denouncing the treaty and the necessity of calling a conference would make it difficult to withdraw. Sir Michael Wright said that the article should provide the right of withdrawal if another country conducted a nuclear explosion. In an atmospheric treaty this could take place after a finding by observers. Who should make the finding in a comprehensive treaty was still a debatable point. He would ask the Foreign Office to propose some alternatives. Mr. Wilkinson questioned a possible inconsistency between paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article VII, since paragraph 2 seemed to annul the value of paragraph 1 by providing an alternative exit from the treaty without a conference. Mr. Goodby remarked that if a party to the treaty resumed testing there would be little need for a conference.
On the subject of tactics for the resumed session of the 18-NDC, Amb. Dean predicted that the Soviet delegation would have a draft treaty, that if we did not also table a draft treaty, the eight neutrals probably would. Hopefully, we would have a treaty to present and it would then be better to undergo an uncomfortable first two weeks. If we could not table a comprehensive treaty, he asked whether we should table an atmospheric treaty before the General Assembly convened. We could not maintain the position of the April 18, 1961 treaty indefinitely. If the scientific problems of the new comprehensive draft could be solved, we might have something more workable and more realistic despite the downgrading of the identification process. Sir Michael Wright pointed out that the new system would enable detection and identification to start within 6 months whereas the Geneva system could not have been put into operation for 4 years.
Amb. Stelle suggested another alternative. The real decision was whether we could proceed on the basis of national detection systems, which would give us a new basis for agreement. It might be simpler to present a skeleton working paper at Geneva on what we were prepared to accept without entering into details. If we were starting on a new basis we would probably want to abandon the historical wording of the April 18th treaty.
Mr. Beam commented that whereas we could commit ourselves by tabling a treaty, the presentation of a working paper would have more leeway for discussion. Mr. Neidle/5/ remarked that this procedure had been used in the early stages of the Antarctic Treaty. Amb. Dean stressed that the actual drafting of the treaty probably presented the least problem. The important thing was to have the fundamentals cleared. Mr. Spiers said that it would be possible to prepare such a working paper a little more quickly than a draft treaty but that its primary advantage would be as a better negotiating technique allowing greater flexibility.
/5/Alan F. Neidle (ACDA/GC)
Sir Michael Wright recalled that the US disarmament treaty had been called an outline and that it might have been better to put forth a fuller paper. The small print in the test ban treaty was also very important. It would be better to think this over. He reported that London was very much in favor of Padilla Nervo's proposal for a time lapse between the signing and coming into force of a treaty./6/ He then asked about the possibility of tabling the two alternative treaties simultaneously. Mr. Beam felt that we would gain greater moral credit if we started with the comprehensive treaty. We would then have the atmospheric treaty as a fall-back.
/6/Reference presumably is to the proposals of Luis Padilla Nervo, Mexican Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, for an end date for atmospheric testing. On June 14, for example, he said that the agreed date might be January 1963. See Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 479-484.
Amb. Dean commented that it was hard to put verification meas-ures into the atmospheric treaty. If both were advanced simultaneously the Soviet Union would always play one off against the other and thus preclude the possibility of agreement on inspection. It would be better to fall back on the atmospheric treaty.
Recapitulating his preferences, Sir Michael Wright listed first, a full treaty text on a comprehensive test ban; secondly, a full treaty text on an atmospheric test ban as a fall-back position; and thirdly, a skeleton working paper.
194. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, July 12, 1962, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-1262. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on July 13. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.
SUBJECT
Nuclear Tests
PARTICIPANTS
Anatoli Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR
Georgi M. Kornienko, Counsellor of Soviet Embassy
The Secretary
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary
Martin J. Hillenbrand, Director, Office of German Affairs
During a discussion devoted mainly to Berlin/2/ Dobrynin referred to the need of the Soviet Union to be militarily prepared in view of what he described as provocative American statements about a possible attack on the Soviet Union. As to nuclear tests, the Soviet Union had felt that the United States had been ahead. It had then caught up, and now the United States was testing again. This was a vicious circle. The Secretary said that an announcement was being made that the Christmas Island phase of the tests had ended./3/ Dobrynin observed that we would still be testing on Johnson Island and in Nevada. He asked if there were any deadlines on these tests. The Secretary said that he thought they would end soon. Dobrynin asked if he meant in one or two months. The Secretary responded that it would probably be in that range, but he could give no commitment on this since he was not in charge and such matters as weather could affect timing. However, if Dobrynin wanted a base of reference we had said that we would make fewer tests than the Soviets had made in their last series. Hence the Soviets could do a certain amount of calculating on their own.
/2/The memorandum of conversation on Berlin is printed in vol. XV, pp. 215-222. Regarding their discussion of other subjects, see vol. V, Document 127.
/3/The Atomic Energy Commission made this announcement on July 12. (The New York Times, July 13, 1962)
Dobrynin observed that newspaper reports indicated we had obtained good results from our underground tests. The Secretary commented that the Soviets should have sent their people as observers. Dobrynin said that the tests seemed to be proving the Soviet point. The American press had indicated detection as taking place over 3000 miles. The Secretary said this applied to certain kind of events only. Although a full report was not yet available, we believed that some control points and inspections would still be required. Some improvement had been achieved. If the Soviets felt that their scientists had instruments which went all the way, this was a matter which should be discussed between the scientists of both countries.
The Secretary observed that he had been sorry to see that Khrushchev, in his recent speech, had come back to the point that any kind of inspection was tantamount to espionage./4/ This was not in accord with the facts of what would really happen under international inspection. It was difficult to put this development into correct prospective, since up to a year or a year-and-a-half ago, the Soviet were talking of international inspection. In the last year or so, however, the Soviet Government has maintained that all inspection is unacceptable because it is equivalent to espionage. Inspection was not really capable of producing espionage, and this question had no relation anyway to the techniques of modern war.
/4/In the course of a long speech to the World Congress on Disarmament in Moscow on July 10, Khrushchev said that the U.S. control proposal was "designed to set up a legalised system of international espionage for the benefit of a potential aggressor." (Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II, pp. 642-643)
After a rather obscure reference to a 1957 proposal for control posts and air inspection which had been rejected, Dobrynin admitted that a year ago the Soviet had changed its position because its security was involved. He wondered why the US so strongly insisted on inspection in connection with a test ban. Since detection can take place without inspection, this insistence merely increased Soviet suspicions. The Soviet Union was fully aware that the US had adequate facilities in adjacent countries to detect Soviet tests. The Secretary said that this would not apply to underground and small tests. Dobrynin said that perhaps tomorrow American scientists would announce that they could detect explosions 5000 miles away. The Secretary responded that, if Soviet scientists had such a capability in their instruments, why were they not willing to talk about it. Dobrynin asked why, if American scientists were so sure, the US did not sign the treaty. The Secretary observed that our scientists were not sure of the possibility of effective detection and identification at such great distances. The full technical analysis was not yet completed, and perhaps the Vela Tests would help to solve the problem, but they would not eliminate the need for inspection.
Dobrynin said signature of the treaty would eliminate distrust and provide progress, which so far had not been made. The Soviet Government felt strongly about this and the need to discuss these disarmament questions. All tests could be detected. Only underground tests had been in question. Now even US scientists were convinced, as British scientists previously had been. Soviet scientists were convinced. Why did the US have to be so stubborn and continue saying that it must have posts in the USSR? The Secretary said that, even on the basis of the Vela Tests, national systems would not suffice, but scientists from the various countries might discuss the question and see if they could not come to some conclusions.
195. Editorial Note
On July 7, 1962, the Department of Defense released to the public some of the preliminary results of its seismic research program, known as Project Vela. (Press Release No. 1150-62, printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1962, volume II, pages 633-635) As summarized by Glenn Seaborg, among the technical conclusions of this project were: 1) the possibility of improved detection by properly placing and reinforcing instruments; 2) the promise of ocean-bottom seismometers; 3) the large variation in signal strength of underground explosions depending on the medium surrounding the shot place; and 4) the existence of many fewer earthquakes in the Soviet Union that might be mistaken for nuclear explosions than had previously been estimated. (Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban, page 162)
U.S. officials had earlier learned about the Vela findings and their implications for U.S. insistence on control posts in disarmament, but this knowledge had not yet resulted in any change in policy. Nevertheless, when Ambassador Dean arrived at the airport in Geneva on July 14, he reportedly said that the Vela findings suggested that international detection stations inside the Soviet Union might not be necessary if the United States could get non-nuclear nations to cooperate.
When Secretary Rusk learned of Dean's statement, he telephoned ACDA Deputy Director Adrian Fisher (Foster was away), and together the Secretary and Fisher sent a message to Dean, which reads in part:
"A Reuters dispatch from Paris quotes you as having said 'Perhaps we could do without them' referring to control posts in the Soviet Union and that you may be able to cut down the number of on-site inspections but it is too early to tell. While we have no way of knowing whether or not this is an accurate quotation of what you said, you should know that there has been no decision on the part of the U.S. Government, in its position on a test ban, authorizing a change, and that my position and the position of the Department and ACDA, when asked, will continue to be that, while the recent results of the Vela Program are promising and are being evaluated, the evaluation to date has not led to a decision to abandon necessity of control posts in the Soviet Union or reduce the number of on-site inspections. Your position should be the same. Whether and to what extent U.S. position should be revised, based on new data now under active consideration in Executive Branch and in consultation with Congress, and speculation as to possibility of a change can only prejudice this consideration." (Todis 432 to Geneva, July 14; Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-1462)
The Secretary and Fisher also wrote a statement emphasizing that the conclusions of the Vela program were preliminary and "do not demonstrate the possibility of doing away with control posts and on-site inspections to determine the precise nature of suspicious events." As a result of further evaluation of the Vela findings, the statement continued, the United States "will make in the near future whatever modifications in its present position as seem possible." This statement was given to the press on July 16. (Department of State Bulletin, August 6, 1962, page 234)
Fisher later recalled President Kennedy's reaction to Dean's statement:
"Now I didn't discuss this with the President directly, but I talked with Mac Bundy about it. And frankly, the President was very upset. He liked to have things done well. And the idea that we had made a proposition and we were saying something else: he had a rather adverse reaction to that, to put it mildly. So he passed the word down: 'Now look, let's get this thing straight. Either we've got a position or we don't have.' (Frank Sieverts, interview with Adrian S. Fisher, May 13, 1964, page 34; Kennedy Library, Oral History Program)
The Embassy in Moscow reported on July 19: "Soviet press predictably seizes on US press stories that Ambassador Dean publicly corrected by Department following his alleged July 14 statement Vela tests might make it possible for US to accept national control system. Pravda describes Dean statement as constituting 'certain retreat from former US position' but asserts even this hint at change 'created panic in Washington.' New York Times Finney article quoted at length to bolster Soviet contention US obstructing test ban agreement." (Telegram 178 from Moscow, July 19; Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/7-1962)
John W. Finney's feature article on the Soviet and U.S. nuclear tests and on the impasse in the Geneva negotiations for a nuclear test ban treaty was published in The New York Times, July 15, 1962.
196. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, July 20, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 4/5-7/30/62. Secret. Copies were sent to Bundy and Wiesner.
SUBJECT
New Data on Detecting Underground Nuclear Explosions
1. You asked last week how long the Defense Department had known the new figures on the basis of which they made their announcement about the change in our ability to detect underground nuclear tests in the Soviet Union a little while ago./2/ There is no simple answer to this question in terms of time. In one sense the Department of Defense did not know that they had the new information until they were asked by Disarmament (ACDA) on 15 June to give an evaluation of the proposals that the neutrals had been making in Geneva./3/ These proposals rested on the proposition that we could reliably detect underground nuclear tests in the Soviet Union without requiring seismic stations inside the Soviet Union. But in the course of looking up the answer to this question they looked at all their earlier figures and thought about them anew. This led to a realization, by 3 July,/4/ that the previous estimates of how many small earthquakes per year of a given size occurred on the average in the Soviet Union were too high by a significant factor.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 204.
/3/This ACDA request has not been further identified.
/4/Reference presumably is to an interagency meeting on July 3 at which the Vela findings were discussed in some detail. John McNaughton summarized the consensus at the meeting in a July 3 memorandum to Nitze. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/AE Files: FRC 69 A 2243, 97 USP, Nuclear Test Suspension/Geneva (1960-1962)) See the Supplement. See also Document 204.
2. However, the answer that we first knew the new figures on 3 July is an over-simplification. In fact, the scientists in the Air Force who run the detection system for nuclear explosions (AFTAC) suspected as early as 1958 that their current interpretation of their measurements might be incorrect. The Hardtack shot at the end of 1958 raised this suspicion. However, we changed our official estimates in the opposite direction. In the summer of 1961 the first half-year report from one of the new accurately-instrumented and specially organized stations in the Vela program led to further doubt about the validity of our previous estimates. These doubts remained no more than doubts until February of this year. Then this data on the Soviet tests made the suspicion stronger. Our measurements on the French test of 1 May and our measurements on the Aardvark shot in our own underground test series of 12 May changed suspicion to new knowledge./5/ The inquiry by ACDA crystallized the new knowledge into a new estimate.
/5/Aardvark was an underground shot with a yield of 40 kilotons in the Nevada test series. (Department of Energy, Announced United States Nuclear Tests, p. 19)
3. The essence of the problem lies in the fact that our previous measurements rested on the observations of the world-wide system of existing academic and governmental seismic stations. These stations had two shortcomings. First, their instruments were not carefully calibrated against each other or a known standard. Second, they were chiefly useful in measuring relatively large earthquakes in which seismologists were interested for scientific purposes. When we created the Atomic Energy Detection System of stations operated by the AFTAC, we got the first set of stations with high quality, uniformly calibrated instruments directed toward measuring small underground shocks, such as arise from underground nuclear tests. These stations were designed to measure a different kind of seismic shock than the others, namely the underground or body wave as opposed to the surface wave which was used to measure large earthquakes. The problem has always been: what is the relation of the two kinds of measurements? It is only on the basis of this relation that we are able to interpret our observations to make an estimate of the number of earthquakes of given magnitude in the Soviet Union. What the events I have summarized above did was lead the scientists in AFTAC to conclude that the old formula for relating these two sets of measurements was wrong, and that a new formula was needed.
4. The estimates of the frequency of small shocks/6/ in the Soviet Union which we presented at the Geneva Experts Conference/7/ were challenged by Soviet scientists. Their figures differed from our figures by roughly the amount of the correction factor which we have now accepted. Thus our new figures are about the same as those the Soviets offered in 1958. We still do not understand whether this is a coincidence, which is what the AFTAC scientists say, or whether the Soviets did have a better understanding of the real relation between the two sets of measurements. We cannot simply say that the Soviets had the right formula, because the nature of their argument about the difference between these two sets of figures was not couched in these terms. Frank Press, one of the leading seismologists in the country, who is a member of your Scientific Advisory Committee, does not accept the explanation that the identity of our new result and the Soviet figures in 1958 is just a coincidence. However, he is still unsure of just what the relation between the two sets of figures is. The important practical fact, of course, is that we have changed our figures to look more like the Soviet figures, whatever the reason.
/6/The word "shots" has been crossed out and the word "shocks" inserted by hand.
/7/Regarding the conclusions of this conference, which met in Geneva July 1-August 21, 1958, see Report of the Conference of Experts To Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office), Miscellaneous No. 11 (1958). Additional documentation on the conference is in Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, volume III.456
5. It is still too soon to say precisely what the significance of the new figures is for our position on a test ban treaty. The interested people will be discussing this in the coming week, and you will probably get an evaluation by the end of the week or early the following week.
6. I think there is one significant moral to be drawn from the story. It is the fact that the accurate data which AFTAC collected on its new system was highly classified and its existence in detail was unknown to all except a few scientists inside the Government. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the technical people who had produced the original set of figures, did not quickly leap to the thought that the discrepancies which they had observed, and the questions which others had raised, based on the small amount of public data and the Russian figures, might be explicable in some other way than as mistakes in public or Soviet data. If the AFTAC figures had been made more widely available, or if AFTAC's activities had been reviewed in detail more frequently by outside scientists, the change in understanding and evaluation might have come a good deal more quickly. It is fair to say, of course, that this is a speculation. How hard and how long a man has to look at new figures before he sees that they are inconsistent with an old theory remains one of the inscrutable mysteries of science.
CK/8/
/8/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
197. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
USMC/5
Geneva, July 21, 1962, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Kohler. The meeting was held during luncheon at the British Mission. Secretary Rusk was in Geneva July 19 for sessions of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, which reconvened on July 16, and for the signing of the Laos Accords on July 23.
SECRETARY'S GENEVA TRIP
July 19-26, 1962
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary
Mr. Kohler
United Kingdom
Lord Home
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Sir Michael Wright
Mr. Price, Ministry of Defense/2/
/2/Benjamin Terence Price, Chief Scientific Officer, British Ministry of Defense.
SUBJECT
Nuclear Tests
Lord Home brought in Sir Michael and Mr. Price for this phase of the discussion with the Secretary. He opened with the question as to when the US expected to have new proposals in the nuclear testing field. The Secretary replied that he hoped we would be able to develop our conclusions by next week. He would comment as regards the Vela tests that they had produced entirely new data which needed a considerable amount of further analysis. As Lord Home knew, the President was prepared to go as far as was technically possible. However another factor was that considerable education would be necessary for key Congressional leaders, especially in the Senate. From what he had learned to date, though he had not been fully briefed, the Secretary thought that the Vela results would certainly not do away entirely with the need for on-site inspections and would probably not entirely obviate the need for some control posts in the Soviet Union.
Mr. Price gave a brief review of the consultations with the President's Science Adviser, Jerome Wiesner, in London/3/ and commented that these had come to considerably more optimistic conclusions than those voiced by the Secretary.
/3/Regarding these London meetings, see footnote 4, Document 193.
Sir Michael commented that if the Vela results enabled us to have satisfactory assurances on the basis of 25 posts mainly around the periphery of the Soviet Union rather than inside, we could be in business within six months. This contrasted with the present plan under which it would take six years to build the control posts called for, and since there would not be enough to be effective at all for at least two years, we would in fact be faced with a two-year moratorium for the Soviets.
This part of the conversation terminated with the Secretary saying that we would push ahead on this matter and that he would give it his personal attention after his return to Washington.
198. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
USMC/20
Geneva, July 24, 1962, 1:25 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-RU/7-2462. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and Akalovsky on July 26. The meeting was held at the Soviet Mission.
SECRETARY'S GENEVA TRIP
July 19-26, 1962
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary of State
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Akalovsky
USSR
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Mr. Ilyichev/2/
Mr. Kovalev
Mr. Sukhodriev
/2/Ivan Ivanovich Ilyichev, Chief of the Third European Division, Soviet Foreign Ministry.
SUBJECT
Disarmament and Related Topics
While drinks were served, Gromyko contended he had made two new proposals in his speech during the morning at the Disarmament Conference./3/ The Secretary replied he was very much interested in Mr. Gromyko's remarks on the question of force levels. Gromyko said that, since some delegations at the conference had mentioned the possibility of splitting up the difference between the US 2.1 level and the Soviet 1.7 level, the Soviet Union thought that the 1.9 million level might be a good compromise. The Secretary then observed that, when he got back to Washington he would see what could be done to get for Ambassador Dean instructions to follow up on the conversation Mr. Gromyko and he had had earlier on the subject of nondiffusion./4/
/3/For text of Gromyko's remarks to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on July 24, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II, pp. 681-688.
/4/Reference is to a private dinner meeting between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko, probably on July 22. No full report of their conversation on that occasion has been found, but see footnote 7, Document 201.
During the luncheon discussion between the Secretary and Gromyko, there was an exchange on the relationship between disarmament and the solution of other problems. The Secretary made the point that the lowering of tensions which would result from solution of some of these other problems would undoubtedly have its affect on progress in disarmament. Gromyko at first seemed to think that the Secretary was claiming that progress in disarmament could not be made without first resolving these other problems and said that, while the USSR recognized a certain relationship between solution of disarmament and other problems, it objected to making solution of one question dependent on solution of the other. That would create a vicious circle. The Secretary then pointed out that we wanted to go ahead with disarmament and to make progress in this field, but as Khrushchev himself had said, there was an obvious relationship between disarmament and other political problems. The Secretary thought that the US could not agree to reduce its military capabilities before the Berlin problem was settled. He also called attention in this context to the relationship between the increased pressures on Berlin last summer and the acceleration of US military preparations and increased arms expenditures. Gromyko said we could not expect that he could accept this was a justified result. The Secretary responded that he was merely referring to an obvious fact and called attention to what Khrushchev had told President Kennedy in Vienna./5/ Khrushchev had mentioned the pressures his military and scientists were putting on him to increase arms expenditures which were put in terms of matching US capabilities; then when the Soviets increased their expenditures, pressures were applied to President Kennedy to increase US expenditures, and a chain reaction ensued.
/5/Documentation on the Vienna summit June 3-4, 1961, is printed in volumes V and XIV.
Gromyko stressed the need by the US to control its official spokesmen who made belligerent and threatening public statements. The Secretary pointed out the fact that under the American system the Executive required public and Congressional cooperation in order to obtain appropriations, something that was different from the situation in the Soviet Union. The Soviets could divert resources from one area to another purely by executive action whereas this was not possible under our system. Hence, there was a need to convince public opinion and this required speaking about the subject.
Gromyko also stressed the point that the US was wrong in thinking that it could bankrupt the Soviet Union through the arms race. The Soviet Union was doing very well and its seven-year plan for economic development was being greatly overfulfilled. Gromyko emphasized he was mentioning this latter point only in passing, and not for any special purpose. The Secretary said we were aware the USSR was a great power with large resources and assured Mr. Gromyko that there was no theory in the US of making the USSR bankrupt through the arms race.
The Secretary recalled the remarks by the Canadian Minister of External Affairs at the Disarmament Conference this morning, in which Mr. Green had expressed the view that there should be no recess of the Disarmament Conference during the General Assembly./6/ The Secretary observed this thought was a new one and that he personally felt that there would be at least some break in the Conference during the GA, particularly since many of the delegates to the Conference were the obvious persons to discuss disarmament in the GA. Mr. Gromyko said that only 17 nations were participating in the Conference and that, therefore, other nations should have the chance of expressing their views on disarmament at least once a year, i.e., at the General Assembly. While a recess had its pros and cons, the USSR felt that some recess during the GA would be in order. As to the Secretary's remarks that the delegates at the conference table would be the logical persons to discuss disarmament, Mr. Gromyko said this was of course something to be decided by each individual country and that he personally did not want to be deprived of the opportunity to speak on that subject. The Secretary denied that he had any intention in this respect.
/6/Green's statement is in U.N. doc. ENDC/PV.60.
199. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
USMC/22
Geneva, July 25, 1962, 10:30-10:50 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-RU/7-2562. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Kohler and approved in S on July 31. The meeting was held at the Soviet Mission.
[Here follow a list of participants and a paragraph on Germany and Berlin.]
Mr. Kohler said the second point was connected with a long private discussion between the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko at dinner the other night on the question of nondiffusion of nuclear weapons and the possibility of finding a formula which would be acceptable to both sides./2/ The question had been posed by Mr. Gromyko as to whether the wording, "direct or indirect," could be accepted from the Soviet formulation on this question but which, as the Secretary had explained, would apply only to assistance to national nuclear capabilities. The Secretary wanted Mr. Gromyko to be informed that he would consider and work on this after his return to Washington and would be in touch with Ambassador Dobrynin on the subject. Mr. Gromyko replied that this was a question for discussion. Wording must be found which would ensure that there were no loopholes. The Soviet Government wanted an agreement on this subject. However, as he had stressed to the Secretary, if there should be any delay in reaching a broader agreement on the subject, this should not entail any delay in reaching an arrangement on this point with respect to the two German states. The Soviet Union was opposed to making one problem dependent on another.
/2/See footnote 4, Document 198.
[Here follows discussion of other U.S.-Soviet issues.]
200. Editorial Note
Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson had a 2-hour conversation with Chairman Khrushchev in the morning of July 25, 1962, followed by a 3-hour conversation with him the same afternoon at Khrushchev's dacha. These conversations covered several subjects in U.S.-Soviet relations. Records of their discussions on Berlin are printed in volume XV, pages 252-255. Following a discussion of military matters, Thompson reported, "Throughout conversation K made many references to U-2." Thompson continued:
"In discussing disarmament I said I could not understand why Soviets had not given serious consideration to our zonal plan of inspection. I said this was serious effort on our part to meet their preoccupation with secrecy and to meet their insistence that amount of inspection be related to amount of disarmament. Our whole effort in this field seemed breaking down because of Soviet obsession with secrecy which I believe based on outmoded analysis. I cited Telstar as latest evidence world shrinking and said whatever advantage they had from secrecy wasting asset. K responded it might be true they gave too much attention and importance to secrecy but said on our side our military obsessed with desire acquire ever more information. He said of course every country had spies but sending U-2 across frontier was essentially act of war. We wanted to know where their rocket bases were but these like anything else could be camouflaged. I said it was natural human trait to fear unknown but pointed out this not to their advantage since it caused our military to prepare to meet threats which might not exist. K said he was more concerned now with use of outer space than with planes but said his own people had shown him photos (not clear whether from planes or satellites but I inferred latter) showing airfield or factories and even planes on field, but not showing what purpose of planes was or what factories produced. Always possible conceal essential information.
"With regard to our zonal proposal K said there were only limited number of Soviet rocket bases and we knew where they are. It would therefore be simple for us to arrange to inspect them all. He did not seem convinced by my counterarguments that if disarmament were 30 percent in first stage, only 30 percent of zones could be inspected. He said essence of disarmament problem was that we wanted to take away weapon with which they could hit us while preserving our overseas bases for use against them. I pointed out that in our first stage they would retain 70 percent of their missiles but he said in order know what 30 percent reduction was we would have to know what their total strength was, and pushed aside my argument that this would not involve inspection of all of them.
"K began discussion of test ban by asking Sobolev whether their announcement of resumption had been published. When answered in affirmative he said they would begin about August 5 or 6--he could not remember exact date. Soviets had resumed testing only because of our actions in military field. He added however somewhat cryptically that he understood President's action. He hoped that as result of our experiments we would now be able to conclude test ban, implication being after their next series was completed. I observed there appeared to be hope that as result of our new studies it might be possible to agree not to have permanent observation posts but it would still be necessary to have verification of suspicious events. K brushed this aside saying that we could detect anything from outside and he cited fact that Soviets had conducted unannounced underground test in last series which we had detected and publicized. He said same true of French test which I gathered Soviets had detected. He said test agreement could be reached but he did not think Pentagon wanted it.
"From nature of conversation I gathered K has little hope that disarmament agreement can be reached.
"He said, for example, that greatest problem was fact that we have many invested interests in arms race and our monopolists would prevent agreement. I replied this was absurd and that what he called monopolists knew as well as anyone else that arms race was dangerous and war would hit them as well as anyone else. I added we had many interesting projects and needs which would require all our resources. It was true sudden disarmament would cause dislocations but we were confident we could deal with them. I expressed opinion military people on both sides responsible for security of country prudently always tended give other side maximum capability and worst intentions but it would be tragic if we let this determine our overall policy, and that arms race was not only vast economic waste but also cause of dangerous tensions.
"K said Soviet 7-year plan would be fulfilled whether or not there was disarmament and said plan had been based on assumption there would not be. If disarmament achieved they would probably complete plan by end of five years.
"I brought up subject of prevention war by accident or miscalculation saying we had taken many unilateral steps in this field but others called for which required cooperation of both sides and I hoped Soviets would pursue this problem with us. I indicated agreement but did not pursue matter." (Telegram 227 from Moscow, July 26; Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-2662)
On July 27, Thompson, who was to be replaced by Foy D. Kohler as Ambassador to the Soviet Union, left Moscow to return to the United States. During a stop en route in Copenhagen, Thompson transmitted further reflections on these talks. Following his comments on Berlin, Thompson added:
"(2) Even if we are willing to give up insistence upon having control posts inside Soviet Union I do not think Khrushchev will agree to more than one or two verifications of test ban a year and probably none. He is obsessed with idea we want to locate his missiles but probably more important he wants to conceal his relative weakness.
"(3) The mere fact that Khrushchev asserted he could achieve his seven year plan without disarmament convinces me that the opposite is the case but I doubt that we will get anywhere on real disarmament at this time. I got impression, however, that Khrushchev will be prepared seriously to consider steps to prevent war by accident or miscalculation. If we can get over the Berlin hump and then let him know our intelligence capabilities we might make progress on GCD." (Telegram 76 from Copenhagen, July 28; ibid., 762.00/7-2862)
201. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, July 26, 1962, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Gathright and approved in S on August 16. McCone also wrote a memorandum for the record of this meeting, July 26. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Memos for Record 4/7/62-8/21/62) See the Supplement.
SUBJECT
Meeting of Committee of Principals
PARTICIPANTS
See attached list/2/
/2/The attached list of 23 participants is not printed.
Nuclear Test Ban
The Secretary asked Mr. Foster to present the issues for discussion.
Mr. Foster stated that findings reported by Project Vela and by AFTAC hold some hope for modification of the present U.S. position on a nuclear test ban. These findings have received intensive consideration. As the result of press coverage, Congress has been taking a substantial interest in the matter. Alternative approaches have been discussed with the Congressional committees, which have been informed that no decision has yet been made. The alternatives presented for consideration by the Principals have been reviewed by the scientists and by the Deputies./3/
/3/A meeting of the Deputies on July 20 discussed a draft nuclear test ban treaty. No record of this meeting has been found.
The fundamental question is whether, in contrast to continued "leap-frogging" of tests, the national interest is best served by taking advantage of technical improvements in order to propose a treaty that might be more acceptable to the Soviet Union. ACDA feels that two types of treaties might be more acceptable to the Soviet Union than present proposals while at the same time providing assurance that we would be able to catch any gross cheating.
ACDA considers that the most desirable approach would be to present a modified comprehensive treaty with no threshold and no right to test at all. There would be an "international-national" system involving fewer stations than previously proposed. The stations would be operated by nationals of the host countries and would feed data to an international commission, which would determine suspicious events and request on-site inspection. The alternative would be a ban on atmospheric, outer space, and underwater testing but not on underground testing; any party would be entitled to proceed with underground testing under conditions which would preclude venting outside of national borders. Both approaches seem technically possible. ACDA believes that we should first present the comprehensive treaty. If that fails, we should offer the atmospheric ban.
Technical presentations should be made at Geneva to prepare the groundwork and explain why it is still necessary to have on-site inspections.
The Secretary noted that the draft "U.S. Program"/4/ described the new findings as "tentative" and asked how tentative they were.
/4/"U.S. Program Regarding a Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons Tests", draft of July 25. [Footnote in the source text. The draft has not been found. A July 24 draft is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 23, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Regarding a July 26 draft, see footnote 3, Document 202.]
Mr. Fisher explained that in an appearance before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Doyle Northrup of AFTAC had described the findings in this way and that his view had been reflected in the Holifield-Jackson letter to the President./5/ On the other hand, Northrup had developed suggestions for an improved detection system based on the new findings. The findings do look very good, and we should make up our minds.
/5/Not further identified.
The Secretary thought we should interpret "tentative" as meaning that to the best of our present ability to know what is correct, this is the way things look.
Dr. Wiesner pointed out that there is enough certainty so that people are reasonably comfortable. His view was that the data will get better and that it is unlikely that there will be any retrogression. Present lack of agreement is largely over the subtleties of numbers.
Secretary McNamara thought there were two unknowns. The first was the level of the detection threshold and of undifferentiated events above the threshold. Knowledge of this is fairly certain; there is a degree of uncertainty, but not very great. The second unknown, about which there was greater uncertainty, was the amount of advancement in nuclear technology that can take place below the threshold.
