Documents 300-350
300. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State/1/
London, June 27, 1963, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL/7US/Harriman. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to Moscow.
Secto 15. Eyes only for Harriman and Foster. Secretary reviewed position on test ban and forthcoming mission to Moscow with Foreign Secretary June 27. Home was attended by Heath, Caccia, Godber, Trevelyan and others; Secretary by Franklin Long and Raymond Courtney./2/ Uncleared memcon, subject to revision, follows:
/2/First Secretary of the Embassy in the Political Section.
Secretary stressed importance of making strongest effort to obtain agreement with Soviets on comprehensive test ban even though Soviets have given us no reason for encouragement. He noted discussions with Soviets might be initiated by focusing on two points which Soviets alleged are technical but which in fact involve important points of policy--namely, whether existing national detection systems are adequate to detect and identify all significant seismic events and whether inspection would constitute espionage. We hoped to open up a thorough examination of Soviet claims. Possibly we might enter some new terrain if we introduced (1) distinction between seismic and aseismic areas and (2) spreading inspection quota over period of years. Home agreed to importance of making real try to get comprehensive ban. It was agreed that tactically it would be best to avoid debate on numbers of inspection until last and try first to find where understanding on modalities might be possible.
British raised number of points which, although not new nor seeming seriously to question key aspects of Western position, suggested re-examination. Secretary assured him that US had none at all and that it was essential there be a reasonable relation between number of suspicious events and inspections. It was pointed out that small underground tests could have military significance for Soviets. British asked if there were any real risk in some technical advances being made by underground tests since really significant weapons developments would eventually have to be tested in atmosphere before being put into production. Secretary and Dr. Long pointed out this was not necessarily true. Godber suggested we should look again very carefully at size of inspection areas, number of inspectors, composition of teams, number of automatic recording boxes, etc. It was agreed that US and UK experts should make further thorough examination of modalities; Home suggested that Lord Hailsham probably would like to join in such preparatory effort.
Secretary said if it became clear that agreement on comprehensive ban was not possible we might proceed to several alternatives which have been considered, including three environments ban with continued effort on underground ban. Variation of this might include some kind of limitation on underground tests. There was some reason to hope we might be able to get somewhere in this way. British spokesmen expressed doubt. Secretary reaffirmed US could not accept unpoliced moratorium: any agreement to cessation of underground testing for extended period must be accompanied with adequate assurances.
With respect non-proliferation agreement, Secretary pointed out we should be fully prepared to discuss this (and present some comprehensive papers to Soviets both on this and on the test ban) but not try to go too far toward non-proliferation agreement without bringing French in. He also noted we questioned whether Russian assertion that MLF would be obstacle to non-proliferation was as genuine as they made out; probably, rather, their Chinese problem was more important. He also pointed out Soviets probably don't really understand German unilateral control would be impossible in MLF and that MLF would be measure inhibiting development of further independent nuclear capabilities. With respect non-aggression arrangement or NATO-Warsaw declaration, US felt if we got in sight of test ban or no-transfer arrangement French and German attitudes might change and their veto need not be considered certain.
In summary, it was agreed that although we could not expect to come away from Moscow with anything finished and signed, it was of greatest importance to make most serious try to find whether there could be basis for agreement. If Khrushchev really did not want agreement (and there were indications that this might be the case and that Soviets were intending to resume atmospheric testing) that might come clear. If he did want agreement, the outstanding points of difference probably were not insuperable. In any event, US and UK points of view were very close together. By way of further preparation for mission, experts would proceed with further examination of modalities, and secretaries would prepare joint paper for their principals./3/
/3/In Secto 19 from London, June 28, marked "Eyes Only for President from Secretary," Rusk stated that because of the "wide range of agreement" reached on the Hailsham-Harriman mission and because further discussions were needed "only on deep technical details of modes of inspection," he had told Harriman and Foster that they would not need to attend Kennedy's forthcoming meeting with Macmillan. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Kennedy)
Bruce
301. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
NIE 4-63
Washington, June 28, 1963.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Estimates 4, Arms and Disarmament. Secret; Controlled Dissemination. A table of contents is not printed. A note on the title page states: "Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board." A note on the following page indicates that the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained because the subject was outside of his jurisdiction.
LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCES OF A PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS
The Problem
To estimate the capabilities and intentions of additional countries to develop and produce nuclear weapons and compatible delivery systems over the next decade; and to estimate the consequences thereof.
Conclusions
A. With the increasing availability of uranium, and nuclear technology and technicians, the development of a minimal nuclear weapons capability has come increasingly within the reach of nonnuclear states. A program for one or two low-yield fission weapons a year would cost, through the first detonation, about $140-$180 million and some $20-$30 million a year thereafter. However, costs rise steeply for more than a minimal program and become very large when advanced delivery systems and compatible weapons are required. Political and military considerations are likely to prove more important in determining the pace and scope of nuclear diffusion than differences in national wealth and technical skill. Where the motivation is strong enough, a country might attempt to overcome a lack of native resources by importing materials, technology, and technicians, or even weapons themselves. (Paras. 1-6)
B. We believe that eight countries, in addition to France, have the physical and financial resources to develop an operational nuclear capability (weapons and means of delivery) over the next decade. However, we believe that only Communist China has actually started a weapons program. The Chinese may be able to detonate a first nuclear device by early 1964, but a more likely date is late 1964 or beyond. Approximately two years after a test the Chinese could probably produce their first crude fission weapon. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Thus far the remaining countries--India, Japan, Sweden, Canada, Italy, and West Germany--have limited their nuclear programs to demonstrably peaceful purposes. They will, however, almost certainly continue development of their peaceful nuclear programs, some to a point which would significantly reduce the time required to carry through a weapons program. (Paras. 7-21)
C. We do not believe that the explosion of a first device, or even the acquisition of a limited nuclear weapons capability, would produce major changes in Communist China's foreign policy in the sense that the Chinese would adopt a general policy of open military aggression, or even become willing to take significantly greater military risks. It would, however, increase Chinese self-confidence and prestige and reinforce their efforts to achieve Asian hegemony through political pressures and the indirect support of local "wars of liberation." India probably would not embark on a nuclear weapons program on the basis of a Chinese detonation of a nuclear device, but is likely to continue its present nuclear program to a point where a crash weapons program could be developed relatively quickly. Japan also would feel an increased sense of pressure, but would be more reluctant than most other countries to develop a weapons capability. We believe the Israelis would probably employ a nuclear capability to intimidate the Arabs, but not to make war forthwith. The Arab States would probably blame the West, particularly the US, and the Soviets would probably finds ways of exploiting the situation. (Paras. 25-31)
D. The French force has as its primary purpose heightening French prestige and assisting France to assume leadership of a Europe less dependent on the US and with a voice in the management and control of Western nuclear power. While many Europeans are in general sympathy with de Gaulle's objectives, they also fear that the French program will stimulate further nuclear proliferation, erode the NATO concept, and perhaps most important, lead to German acquisition of nuclear weapons. We believe, however, that the Germans will limit themselves to peaceful nuclear programs over the next few years. If the Germans began to believe that their Allies, and especially the US, might not use nuclear weapons in the defense of the Federal Republic, German interest in a national capability would rise. (Paras. 32-37)
E. We believe that the USSR desires to prevent the diffusion of nuclear weapons, but that this desire will not prove so strong as to produce major changes in its policy. The Soviets have thus far proved unwilling to conclude nondiffusion agreements save on unacceptable terms. Even if the Soviets conclude that West Germany was moving toward a nuclear status, they would probably not make radical changes in their policy, but employ instead a mixture of threats, appeals, and proposals for regional disarmament. (Paras. 38-41)
F. Even if the US, the UK, and the USSR could agree on terms of a nondiffusion agreement, Communist China would almost certainly refuse to sign, and French and Israeli adherence would be doubtful. Nevertheless, the very existence of such an agreement would inhibit other nonsignatories and reinforce internal opposition where it already existed. A comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty would impose serious limitations on the development of nuclear capabilities by nonnuclear signatories but would be subject to many of the same difficulties as a nondiffusion agreement. (Paras. 44-46)
G. In strictly military terms, the nuclear proliferation likely to occur over the next 10 years will almost certainly not upset global power relations nor do we believe it will produce major realignments in the relations of states. The impact will be in the political and psychological effects of the existence of such new weapons, the greater unpredictability of relations within and between alliance systems, and the possibility that hostilities arising out of existing or future controversies could escalate into a serious confrontation involving the major powers. (Paras. 47-48)
H. The possession of nuclear weapons may encourage a new nuclear power to pursue policies which might result in a local crisis, but the possibility that such weapons could be used will almost certainly introduce a strong element of prudence into the calculations of regional enemies. As the number of countries with nuclear weapons programs increases, the likelihood of accidental detonation of weapons will also rise, particularly because safety measures are expensive and temptingly easy to dispense with. An unintentional nuclear explosion in some circumstances might even touch off a nuclear exchange, though we believe the major nuclear powers would react cautiously to such an accident. A serious nuclear reactor accident or a nuclear weapons detonation established as unintentional would almost certainly intensify domestic opposition to the country's nuclear weapons program, and would cause other governments considering a weapons program to hesitate. If US nuclear forces were stationed in the area concerned, there might be considerable regional pressure for their withdrawal. (Paras. 50-54)
[Here follow the Discussion section of the paper and an annex, totaling 21 pages.]
302. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen)/1/
Washington, June 28, 1963, 2:40 p.m.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Box 581, June-July 1963 Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. The source text bears the typed note: "No Distribution Except to Sullivan." Sullivan was Harriman's Special Assistant.
H called K.
H--I think we better call it off. And then there is another message here which says in light of the wide range of agreement I was just as glad not to go but the idea that they had a great idea about this. If you want to do this, send Foster over. You and I stay home. I put it to the Secy--I said is this a propaganda stunt, in which case I'll go along with it, or do you want to reach some kind of an agreement. And the strange thing is that John McCone and particularly Bob McNamara is keen to have us explore the widest range of this. But if we are to . . . then the hell with it.
K--I am going to call Mac's attention to these two cables/2/ and give him the flavor of our reaction./3/
/2/Apparently Secto 15 and Secto 19; see Document 300 and footnote 3 thereto.
/3/See Document 303.
H--The point is that so far we haven't yet hit the right chord. To go over the same arguments--all they are doing is going over the same arguments.
K--I couldn't agree with you more. I wanted to flag it for Mac so he can manage the situation on Sunday.
H . . . I am not worried about the President's own view. I think it would be very important if you and I and perhaps Mac could have a private talk with the President.
K--Mac has this very much in mind.
H--Without the entire group, without chaperones. I am very disciplined. I want to know what the objective is and I will conform completely. I really ought to find out what he would like to try to achieve. Certainly we are not going to get anywhere on any of the points of this conversation in this telegram.
K--Did you read the record of Foster and Kuznetsov?/4/ An opportunity was present twice, in my judgment.
/4/Not further identified.
H--I will get Adrian/5/ to pick it out.
/5/Adrian Fisher.
303. Telegram From the White House to the President's Party in the United Kingdom/1/
Washington, June 28, 1963.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Box 5TS, Test Ban 2, Background. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The communications channel and delivery point are not indicated. By Saturday morning, the President was at Prime Minister Macmillan's private residence, Birch Grove.
To Mr. Bundy from Mr. Kaysen. Deliver at opening of business on Saturday.
Ref: Secto 15 (Eyes Only for Harriman and Foster); Secto 19 (Eyes Only for President).
Harriman and I feel most strongly that if these messages reflect the state of affairs as U.S. sees them, we might as well stay home and send Bill Foster to Moscow to repeat his performance of this past winter in New York and Washington. In recent discussion with Harriman, McNamara has shown he too believes that there is something to be gained by serious and wide-ranging exploration of Soviet interest in test ban and broader security and disarmament measures which might follow from it. If what we bring "in our luggage" is what Secto 15 describes, we will hardly be in a position to raise these wider questions.
At the minimum, we should be in a position to indicate early in the discussion that we are flexible on numbers. Tactically speaking, this seems to me necessary to make progress. If, as Secto 15 suggests, we again begin with modalities, we are in danger of reminding the Soviets painfully of previous round. Lack of suggestion of what we have in mind on Chinese problem also an example of overcaution, unless directed at British rather than Soviets. Finally, to suggest in advance that our explorations may be limited by anticipated attitudes French, Germans is also not conducive to a forthcoming response.
I know this message tells you nothing now but even Jove nods, and Harriman and I think it important to remind you of the stage management problem all this poses for you and the President./2/
/2/In Tosit 2 to the White House, June 29 (routed through CIA channels), Bundy stated that "none of three concerns in your telegram poses problem of persuading UK, so I do not think that Birch Grove is the place to settle them. Moreover, conversation here suggests Secto 15 and 20 [19] represent minimum, not maximum, US position. Therefore suggest you and Averell continue to prepare your own packages for Moscow to be discussed on President's return. Jove often nods, but in this case the moment of truth has not yet come." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Test Ban Cables 6/13-7/15/63)
304. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
PET/MC/16
Birch Grove, England, June 29, 1963, 10:15-11: 30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Kennedy. Top Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved by the White House on July 12. Birch Grove was Prime Minister Macmillan's private residence.
PRESIDENT'S EUROPEAN TRIP
June 1963
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The President
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. William R. Tyler
United Kingdom
Prime Minister Macmillan
Lord Home
Sir Harold Caccia
Sir David Ormsby Gore
Lord Hailsham
Mr. Philip de Zulueta
SUBJECT
Nuclear Matters, including forthcoming test ban discussions with the USSR
The Prime Minister began with a discussion of the importance of the test ban. It was our one great hope for progress toward peace and we ought to make a really big try. All the rest was really nonsense. We should discuss this problem, and trivial problems of weapons and internal organization of the alliance should be put aside as having really no comparable significance. The Russians may or may not be ready for a real agreement, and they might or might not be really ready to trust us, but we must try--and here the Prime Minister complimented the President upon his success in preventing American generals from making the threatening noises which they frequently made in General Eisenhower's time.
As the Prime Minister saw it, there were three arguments to be pressed with the Russians:
(1) If we could not get an agreement now, both sides would have to go forward with the effort to develop an anti-missile missile. This would require more and more effort and expense on unproductive weapons, in an endless competition of emptiness. Surely this matter of cost and irrelevant effort was important to Khrushchev.
(2) While the great nuclear powers were in this endless competition to the clouds, other small but dangerous forces would be growing up from the earth. We could offer to keep such small powers out of the game.
(3) We might be able to get 60-70 nations to join in a test ban treaty, and this would create a big pull against further nuclear efforts. China? France? Surely somehow the United States and United Kingdom could deal with France so that it would not pose a threat to the Soviet Union--and indeed the Prime Minister doubted if the Russians were frightened of the French (later in the evening the Prime Minister remarked that he had always wanted to bring France into the exercise, but that General Eisenhower had not agreed with him, in the light of the requirements of the McMahon Act).
China? China was more of a problem for the Russians, but it was conceivable that it would be impressive if there could be a joint note with the Russians to the Chinese.
The Prime Minister then remarked that nearly every time anyone got near to a test ban agreement, someone who wanted testing would invent a new reason to prevent such an agreement. The Prime Minister referred bitterly to the effect of the idea of decoupling in this connection.
So the question arose of the instructions to Hailsham and Harriman--the Prime Minister remarked on the outstanding qualities of both emissaries, and said that he thought the problem of what we could propose was purely political--what can we get away with? The difficulty is to know what really is worthwhile. We must have no more dreary Geneva discussions of technical details--we must somehow get a different vista of the future. Khrushchev was a practical, hard, and brutal man. He might be happy with the current balance and fearful of change through further competition, so that it might be to his advantage to get a settlement now. Great powers were jealous and critical of small powers, and that it was in their interest for smaller powers to conform.
So our problem was to work out the line of instructions. The negotiators should play by ear, quick or slow as circumstances suggest, and not hampered too much by technical advice--which changed in any event every six months.
The President said he felt indeed that this was the summer for an agreement. He also agreed that the experts were often unreliable, and remarked that we had not learned as much from our atmospheric tests as had been predicted. However, the U.S. Government was not unanimous; there were serious divisions within it on the nature of the test ban problem.
Moreover, American opinion was much affected by previous Soviet behavior in such matters as the broken test-ban moratorium and the attempt to introduce missiles in Cuba. The President did not wish to make basic technical judgments this evening. And as he faced the broad political problem he must consider whether it would be better not to have a treaty than to have one which might be badly beaten in the Senate--a close contest might move us forward, but a bad defeat might be destructive.
The President wondered whether in fact a series of underground tests could be conducted without detection. There was a difference of view here, as there was on the question of how much could be learned from clandestine underground testing of any sort. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had one opinion and the President another which was on the whole that clandestine testing would not be decisive. This was a matter on which he would address himself to the Prime Minister later, and in two respects. (1) Could the Soviets run a series of clandestine tests? (2) How much could such tests alter the balance of power? The balance of power of course was a subtle thing. The President was inclined to share the Prime Minister's view that we have much too much nuclear strength, but it has had a part to play in international psychology. The French will have "enough" in 4 or 5 years; the U.K. has "enough" now. But we have more, and it has some political importance. If the USSR should seem to make gains, it might be helped psychologically. But if we can get a new view of the technical considerations involved, we might well give instructions to our negotiators.
The third question which seemed to the President central was China. A Chinese bomb would be important, especially psychologically, and the question would arise whether China could be bound by an agreement and, if so, how?
The Prime Minister wondered how new tests on our side would affect Chinese behavior. He also wondered whether the Soviets would gain anything by underground testing or whether they must go to atmospheric testing for any serious results. (This theme recurred several times later in the discussion, on the British side.)
The President remarked that we would have to test if the Chinese tested. On the other hand, if the Chinese could be restrained, that would be the most powerful argument in favor of a test ban. That subject we must try to discuss with the Russians.
A next question was the relation of the French to a test ban. How could they be worked in? We think this is a workable problem.
And, third, was the relation of the MLF to a test ban--and the President indicated his feeling that if in fact a test ban agreement came in sight, it would be desirable and possible to modify our planning for the multilateral force.
The President said that the Chinese are now testing missile systems. From what information we have, these are rather primitive.
Macmillan said that Cuba showed that the important things today "are the pawns and not the queens." Small countries and highly localized acute problems can endanger the peace of the world by bringing the powerful countries into competition and conflict with each other. He said that one of the curious results of Cuba was that both Cuba and Berlin were now equally vulnerable and tended to cancel each other out. The President said that the Russians may have undertaken their desperate gamble in Cuba in order to try to give the world the appearance of having changed the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States, had their plan succeeded.
Lord Home said he thought that nondissemination of nuclear weapons was of very great importance as an appeal to the Soviets in relation to Germany.
The President said we really had to come to a decision on two points with regard to the test ban talks: (1) What do we say? (2) What are the means at our disposal?
There was a question of whether the Russians would be able to test if we limited ourselves to national means of detection. We would have to ask ourselves three questions: (1) What kind of tests would they be able to get away with? (2) Just how much additional knowledge would such tests be likely to provide them with? (3) Would the Russians then be in a position to apply this knowledge so as to increase significantly their nuclear potential?
305. Paper Prepared for the Kennedy-Macmillan Talks/1/
Birch Grove, England, June 30, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Test Ban Inspections. No classification marking. Prepared by a U.S.-U.K. team consisting of McNaughton, Sir Solly Zuckerman, Frank Long, and Archibald Duncan Wilson, Assistant Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office.
Question One. What is the maximum size of underground nuclear tests which the USSR could repeatedly carry out without significant fear of detection?
Answer. By testing in carefully chosen soft media, the USSR could test up to perhaps 3 KT and risk only a 10% chance of detection of individual tests by seismic means. The risk by detection by physical means would be larger if a series of tests were carried out, and the risk of detection by other kinds of intelligence would also increase. Substantially larger tests, up to perhaps 25/2/ KT, could be carried out with small risk of seismic detection by accomplishing them in spherical underground cavities of a few hundred feet in diameter. But the construction of such a cavity would run the risk of being detected by other means.
/2/A handwritten marginal note reads "50."
Question Two. What can be learned technically from such small underground tests and what will be the military significance of the increased knowledge?
Answer. Increases of several fold in the yield-to-weight ratio could be accomplished for weapons in the low kiloton range. The fraction of fissionable material in thermonuclear weapons could be reduced. Weapons could be developed with enhanced radiation yield and also with deliberately suppressed radiation yield. Some weapons effects tests could be carried out, specifically on the effects of radiation on warhead components and some studies of hardened structure response. The following weapons effects cannot be studied/3/ underground: Electro-magnetic pulse, blackout, megaton-range ground shock, and full-scale interactions of re-entry vehicles.
/3/A handwritten marginal insertion reads: "to any significant extent."
The necessity of carrying out these tests clandestinely would substantially increase both the time scale and the cost of the program.
Studies of these sorts would permit development of a wide range of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons. Underground tests could also lead to improvements in the warheads of anti-ballistic missiles. However, the warhead is only one component in the necessarily complex ABM system, and the offensive forces have enough retaliatory means at their disposal that the possible improvements of ABM warheads do not appear to be of great military importance. Underground testing cannot be expected to lead to operationally meaningful improvements in strategic warheads./4/
/4/An additional handwritten sentence in the margin reads: "JCS says extrapolated ideas could be tested in outer space (!)"
Question Three. Will atmospheric tests be required to prove out developments made by underground testing?
Answer. Atmospheric tests will not be required for development of tactical nuclear weapons. Nor are they necessary for improving some components of strategic weapons. However, atmospheric testing would be required: (1) For proving out significant new designs of strategic weapons which might be based on developments made by underground tests; (2) to test the operational effectiveness of anti-ballistic missile systems; (3) for a range of significant weapons effects tests.
306. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Birch Grove, England, June 30, 1963, 11:45 a.m.-1:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Test Ban Inspections. Secret. Drafted by John McNaughton, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, on July 1. Copies were sent to William R. Tyler and Franklin Long.
SUBJECT
President-Prime Minister Test Ban Conversations, June 30, 1963
The President and the Prime Minister with their advisers discussed test ban matters during a meeting at Birch Grove from 11:45 a.m. until 1:15 p.m., Sunday, June 30, 1963. Present at the discussions assisting the President were Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Bruce, and Messrs. Tyler, McNaughton, and Long. Assisting the Prime Minister, in addition to his personal secretary, were Lord Home (in and out), Minister Thorneycroft,/2/ Ambassador Ormsby Gore, Lord Hailsham, and Messrs. Caccia, Zuckerman and Wilson.
/2/Peter Thorneycroft, Minister of Defense.
The Prime Minister asked "the scientists" to provide the answers to the three questions put to them the night before. I read to them the questions and in each case the answers which had been prepared by the team of Zuckerman-Wilson-Long-McNaughton./3/ There was discussion after each answer. (The questions and answers appear elsewhere in the form of the informal talking paper used by the group.)
/3/Document 305.
The President then read from the JCS June 18 "Comments on the Proposed Nuclear Test Ban Treaty."/4/ He read extensively from Parts II, III and IV of the JCS statement. In some cases he asked me for fuller explanation of the Chiefs' meaning, and in all cases there was discussion of the points made by the Chiefs. The President stated that it will be important for us to "get back home and talk this over."
/4/Not found, but presumably an earlier draft of the paper cited in footnote 12, Document 294.
It was stated that it would be advisable for Mr. Harriman to spend perhaps two days in London before going on to Moscow. It was understood that the US-UK liaison at the working level was going on already.
Lord Home suggested that, in the Moscow negotiations, we should not permit the debate to focus on number of inspections. Rather, he preferred to have the emphasis put on kinds of inspection.
There was some discussion of what inducements the Soviets might have to agree to a test ban. In response to a question from Lord Hailsham, I said that the interest on the part of the Soviets might flow (1) from a different strategic outlook (one in which superiority in very large weapons appeared sufficient), and (2) from a desire to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. The Prime Minister added two reasons: (3) That the Soviets may wish to save the resources now being diverted to the arms race, and (4) that they may be interested in taking a step toward disarmament. He doubted very much that the Soviets would enter a treaty intending to cheat; he believed that the question in their minds would be "Do we want this deal or don't we?" The questions would be how much each side had to give to reach agreement.
