Documents 351-375
351. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/
Washington, July 24, 1963, 9:44 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only Ban. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by Foster, Thompson, Ball, and Bundy; and approved by Read.
321. You must continue to press with regard to the matter raised in Deptel 305/2/ concerning Paragraph 2 of Article III, especially as Gromyko's comments/3/ raise a question we cannot ignore. As treaty language now reads, instruments of accession must be deposited with all the Governments of the original parties. We cannot adopt a different position toward Nationalist China than the USSR adopts toward Red China. Yet under the present treaty language it is not clear that if one of the depositary states refuses to recognize the signature of an acceding state, the provisions of Paragraph 4 of Article III are complied with so as to make the accession of the depositing state effective.
/2/In telegram 305, July 23, 10 p.m. (drafted by Thompson; cleared by Bundy, Foster, Ball, and Read; and approved by Rusk), the Department stated its continuing concern over the ratification issue and inquired whether it was "contemplated" that each party would deposit its ratification with all three depositories. If so, the Department suggested insertion of language in Article II that would explicitly allow any acceding nation to deposit the ratification with any or all of the three original parties. This procedure "might take care of the Soviet problem if their concern is that there would be a disproportionate number of signatures or accessions deposited with Western parties." (Ibid.)
/3/Reference is to Gromyko's comments on the ratification issue reported in telegram 312 from Moscow, July 24, received at 5:30 p.m., and telegram 316 from Moscow, July 25. (Both ibid., DEF 18-3 USSR (MO))
Under these circumstances, the best solution would be for the insertion of the words "any of" between the words "of" and "the" in the second sentence of Paragraph 2. However, we need not insist upon that if there can be a written understanding by all original parties that if a state which one or more does not recognize deposits its instrument of accession with at least one original party, that will be sufficient to register accession. Such a written understanding could also record agreement that accession in no way affects degree of recognition granted by any party to another. FYI. This understanding would be most helpful to us with Bonn which is already raising question whether GDR accession is consistent with Hallstein doctrine. End FYI.
In raising this question with Gromyko you should make it clear to him that if he denies the accession of Nationalist China as a party upon deposit of an instrument of accession with the US, then we must deny the accession of Mainland China and other regimes not recognized by us if they deposit instruments of accession with the Soviet Union. In that event Mainland China and other regimes not recognized by the US could take the position that their desire to join was frustrated, and, thus, they had no responsibility for any inhibitions on testing. If your analysis is correct that the Soviet Union is seeking in the test ban treaty to obtain leverage on Peking, then this argument should be sufficient to persuade Gromyko to adopt a more acceptable position on this question. You might also point out that if the problem of non-recognition is injected as an impediment to accession, then many states will have problems since there will be many instances where a party does not recognize one or more other states. This would greatly diminish the scope and effectiveness of the treaty.
Rusk
352. Letter From President Kennedy to President de Gaulle/1/
Washington, July 25, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy/Johnson Correspondence with de Gaulle 1961-1964. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A note on the source text reads: "Original delivered to Elysee on 25 Jul 63." Concerning the delivery of this letter, see Document 349.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am sure you have been watching the signs of movement within the Communist Bloc. There is accumulating evidence that the Sino-Soviet rift is definite. This could lead to major developments along lines that you have long foreseen. The speed and direction of these developments may shortly be clarified.
During fluid periods such as the present, we all face particularly heavy burdens of decision. We must be on guard not to mistake transient signs of movement for long-range trends. But we must be equally alert to seize the opportunities that may be presented by great historic changes.
This is the dilemma that has confronted us in our current discussions with the Soviet Union. Chairman Khrushchev has put forward in Moscow several suggestions that may indicate a serious interest in making progress toward the control of armaments. He has mentioned the establishment of static observation posts to provide safeguards against surprise attack through early information on unusual troop movements and concentrations. He has also suggested the possibility of limitations on force levels and the level of military budget expenditures.
The Soviet Government has also stressed its desire for a non-aggression pact. We of course have made it plain that any proposals of this sort will require consultation and agreement among the Western allies before any action at all can be taken, and we rejected the notion of a necessary link between a test ban and this quite separate topic. We will take pains in any communiqu? on the present discussion to make clear the interest which our allies have in this matter.
I am not at all sure how far any of this can be pursued, but it is possible that some of these proposals can be usefully considered in later discussion.
The one field in which Governor Harriman and Lord Hailsham have been authorized to negotiate is the field of a test ban treaty, and in this area they appear near agreement on a draft of a treaty which will commit its signers to an ending of nuclear testing in three environments--the atmosphere, outer space, and under the sea. In my judgment this is a limited but important accomplishment.