Dr. Seaborg pointed out that the detection threshold differs as between tuff, granite, and alluvium, the threshold for the latter being 14 kt. If we accept the possibility that the Soviet Union can test below 14 kt, a lot can be done. [3 lines of source text not declassified]
Dr. Wiesner did not believe that one would dare conduct tests as large as 14 kt.
Mr. Foster pointed out that the Soviet Union would face the possibility of detection. By unilateral means, we would be able to detect tests in alluvium.
Secretary McNamara was prepared to believe that the actual threshold might be around 7 kt; testing below that level, however, might give substantial gains to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, although it seemed that the degree of risk from cheating was substantial, we also needed to know the risks of not having a ban at all.
Dr. Seaborg identified the principal purposes of tests below 10 kt./6/ However, he thought there was a more important question than that of the data that could be obtained from underground testing and explained that AEC's chief concern was the effect of stopping underground testing on the vitality of our laboratories. If we stopped but the Soviet Union continued to test underground, they would be prepared to resume atmospheric testing. Dr. Haworth stated the problem in a somewhat different way, pointing out that AEC's concern was that the Soviet Union might at a future time abrogate a comprehensive treaty with a big, all-out atmospheric test series. We couldn't forestall such a possibility completely, but we could minimize its effects. An atmospheric ban, with continued underground testing, would permit us to maintain a posture of readiness.
/6/Separate Memorandum of Conversation classified Secret-Restricted Data on file in ACDA and AEC. [Footnote in the source text. A memorandum from C.E. Conger (ACDA/D) to William H. Brubeck (S/S), August 10, attached to the source text, notes that because certain of Seaborg's remarks involved atomic energy restricted data, ACDA/D "summarized this part of Seaborg's remarks in a brief separate memorandum, copies of which will be on file in ACDA and AEC." This memorandum of conversation has not been found. A note from Brubeck to Emory C. Swank (S), August 13, also attached to the source text, notes that S/S would obtain a copy of the memorandum containing Seaborg's remarks "if the Secretary desires to read it." No response from the Secretary has been found.]
In response to a question by the Secretary, Mr. McNamara stated that he believed that if we could be certain that the Soviet Union would stop testing, we should do so. Dr. Seaborg had no reservations about this.
The Secretary then said that it is fundamental to the U.S. position that we should not put forward proposals for purely propagandistic or political reasons. Public statements on the Project VELA findings have built up great expectations, but we must be prepared to live with the proposals we advance. We are always under steady pressure, from those bearing less responsibility, to alter our proposals. The numbers (of detection stations and on-site inspections) we talk about are significant to us but less so to others. They will urge concessions and try to whack the numbers down still further. Unless we are prepared to state our position and stick with it, there will always be erosion.
There are two approaches we might take. We could go in with a fairly complete and tight comprehensive treaty, support it with the data we have, and be prepared to fall back to an atmospheric ban. On the other hand, the Soviet Union is categorically saying that it will accept no on-site inspection. Gromyko repeated this in personal conversations. Under these circumstances, our numbers are not particularly relevant. Changes in our numbers don't move us toward agreement. Perhaps we should say that we would like to work on a comprehensive treaty but that we are aware of the Soviet position on on-site inspection. So long as that position prevails, there is no point in playing a numbers game. For our own part, we want to make a start somewhere, so we propose starting with an atmospheric treaty and making it comprehensive as soon as possible. Since the rest of the world is primarily concerned with atmospheric tests and the effects of fallout, this approach should be well received.
Mr. McCone recalled that we had tried this approach twice before, once in 1959 and again in 1961.
Mr. Fisher, however, pointed out that the 1959 proposal had been an elaborate one whereas the present proposal was pared down. The 1961 proposal had been put forward under special circumstances and a time limit had been placed on its acceptance. We have not put forward a proposal for an atmospheric ban in the manner in which we would do so now.
Although not feeling at this point in a position to express a final preference, the Secretary had the impression that atmospheric tests seemed more important than underground tests and that it would be more desirable to seek an atmospheric ban than to go through a series of conflicts over numbers, both at home with the Congress as well as abroad.
Mr. Murrow agreed. He thought our posture would be good in terms of world opinion.
The Secretary then noted that we have supposed that the Soviet Union would not accept an atmospheric ban. However in view of Soviet concern over the proliferation of nuclear weapons, he thought that if we could move forward simultaneously with an atmospheric ban and something on non-proliferation, the Soviet Union might accept it./7/
/7/Separate Memorandum of Conversation classified Secret-Limited Distribution on file in ACDA and S/S. [Footnote in the source text. In his August 10 memorandum to Brubeck, Conger wrote that during the meeting "the Secretary requested that references to a recent talk with Gromyko be closely held." Thus this part of the Secretary's conversation was summarized in a separate, limited distribution memorandum. This separate memorandum, attached to the source text, reads: "Referring to recent conversations with Gromyko, the Secretary stated that he thought the Soviet Union was seriously concerned about the question of nuclear proliferation, particularly in the case of West Germany. Gromyko had suggested language to the effect that we would not help other countries 'directly or indirectly'. The Secretary had questioned whether the United States and the Soviet Union would interpret 'indirectly' in the same manner. However, he thought there was some possibility that we could develop mutually acceptable language on non-proliferation which would safeguard our position on a multi-national European nuclear force while assuring the Soviet Union that we would not assist any state in obtaining nuclear weapons for use on the basis of a national decision."]
Dr. Wiesner asked why we should use Soviet interest in non-proliferation to get an atmospheric ban. Why not try to get a total ban. Moreover, he thought that other countries were unlikely to agree to a self-denying non-proliferation agreement, if we ourselves retained the right to test underground.
With reference to the apparent impossibility of obtaining Soviet agreement to a comprehensive treaty with on-site inspection, Dr. Seaborg assumed that there was no disagreement in the U.S. regarding the need for inspection, and the Secretary asked whether it could be reported to the President that there was no opinion that zero inspection would be acceptable.
There was general agreement with this statement. Mr. McNamara added, however, that although he was not prepared to say that zero inspection was acceptable, he was also not prepared to say what risk would be involved in a continuation of testing. He thought that we should put down the risks that would arise from the Soviet Union's beating the system and put alongside these the risks involved in continuation of testing. His personal view was that the risks of continued testing were very serious if we looked ahead ten years. He was seriously concerned about the degree of proliferation that would take place in this period.
Mr. Murrow asked whether this did not argue against putting forward a specific number of required inspection. Mr. McNamara thought it might. He thought the Secretary's suggestion of associating an atmospheric test ban with a non-proliferation agreement was interesting, but he wondered whether we could get agreement.
Mr. Bundy thought this approach was so one-sided that we were unlikely to get agreement. Only those countries which now had nuclear weapons would be free to test. Dr. Wiesner supported this view, but Mr. Nitze disagreed. He thought that there was a certain inequity anyway and that if the Secretary's approach were followed, the situation would not be much more inequitable than at present. However, he suggested that we add to the atmospheric ban and nonproliferation proposals, an expression of our willingness to extend the ban to underground testing if the Soviet Union would agree to inspection. Mr. Foster agreed that the possibility of a comprehensive treaty should be part of the package.
The Secretary concluded that both the principal alternatives should be presented to the President. He continued to fear, however, that if we presented specific numbers in Geneva, we would generate much controversy at home and that such controversy would be purposeless in view of the Soviet position. If we don't go in with numbers, we will have more time to explain the situation to the Congress. We could say at Geneva that it would be possible to work the matter out on the basis of lower numbers but not prior to acceptance by the Soviet Union of the need for inspection.
Mr. Keeny cautioned that this approach would, in effect, invite the neutrals to present proposals involving very little inspection. Dr. Wiesner agreed and thought that by extrapolation, the old numbers would go way down in the light of the new findings. If we go forward with the findings but without the numbers we want, we may be compromising our own position. Mr. Foster noted that this did not seem to change the fundamental point which was that apparently the Soviet Union would not accept any numbers at all. We can say that if the Soviet Union will accept inspection, the number will be lower than 20.
Mr. Bundy agreed that it would not be fruitful to present precise numbers. As far as Congress was concerned, he thought we would have an additional problem with the question of "international-national" systems. It might be desirable to remain uncommitted on this point. Dr. Wiesner, however, pointed out that we had agreed to study the neutrals' proposal and that it would be strange if we said nothing. Mr. Foster thought this could be handled by stressing the use of national systems in support of an atmospheric ban. The Secretary hoped that we could clarify the term "international-national" and avoid any confusion with the Soviet interpretation.
Mr. McNamara stated his understanding that under the foregoing approach we actually would continue underground testing. Mr. Bundy noted that the second round has been approved with no time limit. Mr. Murrow asked whether there was any necessity of announcing completion of the current series. He noted that the beginning of each new series was always greeted with a poor reaction abroad. He wondered why we could not simply drag the present series out. Mr. Bundy said that was, in effect, what we were doing.
Mr. McNamara then asked whether, under an atmospheric ban, we would contemplate preparing for resumption of atmospheric tests to prepare for the contingency that the Soviet Union might do so. Mr. Bundy thought it would be important to be prepared, that we would need to maintain standby readiness through time. The Secretary pointed out that the kind of preparations we undertook would be affected by the question of whether preparations were initiated before or after an agreement. We should try to set up categories of preparations that would be desirable and acceptable after the signing of a test ban. Dr. Seaborg noted in this regard that Christmas Island presented a knotty problem. Mr. McNamara thought we could determine what things could be done without becoming known internationally.
Dr. Wiesner commented that we were probably taking too narrow an approach in considering countermeasures to possible resumption of testing by the Soviet Union. Rather than resume testing ourselves, we might, for example, say that we would double the size of our missile force. This might be a more effective deterrent to Soviet resumption.
(Note: In connection with the foregoing, no discussion took place respecting the texts of the draft treaties.)
Production During Stage I of Disarmament
Mr. Fisher explained that ACDA recommended that Stage I production of armaments be on the basis of one-for-one replacement by types./8/ Even under this approach, there would have to be an upper limit on production. As a basis for negotiation, we could say that the reduction should be at least 10 percent a year during Stage I but that it might be greater. A reduction on this basis would parallel the reduction of armaments, and we could take advantage of the Soviet proposal that armaments and production be reduced proportionately.
/8/See "Recommendation on Production Limits in Stage I", draft of July 23, 1962. [Footnote in the source text. A copy is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 23, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.]
Gen. Lemnitzer thought that much depended on the definition of "types". He asked whether a Minuteman could be substituted for an Atlas.
Mr. Fisher explained that all B-52's would be regarded as one type regardless of series but that Minuteman and Atlas represented different types.
Mr. McNamara stated that production by types was acceptable.
Gen. Lemnitzer expressed the view that there should be no ban on production of prototypes or on modernization of production facilities.
Mr. Foster, however, pointed out that there would be a need to show that we were prepared to go ahead with disarmament. Production of new prototypes would raise doubts about this. Moreover, the approach was based on the belief that by 1964 the U.S. would be in a good position and that it would be best to freeze types at that time. Dr. Wiesner added that we certainly would not want to permit new facilities for producing weapons to be established during Stage I.
The Secretary asked about the cut-off between production of items for military and for civilian use. Mr. Foster thought the dividing line was sufficiently clear for present negotiating purposes, but there would be problems later. He noted that this problem had been encountered in the JCS wargame on inspection and believed that it would be desirable to have additional wargames.
It was agreed that the recommendation on production should be presented to the President for approval.
Reduction of Military Bases in Stage I
Mr. Foster stated that the ACDA recommendation/9/ put discussion of military bases back toward the end of Stage I but did permit discussion. The U.S. would not accept the singling out of "foreign" bases but might be willing to begin a reduction of bases at some point in Stage I. It would be inconsistent to be unwilling to discuss this if progress were made on other points.
/9/"Stage I reduction of military bases", draft of July 23, 1962. [Footnote in the source text. This draft has not been found.]
The Secretary asked whether there will be any foreign bases we will be prepared to give up in the next few years. Mr. McNamara estimated that we would probably give up a small number in the next two or three years, perhaps 20-50 out of, say, 500 of the larger bases (not counting the many small installations). Mr. Murrow thought it might be useful to have a definition of "military bases" that would differentiate between large bases and small installations.
Gen. Taylor asked whether this presupposed redeployment. Mr. McNamara said that what he had in mind was some of the B-47 bases and other bases of that character. Twenty was not a large number. The Secretary pointed out that we do not redeploy in order to reduce bases; we reduce bases when we redeploy.
Mr. McNamara accepted the recommendation on military bases, and it was agreed that the recommendation should be presented to the President for approval.
Stage I Force Levels
The Secretary noted in view of the Soviet action accepting a Stage I force level of 1.9 million, there would be increased pressure for the U.S. to accept the same level. Mr. McNamara recognized that this would be the case. Mr. Foster requested that the force level study be expedited so that we might be able to say something before the next recess, which was expected in September. Mr. McNamara agreed that the study should be expedited. Mr. Nitze noted in this connection that the question of civilian personnel was of great importance.
202. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, July 26, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 7/27/62. Confidential. Attached to the source text is a note from McGeorge Bundy to the President that reads: "Here is a basic paper for tomorrow's testing-disarmament meeting--set for 10:15 AM. It puts the main issues clearly. The positions relating to the general disarmament treaty are easy--and unanimously agreed. The testing scenario is the hard one. My belief is that you will want to listen hard, and not decide, tomorrow morning."
SUBJECT
U.S. Program Regarding a Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapon Tests and Other Disarmament Proposals
The Committee of Principals met on July 26, 1962 to consider issues which are outstanding in the disarmament negotiations now going on in Geneva./2/ At that meeting, we considered alternative lines of approach with respect to negotiations for a ban on nuclear weapons tests. These lines of approach are based on a combination of technical and political developments which are described in the attached memorandum./3/
/2/See Document 201.
/3/Entitled "U.S. Program Regarding a Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons Tests," dated July 26, not printed.
There are two proposed alternatives which are described below. The members of the Committee of Principals are prepared to discuss the issues with you tomorrow to help you in making your determination as to which is most in the national interest.
1. Alternative One. The United States should simultaneously pursue the following five courses:
a. Atmospheric test ban. The United States should table an atmospheric-outerspace-underwater test-ban treaty.
b. Comprehensive test ban. With respect to a comprehensive treaty, we should not table one now./4/ We should declare a willingness to accept a comprehensive test-ban treaty involving no foreign-operated control posts on Soviet soil and involving fewer than 20 on-site inspections (but we should state that we see no point in suggesting or debating details or numbers until the Soviet Union agrees to at least some on-site inspections)./5/ We should at the same time provide the Conference with as much recent data as we can relating to detection, location and identification capabilities of internationally coordinated "national" systems. We should express our willingness to negotiate in any of these areas even though the Soviet Union commences an atmospheric test series.
/4/This sentence has been crossed out in the source text, presumably by the President. It is also crossed out by McGeorge Bundy on a carbon copy attached to the source text.
/5/This sentence contains the following markings presumably in the President's hand: "foreign operated" has been crossed out, and inserted in the margin are the words, "internationally monitored nation'l control posts"; "fewer than 20 on-site" has been deleted, and inserted by hand in the margin is "possible reduction in on site"; and from the word "but" to the end of the sentence has been placed in brackets. The first change is the same on Bundy's carbon copy; the second is the same except Bundy has not crossed out "on site" and has written in "a possible reduction in". Instead of brackets for the last clause in this sentence, Bundy has written in the margin: "reserved for discussion with Dean".
c. No-transfer agreement. The United States should press for a world-wide agreement banning the transfer or acquisition of nuclear weapons or nuclear technology. This course of action would be related practically, but not organically to the other courses of action.
d. Underground testing. We should continue our underground testing program./6/
/6/McGeorge Bundy wrote in the margin on the carbon copy: "no public announcement".
e. Readiness to test in the atmosphere. We should, to the extent feasible, maintain readiness to test in the atmosphere./7/
/7/Next to this paragraph on the carbon copy, Bundy wrote: "prepared to".
2. Alternative Two. The United States should pursue the following courses in the order indicated:
a. Tabling of data. The United States should provide the Conference with the recent data relating to detection, location and identification capabilities.
b. Comprehensive test ban. We should propose a comprehensive test-ban treaty involving the following changes:
(i) The total number of control posts in the USSR to be reduced from 19 to perhaps 5.
(ii) The control posts to be operated by nationals of the country where they are located but standardized and coordinated by an international organization. There would also be permanent international observers at these posts or periodic visits to them by such observers.
(iii) The number of on-site inspections in the Soviet Union to be reduced from the present range of 12 to 20 to a flat figure which might be less than the present minimum of 12.
c. Atmospheric test ban. We should be prepared to fall back to an atmospheric-outerspace-underwater test-ban treaty in the event that the Soviet Union is unwilling to agree to on-site inspections.
In discussing the problem of nuclear testing, the Committee of Principals agreed that two concurrent studies should be undertaken on an urgent basis: an assessment of the risks to U.S. security under the alternative types of test bans, and an assessment of the risks to U.S. security that would result from the indefinite continuation of testing of nuclear weapons by the U.S., the Soviet Union, and other countries.
In addition to considering questions related to cessation of nuclear weapon testing, the Committee of Principals also considered and recommends for your approval the following positions related to general disarmament negotiations:
Stage I production. The Committee of Principals proposes that production of armaments during Stage I should be limited to replacement and repair of existing armaments. Replacement would be "in kind." The amount of production would be reduced at least as much as the reduction of armaments. Production of new types of weapons, of prototypes, and of new armament production facilities would be prohibited.
Bases. The Committee of Principals also proposes that the United States should state at the Geneva Conference that it would be willing to discuss the possibility of a Stage I reduction of military bases but that any such discussion should take place only after substantial progress has been made toward reaching agreement on the central problems of reducing armaments and armed forces and on verification and other measures providing necessary safeguards in a disarming world.
William C. Foster
203. Memorandum of Meeting With President Kennedy/1/
Washington, July 27, 1962, 10:20 a.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 7/27/62. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. A list of the 19 participants at the meeting is in the President's Appointment Book. (Ibid.) McCone also prepared a summary memorandum of this NSC meeting. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI, ER Subject Files, NSC, 7/1/62-7/31/62) See the Supplement.
SUBJECT
Disarmament Proposals
Secretary Rusk introduced the Committee of Principals' proposals with respect to a nuclear weapons test ban and other disarmament measures. He said that we must proceed with prudence and that we must have reasonable assurances that the other side is not testing if we are to live with treaty provisions prohibiting our testing. He added that everyone was agreed that if we can get an acceptable treaty, we want a nuclear weapons test ban. He presented two alternatives:
(1) We can go all the way for a comprehensive all-environment ban, relying on a national protection system. This system involves neutral observers at each station, plus twelve on-site inspections in the Soviet Union. The Soviet inspection figure is zero. Thus, we are exposed to pressure from the neutrals to reduce our minimum figure of twelve. He noted that key Congressional leaders were not pleased with the thought that we would be putting forward to the Russians any new disarmament proposal.
(2) The second alternative is to start with a fallback position in anticipation of the Russians' refusal to accept any on-site inspection. The fallback position would involve a ban on atmospheric testing.
Secretary Rusk favored going to an atmospheric ban treaty now and move toward a comprehensive treaty just as soon as the Russians would accept on-site inspection. He saw no point in playing with the number of inspections when the Soviets had clearly told us that they would accept no inspection.
The President asked what happened when the Soviets renew their tests. He called attention to the fact that we might have to resume testing, depending on what the Russians do and what we think they have learned from their most recent tests.
Secretary Rusk said we would have to protect ourselves from a situation in which the Russians would be obtaining new information while we would be treaty-bound not to test.
The President asked whether we would hold off until the Soviets have finished their testing. He also asked what we would do if they made us an offer on, say, January 1, to henceforth cease all testing. Between now and January 1 we would be embarrassed to test even if we were in a position to do so.
Secretary Rusk said we must keep open the possibility of future U.S. testing until we know as much as we can about what the Russians had learned during their current series.
Mr. Murrow agreed that we should make every effort to avoid playing the numbers game with inspections. He suggested that we ask the Russians to hold off for eight months or as long as we did before resuming tests.
Dr. Wiesner said we would have to continue our tests for at least a month or six weeks.
The President asked why we chose twelve as the number of inspections. He noted that our latest information on the number of earthquakes was lower in percentage terms than the reduction in the number of U.S. inspections we said we wanted. He asked why we shouldn't put the number lower in view of the probability that the Soviets were going to refuse all inspection.
Mr. Bundy responded that Ambassador Dean's view is that he wants a fixed number of inspections so that he can resist pressure from the neutrals who are insisting that we be precise about our proposal.
Secretary Rusk replied that Dean must negotiate with the Soviet representatives and not with the neutral representatives.
Mr. Foster commented that we should not discuss merely the number of inspections but look at the entire inspection system we are proposing.
Dr. Wiesner noted that the national detection system being proposed is a British system now adopted by the neutrals. He stated his view that it is almost certain we can detect nuclear weapons tests by a system located entirely outside the USSR. The proposal is to go from nineteen international stations down to five national stations inside the USSR. He acknowledged that the new proposal involved a degradation of from one to two KT over the Geneva system. He noted that inspection outside the USSR would continue. He mentioned 70-plus events, thirty of them outside the Kurile Islands, with which we would have to deal. He thought that we could accept six to nine inspections.
Secretary McNamara said the number of inspections we were asking was lower because we had raised the threshold. He said the threshold was now one KT in granite.
Chairman Seaborg said what we were talking about was two KT in tuff.
Mr. Bundy intervened to state that we were not trying to reach a decision now because we don't know what our new data actually means. We haven't war-gamed the situation on the basis of the new data. For example, reconnaissance satellites might be in a position to photograph alluvial shots.
In response to the President's question, Dr. Seaborg said we could learn much from underground tests smaller than ten KT. In addition, underground tests would keep alive the laboratories and permit us to experiment with new ideas involving vulnerability of our weapons, weapons effects, primers, and the all-fusion weapons.
Director McCone said he favored underground tests but commented that other countries could conduct underground tests, thereby resulting in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He recalled that in April 1959 President Eisenhower had proposed a test ban very similar to the one now being considered. To do so again would involve repeating an idea previously turned down by the Russians. He read an extract from President Eisenhower's letter containing the test ban proposal. He said he was not proposing an atmospheric test ban but he did recall that the Soviets proposed such a ban immediately after they had finished their last test series and we, at that time, ridiculed their suggestion.
The President said that if we now propose such a ban, they would turn it down. He suggested that we may want to reserve this proposal for use after they complete their test series, if we believe they have learned little in this series.
Secretary McNamara said we are not in a position now to decide on the number of inspections. He saw the situation as involving the risks of continuing tests affecting the risks of the treaty ban. He suggested that we agree to an atmospheric test ban, a willingness to accept a simplified comprehensive test ban treaty, and an agreement prohibiting transfer of weapons but continuance of our underground testing program.
Mr. Bundy said he felt we were not yet ready to decide on a national detection system.
Secretary Rusk said what he had in mind was a national system which would include neutral observers at the national stations.
The President said it was reasonable for us to have neutral observers in the national stations. He suggested that we proposed this idea even if we had to give way on it later.
Secretary Rusk said that Congressional leaders were asking why we kept talking numbers of inspections in view of the fact that the Russians kept rejecting all inspections. He thought one way around this Congressional problem was to keep attention focused on an atmospheric test ban.
The President said that if we could get all tests stopped it would be very good. The danger of proliferation and the prospect that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] might acquire a nuclear capability offset the danger involved in possible Soviet cheating. He thought we should go to Congress with this argument.
Mr. Foster said he thought we could impress Congress with the new data which we have acquired. He said we could evaluate the risks of Soviet cheating as compared with the risks growing out of a continuation of the arms race.
Mr. Bundy said we need more information as well as more education of our negotiators in Geneva. He wondered if we could ask for a delay in negotiations. Secretary Rusk pointed out that we ought to brief our Geneva officials on the nature of the new technical data.
The President commented that we had messed up the handling of the new data in the U.S. Government. He said that information about it was all over town before we had decided what effect it would have on our policy. For the future, he said we must make our policy decisions before the U.K. or anyone else is informed of new information. We cannot publicize new data in such a way as to make it appear that information is ahead of policy. He asked that we seek a three- or four-day delay in the Geneva negotiations and that we order Ambassador Dean to Washington to talk to him here on Monday./2/ He could tell us his problems and the scientists with their information could return with him to Geneva.
/2/July 30.
Mr. Bundy said the posture would be that the President had discussed new policy proposals, had asked Dean to return for further policy discussions, and that Dean would return to Geneva carrying the decisions we had reached.
Secretary Rusk said that we must have on-site inspections and the Soviets will not accept such inspections. In his view, Vela information did not open the door to a solution.
The President suggested that Mr. Foster hold a background press conference, making the point that new information improves the detection situation but does not solve it and that the purpose of the press briefing would be to cool off Congress and the British by repeating our view that on-site inspections continue to be necessary, even with a national system under an international organization./3/
/3/No record of this press briefing, if held, has been found.
The President said Alternative I sounded right to him (see the July 26, 1962 paper attached)./4/ He asked that a memorandum be written to the British on the limitations of the new data. The group would meet with Dean on Monday. In his view, we could not get away with a position which involved refusal to discuss numbers of inspections. He wanted additional information on the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
/4/Not attached, but presumably Foster's memorandum to the President, Document 202.
The press would be told about Dean's return but would be given no information or background on details of Alternative I proposals. The press would be told that the President was reserving a decision until he had talked to Dean and until several questions which had arisen in today's meeting could be answered. An effort would be made to knock down any reporter's view that there was a division within the government or that a major controversy had arisen with respect to the test ban treaty proposal.
204. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, July 28, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Nuclear Testing, Vol. II, 7/62-2/63. Secret. In a July 28 note to McNamara, attached to a carbon copy of this memorandum, Harold Brown wrote that Adam Yarmolinsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, and Jack Ruina, Director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense Research and Engineering, had drafted the memorandum on the previous day and, regarding the final paragraph, Solis Horwitz, DOD's Director of Office of Organizational and Management Planning, "concurs in the proposed assignment of responsibility. So do I, though somewhat reluctantly." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Atomic 000.01-400.112, 1962)
This is in reply to your memorandum of 21 July 1962/2/ on the way in which the new conclusions about nuclear test detection were evaluated and disseminated in the Government.
/2/Reference is to National Security Action Memorandum No. 174, July 21, addressed to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, which expressed the President's puzzlement at the release of new data on the U.S. ability to detect small underground nuclear tests and requested these agency heads to "consider how matters can be reorganized to avoid a repetition of this unfortunate event." (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 174) Secretary Rusk responded to NSAM No. 174 in an August 15 memorandum to the President. (Ibid.) Marshall S. Carter, Acting Director of Central Intelligence, replied in an August 31 memorandum to the President. (Ibid.)
The information disclosed by Dr. Carl Romney of the Air Force Technical Application Center (AFTAC) at the 3 July meeting called by ACDA/3/ had been developed in final form by Dr. Romney only over the previous weekend, and had been approved for dissemination outside AFTAC by Dr. Romney's superiors. Dr. Romney had anticipated that the ACDA meeting would be much smaller than it actually was, and he had not had an opportunity to present his report to the chairman of the meeting, the Deputy Director of ACDA, before the meeting actually took place. The information could not, in my judgment, have been developed at an earlier date.
/3/See footnote 4, Document 196.
Apart from ensuring that chairmen of similar meetings inform themselves in advance of the content of scientific reports to be rendered, I believe the best way to avoid a recurrence of this situation is to provide for review of information to be disseminated outside ACDA by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, as I have already directed.
The detailed facts and chronology underlying the 3 July disclosure are as follows:
The new information disclosed at the 3 July meeting related not to our ability to detect small underground shots from a distance, but rather to the fact that it now appears there are significantly fewer earthquakes in the Soviet Union, producing signals equivalent to an underground nuclear explosion of a given yield in a given medium, than had hitherto been assumed. Measurements of the Soviet underground explosion of 2 February, the French underground explosion of 1 May, and the U.S. Aardvark explosion of 12 May, all taken together, gave the first indication that a correction factor previously used for determining Soviet earthquake statistics was in error. These explosions occurred during a period when our measurement abilities were rapidly increasing, primarily as a result of the Vela program of nuclear testing detection research. The information obtained from the 1 May shot was not available for interpretation until June. When taken together with the information from the February shot, it led Dr. Romney to direct a further analysis of the 12 May data. This analysis was received by Dr. Romney at the end of June. At the same time he was working on a study requested by ACDA to evaluate the technical capabilities of a system of existing external national seismic stations to detect and identify Soviet nuclear explosions. On 29 June, he decided to work over the weekend in order to test the hypothesis that the earlier accepted conclusions about the level of Soviet earthquake activities were in error, so that he could include the results in his report to ACDA on 3 July. It should be noted that the previously accepted estimates of Soviet earthquake statistics had several times been presented to both government and consulting scientists, and had been unchallenged.
Dr. Romney consulted his superiors about the form and content of his report, including the new evidence that the number of earthquakes in the Soviet Union might have been previously overestimated. They instructed him to include this information, since they thought it was relevant and timely.
The 3 July meeting was attended by some 25 officials from the White House, AEC, ACDA, State, CIA, and DoD, including Dr. Wiesner, Ambassador Stelle, Mr. Fisher, and Dr. Long of ACDA, and Commissioner Haworth of AEC.
As you know, after the 3 July meeting there was a great concern that if these new estimates should leak to the press, the government would be in the embarrassing position of being accused of withholding information that would tend to ease the inspection problem in a nuclear test ban, and it was, therefore, decided that a news release be made. The Department of Defense concurred reluctantly with this position, on the grounds that (1) a release of this estimate alone would tend to exaggerate its significance, and it would give the impression of a major technical breakthrough; and (2) the new estimates had not been independently evaluated outside AFTAC. Therefore, the Department issued a release covering all Vela results and including the new Soviet earthquake estimates as only one of these results; and, in addition, prior to the release, a group of technical experts reviewed the AFTAC conclusions. Although some skepticism was expressed, the group generally agreed that the AFTAC conclusions were reasonable. Since then, the analysis of much more data tends to confirm the AFTAC conclusions.
AFTAC is recognized to have special scientific competence associated with detection of nuclear tests, not found elsewhere in government. Because of this competence, AFTAC has continuously received high priority assignments not only from other Defense agencies but also from such organizations as State, CIA, AEC, and even the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. It has been very difficult for AFTAC to establish relative priorities amongst this continuous input of requirements. Therefore, I have decided to assign to the Director of Defense Research and Engineering the responsibility for establishing these relative priorities, and for the staff supervision of AFTAC in all technical activities not primarily a matter of intelligence collection and processing. The assignment will include responsibility for the evaluation, control, and dissemination of new results of AFTAC technical analyses.
Robert S. McNamara/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.
205. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, July 30, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Atomic Energy--Armaments 62. Confidential. Copies were distributed to the Principals under cover of a July 30 memorandum from Foster, which is attached to the source text.
SUBJECT
U.S. Program Regarding a Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons Tests and Other Disarmament Proposals (as revised)/2/
/2/Regarding the revised version, see footnote 4 below.
The Committee of Principals met on July 26, 1962, and with you on July 27, 1962,/3/ to consider issues which are outstanding in the disarmament negotiations now going on in Geneva. At that meeting, we considered various lines of approach with respect to negotiations for a ban on nuclear weapons tests in the light of recent developments of a technical and political nature.
/3/See Documents 201 and 203.
The principal political development has been the tabling, on April 16, 1962, of a memorandum by the eight non-NATO, non-Warsaw Pact, delegations. This memorandum suggests that nationally operated seismic stations should be the basis of any test ban agreement and contains a statement on on-site inspections which can be interpreted as either obligatory or invitational.
There have been two technical developments. The first was the achievement of a long-range seismic detection capability which will make it possible to detect events in the USSR from stations outside the country. The second was the determination that the number of earthquakes which might produce unidentified events comparable to an underground nuclear test of a given magnitude had been substantially reduced above the previous estimate--by a factor between 4 and 5.
