London, June 27, 1963, 10 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL/7US/Harriman. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to Moscow.

Secto 15. Eyes only for Harriman and Foster. Secretary reviewed position on test ban and forthcoming mission to Moscow with Foreign Secretary June 27. Home was attended by Heath, Caccia, Godber, Trevelyan and others; Secretary by Franklin Long and Raymond Courtney./2/ Uncleared memcon, subject to revision, follows:

/2/First Secretary of the Embassy in the Political Section.

Secretary stressed importance of making strongest effort to obtain agreement with Soviets on comprehensive test ban even though Soviets have given us no reason for encouragement. He noted discussions with Soviets might be initiated by focusing on two points which Soviets alleged are technical but which in fact involve important points of policy--namely, whether existing national detection systems are adequate to detect and identify all significant seismic events and whether inspection would constitute espionage. We hoped to open up a thorough examination of Soviet claims. Possibly we might enter some new terrain if we introduced (1) distinction between seismic and aseismic areas and (2) spreading inspection quota over period of years. Home agreed to importance of making real try to get comprehensive ban. It was agreed that tactically it would be best to avoid debate on numbers of inspection until last and try first to find where understanding on modalities might be possible.

British raised number of points which, although not new nor seeming seriously to question key aspects of Western position, suggested re-examination. Secretary assured him that US had none at all and that it was essential there be a reasonable relation between number of suspicious events and inspections. It was pointed out that small underground tests could have military significance for Soviets. British asked if there were any real risk in some technical advances being made by underground tests since really significant weapons developments would eventually have to be tested in atmosphere before being put into production. Secretary and Dr. Long pointed out this was not necessarily true. Godber suggested we should look again very carefully at size of inspection areas, number of inspectors, composition of teams, number of automatic recording boxes, etc. It was agreed that US and UK experts should make further thorough examination of modalities; Home suggested that Lord Hailsham probably would like to join in such preparatory effort.

Secretary said if it became clear that agreement on comprehensive ban was not possible we might proceed to several alternatives which have been considered, including three environments ban with continued effort on underground ban. Variation of this might include some kind of limitation on underground tests. There was some reason to hope we might be able to get somewhere in this way. British spokesmen expressed doubt. Secretary reaffirmed US could not accept unpoliced moratorium: any agreement to cessation of underground testing for extended period must be accompanied with adequate assurances.

With respect non-proliferation agreement, Secretary pointed out we should be fully prepared to discuss this (and present some comprehensive papers to Soviets both on this and on the test ban) but not try to go too far toward non-proliferation agreement without bringing French in. He also noted we questioned whether Russian assertion that MLF would be obstacle to non-proliferation was as genuine as they made out; probably, rather, their Chinese problem was more important. He also pointed out Soviets probably don't really understand German unilateral control would be impossible in MLF and that MLF would be measure inhibiting development of further independent nuclear capabilities. With respect non-aggression arrangement or NATO-Warsaw declaration, US felt if we got in sight of test ban or no-transfer arrangement French and German attitudes might change and their veto need not be considered certain.

In summary, it was agreed that although we could not expect to come away from Moscow with anything finished and signed, it was of greatest importance to make most serious try to find whether there could be basis for agreement. If Khrushchev really did not want agreement (and there were indications that this might be the case and that Soviets were intending to resume atmospheric testing) that might come clear. If he did want agreement, the outstanding points of difference probably were not insuperable. In any event, US and UK points of view were very close together. By way of further preparation for mission, experts would proceed with further examination of modalities, and secretaries would prepare joint paper for their principals./3/

/3/In Secto 19 from London, June 28, marked "Eyes Only for President from Secretary," Rusk stated that because of the "wide range of agreement" reached on the Hailsham-Harriman mission and because further discussions were needed "only on deep technical details of modes of inspection," he had told Harriman and Foster that they would not need to attend Kennedy's forthcoming meeting with Macmillan. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Kennedy)

Bruce

301. National Intelligence Estimate/1/

NIE 4-63

Washington, June 28, 1963.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Estimates 4, Arms and Disarmament. Secret; Controlled Dissemination. A table of contents is not printed. A note on the title page states: "Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board." A note on the following page indicates that the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained because the subject was outside of his jurisdiction.

LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCES OF A PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS

To estimate the capabilities and intentions of additional countries to develop and produce nuclear weapons and compatible delivery systems over the next decade; and to estimate the consequences thereof.

Conclusions

A. With the increasing availability of uranium, and nuclear technology and technicians, the development of a minimal nuclear weapons capability has come increasingly within the reach of nonnuclear states. A program for one or two low-yield fission weapons a year would cost, through the first detonation, about $140-$180 million and some $20-$30 million a year thereafter. However, costs rise steeply for more than a minimal program and become very large when advanced delivery systems and compatible weapons are required. Political and military considerations are likely to prove more important in determining the pace and scope of nuclear diffusion than differences in national wealth and technical skill. Where the motivation is strong enough, a country might attempt to overcome a lack of native resources by importing materials, technology, and technicians, or even weapons themselves. (Paras. 1-6)

B. We believe that eight countries, in addition to France, have the physical and financial resources to develop an operational nuclear capability (weapons and means of delivery) over the next decade. However, we believe that only Communist China has actually started a weapons program. The Chinese may be able to detonate a first nuclear device by early 1964, but a more likely date is late 1964 or beyond. Approximately two years after a test the Chinese could probably produce their first crude fission weapon. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Thus far the remaining countries--India, Japan, Sweden, Canada, Italy, and West Germany--have limited their nuclear programs to demonstrably peaceful purposes. They will, however, almost certainly continue development of their peaceful nuclear programs, some to a point which would significantly reduce the time required to carry through a weapons program. (Paras. 7-21)

C. We do not believe that the explosion of a first device, or even the acquisition of a limited nuclear weapons capability, would produce major changes in Communist China's foreign policy in the sense that the Chinese would adopt a general policy of open military aggression, or even become willing to take significantly greater military risks. It would, however, increase Chinese self-confidence and prestige and reinforce their efforts to achieve Asian hegemony through political pressures and the indirect support of local "wars of liberation." India probably would not embark on a nuclear weapons program on the basis of a Chinese detonation of a nuclear device, but is likely to continue its present nuclear program to a point where a crash weapons program could be developed relatively quickly. Japan also would feel an increased sense of pressure, but would be more reluctant than most other countries to develop a weapons capability. We believe the Israelis would probably employ a nuclear capability to intimidate the Arabs, but not to make war forthwith. The Arab States would probably blame the West, particularly the US, and the Soviets would probably finds ways of exploiting the situation. (Paras. 25-31)

D. The French force has as its primary purpose heightening French prestige and assisting France to assume leadership of a Europe less dependent on the US and with a voice in the management and control of Western nuclear power. While many Europeans are in general sympathy with de Gaulle's objectives, they also fear that the French program will stimulate further nuclear proliferation, erode the NATO concept, and perhaps most important, lead to German acquisition of nuclear weapons. We believe, however, that the Germans will limit themselves to peaceful nuclear programs over the next few years. If the Germans began to believe that their Allies, and especially the US, might not use nuclear weapons in the defense of the Federal Republic, German interest in a national capability would rise. (Paras. 32-37)

E. We believe that the USSR desires to prevent the diffusion of nuclear weapons, but that this desire will not prove so strong as to produce major changes in its policy. The Soviets have thus far proved unwilling to conclude nondiffusion agreements save on unacceptable terms. Even if the Soviets conclude that West Germany was moving toward a nuclear status, they would probably not make radical changes in their policy, but employ instead a mixture of threats, appeals, and proposals for regional disarmament. (Paras. 38-41)

F. Even if the US, the UK, and the USSR could agree on terms of a nondiffusion agreement, Communist China would almost certainly refuse to sign, and French and Israeli adherence would be doubtful. Nevertheless, the very existence of such an agreement would inhibit other nonsignatories and reinforce internal opposition where it already existed. A comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty would impose serious limitations on the development of nuclear capabilities by nonnuclear signatories but would be subject to many of the same difficulties as a nondiffusion agreement. (Paras. 44-46)

G. In strictly military terms, the nuclear proliferation likely to occur over the next 10 years will almost certainly not upset global power relations nor do we believe it will produce major realignments in the relations of states. The impact will be in the political and psychological effects of the existence of such new weapons, the greater unpredictability of relations within and between alliance systems, and the possibility that hostilities arising out of existing or future controversies could escalate into a serious confrontation involving the major powers. (Paras. 47-48)

H. The possession of nuclear weapons may encourage a new nuclear power to pursue policies which might result in a local crisis, but the possibility that such weapons could be used will almost certainly introduce a strong element of prudence into the calculations of regional enemies. As the number of countries with nuclear weapons programs increases, the likelihood of accidental detonation of weapons will also rise, particularly because safety measures are expensive and temptingly easy to dispense with. An unintentional nuclear explosion in some circumstances might even touch off a nuclear exchange, though we believe the major nuclear powers would react cautiously to such an accident. A serious nuclear reactor accident or a nuclear weapons detonation established as unintentional would almost certainly intensify domestic opposition to the country's nuclear weapons program, and would cause other governments considering a weapons program to hesitate. If US nuclear forces were stationed in the area concerned, there might be considerable regional pressure for their withdrawal. (Paras. 50-54)

[Here follow the Discussion section of the paper and an annex, totaling 21 pages.]

302. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen)/1/

Washington, June 28, 1963, 2:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Box 581, June-July 1963 Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. The source text bears the typed note: "No Distribution Except to Sullivan." Sullivan was Harriman's Special Assistant.

H called K.