My view of this limited agreement is governed by the possibility that we may be at an important turning point and that the ability of the leading Western nations to show a common front to the Communist Bloc can make a vital difference in the outcome. I hope, therefore, that you will not feel it necessary to make an early final decision with regard to the policy of France toward this treaty. I hope that you may decide to reserve judgment until after there is an opportunity for full discussion among your Government, the Government of the United Kingdom, and the Government of the United States. We have always hoped to have the participation of France in banning tests, and French participation, after due consideration and discussion, could have great positive effects.
I recognize that in considering whether to sign this treaty, you will have to weigh the fact that adherence to a treaty would end your use of one means of acquiring information relevant to nuclear weapons. As we have already indicated, the United States Government would be willing to explore alternatives which might make French testing in these three environments unnecessary. While there are both political and technical problems here, we hope they are capable of solution.
These are most complex topics, and I am sure that effective and productive understandings will require most careful discussion among us. All that I am urging now is that it would be to our common advantage for our three Governments to explore these questions. Such exploration will obviously be much more likely of success if the French position on a possible test ban agreement can be kept open while the problems involved are examined.
Our Governments have had different approaches to this set of problems for many years, and if we are to work out a new level of understanding, we shall need time and patience. But I cannot avoid the conclusion that we shall gain more than we lose if we are able to begin a serious reconsideration in the light of the possibility that the world may be able to put a stop to further nuclear testing in the air, underwater, and in space.
Sincerely,/2/
/2/Printed from an unsigned copy.
353. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, July 25, 1963, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret. Received at 6:28 p.m.
328. 1. Initialing took place 7:15 p.m./2/ This was only general business following private meeting of over two hours with Harriman, Gromyko and Hailsham discussing problem of unrecognized regimes dealt with in Deptel 305/3/ and problem of interpretation of Article One dealt with in Deptel 304,/4/ and telephone conversation Kaysen/Bundy at 7 p.m./5/
/2/For text of the tripartite communiqu?, dated July 25, which was released with the text of the treaty simultaneously in Moscow, London, and Paris, see Department of State Bulletin, August 12, 1963, p. 239. Text of President Kennedy's radio and television address delivered July 26 is ibid., pp. 234-238.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 351.
/4/See footnote 6, Document 344.
/5/See footnote 11 below.
2. With respect to unrecognized regimes, an explicit oral understanding was reached as follows: any such regime could deposit with any depositary or depositaries which would take it and this depositary in turn could send notice to other depositaries. If this notice is accepted by the other depositaries, there is a full, binding accession all around. But no depositary is bound to accept either directly or indirectly through notice, accession by a regime which it did not recognize. If notice is not accepted the obligation between the depositor and the receiving depositary is nonetheless valid, although the refusing party recognizes no relation. If notice is refused, no further comment will be made either by the party refusing notice or any other party./6/
/6/In a telephone call to Rusk at 11:45 a.m. on July 25, Bundy stated that Macmillan, acting on a message from Hailsham received before that day's meetings in Moscow, thought that the United States should not insist on pursuit of either the depository or the wartime explosion issue. Bundy pointed out that the White House, however, thought both could be pursued for another 24 hours. "Sec agrees. If we seem to agree when we don't we are in trouble." (Memorandum by Bernau; Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
Gromyko made it clear that with respect to a regime which they did not recognize whose accession they would not accept, they would consider any action by that regime to adhere to the treaty illegal, but was aware that the US would have different views and would accept the accession. Gromyko was explicitly referring to the GDR. The Soviet Union would not object to our action, unless we made some statement to insist that the Soviet position was incorrect. Gromyko indicated that he recognized that the US would have the same rights. He gave as hypothetical case, US refusal to recognize adherence of GDR: US would not recognize the legality of a deposit by GDR; but USSR would accept adherence and GDR would be regarded by USSR as party to treaty.
Gromyko indicated that both countries might well accept notification of accession of regimes which they did not recognize and did not propose to recognize. He hoped that we would in the case of the GDR and similar cases and stated the USSR would in all cases except one.