These developments are significant in three respects. First, the increase in the long-range detection capability makes it possible to develop a system of some twenty-five stations, internationally monitored and coordinated but nationally manned and controlled, which would have a detection capability not significantly different from that originally contemplated for the 180 internationally operated stations planned for the "Geneva" system. Second, the decrease in the number of unidentified events with which a detection system will have to cope will make it possible to decrease the number of on-site inspections required for verification. Third, these developments do not provide a way of determining from seismic data that a particular suspicious event was an underground explosion and therefore do not eliminate the requirement of some on-site inspections as an essential element of any system of verification.
On balance, it is my judgment that the over-all risks to the security of the United States would be less under a comprehensive test ban treaty based on the twenty-five detection stations described above and with a number of on-site inspections lower than that we have been discussing in the past than they would be under the indefinite continuation of nuclear testing by the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and other countries. I believe that this conclusion is reinforced by the material submitted to you by the Department of Defense. On balance, however, I would not recommend the ta-bling of such a treaty at the present time. I have three reasons for this latter conclusion.
First, our thinking on the number of on-site inspections has not progressed to a point where there is any particular number lower than the figure of 12-20, which is now on the table, which we could defend against both the neutrals who would want it lower and the congressional critics who would say it is too low already.
Second, as long as the Soviet Government holds to its present position that there should be no on-site inspections, there are disadvantages to talking specific numbers lower than those discussed before.
Third, domestic opinion, particularly Congressional opinion, is not prepared for such a move. A treaty based on a reduced number of nationally-operated, internationally-monitored seismic stations with a reduced number of on-site inspections represents a substantial scaling down of safeguards that this administration and the prior administration have been insisting was the minimum necessary for national security. It is based on information which has only been available outside of the Department of Defense since July 3 of this year, and this information has been very skeptically received in the legislative branch of the Government. Our best information is that if a modified comprehensive treaty were to be tabled at this time, Congressional leaders, whose support would be essential at the time of ratification if agreement were to be reached, would take public positions adverse to the proposals. Similarly, the tabling of a modified comprehensive treaty now without further domestic political preparations might result in their becoming an issue in the fall Congressional elections.
On the basis of these considerations, I recommend the following course of action:
a. Atmospheric test ban. The United States should table an atmospheric-outer space-underwater test ban treaty.
b. Comprehensive Test Ban. At the time of tabling an atmospheric-outer space-underwater test ban treaty the United States should declare its willingness to accept a comprehensive test ban treaty involving internationally-monitored national control posts on Soviet soil and involving a possible reduction in the number of on-site inspections. We should be prepared to provide the Conference/4/ with as much recent data as we can relating to detection, location and identification capabilities of internationally-monitored and coordinated "national" systems while making the point that this data does not eliminate the need for on-site inspections. We should avoid proposing specific numbers either of stations or of on-site inspections on the ground that we see no point in suggesting or debating details or numbers until the Soviet Union accepts the principle of on-site inspections.
/4/The only change in the revised version was the substitution in this paragraph of the words, "We should be prepared to provide the Conference" for "We should, at the same time, provide the Conference". A copy of the earlier draft, also dated July 30, is in Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-3062. According to a July 30 memorandum from Foster to the President, attached to another copy of the revised version, "The revision is one of emphasis in playing down the significance of the presentation of scientific data made by technical people. It has been made after consultation with the Secretary of State and Ambassador Dean." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Nuclear Testing, Vol. II, 7/62-2/63)
c. Soviet testing. In the event the Soviet commences an atmospheric series we should continue to indicate willingness to negotiate in both areas (a) and (b) above but should indicate that we might wish to conduct further tests ourselves if the Soviet series produced extraordinary results.
d. Domestic political preparation. The decision to table a revised comprehensive treaty should await the developments both at Geneva and in this country. A major campaign of domestic information and political preparation should be begun as to the new data and its significance.
e. No-transfer agreement. The United States should press for a world-wide agreement banning the transfer or acquisition of nuclear weapons or nuclear technology. This course of action would be related practically, but not organically, to the other courses of action.
f. Underground testing. We should continue our underground testing program until a comprehensive treaty has been achieved.
g. Readiness to test in the atmosphere. We should, to the extent feasible, maintain readiness to test in the atmosphere. This will involve discussions with the U.K. as to the continuing readiness of Christmas Island as a test site.
William C. Foster /4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
206. Memorandum of Meeting With President Kennedy/1/
Washington, July 30, 1962, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 7/29-31/62. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. McCone summarized this meeting in a memorandum for the files, August 2. (Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 7/1/62-12/31/62) See the Supplement. A July 30 memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, which sets forth the agenda for this meeting, indicates that Foster's memorandum (Document 205) and two memoranda each from McNamara and Haworth, submitted in response to "certain questions on which you asked for reports over the week end," were attached to his memorandum. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 7/29-31/62) None, however, is attached. An "index" identifies the subjects of these memoranda as follows: The US-USSR Military Balance With and Without a Test Ban, The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons With and Without a Test Ban Agreement, Maintaining Readiness to Test During a Test Ban, and Relative Technical and Military Advantages of Testing or Non-testing Under Various Testing Constraints. (Ibid.) Undated drafts of the former two are ibid. Haworth's two memoranda have not been found.
SUBJECT
Disarmament Negotiations
In response to a question, a Defense spokesman said the destruction of the launching pad would delay our test series some weeks./2/ A new pad would be ready in September and could be used in October.
/2/Reference is to the failure of the Bluegill shot in the Dominic series, a Thor missile-launched nuclear test from Johnston Island on July 25. The missile malfunctioned and blew up shortly after ignition causing major damage to the launching pad and radioactive contamination to the surrounding area.
The President stated that he did not want to conduct U.S. tests after the Soviets have finished their current test series if we can help it./3/ He was informed that we now think the Soviets will end their current series on October 20. He noted that there was a risk in talking about a test ban if the Soviets finished their series and we have not held our final test in the current series.
/3/A TASS announcement made over Moscow radio on July 21 said in part: "In response to the series of nuclear tests by the United States, the Soviet Government has ordered tests to be held of the newest types of Soviet nuclear weapons." The statement is reproduced in International Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapons Tests, September 1961-September 1962, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 9, October 1962, pp. 253-255. For a variant translation of the same statement, dated July 22, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II, pp. 677-679.
Secretary McNamara presented his paper on the proliferation of nuclear weapons (copy attached)./4/ He estimated that in the next ten years sixteen States would be added to the four which now have a nuclear capability. Some three to seven years would elapse after a decision to go for a nuclear capability had been made, before a weapons capability would be achieved.
/4/Not attached but see the source note above.
Mr. Nitze discussed the situation during the next ten years in China, Sweden, India, Japan, Australia and South Africa, including the capabilities of these States to produce nuclear weapons and the restraints involved in their deciding to seek a nuclear capability. He acknowledged that in Germany and Italy pressures for nuclear capability was very great. This pressure might be dealt with by creating a multilateral force in NATO.
After ten years, the picture became quite different. The cost of producing nuclear weapons would drop drastically if the U.S. and the USSR continue testing and improving their weapons. As the years go by, the ease of getting a nuclear capability rapidly increases. States which do not now have a weapons capability can learn a great deal from the operation of their peaceful use reactors. If fusion is achieved, bombs become much cheaper.
Secretary Rusk estimated that by cheating it is possible to achieve the all-fission bomb underground and below the present threshold. In answer to the question, do fission bombs contribute to our military capability, he replied that at present they did not in view of our existing stockpile of bombs.
Dr. Wiesner said the fission is a time bomb and is not advantageous as a battle field weapon because its action in causing deaths is not instantaneous and its effect on personnel is delayed, thus reducing its usefulness in active combat.
Commissioner Haworth summarized an AEC paper on test readiness./5/ He discussed the use of Christmas Island which he said would take two to three months to be made ready, but this could be reduced to thirty to sixty days if sufficient funds were expended. He also discussed a test system involving the use of no land by relying only on shipborne and airborne diagnostic instruments. He mentioned the value of using Johnston Island for weapons effects tests. He spoke of the possibility of conducting a high-altitude test by launching a missile from a ship at sea.
/5/Not attached and not found. [note: document 206 has two numeral 4 footnotes. I've changed the first one to footnote 5 and the second one to footnote 6. We might need to check the original manuscript for the correct citation]
The President suggested that we first try to reach a long-term agreement with the British covering the use of Christmas Island. If the British refuse, then we can proceed to ready the other test systems.
Commissioner Haworth then briefed a paper on the various limitations which apply to different kinds of tests./6/ He summarized the information we can learn from underground tests. In his view, the most important point in connection with cheating is the stimulating effect on the laboratories of the cheater. The cheater scientist will continue to work on new ideas because of the knowledge that they will have a chance, even underground, to prove out these ideas. If during a treaty period there has been cheating, the advantages gained by the cheater are much higher if the treaty is suddenly abrogated, thus making possible prompt tests of the new ideas.
/6/Not attached and not found.
Dr. Wiesner said that if there was an abrogation of the treaty, we had numerous options.
Mr. Foster summarized his memorandum (attached)./7/ In response to a Presidential question, Mr. Foster summarized the internationally monitored national control system. The President asked whether the data gained by the proposed system was important. Mr. Foster responded that this data was not important, but the political aspect of the system was important. The President asked whether we could agree to drop the international monitoring aspect of the control system if we had to and Mr. Foster agreed that we could.
/7/Document 205.
Dr. Long, in response to a question as to what kind of a system would do a good job, said that we could reduce the number of stations from 180 to 50, comprising 20 seismic stations and 30 electro-magnetic acoustic stations.
The President requested additional information from Dr. Long. In response, Dr. Long said the capability of the system is 20 KT in tuff, while the Geneva system was estimated to have a 1 KT threshold.
There followed considerable confused discussion of seismic events and required number of seismic and electro-magnetic and acoustic detection stations.
Commissioner Haworth said in summary that in his view the Soviets could achieve no decisive technical advance by cheating on a test ban system.
Ambassador Dean predicted that if we offered the Russians only a ban of atmospheric tests, they would turn this down. They know we are far ahead of them in the technique of underground testing. In addition, the neutrals expect us to come back to Geneva with concessions, plus a comprehensive test ban treaty.
The President suggested that we could answer both the French and the Russian arguments about underground tests by telling them that our figures relate to 50 KT devices exploded in rock.
Ambassador Dean commented that 8 neutrals in Geneva are just about ready to abandon hope of an agreement, and, therefore, they are putting pressure on us to come forth with a comprehensive test ban treaty in advance of the UN General Assembly meeting.
The President said that as he understood the situation new information which we now had made it possible for us to reduce the number of stations inside the Soviet Union from 19 to 5, in a worldwide system comprising 50 stations in lieu of 180 stations.
Mr. Foster reviewed the political situation in the Senate. He cautioned that if we moved too fast, we would lose the prospect of obtaining Senate approval of any treaty.
Mr. Bundy commented that our difficulties in Congress are the result of the Congressmen's lack of information.
The President acknowledged that we could not go to the Senate with a treaty this summer. We might be able to do so in the fall after the Soviets have finished their test series and we have decided that there has been no Soviet breakthrough as a result of their tests.
Ambassador Dean said he felt a strong need to come up within the next two or three weeks with new proposals.
Secretary McNamara denied that our new data and information we now have had been kept from those who need to have it.
Mr. Foster summarized his view. We should table a treaty banning only atmospheric tests now. We should tell the neutrals that our new data means we can accept a national detection system, fewer detection stations, and fewer on-site inspections, but we must first get acceptance from the Russians of the principle of on-site inspection.
Ambassador Dean repeated his view that we should table a comprehensive test ban treaty even though all its details could only be spelled out later.
Mr. Bundy pointed out that tabling a comprehensive treaty would upset the Senators.
The Vice President acknowledged that many Senators were upset. They are concerned about what we are now doing and they need additional information. Possibly the President will have to talk to certain key Senators.
Ambassador Dean restated his view that we should introduce a revised comprehensive treaty now.
Mr. McCone said that the Congressmen are worrying [about?] the test sites in the Soviet Union.
It was decided that a further discussion would be held tomorrow./8/ The control post system would be described. It was acknowledged that Ambassador Dean would have to return to Geneva with some change in the U.S. position because of all of the interest in news stories indicating he had returned to Washington for further policy instructions.
/8/See Document 208.
The President pointed out that no real progress would be made by the Soviets or the U.S. until after the current test series is ended, but there would be an advantage in creating a situation in which the Russians would be blamed by the UN General Assembly for failure to achieve a disarmament agreement. It was acknowledged that our decisions depend on whether the new data made possible new test ban proposals.
207. Report of the Inspection Study Group/1/
Washington, July 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Inspection Study Group. Secret. The typescript report is 12 pages, plus 4 pages of front matter and 7 appendices, totaling 98 pages. Regarding the interagency Inspection Study Group (also known as the Foster Panel), see footnote 4, Document 140. In an August 31 letter to McGeorge Bundy, Foster enclosed copies of the report "for yourself and for the President if you find, as I hope you will, that it is worthy of his attention." He called the report "the most thorough investigation of inspection and verification, and of the relations of intelligence to arms control inspection, that has so far been made," though he emphasized that it was "but a beginning, and that its preliminary estimate of the scope of inspection that might be required for comprehensive arms control on a zonal basis, for example, is only illustrative." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 7/62-6/63)
[Here follow a title page, preface, contents, Part A. History of the Inspection Study Group Project, Part B. Task of the Inspection Study Group, and Part C. General Remarks Concerning Inspection.]
D. CONCLUSIONS
1. Need for Experiment and Testing. It appears to us that the resources of existing technology will allow an inspection system that will support an arms control agreement. We are impressed, however, with the gap in our knowledge of such capabilities and therefore believe that a program of experiment and test is much needed to determine and perfect inspection equipment, techniques and methodology, and to permit the determination of a minimum level of inspection needed to support various objectives of arms control. Knowing then what type and degree of inspection is necessary to achieve specific inspection goals, an evaluation can and should be made of the minimum rights of access essential to meaningful inspection, and the policy implications of these necessary rights should be developed. On the basis of field test results and access requirement studies, longer range research and development programs can be formulated.
There is a very great need for determining what is an acceptable balance of cost and effectiveness in an inspection system: that optimum employment of people, techniques and equipment which correctly balances the (unacceptable) cost of additional information with the cost of less--and insufficient--information. Even before this there is much testing to be done to determine whether a certain device will indeed do a specific inspection job, and how well. There is little question but that the inspection concepts we have proposed in Appendix III,/2/ for example, are redundant in combination and in many individual cases more thorough than will be required in the actual inspection situation. The technical "minimums", however, cannot be satisfactorily determined until actual field tests of inspection equipment and techniques have been carried out. Considering the abstract physical properties of equipment and techniques is not sufficient. It is necessary to take them off the shelf, into the field and try them, individually and in combination, as nearly as possible in the context of an actual arms control inspection situation.
/2/Appendix III is entitled "Some General Characteristics of an Inspection System To Verify Comprehensive Arms Control Programs."
2. "Critical Components" Philosophy. Zonal inspection is itself a form of sampling./3/ Within the inspection process, another sampling method which may cut down the number of inspectors and kinds of inspection is to locate the critical points in the production, handling, or use of the item to be inspected. We need to look at the things that give the greatest gain in information. Much productive research could be conducted to establish for each inspection target the critical components--those items, stages or people without which the inspected thing cannot be produced or distributed. (Such research will have to keep pace with new technology, especially when an inspection system is actually in operation.) It must be kept in mind, however, that this is and must remain a sampling technique, and that there should be no corresponding diminution of inspection rights; that is, any limitation to inspection of critical components should be one of choice for efficiency within a secure inspection framework, not a restriction written into an agreement. As a matter of principle, no agreement should have as one of its requirements limitation to critical components, for it would always be technically possible to circumvent such an agreement.
/3/ The Inspection Study Group did not concern itself with the technical problem of statistical sampling in inspection. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Transport Inspection Problems. In our preliminary description of the general characteristics of an inspection system for zonal disarmament, by far the greatest number of inspectors and consequently the major portion of the personnel costs are those connected with transport inspection, where there must be provided a capability to detect a sufficient fraction of any illegal movement out of zones to deter efforts at evasion. The Group looked into countrywide inspection at all zonal boundaries and found it impractical because of the very large number of inspectors required; we therefore suggest restriction to the boundaries of the single zone selected for inspection. Careful advance planning can reduce the interval between announcement of the zone and arrival of inspectors; a moratorium on traffic out of the zone for even a few hours, checked by air surveillance, would help; and the zonal inspection forces can first be assigned entirely to seal off the zone, then move to their regular assignments. Even then, transport inspection will require substantial numbers of inspectors. A priority research task is to develop equipment and techniques which will reduce the numbers necessary for this critical portion of the total inspection process.
4. Need for Precise Definition and Designations. In the past the USSR has been able to evade the general purposes of declarations to international organizations by using special designators for equipment which cannot be compared with those in general use either internally or internationally. It is essential that arms declarations agreements include explicit provisions for giving all designators for the item under consideration, definition of locations by name and geographic coordinates, as well as meaningful and internationally acceptable specifications for items to be declared. Similarly, all necessary inspection rights and procedures must be defined explicitly and precisely, with their practical application spelled out in detail. Zonal design criteria must be decided upon which will balance potential gerrymandering against the requirements of efficient and secure inspection. (See Appendix VI for further discussion.)/4/
/4/The title of Appendix VI is "Some Aspects of Zonal Schemes."
5. Intelligence Capabilities. Unilateral intelligence probably has the capability to assess the accuracy of armaments declarations relating to strategic aircraft, fixed strategic missile launch facilities and AICBM installations, location and class of airfields and ports, the number and location of major surface ships, and the number of missile-carrying submarines and the number of launchers they contain. In other areas of armaments declarations, intelligence can aid in evaluating their general reasonableness. There is particularly a weakness in capability to evaluate operational inventories of missiles, including those on submarines, and declarations concerning mobile land-based missile launchers. (See Appendices II and VII.)/5/
/5/Appendices II and VII are entitled respectively "Intelligence and ACDA Plan 1," and "Findings and Problems."
6. Intelligence can aid in the identification of evasions by discovering indications of suspicious activity and guiding inspection efforts to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources. Intelligence may not, for various reasons, justify a smaller inspection effort, but it can increase the deterrent influence and effectiveness of one in being.
7. Addition of Fixed Launch Facilities as Inspection Target. The relative confidence in intelligence and inspection capabilities in connection with fixed launching sites for strategic missiles, compared with the lack of confidence in ability to verify declarations on the missiles themselves, leads us to suggest that any control agreement, in addition to numbers of missiles and their deployment, include as well inspection of fixed launch facilities.
8. Use of Indications Intelligence. The method of indications intelligence, i.e., the comparison of intelligence information with a list of "indicators" which taken together suggest the occurrence of some significant event, should be developed in application to arms control. It may help to disclose evasions of the agreement which are not individually susceptible to detection or measurement, or which in isolation are seemingly not significant. (See Appendix VII.)
[Here follow Part E. Intelligence and Arms Control Inspection, Part F. Some General Characteristics of an Inspection System, Part G. Research and Development, Test and Evaluation Programs on Inspection Techniques, and seven appendices.]
208. Memorandum of Meeting With President Kennedy/1/
Washington, August 1, 1962, 4:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 8/1/62-8/23/62. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
SUBJECT
Disarmament Negotiations
The President read the Prime Minister's reply to his cable concerning the future use of Christmas Island as a test site./2/ In summary, the British were prepared to permit us to use the island for the time being.
/2/In his August 1 message to President Kennedy, Prime Minister Macmillan thanked the President for his July 27 message, summarized their differences on nuclear testing, accepted his proposal for promoting an atmospheric ban treaty, suggested a comprehensive test ban, and "if the treaties were tabled" would agree to keep Christmas Island "on a care and maintenance basis" in case further testing was required. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, M-K, 1961-1962) See the Supplement.
Mr. Bundy called attention to the pressure which was being put upon us by reporters to define the internationally monitored national control post system.
The President responded by saying that Mr. Salinger had been given guidance. Ambassador Dean would spell out the details of the system in the current negotiations. Our position is that we would be prepared to discuss control posts under effective international supervision but we have not accepted national control posts alone as being sufficient.
Secretary Rusk said the key question before us is what should we do if the pressure in Geneva is to move to an atmospheric test ban. He favored going ahead with an atmospheric ban.
The President asked whether we should accept immediately or on a fixed date, such as September 1 or June 1, so that we could test again before it became effective if we desired to do so. Pedro Nevilla's proposal was mentioned./3/
/3/Reference is to Luis Padilla Nervo; see footnote 6, Document 193.
The AEC and the Department of Defense spokesmen agreed we should go for an atmospheric ban.
Ambassador Dean said he differed with Secretary Rusk. He felt that we are walking into a Soviet trap. Inevitably, the Soviets and the neutrals would push us toward an unpoliced moratorium, including underground testing.
The President said he felt no pressure for a moratorium.
Mr. McCloy and Mr. Lovett both noted that we are not talking about an impractical moratorium on underground testing and Secretary Rusk said we needn't fall into a trap because we know in advance that it is there.
There followed discussion as to what test cutoff date we should accept.
Secretary McNamara said we cannot decide whether the date should be September 1 or June 1 until we know the results of our tests and have a good idea of the results of the Soviet tests.
Dr. Wiesner pointed out that we will have to give figures on the number of inspections and Ambassador Dean agreed with him.
Mr. Bundy said we must not reveal the number of inspections which would be acceptable to us, but the number of control posts was not very important.
Secretary Rusk said he realized our position would be difficult for Ambassador Dean, but he said Dean must negotiate with the Russians first and then the neutrals.
Ambassador Dean said that before we presented our last proposals we had informed our allies and we must do so again. The Canadians especially will insist on advance knowledge. If we hold four-power Western discussions, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].
The President noted that Macmillan's position indicates a willingness to accept a national detection system. He asked how many stations would be involved in such a system.
Dr. Long replied 50 to 80 stations, adding that 25 seismic stations are now as good as the Geneva system because we have learned so much since the Geneva system was proposed.
Ambassador Dean added the number was 80 in all environments, including seismic, acoustic and outer space stations. He added that we must relate the number of on-site inspections to the ratio of unidentified events.
The President said he would be prepared to sign a treaty tomorrow if it resulted in an immediately effective ban on atmospheric tests. If we did not sign tomorrow, then we would have to negotiate the date the treaty would go into effect.
Mr. Kaysen noted that we would undermine our position on comprehensive treaty if we appeared ready to negotiate the effective time of an atmospheric ban.
Mr. Foster read from the July 26 paper, pages 3 and 4, a proposal on Stage I production of armaments, copy of paper attached./4/
/4/Not attached; it was attached to Foster's memorandum to the President, Document 202.
General Lemnitzer stated that the Joint Chiefs were not clear as to the meaning of the sentence "replacement would be in kind." He said these words must be defined precisely in an annex.
Mr. Foster said the definition had been narrowed to types (B-52s) in order to avoid dealing with categories.
Mr. Foster referred to the same paper and read the position on U.S. bases. He noted that the recommendation involved only discussion of the possibility of including military base reduction in Stage I.
General Lemnitzer said the Joint Chiefs had a major problem with this paragraph because they did not know how the word "bases" was being used. He said the proposal would affect NATO deployments. In any negotiations on bases, the U.S. was at a disadvantage because if the Russians gave up bases outside the USSR, they could return to them very quickly but that if we withdrew from our overseas bases our re-entry would be very difficult.
Ambassador Dean raised the question of briefing the disarmament delegates on the technical aspects of our new information. He suggested that the scientists come to Geneva on August 9 following a week of political talks with the four Western nations and with USSR representative Zorin.
Ambassador Dean said the Soviet position on total armed forces had gone from 2.5 million to 1.9 million. Mr. Foster and Secretary McNamara said we were studying what our position should be in the light of the difficulties any new position would have for the Joint Chiefs.
With respect to background briefing as to the meeting, Secretary Rusk stated that he felt little more should be said than the President had said in his past press conferences. At the Joint Atomic Energy Committee meeting tomorrow, Ambassador Dean would merely report on what he is now to do./5/ The Senate Foreign Relations Committee would be invited to join the Armed Forces Committee to hear Ambassador Dean's report./6/ Mr. Foster has already seen Congressman Holifield and Senator Jackson. He would see Senator Russell separately.
/5/Not further identified.
/6/No record of Dean's appearance before the House or Senate Armed Services Committee on August 2 has been found, but on that day he, Foster, and Fisher briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's subcommittee on disarmament in executive session on the Geneva talks. See Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), 1962, vol. XIV, p. 671.
Secretary Rusk said it was important that reports of differences within the Administration be knocked down. We should emphasize the new data we have in the simplest possible terms. We should avoid too much optimism in stating what we thought the Soviet position was. We should avoid discussion of the internationally supervised national control post system.
Mr. Bundy agreed that the last point was the most important.
Director Murrow asked whether our position was that we would accept an atmospheric test ban immediately.
Ambassador Dean said no. He hoped to see Mrs. Myrdal /7/ first in Geneva to learn what it is the neutrals will be proposing. He noted that Prime Minister Macmillan had told the British Parliament recently of the possibility that all on-site inspections could be eliminated./8/ It was acknowledged that Macmillan was under heavy Parliamentary pressure.
/7/Alva Myrdal, Chairman of the Swedish Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.
/8/Macmillan told the House of Commons on July 19 that the recent U.S. Department of Defense statement on the Vela program "shows that further progress has been made in work on which the scientists have been engaged for a long time. I hope that this may facilitate all that we hope for, which is a final and comprehensive treaty." (Parliamentary Debates, vol. 663, col. 631)
In response to questions, both Mr. McCloy and Mr. Lovett stated they agreed in general and had no comments to add.
209. Memorandum for the File/1/
Washington, August 2, 1962.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 7/1/62-12/31/62. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone.
At the conclusion of the meeting on Monday, July 30th,/2/ the President requested that Messrs. McCloy and Lovett/3/ be asked to come down from New York to study the seismic results and also that DCI study them and the three of us serve as an advisory group. Mr. Bundy decided to ask them to come on Wednesday.
/2/See Document 206.
/3/Robert A. Lovett, former Under Secretary of State and former Secretary of Defense, who served as a member of ACDA's General Advisory Committee and a consultant to the Kennedy administration.
On Tuesday Secretary McNamara and I spent approximately three hours with Drs. Northrup,/4/ Romney, and others, and DOD General Counsel Norton, reviewing the results of the Vela seismic improvement program. We developed the attached table/5/ as representative of the changes in the basic detection capability and the appraisal of natural events by number which would remain unidentified under the system as it existed or was known in March 1962, the March '62 system with the present technology and knowledge, and the so-called national system. Also are noted the probabilities of success and the deficiencies.
/4/The Air Force superiors of Dr. Doyle Northrup, technical director of the Air Force Technical Application Center (AFTAC), severely criticized Northrup for his handling of the AFTAC's newly developed information on seismic detection. (Memorandum of July 27 discussion by McCone, drafted July 31; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Memos for Record, 4/7/62-8/21/62) See the Supplement.
/5/Not attached.
On Tuesday evening Mr. Lovett came to my home at 7:00 o'clock. We discussed the situation generally and he remained in my home for dinner in my absence and read the transcripts of the Joint Committee hearings of July 19th and 23rd, a number of documents given to him by the White House, and other material which I had assembled for him.
On Wednesday morning, August 1st, Mr. Lovett reviewed the content of these documents with Mr. McCloy and at 10:00 o'clock Messrs. Lovett and McCloy met with the same group of scientists that McNamara and I had met with on Tuesday.
On Wednesday at 11:30, the President convened a small meeting, attended by the Secretary of State, Mr. Gilpatric for Defense, the Vice President, Foster, Bundy, Arthur Dean, Murrow, to further discuss negotiating policies at Geneva and also the statement the President should make at his press conference at 4:00 o'clock. A statement substantially along the lines read by the President was agreed upon; the final draft was prepared and was cleared by those in attendance at 2:30 in the afternoon./6/ In this meeting McCloy and Lovett strongly urged the President not to engage in detailed negotiations until and unless the Soviets change their position on zero on-site inspections and indicated that there existed a climate which would permit negotiation. I strongly supported this recommendation. It was agreed that we should follow this course. Mr. Dean felt that we should present a comprehensive program indicating the revised arrangement of stations as well as a minimum number of on-site inspections. In this connection it was stated that Secretary McNamara concluded that six on-site inspections per year was sufficient.
/6/For text of President Kennedy's opening statement on nuclear testing at his press conference on August 1, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, p. 591.
Note: After this meeting I called Secretary Gilpatric questioning McNamara's position. Gilpatric told me that McNamara had felt that some number between six and twelve was acceptable and the President had seized on the number of six as representative of McNamara's position. I urged that this be straightened out, indicating that if this information was given to anyone on the Hill, serious difficulties would result.
The meeting was adjourned and was reassembled at 4:45, with a larger group in attendance./7/ At this meeting it was definitely decided that:
/7/For a fuller account of this meeting, see Document 208.
(a) We should not agree to negotiate unless the Soviets change their position on on-site inspections.
(b) That a complex of stations totaling about 80, of which 25 would be seismic and five of which would be in the USSR, would represent an acceptable modification to the original Geneva plan.
(c) On-site inspections were a must, there was no decision as to the required number.
(d) International supervision and inspection of national stations meant that we must have an international supervisor in residence on each station. The President wished to remain flexible in this regard. However, he was urged to accept this definition as a must.
A difference arose between Arthur Dean and Secretary Rusk, the latter favoring immediate acceptance of an atmospheric ban but Dean maintaining that this should be a holding position and we should exhaust the possibilities of a comprehensive ban before proceeding with a discussion of an atmospheric ban.
The meeting adjourned about 6:00 o'clock. I was requested to contact Senator Russell and members of the Joint Committee prior to Mr. Dean's appearance on the Hill on Thursday, which I did the following morning, and transcripts of my conversations are available.
John A. McCone/8/
Director
/8/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
210. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, August 3, 1962, noon.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8-362. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution.
Disto 683. Godber and Wright told Stelle this morning they deeply disturbed at message they had received from British Emb in Wash describing, on basis talk with Foster, substance new US position on test ban. Their particular concern is with what they understand is provision that there should be a minimum of one foreigner per eight hour shift at control posts in USSR./2/ Godber said such a provision would vitiate whole political value of acceptance "national stations" concept. Also said his understanding from US-UK technical talks was that Sov posts could be excluded from system and system could still have satisfactory detection capabilities.
/2/Foster told Hood in a meeting on August 2 that Dean's instructions included continued insistence "on a form of international control for control posts." This could range from international staffing to staffing by nationals of the countries "but with some form of international representation at each post." The exact form of international representation was not spelled out in the U.S. position, but "one might think in terms of one representative or 'prisoner' for each post or possibly one to cover each 8-hour shift." Upon further questioning by Hood, Foster stated that international representation "could serve as a deterrent to spoofing and that the precedental value, in terms of other disarmament agreements, of maintaining the principle of international control was important." (Memorandum of conversation by Goodby, August 3; Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8-362)
Godber feels so strongly he is flying back to London this morning to see Home in effort to get Macmillan to intercede with President.
Godber said if US would not move on provision in question, he would personally recommend that UK not support new US position even if this resulted in public split.
211. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee/1/
Washington, August 3, 1962, 12:24 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/8-362. Top Secret. Drafted by Foster and Fisher; cleared by Edward S. Little (S/S), Bundy for the President (White House), Haworth/Seaborg (AEC), Nitze/McNaughton (DOD), and McCone (CIA); and approved by Secretary Rusk.