H--I think we better call it off. And then there is another message here which says in light of the wide range of agreement I was just as glad not to go but the idea that they had a great idea about this. If you want to do this, send Foster over. You and I stay home. I put it to the Secy--I said is this a propaganda stunt, in which case I'll go along with it, or do you want to reach some kind of an agreement. And the strange thing is that John McCone and particularly Bob McNamara is keen to have us explore the widest range of this. But if we are to . . . then the hell with it.

K--I am going to call Mac's attention to these two cables/2/ and give him the flavor of our reaction./3/

/2/Apparently Secto 15 and Secto 19; see Document 300 and footnote 3 thereto.

/3/See Document 303.

H--The point is that so far we haven't yet hit the right chord. To go over the same arguments--all they are doing is going over the same arguments.

K--I couldn't agree with you more. I wanted to flag it for Mac so he can manage the situation on Sunday.

H . . . I am not worried about the President's own view. I think it would be very important if you and I and perhaps Mac could have a private talk with the President.

K--Mac has this very much in mind.

H--Without the entire group, without chaperones. I am very disciplined. I want to know what the objective is and I will conform completely. I really ought to find out what he would like to try to achieve. Certainly we are not going to get anywhere on any of the points of this conversation in this telegram.

K--Did you read the record of Foster and Kuznetsov?/4/ An opportunity was present twice, in my judgment.

/4/Not further identified.

H--I will get Adrian/5/ to pick it out.

/5/Adrian Fisher.

303. Telegram From the White House to the President's Party in the United Kingdom/1/

Washington, June 28, 1963.

/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Box 5TS, Test Ban 2, Background. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The communications channel and delivery point are not indicated. By Saturday morning, the President was at Prime Minister Macmillan's private residence, Birch Grove.

To Mr. Bundy from Mr. Kaysen. Deliver at opening of business on Saturday.

Ref: Secto 15 (Eyes Only for Harriman and Foster); Secto 19 (Eyes Only for President).

Harriman and I feel most strongly that if these messages reflect the state of affairs as U.S. sees them, we might as well stay home and send Bill Foster to Moscow to repeat his performance of this past winter in New York and Washington. In recent discussion with Harriman, McNamara has shown he too believes that there is something to be gained by serious and wide-ranging exploration of Soviet interest in test ban and broader security and disarmament measures which might follow from it. If what we bring "in our luggage" is what Secto 15 describes, we will hardly be in a position to raise these wider questions.

At the minimum, we should be in a position to indicate early in the discussion that we are flexible on numbers. Tactically speaking, this seems to me necessary to make progress. If, as Secto 15 suggests, we again begin with modalities, we are in danger of reminding the Soviets painfully of previous round. Lack of suggestion of what we have in mind on Chinese problem also an example of overcaution, unless directed at British rather than Soviets. Finally, to suggest in advance that our explorations may be limited by anticipated attitudes French, Germans is also not conducive to a forthcoming response.

I know this message tells you nothing now but even Jove nods, and Harriman and I think it important to remind you of the stage management problem all this poses for you and the President./2/

/2/In Tosit 2 to the White House, June 29 (routed through CIA channels), Bundy stated that "none of three concerns in your telegram poses problem of persuading UK, so I do not think that Birch Grove is the place to settle them. Moreover, conversation here suggests Secto 15 and 20 [19] represent minimum, not maximum, US position. Therefore suggest you and Averell continue to prepare your own packages for Moscow to be discussed on President's return. Jove often nods, but in this case the moment of truth has not yet come." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Test Ban Cables 6/13-7/15/63)

304. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

PET/MC/16

Birch Grove, England, June 29, 1963, 10:15-11: 30 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Kennedy. Top Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved by the White House on July 12. Birch Grove was Prime Minister Macmillan's private residence.

PRESIDENT'S EUROPEAN TRIP
June 1963

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The President
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. William R. Tyler

United Kingdom
Prime Minister Macmillan
Lord Home
Sir Harold Caccia
Sir David Ormsby Gore
Lord Hailsham
Mr. Philip de Zulueta

SUBJECT
Nuclear Matters, including forthcoming test ban discussions with the USSR

The Prime Minister began with a discussion of the importance of the test ban. It was our one great hope for progress toward peace and we ought to make a really big try. All the rest was really nonsense. We should discuss this problem, and trivial problems of weapons and internal organization of the alliance should be put aside as having really no comparable significance. The Russians may or may not be ready for a real agreement, and they might or might not be really ready to trust us, but we must try--and here the Prime Minister complimented the President upon his success in preventing American generals from making the threatening noises which they frequently made in General Eisenhower's time.

As the Prime Minister saw it, there were three arguments to be pressed with the Russians:

(1) If we could not get an agreement now, both sides would have to go forward with the effort to develop an anti-missile missile. This would require more and more effort and expense on unproductive weapons, in an endless competition of emptiness. Surely this matter of cost and irrelevant effort was important to Khrushchev.

(2) While the great nuclear powers were in this endless competition to the clouds, other small but dangerous forces would be growing up from the earth. We could offer to keep such small powers out of the game.

(3) We might be able to get 60-70 nations to join in a test ban treaty, and this would create a big pull against further nuclear efforts. China? France? Surely somehow the United States and United Kingdom could deal with France so that it would not pose a threat to the Soviet Union--and indeed the Prime Minister doubted if the Russians were frightened of the French (later in the evening the Prime Minister remarked that he had always wanted to bring France into the exercise, but that General Eisenhower had not agreed with him, in the light of the requirements of the McMahon Act).

China? China was more of a problem for the Russians, but it was conceivable that it would be impressive if there could be a joint note with the Russians to the Chinese.

The Prime Minister then remarked that nearly every time anyone got near to a test ban agreement, someone who wanted testing would invent a new reason to prevent such an agreement. The Prime Minister referred bitterly to the effect of the idea of decoupling in this connection.

So the question arose of the instructions to Hailsham and Harriman--the Prime Minister remarked on the outstanding qualities of both emissaries, and said that he thought the problem of what we could propose was purely political--what can we get away with? The difficulty is to know what really is worthwhile. We must have no more dreary Geneva discussions of technical details--we must somehow get a different vista of the future. Khrushchev was a practical, hard, and brutal man. He might be happy with the current balance and fearful of change through further competition, so that it might be to his advantage to get a settlement now. Great powers were jealous and critical of small powers, and that it was in their interest for smaller powers to conform.

So our problem was to work out the line of instructions. The negotiators should play by ear, quick or slow as circumstances suggest, and not hampered too much by technical advice--which changed in any event every six months.

The President said he felt indeed that this was the summer for an agreement. He also agreed that the experts were often unreliable, and remarked that we had not learned as much from our atmospheric tests as had been predicted. However, the U.S. Government was not unanimous; there were serious divisions within it on the nature of the test ban problem.

Moreover, American opinion was much affected by previous Soviet behavior in such matters as the broken test-ban moratorium and the attempt to introduce missiles in Cuba. The President did not wish to make basic technical judgments this evening. And as he faced the broad political problem he must consider whether it would be better not to have a treaty than to have one which might be badly beaten in the Senate--a close contest might move us forward, but a bad defeat might be destructive.

The President wondered whether in fact a series of underground tests could be conducted without detection. There was a difference of view here, as there was on the question of how much could be learned from clandestine underground testing of any sort. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had one opinion and the President another which was on the whole that clandestine testing would not be decisive. This was a matter on which he would address himself to the Prime Minister later, and in two respects. (1) Could the Soviets run a series of clandestine tests? (2) How much could such tests alter the balance of power? The balance of power of course was a subtle thing. The President was inclined to share the Prime Minister's view that we have much too much nuclear strength, but it has had a part to play in international psychology. The French will have "enough" in 4 or 5 years; the U.K. has "enough" now. But we have more, and it has some political importance. If the USSR should seem to make gains, it might be helped psychologically. But if we can get a new view of the technical considerations involved, we might well give instructions to our negotiators.

The third question which seemed to the President central was China. A Chinese bomb would be important, especially psychologically, and the question would arise whether China could be bound by an agreement and, if so, how?

The Prime Minister wondered how new tests on our side would affect Chinese behavior. He also wondered whether the Soviets would gain anything by underground testing or whether they must go to atmospheric testing for any serious results. (This theme recurred several times later in the discussion, on the British side.)

The President remarked that we would have to test if the Chinese tested. On the other hand, if the Chinese could be restrained, that would be the most powerful argument in favor of a test ban. That subject we must try to discuss with the Russians.

A next question was the relation of the French to a test ban. How could they be worked in? We think this is a workable problem.

And, third, was the relation of the MLF to a test ban--and the President indicated his feeling that if in fact a test ban agreement came in sight, it would be desirable and possible to modify our planning for the multilateral force.

The President said that the Chinese are now testing missile systems. From what information we have, these are rather primitive.

Macmillan said that Cuba showed that the important things today "are the pawns and not the queens." Small countries and highly localized acute problems can endanger the peace of the world by bringing the powerful countries into competition and conflict with each other. He said that one of the curious results of Cuba was that both Cuba and Berlin were now equally vulnerable and tended to cancel each other out. The President said that the Russians may have undertaken their desperate gamble in Cuba in order to try to give the world the appearance of having changed the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States, had their plan succeeded.

Lord Home said he thought that nondissemination of nuclear weapons was of very great importance as an appeal to the Soviets in relation to Germany.

The President said we really had to come to a decision on two points with regard to the test ban talks: (1) What do we say? (2) What are the means at our disposal?

There was a question of whether the Russians would be able to test if we limited ourselves to national means of detection. We would have to ask ourselves three questions: (1) What kind of tests would they be able to get away with? (2) Just how much additional knowledge would such tests be likely to provide them with? (3) Would the Russians then be in a position to apply this knowledge so as to increase significantly their nuclear potential?