Gromyko said that if we attempted to write anything on the subject he would have to include a reference to the one country he had in mind and thought it was best that the matter remain on the basis of the explicit oral understanding we had reached. Harriman explained we must pre-sent this matter to Senate, and it was agreed that Harriman and other US officials were free to present the understanding and explain it in any appropriate way to Senate in presentation of treaty. Gromyko further stated he did not want to write our testimony to the Senate for us, nor did he want to edit it; we were free to say whatever we wished to about the understanding; as long as we stuck to the facts then Soviets would remain silent. Soviet Government would of course have to correct any incorrect statement. In course of discussion, it was agreed that Harriman-Gromyko letter referred to in Embtel 321/7/ should be treated as memorandum already overtaken by events./8/
/7/Telegram 321 from Moscow, July 25, reported in part on the presentation to the Soviets on the morning of July 25 of a letter from Harriman to Gromyko that embodied the instructions in telegram 321, Document 351. Hailsham disassociated himself from the U.S. position on this matter. Text of the letter, marked "Returned," is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Test Ban 8, Miscellaneous.
/8/Gromyko gave Harriman a letter in reply. It purportedly stated that the Soviets would "under no circumstances" recognize "as legitimate the deposit of ratification instruments by the Chiang Kai-shek regime, which represents no one, or accession by that regime to the said treaty." A reconstructed text, marked "restored from memory by Akalovsky," is ibid. After Harriman at the private session pointed out that this letter would force him to write a similar letter to Gromyko with reference to the PRC, despite U.S. desire that the PRC would adhere to the treaty, the two agreed to take back their letters and went on to reach the agreement described here. (Telegram 333 from Moscow, July 25; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) See the Supplement.
3. In the private session, I made the statement contained in Embtel 320/9/ regarding possibility that Article One might be read to outlaw use of nuclear weapons in war. Gromyko looked baffled./10/ He said "this treaty deals with the prohibition of nuclear tests in three environments. Of course it is not a prohibition of nuclear weapons or weapons in general, although the USSR is in favor of general and complete disarmament. The scope of the treaty is self-explanatory."/11/
/9/The statement actually was contained in telegram 322 from Moscow, July 25. Harriman first mentioned Khrushchev's remark in the opening meeting. He then said that the test ban would not remove the risk of nuclear war but that "some people" might say that Article I made illegal the use of nuclear weapons in war, in which case the United States might have to "explain" that the test ban treaty did not prevent a country from using any weapons, including nuclear weapons, in self defense as permitted under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) Regarding the opening meeting, see Document 325.
/10/In his interview with Bunn, McNaughton stated that Harriman was "upset" by the instruction to raise the issue of use of nuclear weapons in war. "He felt that it was insane to think that anyone would construe Article I as barring the use of nuclear weapons in anger." In reporting to Washington, the delegation "spent 30 minutes trying to think of a word" to describe Gromyko's reaction. "We ended up with `baffled.' Harriman cherished this word. It pleased him very much. He read this sentence over and over to himself." See footnote 2, Document 350.
/11/In a telephone call to Bundy after the private meeting, at approximately 7 p.m. Moscow time, Kaysen described the terms of the understanding on depositories and indicated that the Soviets had made no objection to the statement on nuclear explosions in time of war. Bundy obtained approval of these actions by consulting the President while Kaysen was on the line, and while Kennedy apparently was on the telephone with Macmillan. The principals in Moscow then initialed the treaty in plenary session. While no record of Kennedy's conversation with Macmillan has been found, there are two of the Kaysen-Bundy conversation. One is part of Kaysen's memorandum on the private meeting. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Test Ban 12, Post-trip) The other is a partial transcript, drafter not indicated. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Harriman Mission, Records/Action) Both are in the Supplement.
4. Full report follows soonest./12/
/12/Telegram 321; see footnote 7 above. Telegram 347 from Moscow, July 26, gives details of the plenary session. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) See the Supplement.
Rusk
354. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, July 27, 1963, noon.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman. Secret; Eyes Only. Received at 8:30 a.m. and passed to the White House. The portions of this telegram concerning Germany are printed in vol. XV, pp. 539-544.
365. From Harriman. Harriman, accompanied by Kohler, Kaysen and Akalovsky, met with Khrushchev in latter's Kremlin office from 3 to 5:45 p.m., July 26. Khrushchev accompanied by Gromyko and Dobrynin.
After exchange of amenities, Harriman opened by congratulating Gromyko on his constructive work in making agreement on TB treaty possible. Said whenever problems had arisen Gromyko tried help find solution.
Khrushchev congratulated Harriman and his associates on flexible and skillful work in making it possible reach a good agreement, which Sovs believed was very good beginning. Accepted Harriman's congratulations to Gromyko and expressed his own.
Harriman believed we had good agreement; treaty was clear and no one could misunderstand it.
Khrushchev commented it would be difficult for anyone to object to it.