The President raised the question of a partial test ban--one which had no meaningful on-site inspections but which allowed a given number (possibly 7 to 10) of underground tests each year. He doubted that the Soviets would be interested in such a proposal. Secretary Rusk emphasized the importance for pressing for a comprehensive ban for quite some time before falling back to a partial ban. The President observed that such a partial ban would meet some of the Soviet needs while at the same time making a ban more consistent with US military and political requirements.
The problem of China was raised. It was observed that it might be hard to get a treaty ratified by the Senate if the Chinese tested prior to that time and, in any event, that the Senate ratification might provide that the treaty terminate if the Chinese conducted a test. There were some references to methods which might be used to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities.
JTMcN
307. Draft Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, July 2, 1963.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI, ER Subject Files, White Papers: Nuclear Test Ban 3/1/63-1/21/64. Top Secret. The source text does not indicate whether a final version of this memorandum was sent.
SUBJECT
Comments on Conclusions of the White Papers (Draft) on Nuclear Testing Problems/2/
/2/A series of draft white papers on the strengths and weaknesses of a nuclear test ban was prepared in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in June and July of 1963. None appears to have reached final form. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Testimony, and ibid., DOD, Vol. IV, 1/63-6/63)
1. A forceful test ban would freeze the present status of nuclear weapons except for modest refinements which can be accomplished in the laboratories without testing, or improvements which can be accomplished by clandestine testing under the threshold which will be discussed later.
2. This will mean that the Soviets will preserve their lead in weapons ranging from 6,000# to 25,000# in weight and in yields from 13 to 100 megatons. Our estimates lead to the conclusions that the Soviets now possess missile delivery warheads of about 25 megatons and are in the process of developing a missile which can deliver a 100-megaton warhead. It is apparent that these large warheads can destroy vast areas from thermo effect if the large megaton warheads are exploded at high altitude. It does not appear that weapons of this type would be useful against our hardened missile sites and it does not appear to me that the Soviets will plan such uses, as they will have several hundred ICBMs capable of delivering warheads of about 10 megatons. These, I believe, would be used against our missile sites.
3. It is true that during the period of which I am speaking we will build many more ICBMs and Polaris missiles and will outnumber the Soviets by 3 or 4. It is also true that during this period the Soviets will be hardening their ICBM sites as they now appear to be doing and these will be less vulnerable to our comparatively low yield warheads.
4. I therefore conclude that in the field of strategic weapons we will be at a disadvantage under a test ban. The technology proven in our last test series can be fully developed and weaponized to produce warheads at yields 3 to 5 times as great as those we now have with no increase in weight. While this will not equal the very large warheads of the Soviets, it will give us a far more effective offensive capability than we would otherwise possess.
308. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
NIE 11-2-63
Washington, July 2, 1963.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-63, USSR. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A table of contents is not printed. A note on the cover sheet reads: "This estimate was prepared and agreed upon by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee which is composed of representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, AEC, NSA, and FBI." The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred except the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdictions.
THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
The Problem
To estimate the current status and probable future course of the Soviet atomic energy program to mid-1968.
Principal Conclusions
Nuclear Testing and Technology
1. The Soviets have a highly developed nuclear weapon technology which differs in design philosophy and emphasis from that of the West. They have tested thermonuclear devices in very high yields (up to 63 megatons) well above any in Western experience, and in this range have achieved an outstanding yield-to-weight performance. They have also shown an excellent performance in thermonuclear devices of lower yields, down to about two megatons. In the submegaton thermonuclear class, [2 lines of source text not declassified] and they have not yet demonstrated a thermonuclear capability in weights below about 600 pounds.
2. The Soviets have conducted many tests below 50 kilotons, some of which may not have been fission devices. Debris from a number of tests in 1961-1962 was not obtained and analysis of those 1962 tests for which debris was obtained has not been completed. In general, data from the 1961-1962 devices analyzed to date do not permit any definitive judgment as to their progress in fission weapon technology, particularly in the very low yield category where evidence of testing may have been missed. They have continued to show interest in unboosted fission devices, although they have also tested many well-boosted devices.
Weapon Stockpiles
3. A small number of individually produced weapons for interim use could be fabricated within a few months after device testing. Thus, a few weapons with very high yields of up to 100 MT could now be available. However, we believe that the Soviet time lag between nuclear tests of a device and initial stockpile entry of a serially produced weaponized version is about two years at a minimum. On this basis, some of the new devices tested in 1961 could be entering stockpile during the latter part of 1963 if a priority development is assumed. It is estimated, however, that this could be done only on a limited scale, and that, in general, the devices tested in 1961-1962 would be stockpiled in 1964 and 1965. We believe that weapons currently stockpiled are derived primarily from devices tested in 1958 or earlier; these weapons range in yield from a few kilotons up to 6 megatons.
Requirements for Further Testing
4. Soviet nuclear weapon technology appears to be highly sophisticated and adequate for present delivery systems, but significant advancements can still be made through further development and testing. Probably one of the strongest requirements is in the area of high-altitude effects of nuclear weapons. The Soviets conducted several such tests in 1961-1962, but probably need additional tests to obtain weapon effects data pertinent to antimissile development and countermeasures. They also lack direct information on effects of high-yield weapons on hardened ground targets and on the effects of lower-yield weapons on deep underwater targets. The Soviets probably also have requirements to conduct further tests to improve yield-to-weight ratios particularly in the lower weight range and to develop new weapon capabilities such as light-weight thermonuclear warheads for smaller missile systems, very small weapons for tactical employment, weapons with enhanced radiation output, and weapons with minimal residual radiation.
5. We believe that the Soviets are continuing a vigorous weapons research and development program, and that they are maintaining a posture to resume nuclear testing promptly if a decision is made.
Fissionable Materials Production
6. We estimate the mid-1963 cumulative Soviet production of fissionable materials at about 15,000 kilograms of plutonium equivalent and 130,000 kilograms of U-235./2/ These quantities are somewhat lower than previously estimated for mid-1963, as the result of further analysis and additional evidence. The Soviets are continuing to expand their fissionable material production capability at a significant rate. We estimate that by mid-1968 cumulative production will amount to about 35,000 kilograms of plutonium equivalent and 380,000 kilograms of U-235.
/2/See page 35 for the views of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence). [Footnote in the source text.]
Reactor Development
7. Soviet research reactor development continues to be competent in most areas and is unique in a few. However, the original, unrealistic Soviet nuclear electric program has been abandoned and they are now proceeding with one which is more commensurate with their economic requirements and the state of their reactor technology. Moreover, the Soviets have encountered numerous difficulties with the nuclear propulsion of the icebreaker Lenin, and there is considerable evidence of similar difficulties with Soviet nuclear powered submarines. Soviet work on ion propulsion and nuclear auxiliary power supplied for space applications is continuing, and we believe that they have a program to develop materials suitable for nuclear rocket motors. The Soviet aircraft nuclear propulsion program appears to have been delayed and may have been cut back or even canceled.
[Here follow a 44-page summary, a 33-page Discussion section, and an evaluation of Soviet nuclear tests from August 1949 to December 1962.]
309. Editorial Note
On July 2, 1963, Soviet Chairman Khrushchev spoke on the test ban question in East Berlin. After emphasizing the Soviet preference for a comprehensive agreement without inspections, he stated that "since the Western Powers are impeding the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear tests, the Soviet Government expresses its readiness to include an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water." Later in the speech, Khrushchev stated "that it would be advisable straightaway, when an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests is concluded, to take also another big step towards the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of confidence between states, namely, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the two main military groupings of states--the NATO countries and the countries parties to the Warsaw Treaty." He noted that an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, "together with the simultaneous signing of a non-aggression pact between those two groupings of States, will create a new international atmosphere more favorable to the solution of the most important problems of the modern world, including the problem of disarmament." For text of this speech, see Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pages 244-246.
At 5:15 p.m. on July 2 in Washington, Kaysen telephoned Harriman, who said he "looked on" a summary he had of Khrushchev's speech as "mighty interesting and that he had [not?] said this before." Harriman also asked "if it looked pretty good. Kaysen said it looks like something to me. There is a lot about the German Peace Treaty." In a telephone conversation with syndicated columnist Joseph Alsop at 1:20 p.m. on July 3, Harriman stated that the Soviets "never agreed to testing in this manner before. We have proposed it--the three elements, three environments. The question is whether he ties that in definitely to Warsaw-NATO agreement. It isn't clear whether he ties [them?] together or whether he thinks they should be one after another." (Both memoranda of conversation in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Box 581, June-July Telephone Conversations)
On July 3, the President held two meetings at the White House with senior officials including McNamara, Ball, Harriman, Foster, Bundy, and Kaysen. Rusk was at the second meeting, held at 4:10 p.m., but not at the first, apparently held some time between 9 and 11 a.m. Kaysen's handwritten notes of the meetings indicate that the President was searching for some means of seeing whether the United States could meet the Soviet desire for a non-aggression pact without jeopardizing the Western position in Berlin and without antagonizing Chancellor Adenauer and President de Gaulle. Kennedy in the 4 p.m. meeting pointed out the difficulty of getting de Gaulle involved in the test ban, given his "natural" opposition to any U.S. initiative, and wondered how to make him "a larger figure in this matter."
At both meetings, Harriman spoke of the difficulty of having frank discussions in Moscow if the French joined the talks. With Adenauer, the major issue was the non-aggression pact. Kennedy is reported as saying at the second meeting that "we don't mind, poor grounds for refusing it, how do we convince Germans." The President decided that he should write Adenauer and "reserve position," apparently on the non-aggression pact, and that Rusk should write Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder. Regarding France, the resolution of the meetings was less clear, seeming to depend on soundings to be taken by Ambassador Bohlen over the next few days. (Both memoranda of conversation in Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Harriman Instructions) For Kennedy's letter to Adenauer, see Document 310; for Rusk's letter to Schroeder, see Document 311.
310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, July 3, 1963, 9:46 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Kennedy. Secret; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Bromley Smith.
39. The following letter from the President to Chancellor Adenauer should be delivered to the Chancellor's office in the course of business Thursday but without giving an impression that it is being delivered with special haste in connection with the meeting between the Chancellor and De Gaulle./2/ Text of letter follows:
/2/This meeting was held in Bonn July 4-5.
"Dear Mr. Chancellor:
On my return to Washington, I write to thank you once again--and most heartily--for all your kindness and courtesy during my visit to the Federal Republic./3/ I shall not soon forget the welcome which you and your people gave to us.
/3/Kennedy was in Germany June 23-26.
I particularly value the intimate private conversations which you and I were able to have, and I was grateful to you for your exposition of certain soundings which you have thought it useful to undertake. We on our side will also keep you fully informed. In that spirit, I have asked Mr. Rusk to give to Mr. Schroeder a complete account of our preliminary thinking about the possible meaning of the new language on nuclear tests which has appeared quite unexpectedly in Khrushchev's Berlin speech./4/
/4/See Document 309.
It is far from clear what the linkage may be between this apparently new position on a limited test ban and the question of a non-aggression agreement, but it seems to me at least possible that we can work out a bargain which in effect produces the kind of standstill agreement that you spoke of to me./5/ It is essential to us, of course, that any such arrangement protect all our interests, but it may be, as you suggested that Khrushchev is becoming ready to accept this kind of standstill, instead of the one-sided agreements he has sought in the past.
/5/No record has been found of the President's private meeting with the Chancellor the morning of June 24. That afternoon, Kennedy and Adenauer discussed the test ban briefly with others present. (Memorandum by Creel; Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Kennedy) See the Supplement.
In any event, this is what we must now find out, and I doubt if we shall know much more until after Harriman has been to Moscow. Meanwhile, my people will be in close consultation with yours, and I will be sure to get in touch with you personally if there is any important new development. In the meantime, I have asked Mr. Rusk to make sure that all our people avoid any public statements which might seem to prejudge the matter one way or another, and if you should think it useful, I hope you may be able to take a similar line with your people.
I am particularly conscious that General de Gaulle may have reservations about any possible standstill, and I should be glad to have your own advice as to how the matter might best be discussed with him after your talks with him are over. I persist in my conviction that the real interests of all our nations are the same and that we must find ways of pursuing them in increasing unity."
Rusk
311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, July 3, 1963, 7:10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Secret; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Ball; cleared by Rusk (in substance), Richard Davis (EUR), and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Paris.
31. Eyes only for Ambassadors. Deliver following message from Secretary to Foreign Minister Schroeder as soon as possible, hopefully before start of Adenauer-DeGaulle talks.
"Dear Gerhard:
Since returning to Washington last night the President and I have had a first look at the text of Chairman Khrushchev's speech delivered yesterday in East Berlin. We had no previous intimation of this Soviet proposal. It seems interesting particularly in view of its timing, coming just before the meeting with the Chinese on Friday/2/ and the Harriman-Hailsham mission on July 15.
/2/That is, the Soviet-PRC meeting on July 5.
While, as you know, we have always preferred a comprehensive test ban with adequate inspection, we could nevertheless foresee real advantages to the West in even a three-environment test ban particularly as it might affect the Chinese nuclear development.
It is too early to say whether Chairman Khrushchev's speech can lead to an agreement on any form of test ban. But if such agreement appears possible and if the Soviet Union is to be put in position to make a maximum effort to obtain Chinese compliance, then it seems essential that the French Government join in the agreement. We have been giving some thought as to what President de Gaulle might feel he would need if he is to participate in a test ban. In fact, Ambassador Bohlen has indicated to Couve de Murville that this is an area which we might be prepared to explore./3/ We recognize, of course, the many complications of this question and we shall wish to keep in close touch with you about it.
/3/Telegram 97 to Paris, July 3, instructed Bohlen to "recognize of course that primary purpose of letter to Schroeder was to inform Germans in general terms of your recent conversation with Couve de Murville re nuclear matters before French informed them." The Department recognized that there was "little incentive for de Gaulle to go along on test ban or NAP," and stated that while it was inclined to doubt the value of Harriman seeing de Gaulle before the Moscow visit, it wished Bohlen's opinion in the matter. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) In telegram 78 from Paris, July 5, Bohlen stated that he agreed with the Department since "we in effect have nothing new to take up" with de Gaulle. (Ibid., POL 7 Harriman)
We are not clear from Khrushchev's speech regarding the extent to which he is linking the conclusion of a test ban agreement with a nonaggression pact. This will probably emerge only during the course of the Harriman-Hailsham talks. However, as we are informing the quadripartite ambassadorial group this afternoon, we could not of course make any commitments in a matter on which the NATO Alliance as a whole must move together. As it now seems certain that Khrushchev will raise the question, Harriman will plan to listen and ascertain the Soviet intentions in this regard.
Our own views on this remain the same as I discussed at Ottawa. We believe that a nonaggression pact is worth exploring if, in fact, it could be so designed as to give greater security to Berlin. Pending whatever we may learn as the result of Harriman's talks, the President and I feel that we should not foreclose full exploration of these possibilities and am hopeful that our governments will keep the question open and not take public positions until this can be done./4/
/4/Circular telegram 25, July 3, indicated that many of the same points were made by Ball in a briefing of the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group in Washington the evening of July 3, and that this material was also circulated for NATO briefing purposes. (Ibid., POL 15-1 USSR)
[Here follows discussion of the MLF.]
With every good wish."/5/
/5/In telegram 47 from Bonn, July 4, McGhee reported that Schroeder had stated in a preliminary comment on Rusk's letter that he would try to work discussion of a limited test ban into his talks with de Gaulle although he had "little hope de Gaulle would be responsive. He questioned whether it was realistic to expect that the Soviets would be able to obtain Chinese agreement to a test ban." (Ibid., DEF 18-4)
Rusk
312. Telegram From Prime Minister Macmillan's Personal Secretary (de Zulueta) to President Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
London, July 4, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Harriman Mission, Telegrams 7/1/63-7/6/63. Secret; Personal. The time of transmission is 1904 Zulu.
T. 295/63. Following from de Zulueta for Bundy. Your CAP 63369. Great men think alike. The President's message has crossed a letter which the Prime Minister has sent by the bag. I cannot get the Prime Minister this evening and so I am sending you now the text of his letter of which the original will reach you in due course.
Text of letter from Prime Minister to the President:--
Personal
Dear friend,
[Here follow two paragraphs primarily of a social nature.]
I don't know how you feel about Khrushchev's speech in Berlin. No doubt your people will analyse it and so will ours. We shall have to agree the vital point which is how to play the hand on this. We are looking forward to having preliminary talks with Harriman here. My inclination is to do what I said in the House of Commons--press on in the first instance to see whether accommodation can be reached to get the full ban. But at the same time we must be practical. If Khrushchev really drops the offer of inspection and we cannot meet him by any form of accommodation, then I feel we should not let slip the very big prize of the modified ban, which of course may be possible if it is true that he will not now try to insist on the unpoliced moratorium on underground tests. Alternatively there may be alternative proposals about underground tests such as you mentioned at Birch Grove./2/ At any rate we must get agreement if we can. For then we may be able to approach much more effectively the problems that we have with France, Germany, etc. And Khrushchev also may be able to do something with China. So even the second prize may turn out well worth having and would certainly be fatal to lose.
/2/See Documents 304-306.
These, however, are only my first thoughts.
Yours very sincerely
Harold Macmillan/3/
/3/This letter crossed a letter from Kennedy to Macmillan, also dated July 4, in which the President stated that he agreed with "what you said in the House yesterday," particularly "that the most important thing at the moment is try to keep our French and German friends from throwing any cold water in public." Kennedy asked for Macmillan's thoughts on possible ways of leading de Gaulle to a "less negative attitude." (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan 1963, Vol. III)
End of message.
313. Draft Instructions for the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)/1/
Washington, July 5, 1963.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Test Ban I, Background. Secret. Drafted by Kaysen. Attached to a July 5 letter from Kaysen to Harriman.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR HONORABLE W. AVERELL HARRIMANSPECIAL AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW
The purposes of your mission are three:
1. To negotiate the most comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty possible in accordance with existing guidelines.
2. To explore what other acceptable measures of disarmament the Soviets are interested in undertaking.
3. To probe Soviet intentions in related areas, including those mentioned in Khrushchev's speech of July 2.
I. Test Ban
1. Our judgment that a test ban treaty is in the national interest rests on two grounds. First, it may be a significant first step toward the halting of the arms race and thus reduce international tensions. Second, and more important, it is an indispensable first step toward the limitation of the further diffusion of nuclear weapons. The prospects of a further increase in the number of powers possessing nuclear weapons poses a potentially serious threat to our security and to world stability and peace. Therefore, a test ban treaty must be viewed in relation to the problem of checking the further diffusion of nuclear weapons.
2. Accordingly, the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty outlawing testing in all environments remains our objective. However, Chairman Khrushchev's speech makes it unlikely that we can reach agreement with the Soviets on a comprehensive treaty at this time. Therefore, we should seek an agreement banning testing in three environments along the lines of the August 27, 1962, draft treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in atmosphere, outer space and underwater, presented to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva./2/
/2/Harriman wrote a marginal note next to this paragraph: "Should we sign if possible or wait for Secretary's meeting?"
3. The achievement of such an agreement should be viewed as a first step toward the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty. You should therefore initiate technical discussions with the Soviet Union which may resolve the present disagreements between the Soviet Union and ourselves and the United Kingdom on the need for inspections in any comprehensive test ban treaty. You may also explore other possible means of extending the scope of the treaty such as limiting the number of underground tests to an agreed quota./3/
/3/Beside this sentence Harriman wrote: "I don't want to do this particularly as it would be more difficult to sell Congress."
4. You should continue to emphasize the relation between the nuclear test ban treaty and control of the diffusion of nuclear weapons. In pursuing this subject, you should be guided by the talks on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons between Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Dobrynin./4/
/4/At the end of this sentence Harriman wrote: "Read this." Regarding the Rusk-Dobrynin talks, see Document 287.
II. Other Measures of Disarmament
1. Our talks on general and complete disarmament in the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva have made little progress. Recently Foreign Minister Gromyko made a proposal/5/ which at least raises the question of whether or not the Soviets are willing to consider serious first stage disarmament measures not tied to an agreement to proceed rapidly to complete and general disarmament on terms which we have always found unacceptable. You should accordingly explore the possibility that the Gromyko proposal is intended to open a serious discussion of separable first stages.
/5/Not further identified.
2. In addition, you should attempt to discover Soviet interest in other measures not necessarily part of a general disarmament treaty. These include:
a. An agreement not to put weapons of mass destruction in orbit.
b. A halt to the production of fissionable materials, under appropriate safeguards.
c. In combination with (b.), the transfer from military stockpiles of agreed quantities of fissionable materials to peaceful uses. In this connection, you should be prepared to discuss an arrangement in which we transfer more fissionable materials than the Soviets.
d. The scrapping on a one-for-one basis of B-47's and Badgers at a rate to be agreed.
In exploring these and other possibilities, you will be guided by the paper, __________, recommended by the Committee of Principals and approved by the President.
III. Other Measures
1. Chairman Khrushchev, in his speech, stated a connection between the test ban treaty and a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pacts. Neither the degree of this connection nor the nature of the proposals to which Chairman Khrushchev referred are clear. In exploring Soviet intentions in this respect, you should be guided by the following objectives:
a. If possible, we should separate the non-aggression pact from the test ban treaty and other disarmament matters. We should press the discussions on these, and defer to a later date the further discussions of the non-aggression pact. We would prefer to conclude the three environment test ban treaty first, get the discussion on other measures of disarmament under way, and discuss the Soviet proposals for a non-aggression pact in the context of our discussions of further disarmament measures.
b. Even if it proves impossible to agree on this procedure it is useful to explore Soviet purposes. The phrase, "non-aggression pact," has been loosely used to cover a wide variety of possible arrangements about the way in which relations between Eastern European Communist states and Soviet Russia on the one hand, and the NATO allies, on the other, are conducted. In discussing these arrangements, we must continue to make clear that we can accept no arrangement which formally recognizes the East German regime or which renounces the ultimate reunification of Germany as a policy goal. Within these constraints, you should explore Soviet purposes in advancing this suggestion, and the possible modes which, in the Soviet view, would meet these purposes./6/
/6/At the end of this paragraph Harriman wrote: "Also safeguards our position in West Berlin."
2. You should also be prepared to explore any other matters which the Soviets wish to raise under the general heading of reducing tensions between the Soviet Bloc and NATO; or between the United States and the Soviet Union./7/
/7/Harriman wrote below this paragraph: "Discuss Laos in depth."
314. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for National Estimates (Kent) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)/1/
Washington, July 8, 1963.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Test Ban I, Background. Secret.
SUBJECT
What the Soviets Must be Thinking as They Perceive the Chinese Communists Working Towards an Initial Advanced Weapons Capability--Nuclear Weapons and Missiles
1. I have long felt that the Soviet leaders must harbor the profoundest apprehension of the Chinese attainment of an early nuclear capability.
2. The Soviets must appreciate that, upon the attainment of a primitive capability, the Chinese will require perhaps decades before this could be expanded to a meaningful deterrent of the US. The Soviets must also realize that when the Chinese have such a capability, it might be directed westward against the USSR as well as eastward against the US.
3. Worrisome as the prospect of the achievement of this capability may be, its attainment is obviously a long way off. But the period between the moment of an initial operational capability with crude weapons and delivery systems, and this later time, should cause the Soviets almost equal alarm. For during this period they will perceive that the Chinese are possessed of the means of starting a nuclear war in the Far East which they cannot finish.
4. Should the Chinese be so misguided as to attack Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, or Southeast Asia, and thus throw down the nuclear gage to the US, Soviet leaders must see themselves facing up to a most trying decision: whether to stand by and see China as a base for the Far Eastern Communist movement knocked into a cocked hat, or whether to come to China's defense, thus finding themselves in a nuclear war with the US for reasons not of their own choosing.