305. Paper Prepared for the Kennedy-Macmillan Talks/1/

Birch Grove, England, June 30, 1963.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Test Ban Inspections. No classification marking. Prepared by a U.S.-U.K. team consisting of McNaughton, Sir Solly Zuckerman, Frank Long, and Archibald Duncan Wilson, Assistant Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office.

Question One. What is the maximum size of underground nuclear tests which the USSR could repeatedly carry out without significant fear of detection?

Answer. By testing in carefully chosen soft media, the USSR could test up to perhaps 3 KT and risk only a 10% chance of detection of individual tests by seismic means. The risk by detection by physical means would be larger if a series of tests were carried out, and the risk of detection by other kinds of intelligence would also increase. Substantially larger tests, up to perhaps 25/2/ KT, could be carried out with small risk of seismic detection by accomplishing them in spherical underground cavities of a few hundred feet in diameter. But the construction of such a cavity would run the risk of being detected by other means.

/2/A handwritten marginal note reads "50."

Question Two. What can be learned technically from such small underground tests and what will be the military significance of the increased knowledge?

Answer. Increases of several fold in the yield-to-weight ratio could be accomplished for weapons in the low kiloton range. The fraction of fissionable material in thermonuclear weapons could be reduced. Weapons could be developed with enhanced radiation yield and also with deliberately suppressed radiation yield. Some weapons effects tests could be carried out, specifically on the effects of radiation on warhead components and some studies of hardened structure response. The following weapons effects cannot be studied/3/ underground: Electro-magnetic pulse, blackout, megaton-range ground shock, and full-scale interactions of re-entry vehicles.

/3/A handwritten marginal insertion reads: "to any significant extent."

The necessity of carrying out these tests clandestinely would substantially increase both the time scale and the cost of the program.

Studies of these sorts would permit development of a wide range of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons. Underground tests could also lead to improvements in the warheads of anti-ballistic missiles. However, the warhead is only one component in the necessarily complex ABM system, and the offensive forces have enough retaliatory means at their disposal that the possible improvements of ABM warheads do not appear to be of great military importance. Underground testing cannot be expected to lead to operationally meaningful improvements in strategic warheads./4/

/4/An additional handwritten sentence in the margin reads: "JCS says extrapolated ideas could be tested in outer space (!)"

Question Three. Will atmospheric tests be required to prove out developments made by underground testing?

Answer. Atmospheric tests will not be required for development of tactical nuclear weapons. Nor are they necessary for improving some components of strategic weapons. However, atmospheric testing would be required: (1) For proving out significant new designs of strategic weapons which might be based on developments made by underground tests; (2) to test the operational effectiveness of anti-ballistic missile systems; (3) for a range of significant weapons effects tests.

306. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Birch Grove, England, June 30, 1963, 11:45 a.m.-1:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Test Ban Inspections. Secret. Drafted by John McNaughton, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, on July 1. Copies were sent to William R. Tyler and Franklin Long.

SUBJECT
President-Prime Minister Test Ban Conversations, June 30, 1963

The President and the Prime Minister with their advisers discussed test ban matters during a meeting at Birch Grove from 11:45 a.m. until 1:15 p.m., Sunday, June 30, 1963. Present at the discussions assisting the President were Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Bruce, and Messrs. Tyler, McNaughton, and Long. Assisting the Prime Minister, in addition to his personal secretary, were Lord Home (in and out), Minister Thorneycroft,/2/ Ambassador Ormsby Gore, Lord Hailsham, and Messrs. Caccia, Zuckerman and Wilson.

/2/Peter Thorneycroft, Minister of Defense.

The Prime Minister asked "the scientists" to provide the answers to the three questions put to them the night before. I read to them the questions and in each case the answers which had been prepared by the team of Zuckerman-Wilson-Long-McNaughton./3/ There was discussion after each answer. (The questions and answers appear elsewhere in the form of the informal talking paper used by the group.)

/3/Document 305.

The President then read from the JCS June 18 "Comments on the Proposed Nuclear Test Ban Treaty."/4/ He read extensively from Parts II, III and IV of the JCS statement. In some cases he asked me for fuller explanation of the Chiefs' meaning, and in all cases there was discussion of the points made by the Chiefs. The President stated that it will be important for us to "get back home and talk this over."

/4/Not found, but presumably an earlier draft of the paper cited in footnote 12, Document 294.

It was stated that it would be advisable for Mr. Harriman to spend perhaps two days in London before going on to Moscow. It was understood that the US-UK liaison at the working level was going on already.

Lord Home suggested that, in the Moscow negotiations, we should not permit the debate to focus on number of inspections. Rather, he preferred to have the emphasis put on kinds of inspection.

There was some discussion of what inducements the Soviets might have to agree to a test ban. In response to a question from Lord Hailsham, I said that the interest on the part of the Soviets might flow (1) from a different strategic outlook (one in which superiority in very large weapons appeared sufficient), and (2) from a desire to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. The Prime Minister added two reasons: (3) That the Soviets may wish to save the resources now being diverted to the arms race, and (4) that they may be interested in taking a step toward disarmament. He doubted very much that the Soviets would enter a treaty intending to cheat; he believed that the question in their minds would be "Do we want this deal or don't we?" The questions would be how much each side had to give to reach agreement.

The President raised the question of a partial test ban--one which had no meaningful on-site inspections but which allowed a given number (possibly 7 to 10) of underground tests each year. He doubted that the Soviets would be interested in such a proposal. Secretary Rusk emphasized the importance for pressing for a comprehensive ban for quite some time before falling back to a partial ban. The President observed that such a partial ban would meet some of the Soviet needs while at the same time making a ban more consistent with US military and political requirements.

The problem of China was raised. It was observed that it might be hard to get a treaty ratified by the Senate if the Chinese tested prior to that time and, in any event, that the Senate ratification might provide that the treaty terminate if the Chinese conducted a test. There were some references to methods which might be used to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities.

JTMcN

307. Draft Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

Washington, July 2, 1963.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI, ER Subject Files, White Papers: Nuclear Test Ban 3/1/63-1/21/64. Top Secret. The source text does not indicate whether a final version of this memorandum was sent.

SUBJECT
Comments on Conclusions of the White Papers (Draft) on Nuclear Testing Problems/2/

/2/A series of draft white papers on the strengths and weaknesses of a nuclear test ban was prepared in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in June and July of 1963. None appears to have reached final form. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Testimony, and ibid., DOD, Vol. IV, 1/63-6/63)

1. A forceful test ban would freeze the present status of nuclear weapons except for modest refinements which can be accomplished in the laboratories without testing, or improvements which can be accomplished by clandestine testing under the threshold which will be discussed later.

2. This will mean that the Soviets will preserve their lead in weapons ranging from 6,000# to 25,000# in weight and in yields from 13 to 100 megatons. Our estimates lead to the conclusions that the Soviets now possess missile delivery warheads of about 25 megatons and are in the process of developing a missile which can deliver a 100-megaton warhead. It is apparent that these large warheads can destroy vast areas from thermo effect if the large megaton warheads are exploded at high altitude. It does not appear that weapons of this type would be useful against our hardened missile sites and it does not appear to me that the Soviets will plan such uses, as they will have several hundred ICBMs capable of delivering warheads of about 10 megatons. These, I believe, would be used against our missile sites.

3. It is true that during the period of which I am speaking we will build many more ICBMs and Polaris missiles and will outnumber the Soviets by 3 or 4. It is also true that during this period the Soviets will be hardening their ICBM sites as they now appear to be doing and these will be less vulnerable to our comparatively low yield warheads.

4. I therefore conclude that in the field of strategic weapons we will be at a disadvantage under a test ban. The technology proven in our last test series can be fully developed and weaponized to produce warheads at yields 3 to 5 times as great as those we now have with no increase in weight. While this will not equal the very large warheads of the Soviets, it will give us a far more effective offensive capability than we would otherwise possess.

308. National Intelligence Estimate/1/

NIE 11-2-63

Washington, July 2, 1963.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-63, USSR. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A table of contents is not printed. A note on the cover sheet reads: "This estimate was prepared and agreed upon by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee which is composed of representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, AEC, NSA, and FBI." The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred except the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdictions.

THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM

The Problem

Principal Conclusions

1. The Soviets have a highly developed nuclear weapon technology which differs in design philosophy and emphasis from that of the West. They have tested thermonuclear devices in very high yields (up to 63 megatons) well above any in Western experience, and in this range have achieved an outstanding yield-to-weight performance. They have also shown an excellent performance in thermonuclear devices of lower yields, down to about two megatons. In the submegaton thermonuclear class, [2 lines of source text not declassified] and they have not yet demonstrated a thermonuclear capability in weights below about 600 pounds.

2. The Soviets have conducted many tests below 50 kilotons, some of which may not have been fission devices. Debris from a number of tests in 1961-1962 was not obtained and analysis of those 1962 tests for which debris was obtained has not been completed. In general, data from the 1961-1962 devices analyzed to date do not permit any definitive judgment as to their progress in fission weapon technology, particularly in the very low yield category where evidence of testing may have been missed. They have continued to show interest in unboosted fission devices, although they have also tested many well-boosted devices.

Weapon Stockpiles

3. A small number of individually produced weapons for interim use could be fabricated within a few months after device testing. Thus, a few weapons with very high yields of up to 100 MT could now be available. However, we believe that the Soviet time lag between nuclear tests of a device and initial stockpile entry of a serially produced weaponized version is about two years at a minimum. On this basis, some of the new devices tested in 1961 could be entering stockpile during the latter part of 1963 if a priority development is assumed. It is estimated, however, that this could be done only on a limited scale, and that, in general, the devices tested in 1961-1962 would be stockpiled in 1964 and 1965. We believe that weapons currently stockpiled are derived primarily from devices tested in 1958 or earlier; these weapons range in yield from a few kilotons up to 6 megatons.