Todis 469. Eyes only for Ambassador Dean. Following are your instructions on the nuclear test ban issue at Geneva:
a. Comprehensive Test Ban. The United States should declare its willingness to discuss a comprehensive test ban treaty involving internationally-supervised national control posts, including some on Soviet soil and involving a possible reduction in the number of on-site inspections. Our position on the nature of the international supervision is that it must be effective international control but that it might range from an arrangement similar to that contemplated in the April 18, 1961 treaty draft to an arrangement providing for the permanent stationing of international inspectors at the station. We should avoid negotiating the precise arrangements for international supervision for specific numbers of control posts or of on-site inspections on the ground that we see no point in suggesting or debating details or numbers until the Soviet Union accepts the principle of on-site inspections. After a period of time spent focusing on the political significance of the USSR's refusal to accept on-site inspections, we should be prepared to provide the Conference with as much recent data as we can relating to detection, location and identification capabilities of internationally-supervised national systems while making the point that this data does not eliminate the need for on-site inspections. As part of the scientific presentation we should be prepared to discuss the range of possible numbers of control posts in the order of magnitude of 70-80 of all types. We should indicate in general terms a willingness to relate the number of on-site inspections to the number of unidentified events but should not refer to any specific number.
b. Atmospheric Test Ban. If the Soviet Union continues to indicate unwillingness to accept obligatory on-site inspections on Soviet soil, the United States should be ready to discuss affirmatively an atmospheric-outer space-underwater test ban treaty, possibly around the latter part of August, taking the position that the Soviet refusal to agree to on-site inspection makes it necessary to go to this type of treaty. We should indicate this is an attempt to reach the widest area of agreement in banning nuclear tests but should make it perfectly clear that our proposing such a treaty does not involve any willingness to consider a moratorium on underground testing. We would not accept an atmospheric ban without the necessity for considering the security aspects of further Soviet testing which may make it in the interests of U.S. security to conduct further tests following the Soviet series. Therefore we should indicate receptivity to a cut-off date which is either very soon or reasonably far off such as mid-summer 1963.
c. The issue of nuclear proliferation will be the subject of a separate instruction.
d. As you know the President is deeply and personally interested in the course of these discussions. You are faced with complex problems of timing and tactics in the interrelation of technical discussions and proposals of others with these instructions. For this reason the President hopes to have unusually close communication between Geneva and Washington and at moments of decision we will try to respond speedily.
Rusk
212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Disarmament Committee/1/
Washington, August 3, 1962, 5:58 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, K-M, 1961-1962. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Beam and approved by Brubeck (S/S) and Bromley Smith (White House). Repeated to London eyes only for the Ambassador.
Todis 474. Eyes only Ambassador Dean and Fisher. Following message despatched by President to Prime Minister today.
"Dear Prime Minister:
I got your answer just in time for it to be helpful in our concluding conversations with Arthur Dean./2/
/2/See Documents 206 and 208.
I recognize your own feeling that we could get along with a simple abolition of nuclear tests. I wish I could agree with you, and I am grateful in the circumstances for your understanding of our views.
We are now sending Arthur Dean back with the general position which I announced in my press conference./3/ Our people here have talked with Lord Hood to give him full details of this position./4/ In essence, our view is that we will be glad to go into serious negotiations on other matters if only the Soviet Union will go back to its earlier position that a limited number of on-site inspections is acceptable. We could not get five votes for any other position in the Senate.
/3/For text of President Kennedy's remarks on the Geneva negotiations on a nuclear test ban and disarmament at his press conference on August 2, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 591 and 595-597.
/4/See footnote 2, Document 210. Secretary Rusk informed Lord Hood at a meeting on August 3 at 6 p.m. that "the President was sending a message to the Prime Minister on this subject, and that we thought it very important that we not make this a matter of issue between ourselves, but rather probe the Russians and see how far we could bring them in our direction." (Memorandum of conversation by Tyler, August 3; Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/8-362)
We have concluded that we should not table a comprehensive treaty, even with blank numbers, for the moment. Our technical analyses on the problem of control posts are most incomplete and we think it will be helpful to let this question work itself out in the technical channels for a while. In these discussions we shall be using for purposes of illustration a system with a total number of control posts ranging between 70 and 80. This larger number includes many stations for detection in other than seismic media, and its seismic stations are similar in number to the figures in my last message.
We have had much discussion here on the question of the degree to which we can accept the neutral proposal for fully national detection stations. It has become very plain that we shall have a first-class political row here if we move to full acceptance of this position at this moment. While the technical data are promising, they are certainly not definitive. The furthest we can go for the present is to indicate our willingness to discuss national control posts with a resident international representative.
I hear from Geneva that your negotiators are disappointed at this position,/5/ and I hope very much that both publicly and privately you may be able to join with us in avoiding a public disagreement on this issue now. I am convinced that it is foolish for us to have a division on side issues at a time when there is no flexibility at all in the Soviet position on a fundamental point. If we can ever get a reasonable response from the Soviet Government, I can make great progress here at home on this matter--but a purely hypothetical debate between the U.S. and the UK, prior to any indications of a possible accord with the Soviet Union, would only bring division and weakness in our effort for a treaty. In short, I am suggesting that we both reserve our positions on this point until we know whether we can move forward with the Russians.
/5/See Document 210.
Meanwhile, there is some sign of new life in the area of the atmospheric test ban, and this is certainly a reasonable second best. The timing and tactics of discussion of the two kinds of treaties are going to be quite complex. I am therefore asking Arthur Dean to keep very closely in touch with us and we, for our part, will try to keep in the closest communication with you. Our different angles of vision must not prevent us from working closely together for the best possible common results.
As for Christmas Island, I am glad of your friendly first reaction, and I am asking our technical people to begin to work on the question, keeping in touch with yours.
With warm regards,
Sincerely, John F. Kennedy"
Rusk
213. Message From Foreign Secretary Home to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
London, undated.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Nuclear Testing, Vol. II, 7/62-2/63. Secret. An attached note from Lord Hood to Secretary Rusk, August 5, notes that Foreign Secretary Home had asked him to transmit the enclosed message. Also attached to the source text is a memorandum from Brubeck (S/S) through McGeorge Bundy to Kaysen, August 6, saying that the message was received from the British Embassy on August 5. "A proposed reply," the memorandum concluded, "is now in preparation and will be forwarded to you as soon as possible." This reply has not been found.
I got your message asking me to help you on the matter of the test policy at Geneva. Of course we will do what we can but we are in a great difficulty.
Considerable expectations were aroused by the information about new data on detection which was given out in Washington some week ago. Dean raised them higher on arrival at Geneva./2/ Now it seems that we cannot put forward any concrete proposals corresponding to the new data, and this will get us into a very bad position.
/2/See Document 195.
It had, we thought, been agreed at the Washington Scientific talks/3/ that adequate machinery for detecting and inspecting underground tests could be provided by a national system of detection posts, reporting to an international commission, and a minimum number of on-site inspections. We thought that this understanding was reflected in the draft treaty of July 24./4/
/3/See Document 193.
/4/See footnote 4, Document 201.
I can understand that you have great difficulties in putting forward anything like this draft at present. But I am very much concerned that we should not gravely prejudice our position by putting forward at this stage other detailed proposals which have no scientific justification.
It seemed probable for instance from the Washington talks that we could for detection purposes dispense with national stations in Russia. It may be useful to include them in the system, but it would surely be impossible to justify on a scientific basis including three or four international bodies in each Soviet station, which is what an 8-hour shift amounts to.
If for political reasons, you cannot drop this demand, the only thing we can do is to avoid discussion of it. For this purpose I am sure that it is useless to go back to the old dodge of asking the Russians to accept inspection in principle. We must put forward something concrete and show that they are being unreasonable in refusing it. I very much hope it will be possible to say that, on the basis of present data, we thought that the number of on-site inspections could be reduced to a maximum of say 10 or 8 a year, that this would be a maximum need and that any number below this would be a matter for discussion and we hope for agreement.
We could then say that after this had been accepted we could discuss questions about detection posts and their relation to the international commission: but first things first. This would be a more pointed variant of our earlier tactics at Geneva.
Next best would be to propose at this stage a ban on atmospheric tests only. But after all the publicity about the new data, I do not see how we can stall on everything else without creating the impression that we are hopelessly insincere. If we want a test ban--and I take it that militarily we do--we should get on with the job of making proposals based on the new data, and hold the point as best we can in the meantime. I think that great pressures will build up, so I do hope that you can tell me that Dean is being given fresh instructions. We can then go all out to help. I do not see otherwise how we can conceal our concern that more positive proposals are not being made. The cross-examination by other members of the Conference is going to be very penetrating. I shall much welcome your views.
214. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, August 6, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Nuclear Testing, Vol. II, 7/62-2/63. Secret.
In view of the present discussions with the British, it appears appropriate to put down what I know of the conversations that have taken place between U.S. and U.K. experts since the new technical information became available.
The British first became aware of the new technical information when they came here for the Four Power Disarmament Meetings early in July./2/ At that time the Disarmament Agency showed them a draft comprehensive test-ban treaty depending upon national stations for seismic detection./3/ During the course of these talks, they were also made aware of the new seismic data. I was not involved in any of these meetings, and so have no first-hand knowledge of the extent of the conversations.
/2/See Document 193.
/3/See footnote 3, Document 193.
Our new technical data and British seismic research were the subject of a day-long meeting in London as part of more general technical discussions involving people from the Defense Department, ACDA, and my office./4/ The attached memorandum was prepared by the British to provide a record of their understanding of the technical discussions./5/ It is an accurate representation of the discussions. I did not join in the memorandum because we had agreed that the meetings were to be informal exchanges of technical information.
/4/See footnote 4, Document 193.
/5/Not attached and not found.
In a conversation with Lord Home, I went out of my way to avoid any statement regarding what the U.S. position would ultimately be, on the grounds that it was still being discussed at home.
Jerome B. Wiesner/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
215. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, August 7, 1962, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/8-762. Secret; Limit Distribution.
Disto 716. For Secretary and Foster from Dean. Re: Todis 469./2/ As indicated in recent delegation telegrams, my presentation of new US test ban position to Zorin has stressed that Soviet acceptance in principle of obligatory on-site inspections is key to successful negotiation on other outstanding questions. Following instructions reftel, I have also avoided details. To extent possible, regarding arrangements for control posts and for international supervision thereof which the United States might be prepared to accept. I have, of course, confirmed to Zorin that "US believed that as practical matter there would have to be international officials at control posts" (Disto 709)/3/ and I will not hesitate to repeat this if point is again directly raised. However, the main focus has been on the scientific necessity for firm commitments regarding on-site inspection.
/2/Document 211.
/3/Dean held private meetings with Zorin on August 5 and 6. A summary of their August 5 meeting was transmitted in Disto 702, August 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8-562) A summary of the August 6 meeting is Disto 709, August 6. (Ibid.)
We had assumed that for this phase of work on test ban Zorin would not only marshal arguments against obligatory inspection, but would also zero in on US insistence that there be international resident supervisors at control posts on Soviet territory to support Soviet allegation that US position has not substantially changed. However, initial informal comments by Zorin (though this line could be greatly changed at formal meetings) have not paid much attention to matter of resident supervisors, but have attacked entire US proposal that nationally manned control posts be subject to international integration, coordination, and supervision. He has, in informal session, attacked idea that international scientific commission could give directives to host country nationals operating control posts regarding procedures of work, training, use of instrumentation, etc.
We believe that if Zorin persists on this tack, we will find it very useful to focus on broad principle of integrated international control network as well as on broad principle of obligatory inspection. If eight-nation April 6 memo is clear on anything, it states that the international commission is to get data from national stations and to arrange for their equipping in modern fashion when necessary. Moreover, agreements are to be made to cover the use of existing stations in the worldwide system. Soviet position which denies any shadow of authority to international commission to coordinate and standardize operations of numerous national posts will be vulnerable and we believe it would be tactically advantageous to capitalize on this aspect of Soviet inflexibility just as much as on Soviet rejection of obligatory inspection. Moreover, such course would minimize divergences with UK and make it easier for them to give full support to our general position. If question is specifically raised by others, we will, of course, repeat our position that international supervisors will have to be in residence at control posts, but Godber advises that if this is done at subcommittee on Thursday,/4/ UKDel will have to say their scientists disagree both as to necessity Soviet control posts and necessity resident inspectors for improving quality scientific data. Therefore, we have agreed play specifics on international scientists in residence in very low key unless Zorin's tactics require otherwise.
/4/August 9.
216. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, August 8, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.6112/8-862. Secret. Drafted by Valdes and approved in S on August 15. A memorandum of the Secretary's conversation with Dobrynin on a comprehensive test ban agreement on this occasion is not printed. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.
SUBJECT
Non-diffusion of nuclear weapons
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR
Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor, Soviet Embassy
The Secretary
Philip H. Valdes, EUR/SOV
The Secretary, who had asked Ambassador Dobrynin to call, said he would like to ask him to convey a personal message to Gromyko, following up the conversations Gromyko and he had had in Geneva./2/ He would like to give the message orally, though if Mr. Kornienko wished to, he could go over his notes with Mr. Valdes later. The message concerned non-diffusion of nuclear weapons. The Secretary then read the message, which follows:
/2/See Document 198.
"This personal message follows upon our very informal conversation in Geneva about the non-transfer of nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing them./3/ I have had an opportunity to consider this matter further in Washington and believe that we could clarify how best we might proceed.
/3/See Document 198 and footnote 7, Document 201.
"It seems to me that we could agree that our two countries share a common interest in preventing the further diffusion of nuclear weapons to additional nations. There are many elements in this common interest; high among them is the prospect that further diffusion would greatly complicate the possibilities of progress toward disarmament to which the U.S. attaches the greatest importance.
"As I explained to you in Geneva, it has been a longstanding United States policy to oppose the proliferation of national nuclear weapons capabilities. We estimate that it is now within the capabilities of up to twenty countries to achieve nuclear weapons within the next several years if they make the necessary effort. Indeed, the amount of effort required is steadily decreasing for technical and scientific reasons with which you are familiar. Obviously, the countries of greatest concern to us are not necessarily those of greatest concern to you; our respective priorities might be different. But surely we could agree that you and we would both be better off if none of them developed nuclear weapons on a national basis.
"It seems to me, therefore, that we ought to be able to find a way to move promptly with other nuclear powers to propose an agreement which would have two principal provisions: (1) a commitment by existing nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to other nations, and (2) a commitment by all others not to develop nuclear weapons of their own. I am not now using technical language but simply expressing the general idea. I recognize that there are other problems, such as the transfer of nuclear warhead technology, which might have to be covered.
"The difficulty about our moving promptly in concert on this matter arises with respect to multilateral arrangements. Your Government apparently wishes to consider multilateral arrangements with respect to nuclear weapons as a part of the central problem of the multiplication of national nuclear forces. I sincerely believe that this point of view rests upon a misunderstanding and that it stands in the way of our acting together on a common interest.
"From our point of view, we consider the discussion of multilateral arrangements in the West as, among other things, a means for preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons on a national basis. You apparently are fearful that multilateral arrangements are intended to provide a pretext or a screen for giving nuclear weapons to national forces to be used by national decision. This is not our purpose.
"As you know, the question of multilateral nuclear forces within NATO has been under discussion for quite some time. It is not possible to be precise about just what such arrangements might be because, as you also know, there are different approaches within NATO on what is a highly complex matter. Indeed, whether there will be anytime soon any consensus in the West on this matter is impossible to predict. But I can tell you that the United States does not have in mind equipping other national forces with nuclear weapons under circumstances which would make it possible for national governments to make individual decisions about their employment. As you know, under present United States law and allied military arrangements, United States nuclear warheads remain under all circumstances under United States custody and control.
"I had the impression from our conversation in Geneva that it might be possible for us to concentrate on the single issue of national nuclear capability."
The Secretary explained to the Ambassador that Gromyko had asked if we do concentrate on national nuclear capability, could we be sure this meant not transferring either directly or indirectly. The Secretary said he had replied that this would be possible if it were clearly understood what was meant by indirectly. If this meant that multilateral arrangements could not be used as a screen or device to permit use by national decision, then we could work out an agreement. The Secretary then continued with the message:
"If it is clear on both sides that this is the object and that we are not now trying to deal with the issue of possible multilateral arrangements, it seems to me that we might be able to reach an agreement with respect to the non-transfer of nuclear weapons, either directly or indirectly, to additional national forces.
"This is a matter which we would, of course, have to discuss with our allies because two of them have their own nuclear capabilities and because the others would be among the large numbers of states who would be expected to renounce national nuclear weapons. If you believe that there is a possibility of progress in this direction, we would be glad to take up this matter with other governments producing nuclear weapons and try to find as quickly as possible a basis for agreement. We could keep in touch either through your Ambassador in Washington or through our Ambassadors in Geneva. My own personal view is that it would be of advantage to take this important step and that we should not abandon the effort because of other factors not directly related to the central issue. If we find that we can agree on the substance, we would need to consider how best to move rapidly to bring the matter to a conclusion. It may be, for example, that we should seek to obtain declarations on the part of other governments that they are prepared to enter into the type of agreement we would put forward; this would give us an opportunity on both sides to ascertain that all governments essential to an agreement would in fact participate.
"Will you be good enough to let me have your reactions at your early convenience?"
He summarized for the Ambassador by saying he was asking whether there is enough prospect for agreement in order to pursue it urgently to bring it to a conclusion. If not, we would not wish to go through the exercise, which could worsen matters if it failed. Here is one point where for a dozen reasons you and we have a common purpose in not seeing atomic weapons move to other hands.
Dobrynin recalled Gromyko had raised three questions: possible loopholes, inclusion of international alliances, and the two Germanies. As Gromyko said, we think this is most important. He would like to repeat what Gromyko had said. Agreement on a broader scale will take time. We want to work on it. Meanwhile, we want an agreement with you on the more narrow question of the two Germanies. This would include not giving them weapons or data, and their not acquiring either themselves.
The Secretary said his proposal does not contemplate a special arrangement for Germany. From the Soviet point of view, it already exists. He knew our longstanding national policy that we have applied even with respect to France. Germany itself took commitments in 1955 on ABC weapons. We consider this a formal commitment. We do not see an advantage at this time in making special arrangements for Germany. Other countries are important. He was interested in Germany; we were interested in mainland China; we both should be in Israel.
Dobrynin said he had the impression the Secretary thought a separate agreement for the two Germanies was possible.
The Secretary said he supposed this agreement he proposed was not possible unless Germany was included.
Dobrynin said Germany is the number one problem for the Soviets. They are therefore prepared to proceed with a general agreement, but want another on the two Germanies, undertaking on our side not to transfer weapons or data, and on theirs not to produce or try to get nuclear weapons in any way.
The Secretary said he had the impression from Gromyko that if there were any delays in reaching a general agreement, he might want to come back to one on Germany.
Dobrynin said this was not his impression.
The Secretary said there was a reference to a non-transfer agreement in the principles paper,/4/ but the Soviet side did not take this up for discussion. The Secretary supposed that if we had an agreement of this sort including Germany, Soviet concern would be taken care of, as well as our concerns.
/4/Reference is to a paper prepared for discussions with the Soviets on Berlin; for the fifth revision, see vol. XV, pp. 95-98.
Dobrynin objected that there are too many states. It would take quite a time.
The Secretary asked if the Soviet Government has ever made a formal announcement on its policy concerning non-transfer.
Dobrynin replied it had at the UN last March./5/
/5/Reference may be to Gromyko's letter to Acting Secretary-General U Thant, March 10, 1962, on the spread of nuclear weapons; text in Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 83-86.
The Secretrary said he meant a statement of existing Soviet policy, not what the Soviets would be prepared to do. We have said we are opposed on a national basis to proliferation. He said that in our principles paper we indicated the Deputy Foreign Ministers could go into non-diffusion, or this could be done in a different forum--we had Geneva in mind. He said he thought the Soviets overestimate the difference in time between the two agreements (general, or on Germany). His guess was that of the 104 in the UN and the 6 or so not in the UN that were involved, most would agree promptly. Some who could produce nuclear weapons have never declared themselves, for example Sweden, Switzerland, Brazil and India.
Dobrynin said the Swedes have said they are prepared to enter into an agreement. The Swiss have not. He understood the Secretary's point, however.
The Secretary said his point was that we do it on a comprehensive basis, including Germany.
Dobrynin asked if Germany would be mentioned in the agreement.
The Secretary said every country would be mentioned, since all would sign.
Dobrynin asked if Germany would be specifically mentioned, in a clause.
The Secretary asked why it should be, anymore than mainland China?
Dobrynin replied Germany was an issue between our two countries. This is one of the most explosive areas.
The Secretary commented there are other countries in that area of Europe which should be added.
Dobrynin recalled the Soviet Government has made proposals concerning this. He said he had had the impression the Secretary accepted Soviet apprehension over West Germany having atomic weapons. It is our problem number one, he repeated. If we proceed with the other agreement, there would be a delay.
The Secretary said that the discussion concerning our principles paper was in the context of the German question as a whole. He did not see how we could pull out non-diffusion and deal with it as a special German problem. We can deal with it, however, in a general way, and he did not see why this should take so long.
Turning to the point in the Secretary's message concerning multilateral arrangements, Dobrynin said he thought this was all right--it is not part of the central problem. He asked about Germany, however. The Soviets had three points, not to give Germany atomic weapons directly, indirectly, or through multilateral arrangements.
The Secretary said we should clarify this. If Dobrynin asked him what multilateral arrangement was likely to come into being in NATO, he could not tell him. There are differences of approach, and he did not know what consensus could be reached, if any. He could say, as an example, that we would not consider a nuclear-armed Dutch submarine, with a Dutch crew and a Dutch captain to be multilateral just because it was assigned to NATO, for this would be a case of a national government's being able to use nuclear weapons by national command.
Dobrynin asked if it would be written in the treaty that it does not include multilateral arrangements.
The Secretary said it would not be, not in that way. We would describe what the treaty forbids. No additional country would be able to use nuclear weapons through its own national decision.
Dobrynin added but we would be free to give them through NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
The Secretary said not to national forces. With our existing arrangements, we have nuclear weapons to support NATO forces, but they are in our hands. If you said the decision to use nuclear weapons would be made jointly by the Warsaw Pact nations, we would not object. But if you transferred weapons to the Czechs or East Germans, and they could use them, we would object.
Dobrynin objected that this sort of agreement does not cover everything.
The Secretary agreed this was true. He said, however, that we are concerned with the overriding problem of not transferring to national use. We are not concerned with just Germany, or even China. We know, for example, that Egypt is giving high priority to nuclear physics.
Dobrynin objected that he did not think Egypt was really a problem, unless perhaps Israel obtained nuclear weapons. The Secretary had said, he added, that it was impossible to be precise about just what multilateral arrangements there could be.
The Secretary replied he had said that because we simply do not know. What we say is that whatever they may be, they cannot involve transfer to national forces. We are removing that possibility.
Dobrynin asked about procedure. Would there be some negotiation between the two of us?
The Secretary replied that he needed to know if Mr. Gromyko thinks there is sufficient possibility for agreement to make it worth going into. If so, he would then take it up with the British and French, who produce nuclear weapons, to see if we could define our position further. Then we would see if we could work out language.
Dobrynin said he would send the Secretary's message, but he was certain his government would have difficulties over these questions.
The Secretary said it may be there is a broader field on which the Soviets want agreement. If we cannot reach agreement on this broader field, let us take the central, most important two thirds of it, and screen off and block out national capability from the multilateral area.
Dobrynin said this would be more limited.
The Secretary agreed, but said it gets at the greatest problem.
After a discussion of other issues the Secretary returned to the question of non-diffusion to say that he wished we could report agreement on non-diffusion at the UN General Assembly.
217. Memorandum From William Y. Smith to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/
Washington, August 10, 1962.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, WYS Chron File, Jul-Sep 62. Top Secret; Restricted Data.
SUBJECT
Comparison of US and USSR Atomic Energy Programs/2/
Of the attached thick volume,/3/ only the first 9 pages need to be scanned. Even then, the report does not contain much that is new. It does reaffirm the following points.
/2/NSAM No. 168, from McGeorge Bundy to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of Central Intelligence, June 26, directed the three agencies to prepare a comparative study of U.S. and Soviet atomic energy programs, "using insofar as practicable the recent [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], and 1AP 1-62 and comparable data on the U.S. program." Bundy requested completion of the report by August 1. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) See Documents 78 and 183. 1AP 1-62 has not been found.
/3/Not attached and not found. At the White House daily staff meeting on August 3, Chuck Johnson reported that this comparative study of U.S. and Soviet atomic energy programs had been finished, "but that Mr. McCone was considering it and had not yet released it. Bundy said that the President would like to see this as soon as possible, preferably this weekend." (Memorandum for the record by Ewell, August 3; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings, May-Sept 62) According to Ewell, at the August 6 White House daily staff meeting, Johnson remarked that the paper, which was "very interesting," was not to be distributed, but the President had a copy and Johnson was holding Bundy's. Ewell added that he thought General Taylor would like to see this study, and Taylor wrote in the margin, "Let me see." (Memorandum for the record by Ewell, August 6; ibid.)
a. Although US has overall superiority to the Soviet Union in the field of nuclear energy, the USSR has apparently made technological advances at rates at least equal to those achieved by the US in several areas which are of prime significance to the Soviet national defense posture. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
b. The Soviet system for control of nuclear weapons is generally similar to that of the US, but we have thus far been unable to identify Soviet storage of nuclear weapons within the satellites.
c. The US has 26 nuclear submarines in operation and a total of 61 have been authorized. The USSR has about 20 nuclear submarines. The Soviet missile nuclear submarines carry either 3 ballistic-type of 6 cruise-type missiles, both of short range and with a yield approaching 3 megatons.
d. It is estimated the Soviets could have an aircraft nuclear power plant in early 1963-1964.
e. [2 lines of source text not declassified] The US has conducted more nuclear tests, but the USSR has detonated a larger total yield. It is known that 10 or more additional small yield Soviet tests were not detected.
W.Y.S./4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
218. Editorial Note
On August 10, 1962, Glenn Seaborg wrote a letter to President Kennedy advising him on the current status of the results of Operation Dominic, the atmospheric nuclear test program in the Pacific. The first phase of these tests ended on July 11, 1962. Seaborg's letter did not discuss in detail individual shots or those that were primarily of interest to the Department of Defense, but he provided a general review and assessment of the test series.
Seaborg asserted that the "over-all objective of Operation Dominic, to increase our understanding and improve our technology in the fields of weapons effects is being achieved." He noted, among other things, that the testing of various weapons "verified the performance of several warheads which are now or soon will constitute a critical portion of our strategic weapon stockpile" and "provided a storehouse of information leading to significant improvements in weapon efficiency and higher yield-to-weight ratios." He singled out as "particularly significant" successes in the following two categories: development and weapons verification, and advanced concepts (e.g., improvement in yield-to-weight ratios of future devices [text not declassified]).
At the end of his letter, Seaborg offered this evaluation:
"The current test series have produced many important successes. They have also yielded some surprises and some failures which confirm that we are indeed experimenting at the frontiers of weapons technology. The test successes vindicate, in a large measure, the elaborate computational and certification procedures which were developed during the moratorium. The surprises and failures serve to remind us that our theories and procedures are, at best, only approximate, particularly in the very important limit represented by fully optimized warhead designs.
"Although not a stated objective of our test program, I believe that one of the most significant results is the fact that our laboratories have become revitalized to a major degree. The importance of this reawakening to our defense posture cannot be overstressed." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Operation Dominic, 2/62-4/63)
In a letter to McGeorge Bundy, August 10, Seaborg supplemented his letter to the President with additional data, especially in the area of advanced concepts tested in the series. He also enclosed with this letter a detailed analysis of Atomic Energy Commission sponsored events in Operation Dominic. (Ibid.)
Seaborg also provided a summary statement of the achievements of Operation Nougat, the Nevada test series, in a letter to President Kennedy, August 15, and he provided additional details on the results in a letter to McGeorge Bundy, August 15. Both letters are in Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171, Jul.-Sept. 1962.
219. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, August 14, 1962, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/8-1462. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only.
Disto 748. For Secretary and Foster from Dean. My instructions, Todis 469,/2/ stated that if the Sov Union continues to indicate unwillingness to accept obligatory on-site inspection, the US should be ready to discuss affirmatively an atmospheric, outer space, under water test ban treaty possibly latter part August. The clear Sov rejection of on-site inspection by Zorin in our informal meetings/3/ and in the test ban subcommittee and by Kuznetsov today in the plenary meeting of the conference/4/ will undoubtedly be repeated in further meetings but the clarity and firmness of the rejection of obligatory on-site inspection is now well established. Both our own general tactic of focusing on the inspection issue and not being drawn into detail on the numbers of detection posts or on-site inspections, or the degree of international supervision required, as well as our continuing differences on the last point with the British, argue for early introduction of an atmospheric test ban offer.
/2/Document 211.
/3/See footnote 3, Document 215.
/4/Vasily Vasilevich Kuznetsov replaced Zorin, who was going on vacation and leaving Geneva on August 15, as Soviet Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. (Disto 741 from Geneva, August 13; Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/8-1362)
The Secretary has, of course, already brought this up with Dobrynin,/5/ but we should make a formal presentation here in Geneva and I believe the appropriate time would be next week.
/5/See the source note, Document 216.
I would hope, very strongly, that we could accompany our offer of an atmospheric agreement with the text of at least the essential portions of a draft treaty. I understand there may be some difficulties about precise language on peaceful uses explosions but I should think, for our present purposes, we could table a draft which merely permitted such explosions in accordance with an annex which we would not need to table simultaneously. It would, of course, be helpful in our relations with the British to have a draft treaty soon enough so that we could discuss it with them here at least a couple of days before we table it in the conference.
We have already made use of the presence of our scientists here in informal discussions of the technical problems of a comprehensive treaty/6/ and intend, insofar as test ban matters are concerned, to continue our present general line for at least the remainder of this week. But I believe we should be fully prepared to table a draft atmospheric treaty next week, and possibly as early as Monday though believe we should pursue some negotiating tactics on atmospheric with Kuznetsov as we did with Zorin on comprehensive before formal tabling which would mean few days delay. I would greatly appreciate it if clearance of a draft atmospheric treaty could be expedited and if I could be given discretionary authority for tabling it as early next week as may seem appropriate in the light of further developments of discussions here of a comprehensive agreement.
/6/Wiesner, Long, Haworth, Matthew L. Sands (ACDA consultant), and Carl Romney (AFTAC) traveled to Geneva as scientific experts on August 11 to brief Western and neutral delegations on their conclusions on present scientific knowledge of the limits of identification capabilities without inspection. On August 13, the U.S. team, "with UK scientists attending and contributing as desired," briefed seven of the eight delegations that had earlier put forward the eight-nation memorandum. (Disto 744 from Geneva, August 13; Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/8-1362) They briefed the eighth (Mexico) on August 14. (Disto 751 from Geneva, August 14; ibid.) For Wiesner's report on these discussions, see Document 220.
220. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, August 20, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Nuclear Testing, Vol. II, 7/62-2/63. Secret.
The situation in Geneva doesn't look any more hopeful seen first-hand than it does when viewed through cables and newspapers. The Soviet delegation maintains the same rigid position with which they began this conference and does not appear to have any leeway to negotiate in a meaningful way. This applied to both issues on the agenda--the test ban treaty and General and Complete Disarmament. There was some hope that the arrival of Mr. Kuznetsov to replace Zorin really meant more than an opportunity for Zorin to have his holiday before the U.N. General Assembly convenes on September 15, but in statements and private discussions during his first three days there has been no evidence whatsoever of a desire to seek resolution of the differences over the test ban on any terms but theirs. GCD was not discussed while I was in Geneva.
The primary purpose for having scientists join the U.S. delegation for a few days was to interpret the new seismic information for the Western and neutral delegates so that they would understand the changes in position that are made possible and, more important, to make them aware of the technical limitations which still exist./2/ Our first meetings were with the British scientists, who later helped us greatly in presentations to the eight-nation groups. We easily agreed with the U.K. group on a technical position which emphasized the need for international specification and control of the control posts and the continued requirement for some on-site inspections.