Harriman believed whole world would hail treaty as good effort on part of three parties. In broader context it would be regarded as first step toward further cooperation in achieving even greater results. Observed he had visited West Africa in 1960 and Africans had been very indignant with French tests impending in Sahara. They had been told they would lose their manhood if wind were to blow south and bring radioactive debris; however, when tests occurred they had found out wind was blowing east. Africans would be very happy about our treaty provided France adhered to agreement. Said UK had info, which he had no reason to believe incorrect, that French could not conduct tests for year. Thus we had time to work on de Gaulle. Wondered whether Khrushchev had any suggestions or advice this respect. In any event, believed the less said publicly the better.
Khrushchev said could give no advice, but Sov desire to see France accede to treaty had been stated. In their statements Sovs would not stress or accentuate French problem; in other words they would not say "If France, etc." Thus Sovs would provide calm situation and give de Gaulle chance consider this problem calmly and take positive stand on it.
Harriman recalled his statement to Gromyko that President had written to de Gaulle. Letter had been delivered yesterday afternoon because President wanted de Gaulle receive letter before he had seen communiqu? and treaty. President had indicated in letter importance we place on end of testing and indicated readiness discuss this with de Gaulle. While we did not know what outcome would be, this was at least an opener. De Gaulle would visit US early next year, in January or February.
Khrushchev said that was good.
Harriman said did not know whether Khrushchev knew about agreement we had with UK/2/ which was outcome of US/UK pooling their scientific knowledge in nuclear field during war. Under this agreement UK got information from us but could not pass it on without our consent. Harriman continued did not know what discussion with de Gaulle would be. However, whatever influence we had would attempt ensure that no additional country became nuclear power. Harriman expressed hope US and Sovs could work together to that end.
/2/Agreement for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes; signed at Washington on July 3, 1958. (9 UST (Pt. 1) 1028)
At this point Harriman noticed on Khrushchev's desk model of early vintage car. Khrushchev said he had been given this model by Italian industrialist who had visited him; it was model of first Fiat, produced 1899. Harriman wondered whether this industrialist was capitalist or imperialist. Khrushchev replied this was matter of qualitative change, but essence was same.
Khrushchev then pointed at slab of ore on his desk, saying it was specimen containing nickel, copper and gold. Harriman commented perhaps Sovs could give us some gold.
Khrushchev seized this opportunity to say Sovs all in favor of trade; they were not like US Congress. Sovs were now about to start large-scale development chemical fertilizer industry, and if it were not for obstacles raised by US Congress they could place orders for equipment in US.
Harriman hoped that as relations between our two countries improved trade relations could also be improved. Noted Khrushchev had said in one of his statements that Sov trade with China had been reduced by 60 per cent.
Khrushchev confirmed this. Said Sov trade with China had been reduced to minimum and Sovs could not understand Chinese position on this matter. Commented however that position would not harm USSR.
Harriman said had thought reduction of trade had been at Sov initiative but Khrushchev's remark implied this had been at China's initiative.
Khrushchev denied it had been Sov initiative but noted Sovs had been giving credits to Chinese for their trade with USSR.
Harriman commented that Sovs had cut out credits to China.
Khrushchev said Chinese had cancelled orders in USSR and refused use Sov credit.
Harriman wondered whether Khrushchev wanted say anything re China's progress toward a nuclear explosion, so that he could pass this info on to President.
Khrushchev replied could only say Sovs had no info whatsoever on this matter. Sovs had none of their people there and there was no Sov-Chinese mutual exchange of info, particularly on this question. Sovs knew nothing about this matter except what they saw in the press; however, Khrushchev believed press reports were more inventions than reflection of facts.
Harriman observed Sovs had apparently helped Chinese in this area until 1960.
Khrushchev confirmed this, saying this had been done at initial stage but had not been comprehensive assistance. Chinese scientists and engineers had had access to Sov secrets but this had been at very early stage and he did not believe they had mastered necessary knowledge; he thought Chinese were developing very slowly in this respect.
Harriman said there was impression among public that Chinese would explode nuclear device before end this year or next year.
Khrushchev commented such reports had been appearing in press over past two years. But US and USSR knew it quite insufficient to hand over secrets of bomb design because for development of nuclear capability it was also necessary to have necessary industry to back up such project.
Harriman asked whether Khrushchev was not concerned that China would explode nuclear device soon.
Khrushchev said he was not concerned at all, even if Chinese were to do it soon. UK and France had also exploded nuclear bombs but who was concerned? There were only two countries which could, because of economic might, solve fully problem of nuclear weapons, and those countries were US and USSR. Khrushchev continued US had developed nuclear weapons earlier than USSR but had developed delivery vehicles only later. US had had considerable difficulties in developing delivery vehicles and Sovs believed it had not overcome those difficulties even now, in spite of fact that US possessed excellent industry. US had emphasized bombers too long. He believed US bases in Europe had played dirty trick on US because US had believed it could keep USSR in fear with bombers stationed at those bases. On other hand, USSR had no bases and had therefore concentrated on rockets and thus overtaken US. McNamara has expressed similar thoughts in one of his speeches, and he, Khrushchev, agreed with him.