Requirements for Further Testing

4. Soviet nuclear weapon technology appears to be highly sophisticated and adequate for present delivery systems, but significant advancements can still be made through further development and testing. Probably one of the strongest requirements is in the area of high-altitude effects of nuclear weapons. The Soviets conducted several such tests in 1961-1962, but probably need additional tests to obtain weapon effects data pertinent to antimissile development and countermeasures. They also lack direct information on effects of high-yield weapons on hardened ground targets and on the effects of lower-yield weapons on deep underwater targets. The Soviets probably also have requirements to conduct further tests to improve yield-to-weight ratios particularly in the lower weight range and to develop new weapon capabilities such as light-weight thermonuclear warheads for smaller missile systems, very small weapons for tactical employment, weapons with enhanced radiation output, and weapons with minimal residual radiation.

5. We believe that the Soviets are continuing a vigorous weapons research and development program, and that they are maintaining a posture to resume nuclear testing promptly if a decision is made.

Fissionable Materials Production

6. We estimate the mid-1963 cumulative Soviet production of fissionable materials at about 15,000 kilograms of plutonium equivalent and 130,000 kilograms of U-235./2/ These quantities are somewhat lower than previously estimated for mid-1963, as the result of further analysis and additional evidence. The Soviets are continuing to expand their fissionable material production capability at a significant rate. We estimate that by mid-1968 cumulative production will amount to about 35,000 kilograms of plutonium equivalent and 380,000 kilograms of U-235.

/2/See page 35 for the views of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence). [Footnote in the source text.]

Reactor Development

7. Soviet research reactor development continues to be competent in most areas and is unique in a few. However, the original, unrealistic Soviet nuclear electric program has been abandoned and they are now proceeding with one which is more commensurate with their economic requirements and the state of their reactor technology. Moreover, the Soviets have encountered numerous difficulties with the nuclear propulsion of the icebreaker Lenin, and there is considerable evidence of similar difficulties with Soviet nuclear powered submarines. Soviet work on ion propulsion and nuclear auxiliary power supplied for space applications is continuing, and we believe that they have a program to develop materials suitable for nuclear rocket motors. The Soviet aircraft nuclear propulsion program appears to have been delayed and may have been cut back or even canceled.

[Here follow a 44-page summary, a 33-page Discussion section, and an evaluation of Soviet nuclear tests from August 1949 to December 1962.]

309. Editorial Note

On July 2, 1963, Soviet Chairman Khrushchev spoke on the test ban question in East Berlin. After emphasizing the Soviet preference for a comprehensive agreement without inspections, he stated that "since the Western Powers are impeding the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear tests, the Soviet Government expresses its readiness to include an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water." Later in the speech, Khrushchev stated "that it would be advisable straightaway, when an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests is concluded, to take also another big step towards the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of confidence between states, namely, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the two main military groupings of states--the NATO countries and the countries parties to the Warsaw Treaty." He noted that an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, "together with the simultaneous signing of a non-aggression pact between those two groupings of States, will create a new international atmosphere more favorable to the solution of the most important problems of the modern world, including the problem of disarmament." For text of this speech, see Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pages 244-246.

At 5:15 p.m. on July 2 in Washington, Kaysen telephoned Harriman, who said he "looked on" a summary he had of Khrushchev's speech as "mighty interesting and that he had [not?] said this before." Harriman also asked "if it looked pretty good. Kaysen said it looks like something to me. There is a lot about the German Peace Treaty." In a telephone conversation with syndicated columnist Joseph Alsop at 1:20 p.m. on July 3, Harriman stated that the Soviets "never agreed to testing in this manner before. We have proposed it--the three elements, three environments. The question is whether he ties that in definitely to Warsaw-NATO agreement. It isn't clear whether he ties [them?] together or whether he thinks they should be one after another." (Both memoranda of conversation in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Box 581, June-July Telephone Conversations)

On July 3, the President held two meetings at the White House with senior officials including McNamara, Ball, Harriman, Foster, Bundy, and Kaysen. Rusk was at the second meeting, held at 4:10 p.m., but not at the first, apparently held some time between 9 and 11 a.m. Kaysen's handwritten notes of the meetings indicate that the President was searching for some means of seeing whether the United States could meet the Soviet desire for a non-aggression pact without jeopardizing the Western position in Berlin and without antagonizing Chancellor Adenauer and President de Gaulle. Kennedy in the 4 p.m. meeting pointed out the difficulty of getting de Gaulle involved in the test ban, given his "natural" opposition to any U.S. initiative, and wondered how to make him "a larger figure in this matter."

At both meetings, Harriman spoke of the difficulty of having frank discussions in Moscow if the French joined the talks. With Adenauer, the major issue was the non-aggression pact. Kennedy is reported as saying at the second meeting that "we don't mind, poor grounds for refusing it, how do we convince Germans." The President decided that he should write Adenauer and "reserve position," apparently on the non-aggression pact, and that Rusk should write Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder. Regarding France, the resolution of the meetings was less clear, seeming to depend on soundings to be taken by Ambassador Bohlen over the next few days. (Both memoranda of conversation in Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Harriman Instructions) For Kennedy's letter to Adenauer, see Document 310; for Rusk's letter to Schroeder, see Document 311.

310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/

Washington, July 3, 1963, 9:46 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Kennedy. Secret; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Bromley Smith.

39. The following letter from the President to Chancellor Adenauer should be delivered to the Chancellor's office in the course of business Thursday but without giving an impression that it is being delivered with special haste in connection with the meeting between the Chancellor and De Gaulle./2/ Text of letter follows:

/2/This meeting was held in Bonn July 4-5.

"Dear Mr. Chancellor:

On my return to Washington, I write to thank you once again--and most heartily--for all your kindness and courtesy during my visit to the Federal Republic./3/ I shall not soon forget the welcome which you and your people gave to us.

/3/Kennedy was in Germany June 23-26.

I particularly value the intimate private conversations which you and I were able to have, and I was grateful to you for your exposition of certain soundings which you have thought it useful to undertake. We on our side will also keep you fully informed. In that spirit, I have asked Mr. Rusk to give to Mr. Schroeder a complete account of our preliminary thinking about the possible meaning of the new language on nuclear tests which has appeared quite unexpectedly in Khrushchev's Berlin speech./4/

/4/See Document 309.

It is far from clear what the linkage may be between this apparently new position on a limited test ban and the question of a non-aggression agreement, but it seems to me at least possible that we can work out a bargain which in effect produces the kind of standstill agreement that you spoke of to me./5/ It is essential to us, of course, that any such arrangement protect all our interests, but it may be, as you suggested that Khrushchev is becoming ready to accept this kind of standstill, instead of the one-sided agreements he has sought in the past.

/5/No record has been found of the President's private meeting with the Chancellor the morning of June 24. That afternoon, Kennedy and Adenauer discussed the test ban briefly with others present. (Memorandum by Creel; Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Kennedy) See the Supplement.

In any event, this is what we must now find out, and I doubt if we shall know much more until after Harriman has been to Moscow. Meanwhile, my people will be in close consultation with yours, and I will be sure to get in touch with you personally if there is any important new development. In the meantime, I have asked Mr. Rusk to make sure that all our people avoid any public statements which might seem to prejudge the matter one way or another, and if you should think it useful, I hope you may be able to take a similar line with your people.

I am particularly conscious that General de Gaulle may have reservations about any possible standstill, and I should be glad to have your own advice as to how the matter might best be discussed with him after your talks with him are over. I persist in my conviction that the real interests of all our nations are the same and that we must find ways of pursuing them in increasing unity."

Rusk

311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/

Washington, July 3, 1963, 7:10 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Secret; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Ball; cleared by Rusk (in substance), Richard Davis (EUR), and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Paris.

31. Eyes only for Ambassadors. Deliver following message from Secretary to Foreign Minister Schroeder as soon as possible, hopefully before start of Adenauer-DeGaulle talks.

"Dear Gerhard:

Since returning to Washington last night the President and I have had a first look at the text of Chairman Khrushchev's speech delivered yesterday in East Berlin. We had no previous intimation of this Soviet proposal. It seems interesting particularly in view of its timing, coming just before the meeting with the Chinese on Friday/2/ and the Harriman-Hailsham mission on July 15.

/2/That is, the Soviet-PRC meeting on July 5.

While, as you know, we have always preferred a comprehensive test ban with adequate inspection, we could nevertheless foresee real advantages to the West in even a three-environment test ban particularly as it might affect the Chinese nuclear development.

It is too early to say whether Chairman Khrushchev's speech can lead to an agreement on any form of test ban. But if such agreement appears possible and if the Soviet Union is to be put in position to make a maximum effort to obtain Chinese compliance, then it seems essential that the French Government join in the agreement. We have been giving some thought as to what President de Gaulle might feel he would need if he is to participate in a test ban. In fact, Ambassador Bohlen has indicated to Couve de Murville that this is an area which we might be prepared to explore./3/ We recognize, of course, the many complications of this question and we shall wish to keep in close touch with you about it.