/2/See footnote 6, Document 219.
Our technical position was sound--as of the moment--while Zorin had repeatedly made the extreme claim that inspection was now altogether unnecessary technically, while ducking demands to supply technical information to substantiate his stand. On the whole, we succeeded in making our points to those capable of understanding them. Some delegations, such as the Nigerian and Ethiopian, had no scientists in their group.
Though the technical facts were accepted by most groups, they did not all accept our position regarding the need for rigid safeguards. I think it fair to say that most of the neutrals at the Conference and our allies too would advocate accepting the invitational inspection proposal on the grounds that the risks of the arms race far outweigh any conceivable danger from clandestine testing. Much of the time of the Conference is now occupied in a discussion of obligatory versus invitational inspection.
It is obviously impossible to get any reliable explanation for the Soviet attitude, but most delegates echo two propositions--fear of the U.S. striking force and the fact that Khrushchev would be called an appeaser by the hard-line groups who have constantly opposed his co-existence. The Polish delegate Lachs/3/ stressed the latter point in conversation and stated that it was his firm belief that the Soviets would only accept on-site inspection if the test ban were linked with other agreements. As you know, I believe this too.
/3/Professor Manfred Lachs, Polish Deputy Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.
Just before I left Geneva, Ambassador Dean, Mr. Fisher and I spent about two hours with Kuznetsov and other members of the Soviet delegation. Kuznetsov made two points very clear: 1) their objections to on-site inspection stemmed from political not technical considerations--he stated this very plainly--and, 2) that they do not have completely reliable identification methods--this was essentially admitted in response to direct questions.
There is a deep feeling of frustration and gloom among the delegations at the Conference because of the lack of any real progress. Some of the delegations, particularly the Swedish and the Indian, had hoped that they could work out a satisfactory compromise on the test ban treaty and they are deeply disappointed. They tend to blame both sides for the impasse, though the Soviets' behavior has, I think, caused most of the uncommitted delegations to be somewhat more understanding of our viewpoint than of the Soviets'.
I do not believe that real progress toward resolving disarmament issues can be made at a large semi-public conference such as this. I now have had four years of relatively intimate association with such meetings, and I am still appalled at how little real information is exchanged. Both sides are so busy scoring points that there is little opportunity for serious private discussion. Even the small private get-togethers are badly inhibited by the knowledge that the plenary sessions are certain to follow, I think that bilateral meetings such as those held last year between Zorin and McCloy might make more progress.
On the positive side, the Conference has served to educate the neutral groups and excite their interest as well. I believe that several of the delegations, particularly the Swedes, have developed an enduring interest in the technical and political problems of disarmament which will lead them to set up their own research groups.
Everyone expects that the eight-nation group will be very active at the U.N. during the General Assembly, and that they will introduce a series of resolutions on the test ban and on GCD, some of which could be embarrassing or even dangerous to the U.S. I recommend that we prepare to send people, particularly some scientists, from the Arms Control Agency, DOD and possibly any office to help our U.N. delegation. This will require a substantial effort because it will be necessary to talk to 100 delegations, not the dozen that we had at Geneva.
Attached is the cable report filed by Ambassador Dean following the meeting with Kuznetsov./4/
Jerome B. Wiesner/5/
/4/Not attached. (Disto 757 from Geneva, August 16; Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8-1662) See the Supplement.
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
221. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, August 23, 1962, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/8-2362. Secret.
Disto 799. For Secretary and Foster from Dean. In various conversations with Kouznetsov (Sov), other than at formal meetings, he does not hesitate to speak in English, speaks warmly of his post-graduate work and stay in the United States, emphasizes great admiration Soviet people have for US technical achievements and absolute necessity of our solving both nuclear test ban and disarmament problems. Speaks warmly of his friendship for Foster and of their excellent cooperation at surprise attack conference in 1958, and recalls gifts of Life of Lincoln and Lee.
Yesterday he expressed great admiration for my practical approach to problems and cordially invited me but in rather casual than formal terms to come to Soviet Union to see Khrushchev, preferably before UNGA, but at any time.
Nevertheless, despite the fact he is seemingly more gracious and more cordial and outgiving than Zorin, believe it is largely a surface cordiality and he is actually somewhat harder and tougher than Zorin, who is always polite but more of a skilled technician. Kouznetsov never fails in a charming way to extol the virtues of the Soviet Union, the Russian people, and Communism, and to ridicule in a polite way failings of American system.
Constantly talks about necessity breaking down economic barriers in trade between US and USSR and firm necessity of our standing shoulder to shoulder together in solution world's problems and tends by subtle form of flattery to indicate that if we two were left together, we could easily solve problems.
Cannot detect any evidence of any softening in Soviet position and in fact detect slight hardening in general tone, although it would be difficult to fasten on any particular words or expressions to prove this with evidence.
Believe they fully intend to carry out their present series of atmospheric tests and they look upon Padilla Nervo's suggestion as another uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium on underground testing;/2/ though when I point out we would be against this, Kouznetsov's answer is "Let's not use the word 'moratorium'." Or "Let's not speak of inspection or control." "Let us just say that neither of us will conduct underground tests, as inspections are no more necessary in connection with underground tests than they are with respect to atmospheric."
/2/See footnote 6, Document 193.
Advises definitely he will not go to UNGA and in respect to question as to whether Khrushchev would, stated he was uninformed.
Believe that theories which I have heard often expressed that Kouznetsov was sent here to expound easier policy on test ban and disarmament is so far not warranted by actual facts, and that their principal aim is to get us to stop testing underground.
222. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, August 23, 1962, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/8-2362. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Anderson and approved in S on August 28.
SUBJECT
Non-diffusion of Nuclear Weapons
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Embassy
Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor, Soviet Embassy
The Secretary
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
William O. Anderson, EUR/SOV
The Ambassador called by appointment at his own request. He opened the conversation by stating that he had received, and was instructed to convey to the Secretary, a message from Foreign Minister Gromyko responding to the Secretary's message of August 8./2/ (Note: Subsequent to the conversation Mr. Anderson informally obtained from Counselor Kornienko a Russian text of the Gromyko message;/3/ a translation is attached.) In brief, the message from the Foreign Minister noted that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. positions now appear to be quite close as regards the non-transfer problem. It is proposed that an international undertaking be sought involving three points: (1) an obligation on the part of the nuclear powers not to hand over to non-nuclear states nuclear weapons or the technical information necessary for their production; (2) an obligation on the part of non-nuclear states not to produce and not to acquire from other states nuclear weapons, and also not to receive technical information necessary for their production; (3) there should also be excluded the transfer of nuclear weapons through military alliances to those states which do not possess them, i.e., the transfer of such weapons in an indirect manner, irrespective of whether or not the national armed forces of these states are component parts of the armed forces of any military alliance.
/2/See Document 216.
/3/The Russian text has not been found.
A question now arises concerning the steps which should be taken next. It would seem that the four nuclear powers, the U.S., U.K., France and the U.S.S.R., should take the initiative in attempting to formulate an international agreement to which other powers would be invited to adhere.
The Secretary commented that, as he understood the presentation, the position outlined by Foreign Minister Gromyko would appear to be a constructive and positive step forward. He then stressed that it is very important that there be no misunderstanding as regards the third point mentioned in the Gromyko message. The Secretary stated carefully that we are ready to agree not to transfer weapons directly to a non-nuclear nation and we are likewise willing to agree not to pass nuclear weapons indirectly through a military alliance to a non-nuclear power. However, it must be clear that alliance arrangements as regards the possible use of nuclear weapons constitute a subject which, as the Ambassador well knows, has been under discussion on our side for some time. We cannot now define the hypothetical formula upon which the alliance on our side may agree; however, it should be clear that we would not use an alliance arrangement for the purpose of passing nuclear weapons indirectly to a non-nuclear power. The Secretary reminded the Ambassador that we had discussed this matter in some detail on several occasions with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva and it is highly desirable that the Foreign Minister not misunderstand the U.S. position on this point. The Ambassador stated that he understood the Secretary's concern and would report this point fully to the Soviet Government.
Attachment/4/
/4/Secret. Translation drafted by Lewis W. Bowden (EUR/SOV) on August 23.
MESSAGE FROM SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO TO SECRETARY RUSK, DELIVERED ORALLY BY AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN TO THE SECRETARY AUGUST 23, 1962
Your message regarding the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons, sent to me through Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin, concerns a question to which the Soviet Government attaches great significance. During our conversations in Geneva I told you that the Soviet Government is in favor of preventing the further diffusion of nuclear weapons in the world. The Soviet Government has already put forward proposals on this matter in the General Assembly of the UN as well as in the Committee of Eighteen in Geneva. It is apparent from your message that the position of the United States Government at the present time is close to the position of the Soviet Government on this question. It is clear that between us there are no differences concerning the fact that an agreement on the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons should contain provisions under which the nuclear powers would take upon themselves the obligation not to make nuclear weapons available to other states and the latter [would assume]/5/ the obligation not to receive or produce such weapons.
/5/Brackets in the source text.
As you will recall, during the course of our discussion of this question in Geneva, I pointed to the importance of avoiding the possibility of transferring nuclear weapons to non-nuclear powers through military alliances. You then declared the readiness of the United States to find a formula which would exclude the transfer of nuclear weapons to national possession through the agency of military alliances and blocs. It is in this light that the Soviet Government is also examining the words contained in your message to the effect that the U.S. and the USSR could reach an agreement regarding the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons to national armed forces of other countries, not only directly but also indirectly, i.e., through blocs such as NATO. In other words, the agreement should guarantee the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons to the national forces of non-nuclear states also in those cases where such forces are component parts of the armed forces of one military bloc or another.
Thus, inasmuch as there is between us in essence agreement relative to the contents of the agreement on the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons, the next step could be the working out of the concrete provisions of such an agreement.
From the exchange of opinions between us it follows that the basic points of an agreement on the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons should clearly be the following:
1. An obligation on the part of the nuclear powers not to hand over to non-nuclear states nuclear weapons or the technical information necessary for their production;
2. An obligation on the part of non-nuclear states not to produce and not to acquire from other states nuclear weapons, and also not to receive technical information necessary for their production;
3. There should also be excluded the transfer of nuclear weapons through military alliances to those states which do not possess them, i.e., the transfer of such weapons in an indirect manner, irrespective of whether or not the national armed forces of these states are component parts of the armed forces of any military alliance.
What course of action would it be advisable to take in order to achieve practical results more quickly with respect to preventing the diffusion of nuclear weapons? I think that the nuclear powers could already agree on the necessity of working out an appropriate agreement. It is quite obvious that all powers which possess nuclear weapons, i.e., the USSR, the U.S., England and France, could undertake an initiative for the preparation of an appropriate international agreement which would be proposed for the signature of all governments.
We are prepared to continue maintaining contact with you concerning this question through our Ambassador in Washington.
223. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 8/24-31/62. Confidential.
SUBJECT
Next Steps in Nuclear Test Negotiations
We would like to be in a position to submit to the Geneva Disarmament Conference the text of a modified comprehensive test ban treaty, as well as of a limited atmospheric-underwater-outer space agreement, either on August 27 or August 29. This would be sufficiently in advance of the recess now scheduled for September 8 to allow for a limited discussion of these two documents. The agreed texts are attached as Tabs A and B./2/
/2/Tab A, Comprehensive Treaty, July 23, 23 pages, and Tab B, Atmospheric Treaty, July 23, 8 pages, are not printed.
We have the formal concurrence of State, Defense and AEC in these texts. Although the UK has continued to have some reservation about the handling of international observers at nationally manned control posts, they have agreed not to pursue these differences given their feeling about the urgent need for an early tabling of these documents.
The comprehensive treaty draft reflects the new approach which Ambassador Dean has already presented in general terms in Geneva. It does not include any numbers for on-site inspections or control posts, since we wish to avoid discussing such matters while the USSR rejects the very principle of on-site inspection.
Although Soviet acceptance of the principle of on-site inspection is currently not likely, submitting specific treaty language will pose the question to them in terms which are clearer and more pointed than has been possible during the past several weeks.
More importantly, we believe that having both treaties on record will serve to define the U.S. position on the nuclear test question with considerably more precision and will provide us with a platform on which to make our case in the General Assembly during the next months.
In the absence of a comprehensive proposal which is as specific as we can make it, we are concerned that our efforts to negotiate a limited treaty will be doomed from the outset. Unless we have an attractive alternative, the Soviet Union will probably be able to make headway if it attempts to round up support for an atmospheric, underwater and outer space test ban agreement coupled with and inseparable from a moratorium on underground nuclear weapon tests. Unquestionably, the Soviet Union will attempt to make the issue in the coming General Assembly debate one of American refusal to accept a moratorium on underground tests and thus shift the focus from Soviet refusal to accept on-site inspection. We will be in a good position to fend off this attack if we have on the record a sound and reasonable comprehensive test ban treaty based on the most recent scientific findings.
William C. Foster
224. Editorial Note
On August 27, 1962, President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Macmillan issued a joint statement indicating that they had instructed their representatives in Geneva to submit to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee "a draft treaty containing proposals for an end to all nuclear testing in all environments as well as an alternative draft treaty providing for an end to nuclear testing in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space." The two leaders expressed a "strong preference" for prompt action on the comprehensive treaty but indicated that they were also prepared to conclude a more limited atmospheric, underwater, and outer space agreement. The latter "would result in a definite downward turn in the arms race," "would make it easier to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries not now possessing them," "would free mankind from the dangers and fear of radioactive fallout," and "might be a first step toward an agreement banning testing in all environments." For text of this statement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, volume II, pages 791-792.
For texts of the draft treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in all environments (ENDC/58) and of the draft treaty banning these tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater (ENDC/59), as submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on August 27, see ibid., pages 792-804 and 804-807. Extensive documentation on the development of these draft treaties in the U.S. Government as well as coordination with the United Kingdom is in Department of State, Central Files 396.12-GE, 600.0012, and 700.5611. An August 14 draft of the comprehensive treaty and an August 17 draft of the atmospheric, outer space, and underwater treaty are in the Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 23, Eighteen-Nation Committee. See also Foster's memorandum to Bundy, Document 223.
225. Informal Communication From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy/1/
Moscow, September 4, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Khrushchev Correspondence with President Kennedy, 1961-1962, Vol. I. Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Adrian Fisher (ACDA), Secretary Rusk, and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William R. Tyler. Also printed in vol. VI, Document 52.
We have familiarized ourselves with the statement which you and the Prime-Minister of Great Britain Mr. Macmillan made August 27, concerning the latest Anglo-American proposals on the cessation of nuclear tests./2/
/2/See Document 24.
Now I would like to address myself to you to find out whether we can reach at last a practical agreement on this important problem even though it may not solve the whole problem completely.
The positions of our sides on the question of cessation of nuclear tests are well known. We believe that it would be in the interests of peace to put an end to all nuclear tests with an appropriate control by the national means of states to be established. You still express doubts with regard to this position of ours. At the same time you appeal to us to accept your proposals on the cessation of nuclear tests in all environments on such conditions which in our deep conviction do not have any justification and are absolutely unacceptable to us for the reasons to which we have pointed out more than once. I think you yourself understand that too. Perhaps that is why the Anglo-American proposals contain also an alternative version. You propose to conclude an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and leave aside underground tests.
We are ready to take into account your position. Let us immediately sign an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water but at the same time let us agree that with regard to underground tests negotiations will go on with an aim to reach an agreement on the underground tests as well. However we are of the opinion that the peoples would be extremely disappointed if the underground tests continue even at the time when negotiations are in progress on the possibility of an agreement on this problem. We believe that the governments of nuclear powers would act with honor if they agreed, and fixed that in the agreement as well, that the negotiations on the cessation of underground nuclear tests must go on and that during these negotiations and henceforth until an agreement banning also underground nuclear tests is reached, nuclear powers shall refrain from conducting such tests.
We think that an agreement on such basis though in our opinion it is not satisfactory in every respect, would, nevertheless, be a major step forward.
I will tell you frankly that accepting such an agreement we make a step to meet your position which we cannot justify since we are convinced that there is every possibility to conclude already now a comprehensive agreement on the cessation of all nuclear tests, but which we are ready to take into consideration.
You may say that there is not much new in what I have said. May be. But we are convinced that such a solution and such an agreement do not give either us or you any unilateral advantage, but benefits arising out of them for all nuclear powers and for the cause of peace in general are obvious.
And, finally, the last consideration: it is not clear from your and Mr. Macmillan's statement what role France as nuclear power shall play. We proceeded earlier and proceed now from an assumption that under any international agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests France should assume commitments analogous to those of the USSR, the US and Britain.
I await with great interest your reaction to the considerations I have expressed. If you react to them positively then our representatives could, evidently without great difficulty, work out the text of an appropriate international treaty.
226. Editorial Note
During 1961 and 1962, Kennedy administration officials became increasingly concerned about a possible arms race in outer space. On September 25, 1961, for instance, President Kennedy had proposed in an address before the U.N. General Assembly "keeping nuclear weapons from seeding new battlegrounds in outer space" and extending the rule of law on earth "to man's new domain--outer space." (Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pages 470-471) On December 20, 1961, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously approved General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI) on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. For text, see ibid., pages 738-741. The U.S. treaty outline on general and comprehensive disarmament, submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on April 18, 1962, proposed: "The parties to the Treaty would agree not to place in orbit weapons capable of producing mass destruction." (Ibid., 1962, volume I, page 360)
On May 26, 1962, President Kennedy issued NSAM No. 156, which called for the Department of State to organize a committee composed of representatives of the Departments of Defense and State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This committee would review negotiations on the peaceful uses of outer space "with a view to formulating a position which avoids the dangers of restricting ourselves, compromising highly classified programs, or providing assistance of significant military value to the Soviet Union and which at the same time permits us to continue to work for disarmament and international cooperation in space." (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 156)
This NSAM 156 Committee submitted its Report on Political and Informational Aspects of Satellite Reconnaissance Policy, dated July 1, under cover of a July 2 memorandum from Secretary Rusk to the President. The report made several recommendations, but the committee members did not reach a decision as to whether to propose a separate arms control agreement (i.e., outside the framework of the April 18 treaty outline on general and comprehensive disarmament) "banning weapons of mass destruction from being carried in satellites, with appropriate verification controls," but agreed only that no such proposal should be tabled until the issue had been reviewed with the President. (Ibid.) Attached to the report was a paper listing the pros and cons of a separate ban on bombs in space. Following NSC discussion on July 10, President Kennedy issued NSC Action No. 2454, which accepted the NSAM 156 Committee's recommendations and referred the question of a separate arms control accord back to the Committee for further study. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) The Committee's unanimous recommendations, which were incorporated into a July 12 memorandum from Secretary Rusk to the President, included opposition to a declaratory ban, the need for adequate verification controls, and further study by ACDA of the inspection requirements. (Ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 156)
The President questioned the need for inspection, however, and asked for study of the prospects for a ban relying on unilateral verification. After further study by the NSAM 156 Committee, the Committee of Principals on September 19 agreed on a declaratory ban monitored by national technical means, which would be put forward in the U.N. General Assembly. (Ibid., Central Files, 600.0012/9-1962) This position was incorporated in NSAM No. 192, October 2. (Ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 192)
Meanwhile, the NSC and State and Defense Departments cooperated in a separate initiative, which consisted of making authoritative administration public statements denying U.S. intentions to place any weapons of mass destruction in outer space. They hoped these statements would encourage the Soviet Union to take a similar position and contribute to an eventual agreement. Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric led off on September 5 with an address, "Research and Development as a Factor in Defense Procurement," which he gave to business and university leaders in South Bend, Indiana. A major theme of Gilpatric's speech was the problem of nuclear weapons in outer space: "The United States believes that it is highly desirable for its own security and for the security of the world that the arms race should not be extended into outer space, and we are seeking in every feasible way to achieve that purpose."
Gilpatric continued: "We have no program to place any weapons of mass destruction into orbit. An arms race in space will not contribute to our security. I can think of no greater stimulus for a Soviet thermonuclear arms effort in space than a U.S. commitment to such a program. This we will not do." (Congressional Record, Eighty-seventh Congress, Second Session, September 21, 1962, Appendix, page A7008)
Documentation on U.S. initiatives on outer space both privately with the Soviet Union and in the United Nations is scheduled for publication in volume XXV. See also Documents on International Aspects of the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 1954-1962, Staff Report Prepared for the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United States Senate, Eighty-eighth Congress, First Session, Document No. 18 (Washington, 1963); and Raymond L. Garthoff, "Banning the Bomb in Outer Space," International Security, volume V (Winter 1980/81), pages 25-40. Garthoff, a Foreign Service officer and Executive Secretary of the NSAM 156 Committee, was intimately involved in the development of U.S. space policy during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
227. Teletype Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy/1/
London, September 6, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Prime Minister Macmillan Correspondence with President Kennedy, 1962-1963, Vol. III. Secret; Eyes Only.
T 446/62. Your message CAP5408-62 of September 5. Please pass following message to President Kennedy from Prime Minister Macmillan.
Begins
Dear Friend,
Thank you very much for sending me the private message from Khrushchev./2/
/2/A note from Bromley Smith to Edward S. Little (S/S), September 12, attached to the source text, indicates that the text of the message from Khrushchev (Document 225) was transmitted to Macmillan, presumably over private wire, "without any comment."
Of course I share your view that we should try to keep this matter in play and at first sight Khrushchev's message seems intended to do the same. However there are some pretty obvious difficulties in his plan.
I wonder if we could deal with the matter in two parts. The first part would be an unpoliced ban in the atmosphere, under the sea and in space. The second part would be to urge Khrushchev once again to set up a joint working party with Russian scientists to see if an agreed basis for detection and verification could be found. A time limit of three or six months could be given.
The French point is very awkward and meant to be so. We could perhaps answer it by saying that it is for the three of us to set an example and that we would invite all other countries, including France and China, to join us in the atmospheric ban and of course, if the other negotiations succeed, to join us later in the comprehensive treaty.
I have been tied up with Commonwealth meetings all day but I thought you would like to have these first thoughts. I should be interested to know how you view the matter.
With warm regard,
Yours sincerely,
Harold Macmillan
Ends.
228. Editorial Note
On September 5, 1962, Glenn Seaborg and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara sent President Kennedy a memorandum proposing additional atmospheric tests to the Dominic series. This memorandum has not been found, but in a memorandum to the President, September 5, Jerome Wiesner wrote that the DOD-AEC proposal called for eleven tests, six high-altitude shots and five developmental tests. After summarizing the altitudes and yields of these proposed shots, Wiesner commented:
"Two points should be considered in judging these tests:
"1. The timing and scope will make the series look like a new U.S. test series. If all the tests are approved, [2 lines of source text not declassified]. This group of tests would produce about 40% of the fallout produced by our previous tests this year. It is also possible that these tests would extend beyond the end of the Soviet series.
"2. The extensive high altitude series, though of low yield, could stimulate further Soviet high altitude tests and these might be of considerably greater yield with the known undesirable consequences."
Wiesner concluded by suggesting a prioritized list of three categories if the President wanted to restrict the series. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 8/62-12/62)
President Kennedy met with his principals in the Cabinet Room of the White House on September 5 from 5:10 to 6:30 p.m. to discuss the proposed add-on tests. According to Seaborg: "The President directed that we cut the proposed eleven to eight tests and to relate the alternative schedule to Astronaut Schirra's September 23rd flight. The President suggested dropping Urraca. In a later meeting, dominated by McNamara, it was decided to drop Urraca, Thumbelina (a Los Alamos shot) and a DOD high altitude shot." (Seaborg, Journal, volume 4, page 180)
On the following day, September 6, from 10:35 to 11:15 a.m., President Kennedy presided over a meeting of the National Security Council at the White House. Seaborg noted in his journal after the meeting: "As a result of the meeting yesterday with the President, in which it was decided to reduce the 11 Johnston Island events (five developmental and six high altitude tests) to eight, it was decided to drop the AEC Haymaker Prime and Urraca tests and the DOD high altitude test. The President raised questions about including Thumbelina, the developmental Los Alamos test. On the basis of my representations, the President decided that, in the balance of the developmental base that this would give Los Alamos, it counterbalances the disadvantage of the fallout.
"Prior to the meeting, the President was given a memorandum, signed by Secretary McNamara and me, and dated today, which included Haymaker Prime, but not Thumbelina, on the basis of the preliminary discussions in the meeting with the President yesterday. In view of today's discussion, this memorandum will be revised to reflect the decisions made, i.e., substitution of Thumbelina for Haymaker Prime. It includes two alternates for the eight tests, depending on whether Astronaut Schirra goes into orbit on September 25th as scheduled, or is delayed, because the Bluegill shot must not go until after his orbiting.
"It was decided that the announcement would be the regular AEC-DOD announcement, as a follow-up of that which announced the closing of the Johnston Island danger zone, and which indicated that such a new announcement would precede the reopening of this zone.
"The addition of the four developmental tests to the series, which will end early in November, will be played in a low key. Special attention will be paid to the problem of fallout from the Thumbelina event." (Ibid.)
NSC Action No. 2456, September 6, which summarized the decisions reached at this 504th NSC meeting, is in Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council. See the Supplement.
An unsigned copy of the 12-page draft letter from Seaborg and McNamara to the President, September 6, is ibid., S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171. The subsequently revised version mentioned in Seaborg's journal entry has not been found. The President's approval of the eight tests is in NSAM No. 185 to McNamara and Seaborg, September 7. This memorandum specified, however, that only preparations were authorized for Kingfish, a high-altitude shot, and that "the final decision to execute is reserved." (Ibid.) In NSAM No. 198 to McNamara, Seaborg, and NASA Director James E. Webb, October 24, Kaysen wrote that the President had that day authorized the Kingfish event. (Ibid., S/S-NSN Files: Lot 72 D 316)
The Project Mercury orbital flight of astronaut Walter Schirra, which is also referred to in Seaborg's journal entry above, took place on October 3.
President Kennedy informed the U.K. Government of his decisions on the eight tests in a message to Macmillan, September 7. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, K-M, Vol. II) See the Supplement.
Ultimately, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense conducted nine atmospheric tests in the Johnston Island area from October 2 to November 3, 1962. These tests are summarized in Announced United States Nuclear Tests, DOE/NV-209 (Rev. 11) and Operation Dominic I--1962, DNA-6040F.
229. Message From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev/1/
Washington, September 15, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. No classification marking. Also printed in vol. VI, Document 54.
I am happy to note your suggestion that you are prepared to negotiate a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in the immediate future. Now that the subcommittee on nuclear test ban is continuing in session throughout the recess in the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference, I think we should make a serious effort to work out such an agreement in time to meet the target date of January 1, 1963 which both sides have mentioned in the Geneva negotiations. We have prepared such a treaty,/2/ and our representatives and those of the United Kingdom will be working with yours in the subcommittee to get the earliest possible agreement on a final text.
/2/See Document 224.
While we are negotiating toward a limited ban of this type we should at the same time be negotiating towards a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in all environments. As part of this effort we could b0e working to eliminate the difference of view as to a question of scientific fact which has so far kept our negotiators apart. Our scientists advise me that although substantial progress has been made in detecting and identifying nuclear explosions on the basis of instrumentation, it is not possible to do so on a basis which renders the requirement of on-site inspections unnecessary. Your delegation has taken the opposing view but has not supplied any scientific information which may have led your government to hold this view. A joint working party of your scientists together with ours and scientists from the United Kingdom might be able, finally, to dispel the differences which have so far blocked our efforts to obtain agreement.
I believe that when we have prepared and put into effect a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, we can then look at the problem of continued testing under ground and take such steps as we may then determine seem most likely to be helpful in arriving at a comprehensive treaty in the light of the progress which has been made at that time.
In your message you mention the role that France should play in the treaty. Of course, our comprehensive treaty draft provides that the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union shall cooperate in encouraging other states to become parties to the treaty. For its part, the United States would work in close consultation with France and would hope that France would adhere to the treaty. Indeed, both you and we have a great interest in assuring the adherence to the treaty of all states or authorities capable of conducting a nuclear weapons test. Without their adherence the treaty could not endure.
A test ban agreement, together with an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons of the kind which Secretary Rusk has discussed with Ambassador Dobrynin,/3/ would have a powerful effect in deterring the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities to other countries. I firmly believe that obtaining this objective is in our mutual interest. It cannot be in the security interest of any of us if the present small number of nuclear powers is expanded, for, to the extent this is the case, the possibilities of war by accident or by design can only increase. There is still time to put an effective end to this threat./4/
/3/See Documents 216 and 222.
/4/Printed from an unsigned copy.
230. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, September 21, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Non-Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons, 8/62-7/63. Confidential. An undated memorandum from Foster to the President, attached to the source text, states, "The attached documents while not actually seen by Secretary Rusk, have been discussed with him by me and he has expressed his present intention to discuss this matter with Lord Home in New York, probably on Sunday." A copy of the source text identifies ACDA officers Adrian Fisher, James Goodby, and Betty Goetz as the drafters. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/DD Files: FRC 77 A 17, Chron File, July-Sep 1962)
SUBJECT
Agreement on Non-Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons
You are aware of the conversations which I have been having with the Soviet Foreign Minister and with the Soviet Ambassador in Washington on the question of restricting the spread of independent national nuclear weapons capabilities.
At the last meeting, August 23,/2/ a potentially important shift occurred in the Soviet position. The Soviet Union now appears willing to consider reaching an agreement on non-diffusion couched in more general terms than its previous position which had specified that a prior agreement had to be reached separately concerning the specific problem of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the East German regime. In addition, although the language is ambiguous, the Soviets have not apparently precluded considering an understanding which would not rule out international nuclear weapons arrangements of a truly multilateral nature of the type which might be developed within the NATO framework./3/
/2/See Document 222.
/3/In the margin next to this sentence, the President wrote, "Get an understanding."
In view of these potential shifts in the Soviet position, I now propose for your approval an immediate program of action looking toward the formal submission to the Soviet Union by the United States and its principal Western allies of a declaration regarding the non-transfer of nuclear weapons. In doing so it would be made clear that we did not propose to give up our right to work out a truly multinational NATO nuclear force, with appropriate safeguards to assure that nuclear weapons assigned to that force could not be used on the basis of a national decision alone.
1. I propose that within the next few days I discuss the substance and tactics of negotiating a non-transfer agreement with the British Foreign Minister and British Ambassador. The points I would make are attached as Tab A./4/ I would also show them a draft Declaration, attached as Tab B,/5/ and a draft Minute, further clarifying our proposal, which is attached as Tab C./6/
/4/Talking Points for Discussions with U.K. on Non-Dissemination, not printed.
/5/Draft Non-Transfer Declaration, not printed.
/6/Minute for Use in Discussion with Draft Non-Transfer Declaration, not printed.
2. Assuming a generally favorable response I propose that we then could approach President De Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer regarding our interest in securing a non-transfer declaration. We would seek the active participation and support of France in further negotiations with the Soviet Union, and we would seek the support and approval in this effort of the Federal Republic of Germany. The United States will be in a better position to urge the Soviet Union to place pressure on Communist China to sign a non-diffusion declaration if the U.K. and France join with the U.S. in being willing to sign such a declaration, and the Federal Republic of Germany is prepared to undertake an obligation not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons.
3. Assuming that agreement can be worked out with the heads of the governments of the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, we would again take the matter up with the U.S.S.R. In the event that one or more of the other three Western governments refused to participate in this endeavor or attached conditions to their acceptance, I would then propose reviewing with you further steps that could be taken.