Sherman Kent
315. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, July 8, 1963.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Special Group (5412) (1963). Top Secret. Drafted by Louis Marengo on July 9. An attached list of the 24 participants is not printed. Among those attending but not reported as speaking were Harriman, Nitze, and McGeorge Bundy. Another, lengthier memorandum of this meeting prepared by George Rathjens of ACDA is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Committee of Principals 5/63-7/63. See the Supplement.
SUBJECT
Meeting of the Committee of Principals, 8 July 1963
1. Mr. Foster opened the meeting by explaining that its purpose was to consider two measures prepared in response to NSAM 239./2/ The first, a separable first stage measure, proposed 50% or 75% destruction of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and limitations on production, but included inspection of residuals only with the 75% cut and not with the 50% cut. The other, a gradual approach measure, stretched out the steps contained in Stage I of the present US proposal for GCD./3/ Mr. Foster said that he was not seeking a decision on these specific proposals today, but wanted to focus on the direction in which they led.
/2/Document 284. The proposals have not been found.
/3/Reference is to the Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, presented at Geneva on April 18, 1962. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 351-382.
2. Secretary McNamara said that he favored the gradual approach because the more extreme separable measure was unlikely to lead to agreement and had the following disadvantages: 1) It destroyed the West's nuclear deterrent against conventional aggression. 2) It gave up the West's superior nuclear power without reductions in Soviet conventional forces. 3) The inspection procedures were too loose, particularly for the 50% cut, but even for the 75% cut. 4) It had no advantage to the West as compared with the present US Stage I--it would not reduce the risk of strategic nuclear war and could increase it. Mr. McNamara preferred gradual steps to develop confidence which, in turn, might produce more substantial agreements.
3. Mr. McCone said that the separable first stage plan concerned him because of its reliance on intelligence as a substitute for inspection of residuals./4/ (50% cut) He noted that our intelligence inventory is made up principally of photographic intelligence, SIGINT, and, to a small degree, clandestine intelligence. These have improved over a few years ago but are not sufficient for us to determine residuals. Photography can be deceived by camouflage, satellites can be intercepted, SIGINT is perishable, and clandestine sources are not dependable. Furthermore, photography can tell us nothing about the number of missiles or reload capabilities, and we know very little about manufacturing complexes for missiles. In Mr. McCone's view, in brief, there was very serious danger in depending on intelligence to verify residuals because intelligence was 1) perishable, and 2) capable of being deceived. He noted, moreover, that differences would arise between the US and the Soviets over the number of arms in existence and the US could prove its case only by revealing intelligence. Furthermore, Congress and the public would want to know how good our intelligence was and it would have to be revealed. Mr. McCone felt that it was hard to overestimate the consequences of exposing our intelligence. Finally, he noted that dependence on intelligence would leave us in an uneasy position as we are now in Cuba, where the photography is of better quality. Mr. McCone concluded that we could not safely proceed on the basis of using intelligence to determine the quantity of residual arms. He felt that we would have to inspect residuals as well as the quantities destroyed. We had always taken this approach, and he felt that we should continue to do so.
/4/McCone commented at greater length on intelligence implications of the separable first stage plan in two memoranda dated July 8. (Both in Central Intelligence Agency, Special Group (5412)(1963))
4. In response to a question from Secretary Rusk, Mr. McCone said we had no evidence of camouflage, but pointed out that Khrushchev had said in 1959 at Camp David that he could hide missiles in canyons. The difficulty regarding camouflage was that one could not prove a negative.
5. General Taylor said that he agreed with Secretary McNamara and could add nothing; he said that he preferred the gradual approach. Mr. McCone said that this was his preference too.
6. Dr. Wiesner said that many comments might be made similar to those of Secretary McNamara. There was no need to abandon our present treaty without good reason; however, we now know things about intelligence capabilities that we did not know when the present treaty was tabled, so we might consider changes in the inspection provisions of Stage I. He said that our intelligence was good enough for this but agreed with Mr. McCone that we should be very careful about larger cuts--30% might be supported and maybe 50%. He added that it might be better to negotiate absolute numbers rather than percentages.
7. Dr. Seaborg said that he had nothing to add to the discussion.
8. After these statements of basic position by the key Principals, there was discussion of details and of related matters. Secretary McNamara reported that the Department of Defense was looking ahead for 10 years, that it might be possible to stabilize nuclear stockpiles, and if so, there could be some reduction in AEC production of weapons (perhaps $800 million per year). Secretary Rusk suggested that instead of formal agreements, it might be possible for the U.S. and USSR to report to each other what they plan to do unilaterally, e.g. the U.S. weapons production cut, with the hope that the other side would react to this news by cuts of its own. Mr. McNamara doubted, however, that the other side would react similarly, but instead would try to maximize its own program.
9. Mr. McCone confirmed that it was true that as of July 1st, 1963, the Soviets were at the lower end of the range of ICBMs which had been estimated by the intelligence community. He added that there was another problem which disturbed him. The Soviets had three types of long range surface-to-surface missiles--the SS-6, the SS-7 and the SS-8. There was a sharp difference as to whether the SS-8 is large--some believe it will lift 50-100 megatons. So when cutting by categories, the Soviets could retain a few missiles with enormous destructive power greater than that of the U.S. with its larger number of missiles retained. This should be kept in mind.
10. Mr. Foster said that he could not agree that the 50% or 75% cuts would not reduce the risk or destructiveness of war. He was also astonished because he thought we had enjoyed greater success than Secretary McNamara had indicated in balancing off our own conventional forces vis-?-vis those of the Soviet Union. He was also puzzled by Mr. McCone's lack of confidence in intelligence. He said that we build our forces based on intelligence so why could we not disarm on this basis? Before Mr. McCone could answer, Secretary McNamara supplied the answer--in our planning we put in a 100% safety factor.
11. Mr. McCone asked why we followed one procedure for inspection with 50% cuts and another for 75% cuts. Mr. Foster said that ACDA felt that the Soviets would accept more inspection if the cuts were deeper. Secretary McNamara reiterated his concern that we were cutting in the strategic delivery area and not in the conventional area. He wanted to retain a balance, roughly like the present balance. Mr. Fisher said that at the meetings of the Deputies, the Defense representatives had seemingly wanted to focus on strategic vehicles.
12. Secretary Rusk said there were two great obstacles to disarmament. One, the Soviets could not or would not back off regarding South Vietnam, Laos, Berlin, and military personnel in Cuba. Two, they refused to accept inspection. He felt that if the Soviets were seriously interested in disarmament, these things were not a great deal to ask.
13. There was then some conversation about the possibility of combining Stages I and II of the U.S. GCD proposal, which was inconclusive. General Taylor suggested the possibility of NATO vs. Warsaw Pact rather than U.S. vs. USSR, and Mr. Foster said that this was open. In response to Secretary Rusk's question, Mr. Foster said we were already authorized to discuss medium bomber bonfires, cessation of fissionable materials production, transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses, exchange of military missions, notification of major maneuvers, controls over military expenditures, no bombs in orbit, and certain nuclear free zones. Secretary Rusk commented that Governor Harriman had plenty to discuss. He asked if we could conceivably go to 50% across the board (including conventional). Secretary McNamara said yes, but did not answer when asked if we could do so without Communist China. Mr. Kaysen asked whether Secretary McNamara would still be concerned if there were 50% cuts in strategic delivery vehicles and 30% elsewhere. Secretary McNamara answered yes, and then made a plea for practical as against propagandistic proposals.
14. Mr. McCone expressed his concern about the continuing long-term plans of the Soviets for further increases in their arms. He referred specifically to the continuing buildup of facilities for producing fissionable materials. Secretary Rusk asked if there could be a study of damage to the U.S. from 15-20 large nuclear warheads. Secretary McNamara said this was being done./5/
/5/The study has not been found.
15. Secretary Rusk concluded the meeting by saying that some instructions would be drafted for Governor Harriman./6/ The idea of the separable measure would be kept in play, but not specific large cuts such as 75%. Governor Harriman would be authorized to explore this idea with the Soviets, and to find out, for example, how they would propose to relate strategic cuts to conventional cuts./7/
/6/Document 319.
/7/A memorandum by Rathjens, also dated July 8, of action taken at this meeting indicates that McNamara, Taylor, and McCone preferred the gradual approach as compared with the separable first-stage proposal, but that no action was recommended even on the gradual approach. The memorandum also noted "a consensus that Mr. Harriman had enough other items to discuss" in Moscow "so that there should be no US initiative relating to changes in our position relating to strategic delivery vehicles." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Documents, Volume I)
Louis Marengo
316. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, July 8, 1963, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Test Ban Backgound. Secret; Personal; No Distribution. Drafted by Harriman. The meeting was held in Secretary McNamara's office.
PARTICIPANTS
Secretary of Defense McNamara
W. Averell Harriman
The conversation, lasting 45 minutes, was relaxed, covered a wide field.
Secretary McNamara expressed his desire to have me explore any aspects of our problems with the Soviet Union. I asked him what might be proposed which would help reduce our mutual military costs, a subject in which I knew Khrushchev was interested. He mentioned the ABM program, which would be increasingly expensive as time went on, with no end in sight. (14 billion for 20 cities--Alex Johnson thinks it is 20 billion for 14 cities.)
I commented that that was a saving for the future, but what about a cutback? He mentioned first ending production of nuclear material. He would approve 50% conversion of stocks without tactical reduction; if it went beyond that, he would expect reduction in the tactical field. He mentioned particularly equipment such as aircraft, attack submarines, and tanks. He put greater emphasis on this than on number of men in the military.
He suggested further reduction in the temp [tempo?] of competition in outer-space exploration, and proposed the possibility of cooperation.
He was prepared to liberalize trade, particularly if it is part of a bargain in which we gain.
He will fully support a comprehensive test ban treaty, although he recognizes it will be more difficult with the Senate now that an offer has been made for the three environments. He feels a test ban is of grave importance.
W. Averell Harriman/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
317. Letter From Chancellor Adenauer to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, July 9, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Chancellor Adenauer's Correspondence with Presidents Kennedy & Johnson, 1963-1964, Vol. II. Secret. The source text is an unofficial translation apparently provided by the German Embassy.
MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Thank you very much for your letter of July 4,/2/ and for the confidence you have thus shown me. I have gained, I believe, useful impulses for our policy from your visit to the Federal Republic and to West Berlin as from the talks with you, I am particularly grateful for your statement that you will get in personal contact with me if there is any new development.
/2/See Document 310.
I have for the moment stopped my steps towards a contact which I had mentioned to you,/3/ because I deem it suitable for the time being to await the outcome of the negotiations between the Soviet Union and Red China. I shall continue to inform you as soon as something happens.
/3/See footnote 5, Document 310.
In the meanwhile, President de Gaulle was here. The talks with him --the confidential talks as well as the other talks--took a good course. The New York Times as well as BBC-London and anti-de Gaullist papers in Paris are publishing inaccurate reports. I have confidentially spoken to President de Gaulle in downright earnest about the community of interests of all Allies vis-?-vis the Soviet Union, telling him in particular that, whatever I do, I always ask myself: is hereby Moscow's hope of a split in the West to be strengthened or not. I suppose, President de Gaulle deems fair such a question with respect to every Ally. I have not gained the impression that he is in any way biassed vis-?-vis the United States of America./4/
/4/On July 8, Schroeder replied to Rusk's July 3 letter (see Document 311), stating that a potential non-aggression pact must not have the effect of further stabilizing the status quo, including the division of Germany and Berlin, and should be considered only in connection with measures leading to an improvement of the German and Berlin situation. Schroeder agreed that it "would be useful to explore thoroughly the Soviet position in the forthcoming talks." (Unofficial translation supplied by the German Embassy attached to German text; Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, German Officials' Correspondence with Secretary Rusk, 1961-1964) An amplification of Schroeder's letter is contained in a note from the German Embassy, July 9, attached to a memorandum of conversation held July 8 between Tyler and Georg von Lilienfeld, Minister of Embassy, by F.E. Cash of BTF. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 Berlin)
With sincere regards
Yours
K. Adenauer/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that indicates Adenauer signed the original.
318. Summary Record of the 515th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, July 9, 1963, 6:25-6:55 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, Nos. 515-517. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The time of the meeting is from the President's Appointment Book (Kennedy Library); the source text indicates it began at 6 p.m. Taylor and McCone also prepared memoranda of this meeting, and Seaborg wrote a journal entry. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, CJCS Memos for Record, T-236-69; Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President; and Seaborg, Journal, vol. 6, pp. 33-34, respectively)
Harriman Instructions for Mission to Moscow
Secretary Rusk initiated the discussion of the draft instructions for the Harriman mission/2/ by calling attention to a sentence in the test ban section of the draft which authorized Governor Harriman, if the Soviets propose a moratorium on underground tests, to explore the usefulness of responding by suggesting a limited quota of underground tests. The Secretary said that he did not think the mission should mention specific numbers unless so authorized by further instructions from Washington. The mission should be authorized to do no more than to explore the idea of a quota for underground tests.
/2/Apparent reference to a version dated July 9, drafter not indicated. (Johnson Library, Vice President's National Security File, NSC 62-63) The next previous draft, dated July 8, was prepared by Kaysen. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Harriman Instructions) The July 9 draft differs from that of July 8 in omitting some subjects from the list of disarmament measures to be explored in Moscow and contains new language stating that a non-aggression pact could reduce the possibility of another Berlin crisis. A July 5 draft is printed as Document 313.
In response to the President's question, Mr. Foster said he believed we could accept a quota of twelve underground tests without inspection. However, he pointed out that if the treaty provided for a fixed number of underground tests, other States would feel free to conduct tests and we would thereby lose the benefit of restricting proliferation of nuclear weapons. He agreed that we should accept a treaty with a quota of underground tests if that was all we could get from the Russians. He believed the Soviets could gain an advantage out of an arrangement permitting them a number of underground tests because the Russians stand to gain more from testing than we do.
Secretary Rusk said our objective is to continue to try for a comprehensive test ban treaty, accepting a three-environment treaty only as a first step toward the achievement of a comprehensive treaty. He repeated his concern about proposing any quota of underground tests to the Russians prior to consultation with our allies and appropriate Congressional leaders.
Mr. Harriman said his understanding of the instructions was that he was limited to exploring the idea of a quota of underground tests.
General Taylor asked whether the Government as a whole had considered a proposal to accept a limited quota of underground tests. He acknowledged that such a proposal had some good and some bad points, but he urged that, before approving any offer, the entire idea of a quota should be examined in detail.
The President responded by acknowledging that there might not be much for us in a quota of underground tests. He asked whether within the next week we could give detailed consideration to this idea.
In response to a question, Mr. Foster said our present test program involved twenty-five to thirty underground tests.
Secretary Rusk mentioned a second point, i.e. how we define underground tests and atmospheric tests in such a way as to make clear when an underground test becomes an atmospheric test. He said we must define precisely the cut-off point between the two types of tests.
Mr. Foster said definitions of these tests are contained in the draft treaty,/3/ and he read the following:
/3/Reference is to the U.S.-U.K. draft limited test ban treaty tabled at Geneva on August 27, 1962. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II, pp. 804-819.
Article I, Section 1--Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion at any place under its jurisdiction and control . . . in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.
Chairman Seaborg replied that our present underground tests would be legal under this definition. Little radioactive debris from our underground tests falls outside the test area and none outside the State in which the test site is located. He said it would be feasible for us to continue our underground test program under such a limitation.
Secretary Rusk said the acceptance of this definition would mean that we were prepared to limit ourselves to weapons tests which produce no fallout outside the U.S.
Secretary Rusk mentioned the third point which he suggested should be incorporated in the revision of the instructions, i.e. in a discussion of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, the Harriman mission should maintain our position that our multilateral force (MLF) proposal is not inconsistent with the goal of a non-dissemination agreement. If we did not maintain this position, we would cause great confusion among our allies and wreck NATO. He said the mission should point out that our MLF proposal actually means greater control of nuclear weapons and therefore is consistent with our effort to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons.
The President suggested that the pertinent sentence in the non-dissemination section of the instructions be revised to reflect Secretary Rusk's point. He asked what our position would be on a proposal to ban dissemination of nuclear weapons to powers which are now nuclear powers. He wished to avoid any clause which would prohibit us from giving weapons to France if we so desired.
Secretary Rusk responded by saying that the draft treaty covered this point and that the Russians had accepted our definition of the nuclear powers as being the U.S., U.K., France and the USSR. In discussion with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, Secretary Rusk had obtained Soviet acknowledgment that the four named States were nuclear powers. Mr. Bundy added that in our discussions with the Russians we should continue to take for granted that we are agreed on the four nations as being the only nuclear powers.
Secretary Rusk raised the fourth point. He asked that the instructions be revised so that there was no link between discussion of a non-aggression pact and progress in other disarmament missions. He believed that we should not now limit our discussion as to a non-aggression pact. At a later time, we may wish to tie it to Soviet acceptance of other proposals such as a settlement of the Berlin question.
Mr. Harriman asked that the phrase in his instructions be changed from "non-aggression pact" to "non-aggression arrangements." The President suggested that the present wording of the sentence on non-aggression arrangements should be revised to clarify its meaning. Mr. Bundy pointed out that Governor Harriman should make clear that all discussions about non-aggression arrangements would be ad referendum to our allies.
The President suggested that the sentence referring to the desirability of an agreement not to put weapons of mass destruction in orbit should be strengthened. He thought that such an agreement would be useful to us. Secretary McNamara agreed with the President's observation.
In response to Secretary Dillon's question as to what areas we were referring to in the sentence mentioning nuclear-free zones, Secretary Rusk said we were thinking of Latin America and Africa--not the Far East.
The President raised the question as to our dealings with the British on matters arising from the Harriman mission. Mr. Bundy acknowledged that there was considerable suspicion of British motivation. He said many believed that Macmillan wanted a tripartite summit conference, even if there was very little substance for the three principals to discuss and agree upon. He said we should discuss with the British and reach a procedural agreement with them in an effort to hold to an absolute minimum the amount of information made available to the press about the Moscow negotiations. He suggested a procedure whereby each day a joint statement would be made about the developments in Moscow.
The President recalled a conversation with Lord Hailsham who took the position that the British could sign what the Russians proposed and they could sign what the Americans proposed./4/ The President concluded that Hailsham clearly envisages himself as a mediator between us and the Russians. Mr. Bundy mentioned Ambassador Bruce's nervousness about the personal attitude of Hailsham./5/
/4/This conversation has not been identified.
/5/In telegram 5148 from London, June 19, Bruce described Hailsham as a "brilliant, honorable, somewhat impatient man. For considerable time to come, as a potential Prime Minister, he will, I suspect be fully occupied with domestic politics, until a successor to Macmillan is selected." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman)
The President said the reports of the negotiations should be held to a minimum distribution. He agreed that we should limit ourselves to press guidance once a day. He suggested that a personal letter be drafted for him to send to Prime Minister Macmillan calling attention to the importance of keeping the negotiations out of the press. (Copy of the letter is attached.)/6/
/6/Dated July 10, not found attached. The text was transmitted in telegram 273 to London, July 11. (Ibid.)
Secretary Rusk agreed that Harriman's reports should be held very closely. He suggested that a special category of "Eyes Only" messages be established which would result in his receiving reports in a single copy. Further distribution in the State Department would be his decision.
The President raised the question as to whether a test ban agreement would be signed in Moscow or at a summit meeting. He expressed the view that the Russians might make a summit a condition to signing the test ban agreement.
Secretary Rusk said we should conclude an atmospheric test ban treaty if the Soviets agreed and sign it in Moscow if they wished. He shared the President's view that the Soviets would not sign at any meeting other than a summit conference.
Mr. Bundy raised the question of how we deal with the French in connection with an atmospheric test ban. Secretary Rusk said we would keep the French informed. Mr. Bundy felt that de Gaulle would find it almost impossible to sign any agreement which had been reached by the U.S., U.K. and the USSR at a summit conference.
Secretary Rusk stated he believed that it might be necessary to hold a general conference at which other States would sign the test ban treaty. The President agreed that it might be necessary to hold such a conference in order to get other States to sign. Secretary Rusk said we should not permit the French to have a procedural veto on such arrangements.
The President asked how we thought the Russians would discuss a test ban treaty with the Chinese./7/ Mr. Harriman replied that he would try to raise this subject with the Russians but he was personally doubtful that they would discuss this subject with us./8/
/7/In a conversation with Australian Prime Minister Menzies on July 8, Kennedy noted that the Sino-Soviet dispute was "the key and the negotiations in Moscow very much depended upon developments in the Sino-Soviet dispute." (Memorandum by Roger Hilsman; ibid., DEF 18-3 USSR(MO))
/8/During a telephone conversation with syndicated columnist Marquis Childs on July 4, Harriman stated that "he felt the big thing on Khrushchev's mind [is] relations with the Chinese." (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, June-July Telephone Conversations 1963)
In response to the President's question, Secretary McNamara said he accepted the Harriman instructions and had no comment to make. He added that he felt General Taylor had some views which he wished to express as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
General Taylor said that the Chiefs individually had taken the position that a limited test ban treaty, as well as a limited test ban treaty with a quota of underground tests, was not in the national interest./9/ Two of the Chiefs, General LeMay and Admiral Anderson, had already expressed their personal views to the Stennis Committee./10/ General Taylor asked that a governmental review be made of the atmospheric test ban treaty to determine now whether it was in the national interest. He asked that the Committee of Principals review the entire proposal again in the light of developments during the past year. Such a review would include a review by the Chiefs as well as by other agencies of the Government.
/9/See footnote 14, Document 294.
/10/See footnote 12, Document 294.
Secretary McNamara said that each Chief will express his opinion on the treaty to the Stennis Committee.
This testimony will be the personal views of the individual Chiefs of Staff. He opposed a formal review by the Chiefs or by the Government as a whole because it would record again a difference of view. He hoped we could avoid a formal statement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body of its view of a test ban treaty.
The President agreed that we should not ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their formal position because we wished to avoid a statement of their collective judgment becoming public and resulting in press speculation as to differences within the government. He felt that if the Russians accept our treaty, we will have to fight for it in the Senate, win, lose or draw.
General Taylor repeated his request for a review of the test ban treaty in order to take into account developments during the past year.
Secretary McNamara again stated his opposition to such a review on the grounds that there was wider diversity as to the advisability of a treaty this year than there was last year. He feared that any such review would leak to the press while Harriman was en route to Moscow.
Secretary Rusk said we must now take the position that an atmospheric test ban is in the national interest. He said the time to review such a decision is behind us and that we have not [sic] based all our actions on the decision that we wanted to have an atmospheric test ban treaty. If we are not ready to try our best to get an atmospheric test ban treaty, then we should turn Harriman around.
The President suggested that following the meeting Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and General Taylor discuss this point further with him in his office./11/
/11/In his record of this meeting, Taylor wrote that at the meeting in his office the President expressed dissatisfaction with the Stennis Committee for having the JCS testify on a "test ban proposal which might never be seriously considered by the government," expressed "understanding" of the JCS position on both the comprehensive and atmospheric test ban proposals, and said that the JCS would have their "full day in court before the Senate if and when a formal treaty proposal" got that far. Meanwhile, Kennedy hoped that the JCS "would express their personal views as required by Congress but avoid doing anything capable of affecting adversely the Harriman discussions."
The President then asked what we would do if China exploded a nuclear bomb a year after the treaty came into effect. He acknowledged that the Soviets could be properly concerned if France explodes a nuclear bomb following signature of a test ban treaty.
Mr. Foster read from the draft treaty the provisions covering the explosion of a nuclear weapon by a non-treaty power. (Article III states that if a nuclear explosion has been conducted by a State not a party to the treaty under circumstances which might jeopardize the determining parties' national security or if a nuclear explosion has occurred under circumstances in which it is not possible to identify the State conducting the explosions, a State may request a conference of the treaty parties. At the conclusion of this conference, or after sixty days after the request for a conference, a treaty power can withdraw from the treaty by giving notice. The withdrawal takes place sixty days after notification of intent to withdraw.) Mr. Foster added that one advantage of the treaty was to advance toward our goal of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He said our signature to a proposed draft treaty created no threat to the existing military balance. He believed that opinion within the Government was heavily in favor of going ahead with the effort to get a test ban treaty.