/3/Telegram 97 to Paris, July 3, instructed Bohlen to "recognize of course that primary purpose of letter to Schroeder was to inform Germans in general terms of your recent conversation with Couve de Murville re nuclear matters before French informed them." The Department recognized that there was "little incentive for de Gaulle to go along on test ban or NAP," and stated that while it was inclined to doubt the value of Harriman seeing de Gaulle before the Moscow visit, it wished Bohlen's opinion in the matter. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) In telegram 78 from Paris, July 5, Bohlen stated that he agreed with the Department since "we in effect have nothing new to take up" with de Gaulle. (Ibid., POL 7 Harriman)

We are not clear from Khrushchev's speech regarding the extent to which he is linking the conclusion of a test ban agreement with a nonaggression pact. This will probably emerge only during the course of the Harriman-Hailsham talks. However, as we are informing the quadripartite ambassadorial group this afternoon, we could not of course make any commitments in a matter on which the NATO Alliance as a whole must move together. As it now seems certain that Khrushchev will raise the question, Harriman will plan to listen and ascertain the Soviet intentions in this regard.

Our own views on this remain the same as I discussed at Ottawa. We believe that a nonaggression pact is worth exploring if, in fact, it could be so designed as to give greater security to Berlin. Pending whatever we may learn as the result of Harriman's talks, the President and I feel that we should not foreclose full exploration of these possibilities and am hopeful that our governments will keep the question open and not take public positions until this can be done./4/

/4/Circular telegram 25, July 3, indicated that many of the same points were made by Ball in a briefing of the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group in Washington the evening of July 3, and that this material was also circulated for NATO briefing purposes. (Ibid., POL 15-1 USSR)

[Here follows discussion of the MLF.]

With every good wish."/5/

/5/In telegram 47 from Bonn, July 4, McGhee reported that Schroeder had stated in a preliminary comment on Rusk's letter that he would try to work discussion of a limited test ban into his talks with de Gaulle although he had "little hope de Gaulle would be responsive. He questioned whether it was realistic to expect that the Soviets would be able to obtain Chinese agreement to a test ban." (Ibid., DEF 18-4)

Rusk

312. Telegram From Prime Minister Macmillan's Personal Secretary (de Zulueta) to President Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

London, July 4, 1963.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Harriman Mission, Telegrams 7/1/63-7/6/63. Secret; Personal. The time of transmission is 1904 Zulu.

T. 295/63. Following from de Zulueta for Bundy. Your CAP 63369. Great men think alike. The President's message has crossed a letter which the Prime Minister has sent by the bag. I cannot get the Prime Minister this evening and so I am sending you now the text of his letter of which the original will reach you in due course.

Text of letter from Prime Minister to the President:--

Personal

Dear friend,

[Here follow two paragraphs primarily of a social nature.]

I don't know how you feel about Khrushchev's speech in Berlin. No doubt your people will analyse it and so will ours. We shall have to agree the vital point which is how to play the hand on this. We are looking forward to having preliminary talks with Harriman here. My inclination is to do what I said in the House of Commons--press on in the first instance to see whether accommodation can be reached to get the full ban. But at the same time we must be practical. If Khrushchev really drops the offer of inspection and we cannot meet him by any form of accommodation, then I feel we should not let slip the very big prize of the modified ban, which of course may be possible if it is true that he will not now try to insist on the unpoliced moratorium on underground tests. Alternatively there may be alternative proposals about underground tests such as you mentioned at Birch Grove./2/ At any rate we must get agreement if we can. For then we may be able to approach much more effectively the problems that we have with France, Germany, etc. And Khrushchev also may be able to do something with China. So even the second prize may turn out well worth having and would certainly be fatal to lose.

/2/See Documents 304-306.

These, however, are only my first thoughts.

Yours very sincerely

Harold Macmillan/3/

/3/This letter crossed a letter from Kennedy to Macmillan, also dated July 4, in which the President stated that he agreed with "what you said in the House yesterday," particularly "that the most important thing at the moment is try to keep our French and German friends from throwing any cold water in public." Kennedy asked for Macmillan's thoughts on possible ways of leading de Gaulle to a "less negative attitude." (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan 1963, Vol. III)

End of message.

313. Draft Instructions for the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)/1/

Washington, July 5, 1963.

/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Test Ban I, Background. Secret. Drafted by Kaysen. Attached to a July 5 letter from Kaysen to Harriman.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR HONORABLE W. AVERELL HARRIMANSPECIAL AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW

1. To negotiate the most comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty possible in accordance with existing guidelines.

2. To explore what other acceptable measures of disarmament the Soviets are interested in undertaking.

3. To probe Soviet intentions in related areas, including those mentioned in Khrushchev's speech of July 2.

I. Test Ban

2. Accordingly, the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty outlawing testing in all environments remains our objective. However, Chairman Khrushchev's speech makes it unlikely that we can reach agreement with the Soviets on a comprehensive treaty at this time. Therefore, we should seek an agreement banning testing in three environments along the lines of the August 27, 1962, draft treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in atmosphere, outer space and underwater, presented to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva./2/

/2/Harriman wrote a marginal note next to this paragraph: "Should we sign if possible or wait for Secretary's meeting?"

3. The achievement of such an agreement should be viewed as a first step toward the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty. You should therefore initiate technical discussions with the Soviet Union which may resolve the present disagreements between the Soviet Union and ourselves and the United Kingdom on the need for inspections in any comprehensive test ban treaty. You may also explore other possible means of extending the scope of the treaty such as limiting the number of underground tests to an agreed quota./3/

/3/Beside this sentence Harriman wrote: "I don't want to do this particularly as it would be more difficult to sell Congress."

4. You should continue to emphasize the relation between the nuclear test ban treaty and control of the diffusion of nuclear weapons. In pursuing this subject, you should be guided by the talks on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons between Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Dobrynin./4/

/4/At the end of this sentence Harriman wrote: "Read this." Regarding the Rusk-Dobrynin talks, see Document 287.

II. Other Measures of Disarmament

/5/Not further identified.

2. In addition, you should attempt to discover Soviet interest in other measures not necessarily part of a general disarmament treaty. These include:

a. An agreement not to put weapons of mass destruction in orbit.

b. A halt to the production of fissionable materials, under appropriate safeguards.

c. In combination with (b.), the transfer from military stockpiles of agreed quantities of fissionable materials to peaceful uses. In this connection, you should be prepared to discuss an arrangement in which we transfer more fissionable materials than the Soviets.

d. The scrapping on a one-for-one basis of B-47's and Badgers at a rate to be agreed.

In exploring these and other possibilities, you will be guided by the paper, __________, recommended by the Committee of Principals and approved by the President.

III. Other Measures

a. If possible, we should separate the non-aggression pact from the test ban treaty and other disarmament matters. We should press the discussions on these, and defer to a later date the further discussions of the non-aggression pact. We would prefer to conclude the three environment test ban treaty first, get the discussion on other measures of disarmament under way, and discuss the Soviet proposals for a non-aggression pact in the context of our discussions of further disarmament measures.

b. Even if it proves impossible to agree on this procedure it is useful to explore Soviet purposes. The phrase, "non-aggression pact," has been loosely used to cover a wide variety of possible arrangements about the way in which relations between Eastern European Communist states and Soviet Russia on the one hand, and the NATO allies, on the other, are conducted. In discussing these arrangements, we must continue to make clear that we can accept no arrangement which formally recognizes the East German regime or which renounces the ultimate reunification of Germany as a policy goal. Within these constraints, you should explore Soviet purposes in advancing this suggestion, and the possible modes which, in the Soviet view, would meet these purposes./6/

/6/At the end of this paragraph Harriman wrote: "Also safeguards our position in West Berlin."

2. You should also be prepared to explore any other matters which the Soviets wish to raise under the general heading of reducing tensions between the Soviet Bloc and NATO; or between the United States and the Soviet Union./7/

/7/Harriman wrote below this paragraph: "Discuss Laos in depth."

314. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for National Estimates (Kent) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)/1/

Washington, July 8, 1963.

/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Test Ban I, Background. Secret.

SUBJECT
What the Soviets Must be Thinking as They Perceive the Chinese Communists Working Towards an Initial Advanced Weapons Capability--Nuclear Weapons and Missiles

1. I have long felt that the Soviet leaders must harbor the profoundest apprehension of the Chinese attainment of an early nuclear capability.

2. The Soviets must appreciate that, upon the attainment of a primitive capability, the Chinese will require perhaps decades before this could be expanded to a meaningful deterrent of the US. The Soviets must also realize that when the Chinese have such a capability, it might be directed westward against the USSR as well as eastward against the US.

3. Worrisome as the prospect of the achievement of this capability may be, its attainment is obviously a long way off. But the period between the moment of an initial operational capability with crude weapons and delivery systems, and this later time, should cause the Soviets almost equal alarm. For during this period they will perceive that the Chinese are possessed of the means of starting a nuclear war in the Far East which they cannot finish.

4. Should the Chinese be so misguided as to attack Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, or Southeast Asia, and thus throw down the nuclear gage to the US, Soviet leaders must see themselves facing up to a most trying decision: whether to stand by and see China as a base for the Far Eastern Communist movement knocked into a cocked hat, or whether to come to China's defense, thus finding themselves in a nuclear war with the US for reasons not of their own choosing.

Sherman Kent

315. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, July 8, 1963.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Special Group (5412) (1963). Top Secret. Drafted by Louis Marengo on July 9. An attached list of the 24 participants is not printed. Among those attending but not reported as speaking were Harriman, Nitze, and McGeorge Bundy. Another, lengthier memorandum of this meeting prepared by George Rathjens of ACDA is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Committee of Principals 5/63-7/63. See the Supplement.

SUBJECT
Meeting of the Committee of Principals, 8 July 1963

1. Mr. Foster opened the meeting by explaining that its purpose was to consider two measures prepared in response to NSAM 239./2/ The first, a separable first stage measure, proposed 50% or 75% destruction of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and limitations on production, but included inspection of residuals only with the 75% cut and not with the 50% cut. The other, a gradual approach measure, stretched out the steps contained in Stage I of the present US proposal for GCD./3/ Mr. Foster said that he was not seeking a decision on these specific proposals today, but wanted to focus on the direction in which they led.