Harriman said could agree with what Khrushchev had said provided Khrushchev took out reference to US wanting keep USSR in fear. US did not wish frighten USSR.
Khrushchev wondered what other purpose US bases and bombers had been designed for.
Harriman recalled a conversation he had had with Malinovski/3/ 4 years ago in which latter had also said US had made mistake by concentrating on long-range bombers. In response to his, Harriman's, question how many bombers Sovs had, Malinovski had said too many. Harriman agreed with Khrushchev US had not gone into ICBM's soon enough and was still behind Sovs with respect power rocket fuel. Reverting to China, said it would certainly take long time for China to catch up, but many people US took seriously Sov accusations re China's recklessness, and even few missiles in Chinese hands could create great difficulties.
/3/Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky, Soviet Minister of Defense.
Khrushchev said this of course correct. However, Sovs believed US had realized as far back as 7 years ago that it should concentrate on missiles. US would of course catch up, although he did not know when, because no special wisdom was required in this field, and science was making progress everywhere. Noted, however, that this would not be easy to do. He could recall that when he had made statement re obsolescence of bombers under present conditions, his speech had been attacked by Generals and others in US, who denied accuracy of that statement. Said although those denials must have been made by reasonable people they were unwise. Thought those people simply had not wished to admit what everyone knew, i.e., that US did not have missiles, because that would have meant US was disarmed. Of course, when Chinese developed nuclear weapons and rockets, that would ease situation for USSR because strength of socialist camp in juxtaposition to imperialism would be enhanced and thus lesser effort would be required on part USSR. Such development would be directed against US and other imperialists.
Harriman asked Khrushchev if he was sure it would not be directed against Sovs one day.
Khrushchev asked whether US was distressed about UK and French nuclear capability, noting US also had differences with UK and France but basically was in agreement with them. Same situation applied to USSR and China; USSR had common basic Communist concepts with China. If sometimes irresponsible or militant statements were made, that was only natural because whenever someone lacked means he was one who shouted loudest. On other hand, when one possessed means he was more restrained because he knew that his adversary was aware of what he had for defense and even for attack. (Gromyko interjected attacked should be understood as retaliation, and Khrushchev agreed he had meant attack in return for aggression.)
Khrushchev continued when US would have more sense and would leave Taiwan, which would help cause of peace. However, most reasonable thing to do would be not wait until China possessed nuclear weapons and do it in advance. US should recognize China and allow it to take its rightful place in UN. As to Chiang, that was Chinese problem which they should solve. Khrushchev then commented he had digressed; Chinese question was special question and Sovs had no authority speak on Chinese behalf. Suggested conversation return to matters relating to US-USSR relations.
Harriman said before subject nuclear capability dropped he wished note that while US behind in power rocket propellents, it had surpassed long time since in lighter weight nuclear weapons. Said willing drop matter here. Also, said wished point out US relations with UK were different than those with France, because US had pooled its scientific knowledge with UK during war. As to France, we had never been enthusiastic about the de Gaulle's activities which we believed were wasteful and were step in wrong direction. We believed world would be safer if no more nuclear powers develop, and certainly if China did not develop nuclear capability. Hoped Sovs could get Chinese adhere to treaty before they became nuclear power. Also, hoped by time China acquired the ability develop nuclear powers, more comprehensive control of armaments could be had.
Khrushchev agreed and said Sovs making effort prevent increase in number nuclear powers. However, these efforts would of necessity be weak until agreement on disarmament had been reached, because in absence such agreement China and de Gaulle would say why US, UK and USSR may have nuclear weapons and they may not. Therefore, we should concentrate our efforts on reaching agreement on disarmament. This was cardinal problem which would solve this problem.
Harriman inquired what next important steps should be taken in Khrushchev's view.
Khrushchev said perhaps we should move from particular to general. Of course, it would be better if we solved general problem because in such case particulars would fall in place. However, great efforts would be required to resolve general problem and apparently we unable do it now. Yet, particular, or individual measures would also mean progress towards disarmament and they were easier to achieve. Noted we were celebrating today agreement on what was also a partial disarmament measure. At this point Gromyko whispered in Khrushchev's ear.
[Here follows discussion of the proposed non-aggression pact and of Germany.]