In response to the President's request to Mr. McCone for comment, Mr. McCone said he had none./12/
/12/Wiesner called Harriman at 11:30 a.m. on July 10 and said that while he did not wish to raise the issue at the NSC meeting, he thought Harriman's instructions "on the comprehensive test ban" were "unduly restrictive." Harriman "said to talk it over with Carl. He was the drafter. Harriman said he was never inhibited by instructions." (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, June-July Telephone Conversations 1963)
Bromley Smith/13/
/13/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
319. Instructions for the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)/1/
Washington, July 10, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, Nos. 515-517. Secret. Another copy is attached to NSC Action No. 2468, July 9, which states that the President approved the revised text after the 9:30 a.m. meeting; see Document 320. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Regarding earlier drafts of the instructions, see footnote 2, Document 318.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR HONORABLE W. AVERELL HARRIMAN
Your mission involves both negotiating and exploratory aspects.
On the negotiating side, you should seek to negotiate the most comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty possible in accordance with existing guidelines.
On the exploratory side, you should canvass, in so far as appears practical, the range of issues involving peace and security which divide us from the Soviets. You should give especial attention to two points:
1. What other acceptable measures of disarmament the Soviets are interested in undertaking;
2. What are Soviet intentions in dealing with the problems related to European security, as raised in Khrushchev's speech of July 2.
I. Test Ban
1. Our judgment that a test ban treaty is in the national interest rests on two grounds. First, it may be a significant first step toward the halting of the arms race and thus reduce international tensions. Second, and more important, it is an indispensable first step toward the limitation of the further diffusion of nuclear weapons. The prospects of a further increase in the number of powers possessing nuclear weapons poses a potentially serious threat to our security and to world stability and peace. Therefore, a test ban treaty must be viewed in relation to the problem of checking the further diffusion of nuclear weapons.
2. Accordingly, the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty outlawing testing in all environments remains our objective. However, Chairman Khrushchev's speech makes it unlikely that we can reach agreement with the Soviets on a comprehensive treaty at this time. Therefore, we should seek an agreement banning testing in three environments along the lines of the August 27, 1962, draft treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in atmosphere, outer space and underwater, presented to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. You are authorized to carry such negotiations as far as you can.
3. The achievement of such an agreement should be viewed as a first step toward the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty. If the Soviets show an interest in pursuing the topic, you should initiate technical discussions with the Soviet Union which may resolve the present disagreements between the Soviet Union on the one hand, and ourselves and the United Kingdom on the other, on the need for inspections in any comprehensive test ban treaty. The Soviets may, in one way or another, raise the issue of a moratorium on underground tests. If the Soviets do this, you may explore the usefulness of responding to such an initiative by means of a limited quota of underground tests in addition to the total prohibition of testing in other environments, but without discussing specific numbers, unless on further instructions./2/
/2/The part of this sentence beginning with "but" is new.
II. Non-Dissemination
1. You should continue to emphasize the relation between the nuclear test ban treaty and our desire to control the diffusion of nuclear weapons. In pursuing this subject, you should be guided by the talks on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons between Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Dobrynin. You may indicate that the United States will endeavor to secure adherence to or observation of any non-dissemination agreement by those powers associated with it, if the Soviet Union is willing to undertake a parallel responsibility for those powers associated with it./3/ In this connection, you should maintain our position that the MLF proposals now under discussion are not inconsistent with the goal of a non-dissemination agreement./4/
/3/In the July 9 draft this sentence reads: "You may indicate that the U.S. is willing to take some responsibility in respect to non-dissemination with relation to those powers associated with it, if the Soviet Union is willing to take a corresponding obligation for the powers with which it is associated."
/4/This sentence is new.
III. Other Measures of Disarmament
1. Our talks on general and complete disarmament in the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva have made little progress. Recently Foreign Minister Gromyko made a proposal which at least raises the question of whether or not the Soviets are willing to consider serious first-stage disarmament measures not tied to an agreement to proceed rapidly to complete and general disarmament on terms which we have always found unacceptable. Gromyko's proposal still presents serious problems, including the question of the extent of reduction of strategic nuclear forces in relation to the reduction of other forces. Nonetheless, you should explore the possibility that the Gromyko proposal is intended to open a serious discussion of separable first stages, on terms to which we can respond.
2. In addition, you should attempt to discover Soviet interest in other measures previously authorized as separable measures. These include, but need not be limited to:
a. An agreement not to put weapons of mass destruction in orbit. This is a matter of particular interest to the United States./5/
/5/This subparagraph is new.
b. A halt to the production of fissionable materials, under appropriate safeguards, and in combination with the transfer from military stockpiles of agreed quantities of fissionable materials to peaceful uses. In this connection, you should be prepared to discuss an arrangement in which we transfer more fissionable materials than the Soviets.
c. An agreement to establish nuclear free zones in areas where nuclear weapons do not form an integral part of the security arrangements upon which the countries in the areas rely. (This refers to Latin America and Africa.)/6/
/6/The parenthetical sentence is new.
d. The scrapping on a one-for-one basis of B-47's and Badgers at a rate to be agreed.
e. Measures on the reduction of risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication.
IV. Other Measures
1. Chairman Khrushchev, in his speech, stated a connection between the test ban treaty and a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pacts. Neither the degree of this connection nor the nature of the proposals to which Chairman Khrushchev referred are clear. In exploring Soviet intentions in this respect, you should be guided by the following objectives:
a. If possible, we should separate the non-aggression arrangements/7/ from the test ban treaty and other disarmament matters. We should press the discussions on these, and defer to a later date the further discussions of non-aggression arrangements. We would prefer to go as far as possible in discussing the three environment test ban treaty first, and then explore other measures of disarmament, as well as the Soviet proposals for non-aggression arrangements./8/
/7/"Arrangements" replaces "pact."
/8/The phrase "go as far as possible in discussing" replaces "conclude."
b. Even if it proves impossible to agree on this procedure it is useful to explore Soviet purposes. The phrase, "non-aggression pact", has been loosely used to cover a wide variety of possible arrangements about the way in which relations between Eastern European Communist states and Soviet Russia on the one hand, and the NATO allies on the other, are conducted. In discussing these arrangements, we must continue to make clear that we can accept no arrangement which formally recognizes the East German regime or which is inconsistent with the ultimate reunification of Germany as a policy goal./9/ Further, we can make no arrangements which do not insure the present Western position in Berlin. In all these matters we must take into account the interests of our allies. Within these constraints a non-aggression arrangement could be advantageous to the West by reducing the possibility of further Berlin crises. Accordingly, you should explore Soviet purposes in advancing this suggestion, and the possible modes which, in the Soviet view, would meet these purposes.
/9/In the July 9 draft, the latter part of this sentence reads: "or which renounces the ultimate reunification of Germany as a policy goal."
2. You should also be prepared to explore any other matters which the Soviets wish to raise under the general heading of improving relations/10/ between the Soviet Bloc and NATO; or between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the context of such a discussion, you may wish to raise the problem of enforcing the Geneva Agreements in Laos.
/10/"Improving relations" replaces "reducing tensions."
320. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, July 10, 1963, 9:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Harriman Trip to Moscow. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Kaysen. A copy was sent to Bundy and Harriman.
The President met with W. Averell Harriman in his office at 9:30 A.M. on July 10 for a final discussion of Governor Harriman's mission to the Soviet Union. Messrs. Bundy and Kaysen were also present.
The President opened the discussion by remarking on the relation of the Harriman exploration to U.S.-German ties. He felt that as a result of his visit the Germans and we had come to a better understanding, and they were less anxious about us. Further, this was reflected strongly in popular feeling, as well as on a governmental level. He was willing to draw on this feeling as much as seemed useful if there was something to be achieved by it. On the other hand, he thought it was futile to repeat the experience of the '61 discussions on Berlin. These lengthy talks with the Soviet Union had achieved nothing tangible, and aroused great suspicion in Germany.
The President then raised the question of whether or not he wished to meet at the summit with Khrushchev. He recognized that Macmillan would push strongly in this direction. He quoted Lord Hailsham's remarks to him, observed that Hailsham wanted to play the role of mediator between Khrushchev and Kennedy as F.D. Roosevelt had between Stalin and Churchill. For his part, the President thought a summit, especially a summit involving Macmillan as well as himself, would create difficulties in the U.S., in Germany and France. A bilateral meeting between himself and Khrushchev, such as the one in Vienna, would be less troublesome in this respect. However, in spite of the troubles, the President would be willing to pay the price if it proved necessary. In response to Governor Harriman's question, he said, if necessary, he would go to a summit meeting just to sign the test ban treaty covering three environments, although he was concerned about the effect such an action would have on our relations with France.
Governor Harriman mentioned China/2/ and Cuba as problems he might explore. In response, the President indicated that it remained his desire to see all the Russian troops out of Cuba by the end of the year; the advantages of having a restraining Soviet hand on the SAMs seemed to him outweighed by the advantages of liquidating the problem.
/2/In a July 9 paper prepared for Harriman entitled "Points to be Explored with the Russians," William H. Sullivan, Harriman's Special Assistant, listed as the first two points "an indication of the degree of Soviet concern over the Chinese Communist nuclear weapons program" and "an exchange of estimates concerning the problem of the Chinese Communist ability to detonate a nuclear device." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Test Ban Background III) See the Supplement.
Governor Harriman observed that there was an important question as to how could we give Khrushchev something that got him off the hook in Germany. He mentioned Khrushchev's approving quotation of Walter Lippmann's view that the Berlin wall gave the Soviets what they would have gotten from a peace treaty. Harriman went on to quote Khrushchev's phrase, "the acceptance of the two Germanies as they now exist."/3/ The President said that one of his impressions from his German trip was that the strength of feeling in Germany on reunification was great, while the immediate concern about the security of Berlin has lessened. It is clear that a recognition of the permanent division of Germany was not now acceptable to the Germans. The President observed the desirability of getting something along the lines of Brandt's suggestion which would help ease the human situation.
/3/This formula had been used by Khrushchev on a number of occasions since 1958.
Governor Harriman raised the question of our trade with the Soviet Union, and pointed out that Khrushchev would like to increase it further. The European nations supply much of what they want anyway, but it was a matter of pride with Khrushchev. The President agreed that we should be forthcoming on this issue if it came up.
Our position on the MLF then came up. The President said that our first response to this issue should be to repeat our argument that it was consistent with the purposes of non-dissemination, in accordance with the agreed instruction. If, however, there seemed to be some purpose in going beyond this in terms of the China problem or otherwise, Harriman should be guided by his judgment of how useful it was to indicate to the Soviets that in certain circumstances we might not need to go forward with this proposition. But in no event should Governor Harriman give any specific assurances on the MLF.
Governor Harriman reported Secretary McNamara's views on how far McNamara thought it would be wise to go on a first stage disarmament proposal. The President thought it was rather unlikely that there would be any serious discussion on this point.
The President raised the question of Laos and indicated the importance of repeating our dissatisfaction with the present situation and our desire for the Soviets to live up to their commitments there. Governor Harriman responded that this of course brought up all the questions of Soviet-Chinese relations, and whether or not the Soviets were able to influence the situation in Laos. Again the President said that Governor Harriman's judgment should govern his action.
Carl Kaysen/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
321. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, July 10, 1963, 3:45-4:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR(MO). Confidential. Drafted by Beigel and approved in S on August 6. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office.
SUBJECT
Harriman Talks in Moscow
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Ambassador Herve Alphand, French Embassy
Mr. Pierre Pelen, Counselor, French Embassy
Mr. William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. Edgar J. Beigel, WE
Ambassador Alphand called at his request to say that the personal views he had given to Under Secretary Ball on this subject had now been confirmed as the views of the French Government. He summarized these views as follows:
1. The French position is well known that a nuclear test ban agreement is not a disarmament measure and in fact would consolidate the position of countries that have already developed nuclear arsenals. The agreement would not be of interest to France, which must consider its own requirements, although it would not object to the agreement reached by others.
2. A further non-aggression agreement that Khrushchev suggested would seem to be useless and to be merely one element out of the general program presented at Geneva in 1959. The French Government believes that such an agreement: (a) would merely reiterate commitments under the U.N. Charter; (b) is dangerous because one way or another it would constitute recognition of the GDR; and (c) would bless the political status quo in Europe. Ambassador Alphand said that France fears the political and psychological effects of such an agreement. He said that the French Government understands that Khrushchev would want such an agreement in order to represent it as a victory to the Soviet people as well as to the satellites, to gain the "legalization" of the satellites.
3. Any future moves by the West to counter Soviet moves in Berlin or elsewhere might be considered as violating the non-aggression agreement.
4. A non-aggression agreement would give rise to a false illusion in France as well as serious problems were the French Government later to ask for greater sacrifices from the French Parliament and people.
Ambassador Alphand said that France has always wanted something fundamental from the Soviets, something that would contribute to a real d?tente.
Ambassador Alphand then referred to a telegram from the French Embassy in London summarizing a UPI dispatch of July 8 which quoted a Foreign Office spokesman as saying that the Western delegations in Moscow will be authorized to discuss a number of questions: a non-proliferation plan, measures to avoid war by accident, and general problems of disarmament including a non-aggression agreement. He said that he did not know whether this was also U.S. policy for these talks. He thought that the discussions should be limited to the nuclear test ban agreement, and that no gestures should be made toward Khrushchev.
The Secretary said that we do not know the real Soviet attitude on the test ban question, and that we have no information beyond the Khrushchev speech in East Germany. The Ambassador interjected that Khrushchev did not speak of a moratorium on underground testing although this had indeed been part of the earlier Soviet proposal. The Secretary went on to say that we are prepared to discover that the Khrushchev speech is not the entire Soviet position. He said that we could accept an agreement to end tests in all three environments. He said that unless the Soviets are willing to accept considerable inspection arrangements we would not agree to stop underground testing, and we would certainly not accept an uninspected underground test moratorium. He said that we do not know what the fine print will say on the Soviet side.
The Secretary said that on other disarmament questions there will be no change from the positions we have been taking at Geneva. He said that if the Soviets raise these issues, Mr. Harriman would stick to the Geneva positions.
The Secretary said that we do not know whether the test ban question will be linked to a non-aggression agreement,/2/ that this has been obscure in the Soviet public statements, although it is likely that the Soviets will raise the subject. He said that in this event Mr. Harriman will listen, and will point out that this is a matter for the NATO Alliance to consider. The Secretary said that we have already expressed our own concern about a non-aggression agreement along much the same lines as outlined by Alphand. He said that any suggestion of recognition of the GDR is important to us and we must be extremely careful about this. He noted that Ambassador Dobrynin had in conversation said that the Soviet Union would be flexible with regard to the form of such an arrangement, but may have been speaking only personally on this point. He said that we are also concerned about illusions should any non-aggression agreement be followed by a Berlin crisis, and he had emphasized this to Dobrynin.
/2/According to a memorandum by John C. Guthrie, Director of EUR/SOV, of his conversation on July 5 with Alexander J. Zinchuk, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy, the latter stated that the linkage "had not been explicit but in view of the fact that there would be no moratorium on underground testing under the partial test ban agreement, a non-aggression pact was necessary to add 'reassurance' to those concerned by continued testing underground." Zinchuck "indicated that his reading of the Khrushchev speech was that the linkage was clear." (Ibid., POL 7 US/Harriman)
The Secretary felt that the Alliance should not close the door on this question until we can see more clearly what develops within the Sino-Soviet bloc. He noted that there are those in Paris who have said that the Soviet position may change due to relations with China. He believed we should keep things open to see how the situation develops as well within the satellites and between the satellites and the Soviet Union. He noted that Kadar may ask for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and that difficulties are developing with Rumania.
The Secretary reiterated that Mr. Harriman is only going to hold a "listening brief" at Moscow. He noted that M. Spaak would be reporting to the NAC on July 12/3/ and said that we will report the Harriman discussions promptly to the Alliance.
/3/Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister, was in the Soviet Union part of the second week of July. In a letter to Kennedy dated July 11, Spaak described a conversation, apparently on July 9, in which Khrushchev stated that he thought an accord on a partial test ban treaty could be reached. While Khrushchev did not link such an agreement with a non-aggression pact, "it seemed" to Spaak that "he considered that no accord on disarmament was possible if the German situation was not clarified." (Text in telegram 58 from Brussels, July 11; ibid.)
Ambassador Alphand said that there are many ways to conduct a listening brief. The Secretary responded that Mr. Harriman will only want to find out what the Soviets are talking about. Ambassador Alphand went on to illustrate his remark by saying that we might ask about unilateral declarations in lieu of a non-aggression agreement. The Secretary said that Mr. Harriman may probe on the question of form, that we are already studying questions of substance. He pointed out that it would be very difficult to expect U.S. ratification of any agreement with members of the Warsaw Pact.
The Secretary repeated that he had warned the Soviet Ambassador regarding any Berlin crisis that might follow any kind of non-aggression agreement.
Ambassador Alphand said that in the French view they prefer not to link the test ban and non-aggression agreement, that it would in fact be impossible to link the two subjects.
The Secretary said that we must consider this subject against the context of the Berlin situation, and that an illusory non-aggression agreement would be both wrong and dangerous. He went on to say that if a significant change in the situation is in the offing, if the captive nations turn out not to be so captive, then the entire context would be reviewed.
Ambassador Alphand said that in his view a Soviet commitment not to make a Berlin crisis would not be a very worthwhile exchange for a non-aggression agreement.
The Secretary then turned to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and said that our question in Moscow will be whether the Soviets accept the U.S. proposals as a basis for negotiation. He said that if they do, we will report this development to the Alliance. He recalled that Couve de Murville had indicated that France would have to study this carefully if the Soviets accept our proposals. He noted that we are not in an apologetic mood on this since the Soviets have already assisted the Chinese in this field.
The Secretary said that Mr. Harriman would also be prepared to take up again with the Soviets the situation in Laos.
Ambassador Alphand said that he had further word from Paris on this subject, indicating that France would agree to reinforcement if Phoumi would be more cooperative with them.
The Secretary said that there were no other subjects that Mr. Harriman intended to raise in Moscow.
Mr. Tyler noted that we expect a member of the Belgian delegation to Moscow will go to London to brief Mr. Harriman on the Spaak-Khrushchev talks.
322. Position Paper Prepared in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency/1/
Washington, July 12, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 245. Secret; Restricted Data. Attached to a July 12 note from Foster to Bundy.
ACDA POSITION ON U.S. DEVELOPMENT OFVERY HIGH YIELD WEAPONS
Abstract
ACDA considers that the proposed development of a very high yield lay-down weapon by the U.S. for B-52 delivery would, when publicly known, have adverse effects on arms control negotiations, on acceptance of U.S. strategic doctrine and on the credibility of past U.S. statements that Soviet testing of very high yield nuclear weapons did not result in a change in the military balance. Moreover, such a development appears to contemplate continued retention of the manned bomber in the U.S. force structure for a period extending indefinitely into the future. From the arms control standpoint, ACDA believes there is a serious question as to the desirability of accepting indefinitely the manned bomber's destabilizing effects on the strategic situation.
ACDA views with even greater concern the likelihood that, in effect, approval of the present proposal would commit the U.S. to a broader program for the development of very high yield nuclear weapons for delivery by missile. Such a program would entail atmospheric nuclear testing, initiation of a new missile development program, and large political and economic costs and would result in a weapon system inherently destabilizing in nature.
From the arms control standpoint, the course represented by these proposals would represent a major escalation of the arms race, would seriously jeopardize present and future efforts to bring the arms race under control, and would severely increase international tensions.
ACDA is not aware of military considerations which would justify acceptance of these disadvantages./2/
/2/The U.S. Government did not reach a decision on a very high-yield weapon during 1963.
[Here follows a 10-page analysis.]
323. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State/1/
London, July 12, 1963, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman. Secret.
232. From Harriman./2/ After lunch by Prime Minister for principals in both US and UK teams,/3/ he asked me to stay on for discussion alone.
/2/Harriman and his party left Washington on July 11. He was accompanied by Fisher; Kaysen; Tyler; McNaughton; Long; Frank E. Cash, Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs; Alexander Akalovsky, Political Affairs Divison, International Relations Bureau, ACDA; Neville E. Nordness, Public Affairs Adviser, ACDA; and Frank Press, a consultant with ACDA.
/3/The meeting with British officials the morning of July 12 is reported in telegrams 233 and 234 from London, July 12, marked "Eyes Only--Ban from Harriman." Hailsham raised questions about the draft limited test ban treaty of August 27, 1962, which Harriman insisted on presenting to Khrushchev. Hailsham acknowledged, however, that his instruction was to agree to whatever the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on a three-element ban. In a separate talk among Harriman, Bruce, and Home, it was agreed that every effort should be made to obtain a test ban untied to a non-aggression arrangement and that the United States and the United Kingdom would in Moscow make the test ban the first order of business, followed by nuclear non-dissemination and a non-aggression pact, in that order. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman) See the Supplement. "Ban" was a handling indicator for the test ban talks and denoted special restricted handling and distribution procedures.
1. Although he obviously would like a summit meeting, provided an agreement on some subject could be reached, he understands disadvantage of delaying agreement on test ban if it is obtainable. He specifically agreed that we should attempt to conclude test ban if it could be done untied to other issues. On the other hand, he strongly urges a summit meeting if that is only way an agreement can be reached on test ban or other desired objectives. He suggested possibility of Western summit meeting, with Adenauer and de Gaulle, to thrash out subjects other than test ban.
2. He understands that to satisfy France, some special arrangement must be made in order to obtain France's adherence to test ban and non-dissemination. He volunteered to do the job.
3. He suggested we drop word "pact" and develop new term for non-aggression arrangements which might be more palatable to Germans.
4. He agreed to instruct Hailsham to support our position on any points of disagreement, specifically, as example, our unwillingness to accept any Soviet proposal on moratorium on underground testing.
5. He agreed that since subject of Red China is so sensitive, I should raise it with Khrushchev alone. He also volunteered that it would be better for me to discuss Laos and Cuba without Hailsham.
6. We discussed press arrangements covered by exchange of letters with the President, and indicated that he personally would see that understandings would be carried out on British side./4/
/4/At the afternoon meeting between the U.S. and British groups, the United States obtained British agreement that any non-aggression arrangement would have to include a guarantee of Western access to Berlin. The groups also considered measures ensuring against a surprise attack, a cut-off of fissionable materials production, and a ban on bombs in orbit as possible items for discussion in Moscow. (Telegram 236 from London, July 12, marked "Eyes Only--Ban from Harriman"; Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman) See the Supplement.
Bruce
324. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
Washington, July 12, 1963, 8:11 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only Ban. Drafted in the White House by McGeorge Bundy. Also printed in vol. VI, Document 108.
306. For Harriman from Bundy.
1. The President is informing Prime Minister directly that we are not enthusiastic about his "volunteering" to do the job in paragraph 2 of your 232./2/
/2/Document 323. White House telegram CAP 63382 from Bundy to de Zulueta, July 12, states that the President was glad that Macmillan agreed that if a limited test ban (or a non-dissemination agreement) was obtained it would be necessary to "take steps" to obtain French agreement. "The President believes that it would be necessary for our two Governments to consult closely about any such discussions, and he believes that it would be essential to act in concert on this matter which is so near the center of our whole problem with General de Gaulle." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban Correspondence 7/12/63-8/7/63) This telegram was repeated as telegram 173 to London, July 13, marked "Eyes Only--Ban" and "For Harriman from Bundy." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)
2. The President wants you to know that expressions of strong French and German opposition to non-aggression arrangement increased and that it is greatly to our advantage not to link limited test ban to such arrangements if at all possible. You may wish to argue with Khrushchev that such a link would merely strengthen hands of those who are against improvement in relations in all countries, while nevertheless it is a fact that test ban agreement in itself would make it easier for good sense to prevail on other issues of which non-aggression arrangement is one.
3. Presidential letter to Khrushchev follows and is for your delivery in any way you see fit. Message open for amendment if you wish to recommend any./3/
/3/Harriman and Kaysen requested this letter in an undated and unnumbered telegram to Bundy in order "to ensure Harriman reception in right mood and to keep discussion at top level. Understand Hailsham will be delivering message to Khrushchev from PM." (Communication channel not indicated; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Harriman Mission Cables 7/12-7/18/63)
"Dear Mr. Chairman:
I am sending this message by the hand of Averell Harriman, whose visit to Moscow with Lord Hailsham is one that I hope may have important positive consequences for peace.