/2/Document 284. The proposals have not been found.

/3/Reference is to the Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, presented at Geneva on April 18, 1962. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 351-382.

2. Secretary McNamara said that he favored the gradual approach because the more extreme separable measure was unlikely to lead to agreement and had the following disadvantages: 1) It destroyed the West's nuclear deterrent against conventional aggression. 2) It gave up the West's superior nuclear power without reductions in Soviet conventional forces. 3) The inspection procedures were too loose, particularly for the 50% cut, but even for the 75% cut. 4) It had no advantage to the West as compared with the present US Stage I--it would not reduce the risk of strategic nuclear war and could increase it. Mr. McNamara preferred gradual steps to develop confidence which, in turn, might produce more substantial agreements.

3. Mr. McCone said that the separable first stage plan concerned him because of its reliance on intelligence as a substitute for inspection of residuals./4/ (50% cut) He noted that our intelligence inventory is made up principally of photographic intelligence, SIGINT, and, to a small degree, clandestine intelligence. These have improved over a few years ago but are not sufficient for us to determine residuals. Photography can be deceived by camouflage, satellites can be intercepted, SIGINT is perishable, and clandestine sources are not dependable. Furthermore, photography can tell us nothing about the number of missiles or reload capabilities, and we know very little about manufacturing complexes for missiles. In Mr. McCone's view, in brief, there was very serious danger in depending on intelligence to verify residuals because intelligence was 1) perishable, and 2) capable of being deceived. He noted, moreover, that differences would arise between the US and the Soviets over the number of arms in existence and the US could prove its case only by revealing intelligence. Furthermore, Congress and the public would want to know how good our intelligence was and it would have to be revealed. Mr. McCone felt that it was hard to overestimate the consequences of exposing our intelligence. Finally, he noted that dependence on intelligence would leave us in an uneasy position as we are now in Cuba, where the photography is of better quality. Mr. McCone concluded that we could not safely proceed on the basis of using intelligence to determine the quantity of residual arms. He felt that we would have to inspect residuals as well as the quantities destroyed. We had always taken this approach, and he felt that we should continue to do so.

/4/McCone commented at greater length on intelligence implications of the separable first stage plan in two memoranda dated July 8. (Both in Central Intelligence Agency, Special Group (5412)(1963))

4. In response to a question from Secretary Rusk, Mr. McCone said we had no evidence of camouflage, but pointed out that Khrushchev had said in 1959 at Camp David that he could hide missiles in canyons. The difficulty regarding camouflage was that one could not prove a negative.

5. General Taylor said that he agreed with Secretary McNamara and could add nothing; he said that he preferred the gradual approach. Mr. McCone said that this was his preference too.

6. Dr. Wiesner said that many comments might be made similar to those of Secretary McNamara. There was no need to abandon our present treaty without good reason; however, we now know things about intelligence capabilities that we did not know when the present treaty was tabled, so we might consider changes in the inspection provisions of Stage I. He said that our intelligence was good enough for this but agreed with Mr. McCone that we should be very careful about larger cuts--30% might be supported and maybe 50%. He added that it might be better to negotiate absolute numbers rather than percentages.

7. Dr. Seaborg said that he had nothing to add to the discussion.

8. After these statements of basic position by the key Principals, there was discussion of details and of related matters. Secretary McNamara reported that the Department of Defense was looking ahead for 10 years, that it might be possible to stabilize nuclear stockpiles, and if so, there could be some reduction in AEC production of weapons (perhaps $800 million per year). Secretary Rusk suggested that instead of formal agreements, it might be possible for the U.S. and USSR to report to each other what they plan to do unilaterally, e.g. the U.S. weapons production cut, with the hope that the other side would react to this news by cuts of its own. Mr. McNamara doubted, however, that the other side would react similarly, but instead would try to maximize its own program.

9. Mr. McCone confirmed that it was true that as of July 1st, 1963, the Soviets were at the lower end of the range of ICBMs which had been estimated by the intelligence community. He added that there was another problem which disturbed him. The Soviets had three types of long range surface-to-surface missiles--the SS-6, the SS-7 and the SS-8. There was a sharp difference as to whether the SS-8 is large--some believe it will lift 50-100 megatons. So when cutting by categories, the Soviets could retain a few missiles with enormous destructive power greater than that of the U.S. with its larger number of missiles retained. This should be kept in mind.

10. Mr. Foster said that he could not agree that the 50% or 75% cuts would not reduce the risk or destructiveness of war. He was also astonished because he thought we had enjoyed greater success than Secretary McNamara had indicated in balancing off our own conventional forces vis-à-vis those of the Soviet Union. He was also puzzled by Mr. McCone's lack of confidence in intelligence. He said that we build our forces based on intelligence so why could we not disarm on this basis? Before Mr. McCone could answer, Secretary McNamara supplied the answer--in our planning we put in a 100% safety factor.

11. Mr. McCone asked why we followed one procedure for inspection with 50% cuts and another for 75% cuts. Mr. Foster said that ACDA felt that the Soviets would accept more inspection if the cuts were deeper. Secretary McNamara reiterated his concern that we were cutting in the strategic delivery area and not in the conventional area. He wanted to retain a balance, roughly like the present balance. Mr. Fisher said that at the meetings of the Deputies, the Defense representatives had seemingly wanted to focus on strategic vehicles.

12. Secretary Rusk said there were two great obstacles to disarmament. One, the Soviets could not or would not back off regarding South Vietnam, Laos, Berlin, and military personnel in Cuba. Two, they refused to accept inspection. He felt that if the Soviets were seriously interested in disarmament, these things were not a great deal to ask.

13. There was then some conversation about the possibility of combining Stages I and II of the U.S. GCD proposal, which was inconclusive. General Taylor suggested the possibility of NATO vs. Warsaw Pact rather than U.S. vs. USSR, and Mr. Foster said that this was open. In response to Secretary Rusk's question, Mr. Foster said we were already authorized to discuss medium bomber bonfires, cessation of fissionable materials production, transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses, exchange of military missions, notification of major maneuvers, controls over military expenditures, no bombs in orbit, and certain nuclear free zones. Secretary Rusk commented that Governor Harriman had plenty to discuss. He asked if we could conceivably go to 50% across the board (including conventional). Secretary McNamara said yes, but did not answer when asked if we could do so without Communist China. Mr. Kaysen asked whether Secretary McNamara would still be concerned if there were 50% cuts in strategic delivery vehicles and 30% elsewhere. Secretary McNamara answered yes, and then made a plea for practical as against propagandistic proposals.

14. Mr. McCone expressed his concern about the continuing long-term plans of the Soviets for further increases in their arms. He referred specifically to the continuing buildup of facilities for producing fissionable materials. Secretary Rusk asked if there could be a study of damage to the U.S. from 15-20 large nuclear warheads. Secretary McNamara said this was being done./5/

/5/The study has not been found.

15. Secretary Rusk concluded the meeting by saying that some instructions would be drafted for Governor Harriman./6/ The idea of the separable measure would be kept in play, but not specific large cuts such as 75%. Governor Harriman would be authorized to explore this idea with the Soviets, and to find out, for example, how they would propose to relate strategic cuts to conventional cuts./7/

/6/Document 319.

/7/A memorandum by Rathjens, also dated July 8, of action taken at this meeting indicates that McNamara, Taylor, and McCone preferred the gradual approach as compared with the separable first-stage proposal, but that no action was recommended even on the gradual approach. The memorandum also noted "a consensus that Mr. Harriman had enough other items to discuss" in Moscow "so that there should be no US initiative relating to changes in our position relating to strategic delivery vehicles." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Documents, Volume I)

Louis Marengo

316. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, July 8, 1963, 6 p.m.

/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Test Ban Backgound. Secret; Personal; No Distribution. Drafted by Harriman. The meeting was held in Secretary McNamara's office.

PARTICIPANTS
Secretary of Defense McNamara
W. Averell Harriman

The conversation, lasting 45 minutes, was relaxed, covered a wide field.

Secretary McNamara expressed his desire to have me explore any aspects of our problems with the Soviet Union. I asked him what might be proposed which would help reduce our mutual military costs, a subject in which I knew Khrushchev was interested. He mentioned the ABM program, which would be increasingly expensive as time went on, with no end in sight. (14 billion for 20 cities--Alex Johnson thinks it is 20 billion for 14 cities.)

I commented that that was a saving for the future, but what about a cutback? He mentioned first ending production of nuclear material. He would approve 50% conversion of stocks without tactical reduction; if it went beyond that, he would expect reduction in the tactical field. He mentioned particularly equipment such as aircraft, attack submarines, and tanks. He put greater emphasis on this than on number of men in the military.

He suggested further reduction in the temp [tempo?] of competition in outer-space exploration, and proposed the possibility of cooperation.

He was prepared to liberalize trade, particularly if it is part of a bargain in which we gain.

He will fully support a comprehensive test ban treaty, although he recognizes it will be more difficult with the Senate now that an offer has been made for the three environments. He feels a test ban is of grave importance.

W. Averell Harriman/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

317. Letter From Chancellor Adenauer to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, July 9, 1963.

/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Chancellor Adenauer's Correspondence with Presidents Kennedy & Johnson, 1963-1964, Vol. II. Secret. The source text is an unofficial translation apparently provided by the German Embassy.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Thank you very much for your letter of July 4,/2/ and for the confidence you have thus shown me. I have gained, I believe, useful impulses for our policy from your visit to the Federal Republic and to West Berlin as from the talks with you, I am particularly grateful for your statement that you will get in personal contact with me if there is any new development.