4. The above course of action has not been discussed by the Committee of Principals. It is supported by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I am advised that the Joint Chiefs of Staff oppose the course of action and the measure on the grounds that it contains no provisions for inspection; that it may have a very bad effect on our defensive alliance within NATO; and that the measure prohibits transfers which the U.S. itself may wish to make. I am advised that the Department of Defense does not oppose the measure but does question the timing involved in the course of action proposed./7/
/7/In a September 21 memorandum to the President on non-diffusion, Carl Kaysen wrote that he had "talked to the Secretary again on the telephone this afternoon and indicated your desire to talk with him on the subject." He added, among other things, that "Ros Gilpatric has indicated that the Defense Department would go along with this proposal, but the Chiefs object to it strenuously. If possible, Bob [McNamara] and Ros would rather fight with them another time than now." (Ibid.) See the Supplement.
5. I have outlined a course of action to give you a picture of my thinking. At this time, however, I am only asking for approval of the action discussed in point 1. above, the discussion of the measure and the course of action with the U.K. on an exploratory basis. I will ask your further approval of the next step in this negotiation after consulting with the U.K.
231. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SecDel/MC/1
New York, September 25, 1962, 1:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on September 26. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Towers. The source text is labeled "Part II." A memorandum of conversation on Laos, the first subject of their talk, is not printed. (Ibid.)
SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE SEVENTEENTH SESSIONOF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September, 1962
PARTICIPANTS
US
The Secretary
Mr. Akalovsky
USSR
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Sukhodrev
SUBJECT
Test Ban
The second subject the Secretary raised in his post-lunch conversation with Mr. Gromyko was that of a test ban.
The Secretary observed that both the US and USSR were now conducting nuclear tests, but stated that our first choice was to reach agreement on a comprehensive treaty banning tests in all environments. At the same time, from our standpoint we did not see how such a treaty could be agreed upon without adequate arrangements for on-site inspection in case of suspicious underground events. The Secretary stressed that we were unable to understand why the Soviet Union was unwilling to accept the minimum arrangement which would make it possible to stop all nuclear weapons tests. He went on to say that if no agreement on a comprehensive treaty were now possible, agreement could be reached on a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, pending further negotiations on a comprehensive treaty. He pointed out that such a limited treaty would not require any inspection mechanism because not national but international means existed by which atmospheric, underwater and outer space tests could be detected. He said he hoped very much that the Soviet Union could accept such a treaty and noted that as far as the US testing program was concerned, it was such that there would be some time ahead during which both sides could work diligently on a comprehensive treaty.
The Secretary then said he wished to raise one point, noting that he was doing so in all seriousness and not with any desire to be frivolous. He said that some two weeks ago he had seen an article published in the People's Daily in Peiping in which it was stated categorically that under no circumstances would Peiping accept a nuclear test ban, non-proliferation arrangements, or any other arrangements inhibiting the development of a nuclear capability by Peiping./2/ Since any treaty banning nuclear weapons tests would have to contain the provision that tests by a third country would terminate the treaty, the Secretary said it had occurred to him that the current lack of interest on the part of the USSR with respect to a test ban might be motivated by this attitude of Peiping. He stressed that he did not insist on Mr. Gromyko's answering this point, but that he simply wondered whether this might not be at least a partial reason for the current Soviet attitude. He emphasized that as far as the United States was concerned it wished to make progress in Geneva with the hope that a report about the conclusion of an agreement could be submitted to the General Assembly.
/2/An attachment to a memorandum from Foster to Secretary Rusk, August 11, which summarized the attitude of the People's Republic of China on the development and testing of nuclear weapons and on nuclear-free zones, contained extracts from and summaries of articles from People's Daily on these subjects. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/EX/C&R Files: FRC 77 A 8, State Department, Memoranda to the Secretary)
Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet Government had been and still was very serious about the problem of stopping nuclear tests. The Soviet Union was resolutely in favor of stopping all types of tests. It wished to reach agreement on this matter with the United States, the UK, and France. It believed that this would be the best solution, serving the best interests of all. However, the USSR was prepared to agree that no further atmospheric, underwater and outer space tests would be conducted and that during the negotiations on a comprehensive treaty no party would conduct underground tests. He asserted that this was a compromise solution because it would provide for a ban on tests in three environments and for negotiations with respect to the fourth environment, but with the understanding that no underground tests would be conducted during such negotiations. Without such an understanding an atmospheric ban would be of no use because, as the Secretary knew, from the standpoint of nuclear weapons development it did not really matter in what environment one tested. He wished the US Government would think about this point.
As to the Secretary's remark about Peiping, Mr. Gromyko said that test ban and proliferation were two different things. The USSR was in favor of having a test ban agreement signed by the four existing nuclear powers--the US, the UK, the USSR, and, of course, France--because no other nation was known to be a nuclear power at present. Thus, the Soviet Union was in favor of proceeding on the basis on which negotiations on this subject had been taking place so far. As to proliferation, Mr. Gromyko recalled that he and the Secretary had discussed this matter in Geneva and that subsequently the Secretary had sent him a letter to which he had given an appropriate reply. He said that the Soviet Union believed that it would be useful if agreement could be reached with regard to non-proliferation and that the Soviet position on this point remained unchanged. He noted, however, that of course any country, including the socialist states and the Chinese People's Republic in particular, were fully entitled to express their own views. As the Secretary knew full well, the CPR did not participate in disarmament negotiations and was not in the UN as a result of the US position. Mr. Gromyko thought it was dangerous to prevent the CPR from taking part in those activities. Thus the CPR must speak for itself and if the US was creating obstacles in the path of reaching agreement on a test ban or non-dissemination this was not the fault of the USSR but its own.
Referring to the Secretary's remark that the current Soviet lack of interest in a test ban was perhaps motivated by Peiping's attitude, Mr. Gromyko asserted that this was not correct and could not be applied to the Soviet position. He said he wished to state once again that the USSR had believed and continued to believe that a test ban would be a great contributing factor toward relaxation of tensions and progress in disarmament, although in and of itself it would not constitute disarmament. He reiterated that any implication the Secretary had made with regard to the Soviet position being influenced by the Chinese attitude did not hold water and was contrary to the facts.
The Secretary said he was glad to hear this, but wished to add just one more point. He stated that an atmospheric treaty accompanied by an agreement to forego underground tests pending negotiations on a comprehensive treaty was something that could easily become a comprehensive treaty without inspection. Now, during the period when both the US and the USSR were testing, a comprehensive treaty could be reached; on the other hand, refusal to agree to a comprehensive treaty under conditions suggested by Mr. Gromyko could become a prolongation of an uninspected moratorium with regard to underground tests, and this was something the US could not accept. The Secretary then expressed the hope that both sides would give full attention to the sub-committee meeting in Geneva so as to work on a comprehensive treaty.
The Secretary then said that he disagreed with Mr. Gromyko's remarks with regard to the value of a limited test ban. He said that the most dramatic and costly advances would require atmospheric or outer space tests. Although underground tests did make some difference, a ban on atmospheric, outer space and underwater tests would place a useful ceiling on testing.
Mr. Gromyko said that with regard to inspection he could only reiterate the Soviet belief that both the US and USSR, as well as some other states, had means of ensuring the observance of a treaty by all. This had been and remained the Soviet position on this question.
The Secretary suggested that Mr. Gromyko might perhaps think over the possibility that on this point the difference might perhaps be over facts rather than policy. He though scientists from both sides might consult in order to resolve this problem. Noting that as far as the US was concerned its position stemmed from facts rather than policy.
Mr. Gromyko failed to respond and changed the subject.
232. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy/1/
Moscow, undated.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Subjects, Khrushchev Correspondence, Vol. III-B, 9/15/62-10/24/62. No classification marking. The portions on Berlin and Cuba are printed in vols. XV, pp. 337-338, and volume X, respectively. The full text is printed in vol. VI, Document 55.
I studied with interest your reply to my considerations forwarded through Ambassador Dobrynin on the question of cessation of nuclear weapon tests./2/
/2/Document 229.
It is said in your reply that a serious effort should be made to work out by January 1, 1963 an agreement on the question of cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Well, I can say quite definitely that we will not make you waiting. The Soviet Union in the course of many years has been pressing for concluding an agreement on cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and we are prepared to make new efforts in this direction for the sake of achieving this aim.
The Soviet Government is convinced that national means of detecting nuclear explosions now at the disposal of the states are quite adequate to ensure strict control over the fulfillment by all states of their commitments with regard to cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water as well as underground. And the U.S. too recognizes this now with respect to three types of tests--in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water--and no longer insists on establishing international control over the cessation of these tests. Thus there seems to be no difference between us on this point any longer. There remains the question of underground tests. In the U.S. doubts are still being expressed as to the adequacy of national means for detecting underground tests. We do not have such doubts. Nevertheless we are prepared to use every opportunity to come to an agreement on this question on a mutually acceptable basis, on such a basis that would remove your doubts.
I do not know whether you have noticed a suggestion of British scientists Bullard and Penney put forward at the recent Pugwash conference of scientists concerning the use of automatic seismic stations working without any personnel./3/ As we understood, the idea of this suggestion is that automatic seismic stations help with their records to determine what is the cause of this or that underground tremor--underground nuclear blasts or ordinary earthquakes. It would be a sort of mechanical control without men. After thinking this suggestion over we came to the conclusion that it can be accepted if this would make it easier to reach an agreement. In this case it could be provided in the treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests that automatic seismic stations be set up both near the borders of the nuclear states and 2-3 such stations directly on the territory of the states possessing nuclear weapons--in the areas most frequently subjected to earthquakes.
/3/Reference is to geophysicist Sir Edward Bullard and Sir William Penney, Deputy Chairman of the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority, who attended the tenth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, which met in London September 3-7, 1962.
The Soviet Government agrees to this only because it seeks a mutually acceptable basis for an agreement. We do not intend to violate the commitment that we assume regarding cessation of tests but we also want to make you and the public opinion of the U.S. to feel confident that all sides will display an honest approach in fulfilling this commitment.
If you agree to this then we could without much difficulty come to an agreement on cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.
I would like to view as an encouraging sign the fact that the American scientists who took part in the Pugwash conference--and as I was told, very prominent ones--approved of the suggestion about the use of automatic seismic stations for the purposes of control. The Soviet scientists--participants in the Pugwash conference also approved of this suggestion. So it appears that the scientists are already in agreement./4/ Then there is a possibility to move ahead quickly. And as for us, we would like very much to put an end to all that and reach, at last, an agreement on cessation of nuclear tests of all kinds. There have been enough--both for us and for you--of experimental blasts carried out in the atmosphere and underground.
/4/For text of a document calling for a new approach on the test ban negotiations and including the suggestion of utilizing sealed automatic recording stations, which was signed by three U.S. and three Soviet scientists at this Pugwash conference, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II, pp. 863-865.
If we can come now to the conclusion of an agreement on cessation of all nuclear weapon tests we will make good for the peoples of our countries and for the peoples of the entire world.
We prefer to conclude now a treaty on cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. But if the Western powers are not yet prepared for that even taking into account the suggestions put forward at the Pugwash conference we, as I have already told you, are ready in this case also to make a step toward the Western powers and to conclude at this time a treaty on cessation of nuclear weapon tests in three environments; in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.
It would be incorrect in doing that to leave open the question of underground nuclear tests. For it would create a false impression with the world public opinion, a kind of illusion, that an agreement on cessation of tests has seemingly been concluded and that the competition among states in perfecting nuclear arms is coming to an end whereas in fact this competition would continue. The weapons already created would be remodeled on the basis of new scientific data obtained as a result of experimental underground blasts, that is the states would replenish their arsenals with ever more perfect, ever more destructive types of nuclear weapons. With that we cannot agree. I must say frankly and openly that it is impossible to agree to conclude an agreement on the basis of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water if the United States intends to continue underground nuclear explosions. Since in this case we too would face a necessity to carry out experimental nuclear weapon tests and we would conduct those tests, as we are doing now, in the atmosphere.
What is the way out? From our previous exchange of opinion you know how we propose to overcome this difficulty--to agree that after a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in our outer space and under water is signed negotiations on cessation of underground tests as well should be continued and while these negotiations are in progress and until the agreement is reached all nuclear powers should refrain from conducting such tests.
But some people in the West do not want even to hear about any commitment by the states to refrain from conducting nuclear tests. And on the part of some statesmen and in the American press assertions are made from time to time that the Soviet Union has allegedly violated some agreement on moratorium on nuclear tests. However those who make such statements have neither proof nor ground to support them.
And what are the facts? No international agreement on moratorium on underground or any other nuclear tests ever existed and nobody ever signed such an agreement. It can be reminded that as early as March 31, 1958 the Soviet Union unilaterally discontinued tests on all kinds of atomic and hydrogen weapons and called upon the Western powers to follow its example. But the U.S. and Britain responded then to that proposal of ours with an unprecedented in scope new series of tests of nuclear bombs. In subsequent period since the end of 1958 neither the United States or Britain nor the Soviet Union conducted nuclear weapon tests, but they acted so not because of any obligation coming from an international agreement but because of their own unilateral decisions. However, as early as December 29, 1959 your predecessor President Eisenhower clearly and definitely stated that the U.S. did not consider itself any longer bound by its statement that it had no intention to conduct nuclear tests. As for France--a NATO ally of the U.S. and Britain--it was even at that time conducting one nuclear explosion after another.
All this is perfectly known and he who nevertheless claims that the Soviet Union allegedly violated some moratorium on nuclear tests either has a short memory or simply seeks to torpedo the conclusion of an agreement on cessation of nuclear weapon tests.
I would like to note with satisfaction that now you seem to agree in principle that along with the conclusion of a treaty on the ban of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water a moratorium with regard to underground explosions be accepted. If this, is so, then it opens certain prospects.
You believe at the same time, as I have understood, that there should be no unlimited moratorium on underground tests. But we do not put the question that way. We do not propose to declare an unlimited moratorium on underground explosions. We suggest to declare such moratorium for a certain period of time, while the negotiations on banning underground tests of nuclear weapons are in progress. For how long those negotiations will go on--it is of course, impossible to say. But we do not think that much time is needed to conclude a final agreement on underground tests, provided, of course, that both sides display interest in reaching such an agreement promptly.
Anyway we are ready to agree on a term for the course of which the states will assume commitments not to conduct underground nuclear explosions, if an agreement banning nuclear tests only in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water is reached. We agree, for instance, on a 5-year term. And during the five years it will certainly be possible to agree on a final solution of the question of banning also underground nuclear explosions though I repeat, I am convinced that it could be done much faster, especially if the idea of use for the purposes of control of automatic seismic stations is acceptable to you. During this period of time, one should assume all American scientists too will get convinced that the national means of detection of nuclear explosions are quite adequate for ensuring a foolproof control over cessation of nuclear tests, underground tests included.
If, however, even during that term an agreement is not reached--what to do in this case? Then the whole question of banning nuclear weapon tests will have to be reconsidered anew. And if the American side then insists on renewing underground nuclear tests, then--I want to say this already now and in plain terms--the Soviet Union will consider itself free from assumed obligations not to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.
These are considerations which came to my mind in connection with your reply on the question of cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Giving you these considerations I think of nothing else but how to move from the dead point, and out of deadlock the question of cessation of nuclear weapon tests.
If you being concerned about the same are in agreement with our considerations let me know and then the Soviet representatives in Geneva will at once be given instructions to get down together with your and British representatives to practical work of preparing a draft agreement.
One cannot doubt that an agreement on cessation of nuclear weapon tests would be greeted with tremendous joy by all mankind. The peoples wherever they live--in Europe or America, in Africa, Asia or Australia--desire peace, a lasting peace, they want an end to the nuclear arms race, they want the threat of nuclear war be eliminated.
[Here follows the remainder of the letter.]
233. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, October 1, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 8/62-12/62. Secret.
Attached is a copy of the "black box" proposal that prompted the recent discussions about unmanned seismic stations./2/ It proposes that a number of tamper-proof automatic seismic detectors with built-in recorders be provided by an International Control Commission and put in place by the host country. They would be returned to the Commission when needed to help resolve an ambiguous seismic event which had previously been detected by the proposed national seismic system. The only statement in the paper concerning the number of such black boxes is, "the number of sealed automatic stations in the network should be large enough so that it provides a good check of the seismic data supplied by all stations."
/2/Not attached, but the reference is to the statement signed by U.S. and Soviet scientists at the Pugwash conference; see footnote 4, Document 232.
I have talked with Professor Rich of MIT/3/ who participated in the discussions and learned from him that the number of such stations considered ranged from 20 to about 200 with general agreement that a large number was needed. The Russian scientists were unwilling to put any numbers in the paper, so the first draft read "a high density net" but in subsequent drafts they pulled away from that statement and said successively, "large number of stations," "number sufficient to insure multiple records of events," etc.
/3/Professor Alexander Rich, one of the three U.S. scientists who signed the Pugwash statement.
We have made a hasty evaluation of the proposal and have come to the tentative conclusion that such stations would not eliminate the need for some on-site inspections. This is also recognized in item 4 of the London statement./4/ It is impossible to judge just how much good such additional stations would do because we don't know enough about the characteristics of earthquakes in the Soviet Union. Statements made by Soviet seismologists lead us to believe that they don't have the needed information either. This is not surprising, because a large fraction of the Soviet earthquakes occur in the remote, wild Kuriles Islands-Kamchatka Peninsula area where there are very few seismic stations. We don't have sufficient data about earthquakes in the United States to resolve similar questions here. Some properly placed stations, possibly as few as a dozen, might make it possible to resolve half of the ambiguous events that we might have previously expected. We had previously predicted that in an average year there would be approximately 70 to 100 such events in the Soviet Union, so that there would still remain a substantial residue to be inspected. At this time we cannot say whether or not a much larger number of unmanned stations would reduce the residue substantially. A further study of this is being made, and I will report any new results to you as they occur.
/4/Item 4 of this statement mentioned only the manufacture or procurement of the sealed automatic seismographs, but the first sentence of the following paragraph stated: "We think a system developed along these lines may provide a large enough mass of objective seismic data so that the International Control Commission will need to request very few on-site inspections." (Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II, pp. 864-865)
There is a further difficulty. We believe that the stations could only be trusted if they were inspected by representatives of the control commission after installation and such inspection might be regarded as a more serious infringement of Soviet territory than a few obligatory inspections.
I believe that the reports of Sir Edward Bullard's attitude on nuclear test detection problems has been garbled. Sir Edward Bullard (he owns a large interest in the Brewery of the same name) is a world renowned geo-physicist on the faculty at Cambridge University. He was one of the U.K. members of the original Committee of Experts and is an important governmental adviser. I have learned that Bullard did not participate in the discussions of the black box plan, nor was the black box plan discussed by the Pugwash Disarmament Group at Cambridge in which Bullard did participate. This plan emerged later, at the London Conference and was a result of conversations among American and Soviet scientists who had previously been at the Cambridge meeting./5/
/5/Another account of the London meeting is in a memorandum from George W. Rathjens to Fisher, December 21. Rathjens attended the meetings with Soviet and U.S. scientists in London but not in Cambridge. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/EX/RIC/R Files: FRC 77 A 10, Conferences, Pugwash (COSWA))
The talks on test ban issues at Cambridge focused on the need for on-site inspection, and it appears that Bullard was the most outspoken proponent of the position that the Soviet Union should accept the principle of mandatory inspection and that the West should accept a very few inspections. The Working Group paper on nuclear test problems prepared at Cambridge is also attached./6/
/6/Not attached and not found.
It seems likely to me that the discussion of inspection requirements and the black box proposal have become mixed up in re-telling to your informant. With your permission I would like to call Sir Edward, whom I know quite well, and see what I can learn about his present views directly from him.
Jerome B. Wiesner/7/
/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
234. Letter From the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Cline) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster)/1/
Washington, October 1, 1962.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI, ER Subject Files. Secret.
DEAR MR. FOSTER: Thank you for sending us a copy of your September 26 letter to Secretary McNamara, which requested the comments of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs on the current draft proposal for a nuclear non-diffusion agreement./2/
/2/Foster's September 26 letter to McNamara summarized developments regarding a possible international agreement on non-diffusion of nuclear weapons and provided ACDA's recommendations on such an agreement. (Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/9-2762) See the Supplement.
I understand that General Carter has already made known our reservations about parts of the September 18 draft letters to President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer./3/ It occurred to me that further comments might be useful to you.
/3/The comments of Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, have not been found. Undated draft letters from the President to Macmillan, de Gaulle, and Adenauer were transmitted under cover of a memorandum from Foster to the Committee of Principals, September 18. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/DD Files: FRC 77 A 17, Committee of Principals Jan-Dec 1962)
As you know, we believe that the material transmitted to the Committee of Principals on September 18 exaggerated both the imminence and the probable scale of nuclear diffusion./4/ In addition to the considerations discussed in NIE 4-3-61,/5/ with which you are familiar, I should like to add that we also consider the cost of acquiring a nuclear weapons capability still to be an important deterrent. It is true that costs are in general declining as uranium becomes easier to obtain, as plutonium becomes more widely available and as information on weapons technology increases. Nonetheless, the minimum cost is still on the order of two hundred million dollars merely to acquire a single crude nuclear weapon. This does not allow anything for an effective modern delivery system. The French spent one billion dollars before their first test shot in 1960 and will probably be spending this much each year by 1968 on weapons alone. To this must be added the cost of acquiring appropriate delivery vehicles. The French will need at least fifty Mirage IV light jet bombers for a real strike force, and these would cost between 200-250 million dollars. Some seven hundred million dollars more would be required for an intermediate range ballistic missile now under development in France.
/4/In addition to the draft letters cited in footnote 3 above, the material included an undated draft memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President and an undated draft declaration on non-diffusion. The draft memorandum, somewhat revised, was sent to the President on September 21; see Document 230.
/5/NIE 4-3-61, "Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities of Free World Countries Other than the US and UK," September 21, 1961, is scheduled for publication in volume VIII.
A second point we would like to make concerns the feasibility of keeping Communist China from acquiring nuclear weapons. The September 18 draft letter to the President stated that ". . . the possibility of obtaining the adherence of Communist China to such an agreement is very remote unless the appeal can be put as a joint effort by the three Western nuclear powers." We would go considerably farther than this statement. We believe that the Communist Chinese are determined to go ahead with their nuclear weapons program and that the Soviets do not have (and are not likely to acquire) the leverage to produce a change in this decision. In July, Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen-yi stated in a speech that the Chinese were going ahead with their program and would achieve success soon. Early in September, the Peiping People's Daily charged that the real purpose of US disarmament proposals was to tie China's hands in developing nuclear weapons. We suspect that the Chinese are well aware of what is in the wind and that these remarks and their timing are not coincidental. Thus we should be very cautious in assuming that it is feasible to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of the Chinese Communists or that other nations (including the USSR) will find this one of the practical benefits of a nuclear non-diffusion agreement.
With the hope that these observations will be helpful to you,
Sincerely,
Ray S. Cline/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that indicates Cline signed the original.
235. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, October 6, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Bromley Smith Safe, Drawer 1, Bethe Report 10/4/62. Top Secret.
The attached preliminary report by the Foreign Weapons Evaluation Group, a committee of weapons experts from Los Alamos and Livermore under the chairmanship of Dr. Hans Bethe, evaluates the results to date of the 1961 and 1962 Soviet nuclear weapons test series./2/
/2/The attached 6-page "Report of the Foreign Weapons Evaluation Group Meeting of 2-3 October 1962," dated October 4, is not printed. See the Supplement.
The report indicates that the same group significantly over-estimated Soviet capabilities in its original review of the data on the 1961 Soviet test series. On the basis of data from the current Soviet series, including a new source of information from close in electromagnetic signals and a re-evaluation of data from the 1961 series in the light of current knowledge, it is now concluded that the Soviets are probably [6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]./3/ The group has also concluded that the tests in the 1962 Soviet series do not involve any substantial advances over the 1961 series and that a large number of them appear in fact to be repeats of the 1961 tests, presumably in weaponized versions. The new data continues to highlight the fact that the U.S. has a substantial technological lead in the thermonuclear weapons [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
/3/For a summary of the previous Bethe report, November 17, 1961, see Document 96.
These conclusions which have been agreed to by senior scientists from the Livermore and Los Alamos Laboratories and the RAND Corporation are considerably at odds with the views of Dr. Teller who, as the attached newspaper article indicates,/4/ has undertaken a program of public education on the status of U.S. and Soviet weapon capabilities. He has access to all classified weapons data, presumably the analysis on which this report was based.
/4/The attached, unidentified newspaper clipping, not printed, contains a United Press International story in which Dr. Edward Teller, Associated Director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at the University of California, expressed criticism of the U.S. nuclear testing program and said, among other things, "It is my guess, and it is only a guess, that the Russians are ahead of us in the nuclear race today."
Jerry
236. Message From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev/1/
Washington, October 8, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy/Johnson Correspondence with USSR Officials, 1961-1964, Vol. I. Top Secret. Also printed in Vol. VI, Document 58.
I am giving careful consideration to your communication of September 28th,/2/ and I am glad that we can continue to use this channel as a means of communicating privately and frankly.
/2/See Document 232.
I shall want to comment separately on other aspects of your letter, but because of the imminent discussions in the UN I want you to have my views promptly on the subject of nuclear testing. I believe that we are nearer to agreement on this issue than on others, and I believe that we should keep at it to see if we cannot promptly reach the understanding which the world wants and needs.
With respect to this topic, I am encouraged by the areas in which we are in accord and by your statement that the Soviet Union is prepared to make "new efforts" in order to conclude an early agreement. Certainly it would seem we are agreed in our approach to three types of tests--in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.
With respect to underground tests, I am inclined to agree with you that the recent Pugwash conference of scientists brought forth some interesting suggestions, particularly those of British scientists Bullard and Penney./3/ I must comment that we interpret those suggestions in somewhat different light than your letter indicates you do. Nonetheless the suggestions certainly are worthy of intensive development. The development of automatic unmanned seismic mechanisms might very well, if properly worked out, facilitate agreement on the means of actually detecting underground explosions--although my scientists indicate that it would require much more than the two or three such stations you mentioned as being located directly in the areas most frequently subjected to earthquakes. Of course, these mechanical devices would still have to be supplemented by a modest number of on-site inspections--for scientists agree that the data gathered by these machines would still leave doubt as to the cause of the explosion in a number of cases. Surely, considering the great value for international relations and the general security and tranquility of the world which the comprehensive agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests would entail, we can agree on the number of such inspections which would be necessary to identify the nature or cause of these explosions. Once that is done, with the number of unmanned stations worked out scientifically, and the method for international coordination established, we can conclude a treaty which will enable all peoples of the world to rest easier.
/3/See footnotes 3 and 4, Document 232.
In the meantime, you suggest that the agreement we can more promptly reach on the cessation of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water be accompanied by a five year moratorium on underground explosions. But surely it will not take five years to reach agreement--if agreement is ever to be reached--on banning underground tests, particularly in view of our mutual interest in the role of automatic seismic stations for detecting explosions. I would not feel justified in submitting to the Senate, moreover, a treaty on tests in other environments which would be discarded if agreement was not reached on testing under ground. It is nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water which increase the percentage of fall-out and are the cause of grave concern to all peoples of the world. Such a treaty, in short, would be in itself a great step forward, both for humanitarian and political reasons.
So I continue to think that we are within striking distance of a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. I believe we should try to work out such an agreement in time to meet the target day of January 1, 1963, and I think also that in the meanwhile we should be working intensively to make progress as rapidly as possible on the remaining problem of testing under ground. I believe that our negotiators should return to their labors in an intense effort to reach agreement on the questions that still divide us, and I hope very much that they will be able to make real and rapid progress in the meetings now scheduled to resume on November 12th.
JFK/4/
/4/Kennedy's initials appear in an unidentified hand, indicating Kennedy signed the original.
237. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, October 16, 1962, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-1662. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. The telegram is one of seven that Kohler transmitted to the Department of State that reported on his 3-hour conversation with Chairman Khrushchev on the morning of October 16. This was Kohler's first formal meeting as Ambassador. Their lengthy conversation was a tour d'horizon of U.S.-Soviet relations. Telegrams 970, 973, 974, and 982, as well as the full text of telegram 979 are printed in vol. V, Documents 146-150. Telegram 978 on Cuba is printed in volume XI; telegram 981 on Berlin is printed in vol. XV, pp. 359-362.
979. Policy. Khrushchev-Kohler--Part IV--U-2; Cuban fishing port; nuclear test-ban; US elections. [Here follows discussion of President Kennedy's political talents, U-2 incidents, and a Cuban fishing port.]
Khrushchev said there were other basic problems still confronting our two countries. One was nuclear-test-ban. We are now very close on this issue. Only problem is that of underground tests. Soviets didn't want these to continue since they were source of arms race. USSR is on even basis with us on underground testing. We should agree on proposals of English scientists. But President wants inspection, which Soviets will never accept. This is invention of American imperialists and monopolists. Soviets had arranged underground tests which US had detected and announced next day. So national means are clearly enough to detect underground tests.
I said I was familiar with recent exchanges on this subject, but wished to read to Chairman what I had written down after talking to President. (I then read applicable section instructions.)/2/ I said I might just add that we on our side, President, Secretary, Foster, and all concerned, had done our best to recognize their sensibilities and to reduce possibility they might view inspection as espionage. While unmanned seismic stations had greatly improved chances of detecting explosions or what seemed like explosions, there was nothing of which we knew that would replace a certain measure of inspection to determine whether certain events in particular were tests or natural events.
/2/The fourth point of Kohler's instructions, dated September 6, read as follows:
"(4) The President continues to regard an effective nuclear test ban as a matter of the greatest importance, and would like Ambassador Kohler to emphasize these two basic points: first, there is simply no way in which the President can bring the United States Senate to agreement on a comprehensive treaty without inspection; second, as the President sees it, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have three great common interests in a workable agreement:
"(a) the fallout problem
"(b) the hazard of high energy electrons contaminating outer space
"(c) and, perhaps most important of all, the common interest in discouraging other powers from acquiring nuclear weapons." (Department of State, Central Files, 123-Kohler, Foy) Attached to these instructions is a memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to Kohler, September 6, that reads: "The President has approved these instructions as rewritten after his discussion with you."
Khrushchev said statement by American scientists published two days ago admitted there were means to verify this./3/
/3/Not further identified.
I said I thought this was an inaccurate statement. We had looked at all possibilities and were convinced no means existed to determine nature of event. Fact that event has occurred can be determined, but inspection is needed to establish what kind of event it was. Number of cases in which inspection would be necessary wold probably be infinitesimally small, but in those cases it would be necessary. Such inspection would also be helpful to USSR, since our scientists say there must be inspection to establish nature of event. I personally had no doubt that, if USSR said it would not test, then it would not. But there must be provision for objective observers to determine whether events were natural or not, or doubts would remain in rest of world.
Khrushchev said there were various points of view on that question and that is why there is no agreement. But Soviets had found out that there are means to determine nature of event without inspection. It was situation in Congress which prevented President from moving on this subject; he can't convince Congress to agree and consequently holds on to argument about inspection.
I said Congress represents public opinion. Difference between us is now so small, President hopes we can come to agreement. But agreement must be ratified by Congress and Congressional opinion represents US public opinion. We had made every effort to reduce this so it would not be a problem for Soviets and President really hopes for agreement.
[Here follows discussion of the upcoming Congressional elections.]
Kohler
238. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, October 18, 1962, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/10-1862. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by the White House on October 23. The meeting was held in the White House. The source text is labeled "Part III." Part I on Berlin is printed in vol. XV, pp. 370-376; Part II on Cuba is printed in volume XI; Part IV on U.S.-Soviet relations is printed in vol. V, Document 151. Gromyko was in the United States to attend the 17th session of the U.N. General Assembly.
SUBJECT
Test Ban
PARTICIPANTS
US
The President
The Secretary
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Akalovsky
USSR
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Mr. Semenov
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Sukhodrev
Continuing to read from his prepared text.