Harriman referred to further steps that could be taken. Said some people were thinking of what was called in technical terms separable first stage. Such stage could include cut-off of production fissionable materials for weapons uses and perhaps dismantling certain percentage nuclear weapons on each side and making fissionable materials thus derived available for peaceful uses. Wondered whether Khrushchev had any interest in this and commented such steps might reduce Sov military expenditures.
Khrushchev replied he had no interest whatsoever; moreover, he could say Sovs would never agree to this. US position on this matter was well known and had been stated over many years. Sovs had also stated their position, and still held that position. No results could be derived from such an approach. After all, why should Sovs destroy their bombs in which they put so much money; why should Sovs destroy some bombs and build others. Bombs could be destroyed only under a disarmament arrangement. Sovs could not squander their money, particularly as their money was people's money. Sovs were no capitalists, and to capitalists such an arrangement would of course mean no loss. US should not waste its time developing such proposals; they were totally unrealistic.
Harriman noted Khrushchev had neglected his reference to cut-off.
Khrushchev said such arrangement would be of no use. Other people would say cut-off could yield no result in a situation where US and USSR had accumulated enough bombs to blow up whole world. Others would say they did not possess such material and therefore must produce it. Thus this too was waste of time. As for USSR, it had stopped expanding its production fissionable materials and now producing such materials at same rate as before. Although he did not know when precisely this would happen, it very possible Sovs would stop production fissionable materials in near future; however, that would be without any agreement and Sovs would not tell anybody about it. Sovs had enough such materials and US was probably in same position. What Sovs were now engaged in was refabrication all bombs on basis results latest tests.
Harriman referred to press reports Khrushchev might have seen re cutback US production nuclear weapons. Those reports were premature, although he did not know what would happen in future. Wondered whether Khrushchev did not really believe it would be useful to come to agreement as between our two countries, to stop production and commented world would regard this as useful step.
Khrushchev said no. World would assess such arrangement properly because it would yield nothing and would in effect mean deceiving hopes of world.
[Here follows discussion of Germany, Laos, Vietnam, and Cuba.]
Harriman said President very interested in pursuing other questions. Khrushchev had noted President's June 10 speech.
Khrushchev interjected June 10 speech was best statement made by any President since Roosevelt.
Harriman said sure President would appreciate this comment. TB treaty gratifying and good step in right direction. We hoped other steps could also be made but that would of course require give and take. Commented Sovs would soon experience invasion by US Senate.
Khrushchev asked whether those Senators would be clean or unclean. Wondered whether President had pulled them out of Noah's Ark, but said would welcome both kinds.
Harriman remarked President had his political difficulties in open, whereas Khrushchev has his political difficulties behind these walls here.
Khrushchev denied this, saying he now saw Harriman more useful as his adviser when serving as adviser President rather than himself. Harriman had convinced himself USSR society, but Harriman wrong as USSR most open society. Said he never used casuistry in talking to other people, whereas Molotov had always done so and only confused issue. Did not agree with dictum ascribed to Talleyrand that diplomats should [use] their words only to conceal their thoughts.
Harriman reiterated President would be happy hear Khrushchev comment on June 10 speech. Hoped Khrushchev took President's words seriously so that progress could be achieved toward peaceful world.
Khrushchev wished President would consolidate his position on basis that speech. Positions expounded in that speech were good and strong but should be made even stronger; those positions promised yield good dividends both for President personally and for US in general. Concluded here was concrete proof that Sovs did not always use bad words about capitalists, they also used good words about some capitalists if those capitalists deserved them. As it was now dinner time the party walked together to palace./4/
/4/In a brief memorandum Harriman told the following story to illustrate the contrast between Khrushchev and Stalin: as the party crossed Kremlin Square on the way to dinner, Khrushchev "shook hands with some of the bystanders who applauded him. He introduced me as 'Gaspodin Garriman,' saying, 'He has just signed a test ban treaty and I am going to take him to dinner. Do you think he deserves dinner?' They applauded loudly and cheered." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)
Kohler
355. Editorial Note
In a letter to Secretary Rusk dated July 29, 1963, German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder asked that the United States negotiate an explanatory protocol to the limited test ban treaty stating that ratification of the treaty or accession to it by territories or authorities "not generally recognized as states" constituted contractual relations only to parties that had already recognized such entities. In his reply of July 30, Rusk stated that Harriman had specifically stated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 29 that adherence of the "Soviet Zone of Occupation" to the treaty would not affect any question of recognition, that it was not feasible to add to the treaty as already negotiated, and that he (Rusk) did not think the proposed language would add to the understanding on the subject reached at Moscow. In formal hearings after signature of the treaty and in communications with other governments, the United States would make its interpretation on the recognition issue more generally known; however, it was the U.S. view that it was in the interest of the "free world" that the treaty should be binding on as many "governments, regimes and authorities as possible." (Telegrams 292 and 298 to Bonn, both July 30; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)
Schroeder reiterated his proposal in slightly different form in an August 1 letter to Rusk, this time requesting that it be issued as a declaration by the two Western powers upon signature of the treaty in Moscow. Rusk replied on August 2 and again refused, referring to the President's statement at his news conference the preceding day and stating the view that it wasn't in the interest of the "free world to declare abstractly that such deposits created no obligations on an unrecognized regime--having in mind, for example, Communist China--vis-?-vis a non-recognizing depositary. It is our conclusion that any such questions should be reserved for such time as a practical issue might arise." (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, German Officials' Correspondence with Rusk, 1961-1964, and Rusk's Correspondence with German Officials, 1961-1964, respectively)
For text of the President's statement regarding East Germany and the test ban treaty, see Department of State Bulletin, September 2, 1963, page 354. The Department's statement on the subject issued on August 2 is ibid., page 355.
356. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone/1/
Washington, July 30, 1963.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Memoranda 3/1/62-4/30/65. Secret. A typewritten note after the drafting line reads: "Noted by Dr. Chamberlain, whose changes are incorporated." This memorandum was possibly prepared in anticipation of the briefing described in Document 357.
Question: What does the Director think of the test ban agreement?
Answer: In appraising the question of whether the proposed test ban agreement would meet the best interests of the United States one must consider the measurable advantages of continuing testing, which are of particular interest to the Military and to the AEC and its laboratories, and the broader questions of national policy of interest to the President.
It is obvious that by continued testing, we can improve our weapon technology and the quality and dependability of our nuclear weapons. On the other hand, continuation of testing would bring us up against the imponderables of world opinions, intensification of the arms race, dangers inherent in the proliferation question, and finally, fear on the part of that segment of people in the United States and, for that matter the world, whether exaggerated or not, of the consequences of radioactive fallout.
On consideration, our present weapons seem adequate for our military needs, so that further atmospheric testing is unnecessary. To be sure, we could develop larger weapons, but the case for the military effectiveness of larger weapons is not very good in contrast to the case which can be made for a larger number of low-megaton weapons deliverable with greater accuracy of improved weapons systems. In the anti-ballistic missile field, it appears that an ABM system can be built from present technology but it probably will not be the most economical nor the best system. Moreover, significant gains can be made in ABM warhead development by underground testing. In the tactical field, any desired development can be pursued in the underground. Important strides can be made in the underground and many, though not all, weapons effects can be developed in the underground.
On balance, it appears to me our national interest is served by the test ban treaty for two reasons: First, the proliferation question can be partially though not totally resolved; and secondly, a step, though a small one, will be made in reaching an understanding between the two opposing nuclear powers.
This judgment is valid on the assumption that the United States will be resolute in preserving the vitality of its laboratories, in pursuing satisfactory underground test programs to add to the knowledge and the state of the art of the development of our nuclear weapons, and finally, to maintain a high state of readiness our Pacific proving grounds so that a test program could be resumed promptly if the Soviets abrogate the treaty.
357. Editorial Note
On July 30, 1963, John McCone briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff in response to questions raised by them concerning a test ban agreement. The Chiefs first asked what was the present position of the Soviet Union in relation to the United States in the fields of strategic nuclear weapons, anti-missile missile defense, and tactical nuclear weapons. According to McCone's briefing paper, his response was that the Soviet Union [text not declassified]. The United States had more strategic weapons deployed. The Soviets did not exceed the United States in knowledge of the effects of multimegaton warheads on hardened missile sites.
In ABMs, neither side could be confident of the effectiveness of any ABM system chosen on the basis of present data, and hence any system widely deployed by either side was likely to be overdesigned to compensate for uncertainties, and hence more costly than one which would be attained through continued testing in the atmosphere and in space. The United States was presently superior in design, diversity, and numbers of nuclear weapons in most tactical systems. With unlimited underground testing, the Soviets would "over a period of years be able" to overcome the U.S. lead in weapons for tactical deployment and draw even. The briefing paper then detailed error rates in these estimates for different categories of weapons.
With regard to a question on U.S. detection capabilities for clandestine testing, the briefing paper stated that the United States could detect atmospheric tests of 5 KT or more. High yield tests could not escape detection except in deep space. A Soviet attempt to test underwater was unlikely.