/2/See Document 310.

I have for the moment stopped my steps towards a contact which I had mentioned to you,/3/ because I deem it suitable for the time being to await the outcome of the negotiations between the Soviet Union and Red China. I shall continue to inform you as soon as something happens.

/3/See footnote 5, Document 310.

In the meanwhile, President de Gaulle was here. The talks with him --the confidential talks as well as the other talks--took a good course. The New York Times as well as BBC-London and anti-de Gaullist papers in Paris are publishing inaccurate reports. I have confidentially spoken to President de Gaulle in downright earnest about the community of interests of all Allies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, telling him in particular that, whatever I do, I always ask myself: is hereby Moscow's hope of a split in the West to be strengthened or not. I suppose, President de Gaulle deems fair such a question with respect to every Ally. I have not gained the impression that he is in any way biassed vis-à-vis the United States of America./4/

/4/On July 8, Schroeder replied to Rusk's July 3 letter (see Document 311), stating that a potential non-aggression pact must not have the effect of further stabilizing the status quo, including the division of Germany and Berlin, and should be considered only in connection with measures leading to an improvement of the German and Berlin situation. Schroeder agreed that it "would be useful to explore thoroughly the Soviet position in the forthcoming talks." (Unofficial translation supplied by the German Embassy attached to German text; Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, German Officials' Correspondence with Secretary Rusk, 1961-1964) An amplification of Schroeder's letter is contained in a note from the German Embassy, July 9, attached to a memorandum of conversation held July 8 between Tyler and Georg von Lilienfeld, Minister of Embassy, by F.E. Cash of BTF. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 Berlin)

With sincere regards

Yours

K. Adenauer/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that indicates Adenauer signed the original.

318. Summary Record of the 515th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/

Washington, July 9, 1963, 6:25-6:55 p.m.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, Nos. 515-517. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The time of the meeting is from the President's Appointment Book (Kennedy Library); the source text indicates it began at 6 p.m. Taylor and McCone also prepared memoranda of this meeting, and Seaborg wrote a journal entry. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, CJCS Memos for Record, T-236-69; Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President; and Seaborg, Journal, vol. 6, pp. 33-34, respectively)

Harriman Instructions for Mission to Moscow

Secretary Rusk initiated the discussion of the draft instructions for the Harriman mission/2/ by calling attention to a sentence in the test ban section of the draft which authorized Governor Harriman, if the Soviets propose a moratorium on underground tests, to explore the usefulness of responding by suggesting a limited quota of underground tests. The Secretary said that he did not think the mission should mention specific numbers unless so authorized by further instructions from Washington. The mission should be authorized to do no more than to explore the idea of a quota for underground tests.

/2/Apparent reference to a version dated July 9, drafter not indicated. (Johnson Library, Vice President's National Security File, NSC 62-63) The next previous draft, dated July 8, was prepared by Kaysen. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Harriman Instructions) The July 9 draft differs from that of July 8 in omitting some subjects from the list of disarmament measures to be explored in Moscow and contains new language stating that a non-aggression pact could reduce the possibility of another Berlin crisis. A July 5 draft is printed as Document 313.

In response to the President's question, Mr. Foster said he believed we could accept a quota of twelve underground tests without inspection. However, he pointed out that if the treaty provided for a fixed number of underground tests, other States would feel free to conduct tests and we would thereby lose the benefit of restricting proliferation of nuclear weapons. He agreed that we should accept a treaty with a quota of underground tests if that was all we could get from the Russians. He believed the Soviets could gain an advantage out of an arrangement permitting them a number of underground tests because the Russians stand to gain more from testing than we do.

Secretary Rusk said our objective is to continue to try for a comprehensive test ban treaty, accepting a three-environment treaty only as a first step toward the achievement of a comprehensive treaty. He repeated his concern about proposing any quota of underground tests to the Russians prior to consultation with our allies and appropriate Congressional leaders.

Mr. Harriman said his understanding of the instructions was that he was limited to exploring the idea of a quota of underground tests.

General Taylor asked whether the Government as a whole had considered a proposal to accept a limited quota of underground tests. He acknowledged that such a proposal had some good and some bad points, but he urged that, before approving any offer, the entire idea of a quota should be examined in detail.

The President responded by acknowledging that there might not be much for us in a quota of underground tests. He asked whether within the next week we could give detailed consideration to this idea.

In response to a question, Mr. Foster said our present test program involved twenty-five to thirty underground tests.

Secretary Rusk mentioned a second point, i.e. how we define underground tests and atmospheric tests in such a way as to make clear when an underground test becomes an atmospheric test. He said we must define precisely the cut-off point between the two types of tests.

Mr. Foster said definitions of these tests are contained in the draft treaty,/3/ and he read the following:

/3/Reference is to the U.S.-U.K. draft limited test ban treaty tabled at Geneva on August 27, 1962. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II, pp. 804-819.

Article I, Section 1--Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion at any place under its jurisdiction and control . . . in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.

Chairman Seaborg replied that our present underground tests would be legal under this definition. Little radioactive debris from our underground tests falls outside the test area and none outside the State in which the test site is located. He said it would be feasible for us to continue our underground test program under such a limitation.

Secretary Rusk said the acceptance of this definition would mean that we were prepared to limit ourselves to weapons tests which produce no fallout outside the U.S.

Secretary Rusk mentioned the third point which he suggested should be incorporated in the revision of the instructions, i.e. in a discussion of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, the Harriman mission should maintain our position that our multilateral force (MLF) proposal is not inconsistent with the goal of a non-dissemination agreement. If we did not maintain this position, we would cause great confusion among our allies and wreck NATO. He said the mission should point out that our MLF proposal actually means greater control of nuclear weapons and therefore is consistent with our effort to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons.

The President suggested that the pertinent sentence in the non-dissemination section of the instructions be revised to reflect Secretary Rusk's point. He asked what our position would be on a proposal to ban dissemination of nuclear weapons to powers which are now nuclear powers. He wished to avoid any clause which would prohibit us from giving weapons to France if we so desired.

Secretary Rusk responded by saying that the draft treaty covered this point and that the Russians had accepted our definition of the nuclear powers as being the U.S., U.K., France and the USSR. In discussion with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, Secretary Rusk had obtained Soviet acknowledgment that the four named States were nuclear powers. Mr. Bundy added that in our discussions with the Russians we should continue to take for granted that we are agreed on the four nations as being the only nuclear powers.

Secretary Rusk raised the fourth point. He asked that the instructions be revised so that there was no link between discussion of a non-aggression pact and progress in other disarmament missions. He believed that we should not now limit our discussion as to a non-aggression pact. At a later time, we may wish to tie it to Soviet acceptance of other proposals such as a settlement of the Berlin question.

Mr. Harriman asked that the phrase in his instructions be changed from "non-aggression pact" to "non-aggression arrangements." The President suggested that the present wording of the sentence on non-aggression arrangements should be revised to clarify its meaning. Mr. Bundy pointed out that Governor Harriman should make clear that all discussions about non-aggression arrangements would be ad referendum to our allies.

The President suggested that the sentence referring to the desirability of an agreement not to put weapons of mass destruction in orbit should be strengthened. He thought that such an agreement would be useful to us. Secretary McNamara agreed with the President's observation.

In response to Secretary Dillon's question as to what areas we were referring to in the sentence mentioning nuclear-free zones, Secretary Rusk said we were thinking of Latin America and Africa--not the Far East.

The President raised the question as to our dealings with the British on matters arising from the Harriman mission. Mr. Bundy acknowledged that there was considerable suspicion of British motivation. He said many believed that Macmillan wanted a tripartite summit conference, even if there was very little substance for the three principals to discuss and agree upon. He said we should discuss with the British and reach a procedural agreement with them in an effort to hold to an absolute minimum the amount of information made available to the press about the Moscow negotiations. He suggested a procedure whereby each day a joint statement would be made about the developments in Moscow.

The President recalled a conversation with Lord Hailsham who took the position that the British could sign what the Russians proposed and they could sign what the Americans proposed./4/ The President concluded that Hailsham clearly envisages himself as a mediator between us and the Russians. Mr. Bundy mentioned Ambassador Bruce's nervousness about the personal attitude of Hailsham./5/

/4/This conversation has not been identified.

/5/In telegram 5148 from London, June 19, Bruce described Hailsham as a "brilliant, honorable, somewhat impatient man. For considerable time to come, as a potential Prime Minister, he will, I suspect be fully occupied with domestic politics, until a successor to Macmillan is selected." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman)

The President said the reports of the negotiations should be held to a minimum distribution. He agreed that we should limit ourselves to press guidance once a day. He suggested that a personal letter be drafted for him to send to Prime Minister Macmillan calling attention to the importance of keeping the negotiations out of the press. (Copy of the letter is attached.)/6/

/6/Dated July 10, not found attached. The text was transmitted in telegram 273 to London, July 11. (Ibid.)

Secretary Rusk agreed that Harriman's reports should be held very closely. He suggested that a special category of "Eyes Only" messages be established which would result in his receiving reports in a single copy. Further distribution in the State Department would be his decision.

The President raised the question as to whether a test ban agreement would be signed in Moscow or at a summit meeting. He expressed the view that the Russians might make a summit a condition to signing the test ban agreement.

Secretary Rusk said we should conclude an atmospheric test ban treaty if the Soviets agreed and sign it in Moscow if they wished. He shared the President's view that the Soviets would not sign at any meeting other than a summit conference.

Mr. Bundy raised the question of how we deal with the French in connection with an atmospheric test ban. Secretary Rusk said we would keep the French informed. Mr. Bundy felt that de Gaulle would find it almost impossible to sign any agreement which had been reached by the U.S., U.K. and the USSR at a summit conference.