Mr. Gromyko said he was sure the President was familiar with the Soviet Government's and Mr. Khrushchev's views on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests. He said he wished now to call the President's attention to one specific aspect of this problem. Underground tests, in addition to the objections that any nuclear tests aroused, were very costly. Apparently the US Government did not attach any significance to this fact and was willing to have US tax payers pay for them. However, frankly speaking, this path was tantamount to continuing the nuclear arms race and was leading to ever greater expenditures of the funds of the population. The Soviet Union knew what this meant, because it has tested underground. The question was why should the Soviet Union formulate its policy with respect to nuclear tests on the basis of what was convenient to the United States, which did not wish to abandon underground testing. US representatives in Geneva had tried to justify the US position by alleging that the Soviet Union had violated some moratorium. However, it was well known that a moratorium did not constitute an agreement containing obligations which states must fulfill. Furthermore, what was most important, there had not been any moratorium in existence and consequently no violation could have taken place. Indeed when the Soviet Union had ended its tests in accordance with its unilateral decision, President Eisenhower had stated that the United States was free to resume tests and to choose the moment for doing so. How then could one speak of a violation of moratorium? Mr. Gromyko continued that the Soviet Union regretted that no agreement had been reached on the test ban. The views of Mr. Khrushchev on this question, which were known to the President, were designed to facilitate agreement. The USSR understood the situation as indicating that the US wanted to continue testing. The US was seeking ways and means of continuing the build-up of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union was against such a build-up; it was firmly in favor of reaching agreement and terminating all tests. However, since the US did not wish to come to an agreement and did not wish to end all tests, the Soviet Union would have to draw the necessary conclusions with respect to its security. No state or government in the world was more earnestly seeking agreement on the prohibition of all tests than was the Soviet Union, since the Soviet Union was fully aware of the fact that a test ban would constitute a big step in improving international relations and in improving the prospects for disarmament. If the United States also desired to achieve agreement on a test ban, then it was difficult to understand why it was placing obstacles in the path toward such an agreement.
The President responded that it was difficult to recognize the US policy on most matters discussed today, including the test ban, from the description Mr. Gromyko had given it. The US had sought a test ban agreement for a long time and it wished to end tests. Thus any suggestion that the US was not interested in an agreement was inaccurate. We assumed that if the Soviet Union were not interested in ending tests it would not have continued to negotiate on a test ban. The US was also negotiating and we were interested in reaching agreements. We assumed Soviet good faith and the Soviet Union should not question ours. The problem today was a technical one, because there was no assurance that underground tests would not be carried out while the treaty was in force unless there were some means of verification. We had made some technical progress but no analysis he, the President, had seen had indicated there was a way of distinguishing underground nuclear tests from earthquakes on the basis of instrumentation alone. The Soviet Union had made claims to the contrary, but it had not given us any relevant scientific information. The President continued that he believed that neither of the two sides wanted to test in the atmosphere, under water, or in outer space; he also believed that neither side wanted underground tests because there was no need for such tests. He thought there must be some way of providing assurance against espionage and at the same time against underground tests. The Soviet Union had stated that it could not agree to inspection, and we had stated that we could not accept an agreement without assurances concerning underground tests. The President said he understood that there were many areas in the Soviet Union where there were no earthquakes, so he believed some satisfactory arrangements could be worked out for seismic areas, while in other areas there might be no need for inspection. Both sides should continue their efforts in good faith and seek a solution on a scientific basis.
Mr. Gromyko said he took note of the President's statement that the United States was really desirous of achieving agreement on the test ban. It was good that both governments were seeking this objective. He said that he wished to take this opportunity to state again that the Soviet Union was convinced that national means were sufficient to detect any violation of a treaty with respect to underground tests, and the Soviet Union based its conviction on technical data. He also wished to point out that continuing underground tests would be of the same importance from the standpoint of nuclear arms protection and development as atmospheric, under water, and outer space tests. The Soviet Union believed that neither side was interested in the continuation of the nuclear arms race. Moreover, agreement on a ban in three environments only would not promote nondiffusion, since many states could say that they could not be asked not to acquire nuclear weapons when the present nuclear powers would not reach agreement even on a test ban.
The President said that the two sides seem to be in disagreement concerning the scientific facts relating to distinguishing earthquakes from underground tests. He wondered why the Soviet Union could not present its scientific evaluation of this problem, and if agreement could be reached on this matter then early progress toward a test ban could be expected. It was in the interest of both the Soviet Union and the United States to find agreement on a test ban and thus to prevent proliferation. If the Soviet Union could give us adequate scientific data so that a treaty could be presented to the Senate which would give adequate assurances against underground tests, then progress could be expected. The President said he wished to invite the Soviet Union to send its scientists and to show us how a ten KT nuclear explosion in soft ground could be distinguished from an earthquake. If that could be done, agreement would come very quickly.
Mr. Gromyko responded that the Soviet Union had repeatedly stated its views on this point to US representatives, including the Secretary himself, and especially to Lord Home, who had raised this point on a number of occasions. He said he did not wish to take the President's time, but wanted to point out there had been a scientific meeting in London, in which both US and Soviet scientists had participated./2/ The President was surely familiar with this. Frankly speaking, Soviet and British scientists had agreed that a mutually acceptable arrangement was possible regarding surveillance of over the observance of a test ban treaty. US scientists in London differed with that point of view, but only slightly. It would be good if the views expressed in London could be used to reach agreement on this matter.
/2/See footnotes 3 and 4, Document 232.
239. Editorial Note
In the last weeks of October 1962, President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev exchanged several messages in their efforts to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the Cuban missile crisis. Once Khrushchev agreed to the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba and other concessions, the two leaders began to consider other outstanding issues between the two nations. Concerning disarmament, Khrushchev wrote in his message to President Kennedy on October 28: "We should like to continue the exchange of views on the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, general disarmament, and other problems relating to the relaxation of international tensions." (Documents on Disarmament, 1962, volume II, page 997; the letter is also printed in volume VI, Document 67)
President Kennedy immediately responded with a message to Khrushchev on October 28. In the final paragraph of this message, the President wrote:
"I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament, as it relates to the whole world and also to critical areas. Perhaps now, as we step back from danger, we can together make real progress in this vital field. I think we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the great effort for a nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider measures of disarmament can be agreed and put into operation at an early date. The United States government will be prepared to discuss these questions urgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva or elsewhere." (Documents on Disarmament, 1962, volume II, page 1001; the letter is also printed in volume VI, Document 68)
Extensive documentation on the Cuban missile crisis is printed in volume XI.
240. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, October 30, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/10-3062. Confidential. Drafted by Beam and initialed by Foster.
SUBJECT
Denuclearized Zones
PARTICIPANTS
Mr. William C. Foster, Director, ACDA
Herve Alphand, French Ambassador
At dinner last night, Ambassador Alphand expressed great concern about the resolution being offered in the General Assembly by Brazil in favor of denuclearized zones in Latin America and Africa./2/ He felt that Western support of this resolution, and particularly any form of US identification with it, would be misunderstood and would provoke a profound reaction in Western Europe and especially France since it might be interpreted as opening the way for a Rapacki type plan of denuclearization and disengagement. Ambassador Alphand suggested the US make an urgent and high level approach to the French Government reassuring the latter that no such intentions existed.
/2/Brazil introduced a draft resolution on denuclearized zones in Latin America and Africa (U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.312) in the First Committee on September 20. For text of a later revised version of this draft (U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.312/Rev.2) introduced in the First Committee on November 15 by Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II, pp. 1056-1057.
(Upon being informed of the above, Mr. Beam of ACDA and Mr. Tyler of EUR believe that Ambassador Alphand may have been exaggerating his Government's possible reaction with a view to later establishing for the record that he had put Washington on notice. It may be pointed out that USUN was instructed by telegram 1127/3/ to brief Western Delegates, including the French, on our views with respect to the Brazilian resolution. Furthermore the same telegram repeated to Paris as Topol 576 suggested an NAC briefing on the Brazilian resolution, to which Ambassador Finletter agreed in his reply Polto 518./4/ Consequently, it is felt no special steps vis-?-vis the French are required.)
/3/Dated October 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/10-2962)
/4/Dated October 28. (Ibid.)
241. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, November 3, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 8/62-12/62. Secret.
The claim continues to be advanced in a number of quarters that the use of unmanned seismic stations in conjunction with the proposed system would so improve our ability to detect and identify underground nuclear tests that the requirement for on-site inspections could be eliminated from our nuclear test ban treaty proposals. While a properly designed system of such unmanned stations could substantially improve the capabilities of our presently proposed monitoring system, and thereby reduce the number of on-site inspections required to accomplish a given level of surveillance, such a system would not eliminate the need for on-site inspection. In fact, such a system, if designed in a technically acceptable fashion, might require greater overall access to the Soviet Union than our present proposals.
It is certainly possible to design an unmanned seismic station that will record or transmit information on seismic events. Although such stations would be much less sensitive than the elaborate manned stations that are proposed as part of the present monitoring system, the close proximity of these stations to events in a seismic area would permit the collection of sufficient close-in data to permit the identification of many events that would only have been detected by the large distant stations. For example, in a recent review of the problem, it was concluded that a properly located network of 100 unmanned stations would reduce the number of unidentified events above magnitude 4.0 (2 kilotons in Nevada Tuff) in the Soviet Union from 75 to perhaps 20 per year. The estimated remaining 20 unidentified events should be recognized as simply a best guess as to the number of natural events whose characteristics would be essentially the same as nuclear explosions. This number of events would remain unidentified more or less independent of the number of additional unmanned stations added to the system. There is, however, inadequate information on the close-in characteristics of earthquakes in the Soviet Union (or elsewhere) so that this number could be considerably larger or smaller. It should be noted that a much smaller number of unmanned stations, possibly only 6 or 10 properly located, could probably accomplish about half the improvement estimated for the larger system.
In addition to its inability to eliminate entirely the need for inspections, the unmanned stations themselves would probably need to be inspected to prevent them from becoming a source of suspicion as to the validity of the entire system. While tamper-proof devices can almost certainly be devised as well as reporting techniques, it would appear that the installation and maintenance of those devices would have to be subject to inspection. If this were not done, there appear to be a number of obvious methods that the Soviet Union could employ in installing the "tamper-proof" equipment provided by this country so that signals from a nuclear explosion would be distorted in such a way as to appear to be from a natural event. This possibility would certainly be pointed out by opponents to a treaty and would at a minimum be a confidence-destroying factor.
Full inspection of the installation and maintenance of a system of 100 unmanned stations would appear to involve a greater degree of inspection of the Soviet Union than is involved in our presently discussed inspection quotas. It is true, however, that these inspections would be at specific locations picked by the Soviets and not over a 200 to 500 square kilometer region whose location could not be predicted in advance. In addition, it would probably be possible to achieve adequate confidence by a periodic random inspection of a small fraction of the unmanned stations. For example, if the Soviets were to install improperly only one out of ten of the unmanned stations to cover areas where clandestine testing might occur, a total of ten annual random inspections would have about two chances out of three, the first year alone, to determine that the equipment was installed with clandestine testing in mind. Nevertheless, even this degree of station inspection when coupled with the continued need for some on-site inspections would on balance appear to rule out this approach as an answer to the inspection problem. We have previously indicated that a small number of inspections, i.e. 10 or possibly fewer, would be acceptable to the United States. I cannot imagine a number less than three being reasonable whatever the seismic detection system.
I would recommend, therefore, that we should not include this proposal in any modifications of our position on the nuclear test ban treaty. At the same time, I would recommend that we be prepared to discuss this proposal with the Soviets if they advance it and to include it in a treaty proposal if they are willing to allow the necessary inspection of the equipment.
JBW
242. Editorial Note
In early November 1962, the U.N. General Assembly considered resolutions calling for the suspension of nuclear testing. On November 5, Committee One debated and voted on a two-part resolution. Section A was a 37-nation proposal, which was revised and approved in Committee One. Section B, introduced by the United Kingdom and the United States, urged, among other things, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee "to seek the conclusion of a treaty with effective and prompt international verification which prohibits nuclear weapon tests in all environments for all time." A summary of the proceedings and voting on these resolutions in Committee One is in a memorandum from Harlan Cleveland to Secretary of State Rusk, November 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/11-562)
On November 6, the U.N. General Assembly voted separately on the preamble and on each of the seven paragraphs of Section A. The preamble and all but two paragraphs were adopted unanimously, although many nations abstained on several of the votes. The United Kingdom and the United States were among 10 nations voting against paragraph 2, which asked that all nuclear tests "should cease immediately and not later than 1 January 1963." The Soviet bloc constituted the 10 nations voting against paragraph 6, which recommended that in the absence of a test ban agreement by January 1, 1963, the nuclear weapons states should agree immediately to prohibit testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water, accompanied by an "interim arrangement" suspending all underground tests, "such interim agreement to include adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission." Section A as a whole was adopted by a vote of 75-0, with 21 abstentions. The General Assembly adopted Section B by a 51-10 vote, with 40 abstentions. The Soviet bloc constituted the 10 negative votes.
For text of Resolution 1762 (XVII) and additional details on the voting on each section in Committee One and the General Assembly, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, volume II, pages 1029-1033; and Yearbook of the United Nations, 1962, pages 9-13 and 20-26.
243. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, November 8, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 11/1/62-11/22/62. Secret.
SUBJECT
Test Ban: Black Boxes, Khrushchev, and China
A. We are taking the following four actions to straighten out the record on the black boxes:
(1) Through technical channels to Zuckerman, we are asking the British scientists to make clear publicly their privately expressed conviction that the black boxes can reduce, but cannot eliminate, the requirement of on-site inspection of unidentified events.
(2) I have spoken to David Ormsby Gore to ask that the British Government give attention to the same problem, if possible in the immediate future--in any event, during the disarmament discussions at Geneva now likely to resume November 19th./2/
/2/Because of prolongation of discussions on non-diffusion and general and complete disarmament in the U.N. General Assembly, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee did not reconvene in Geneva until November 26.
(3) We are asking ACDA to do some press education on this same point, and of course to be ready with public argument in Geneva.
(4) We have an opportunity to argue on the technicalities of this with the most knowledgeable of the Russian scientists, who is likely to be here informally in the near/3/ future, and arrangements are being made to try to brainwash him.
/3/The word "near" has been added by hand.
Meanwhile Kuznetsov yesterday made a black box offer in New York: three on Soviet territory, and a right to place them and remove them under international supervision. This does not meet the main point, but it does help a little and ACDA is sending experts to talk directly to him on the issue.
B. Our last message from Khrushchev is absolutely categorical in its "unequivocal and frank" rejection of any inspection./4/ This leaves us in a logical box, because there is no way that we can get Senate consent to a treaty covering underground tests that does not provide for inspection; obviously events in Cuba make this point more compelling than ever. Thus, on the surface I see no alternative to a heavy and direct argument to Khrushchev that a very modest amount of inspection is a worthy price to pay. We could certainly indicate in such a discussion that you yourself would expect to exercise the right of inspection in a minimal way--because indeed it is the right of inspection and not the fact of many inspections which is essential to our position.
/4/The quotation is from Khrushchev's long message to President Kennedy of October 30, in which he discussed disarmament and nuclear testing, among other matters. It is printed in vol. VI, Document 70.
There is one other slightly hopeful possibility in the inspection issue. The Soviets have partly agreed to what the neutrals call "invitational" inspection. We insist on what we call "obligational" inspection. If there were a quiet agreement that some small amount of inspection would in fact occur, we might be able to find language to cover both our points of view (though the Senate would be very wary); I think we need time before we can press this discussion.
C. One other possibility, which we have not explored in the past, is to raise with Khrushchev directly the question of Chinese Communist agreement to a test ban. Without the Chicoms, after all, the agreement is not going to mean much, and there may be advantage in pressing with Khrushchev the inescapable relevance of this problem; he has never hesitated to press with us the parallel and lesser problem of France. We might say that for us any agreement would be valuable, and concessions worth considering, only if there could be some assurance about Red China. My own impression is that the Russians would reply first with self-righteous surface answers: "these are peace-loving people with whom you need normal relations before you can ask about their intentions," but we might also get interesting hints that only a test ban would give leverage for both of us against Peking. It's worth asking about, and at your level, I think--but again not immediately.
D. To put it another way, is it really worthwhile for us or the Russians to go around and around the test ban issue without facing squarely up to the question of Chinese Communist participation? A Red China nuclear presence is the greatest single threat to the status quo over the next few years.
And in passing let me say that our uncertainty of Chicom rates of progress is an urgent reason for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
E. An alternative means of dealing with the Chicoms is [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. This in my view deserves real study, with all its obvious hazards. But we need information first.
McG.B./5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears these typewritten initials.
244. Editorial Note
With the conclusion of the U.S. atmospheric nuclear tests in early November 1962 and the Soviet announcement in early November that their test series would end shortly, Kennedy administration officials began to discuss the need for an internal assessment of these tests on the relative balance between U.S. and Soviet nuclear capabilities. Glenn Seaborg noted in his journal some of this thinking in a telephone conversation with Carl Kaysen on November 8:
"Kaysen called and said, now that the U.S. tests are completed and the USSR tests are drawing to a close, the President is interested in an evaluation of the results. In conversation with Bundy, the thought was generated that perhaps a committee should be organized, consisting of one representative from AEC, DOD, CIA, plus Jerry Wiesner. This committee would not take over the functions of existing groups, such as the Bethe Panel, but rather would pull together inputs from all these sources to produce one comprehensive report for the President which would answer the questions: what have we learned from our tests, what have the Russians learned, the significance, etc. I asked whether the committee would be asked to address itself to the necessity of further tests. He said that this would be a very important input for consideration, but the committee itself would not be charged with this responsibility. I asked whether there would be any representation from the White House. Kaysen said that, except for Wiesner, they would not come into the picture until it is time to see what should be done with the document. He has already talked with Gilpatric (in McNamara's absence) and with McCone, and both agreed this committee would be a good idea, and they named as their representatives Harold Brown and Dr. Herbert Scoville, respectively. He asked my opinion, and, if I agree, whom I would designate to represent the AEC. He hoped it would be Dr. Haworth. I agreed that such a committee could provide a very useful function and said that Dr. Haworth would be my choice too; however, I would check to be sure he could take on this project. He emphasized that the job is not to supersede the existing machinery but to draw together the output of all sources and consolidate it so that the President will have only one report containing all the views. As to the timing, this will not be a crash program, but, on the other hand, neither is it expected to proceed at a leisurely pace. The committee should be organized immediately, should start functioning and should present its report to the President at the earliest appropriate time. Kaysen said that shortly there will be a NSAM addressed to McNamara, McCone, and me, putting all this in writing." (Seaborg, Journal, volume 4, page 425)
On the following day, November 9, President Kennedy signed NSAM No. 205 on nuclear testing. Addressed to McNamara, McCone, Seaborg, and Wiesner, NSAM No. 205 stated:
"1. Our 1962 atmospheric test series has come to an end. The Soviets have announced that their test series will end shortly. It is a matter of first importance to review carefully the effect of these two test series on the relative balance between U.S. and Soviet capabilities.
"2. In order that we arrive at the best possible evaluation, I think all information and assessments should be brought together and examined in a single channel. Accordingly, each addressee should select a single technically qualified officer of his agency to sit on an inter-departmental committee to make the evaluation. I should like the representative of the CIA to chair the committee, and my Scientific Advisor, Dr. Wiesner, to sit as a member.
"3. Each member agency will continue to use such internal processes of evaluation and advisory panels as it thinks appropriate. However, all such reports and evaluations should be funneled through the central committee, which alone should be responsible for a final evaluation.
"4. The committee should address itself not only to the specific question of what has been learned by testing in terms of the design of nuclear weapons, their effects, and defense against them, but also to the broader question of the military significance of what has been learned and its probable effects on the present and prospective military balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
"5. All the material which this committee handles should be treated as sensitive, and every member agency should take fullest precautions against unauthorized disclosure of either information or evaluation. If any such disclosure occurs, I would like the head of the responsible agency to report to me personally on it.
"6. The target date for the report is 20 December 1962. Examination of information not now available may require addenda at a later date." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 205)
The committee members were Herbert Scoville, Jr. (CIA) (Chairman), Harold Brown (DOD), Leland J. Haworth (AEC), and Jerome B. Wiesner (White House). The report has not been found, but in a December 20 memorandum transmitting the report to McNamara, McCone, Seaborg, and McGeorge Bundy, the committee members explained their methodology in preparing the report and "emphasized that much of the information on these tests is still quite preliminary." (Ibid.) In a December 24 memorandum to the President, Carl Kaysen summarized several features of the report and concluded, "The best crude one-sentence summary statement is: The information learned from the tests has been of moderate importance, but it has little prospect of affecting the strategic balance one way or the other." (Ibid.) An addendum to this report, dated February 27, 1963, is attached to a memorandum from Scoville to McNamara, McCone, Seaborg, and McGeorge Bundy, February 27. (Ibid.) A second addendum, dated August 15, 1963, is attached to a memorandum from Scoville to McNamara, McCone, Seaborg, and McGeorge Bundy, August 19. (Ibid.) Both addenda are in the Supplement.
245. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, November 10, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret; Restricted Data. Drafted by Baker.
SUBJECT
Meeting of Committee of Principals, November 10, 1962
PARTICIPANTS
See attached list/2/
/2/The list of the 19 participants is not printed.
The Secretary asked if there were any recent developments regarding the Soviet ships en route from Cuba. Mr. McNamara said that 42 missiles had been counted out. It had been thought the total was 43 on the basis of initial Soviet reports that 6 were aboard one of the ships which subsequently proved to be carrying only 5. The Secretary asked if the photos were convincing. Mr. McNamara said he thought so; they just showed long cylindrical tubes but he was personally convinced they were missiles.
The Secretary said that on the matter of resuming the disarmament discussions, any arrangements were contingent on developments in Cuba. If the IL 28's and inspection should become major issues and the situation heated up again, he would agree that we should not talk about disarmament while the temperature was so high. On the other hand, if there were progress on the Cuban situation, the President in his public statements has committed the United States to explore possibilities in disarmament. He personally saw no change in the Soviet attitude on inspection and in this sense the outlook for fruitful disarmament discussions was somewhat gloomy. But if progress can be made on Cuba there are two major issues to be explored. First, the President is determined to see if there is any way to move ahead on the test ban and second, the question of non-dissemination might be worth going into to the point of eliciting a Chinese rejection. The question of whether to attempt this depends primarily on the Germans and whether they would accept the simplified formula we have been discussing with Gromyko. The British and the French are prepared to go ahead if the Germans are agreeable. From our standpoint there would be some advantage either in getting the Chinese Communists into a non-dissemination agreement or in eliciting a rejection from them. As to the relationship of disarmament matters to Cuba, the Secretary said he was not sure whether or not Mr. McNamara had seen the communication in which the President had instructed USUN firmly not to get into other matters until the Cuban matter was under control./3/
/3/Not further identified.
Mr. McNamara said that two issues relating to Cuba remained open, first, that of the IL 28's and second, safeguarding against the presence of offensive weapons. He saw no prospect of progress on verification and safeguard procedures. The Soviets say nothing of a check on nuclear warheads, nor of assurances as to whether they have been there or have been removed. There is no evidence of Soviet acceptance of safeguards on these matters and this indicates there is little basis for disarmament discussion.
The Secretary inquired as to the date on which negotiations would be resumed at Geneva. Mr. Foster related Ambassador Dean's discussion with Mr. Zorin in which Zorin had suggested November 26 as the reconvening date./4/ Mr. Foster said that we recognized that whether or not we can go forward now with the actual presentation of proposals, there is a need to arrive at decisions regarding possibilities to be used at an appropriate time. Mr. Foster said that Gromyko had expressed a significant change in the Soviet position at the General Assembly in his proposal to retain certain nuclear delivery vehicles to the end of Stage II./5/ We did not know what it means; we need to search this meaning out. At least an intellectual case can be made for disproportionate reductions, at least as a possibility to be suggested in ascertaining the Soviet attitude. The meeting has before it this and other proposals which ACDA considers to be in the national interest./6/
/4/Telegram 1728 from USUN, November 9, reported that Zorin told Dean that the "USSR would not object to reconvening at Geneva Nov 22 or 23," but because of the ongoing disarmament discussions in the U.N. General Assembly, he thought November 26 was a "reasonable" compromise. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/11-962)
/5/In the course of his speech to the U.N. General Assembly on September 21, Gromyko remarked: "Taking account of the stand of the Western Powers the Soviet Government agrees that in the process of destroying vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons at the first stage exception be made for a strictly limited and agreed number of global intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles of the ground-to-air type which would remain at the disposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States alone." (Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II, pp. 904-905)
/6/For this meeting, ACDA drafted and forwarded to the Committee of Principals, under cover of a November 6 memorandum, a general paper and five attachments (A-E), detailing ACDA's proposals for U.S. positions to be taken at the resumption of the Eight-een-Nation Disarmament Committee. The general paper outlined the approach to be taken by the U.S. Delegation at Geneva and also listed recommendations regarding modifications in the U.S. position. Attachment A concerned reductions of armaments in Stage I, Attachment B covered nuclear weapons and fissionable materials, Attachment C treated military bases, Attachment D treated military expenditures, and Attachment E concerned pre-treaty bonfires. A sixth enclosure, Attachment F, consisted of the minutes of the meeting of the Deputies of the Committee of Principals on November 1, at which these papers were first discussed. None of these papers is printed. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171)
The Secretary inquired whether we assumed the Russians were aware of the figures on strategic delivery vehicles published in the newspapers a few days ago by the Institute of Strategic Studies./7/
/7/The estimates of the Institute of Strategic Studies were summarized in The New York Times, November 9, 1962.
The consensus was that the Soviets had been aware of this information and that the figures themselves were highly questionable in certain respects.
General Taylor said that as a newcomer to this table, he would like to inquire if we had decided how to verify the initial inventory of arms against which a 30% reduction would be calculated. The Secretary commented that underlying any of our disarmament proposals there was a need for their verification. Dr. Wiesner said that initial declarations would be required but that our unilateral intelligence was sufficient for seeing whether or not these declarations were in the ball park. Mr. Foster said that the United States is believed to have, through unilateral intelligence, a good approximation of inventories on major items such as bombers, launchers, ICBM's and IRBM's which are the subject of the proposal before us. Dr. Wiesner said that inspection increases as the amount of disarmament progresses, and that many of us still think the United States is asking too much verification in the first stage. Mr. Foster said that increasing verification proportionate to risk is the basic philosophy of the U.S. approach. The Soviets do not accept this approach and do not want any inspection until after everything is destroyed. This, of course, is completely unacceptable.
The Secretary said that he assumed that ACDA's first proposal is to find out what the Soviets mean by their proposal. He asked Mr. Foster whether he envisaged large or small variations from the 30% norm. Mr. Foster said we had prepared an earlier paper which included percentages/8/ but they had been subject to strong objection, and accordingly, had been deleted from the present proposal. On the basis of our internal studies, however, it seems logical to think of disparities as great as 50% to 10% in some categories. Mr. Fisher said our effort, as pointed out on page 7 of the paper before the meeting, is basically to ask the Soviets for their ideas on this subject. Our recommendation asks for no percentage. Mr. Nitze had disagreed with specific proposals and we had revised the paper accordingly. We must, however, recognize that merely asking the question as to the acceptability of asymmetrical reductions carries the implication that we are ourselves prepared to consider acceptance of reductions on that basis. Mr. Nitze asked why we should make a distinction between ICBM's and MRBM's. He could not see the logic in our reducing more ICBM's in relation to Soviet reduction of more MRBM's. It was the reverse of what ought to be done. The ICBM's are the thing we want to protect. The Secretary said that the present proposal is for reductions of 30% in each category. He did not think the Soviets would be interested but he considered that a variation to a 40% reduction for us as compared to a 30% reduction for them would not change the present balance to an unfavorable one for us. Mr. McNamara said that he agreed, but asymmetries in the range of 50% to 10% were a different matter.
/8/Not found.
Mr. Foster said that projections show we are likely to move toward a smaller margin of superiority in the larger categories of nuclear delivery vehicles if no agreement is reached. Mr. Kaysen said this is a reasonable interpretation of the information available, but not the only possible one. Dr. Wiesner said the Soviets may be laying their production plans on a different basis from those reflected in the figures upon which we are building our projections.
Mr. Foster said that it is our belief that the Soviets are not satisfied with their present forces, and will build up in the places where they are weakest. The Secretary said a 30% reduction already means that we would destroy a larger number of ICBM's and that the Soviets would reduce a larger number of MRBM's. Thus there is a certain amount of asymmetry even in the single ratio. The question is whether we can accept some modification of that ratio. He could not see how we could accept equivalence or parity until we see a different basic pattern of Soviet behavior from that displayed over the past 15 years.
Mr. McNamara reiterated that we might accept variations of the order of 40 to 30, but not of 50 to 10, and certainly not to parity. Mr. Foster said looking at the projections for 1967 one might conclude that disproportionate cuts could be in the United States interest. Dr. Wiesner said if you take the present proposal for reduction percentage wise, the Russians and some others think the side that is weakest is placed at a disadvantage. Our thesis is that proportionate reductions will have a stabilizing effect in maintaining the balance. The Soviets argue that the smaller force suffers more. The Secretary said he thought the smaller force might in fact suffer more. Dr. Wiesner said if we want an agreement we cannot offer one that increases our advantage to their disadvantage. Mr. Foster said the fundamental thing is whether it is in the United States interest for both sides to continue to build up nuclear delivery vehicles. If it is not, we need to look at ways of securing an agreement to reduce them.
Mr. McNamara said he fully agreed that it is not in the interest of the United States to build up nuclear vehicles all over the world, but it is also not in our interest to weaken ourselves vis-?-vis the Soviet Union. The Secretary said perhaps we can agree that we need not adhere invariably to the 30% formula, but that we can't go very far toward asymmetry. We can, however, indicate enough flexibility to see what the Soviets have in mind.
Mr. McNamara asked whether we can ask these questions without committing ourselves to move from our present position. Mr. Kaysen said we should include an ad referendum element in the instructions as regards any change in position or discussion of any specific ratios. Mr. Foster said that is always understood.
The question arose as to what Gromyko is in effect offering in his new proposal. Dr. Wiesner said that Gromyko appears to be suggesting an approach to parity in nuclear delivery vehicles at a low level. One might say he seems to be offering the Foster Plan at a lower level. Mr. Nitze said Gromyko may be leaning not toward differential reductions so much as to a definition of the end product of disarmament, namely the balance of deterrence which would remain. Mr. Foster said he thought we could ask questions without compromising our position and at the same time indicate some willingness to discuss differentials. Dr. Wiesner said that asking what they mean to aim for and how they expect to get there are two separate questions. Mr. Foster said that what we are asking is to be able to indicate some change in Stage I that shows we have taken into account looking down the gun barrel in the Cuban situation and want to explore means of moving toward a more stable world. The Secretary said we have to distinguish between good countries and bad countries in the light of the past 15 years of history. We cannot consider parity with the USSR.
General Taylor asked if we could trade off future weapons instead of present ones. Both the US and USSR are about to enter into extensive and costly anti-missile programs. Maintaining the present balance would serve the interest of stability. Mr. Foster said preventive disarmament of this kind is the thing we are trying to do already in outer space. Mr. McNamara said we have already agreed in the total treaty to do just what General Taylor had proposed and recalled that the decision to do so had not been viewed favorably by the Joint Chiefs. Dr. Wiesner said it is also conceivable that we can increase our own reductions above 30% instead of just limiting the reductions of the Soviet Union to lesser amounts. The Secretary said we have to take Red China into account in making any increase in United States reductions.
Dr. Wiesner said there are other dimensions we can explore, for example, whether we can shorten the three-year period of Stage I. The Secretary said he was afraid it would take three years to get the treaty through the Senate.