I am sure you know, but I want to say again, that Mr. Harriman comes with my full personal confidence and is in a position to give you my thinking not only about the problems of disarmament but about other issues as well. I have chosen him also because of his clear record of sympathetic understanding of the Russian people and his service to our common cause in the critical days of World War 2.
As Governor Harriman will explain to you, we continue to believe that it will be best if we can get a comprehensive agreement on the end of all nuclear testing, and we regret the continuing difference between us on the question of the nature and number of the inspections which would be necessary to give confidence in such a comprehensive agreement. I can only repeat again that there simply is not any interest in using such inspections for espionage of any sort, but I know from your recent statements that you have not accepted this explanation. In these circumstances, I believe that we should continue with our efforts to resolve this difference, but in the meantime I share the view which you have put forward in your important statement in Berlin that it is sensible to reach agreement where agreement is now possible, in the area of testing in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space. Governor Harriman will explain that we continue to be in favor of such a more limited agreement and that we are encouraged by your statement in Berlin to believe that it is now possible.
I will not take your time in this letter to go into greater detail on this and other questions, but will merely repeat my conviction that we are at a moment in which it is important to make progress together. For this reason we attach great importance to Mr. Harriman's visit.
My wife joins me in sending our good wishes to you, to Mrs. Khrushchev, and to all your family.
Sincerely, John F. Kennedy"
Ball
325. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, July 15, 1963, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret. Received at 5:45 p.m. Another set of the telegrams documenting the Moscow test ban negotiations is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2284-2286.
151. From Harriman. Hailsham and I had discussion with Khrushchev this afternoon lasting over three hours./2/
/2/Telegram 154 from Moscow, July 16, is a 20-page account of this meeting, which began at 3 p.m. and ended at 6:20 p.m. (Ibid., Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) See the Supplement. Kaysen's handwritten notes of this conversation are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Harriman Mission, Records/Actions. Telegram 154 states that before the conversation began, Harriman handed Khrushchev Kennedy's letter transmitted in Document 324.
Conversation opened with general remarks on desirability of relaxation of tensions and protection against risk of nuclear war.
Khrushchev stated that he would not permit any inspection in connection with test ban, and withdrew the two or three inspections which he had previously proposed. He added, however, that he would permit an increased number of black boxes. Since there was obviously no use arguing point, Hailsham and I recorded that both our governments would prefer comprehensive test ban but that we would be prepared to agree to test ban in three environments without inspection, as a first step towards the comprehensive agreement.
Khrushchev tabled two draft treaties, one covering the three environment test ban,/3/ and one covering NAP./4/ In order to divert attention from NAP, I inquired about non-dissemination. Khrushchev indicated his willingness to discuss it along the lines of Soviet previous proposals.
/3/A partial text is in telegram 153 from Moscow, July 15. The preamble includes France as a sponsor and signatory. The first article states that "each party to this agreement undertakes to discontinue the carrying out, in any locality, of all kinds of test explosions of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space, in territorial waters or on the high seas." The second states that the treaty shall enter into force upon signature, and invites adherence by all nations. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO))
/4/Not found.
He then suggested a series of other steps:
First, freezing of military budgets at 1963 levels.
Second, return to earlier proposal to protect against surprise attack, i.e., establishment of fixed control posts within certain specified zones, at rail junctions, major roads, airfields and ports.
Third, agreement on level of armed forces now located in the FRG and GDR.
I asked whether he wanted to discuss reducing his military budget or rather taking steps which would have that effect. He indicated a readiness to do so but maintained that he was going to reduce his military budget anyway, since Soviets now had enough missiles and he wished to increase his investment in chemical industry and agriculture. He paid his compliments to the insatiable demands of his Generals which he claimed he was resisting.
We then came back to the test ban and I gave him a copy of the three environment test ban treaty we tabled in Geneva./5/ Hailsham and I insisted that France be eliminated from Soviet draft. Although we accepted Khrushchev's contention that it was important to get France to join after the three of us had concluded agreement, he agreed that France could be dropped from Soviet draft as original signatory.
/5/See footnote 3, Document 318.
This gave me opportunity to open up problems with China and although considerable time was spent on the subject we got very little info. Khrushchev maintains that it will be some years off before China is a nuclear power and did not indicate particular concern. He commented that only US and USSR can "accumulate nuclear weapons." UK and France can't and China wouldn't be able to.
It was thereupon agreed that we would study the Soviet draft and the Soviets would study our draft over night and that we would meet with Gromyko tomorrow to discuss them. There was no further discussion of NAP. Gromyko, however, tried to get into the communiqu? consideration of documents, which we suspected was an attempt to include NAP in our next conference. However, it was made quite clear by Hailsham and myself that we would meet with Gromyko tomorrow in attempt to reach an agreement on text test ban and treaty and nothing else. It seems quite clear to me that Khrushchev is ready to go ahead with three environment test ban without NAP, but I feel sure Gromyko will make another attempt tomorrow to link the two.
Soviet test ban draft unsatisfactory in form but not in intent. We will probably run into heavy weather in attempting to get reasonable treaty language, but it is our impression that Khrushchev wants an agreement and will accept the three environment test ban without commitment on other subjects.
A good half of the time was spent in listening to Khrushchev's plans for economic development, particularly in agriculture and chemical industry, and a certain amount of levity, some in good nature and some with barbs attached, particularly when referring to trade and pipe.
Khrushchev was in good mood. Although anxious to impress us with his desire to make progress in the fields under discussion, he seemed to prefer not to get into details. Other points of particular interest were:
1. He accepted France without question as a nuclear power.
2. Regarding NAP he said lawyers ought to be able to find language to avoid Western recognition of East Germany which was not his aim.
3. He reaffirmed his strong interest in German peace treaty along lines of July second speech.
4. He warmly praised President's June tenth speech which he thought required courage to make.
Kohler
326. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/
Washington, July 15, 1963, 9:01 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret. Drafted by President Kennedy and cleared by McGeorge Bundy and Benjamin H. Read, Executive Secretary of the Department of State.
191. For Governor Harriman from the President. Your report/2/ is encouraging on limited test ban and you are right to press for that without link to NAP. You are also right to keep French out of initial treaty, though I continue to be prepared to work on French/3/ if Soviets will work on Chinese, and you should make this clear as occasion offers.
/2/Document 325.
/3/In telegram 205 to Moscow, July 16, marked "Eyes Only--Ban" and "For Kaysen from Bundy," stated that Kennedy asked Bundy "to be sure that Harriman understands his intent to discuss test ban agreement with French in terms outlined by Bohlen to Couve. I have assured him that this is well understood, but you may wish to repeat to Averell the President's concern on this point and his desire that negotiations leave path open for such discussion and possible resulting arrangements." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) Regarding Bohlen's conversation with Couve de Murville, see Document 295.
I remain convinced that Chinese problem is more serious than Khrushchev comments in first meeting suggest, and believe you should press question in private meeting with him. I agree that large stockpiles are characteristic of US and USSR only, but consider that relatively small forces in hands of people like ChiComs could be very dangerous to us all. Further believe even limited test ban can and should be means to limit diffusion.
You should try to elicit Khrushchev's view of means of limiting or preventing Chinese nuclear development and his willingness either to take Soviet action or to accept US action aimed in this direction.
Rusk
327. Editorial Note
In his memorandum of the White House staff meeting held July 16, 1963, Bromley Smith stated that the "latest version" of JCS views on a limited test ban was "probably the most comprehensive" paper on the subject in the government. He noted that it "would be useful" to show the paper to Bundy. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, July 1963, T-203-69) Smith's reference may be to the undated draft paper JCSM-543-63, a proposed memorandum from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, which stated that while a limited test ban treaty had fewer disadvantages than a comprehensive one, "it could continue the USSR lead in high-yield technology," and allow significant opportunities for Soviet cheating. A limited test ban treaty would also deny the United States the opportunity to conduct important atmospheric effects tests; to eliminate "some uncertainties" in the survival of a hardened, fixed-base second-strike force; and to conduct training exercises with tactical weapons. The paper concluded that a three-element test ban "would be militarily disadvantageous" and that "there must be overriding nonmilitary considerations favoring such a treaty for it to be in the national interest." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban, U.S. Military Views) See the Supplement.
The language "overriding non-military considerations" was suggested by the Joint Staff on July 10. Taylor favored instead the phrase "there must be compensating non-military considerations." Generals Wheeler and LeMay both wanted the original language, which was approved at a JCS meeting held July 16. The JCS did not, however, forward the draft to McNamara. (Walker S. Poole, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, volume VIII: 1961-1964, Part 1, The Structure of National Defense (Washington, 1983), pages 399-400)
328. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, July 16, 1963, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret. No time of receipt is indicated.
166. From Harriman.
1) At meeting/2/ in friendly atmosphere with Gromyko, Zorin, Tsarapkin, main points three element test ban treaty including each point in Article I/3/ and much of US-UK language accepted by Gromyko. Although NAP raised briefly, not pressed at this point, and further discussion NAP postponed until next or later meetings.
/2/Apparently held the afternoon of July 16. A full account of this meeting, at which the principals were accompanied by their advisers, is in telegram 186 from Moscow, July 17. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.
/3/Of the U.S.-U.K. draft limited test ban treaty that Harriman had presented the previous day; see Document 325.
2) Two significant points of difference arose, on peaceful uses (Art. II) and withdrawal (Art. III).
3) Soviets objected to peaceful uses clause on two arguments: (a) as further exception to comprehensiveness of treaty, in addition to exception of underground tests, would detract from political value, worldwide appeal of treaty, and (b) underground testing already provides for possibility peaceful uses and experiments directed thereto.
Harriman urged need for peaceful uses provision, suggested US would find it easier to give up II(2) if Soviets could take II(1) seriously./4/
/4/Article II reads: "The explosion of any nuclear device for peaceful purposes which would take place in any of the environments described, or would have the effect prescribed, in paragraph 1 of Article I may be conducted only: (1) if unanimously agreed to by the original parties; or (2) if carried out in accordance with an Annex hereto, which Annex shall constitute an integral part of this Treaty." Concerning Article I, see Document 318.
4) Soviets objected to withdrawal clause on grounds casts doubt on seriousness of intentions contracting parties, and unnecessary. Gromyko repeated remarks on France Khrushchev made yesterday./5/ Harriman and Hailsham argued importance withdrawal clause as protection to parties, and Harriman underlined importance China to US./6/ Gromyko remained unmoved. Harriman made clear US would not dispense with adequate withdrawal clause.
/5/Telegram 186 states that Gromyko "wished point out that in agreeing, for reasons indicated by Khrushchev, to having no specific reference to France USSR proceeded from premise that if France should continue testing after agreement signed Sov Govt would have to examine situation resulting therefrom."
/6/According to telegram 186, Harriman commented that the United States would "feel differently re withdrawal provision if Sovs could assure us that CPR would adhere in some reasonable time or that it would not become danger to mankind, which might necessitate" a resumption of U.S. testing.
5) Our present thought is to sacrifice peaceful uses clause for trade against withdrawal clause. Since Soviets have accepted US-UK amendment clause (IV)/7/ in principle, possibility of peaceful uses via amendment still open. In our judgment, satisfactory withdrawal method clearly necessary, peaceful uses not essential.
/7/This article provided that any party to the treaty could propose amendments to the treaty and that the amendments would enter into force upon ratification by two-thirds of the parties.
6) Alternative language of achieving effect present withdrawal clause under consideration. Soviets suggest each side make desired reservation instead of withdrawal clause. Soviets will make reservation which would by inference cover France.
7) Three-party drafting session tomorrow morning covering as much as has been agreed and whatever else seems useful.
Plenary session with Gromyko again tomorrow afternoon. It is likely we cannot then avoid discussion NAP. If it arises we plan to bring up non-dissemination and other matters raised at yesterday's meeting.
8) Need your reactions peaceful uses and withdrawal problems, welcome other advice.
Kohler
329. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, July 17, 1963, midnight.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Eyes Only; Ban, Received at 10:29 p.m.
182. From Harriman. This message contains more detailed summary of day's transactions promised Embtel 180./2/ Further details on test ban negotiations with texts of articles agreed so far follows septel,/3/ as does much more detail [garble--plenary?] session in another septel./4/
/2/Telegram 180, July 17, contained a text of the daily joint tripartite press statement on the test ban talks and gave an extremely brief statement of developments in the negotiations. (Ibid.)
/3/Telegram 183 from Moscow, July 18, (Ibid.)
/4/Telegram 184 from Moscow, July 17. (Ibid.) Telegrams 183 and 184 are in the Supplement.
1. Only business at dinner was Harriman's suggestion to Gromyko he wished see Khrushchev privately as soon as convenient. Was not pressing, since he knew Kadar/5/ was here and Khrushchev busy.
/5/Janos Kadar, Prime Minister of Hungary.
2. Progress on test ban was good. Article I was agreed by working party. After much fencing, and with reference at close of discussion to Harriman argument on importance withdrawal clause to assist President in winning consent of Senate to treaty, Gromyko appeared to accept withdrawal clause in trade for our abandoning peaceful uses clause. Had already tried tactic suggested Deptel 207/6/ para (2) and failed. Deal was not consummated, but tone in which Gromyko said he would consider matter further left little doubt in our minds. Further details except for disputed articles referred drafting committee, including preambulatory language. On this was considerable wrangling in plenary on merits of Soviet draft and language drawn from McCloy/Zorin statement of agreed principles on disarmament.
/6/Telegram 207, July 17, referred to telegram 206 to Moscow, July 16, which had concurred with Harriman's intention to "seek a deal in which peaceful uses clause might be traded against adequate withdrawal provision with understanding that peaceful uses might be restored via amendment either on ad hoc or general basis." If Article II were dropped entirely, Harriman was to make it understood that "Article I language on nuclear weapon test explosions included peaceful uses explosions in prohibited environments or with prohibited effects." Telegram 207 amended this instruction by suggesting Harriman try to get Soviet approval of clause (1) of Article II, in order to get additional Congressional support. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) Regarding Article II, see footnote 4, Document 328.
3. Gromyko then raised non-aggression question, using Harriman proposal language of today's communiqu? as springboard. Gromyko pointed out "in passing" that extent to which this and future communiqu?s could reflect progress will depend on progress made in discussion non-aggression pact./7/
/7/According to telegram 184, Harriman "expressed desire to get communiqu? to President in time for Wednesday press conference," whereupon Gromyko noted "in passing" that "degree of optimism which could be expressed in this communiqu? and future ones depended on progress which could be made on NAP." For text of Kennedy's statement on the test ban negotiations made at his press conference held on Wednesday, July 17, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, p. 566.
4. US and UK agreed that useful move to discuss non-aggression arrangements and other matters that Chairman Khrushchev and they had raised Monday. Both made point these matters involve Allies, require their agreement. We could only explore and not commit them.
5. Harriman then commented on Soviet document/8/ as follows: accepted Khrushchev's statement that form could be such as to avoid issue of recognition of GDR, and recognizing that this was matter for consultation with allies, now considered substance. Preamble and paras (1) and (2) of Soviet draft appear constructive and acceptable, except that language reflecting form of arrangement must be changed suitably. Consider it appropriate to add article after para (2) on fixed control points, along lines discussed by Khrushchev Monday./9/ This could give substance and concreteness to non-aggression arrangements, by providing against surprise attack. Further, another additional article needed to refer to West Berlin. Make clear interference with access would be covered by agreement. Suggested something along lines of following might be useful:
/8/See footnote 3, Document 325.
/9/July 15; see Document 325.
"In order to create conditions favorable to achievement of purpose this declaration, parties agree there will be no interference with access to West Berlin and no change in present situation West Berlin without prior agreement." (Note: This read, not given to Sovs as text.)
6. Hailsham, without commitment to language, accepted principle involved.
7. Gromyko responded in strong negative fashion, beginning with statement he was greatly disappointed. Clear US/UK remarks did not promote progress in discussion of non-aggression pact, to which USSR attaches great importance. He repeated Khrushchev's remarks on form of treaty, but attacked US/UK attempts to broaden its content. To add items on control posts and Berlin would go beyond boundaries of non-aggression pact, lead to danger of losing concept by moving to different subjects, even though important in themselves. Characterized raising these additional questions as inappropriate; reminded us that our non-dissemination proposals did not refer to great many extraneous subjects. Discussion free access to West Berlin leads to extending discussion to free city of West Berlin, GDR sovereignty, and German peace treaty. Also failed to understand so much discussion of consultation allies. This obvious, could be done, and representatives were competent to speak for own governments. [garble] his first response by remarking signing of test ban and simultaneous signing of non-aggression pact would produce great changes in world and be in interest of three powers represented.
8. Response by US and UK repeated essential nature of dealing with West Berlin situation. Soviet draft did not define aggression as covering interference with Berlin access; therefore clause bringing such possibility within agreement necessary. While other items added because Khrushchev had suggested them, this item had different and vital status. Harriman pointed out that while stoppage of access might not be defined as aggression, US and NATO would consider it so and would react violently. Accordingly we must have clause dealing with this problem. However, we desired no one-way arrangement, the interests of all are involved, and we came prepared also to include language on boundary lines and demarcation lines which would be of interest to USSR allies, if USSR so desired. Harriman then suggested adjournment and further consideration.
9. After discussion of communiqu?, already reported, meeting adjourned, to reconvene 3 PM tomorrow July 18, drafting session on test ban 12 noon tomorrow.
10. Comment: Tomorrow, when Gromyko's attitude reveals Khrushchev's reactions, we will know where we stand. As of tonight, it looks as if we are in for some long arguments. Soviets may hold up agreement test ban as pressure on us for non-aggression pact.
Kohler
330. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, July 18, 1963, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Operational Immediate. Received at 10:55 a.m.
193. From Harriman and Kaysen.
1. Question arises how hard to play continuing discussion of comprehensive treaty. Should we make best efforts to highlight it or have it at low key. Sov disposition appears to be along latter lines.
2. Something to be said on both sides. On one hand, President has repeatedly stated our goal is comprehensive treaty. Prime Minister has echoed this. Further, it is clear comprehensive ban more effective in relation to non-diffusion problem.
3. On other side, emphasis on comprehensive at this moment appears to diminish value of three environment treaty. This undesirable both internationally and at home. Further, at least theoretical problem arises that undue emphasis on continuing effort toward comprehensive might lead to argument in Senate that ratification should be postponed to await comprehensive.
4. Our own instincts go in direction of low key treatment. This issue will become operational problem when we get to discussion communiqu? language. Also may arise earlier, especially with you in relation to press.
Await your reaction./2/
/2/In telegram 221 to Moscow, July 18, midnight, the Department agreed that "low key treatment comprehensive treaty desirable at this time" but stated that it was important that "ultimate desirability of comprehensive ban be supported in negotiations and in public discussion even though in low key." (Ibid., DEF 18-4)
Kohler
331. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, July 18, 1963, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Operational Immediate; Ban. Received at 12:43 p.m.
195. From Harriman. Have decided unless instructed otherwise to play down further discussions nondissemination and to request Hailsham do the same. My reasons are:
(1) Sovs including both Khrushchev and Gromyko have shown no interest and in fact brushed subject off on several occasions. I have used it, of course, as one approach to hammer away at China.
(2) If we do pursue it, Soviets will in all probability interject MLF and our nuclear weapons in Europe, which would compel me to retreat from this subject.
(3) I am beginning to piece together a logical theory on why Khrushchev is interested in test ban at this time.
Obviously, his first preoccupation is his battle with ChiComs and particularly effect on Soviet leadership of international Communist movement. Khrushchev wants to use the test ban treaty in this connection. Since he is unable to get the ChiComs to agree to join the test ban, he will attempt to isolate them. He will attempt to get the maximum number of nations to adhere to test ban treaty, thus leaving the Chinese isolated if possible as the only nation refusing to cooperate on this highly emotional subject to the underdeveloped nations. This explains his particular emphasis on France's adherence.
This theory was substantiated by talk I had about Red China with Yuri Zhukov/2/ at Spaso House. When Zhukov was in Washington last year he told me that test ban agreement was imminent. When I asked him about the participation of Red China, he replied that if the US and USSR agree, world opinion would force Red China to adhere. I referred to this conversation yesterday and asked him whether his opinion had changed, and whether there was some other way of getting China to agree, since I doubted world public opinion would affect Peiping. He then explained in some detail that "all 130 countries" should be induced to adhere to test ban treaty and then the pressure of the underdeveloped countries, particularly in Africa, would be extremely great.
/2/Foreign editor of Pravda.
Since ChiComs want to make headway in gaining the support of these countries in competition with Soviet Union, such a situation as Zhukov described would obviously give Moscow a trump card to play against ChiComs.
I will of course do everything I can to explore this theory in further conversations. So far there is some accumulation of evidence to substantiate it. The theory, however, is still too nebulous to accept or to let it affect our negotiating tactics. I have pressed subject of China whenever possible, both in my talk with Khrushchev and Gromyko, so far without anything to show for it, but will continue to raise subject.
Kohler
332. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/
Washington, July 18, 1963, 9:29 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only--Ban. Drafted by Rusk; cleared in draft and substance with the President, Thompson, Ball, Bundy, and Read; and approved by Rusk. All those officials participated in a meeting on the test ban negotiations held at the White House from 6:30 to 7 p.m. that day. At the outset, "the comment was made that the Moscow delegation had ?pact fever' and needed to be slowed down." In the course of the meeting, agreement was reached on several of the instructions contained in telegram 237. (Memorandum by Bromley Smith; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Test Ban Negotiations, Harriman Trip) See the Supplement.
237. Following is President's guidance as of 8:00 pm, July 18:
1. Test Ban Agreement
(a) Withdrawal Provisions. We cannot accept withdrawal clause unrelated to occurrence of nuclear tests and therefore find Soviet version contained Embtel 208/2/ unacceptable. Language of Soviet version would allow any party to withdraw at any time by merely declaring that, in its unilateral judgment, extraordinary circumstances have jeopardized its supreme interests. This is dangerously similar to what happened when Soviets resumed testing in 1961. Alleged extraordinary circumstances could be a mere pretext. The Senate and the American public would almost certainly reject treaty on ground commitments illusory./3/
/2/In telegram 208, July 18 (received at 3:20 p.m.), Harriman reported that at the plenary meeting that day, Gromyko "made a strong pitch" on the importance of the NAP and also tabled a version of the withdrawal article to be adopted if the others dropped the peaceful uses article. The Soviet text reads: "This treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary circumstances have jeopardized the supreme interest of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the treaty three months in advance." Harriman recommended acceptance of this text and removal of the peaceful uses article. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) A longer account of this meeting is in telegram 211 from Moscow, July 18. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.
/3/This point was made by Ball at the 6:30 p.m. meeting at the White House. "He added that when the Soviets resumed testing in 1961, their justification for their action was approximately the same as proposed in the withdrawal clause."
Believe you should hold firmly to withdrawal clause along lines of that set forth in Embtel 183,/4/ adopting as a fall-back language in Deptel 218./5/ The defect in Deptel 218 is that it does not provide either notification period or statute of limitation for renunciation. Therefore, if you have to fall back on Deptel 218 language you should insert those two additional conditions.
/4/See footnote 3, Document 329. This U.S.-U.K. proposal reads: "It is the anticipation of the parties that this treaty shall remain in effect indefinitely and shall be adhered to by all states, particularly those states that could be in a position to carry out an explosion prohibited by this treaty. If a party determines either that another party has failed to observe the terms of this treaty or that any other state has taken action which the parties have bound themselves herein not to take, the party will be free to reconsider its position. It is hereby understood and agreed, however, that the party may not withdraw from the treaty without first both consulting the other parties to the treaty and giving notice of at least 60 days. Such notice is effective only if given no sooner than 60 days and no later than 120 days after the determined date of the failure or action upon which the withdrawal is based."