Secretary Rusk stated he believed that it might be necessary to hold a general conference at which other States would sign the test ban treaty. The President agreed that it might be necessary to hold such a conference in order to get other States to sign. Secretary Rusk said we should not permit the French to have a procedural veto on such arrangements.

The President asked how we thought the Russians would discuss a test ban treaty with the Chinese./7/ Mr. Harriman replied that he would try to raise this subject with the Russians but he was personally doubtful that they would discuss this subject with us./8/

/7/In a conversation with Australian Prime Minister Menzies on July 8, Kennedy noted that the Sino-Soviet dispute was "the key and the negotiations in Moscow very much depended upon developments in the Sino-Soviet dispute." (Memorandum by Roger Hilsman; ibid., DEF 18-3 USSR(MO))

/8/During a telephone conversation with syndicated columnist Marquis Childs on July 4, Harriman stated that "he felt the big thing on Khrushchev's mind [is] relations with the Chinese." (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, June-July Telephone Conversations 1963)

In response to the President's question, Secretary McNamara said he accepted the Harriman instructions and had no comment to make. He added that he felt General Taylor had some views which he wished to express as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Taylor said that the Chiefs individually had taken the position that a limited test ban treaty, as well as a limited test ban treaty with a quota of underground tests, was not in the national interest./9/ Two of the Chiefs, General LeMay and Admiral Anderson, had already expressed their personal views to the Stennis Committee./10/ General Taylor asked that a governmental review be made of the atmospheric test ban treaty to determine now whether it was in the national interest. He asked that the Committee of Principals review the entire proposal again in the light of developments during the past year. Such a review would include a review by the Chiefs as well as by other agencies of the Government.

/9/See footnote 14, Document 294.

/10/See footnote 12, Document 294.

Secretary McNamara said that each Chief will express his opinion on the treaty to the Stennis Committee.

This testimony will be the personal views of the individual Chiefs of Staff. He opposed a formal review by the Chiefs or by the Government as a whole because it would record again a difference of view. He hoped we could avoid a formal statement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body of its view of a test ban treaty.

The President agreed that we should not ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their formal position because we wished to avoid a statement of their collective judgment becoming public and resulting in press speculation as to differences within the government. He felt that if the Russians accept our treaty, we will have to fight for it in the Senate, win, lose or draw.

General Taylor repeated his request for a review of the test ban treaty in order to take into account developments during the past year.

Secretary McNamara again stated his opposition to such a review on the grounds that there was wider diversity as to the advisability of a treaty this year than there was last year. He feared that any such review would leak to the press while Harriman was en route to Moscow.

Secretary Rusk said we must now take the position that an atmospheric test ban is in the national interest. He said the time to review such a decision is behind us and that we have not [sic] based all our actions on the decision that we wanted to have an atmospheric test ban treaty. If we are not ready to try our best to get an atmospheric test ban treaty, then we should turn Harriman around.

The President suggested that following the meeting Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and General Taylor discuss this point further with him in his office./11/

/11/In his record of this meeting, Taylor wrote that at the meeting in his office the President expressed dissatisfaction with the Stennis Committee for having the JCS testify on a "test ban proposal which might never be seriously considered by the government," expressed "understanding" of the JCS position on both the comprehensive and atmospheric test ban proposals, and said that the JCS would have their "full day in court before the Senate if and when a formal treaty proposal" got that far. Meanwhile, Kennedy hoped that the JCS "would express their personal views as required by Congress but avoid doing anything capable of affecting adversely the Harriman discussions."

The President then asked what we would do if China exploded a nuclear bomb a year after the treaty came into effect. He acknowledged that the Soviets could be properly concerned if France explodes a nuclear bomb following signature of a test ban treaty.

Mr. Foster read from the draft treaty the provisions covering the explosion of a nuclear weapon by a non-treaty power. (Article III states that if a nuclear explosion has been conducted by a State not a party to the treaty under circumstances which might jeopardize the determining parties' national security or if a nuclear explosion has occurred under circumstances in which it is not possible to identify the State conducting the explosions, a State may request a conference of the treaty parties. At the conclusion of this conference, or after sixty days after the request for a conference, a treaty power can withdraw from the treaty by giving notice. The withdrawal takes place sixty days after notification of intent to withdraw.) Mr. Foster added that one advantage of the treaty was to advance toward our goal of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He said our signature to a proposed draft treaty created no threat to the existing military balance. He believed that opinion within the Government was heavily in favor of going ahead with the effort to get a test ban treaty.

In response to the President's request to Mr. McCone for comment, Mr. McCone said he had none./12/

/12/Wiesner called Harriman at 11:30 a.m. on July 10 and said that while he did not wish to raise the issue at the NSC meeting, he thought Harriman's instructions "on the comprehensive test ban" were "unduly restrictive." Harriman "said to talk it over with Carl. He was the drafter. Harriman said he was never inhibited by instructions." (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, June-July Telephone Conversations 1963)

Bromley Smith/13/

/13/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

319. Instructions for the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)/1/

Washington, July 10, 1963.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, Nos. 515-517. Secret. Another copy is attached to NSC Action No. 2468, July 9, which states that the President approved the revised text after the 9:30 a.m. meeting; see Document 320. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Regarding earlier drafts of the instructions, see footnote 2, Document 318.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR HONORABLE W. AVERELL HARRIMAN

On the negotiating side, you should seek to negotiate the most comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty possible in accordance with existing guidelines.

On the exploratory side, you should canvass, in so far as appears practical, the range of issues involving peace and security which divide us from the Soviets. You should give especial attention to two points:

1. What other acceptable measures of disarmament the Soviets are interested in undertaking;

2. What are Soviet intentions in dealing with the problems related to European security, as raised in Khrushchev's speech of July 2.

I. Test Ban

2. Accordingly, the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty outlawing testing in all environments remains our objective. However, Chairman Khrushchev's speech makes it unlikely that we can reach agreement with the Soviets on a comprehensive treaty at this time. Therefore, we should seek an agreement banning testing in three environments along the lines of the August 27, 1962, draft treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in atmosphere, outer space and underwater, presented to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. You are authorized to carry such negotiations as far as you can.

3. The achievement of such an agreement should be viewed as a first step toward the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty. If the Soviets show an interest in pursuing the topic, you should initiate technical discussions with the Soviet Union which may resolve the present disagreements between the Soviet Union on the one hand, and ourselves and the United Kingdom on the other, on the need for inspections in any comprehensive test ban treaty. The Soviets may, in one way or another, raise the issue of a moratorium on underground tests. If the Soviets do this, you may explore the usefulness of responding to such an initiative by means of a limited quota of underground tests in addition to the total prohibition of testing in other environments, but without discussing specific numbers, unless on further instructions./2/

/2/The part of this sentence beginning with "but" is new.

II. Non-Dissemination

/3/In the July 9 draft this sentence reads: "You may indicate that the U.S. is willing to take some responsibility in respect to non-dissemination with relation to those powers associated with it, if the Soviet Union is willing to take a corresponding obligation for the powers with which it is associated."

/4/This sentence is new.

III. Other Measures of Disarmament

2. In addition, you should attempt to discover Soviet interest in other measures previously authorized as separable measures. These include, but need not be limited to:

a. An agreement not to put weapons of mass destruction in orbit. This is a matter of particular interest to the United States./5/

/5/This subparagraph is new.

b. A halt to the production of fissionable materials, under appropriate safeguards, and in combination with the transfer from military stockpiles of agreed quantities of fissionable materials to peaceful uses. In this connection, you should be prepared to discuss an arrangement in which we transfer more fissionable materials than the Soviets.

c. An agreement to establish nuclear free zones in areas where nuclear weapons do not form an integral part of the security arrangements upon which the countries in the areas rely. (This refers to Latin America and Africa.)/6/

/6/The parenthetical sentence is new.

d. The scrapping on a one-for-one basis of B-47's and Badgers at a rate to be agreed.

e. Measures on the reduction of risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication.

IV. Other Measures

a. If possible, we should separate the non-aggression arrangements/7/ from the test ban treaty and other disarmament matters. We should press the discussions on these, and defer to a later date the further discussions of non-aggression arrangements. We would prefer to go as far as possible in discussing the three environment test ban treaty first, and then explore other measures of disarmament, as well as the Soviet proposals for non-aggression arrangements./8/

/7/"Arrangements" replaces "pact."

/8/The phrase "go as far as possible in discussing" replaces "conclude."

b. Even if it proves impossible to agree on this procedure it is useful to explore Soviet purposes. The phrase, "non-aggression pact", has been loosely used to cover a wide variety of possible arrangements about the way in which relations between Eastern European Communist states and Soviet Russia on the one hand, and the NATO allies on the other, are conducted. In discussing these arrangements, we must continue to make clear that we can accept no arrangement which formally recognizes the East German regime or which is inconsistent with the ultimate reunification of Germany as a policy goal./9/ Further, we can make no arrangements which do not insure the present Western position in Berlin. In all these matters we must take into account the interests of our allies. Within these constraints a non-aggression arrangement could be advantageous to the West by reducing the possibility of further Berlin crises. Accordingly, you should explore Soviet purposes in advancing this suggestion, and the possible modes which, in the Soviet view, would meet these purposes.

/9/In the July 9 draft, the latter part of this sentence reads: "or which renounces the ultimate reunification of Germany as a policy goal."

2. You should also be prepared to explore any other matters which the Soviets wish to raise under the general heading of improving relations/10/ between the Soviet Bloc and NATO; or between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the context of such a discussion, you may wish to ra