The Secretary said in conclusion that we can contemplate a modest shift in percentages in certain broad categories in the direction of greater proportional cuts in categories where the U.S. is strong. We can do enough to find out what the Soviets have in mind, but the negotiators should realize that Washington would be extremely nervous if the disproportions should exceed a 30 to 40 ratio.
Turning to the next proposal for reduction in nuclear weapons, the Secretary commented that the world thinks we have a larger amount of fissionable material, while the Soviets will not admit they have a smaller amount. Again, as in the case with nuclear delivery vehicles, maybe we should see whether the Soviets are opposed categorically to the idea of limited reductions or whether it is the ratio of reductions that is bothering them. Mr. Foster said this is the purpose of our proposal. The two-for-one proposal does not call for an admission of weakness on their part, since we are no longer asking them to suggest a ratio. Mr. McNamara asked if this is associated with the cut-off of production of fissionable materials. Mr. Foster said this proposal would be added to the cut-off and inspection proposals already contained in Stage I. We were not proposing it now as a separable measure. Similar proposals had, however, been separable in the past and might be again. The proposal takes into account our best estimates of Soviet stockpiles and the margins of error associated with those estimates. If this were advanced as a separable measure at some later date, it would nevertheless be associated with the cut-off and with the verification requirements for the cut-off.
The Secretary said that page 8 of the paper before the meeting seems to make this clear. He asked, however, whether from a negotiating standpoint it would be desirable to begin with a two to one offer. If we start that way the Soviets would insist on four to one, whereas if we start with a 60-40 ratio, they might come back with a proposal of two to one. Mr. Foster stated that we should consider this possibility as a matter of negotiating tactics. He also stated that the Joint Chiefs had opposed the suggestion of a 60 to 40 ratio at an earlier date. Mr. McNamara said the proposal looks like a gimmick. The Department of Defense could, however, support this amount and this ratio for reductions if it was deemed useful in negotiations. General Taylor said it seemed to him we might be giving away important resources. Mr. Foster said part of it could be given to IAEA and could be useful in various development programs. The Secretary said he thought it was worthwhile to try to find out whether the Soviets were interested in this subject.
Mr. Barber asked whether there would be a public or a private discussion of ratios. Mr. Foster said he envisaged a private discussion. The Secretary said he would be reluctant to put forward this proposal publicly because it might cause domestic repercussions with no offsetting gain if the Soviets were not really interested. Dr. Wiesner asked why the Soviets should be interested in a proposal which we are told privately is unbalanced. Mr. Foster said they might be interested because the alternative for them is greater imbalance. The Secretary said even the smallest beginning is worthwhile in avoiding a 100 billion dollar defense budget. Mr. McNamara said he was willing to go even to 100,000 vs. 50,000 kilograms if we can get a stop on production. He was one hundred percent in favor of the proposal but the important part of it is the cut-off. The Soviets will otherwise expand production enormously while ours remain frozen at present levels.
Turning to the question of bases, the Secretary said the important consideration is one of geography. He asked whether this contemplates cuts in bases within the USSR. Mr. Foster said the base structure is an integrated structure, and cuts in armaments would result in base reductions. We cannot, however, accept the validity of a distinction requiring reduction of foreign bases while excluding domestic installations. Mr. McNamara said we had never used the authorization we had to discuss bases, so why go further? Mr. Foster said we did not in our view have authorization to discuss bases. General Taylor said that until we define a base it would be difficult to evaluate the proposal. We would, of course, have to close a lot of installations if forces were reduced by several hundred thousands. But the Soviets are not worried about military concentration of men. They are interested in bases from which they might be struck. Mr. Barber asked if the present position were not adequate. We can, under the present instructions, discuss bases after progress has been achieved on other aspects of Stage I. Mr. Fisher said we would shortly be reaching this point on the agreed agenda and asked what in the view of the group our negotiators should be instructed to say at that point.
Dr. Wiesner said he thought the proposal before us was desirable. If the Soviets, for example, should say they were willing to discuss a 30% reduction in arms provided we were willing to discuss a reduction in bases, we should be able to say we would be willing to make concomitant reduction in bases. Mr. Barber said it seemed to him we cannot in fact discuss bases except in the light of previously agreed reductions. Mr. Foster said he thought discussions of the two matters should proceed in parallel and that was what we were recommending. We would not accept the proposal of the Soviets that we discuss foreign bases apart from domestic ones. Mr. McNamara said that the United States Government has not developed a plan that we would be willing to discuss for reduction of bases. It concerned many of us that we should be opening discussions in the absence of such a plan. General Taylor again asked what is the definition of a base and how can we discuss the matter in the absence of such a definition. Dr. Wiesner said that we must force ourselves to face this question if we are interested in disarmament.
The Secretary said the difficulty is that our last forces to be reduced would probably be those overseas. General Taylor said the reduction process doesn't work quite that way. We need men at home too. We need a 60 to 40 or not less than a 50-50 ratio between men at home or abroad. Mr. Kaysen said the question is whether we are worse off in raising the base question when we are not prepared to pursue it fully or in letting the Russians hammer at us for not being willing to discuss it at all. The Secretary said we can't avoid talking about bases and that the other side would certainly hammer it. The question is only what we say about them. Mr. McNamara said we could hold to existing instructions for 90 days while the U.S. Government works on the question of dismantling bases, how, what, when and where. Mr. Fisher said he did not consider it in the U.S. interest to have a forbidden subject for even 90 days. Dr. Seaborg asked whether we could have an intermediate position. Could the U.S. respond on the question of the bases without proposing reductions as suggested on page 8 of the paper under consideration? The Secretary said we should get a fuller expression of what we have in mind. There was an apparent contradiction between paragraphs (1) and (2) of the proposal as described on page 8. He said he was convinced that we could not avoid the subject, but we can bring the wording of the present instruction into conformity with the views expressed at the meeting.
Dr. Seaborg asked whether we could sharpen up the decision on a previous topic as it regards dismantling weapons in connection with reduction in fissionable materials. Mr. Foster said he believed it would be useful to be able to dismantle weapons, not merely to make offers of fissionable materials as we had done in the past. Dr. Seaborg said that he would prefer to stay with the idea of reductions in fissionable material as such. The Secretary asked if it would not be easier to inspect a cut-off of production of fissionable materials than to inspect a cut-off of weapons production. Mr. Foster said this would be the case. He believed, however, our proposal in the form recommended had more persuasive value than if it were confined to fissionable material alone. The Secretary asked if we had not already put forward estimates as to equivalent destructive power of 50,000 kilograms of fissionable material in terms of weapons. He thought we might take this question up privately with the Soviets to see whether they contemplate a cut-off and reduction of fissionable materials in any form. We need to know whether the problem is one of the ratio, or whether it is more fundamental.
Turning to the topic of military expenditures, the Secretary asked whether it was possible to check military expenditures in the Soviet system. Mr. Foster said this can be done to a satisfactory extent. We have consulted with Mr. Marengo in CIA on this problem. There are differences in accounting and in the price basis of the respective budgets, but we do believe it is practical to verify reductions if we have sufficient access. A high degree of access would certainly be required. A proposal for reductions in military expenditures was one of eight partial measures proposed by Gromyko in a memorandum of 1961/9/ and we think it would be useful to be able to respond to this proposal. The Secretary said unless this is merely a resultant of other reductions, its impact may be specific upon matters we are handling in another way under the agreement. Mr. McNamara said he thought the budget limitation could simply be a translation into financial terms of proposed reductions. Mr. Foster said that a budget limitation could also have a separate limiting effect, since we do envisage agreement on a percentage reduction of the budget. Dr. Wiesner said that our expenditures under a 30% reduction of armaments might easily drop even faster than 30%. The Secretary commented that this proposal had value in verification of agreed disarmament measures. Mr. McNamara said he did not think it could do much harm, and he would be willing to see it advanced if it would help our negotiators.
/9/Reference is to the eight-part Soviet memorandum submitted to the U.N. General Assembly on September 26, 1961. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 496-504.
Dr. Wiesner raised the question of the desirability of a provision for an agreed proportion of funds to be released for development purposes. Mr. Foster said the recommendation on this point was consistent with statements of U.S. intentions made over a period of years in the United Nations and elsewhere. The Secretary said that we are concerned as to whether for example a 30% reduction in budgets might by cross action necessitate a 40% reduction in some types of armaments contrary to treaty requirements. Mr. McNamara said that, as a part of verification procedure an exchange of information on budget would appear to be useful. Mr. Marengo said it would require a great deal of access. Mr. Barber said if we intend the proposal as essentially a verification measure, we may be asking for more access than it is practicable to obtain. Mr. McNamara said he would like very much to get as much access as possible. The Secretary said he was not sure to what extent the proposal as formulated at the top of page 9 goes beyond a truism, and asked whether it does envisage going beyond merely consequential reductions. Mr. Foster said it would be handy in verification to have this kind of access, that it would not impose restrictions beyond those agreed upon as regards armaments, and, that in his opinion, it could do nothing but help us. Dr. Wiesner said that we should seek economic data in connection with any disarmament agreement as an aid to verification, and a provision of this kind in the treaty would help us to obtain such data. The Secretary said we did not want to be unable, for example, to put in an Army pay bill because under our budget ceiling in the treaty we needed the money for bombs. He would like to be clear that we were talking only about result-ant reductions in budget. Mr. Foster said this understanding was correct. It was a measure which comes along behind disarmament, and permits us to see more clearly what the other side is doing. He read Mr. Gromyko's proposal of September 1961, indicating we were not agreeing to do this as a separate measure, as Mr. Gromyko had proposed, but rather as a Stage I measure along with verification. The Secretary said on that basis he could see no objection to it, but it does not turn out to be a very significant proposal. Mr. Foster agreed, saying he had already indicated that none of these proposals were considered to be major ones.
Returning to the question of bases, Dr. Wiesner read a draft he had formulated which he hoped might reconcile the views that had been previously expressed. /10/ Mr. McNamara said the draft still seemed to say that we would reduce bases in Stage I. He was not willing to say that we will reduce bases, but is willing to discuss the matter. A treaty may well be unacceptable to the Soviets if it does not contain provisions for base reductions, but a treaty will be unacceptable to us if it requires such reductions. The Secretary reminded Mr. McNamara to give us plenty of notice before getting out of any bases or destroying any bombers while these matters were subject to negotiation. Mr. Foster said that, in his view, we have to discuss bases. We should be able to sound intelligent in doing so. He also believed we would, regardless of any treaty requirement, be reducing military installations in conjunction with any widespread arms reductions. Mr. McNamara said he was not sure we would decrease our bases at all. We had not increased bases proportionately as we had built up armaments and armed forces. Mr. Foster said if the problem is that of a definition of base or that of a plan for reduction, we should bend every effort to arrive at such a definition and such a plan as quickly as possible. Mr. Nitze said the problem is even deeper. If Mr. Gromyko wants to define a minimal nuclear deterrent in an agreement, we might want to increase conventional forces and the bases upon which they depend in order to de-fuse the nuclear threat. Mr. McNamara reaffirmed that he was perfectly willing to discuss base reductions but not to propose their reduction.
/10/Not found.
Turning to the question of proposed reductions in jet bombers, Mr. Foster said we think at some point, if there is progress in the negotiation, this proposal might be useful. We had previously been authorized to offer 15 bombers per month. Now that a certain amount of time had elapsed, he believed the figure might be raised to 30, in view of our plans to deactivate a number of these bombers in any event. Mr. McNamara said that he could accept a reduction of 30 a month. Again, it seemed to him to be a gimmick, but it was acceptable if it would help the negotiators. The Secretary said he saw another advantage in the proposal--it helps get these bombers out of circulation.
As the meeting concluded, the Secretary said that it might be desirable to rewrite the covering paper for presentation to the President in light of the discussion here./11/ Mr. Kaysen said that no major revision would be required. Mr. McNamara said he wanted to be sure we were clear on the first proposal. He was in accord with our desire to probe and find out what Gromyko meant. He did not want to initiate a proposal on numbers or even a proposal for asymmetry in reductions. The Secretary said it was very hard to draw this kind of a line. It is hard to inquire about a proposition without hinting that it is not obnoxious. Mr. McNamara said he realized that, but he urged that we ask the questions with the least possible implication of acceptability of the idea. Mr. McNamara asked whether we can propose that the base reduction study be completed within 90 days. The Secretary said that instead of postponing authorization of the ACDA proposal for 90 days, let us agree to work out the study within 90 days. Dr. Wiesner asked whether the meeting had decided that the percentage reduction could go above 30%. The Secretary said we could think in terms of 30 or 40% in certain categories but a large percentage such as 50% would certainly raise the question of whether we could proceed without China.
/11/See Document 246.
246. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, November 20, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 11/1/62-11/22/62. Confidential. Attached to the source text is a November 20 memorandum by Foster, presumably sent to the Committee of Principals, which states that the paper was a final revision and reflected the discussion by the Committee of Principals on November 10 and comments received by the interested agencies in response to ACDA's November 13 and November 15 memoranda. A copy of the November 13 memorandum is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/DD Files: FRC 77 A 17, Committee of Principals. The November 15 memorandum and the agencies' responses have not been found.
SUBJECT
Recommendations regarding Resumption of Geneva Disarmament Negotiations
Background
The purpose of this memorandum is to seek your approval of a series of recommendations regarding modifications and elaborations of the United States position on its program for general and complete disarmament and on a pre-stage disarmament treaty proposal. The Committee of Principals discussed the recommendations outlined below at a meeting, Saturday, November 10, 1962./2/ Although there were differences expressed with respect to the details and tactics of handling the various recommendations, there was agreement as to the fundamental elements of the United States position.
/2/See Document 245.
The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), which has been in recess since September 8, is expected to reconvene in Geneva on November 26. The four Western delegations (U.S., U.K., Italy, and Canada) plan to meet in Geneva prior to the resumption to coordinate Western positions and tactics. The ENDC will probably continue its meetings until approximately December 21 and then recess again until January 8, 1963.
The Geneva negotiations provide an opportunity for both sides to determine over a period of time whether arms control offers a realistic alternative to the arms race and they give evidence of the willingness of both sides to explore the possibilities of meaningful accords. When the Geneva negotiations resume we should give a signal to the Soviets and to the world which is consistent with our general foreign policy posture as it has developed out of the Cuban affair. This would mean that no changes in position should be introduced in Geneva in the case of a turn for the worse in Cuba or a failure to live up to the agreement contained in your exchange of letters with Chairman Khrushchev, but that the United States should be prepared to make moves to advance our basic objective in the negotiations when they are appropriate. This basic objective has been, and will continue to be, to determine what constitutes the widest area of agreement in the disarmament-arms control field that might be agreed to even though short of general and complete; whether first or limited steps, such as a non-proliferation, test ban, or outer space agreement can be negotiated; and whether such limited measures represent the outer limits of what can be accomplished. We are not yet in a position to know specifically what might be included in "a widest area of agreement" package, although we can now understand some of the limiting factors of such an area of agreement.
In order to pursue this course successfully, we must not abandon the goal of general and complete disarmament or seek to renegotiate the framework for negotiations represented by the McCloy-Zorin Joint Statement of Agreed Principles.
The measures outlined below are designed to proceed with the objective discussed above. Although the policy modifications proposed in this paper are relatively slight when compared with the differences that exist and will certainly not produce a disarmament agreement, they will be important in signaling to the Soviets and others that the United States is prepared to follow through positively and constructively on the promises implicit in the exchange of letters between Chairman Khrushchev and you. Furthermore, the talks at Geneva may facilitate possible later bilateral discussions at a summit or elsewhere which might include disarmament questions.
The papers submitted by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the various agencies on November 6 to be used as guidelines by the Geneva negotiators,/3/ will be modified in the light of the discussion at the meeting of the Committee of Principals and in the light of action taken by you on this paper.
/3/See footnote 4, Document 245.
Recommendations
1. Substantive modifications of United States proposals for general and complete disarmament.
a. Possible modifications concerning reductions of armaments in Stage I.
(1) The United States should continue to defend the basic equity of the 30 percent across-the-board approach. It should point out that the U.S.S.R. has now accepted this approach for many categories of armaments, but departs from this approach by requiring much larger reductions in strategic delivery vehicles, which constitute the most important category to the West.
(2) The United States should indicate that the recent Soviet proposal--on retaining "an agreed and strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the 'ground-to-air' category until the end of Stage II . . . ," --implies a cut in United States strategic vehicles, such as ICBM's and long-range bombers, by a greater percentage than for the Soviet Union. The United States should know whether the U.S.S.R. is prepared to take larger percentage cuts than does the United States in other categories of armaments, such as IRBM's, tanks and artillery, where the Soviet Union has the larger number of armaments, before the United States can consider a proposal involving even a modest difference in the percentages. The U.S. negotiators should take appropriate probing action to ascertain the Soviet intentions.
(Comment): The United States would expect to probe the Soviets on what numbers they have in mind as to the amount and types of weapons that would be retained. The United States would also ask the Soviet Union about verification of its proposal. In probing the Soviets regarding their proposal, the United States would not specify any numbers or variations in percentages. Our probing would be an indication we are interested to know what the Soviets have in mind. The probing of Soviet intentions would take place privately, although the United States might outline its position at the conference along the lines of points (1) and (2) if this seems appropriate. Studies will be undertaken within the U.S. Government to evaluate the possibility of reductions greater than 30 percent, especially as they would affect the United States posture vis-?-vis Communist China.
b. Stage I reduction of nuclear weapons.
(1) The United States should be prepared to agree to transfer [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of weapons grade U-235 to peaceful purposes if the Soviet Union would make an equivalent transfer of 25,000 kg of weapons grade U-235.
(2) The foregoing proposal should be presented in the context of Stage I and as an alternative to the present United States proposal respecting the transfer of fissionable materials from past production.
(3) The United States should express willingness to consider, within limits, larger numbers at the same ratio if the Soviet Union is interested. The upper limit for the United States [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of weapons grade U-235. This figure could not be mentioned in negotiations without subsequent specific authorization in the light of additional technical studies which are required.
(4) The United States should be prepared to accept an arrangement along the foregoing lines as a separate measure associated with a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials and appropriately verified.
(Comment): Any discussion of ratio other than one-to-one or numbers higher than [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of weapons grade U-235 would take place privately with the Soviet Union, although it might be made public at a later date. The initial approach should not be on the basis of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] but should involve a ratio such as [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as an attempt to probe the Soviets as to whether it is the ratio problem that is concerning them. The initial approach should be private. The delegation should seek to determine in the first instance whether the Soviets are fundamentally opposed to the idea of transfer of fissionable materials before discussing specific amounts and ratios.
c. Discussion of reduction of military bases in Stage I.
(1) The United States should indicate its willingness to discuss bases by indicating that as regards Stage I, specified countries, including at least the United States and the Soviet Union, would be willing to discuss arrangements for dismantling or converting to peaceful uses some agreed military bases, wherever they might be located, to the extent that this might follow from the agreed reductions in armed forces and armaments.
(2) The United States should indicate that a detailed discussion is not appropriate at this phase of negotiations.
(Comment): The United States would assert its view that it does not recognize any distinction in terms of reductions between foreign and domestic bases. Within 90 days the Department of Defense expects to deliver a base study to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency which will evaluate various possible United States positions.
d. Reduction of military expenditures.
(1) The United States should propose the following approach to the reduction of military expenditures:
(a) From the beginning of Stage I, military expenditures should be reduced by percentages from base-period expenditures in such a fashion as to reflect the disarmament process. It follows that these percentages would become progressively larger as disarmament moved forward but they would be so calculated as to reflect the disarmament process, not to act as pressure on it.
(b) Such a measure would be subject to verification by an agreed procedure, including the reporting to the IDO of expenditure, price, and other relevant data and appropriate inspection by IDO personnel.
(c) The parties would allocate to world development, through the United Nations and its affiliated organizations, such proportions of the funds released by the reduction of military expenditures as would be agreed, taking account of the actual development needs, of the contributions of both developing and developed countries, and of other relevant factors.
(2) The United States should also propose the convening of a committee of experts to examine the means of implementing the foregoing proposals, but should first give careful study within the government to the problems involved.
(3) If the progress in the negotiations warrants, it might be possible to work out with the Congress an interim ceiling, effective upon the signing of the treaty but prior to its entry into force, under which military expenditures would be held at the levels then prevailing, if the Soviet Union would also accept such a ceiling and were willing to initiate the exchange of appropriate data.
(Comment): This proposal would permit a positive response to a long-stated Soviet position, namely, that there should be some reductions in military expenditures during Stage I of a disarmament agreement. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has now given sufficient attention and study to this possibility that it feels that we can now proceed to discuss a formula for reductions in expenditures along the lines recommended. ACDA also believes that with a specific proposal on reductions in military expenditures the verification for such a measure will provide information which will be helpful as a supplement to other verification techniques for other disarmament measures.
2. Initiation of destruction of medium jet bombers.
a. At an appropriate time during the next session of the Geneva Conference, the United States should state that while negotiations are proceeding, it is prepared to initiate the destruction of medium jet bombers on the following basis:
(1) Each month, beginning possibly on July 1, 1963, the United States and Soviet Union would each fly 30 medium jet bombers (B-47's and Badgers) to designated depots in the territory of third (neutral) countries.
(2) Upon confirmation that 30 bombers of each country had arrived at the respective depots, the bombers would be destroyed, and their destruction would be verified by an agreed international group.
(3) The foregoing process would be continued for a period of two years to a total of 720 bombers.
(4) Should a disarmament agreement enter into effect prior to the expiration of this period, the destruction of bombers designated for the foregoing arrangement would be continued in the manner prescribed in the agreement.
b. In presenting the foregoing proposal, the United States should make clear that its implementation would result in a more rapid phasing out of our medium bombers than is currently contemplated.
(Comment): The recommendation outlined above suggests that July 1, 1963 might be an appropriate starting date, but if the Soviets are interested in this proposal our negotiators at Geneva would be prepared to discuss a starting date earlier than July 1, if this can be worked out, not only at the negotiations but at the domestic level as well. The rate of destruction has been increased from what was previously agreed to as a United States position, from 15 to 30 a month.
Other Measures
The subject of this paper has been limited to United States modifications in its program for general and complete disarmament and to a proposal for the destruction of medium jet bombers. Other limited measures which have been and will continue to be the subject of negotiations at Geneva or elsewhere will be handled in subsequent memoranda./4/
William C. Foster/5/
/4/In a November 21 memorandum to Foster, Carl Kaysen wrote that the President had approved this memorandum with the understanding that the first recommendation went "no further than inviting exploration of possible Soviet willingness to bargain seriously on terms other than uniform across-the-board reduction." (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Atomic Energy-Armaments, 62) Four position papers ("Reduction of Armaments in Stage I," "Reduction of Nuclear Weapons in Stage I," "Reduction of Military Bases in Stage I," and "Reduction of Military Expenditures") representing the final and cleared backup papers regarding modifications of the U.S. position on general and complete disarmament are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Current. Copies of these papers were pouched to the U.S. Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, and the changes in the U.S. position were interpreted and explained in Todis 731 to Geneva, December 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/12-562)
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
247. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, November 27, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Agencies and Departments Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Non-Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons, 8/62-7/63. Confidential. For an earlier memorandum from Secretary Rusk to President Kennedy on this subject, see Document 230.
SUBJECT
Agreement on Non-Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons
You are aware of the conversations which I have been having with the Soviet Foreign Minister and with the Soviet Ambassador in Washington on the question of restricting the spread of independent national nuclear weapons capabilities.
At the last meeting, August 23, a potentially important shift occurred in the Soviet position. The Soviet Union now appears willing to consider reaching an agreement on non-diffusion couched in more general terms than its previous position which had specified that a prior agreement had to be reached separately concerning the specific problem of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the East German regime. In addition, although the language is ambiguous, the Soviets have not apparently precluded considering an understanding which would not rule out international nuclear weapons arrangements of a truly multilateral nature of the type which might be developed within the NATO framework.
In view of these potential shifts in the Soviet position, I have, as you know, consulted with the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Federal Republic of Germany. The response of the British Foreign Minister was entirely favorable. The French Foreign Minister stated that France would accept if the terms of the agreement were acceptable to the Federal Republic of Germany. The German Foreign Minister has only recently advised me that the Federal Republic could accept a non-proliferation agreement of the kind we have in mind, provided that Communist China adhered to the terms of the arrangement./2/ I made it clear in all of my consultations that we did not propose to give up our right to work out a truly multinational NATO nuclear force, with appropriate safeguards to assure that nuclear weapons assigned to that force could not be used on the basis of a national decision alone.
/2/No record of these responses has been found.
I believe we are now in a position again to approach the Soviet Union. I propose that we do so promptly in order to accomplish two objectives. The first is to determine whether the Soviet Union is in a position to state that its allies, including Communist China, will adhere to the terms of a non-proliferation agreement. I believe we are now in a position to inform the Soviet Union that our allies can be expected to adhere to such an agreement if the allies of the Soviet Union adhere. The second objective is to give the Soviet Union a somewhat more precise indication of what we have in mind concerning the obligation not to transfer nuclear weapons. We should, of course, make it clear that we reserve the right to cooperate in the establishment of a multinational nuclear weapons force within the NATO alliance.
I am attaching a talking paper which would form the basis for the exploration of whether the allies of the Soviet Union can be expected to sign a non-proliferation agreement. There is also attached an oral statement containing the relevant portions of a draft declaration. Both of these papers would be used in our next approach to the Soviet Government. Finally, there is attached the actual text of a Draft Declaration and Minute./3/ I would recommend they not be used at the forthcoming meeting with the Soviet Union but am transmitting them so you can see what we have in mind.
/3/None of the attachments is printed.
I am advised that the Joint Chiefs of Staff oppose the measure on the grounds that it contains no provisions for inspection; that it may have a very bad effect on our defensive alliance within NATO; and that the measure prohibits transfers which the U.S. itself may wish to make. I am advised that the Department of Defense does not oppose the measure but rather thinks it might be in our long-term interest./4/
/4/See footnote 7, Document 230.
Accordingly, I request your approval for carrying out the necessary discussions with the Soviet Government in order to pursue the objectives discussed in this memorandum. /5/
/5/In a November 28 memorandum to Secretary Rusk, McGeorge Bundy noted that the President had approved this memorandum on non-diffusion "and authorizes the necessary discussions with the Soviet Government in the terms set forth in that memorandum with its attachments." (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/EX/C&R Files: FRC 77 A 8, State Department, Memoranda to the Secretary)
Dean Rusk
248. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, December 10, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S on December 10.
SUBJECT
Nontransfer of nuclear weapons
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
The Secretary
Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn E. Thompson
The Secretary informed Ambassador Dobrynin that he was leaving today for the NATO meeting in Paris where he would expect to discuss with his NATO colleagues the problem of the nontransfer of nuclear weapons. In the meantime, he could informally tell the Ambassador his thinking on what the central part of an agreement might be, according to his present thinking. He regretted that he was not in a position to give him an exact text. The Secretary then read the following paragraph:
"The Governments of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics solemnly declare that they will not transfer any nuclear weapons directly, or indirectly through a military alliance, into the national control of individual states not now possessing such weapons, and that they will not assist such other states in the manufacture of such weapons."
The Secretary said it was important that there be no misunderstanding as to what was meant by indirect transfer, and he thought that there should be a written minute or record of some sort explaining our understanding of what was meant. He then read to Mr. Dobrynin the four points that might go into such a minute and, at the Ambassador's request, gave him these four points in writing, on the understanding that this represented his present thinking and was not a definitive text./2/
/2/The written minute has not been found, but a 5-point minute of interpretation, which the Secretary gave the British, French, and German Foreign Ministers in Paris on December 12, is quoted in Document 249. The five points were derived from the Minute attached to the Secretary's memorandum to the President, Document 247.
The Secretary went on to explain that with regard to the adherence of potential nuclear states or authorities, he realized it might be necessary to have a conference at which Peiping might be represented. The Secretary made clear that in our view the agreement would not be implemented until both the Soviet Union and the United States were satisfied that all potential nuclear powers had adhered. He thought that we both had a common interest in adherence by Germany and Peiping, but it was probably not important to either of us whether a country like [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] agreed.
249. Editorial Note
On December 12, 1962, Secretary Rusk arrived in Paris in preparation for the NATO Ministerial Meeting to be held December 13-15. In the course of deliberations on Alliance matters of mutual concern, the Secretary explored with the British, French, and German Foreign Ministers prospects for promoting an agreement with the Soviet Union on the non-transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons states. The Secretary submitted a draft non-transfer declaration to Lord Home on December 12. The declaration was intended to make more precise the Soviet concerns about the transfer of nuclear weapons through military alliances to states that did not possess them. The first paragraph of this 3-paragraph draft is identical to the paragraph, quoted in Document 248, that Rusk read to Dobrynin on December 10. The second was a declaration by the other signatory governments that they would not manufacture nuclear weapons, would refrain from acquiring them directly or indirectly, and would "not ask or receive assistance from the other states in the manufacture of any such weapons." The third paragraph outlined conditions for implementation and abrogation of the agreement. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2200) For text of the declaration, see the Supplement.
Secretary Rusk also forwarded the draft declaration under cover of a December 12 letter to French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville. The Secretary's letter explained that the United States had three main objectives in promoting the declaration: First, there was the remote chance that a four-power agreement on non-diffusion might "throw some obstacles across the path of a Chinese nuclear development." The letter noted that "the Soviets might be able to use the proposal as pressure on Peiping, disagreement between them on the subject could benefit the West, and, as a minimum, Peiping would have to bear the responsibility for no progress." The second goal was "to devise a means for diverting the Soviets away from special arrangements with regard to Germany," and third, it was in the interest of nuclear weapons states to take some such action to try to prevent the likely spread of nuclear weapons to other states. The Secretary hoped that if he, Home, and Couve de Murville could agree on the declaration, they would consult the Germans and then the Soviets and other governments. "Paragraph two," he concluded, "would need the adherence of many governments if the declaration is to achieve its purpose. Certainly we would not be interested in a formal agreement which did not include Peiping." (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2200) The letter is in the Supplement.
During the NATO Ministerial Meeting, Secretary Rusk also shared with the British, French, and German Foreign Ministers a minute of interpretation as guidance respecting the disposition of a nuclear weapon in connection with a regional arrangement. "Such actions," the minute stated, "are prohibited if they would give to any state which is a member of the regional arrangement and which does not possess nuclear weapons the ability to make a determination to use these weapons on the basis of its national decision alone." The minute then listed five illustrative points, as follows:
"1. The draft declaration would prohibit the four powers possessing nuclear weapons from placing nuclear weapons under the control of units of national forces of nations in the NATO or Warsaw Pact which do not now possess nuclear weapons.
"2. The draft declaration would not prevent the four nuclear signatories from deploying nuclear weapons in support of the forces of member nations which are assigned to the forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact, respectively, even though these members do not themselves have such weapons. The arrangements would be such that the four nuclear signatories retain control over the weapons so that they could not be deployed or used solely on the basis of the national decision of any government not now possessing them.
"3. The draft declaration would not prevent the four nuclear signatories from placing nuclear weapons in the custody of units of a multinational defense force within the framework of NATO, or Warsaw Pact defense forces, respectively, if weapons could not be deployed or used on the basis of the national decision of any government not now possessing them.
"4. The draft declaration would not prevent the four nuclear signatories from entering into multinational consultative procedures with respect to the deployment and use of nuclear weapons with countries not now possessing such weapons.
"5. The draft declaration assures adherence to the declaration by all potential nuclear states or authorities. It would not become operative until the four nuclear signatories were satisfied that such adherences had been obtained, and until both had ratified it pursuant to their constitutional processes." (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2200)
In a cable to Acting Secretary Ball and the President at the end of the NATO meeting, Secretary Rusk noted, among other things, that on the non-transfer declaration "British fully agree. Germans will agree if Peiping's adherence is required. French are studying and will let us know. Am slightly encouraged that we have not had oracular rejection from Paris." (Secto 22 from Paris, December 15; ibid., Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1562)
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