/5/In telegram 218 to Moscow, July 17 (drafted by Rusk and cleared with McGeorge Bundy and Foster), Rusk emphasized Senate insistence on a withdrawal provision and suggested this text: "This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely subject to the right of a party to withdraw and be relieved of obligations hereunder if the provisions of the treaty (and its Annexes) are not being fulfilled and observed or if any party to this treaty determines that nuclear explosions in prohibited environments or with prohibited effects have been conducted by a State not a Party to this Treaty under circumstances which might jeopardize the determining Party's national security." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)
(b) Article I. We agree to Article I as set forth in Embtel 183/6/ eliminating phrase in brackets. However, text as drafted contains possible ambiguity since repetition of phrase "the carrying out" might indicate that limitation of qualifying clause listing environments applies only to "other nuclear explosion." To remove ambiguity we suggest that article be reworded to read either: "To prohibit and prevent the carrying out of any nuclear explosion including weapons tests" or "the carrying out of any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion."
/6/Paragraph 1 of the text of Article I in telegram 183 reads: "Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes (except as provided in Article II) to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of any nuclear weapons test explosion and the carrying out of any other nuclear explosion at any other place under its jurisdiction or control: A. in the atmosphere, above the atmosphere, in outer space, or in the territorial high seas; or B. in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted." Article II was the withdrawal article.
(c) Peaceful Uses. We agree to drop Article 2 on peaceful uses as requested Embtel 208.
(d) Formalizing Agreement. If three-environment test ban discussions go well, you will be required at some point to indicate view as to how agreement should be formalized. As President made clear in his press conference Wednesday, such agreement must be submitted for Senate ratification. If Soviets raise point you are authorized to state that President's June 10 statement that U.S. would not be first to test again in atmosphere will continue to apply pending ratification, and assume that Soviets would adopt same policy. If satisfactory draft agreed, our current thought is that you and Hailsham should return to capitals to report, without signing. Within a week of your return to Washington you would go back to Moscow with high-ranking U.S. delegation led by Secretary of State and including Senators of both parties for official signing. All our soundings indicate great importance of maximum Senate consultation and involvement. Moreover, President does not wish to come to Moscow at this time, and we believe that Moscow as locus for signing is important to Soviets and is a concession against which this next to summit level can be bargained. However, if Khrushchev and Hailsham both press hard President might be prepared to meet Khrushchev and Macmillan at some neutral point outside of Soviet Union for signature, but you should not agree to any summit meeting without further instructions.
(e) Depository Arrangements. We would prefer to have UN as depository but recognize this raises question of Communist China and others. We would therefore be agreeable to a neutral depository, preferably Switzerland or Austria. Alternatively we would be prepared to have each of three original signatories act as a depository notifying the other two of the receipt of new signatures.
(f) Approaching Additional Signatories. You should explore how Soviets contemplate approaches to other potential signatory parties. Our preference is that this be covered by language in final communiqu? urging adherence by all other states, to be followed up through diplomatic channels by original signatories.
(g) Adherence of East Germany, North Korea, etc. To permit adherence of entities that we do not recognize as states would suggest treaty language be modified to permit adherence by "all states or governmental authorities recognized by any of the original signatories." Thus in accepting adherence we would not raise question of recognition./7/
/7/This instruction was superseded by telegram 263 to Moscow, July 21 (drafted by Foster, cleared by the President and Bundy, and approved by Read). The language "states or governmental authorities" was not necessary because of "legal advice that this [existing language] does not constitute recognition of any unrecognized country signing subsequently because of multiple depositories." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)
2. Static Observation Posts. While we understand your tactic of pushing for inclusion of this subject in NAP, we think that long-range objective should be to deal with static observation posts proposal independently. Whether or not NAP fails, we see value in achieving satisfactory static observation post agreement. Suggest you draw out Soviets on nature of zones they have in mind. FYI and for use in your discretion, we would favor inclusion of all of Soviet Union and United States. End FYI.
Would be desirable to end up with agreement that each side consult their Allies, leaving open how matter would be further pursued. We would be prepared, however, to transfer further discussions to Geneva.
3. Nonaggression Arrangement.
(a) Avoiding Tie to NAP. President remains deeply concerned that any tie to NAP be avoided both to prevent trouble with French and Germans and to avoid criticism from influential supporters of test-ban at home.
(b) Need for Broad Agreement. You should, of course, maintain position that we could not contemplate nonaggression arrangement unless it were broadened to include provisions relating to the security and stability of Berlin.
(c) Communiqu?. Believe language reference communiqu? your 191/8/ would unduly alarm Germans and French. We could, however, agree to following text: "The Three principals discussed the Soviet proposals for nonaggression arrangements under which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact would confirm their intention to comply strictly with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter in their relations with one another. It was agreed that the three Governments would inform their respective Allies in the two organizations fully about these talks and consult them with a view to further consideration of this subject."
/8/Dated July 18. (Ibid., DEF 4 Warsaw Pact)
4. Freezing Present Level of Forces in GDR and West Germany. Obviously this is unsatisfactory if limited merely to the two Germanies. Soviets could build up forces in other satellites and USSR, while US would have difficulty building up additional US forces outside of Germany. Even if Soviets prepared to broaden this proposal to include stabilization of force levels in all satellites, we do not feel this is a profitable subject to pursue at this time.
5. Proposal for Freezing Budgets. Experience shows that our ability to increase our defense budget in the face of threatened Soviet aggression is one of the most effective sanctions we command. Moreover, we do not believe it feasible to develop effective system of restraint through a budget-freezing in view of the special character of the Soviet economic system and the ability of the Soviet State to control costing and conceal expenditures. You should, therefore, make it clear, if Soviets seriously advance a proposal along this line, that we do not believe this is fruitful course to pursue. As a means of heading off serious consideration this question you might emphasize that any arms control through budgets would necessarily entail highly elaborate inspection arrangements.
6. With respect to both budgets and levels of forces, however, you should say--but not in communiqu?--that US does not seek any increase in arms race--but rather the reverse--and if there can be growing confidence and genuine relaxation of tensions we would hope that force levels and budgets on both sides would begin to come down both by agreed measures of disarmament and by other actions which each side could take by its own decision. Unless international tensions increase, it is our current expectation that our 1964 military budget will be in the same general range as that submitted for 1963.
7. Nondissemination. Agree your recommendation in Embtel 195/9/ that you play down further discussions and request Hailsham to do the same.
8. Trade. If Soviets again inject issue of increased trade, you might reply that the US also is sympathetic to the idea of improving commercial relations and developing trade between our two countries. As the Soviets know, this involves complex technical questions on US side but we are making a fresh review of the possibilities in this field and it may be possible to work out some solutions of these technical problems. One of the difficulties is that the Soviets seem primarily interested in the purchase of prototypes of our sophisticated machinery and thus in obtaining our technology at low expense to themselves. We could take much more forthcoming attitude toward expansion of trade between our countries if we could work out ground rules between us that would include provision for the protection of industrial property (patents, copyrights, etc.) and protection against dumping. This seems necessary in order to facilitate trade between capitalists and state trading systems. We would be interested in their reaction to the possibility of working out such ground rules.
/9/Document 331.
Rusk
333. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, July 19, 1963, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Flash; Ban. Received at 4 p.m.
222. From Harriman.
1. Today's meeting (July 19) lasting little over two hours centered on discussion of the withdrawal clause. Harriman proposed new language in accordance with instructions Deptel 237,/2/ as follows:
/2/Document 332.
"This treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decided that any nuclear explosion has occurred in the prohibited environments which has jeopardized the supreme interest of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the treaty three months in advance, such notice to be given within nine months of the date of the explosion referred to."
2. Gromyko rejected the article rather brusquely. His arguments pointed to elements unacceptable to Sovs: objected to mention of violation of treaty and to limitation on inherent right of sovereign to withdraw treaty in its own supreme interests. Latter, of course, principle of Sov draft withdrawal clause.
3. Harriman reacted sharply, reiterated importance of elements our draft to US. Said Gromyko's immediate rejection failed to show serious consideration of important US position and intimated that issue was a breaking point. By end of meeting, temperature had dropped but issue remained as sharp as ever. It was agreed to discuss matter further at eleven a.m. tomorrow.
Flavor of proceedings given by Gromyko's response to Hailsham's question at end of meeting, summing up his position. It is undesirable to have direct reference to violation or to nuclear explosions. It is better to use broader language, which would cover explosions. Of course, all of us would understand that this is what is referred to, although it goes without saying any state could exercise sovereign right to withdraw. We have no intention of carrying out nuclear explosion and we believe you have no such intention. (While this language not direct quotation, approximately repeats Gromyko's words.)
4. It is not clear to us why Sovs are so firm on this point. Character of discussion showed this not simply the means of tying further progress on test ban treaty to discussion non-aggression pact. Although some have suggested that derogation of Sov theory on state sovereignty in relation to treaty limitations on right to withdraw is explanation, Harriman and others believe it is related to China which is today Soviet overriding preoccupation. Acceptance of our draft would constitute open admission US pressure on Sovs to do something about Chinese nuclear threat. Sovs unwilling make such admission.
5. At close of meeting, Gromyko repeated Sov desire to have simultaneous signing of non-aggression pact and called it main difficulty in these negotiations. This was his second mention of this subject; the other was in the course of his first remarks.
6. Hailsham supported us in meeting although his instructions allowed him to accept Sov draft. We were not surprised that he argued strongly to accept, pointing out how unhappy PM and British public would be if negotiations broke down.
7. Unless otherwise instructed, plan to sit tight. Welcome advice soonest. If we can think of any redraft that seems to offer hope, will send it for instructions.
8. Full report of meeting including some discussion preamble follows soonest./3/
/3/A full report of the plenary session is in telegram 223 from Moscow, July 19. It does not include discussion of the preamble. Telegram 224 from Moscow, also July 19, contains a U.S. draft of the preamble, submitted at the drafting committee meeting that morning, and U.S. language submitted at the plenary session to meet the instructions in telegram 237 to Moscow regarding Article I. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) Both are in the Supplement.
Kohler
334. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/
Washington, July 19, 1963, 8:13 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only Ban. Drafted by Foster, cleared by Rusk and Ball, and approved by Read.
248. Your cable reporting July 19 discussion and providing text new US Del withdrawal clause/2/ relayed to Hyannisport. This message provides Department guidance. If further guidance indicated will forward Saturday.
/2/Document 333.
1. Withdrawal Clause
Agree you should sit tight because Soviet version withdrawal clause would produce totally illusory arrangement subject to cancellation on 90 day notice for any reason whatever. Senate would undoubtedly reject. Draft language you suggest is satisfactory.
Suggest temperature might be lowered by informal and discursive discussion of reasons for clause you have proposed and Western concept difference between power to abrogate treaty and right to withdraw under terms of treaty. Confident Fisher-McNaughton can provide orchestration. Theme is that state always has power to withdraw from treaty if supreme national interest jeopardized. However, if treaties are to have dignity which we and Sovs seek to give them, there can be no right to withdraw unless some other party violates, unless events occur which constitute exception recognized by international law, or unless treaty itself provides for withdrawal. Does not reduce dignity of treaty to provide for withdrawal. On contrary, if withdrawal occurred under circumstances on which both sides now agree, but no provision existed in treaty giving withdrawal right, dignity of treaties in general reduced. Neither power to abrogate nor state sovereignty diminished by treaty provision giving right of withdrawal.
2. Press
Press reports here from Moscow are insistent that US delegation is proposing simultaneous unilateral declarations regarding nonaggression as means of going forward with NAP discussion. Since any suggestion that we are seriously negotiating NAP can create problems with our allies, Mission should make clear to Hightower of AP or others that these stories do not reflect actual situation./3/
/3/In telegram 229 from Moscow, July 20, the delegation replied that it had constantly drawn a line between negotiation of the test ban and exploratory discussion of other topics, that the distinction was understood by the American press. The telegram reported that John Hightower of AP and Seymour Topping of The New York Times had stated that their cable desks had "dropped or rewritten part of their file, thus distorting or coming forth with incomplete views on points they discussed." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO))
Rusk
335. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, July 20, 1963, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Flash; Eyes Only; Ban. Received at 11:19 a.m.
233. From Harriman.
1. Today's plenary meeting (lasting little more than one and a half hours) focused entirely on test ban matters. Non-aggression pact was not mentioned in meeting although communiqu? bears usual reference to "other matters of mutual concern."
2. Major point of discussion was withdrawal article. Gromyko, commenting on Harriman's description of Sov formulation as broader than the US could accept, said this matter had been given particular consideration, as a result of which he had some new language which he thought would meet US needs. Revised Sov draft he then handed us is as follows: (informal translation from Russian draft.)
"This treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
"Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary circumstances, related to the contents of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all others parties to the treaty three months in advance."
In our judgment, this is as far as Sovs will go in specifying tests by others as the basis for withdrawal. With added clause, treaty less subject to criticism that agreement is illusory. On this point, our best judgment is that pressures on Soviets to stick with treaty will not in fact be substantially affected by exact phrasing of the clause, although we appreciate that congressional and public reaction will be sensitive to every word of the article.
Re possibility that new clause may go too far, discussions show that both Khrushchev and Gromyko are perfectly clear in their minds that this clause covers the cases of particular concern: France to them, and China to us.
Our judgment reported Embtel 195/2/ as to reasons for Sov position is strengthened by report to us from Washington of editorial from ChiCom People's Daily 19 July:
/2/Document 331.
"ChiCom People's Daily 19 July editorial 'Expose US Nuclear Fraud' states more explicitly than past propaganda reasons for ChiCom opposition to test ban. While indicating ChiComs would not be deterred from nuclear-weapons development by test-ban agreement, editorial clearly shows concern that such agreement would receive wide approval from peoples and 'peace partisans' throughout world. Says given people's struggle against nuclear weapons, 'it is only natural' they will pin hopes on tripartite Moscow talks. Editorial also says while US goes on manufacturing nuclear weapons, it can use test agreement to 'create pressure of public opinion to prevent socialist countries other than USSR from conducting tests.'"
CAS Washington comments as follows "Editorial's expression of hope that Soviets will not fall into trap of partial test ban accord is preceded by blatant jab that USSR alone is keeping nuclear weapons from its allies."
3. Fisher and McNaughton agree the Soviet language covers the major part of our problem adequately if not perfectly. The word "contents" is the translation given to us [for?] the Russian "soderzhaniye." We could translate this word also as "subject matter" although this not normal translation from Russian. (Smirnitsky's Russian-English dictionary gives "subject matter" among possible alternate translations.) Fisher-McNaughton judgment "subject matter" preferable term for congressional and public use, but not much in it. Perhaps could get this as agreed English text since there is no separate Russian word which translates "subject matter" directly.
4. Soviet draft gives no peg on which to hang statute of limitations element in our draft since it difficult to date on "extraordinary circumstance" in the same way that nuclear explosion or other specific event can be dated. In our judgment it would not be possible to insist on statute of limitations element in any event since it was not in our August 27, 1962, draft, which tabled at outset of these talks. In any event, long-past event can hardly be reasonably argued to create circumstances which "have jeopardized the supreme interests" of the complaining party. Accordingly, recommend we drop this as necessary element of withdrawal clause.
5. Harriman requests authority to accept Soviet draft on withdrawal with whatever translation of "soderzhaniye" we can get. Delegation concurs./3/
/3/In a July 21 message to Kennedy, Macmillan stated that the new Soviet language met "the real point," which was that "withdrawal should be related to the contents of the treaty. So I hope that you will have been able to authorize Harriman to accept it." (Unnumbered telegraphic message received through White House channels; Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy, 1963-1964, vol. V)
6. Drafting problems other articles reported separately./4/ Full record of meeting follows soonest./5/ Next meeting 3 P.M. 22 July: Drafting committee 11 A.M.
/4/See Document 336.
/5/In telegram 239 from Moscow, July 20. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) See the Supplement.
Kohler
336. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, July 20, 1963, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Operational Immediate. Received at 2:30 p.m.
238. From Harriman and Fisher. At the plenary today agreement was reached on the proposal to settle the preamble along the lines proposed by the US in the drafting committee.1 The text reads as follows:
Verbatim text begins. The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the "original parties,"
Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,
Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances,
Have agreed as follows: end verbatim text.
At the plenary Harriman called attention to fact that Article I of treaty draft circulated by Soviets at prior meeting contained differences in language from that previously agreed by drafting committee and adopted by plenary. He stated that US wish to stand upon revised language submitted July 19 involving changes reported Embtel 224./2/ English translation of Article I contained in Soviet draft reads as follows:
/2/See footnote 3, Document 333.
Begin verbatim text. 1. Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes to prohibit and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control: (A) in the atmosphere, and beyond its limits, including outer space, or underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or (B) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted on the understanding that upon the achievement of an agreement to ban all nuclear tests, all such tests shall be prohibited also in the environments referred to in this subparagraph.
2. Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear explosion anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect prescribed, in paragraph 1 of this article. End verbatim text.
Discussion of this new text focused primarily on last three lines Soviets added to paragraph 1(B), Gromyko arguing that this was necessary because this treaty had, in effect, created a new environment, the underground test which resulted in radioactive debris outside the territory, and Soviets wanted to be sure that a treaty banning underground tests did not result in tests in this new environment not being banned. Despite some general indications of non-objection by Hailsham, Harriman indicated that the preamble referred to our desire to negotiate comprehensive ban, that subsequent treaty would stand on its own two feet, and that it was unwise to refer, in a treaty, to another treaty that had not been negotiated. He also pointed out prior US language had a long history of study. Gromyko argued no intention to prejudge separate treaty. After meeting Sov Del sent to US Del new language of (B) which they said would clarify questions raised.
Begin verbatim text. B. In any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted, bearing in mind that the matter of prohibiting nuclear tests in the environments referred to in this subparagraph shall be settled by an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear tests. End verbatim text.
This Soviet suggested Article I, coming at this stage, raises a variety of problems which will be discussed at a meeting of the drafting committee Monday morning. Specifically, we hope at that time to find out what the Sovs driving at in their proposed para 1(B).
Kohler
337. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, July 22, 1963.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Memos for Record 6/5-7/20/63. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone.
SUBJECT
Special Meeting at State Dept.--21 July--re Test Ban Agreement
ATTENDING
Secty. Rusk, Secty. Ball, Mr. Bundy, Secty. McNamara
Secty. Gilpatric and Mr. McCone
A special meeting was held at State Department on Sunday, 21 July, at 10:00 o'clock to consider the Congressional problems in connection with the test ban agreement being worked out by Gov. Harriman in Moscow.
1. There was general agreement the test ban negotiations were reasonably satisfactory./2/ I took the position that withdrawal clause related to the content of the treaty with 60 to 90 day's notice was all right. I favored a shorter rather than a longer notification. Also I urged that any reference to underground tests be stricken from the text of the treaty inasmuch as the treaty was limited to 3 environments. This was agreed. I also advised that I felt there would be some problems in connection with the outlawing of peaceful uses and this would almost certainly cause the Atomic Energy Commission to oppose the treaty. I urged that some organ be included in the treaty to permit reopening of this subject at a later date.
/2/In a memorandum of a telephone conversation with Lewis Strauss on July 22, McCone stated that Strauss had indicated his unhappiness with the prospect of a limited test ban treaty. McCone had "responded that I could not now oppose the atmospheric ban in view of my consistent position favoring such a ban since March 1959 when the idea was first proposed by President Eisenhower." McCone also stated his belief that missile system testing could be valid without explosion of the nuclear components. (Ibid., DCI Memoranda 3/1/62-4/30/65)
2. McNamara suggested that we now develop a White Paper on the pros and cons of the test ban, i.e. whether such a ban would be in the interest of the United States or not. This subject was debated at some length. I took the position that such an appraisal should not be made, we had passed the point of decision in this regard, that we must recognize that the Chiefs and, to a lesser extent the laboratory directors and such men as Edward Teller, would protest the treaty, that I did not think the protest would be particularly well received by either the public or the Congress; stated I thought to try to reappraise the situation now would leak to the Press and would cause a rash of criticism that the Administration was trying to find out if a certain move was in our best interest long after we had publicly endorsed the idea. I therefore urged that a paper be developed giving the rationale and the arguments supporting the treaty and let opposition and criticism fall where it may. This approach was generally accepted and McNamara withdrew his proposal.
3. I was asked to determine the attitudes of Senator Pastore and Senator Anderson. Following the meeting I talked to Anderson. He endorsed the proposed treaty and stated that he had discussed it with Senator Jackson, Senator Symington and Senator Russell and they, too, would support the treaty. This I reported to Bundy.
4. At dinner Sunday night Jackson refused to indicate his support of the treaty although he did not say he would not support it. He engaged in a very serious condemnation of McNamara and Gilpatric over the TFX, and his distress over this issue might cause him to oppose a test ban treaty. He indicated that "he, Symington and Russell would have to get together and make up their minds what to do." This I reported to Bundy.
5. On Monday morning, 22 July, I phoned Senator Pastore who indicated support of the test ban. His position is outlined in the attached memo./3/ This was reported to Bundy.
/3/Not printed. In the conversation, McCone indicated his approval of the projected limited test ban treaty. Pastore then indicated his tentative support, based partly on his hope that the existence of the treaty might instill in the Chinese a "moral inhibition" against testing and acquisition of nuclear weapons. (Ibid., DCI Memos for Record 6/5-7/20/63)
[Here follows discussion of Venezuela.]
7. I then told Rusk/4/ that I felt we must explore an area of agreement with DeGaulle and that we simply could not permit DeGaulle relationships to further deteriorate. I said that normal diplomatic channels are unproductive and suggested we use the Atomic Energy channel, going through Palewski/5/ directly to DeGaulle. I urged that this be done prior to DeGaulle's July 29th Press Conference as I felt it highly probable that he would take a position which would be irrevocable without great embarrassment and the consequences would be that the test ban negotiations would go out the window. Rusk was unresponsive although I proposed that Dwight Ink, Assistant General Manager of the AEC who is now in Europe talking to the French on weapons safety, might open up the subject in sufficient detail to give DeGaulle an indicator which would be useful in stopping him from taking an irrevocable position on July 29th./6/ Mr. Bundy was in on part of this discussion.
/4/The omitted section indicates that this conversation took place following the meeting.
/5/Gaston Palewski, French Atomic Energy Minister.
/6/The date of de Gaulle's projected press conference, at which he did in fact announce French rejection of the treaty. Additional information regarding the initiative proposed by McCone has not been found.
8. During the earlier meeting the DeGaulle problem was discussed off and on. It was obvious that George Ball has a pretty stiff neck on this whole DeGaulle-French problem and is not inclined to offer any concessions. Throughout the meeting I urged the approach discussed privately with Rusk. No one seemed inclined to feel that it was possible to do anything with DeGaulle at the present time. The meetings were inconclusive.
338. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, July 22, 1963, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Operational Immediate; Ban. A longer account of this conversation is in telegram 280 from Moscow, July 23. (Ibid., POL 7 US/Harriman)
268. From Harriman. Ref Deptel 263./2/ In ref to omission Article Two on peaceful uses, I have already spoken rather fully on this subject to Khrushchev, while watching Soviet/American track meet. He told me of the various long range plans Sovs had in mind, building canals and diverting Pechora River, to flow south to Kazakhstan, instead of to the north. This gave me opportunity to express surprise that he had thrown out our article on peaceful uses, since we had understood Soviet Union had big plans for use of nuclear explosions to divert rivers. He denied any immediate plans, but admitted that nuclear explosions for such purposes might be useful in the future. He opposed inclusion today since this reservation would be disappointing to world opinion and arouse suspicions. He readily offered the view that we should have no difficulty in agreeing on such matter when the subject has been more carefully explored, and there were special projects where such explosions would be useful. I mentioned the possibility of another canal paralleling Panama Canal, as a possibility. I pointed to the article on amendments as a means of reaching agreement. He said that when tensions were relieved by a test ban, and reduced by other understandings, would be a better time to raise question of peaceful uses. It would then meet popular approval.
/2/Telegram 263, July 21, reads in part: "We accept omission Article II on peaceful uses. You should make clear, however, that as later operational phase of peaceful uses may develop, we reserve right to reopen question for discussion under the amendment clause or by separate treaty. Point out possibility both sides may wish to conduct such operations under appropriate safeguards for important peaceful purposes. Make clear also we have no present plans for this, but we expect to continue permitted research in this field." (Ibid., DEF 18-3) See also footnotes 3 and 6, Document 339.
Since dictating the above, I brought subject up with Gromyko in this afternoon's session/3/ and made clear record on our position. He accepted my statement and thereupon approved majority including original three signatories, rather than two thirds for amendment procedure.
/3/See Document 339.
Kohler
339. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, July 22, 1963, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Flash. Received at 4:22 p.m.
269. From Harriman.
1. Today's plenary lasted three hours, during which agreement on all substantive points on test ban treaty reached in accordance with your instructions, with exception item discussed para three below. Nonaggression pact was also discussed for last quarter of session.
2. The English text of withdrawal clause (sent Embtel 233)/2/ but with words "events" and "subject matter" in accordance with Deptel 263, /3/ was accepted as agreed translation of Russian text. Harriman explained that "subject matter" read better in English than "contents" and "events" conveyed sense we wished more precisely than "circumstances." After some discussion with translators and colleagues, Gromyko accepted. Our rationale this procedure being sent septel./4/
/2/Document 335.
/3/Telegram 263 to Moscow, July 21 (cleared by Bundy and President Kennedy), instructed Harriman to seek the change from "circumstances" to "events" as a substantive alteration, apparently requiring alteration of the Russian text as well, and change from "contents" to "subject matter" as an interpretive one in the English version. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO))
/4/In telegram 270 from Moscow, July 22, the delegation explained the linguistic problems that prevented it from proposing any changes in the Russian text to parallel the change in the English text from "circumstances" to "events." (Ibid., POL 7 US/Harriman)
3. Gromyko refused suggestion new final qualifying clause Soviet draft Article I-1-B/5/ be dropped and substance put in preamble. Insisted Soviet draft required to make clear that first of two new categories of tests introduced by US language, namely, venting underground explosions which did not, and those which did, distribute debris outside national boundaries, would be prohibited in future comprehensive treaty, however drafted or related to present treaty. After some discussion in which UK took neutral position, there was ten minute recess. US, UK then submitted following language as substitute Soviet language final phrases Article I-1-B, with understanding it was ad referendum. The language was referred to drafting committee, with understanding it was for possible improvement in word order.
/5/Contained in Document 336.
(This language follows immediately after end of original US text.)
"It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the parties have stated in the preamble to this treaty, they seek to achieve."
4. US accepted deletion of Article II in US draft, but Harriman stated strong US interest possibility re-opening matter under appropriate circumstances by amendment procedure./6/ He referred in this connection to his conversation with Khrushchev yesterday, reported septel./7/ Gromyko agreed that withdrawal of Article II was without prejudice to future discussion. In later discussion, Gromyko accepted US proposal change voting procedure governing amendments to majority.
/6/As instructed by telegram 263 to Moscow.
/7/Document 338.
5. Gromyko, at close of test ban discussion, referred to France, citing Khrushchev's remarks at opening meeting with him on importance Soviets attach to French observance of treaty. If France tested, would create new situation, which required Soviets to reconsider its position. On other hand, if US/UK succeeded in persuading France sign treaty, would be important positive achievement, enhancing significance of treaty.
In brief private conversation after meeting among Hailsham, Harriman and Gromyko, Harriman replied that he expected to have instructions from the President in time to discuss this subject with Khrushchev.
6. Other drafting problems practically all solved. Drafting committee meets 10:00 AM 23 July to prepare final draft text. Will send as soon as available.
7. Gromyko turned to nonaggression pact and repeated his and Khrushchev's earlier remarks on its importance to Soviet Union and general detente that would follow from simultaneous signatures. Harriman and Hailsham repeated inability to negotiate before consultation with allies. Pointed to original basis for test ban negotiation to which Khrushchev had agreed. Nonaggression pact was new subject introduced by Khrushchev July 2 speech. US/UK attempt to discuss now would probably preclude allied acceptance. On being handed US draft communiqu? language (Deptel 237)/8/ by Hailsham,/9/ Gromyko reacted coldly describing it as negative in tone. Gromyko said he would consult his government and advise position tomorrow.
/8/Document 332.
/9/The extended report of this meeting states that at this point Hailsham handed Gromyko the text of the U.K. draft communique and that Gromyko reacted to it as described here. Although the extended report describes Harriman outlining the U.S. position to Gromyko, it does not record him handing Gromyko a document on the subject. (Telegram 271 from Moscow, July 22; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) See the Supplement. Much of the U.K. draft is in footnote 10 below.
8. Request authority to accept changed wording Article I-1-B, para 3 above. Also request authority to use proposed UK communiqu? language sent Embtel 248,/10/ if necessary to achieve agreement early signing treaty.
/10/Dated July 22. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) The language reads: "The three principals solemnly reaffirm the intention of their respective governments to comply strictly with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter in their relations between one another. They discussed the Soviet proposal for nonaggression arrangements" under which NATO and the Warsaw Pact "would give similar confirmation of their intentions. The three governments agreed to inform" their allies "fully about these talks and consult with them on the desirability and manner of continuing discussions on this subject."
9. Plenary meeting 3:00 July 23. Full report follows soonest./11/
/11/Telegram 248; see footnote 10 above. Harriman, Hailsham, and Gromyko met privately following the plenary meeting. Most of the discussion concerned the proposed non-aggression pact. (Telegram 274 from Moscow, July 23; Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman) See the Supplement.
Kohler
340. Memorandum of Conference With President Kennedy/1/
Washington, July 22, 1963, 6-6:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President, Harriman Mission, 7/63. Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The ending time of the meeting is from the President's Appointment Book. (Ibid.)
Harriman Mission
OTHERS PRESENT
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Ball
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. William Foster
Mr. Smith
The President asked about the details of formalizing the draft test ban treaty. Following a discussion of these formalities, it was decided that Ambassador Harriman would initial the agreement in Moscow, return to Washington, and then go again to Moscow as part of a delegation to be headed by Secretary Rusk and including several Senators. Secretary Rusk would expect to sign the agreement a week after the initialing ceremony. The purpose of the Senate delegation is to interest them as well as to provide additional opportunities to direct public attention to the benefits of a test ban treaty. The week's delay also provides time for consultation with allies. The plan to send a delegation to Moscow is to be put to Prime Minister Macmillan in the hope that he would agree and name a comparable level British delegation. Ambassador Harriman is to be instructed to suggest the procedure to Gromyko.
In response to the President's question, Mr. Ball said that to "initial" an agreement means no more than that the negotiators accept as accurate the text of the agreement.
There followed a discussion as to whether it would be better to initial the agreement before de Gaulle has his press conference next Monday. The President decided that de Gaulle's actions would probably not be influenced by the initialling of the test ban treaty.
Consideration was then given to the draft letter to de Gaulle./2/ The President suggested several revisions. He asked that the sentence dealing with the non-aggression pact/3/ make clear to de Gaulle that we have told the Russians that any non-aggression proposals would require not only consultation but also agreement among the Western allies before any action at all could be taken. In order to avoid appearing to be condescending, the President suggested that the words "protect the interests of our allies"/4/ be changed to read "to make clear" so that the sentence would read: "We would take pains in any communiqu? on the present discussions to make clear the interest which our allies, especially France and the Federal Republic, have in this matter." (The sentence was later revised to delete reference to France and the Federal Republic.)
/2/What is apparently an earlier draft than the one discussed here is in telegram 247 to Moscow, July 19. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) This earlier draft was written after consultation between Kennedy and Macmillan in a series of personal messages that began with the President's July 16 letter to the Prime Minister. This correspondence is ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan, 1963, and ibid., Macmillan-Kennedy, 1963; other copies are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, JFK-MacM, Test Ban Correspondence 7/63. The draft sent to Harriman also went to Macmillan for comment.
/3/On this subject the draft cited in footnote 2 above reads: "We of course have made it plain [to the Soviets] that any proposals of this sort would require consultation among the Western allies before any action at all could be taken, and we do not accept the notion of a necessary link between a test ban and this quite separate topic. Only if the Russians drop the notion of a necessary link can the test ban agreement become real. It goes without saying that we recognize your special interest in this aspect of the matter."
/4/Not in the text cited in footnote 2 above.
There was a discussion of the following sentence: "As we have already indicated through Ambassador Bohlen, the United States Government would be willing to explore alternatives which might make French testing in these three environments unnecessary."/5/ Ambassador Thompson suggested deleting the reference to Ambassador Bohlen on the grounds that the British Prime Minister, in an earlier letter to the President,/6/ had said he did not know what we had told Ambassador Bohlen to tell the French. Mr. Ball commented that we were not certain whether the conversation between Bohlen and French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville/7/ had actually been reported to de Gaulle. Therefore, we did not know whether the offer Bohlen made to Couve was actually known to de Gaulle. The President agreed to delete the reference to Bohlen.
/5/The pertinent passage in the draft cited in footnote 2 states that de Gaulle would, in adhering to the treaty, cut himself off from "one means" of acquiring nuclear weapons technology. "As we have also indicated through Ambassador Bohlen, the United States Government would be willing to explore alternative means by which the necessary technical information would be made available for your program. We believe that if our experts can discuss these matters carefully together, means can be found which would meet your requirements and allow France to join in the effort to prevent further contamination of the atmosphere." In a July 21 letter to Kennedy, Macmillan recommended omission of the last sentence because of the "danger of going too far in the first communication." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Test Ban Correspondence, JFK-MacM, 1963)
/6/Reference is to Macmillan's July 21 letter.
/7/See Document 295.
In this connection, the President [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Several other anti-U.S. statements by the French to other officials were noted, leading the President to comment on the major campaign which de Gaulle is carrying on against us.
The President suggested changing the word "believe" to "hope" in the sentence which reads: "While there are both political and technical problems here, we hope they are capable of solution." /8/
There was no discussion of the following sentence which was bracketed in the President's reading copy: "We must not take any course that would dismay our allies since it is the strength and unity of the alliance as a whole that matters most."/8/ (This sentence was later deleted by the President who feels that mention of our allies in the initial communication will only be a red rag to the General. We obviously will have to talk about their views at some stage, but he thinks it is a matter which need not be mentioned explicitly now.)
/8/Not in the text cited in footnote 1 above.
The discussion turned to the situation which would exist if the French refused to sign the treaty and announced that they would continue testing. The President suggested that instructions to Harriman/9/ prepare the Russians for what de Gaulle might say at his press conference next Monday. Secretary Rusk suggested, and the President agreed, that Harriman make the point to the Russians that we were looking at what the French would do rather than paying too much attention to what they said. Secretary Rusk suggested that the Russians be told that while we did not react sharply to the Chinese statement that they would not sign the treaty, we would reconsider our situation if the Chinese actually tested a nuclear weapon.
/9/See Document 341.
A suggestion was made that Harriman ask the Russians whether they had a preference as between French testing and our giving limited nuclear assistance to France. Secretary Rusk, Mr. Ball and Ambassador Thompson all opposed this suggestion as being too dangerous to raise with the USSR.
No one was prepared to say exactly what Gromyko meant when he commented that French refusal to sign the treaty would create a new situation which the Russians would have to examine./10/ Ambassador Thompson doubted that the Russians would withdraw from the treaty if de Gaulle said flatly he was not going to sign the ban agreement.
/10/See Document 339.
The President was concerned about what we would do if, having announced that Secretary Rusk and the Senators would go to Moscow to sign the agreement, de Gaulle, on Monday, flatly refused to associate himself with the treaty and the Russians thereupon said they would reconsider their agreement to the test ban. Later, it was agreed to allow a week to elapse between Harriman's initialling the agreement in Moscow and the signature. This provides an interval after de Gaulle's press conference during which we would re-examine the situation, if necessary. With the publication of the text of the agreement, we would be in a position to know French reaction.
The President commended Mr. Ball for his memorandum/11/ explaining his opposition to offering nuclear weapons assistance to France in return for French cooperation on the test ban treaty. In response to the President's question, Mr. Ball said French insistence on developing its own nuclear capability was not based on its desire to join the nuclear club, but arose out of de Gaulle's aim to make France nothing less than top dog in Europe.
/11/Dated July 22. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-8) See the Supplement.
Two letters to the Prime Minister were approved./12/ The first transmitted a copy of the letter to de Gaulle. It also covered the point raised by the President, namely, our instruction to Harriman to forewarn the Russians about the possible French attitude toward the test ban agreement, calling special attention to the difference between what the French say they are going to do and any actual French testing, which is some time off in the future./13/
/12/Both dated July 22; transmitted on July 23 through White House channels as CAP 63400. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Test Ban Correspondence, JFK-MacM, 1963)
/13/McCone had briefed Kennedy on the French testing program on July 19. (Memorandum for the record by McCone, with briefing memorandum attached, both dated July 19; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President)
The second letter to the Prime Minister urged him to accept our proposed language for the communiqu? dealing with the Russian proposal for a non-aggression pact. In our view, the language proposed by Hailsham would, in effect, be a non-aggression declaration by the U.S., U.K. and USSR./14/
/14/Kennedy stated that the Hailsham language "seems to me to go too far. His formulation would, in effect, constitute a non-aggression declaration by the three principals. It would accordingly be resented by the Germans and the French since it would prejudice their position in any future negotiations." In this letter, Kennedy also outlined the procedures for conclusion of the test ban agreement set forth in the first paragraph of this memorandum. Regarding the Hailsham language, see footnote 9, Document 339.
In response to Mr. Foster's question, the President said he had talked to each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff individually. He said General LeMay was solidly opposed to the test ban treaty while the Marine Corps Commandant, General Shoup, saw in the test ban treaty a major turning point. General Taylor's view takes into account considerations other than purely military ones.
There followed a discussion as to the prospects of obtaining Senate approval for the treaty. Secretary Rusk and Mr. Foster reported increasing Senate opinion favoring the treaty. Lewis Strauss is now in favor of an environmental test ban. Mr. McCone was praised by both Mr. Ball and Mr. Foster for the support which he is developing in favor of the treaty.
There was discussion of the Senators who would be asked to go to Moscow to sign the agreement.
At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Foster said there was a problem arising out of the scheduled reconvening of the Geneva arms conference this summer. He said that the Moscow negotiations would not be completed in time to convene this conference as scheduled. The Russians had indicated that they would prefer not to reopen the Geneva talks but to discuss disarmament in the fall in connection with the General Assembly meeting. Mr. Foster favored a short session in Geneva during which we could discuss the details of several of the disarmament suggestions made by Khrushchev to Harriman in Moscow.
The President's view was that we should ask Harriman to ask the Russians whether they favored holding the session. If the Russians insisted on postponing the session, the President saw little profit in our trying to force them into a meeting because we would be unable to draw them out if they did not choose to be drawn.
Bromley Smith/15/
/15/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
341. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/
Washington, July 22, 1963, 10:27 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only Ban. Drafted by Ball; cleared by the President, S, and Foster in substance and by Bromley Smith in draft; and approved by Read.
277. Re Embtel 269 July 22 9:00 p.m./2/ Your draft for article I-1-B contained in paragraph 3 Reftel approved.
/2/Document 339.
We cannot accept U.K. communiqu? language (Embtel 248)/3/ since that in effect constitutes non-aggression declaration by the three principals and would create resentment on part of Germans and French since it would prejudice their position in any further negotiations and would point the finger at them for failure to enter into a non-aggression pact. You should therefore hold firmly to the sense of our proposed communiqu? language on NAP contained in Deptel 237./4/ President is sending letter to Prime Minister explaining our position on this question./5/ This letter is being repeated to you./6/
/3/See footnote 10, Document 339.
/4/Document 332.
/5/See footnotes 12 and 14, Document 340.
/6/In telegram 279 to Moscow, July 22. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)
Believe essential that you try as soon as possible to reach agreement with Gromyko regarding arrangements for signing along lines Deptel 237 as modified in the letter of explanation the President is sending the Prime Minister and which is being repeated to you. You will note that this contemplates your initialing treaty before leaving Moscow.
The President is tonight forwarding letter to De Gaulle for transmission by Bohlen when we give him word that treaty will definitely be initialed. Final version of letter, seen by you in draft, being repeated to you in separate telegram./7/ As you will note final version is largely informative and offer of assistance to De Gaulle is carefully and rather vaguely phrased.
/7/Telegram 433 to Paris, July 22, repeated to Moscow as telegram 278. (Ibid.)
FYI. Indications are that the French are mounting a covert propaganda campaign against the test ban and that De Gaulle in his press conference on July 29 may openly attack and attempt to discredit the treaty. Under these circumstances I think it essential that you carefully prepare Soviets against this possibility. You might say to Gromyko that our indications are that De Gaulle will probably refuse to sign and may even make a public statement against the treaty. This is something out of our control and, while we deplore it, we cannot believe that De Gaulle will have much influence on the other nations of the world. In fact we are persuaded that most nations are looking forward to this treaty and that most nations are prepared to sign, with the probable exceptions of the French and Chinese. You might at this point indicate that the Chinese have already made clear that they will not sign.
Neither side should lose sight, however, of the significant distinction between words and deeds. The important thing is not what the French or Chinese say but what they do. And you would hope that world public opinion mobilized behind the test ban treaty would have a compelling effect on both nations. In any event, so far as the United States is concerned, we are prepared to concentrate on actions rather than words. We will not be deterred by what the Chinese say, although certainly a Chinese nuclear explosion will create a situation which we will have to examine carefully. End FYI.
Rusk
342. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, July 23, 1963, noon.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret. Received at 8:50 a.m.
277. From Harriman. It is becoming crystal clear that Soviets have as objective as described in Embtel 195/2/ attempt to isolate ChiComs. Therefore, they place maximum importance on France's adherence to test ban treaty. Also they will press all other countries to adhere. They want pressure to appear to come on ChiComs from other countries, particularly the underdeveloped, and therefore insisted on avoiding language in withdrawal clause which would appear as pressure on China directly by them. This primary objective will affect other positions they will take. In addition, atmosphere of relaxing of tensions in Europe will have double purpose of showing value of coexistence policies and avoiding battling on two fronts at same time.
/2/Document 331.
Kohler
343. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, July 23, 1963, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman. Secret. Received at 3:57 p.m.
292. From Harriman. In private talk with Hailsham and myself, Gromyko pressed us as hard as he could for a commitment on our attitude towards NAP. I carefully stated that we understood Soviet Government's interest in this subject, that I would report our discussions fully on my return to Washington, and that I was sure we would consult our allies. I knew that my government was interested in extending the good will that had been created by the present talks to include all of Europe both the members of the NATO and Warsaw Pact, and that my government hoped that the test ban agreement, although having great psychological importance in itself, would lead to further understandings. Hailsham made a similar statement, perhaps a bit more definite.
Thereupon Gromyko said he understood from our statements that our respective governments were ready to make every effort regarding NAP and intended to consult allies. Taking this into account, Soviet Government was prepared not to link directly the signing of test ban with NAP. He hoped this would be duly appreciated by both governments. However, Gromyko said language of the communiqu? proposed by Hailsham was not fully satisfactory,/2/ and handed us his proposed draft.
/2/See Document 339 and footnote 10 thereto.
We agreed to consult our respective governments and advise him tomorrow. At his request, I explained to him the details of the procedures we proposed for signing test ban treaty. He said he would consult his government since this question involved "the level and the timing." It was agreed that we would initial the treaty tomorrow, or as soon thereafter as we could agree on communiqu?. Communiqu? and text of treaty should be given out simultaneously in three capitals promptly after initialing. Advise if this procedure satisfactory.
Gromyko's suggested reference to NAP in communiqu? follows:
"The heads of the three delegations discussed the Soviet proposal relating to a pact of non aggression between the participants in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the participants in the Warsaw Treaty. The three governments have agreed fully to inform their respective allies in the two organizations concerning these talks (peregovory, translated by Sukhodrev as 'talks'; it could also be translated as 'negotiations') and to consult with them about the manner of continuing discussions (obsuzhdeniya) on this question with the object of achieving agreement.
An exchange of views also took place with regard to other measures, leading to a relaxation of tension, affecting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty."
Gromyko stated that if we wished to we could list some or all of the subjects raised in the discussions. Neither Hailsham nor I commented, and I would recommend against it.
Our comments on communiqu? follow septel. Also full account of conversation./3/
/3/Telegram 295 from Moscow, July 23. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman) See the Supplement.
Kohler
344. Memorandum of Conference With President Kennedy/1/
Washington, July 23, 1963, 5:15-5:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President, Harriman Mission, 7/63. Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The ending time of the meeting is from the President's Appointment Book. (Ibid.)
Instructions to Ambassador Harriman
OTHERS PRESENT
Secretary Rusk
Mr. McCone
Secretary Ball
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Foster
Mr. McCloy
Mr. Sorensen
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Smith
The first item concerned the wording of that part of the communiqu? to be released at the conclusion of the Moscow discussions which dealt with the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Treaty powers and the NATO powers. The President approved a telegram/2/ which told Harriman that he must insist on acceptable wording lest it appear that we had committed ourselves to achieve a non-aggression pact when all we had done in Moscow was to discuss the suggestion and agree to discuss it further with our allies. Harriman was reminded that the Washington assessment of the situation in Moscow prompted us to insist on our wording in view of our belief that the Russians wanted the test ban treaty and would not break off the negotiations if we refused to accept their wording of the communiqu?. Harriman's reports reveal that he felt we had to meet the Russians on their wording of the non-aggression pact communiqu? paragraph because they had agreed to drop their insistence on linking a test ban treaty to a non-aggression pact.
/2/Document 346.
There followed discussion of the composition of the Senatorial delegation which would accompany Secretary Rusk to Moscow to sign the test ban treaty. The President's view was that if Senators Fulbright and Hickenlooper did not go, the entire plan should be abandoned.
Secretary Rusk, accompanied by Mr. Foster, joined the group after having testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Secretary Rusk said there was a good chance that all of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee members except Senator Lausche would vote to approve the test ban treaty as now drafted.
A telegram to Ambassador Bohlen was discussed. The President shared the view of those present that the wording in the President's letter to de Gaulle referring to possible U.S. nuclear assistance to France should not be made more precise as Bohlen had suggested./3/ The draft de Gaulle letter was modified slightly./4/ Ambassador Bohlen is to deliver it shortly before the announcement of the initialing of the test ban treaty.
/3/In telegram 373 from Paris, July 23, Bohlen had stated his concern at the "fuzziness," which he was aware might be intentional, in the existing text "of willingness to discuss providing France with nuclear information which may arise to plague us in the future." He was "somewhat concerned lest French use this statement against us" at some point "in event these limitations turn out to be somewhat narrow." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) Regarding the existing text, see footnote 4 below.
/4/Text of the draft letter is in telegram 433 to Paris, July 22. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) It was sent after the July 22 meeting; see Document 340. The change removed one sentence from a passage urging de Gaulle to keep the French position on a possible test ban agreement open: "We must not take any course that would dismay our Allies, since it is the strength and unity of the Alliance as a whole that matters most." (Telegram 550 to London, July 23; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) Bundy stated in a message to de Zulueta that Kennedy believed "mention of our allies in the initial communication will only be a red rag to the General." (Unnumbered telegram, July 23; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Test Ban Correspondence, JFK-MacM, 7/63) Both Bundy's message and telegram 550 were sent before the 5:15 p.m. meeting.
Another telegram to Harriman instructed him to urge the Russians not to comment if de Gaulle, in his Monday press conference, announced his refusal to sign the test ban agreement./5/ The President suggested that Harriman urge the Russians not to comment on any French statement about testing which was not related to an actual French nuclear weapons test. We will not withdraw from the treaty on the basis of a Chinese announcement that they will not sign the treaty. However, if it appears that the Chinese are actually about to test a weapon, we will reconsider the situation at that time.
/5/Telegram 301 to Moscow, July 23 (drafted by Thompson, cleared by Rusk and Bundy, and approved by Ball), instructed Harriman as described and added that he "should inform Soviets that if they do make such a statement re France, we would be obliged to make similar statement concerning Communist China which is known to be endeavoring to acquire an atomic capability and which has already indicated that it would not become party to a test ban." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)
There was a long discussion of a phrase in Article I: "or any other nuclear explosion" which might be misinterpreted to mean that in a war situation we could not use nuclear weapons without violating the test ban treaty. Even though the treaty title refers to a ban on nuclear weapons tests, Mr. Ball felt that some Americans, possibly even some Germans, would conclude that we had limited our use of nuclear weapons in self-defense. Several ways of proceeding were discussed. One was to ask the Russians to revise the treaty to clarify this point even though the wording of the treaty is now agreed. We could add a protocol to the treaty, making clear that the clause in no way affected our right to use nuclear weapons for self-defense in accordance with the UN Charter. We could instruct Harriman to discuss this question with the Russians and make clear to them that at an appropriate time we would state publicly that the test ban treaty in no way affected our use of nuclear weapons to oppose aggression and that we assumed this was also their view.
Secretary Rusk and Mr. Sorensen felt the point was so far-fetched that we should not raise this question with the Russians. Mr. Ball and the others felt that this point should be dealt with in one way or another. A telegram was drafted to Harriman asking him to raise this with the Russians and tell them that we would state our views on this matter in public at a later time. (When the telegram was shown to the President following the meeting, he asked that an additional sentence be added giving Harriman the authority not to raise the subject if he felt that the result of his doing so would complicate seriously his task.)/6/
/6/Telegram 304 on this subject, July 23, was drafted by Rusk and cleared with Ball, Foster, Thompson, and Bundy, and approved by Read. It asked Harriman, with the qualification noted, to tell Gromyko that while the United States regarded the test ban treaty as an important step toward the prevention of war, it was "obviously not intended to apply, and, in fact, does not apply to the situation of self-defense, which continues to be governed by commitments under UN Charter." (Ibid.)
Following a presentation by Mr. Foster, the President agreed we should inform the Russians that we thought the disarmament committee of eighteen should resume its sessions in Geneva this summer as scheduled. The Russians had indicated a desire to postpone this session. However, many of the eighteen States, especially Canada, have told us they wish to resume the disarmament talks to discuss developments since their last meeting and to prepare a report for the UN General Assembly. In view of the strong desires of the others, except the Russians, the President accepted the recommendation favoring resumption of the Geneva talks.
Bromley Smith/7/
/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
345. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, July 23, 1963, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Operational Immediate. Received at 7:15 p.m.
279. Today's session started 3 PM with same participants as yesterday.
Meeting began with Tsarapkin report of drafting committee session this morning decision of which reflected our tel 279./2/
/2/Telegram 279, July 23, contains the complete draft text of the test ban treaty. (Ibid.)
Tsarapkin said remaining outstanding point was title which left for principals to decide (see septel)./3/
/3/In the brief initial account of this meeting, Harriman reported that the principals agreed on the title as "Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water." (Telegram 288 from Moscow, July 23; ibid.)
At Harriman's request Fisher discussed US concern re Article 3, para 2, with regard deposits by unrecognized regimes. US preferred arrangement whereby deposit could be with one of three original parties which would notify other two in few cases of unrecognized regimes. Pointed out Khrushchev had said did not wish force us recognize regime against our will.
Gromyko said wished leave text as agreed.
Harriman stated US had no problem with language if could reach understanding as to interpretation. All of us want as many states as possible to adhere to treaty, therefore acceptance of ratification should be easy as possible. Should be sufficient if deposit were with one of three original parties which would then inform other two. Need be no deposit with other two. For example, Outer Mongolia might deposit with USSR which would then notify US and UK and send copy. On this understanding language could be left as is.
Hailsham said language suited UK, which often received without undue embarrassment communications for authorities not recognized as governments.
After somewhat lengthy discussion in which each of three reiterated position, Gromyko said each party would be free to set forth its point of view on this question.
Harriman pointed out this one of last items raised by Washington which would wonder why matter could not be settled now.
Gromyko stated had nothing more say on subject which could be left over until tomorrow.
Harriman agreed but said agreement on procedure to be adopted should be reached before departure. Reiterated was not requesting change in language merely accepting understanding as to what intended.
Gromyko then asked if text could now be considered agreed. Both Harriman and Hailsham said yes.
Gromyko then said quite certain both Harriman and Hailsham understood that Sovs do not consider matter ended for obvious reasons. Suggested three principals have private exchange which began [to begin?] after communiqu? agreed and Hailsham suggested initialing text tomorrow and releasing within 24 hours. This suggestion to be discussed further in private exchange./4/
/4/See Document 347.
Kohler
346. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/
Washington, July 23, 1963, 9:05 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only Ban. Drafted by Ball; cleared by the President, Rusk, Foster, and Thompson; and approved by Read.
296. To Harriman. Ref: Embtel 292./2/ We could agree to Soviet communiqu? language on non-aggression pact provided following changes are made:
/2/Document 343.
First, eliminate "the manner of" before "continuing discussions."
Second, eliminate "with the object of achieving agreement" following word "question."
Third, try to eliminate second paragraph beginning "an exchange of views." Alternatively, attempt substitute words "a brief exchange of views," and change words "leading to" to words "directed at" and eliminate clause "affecting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty."
In arguing this position you should point out that if we are to be able to continue progress toward further agreements, we must demonstrate by our actions that we are faithful to the commitments we have given our allies. Gromyko's language implies a commitment on our side to agree to non-aggression arrangements and this commitment would take effect before consultation with our allies. This position impossible not only with allies but also with important sectors of American opinion.
FYI. We read Soviet position readiness to accept test ban treaty as clear and definite, and do not believe you need to be concerned about communiqu? which necessarily registers our view as well as theirs. End FYI.
However, if after you have taken an emphatic position along lines indicated, Soviets prove unwilling to accept language as modified, you should continue to insist upon first and third modifications listed at start of this message, but you may, as a fall-back for second modification, offer to substitute for "with the object of achieving agreement" the phrase "in the hope that agreement satisfactory to all may be achieved."
Rusk
347. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, July 24, 1963, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman. Secret; Flash. Received at 4 p.m.
311. From Harriman. Hailsham and I had two and one-half hour discussion with Gromyko today July 24.
After lengthy argument, Gromyko accepted our fallback position/2/ for paragraph in communiqu? on nonaggression, with the exception of one word "hope". He insisted that there must be indication of "purpose" in holding the discussions. He pointed out that there have been so many years of discussion that a communiqu? would be meaningless without an indication of a purpose. I am satisfied that we should agree on this point. I have gone so far in the argument that I am convinced we would lose more in our relations with Soviet Union than the value of possible gain we might make with our allies by carrying argument further. With the deletion of the words "the manner of" we are in no way committing our allies.
/2/See Document 346.
In any event, Gromyko gave in reluctantly on other points. He accepted our changes in second paragraph, which incidentally we agreed should be a sentence at the end of a single paragraph.
Nonaggression paragraph in communiqu? will accordingly read as follows and I request authority accept it. All here agree. You will notice that in substituting "purpose" for "hope", subsequent words have been rearranged because of problem in Russian translation.
"The heads of the three delegations discussed the Soviet proposal relating to a pact of non-aggression between the participants in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the participants in the Warsaw Treaty. The three governments have agreed fully to inform their respective allies in the two organizations concerning these talks and to consult with them about continuing discussions on this question with the purpose of achieving agreement satisfactory to all. A brief exchange of views also took place with regard to other measures, directed at a relaxation of tension."
Gromyko agreed with our proposal for signing in Moscow by SecState with a number of Senators. He made an argument for the President's presence which I explained away in accordance with instructions. He also asked whether President would come to some other place in Europe. This I explained in a friendly way would not be in our mutual interests.
We are meeting at three o'clock tomorrow afternoon July 25 and if your approval nonaggression paragraph given,/3/ and as soon as details settled, we will initial treaty.
/3/This authorization came in telegram 322 to Moscow, July 24, 9:44 p.m., drafted by Rusk and cleared by Ball, Foster, Thompson, and Bundy. The authorization applied also to the portion of the communiqu? included in telegram 313, cited in footnote 4 below.
We agreed that communiqu? and text treaty would then be distributed, embargoed for release 10:00 PM Moscow time, in three capitals.
Septels on balance communiqu? and test ban matters./4/
/4/The balance of the draft communiqu? is in telegram 313 from Moscow, July 24, received at 5:40 p.m. The other telegram mentioned is telegram 316, Document 348.
Kohler
348. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, July 25, 1963, 1 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Operational Immediate. Received at 9 p.m.
316. From Harriman. Harriman and Hailsham private meeting with Gromyko 3 PM today.
[Here follows an extended account of the portion of the meeting summarized in telegram 311, Document 347.]
Harriman then said he had been requested/2/ raise another point. Recalled Gromyko's remark that Sov Government would make statement re France and said that while we did not know what Sovs would say we hoped nothing would be said which would make our mutual problems more difficult. Gromyko had not indicated what and when Sovs would say, but this had raised concern in Washington. Observed Hailsham was authorized say something on this matter.
/2/See footnote 5, Document 344.
Hailsham said only thing he could say was that UK possessed information French would not have their Pacific test site ready for another year and that Sahara could be excluded as French testing site for political reasons. Taking this into account Sovs may feel it not necessary make statement at the present time.
Gromyko said could not add anything substantive re France to what Khrushchev and himself had said in course these talks. Sovs had not yet decided when official statement would be made, but evidently it would not be made during stay of US and UK reps here. Rather statement would be made at some future date, and Sovs would expound position they had reserved re France. Stressed great importance Sovs attach to problem of France as latter was nuclear power.
Harriman said obviously Sovs had right make statement, but we believed they might wish postpone it. Noted de Gaulle had announced he would have TV interview on July 29 and if Sov statement were made just before that interview, he might say something hastily just as he had done in January with respect UK. Therefore we asked that Sov statement be postponed, and give us chance to talk to him. If Sovs spoke about France, we would have to speak about China as Chinese problem was very important in our public's mind. Although China in different position than France, it known China attempting develop nuclear device. There was public information that China might achieve that end this year or next year. China was only country that was known to be developing nuclear device and seeking eventually to become nuclear power.
Gromyko said statement would not be made before July 29 but could not say when since no decision had been made yet.
Harriman hoped Sovs would consult with us so that we could give them friendly advice re situation and effect of their possible statement. We were now in doubt as to what Sovs intended say.
Gromyko said would be glad receive information we might have re French attitude and mood and quite possibly would take it into account. Stressed however Sovs reserved right make statement.
Harriman noted we did not wish make statement re China but would have to if Sovs made statement re France.
IV
Gromyko commented US free to do so but wished note France was nuclear power whereas China was not. Reiterated would be useful receive infor re French mood.
Harriman believed he could be affirmative on this latter point.
Hailsham expressed similar view.
Harriman pointed out we and Sovs had common objective of getting French adherence. Did not see why we should not consult to achieve this end.
Gromyko reverted to text of communiqu? and said would study other parts thereof. Inquired whether question of place of signing TB treaty was settled.
Harriman replied in affirmative.
Gromyko said that as to reference to date, he prepared accept "in near future" but Sovs preferred no statement be made, either informally or publicly, spelling out this reference in terms of days or weeks. Schedules of participants would have to be checked and date could be specified later.
Gromyko then referred to problem of interpretation para two Article Three, dealing with deposit of instruments of ratification. Did not believe agreed interpretation could be arrived at. Noted US had one approach to Chiang Kai-shek and Sovs another. To Sovs, Chiang was not a government; he was empty space to them and was illegally in UN. Therefore Sovs could not accept or recognize any document or instrument of ratification from him, whatever the form. Signature of Chiang Kai-shek's representative would not appear on Sov copy of treaty. Gromyko said he trusted we did not expect any different answer from Sovs on this point. Therefore we should have no illusion that agreed interpretation para two Article Three could be arrived at; suggested we should live with our differences and noted this would not damage treaty.
Harriman said while we did not use same language we had similar attitude towards East Germany. Wondered whether Gromyko's statement meant we should not accept Chiang Kai-shek's or East Germany's adherence. Inquired whether Sovs would want them adhere. Asked what situation would be in practice: should ratification be accepted only by one depositary govt, or should it be sent back?
Gromyko said US would be reasonable if it rejected Chiang's ratification and accepted GDR's. Said no analogy between Chiang and GDR, but there was analogy between GDR and FRG.
Harriman suggested that if we were to live with our differences, we should not argue, and inquired again how Gromyko envisaged arrangement in practice.
Gromyko replied he sure we did not expect any other view from Sovs re Chiang. We knew Sov position re Taiwan.
Harriman asked whether this would lead to a situation where none of nonrecognized countries could adhere.
Gromyko replied in negative, noting Sovs attitude toward Franco was well known, and Sov Govt did not recognize him. Said he was speaking only of Chiang.
Harriman said it appeared each case would have to be treated individually.
Gromyko recalled Indochina and Laos conferences, and pointed out USSR had sat there next to South Vietnam and South Korea, Sov attitude toward which was well known. Reiterated he was speaking of Chiang.
Harriman said it thus appeared Sovs did not want Chiang to accede. Observed we in different position; although we did not recognize CPR, we wished see it adhere, and hoped Sovs would use their good offices. Asked whether Sovs would object to CPR's adherence.
Gromyko wondered why they should, pointing out Sovs regarded CPR as lawful govt.
Harriman asked whether Sovs would encourage CPR to adhere.
Gromyko said the broader the participation the better.
Harriman then asked whether Sovs object to Senators participation in signing.
Gromyko said absolutely not. Said had seen Khrushchev today and reported to him. Sovs accepted this and would greet such powerful group as would be composed of SecState, Harriman and Senators. This also went for UK group, although its composition was not known.
After some further discussion it was agreed there would be a meeting at 3:00 PM tomorrow (July 25) to discuss and hopefully agree on communiqu? and then initial TB treaty. Pictures would not be allowed during initialing but only after. Communiqu? and text would be given to press simultaneously but embargoed for release until 10:00 PM Moscow time.
No business was transacted in subsequent larger meeting except to confirm agreement re place of signing and to hear report from drafting committee that all texts had been compared and were ready for initialing.
Kohler
349. Memorandum of Conference With President Kennedy/1/
Washington, July 24, 1963, 6-6:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President, Harriman Mission, 7/63. Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The ending time of the meeting is from the President's Appointment Book. (Ibid.)
Harriman Instructions
OTHERS PRESENT
Secretary Rusk
Under Secretary Ball
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. William Foster
Mr. Alexis Johnson
Director Murrow
Mr. Benjamin Read
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Bromley Smith
The President was handed a copy of a cable reporting Mrs. Gromyko's comment on the test ban treaty made during a dinner in Moscow (copy attached)./2/ The President lightly expressed his hope that the views of Mrs. Kennedy given at social occasions did not receive comparable circulation in government reports.
/2/Telegram 303 from Moscow, July 24, not printed. It reported that during a reception at the Polish Embassy 2 days previously, Mrs. Gromyko had said to Kohler: "You tell Mr. Harriman that he has to do everything that is necessary to get this (test ban) treaty. We have to have this so that when those Chinese have their first nuclear explosion, we will have a basis on which to call them to account." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)
There was a discussion of the problem created by the phrase "or any other nuclear explosion" in Article I of the treaty. The phrase might be misconstrued by opponents of the treaty to mean that in war we could not use nuclear weapons without violating the test ban treaty./3/
/3/According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation at 5 p.m. that day between Rusk and Chayes, the latter stated that his problem with the language was not its international consequences, but that it would give the opposition talking points and would almost certainly cause the Senate to attach a reservation to the treaty. Rusk said that in going over the treaty with three different Senate committees the question had not come up. Chayes said that he himself had been slow to recognize the problem. "He would hate to feel that we had not tried them [the Soviets] out on it." (Drafted by Bernau; Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
Under Secretary Ball said it would be hard for the U.S. delegation to ask now for a change in the treaty language. Secretary McNamara felt that even if the treaty negotiations had to be extended by two days, this time would be well spent if we could get the wording changed to avoid the ambiguity of the phrase. Mr. Ball replied that he thought an exchange of notes with the Russians on this point would be satisfactory, or, alternatively, we could state our understanding of this wording in the communiqu? to be issued at the conclusion of the test ban treaty negotiations.
The President left for his office to give the contents of the treaty to former President Truman on the telephone. A copy of the draft treaty had already been sent to Independence, Missouri.
Mr. Ball expressed his fear that some on the Hill will point to the ambiguity of the "or any other nuclear explosion" phrase and conclude that the Administration had agreed to a poorly drafted treaty, and, therefore, could not be trusted to draft any treaty. Their argument would be that the title of the treaty, as well as the preamble, could be interpreted to mean that the treaty provisions applied even in the case of war.
Secretary Rusk said we could either decide to ride through the Congressional criticism or explain our interpretation in the communiqu?. He said we could say in the communiqu? that nothing in the test ban treaty limited the use of nuclear weapons in self-defense as provided for in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. He suggested that we make this proposal to the Russians and get their response. If they oppose inclusion of this idea in the communiqu?, we would go no farther. If they agree to accept inclusion of this idea, we would go along. He felt that the point, however, had to be raised with the Soviets.
The President agreed that we should so proceed. He said we could explain to the Hill that we had chosen to include the explanation in the communiqu? in preference to drafting a separate protocol to the treaty which would cover this point.
Mr. Ball said that he did not believe oral agreement with the Russians on this point was sufficient. The President said he felt, however, that it was adequate.
Secretary Rusk read the draft communiqu?/4/ which he acknowledged was not ideal from our point of view.
/4/It is not clear which draft is referred to here; see footnote 9 below.
The President then raised the question of sending a letter to de Gaulle./5/ He thought we should send this letter now and let the British Prime Minister know of our decision because the time for his press conference was getting near. He said at the time we announced the initialling in Moscow we should release a statement from the White House saying that we welcomed the successful conclusion of the treaty negotiations. Shortly thereafter he should make a formal speech which would include all our arguments in favor of the test ban treaty.
/5/For text as delivered on July 25, see Document 352.
Secretary Rusk pointed out that several Senators had a let-down feeling because they had been fighting a comprehensive test ban treaty and now are confronted with a three-environment test ban which permitted the continuance of underground testing. Many of the arguments against a comprehensive treaty fall to the ground under the limited test ban treaty because the problem of inspecting underground tests does not arise.
Mr. Murrow felt that public opinion was somewhat confused and urged that the President's speech be made as early as possible.
The President said if the test ban treaty was initialled tomorrow, he could make his speech on Friday or hold over until Monday. No press conference is scheduled before Wednesday. Mr. Bundy suggested that there be a brief statement at the time of initialling to be followed by a longer speech.
Mr. Murrow urged that the Administration set the tone for the public at once by emphasizing that the limited test ban treaty was the result of our initiative.
Secretary Rusk said he felt the bipartisan leaders should be brought in for a briefing promptly. He also suggested that policy guidance on the test ban treaty be sent to the field.
At this point Mr. Bundy reported on a telephone call he had from Mr. Kaysen from Moscow./6/ With respect to the phrase discussed earlier, the delegation felt the cure was worse than the disease. The delegation had been over this point with the British delegation and together they had decided not to raise it with the Russians. The negotiators were in session but the U.S. delegation had asked for a delay in order to obtain additional instructions.
/6/No memorandum of this telephone conversation has been found.
The President said he felt that the language to be included in the communiqu? is regarded more seriously here than in Moscow. If Mr. Harriman still doesn't want the language which we have suggested to him, then we will face the problem of what Mr. Harriman should do. Secretary Rusk said that the President, in his speech and again before signing the treaty, could explain the entire problem.
Mr. Bundy said that Mr. Harriman would be returning to Washington on Saturday or Sunday. Mr. Murrow urged the President not to await Harriman's return before making a speech. The President agreed that he would speak on Friday and would want a draft by tomorrow. Mr. Harriman is to be asked for suggestions to be included in the speech.
Secretary Rusk cautioned that Mr. Harriman, in his talk with Khrushchev on Saturday, might encounter very rough going./7/ Mr. Harriman might be in the position of returning to Washington with a limited test ban treaty in one pocket and a Soviet ultimatum in the other. Ambassador Thompson said that the Russians have pushed Mr. Harriman hard on their proposal for a non-aggression pact.
/7/July 27. Harriman actually met with Khrushchev on July 26; see Document 354.
The President wanted to be sure that the French, Italians and Germans were informed of the negotiations. He thought Secretary Rusk should send a personal message to German Foreign Minister Schroeder./8/
/8/In telegram 232 to Bonn, July 24, Rusk instructed McGhee to tell Schroeder that while the United States considered it "of highest importance" that China, North Vietnam, North Korea, Outer Mongolia, and East Germany all adhere to the test ban treaty, it was "well-established in the post-war period that adherence to multilateral agreements does not imply recognition among signatories who do not otherwise recognize each other." After citing examples, Rusk concluded that he hoped that Schroeder would find his comments a "basis for removing any anxieties about GDR adherence." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)
Mr. Bundy read to the group the most recent Harriman cable on the draft communiqu?./9/
/9/Apparent reference to telegram 311 or 313; see Document 347 and footnote 4 thereto.
The President responded by suggesting that Mr. Harriman discuss the point in his conversation with Khrushchev. He felt it would be hard to deal with it in the wording of the communiqu?. He said we might be asked in the Senate about this point and we should be in a position so that Secretary Rusk could say we have dealt with the point. The record of the Moscow meetings should be such as to prove that the point had been discussed with the Russians.
Secretary Rusk agreed that we must discuss this with the Russians. If they respond and reveal that they had in mind an effort to limit our use of nuclear weapons in war by means of the limited test ban treaty, then we will indeed have a major problem on our hands.
The President said that if we are ever asked about the point, we will answer by saying we have discussed it with the Russians. It is important to tell Mr. Harriman so that he will understand why it is necessary to have raised this question during his meeting in Moscow./10/
/10/See Document 350.
Bromley Smith/11/
/11/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
350. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/
Washington, July 24, 1963, 9:43 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only Ban. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by Foster, Thompson, Ball, and Bundy; and approved by Read.
320. To Harriman. Regret that we must return to Deptel 304/2/ on subject of non-application of test ban treaty to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. On basis Secretary's appearance in preliminary consultation with three Senate Committees, it is already clear that text will be given the most minute examination and any point of ambiguity will be critically examined. Further, it would be of the most far-reaching consequence if there is in fact a disagreement between ourselves and the Soviet Union on this point. Therefore, you should tell Gromyko in the casual, informative fashion suggested in Deptel 304 that if this question is raised in the US, either in public discussion or in the course of Senate consideration, it would be our intention to respond by simply saying that the treaty on a nuclear test ban does not affect the right of self-defense against armed attack under Article 51 of UN Charter. We are confident that this is also Soviet Union's attitude. If he should reflect any different view and disclose that Soviets would claim that this treaty bars the use of nuclear weapons in defense against attack, then procedures presently scheduled should be delayed pending clarification of that point. We are not insisting upon formal changes in the draft treaty or even calling attention to the possibility of a problem in the communiqu?. But we must be clear that no effort will be made to pretend later that this treaty attempts to do something which never arose in the course of discussion, namely, to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in self-defense.
/2/See footnote 6, Document 344. In telegram 312 from Moscow, July 24, received at 5:30 p.m., Harriman stated that the delegation had considered the problem of a literal interpretation of Article I before recommending the revised text, but had been unable to find any appropriate language to avoid the possibility of such a "highly legalistic" construction. Fisher, McNaughton, and a British legal expert had agreed that the provisions in Article I were not legally applicable to use of nuclear weapons in hostilities. "I do believe that raising subject would substantially complicate our task. Therefore, in accordance authority Deptel 304, I have not raised it." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) In an interview with George Bunn on November 21, 1964, McNaughton gave an extended account of the delegation's consideration of this problem. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Classified Series, John T. McNaughton)
We hope that in fact there will be no difference on the merits on this question and that you can establish the necessary record quite informally. It is after all no more than a matter of saying to Gromyko, without significant dissent from him, that this treaty and self-defense are in fact two very different subjects.
Suggest you report results by guarded telephone call as soon as feasible.
Rusk
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