Regarding Soviet motives in signing the limited test ban treaty, the most important, according to the paper, was the Soviet desire to achieve political gains in Europe by bringing about a general relaxation of tensions. The briefing paper also stressed a general Soviet desire to avoid proliferation, although not in China. The Soviets recognized that the treaty would not prevent China from attaining nuclear weapons and were unlikely to mount any preemptive strike against its future nuclear capability. They did wish, however, to demonstrate as part of their ideological competition with China that a Communist state could advantageously negotiate an agreement with a capitalist one. Another possible motive was an economic incentive to check the arms race and bring about a reduction of Soviet forces. (Memorandum from McCone to Bundy dated July 30, which covers two-section briefing paper of same date; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Test Ban, U.S. Military Views)
358. Telegram From the White House to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, August 4, 1963, 8:48 p.m./2/
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, President de Gaulle's Correspondence with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, 1961-1964 Vol. I. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only. The source text does not indicate whether the telegram went directly from the White House to the Embassy or whether it was relayed to the Department for transmission to Paris. The Department received the telegram at 12:11 a.m. on August 5.
/2/The source text bears Greenwich Mean Time and date of 050248Z August.
CAP 63421. From Bundy to Bohlen. For opening of business Monday AM./3/
/3/August 5.
Following is message received from de Gaulle today; our comment follows message.
Message follows: (de Gaulle letter)
Mr. President:
On the eve of the agreement that the United States and Great Britain concluded on July 26 with the Soviet Union you gave me in your message of July 25/4/ some indications concerning the negotiations in Moscow.
/4/Document 352.
I have not failed to pay great attention to the fact that in your opinion certain indications would permit one to think that the Soviets would not be opposed completely to taking some steps on the road to disarmament. If on their side, as well as on yours, some measures were envisaged to bring about the effective elimination of nuclear weapons, France, as you know, would be very willing to discuss the matter. But it does not seem to me that we have reached that point. Nevertheless the French Government believes that the problem of the prohibition of delivery could be studied. It is ready to do so in common with the Government of United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.
I must tell you Mr. President that certain other proposals which were made in Moscow by the Soviet Union could not obtain French acceptance. This is the case in particular regarding the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between on the one hand the members of NATO and on the other the Soviet Union and the countries which she holds under her yoke. Entirely apart from the fact that this kind of assimilation between the two sides could not be accepted by France, the Soviet proposal obviously tends to the recognition, that is to say reinforcement, by the West of the situation that they have created, and which they maintain by force, in Central and Eastern Europe, in particular the fiction of a German Democratic Republic. There is, moreover, every reason to believe that the Soviet Government would not fail in this event to renew its demands concerning the treaty, that is to say the fate of Berlin. The difficulty which would result in Europe and primarily in Germany from the acceptance, even partial, of these claims would react directly on the security and on the policy of France, so that she would be obliged to examine with particular care anything that eventually might be negotiated in Moscow on this subject.
Your message, Mr. President, informed me in the first place of the treaty which was about to be concluded by your negotiations with those of the USSR on the banning of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space and in the sea. In that respect, please be assured of my complete understanding of the decision which you have made. It is quite natural that the United States which has in the last twenty years made a very large number of atomic experiments of every kind and which is equipped with an enormous stock of very powerful and very varied weapons should now consider that new tests would no longer be useful and should undertake to make no more tests, it being understood that the Soviets would also abstain. France is, as you know, in a quite different situation. With her own means she has undertaken, later than the other nuclear powers, a program which will give her, in her turn, atomic armament, not as massive no doubt but of the same order. She could not therefore stop the necessary tests before attaining the goal.
You told me, without giving any precise details, that there exist methods of exchange which would permit the French Government to attain, by other means, the result which she is seeking. But over and above the fact that, no matter what hypothesis one bases oneself on, France would have to make tests; one cannot see how France could receive in this field the assistance of another state without conditions which would limit right to use of these weapons. This, France would regard as incompatible with sovereignty./5/
/5/In telegram 475 from Paris, July 30, Bohlen stated that he had spoken to de Gaulle during a luncheon that day. De Gaulle "told me definitely there was no chance of France adhering to the test ban treaty." Regarding nuclear information, de Gaulle stated that he did not believe Kennedy could, even if he wished, make it available to France; that he doubted whether Kennedy did seriously wish to make it available; and that, even if France received the information, it would have to test in order to verify the workability of its hydrogen bomb. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)
De Gaulle
Our comment: Obviously delivery of this message invalidates preceding instructions/6/ and you should use only those parts of such instructions as are helpful in light of what follows.
/6/In telegram 661 to Paris, August 4, the White House instructed Bohlen to emphasize to Couve de Murville the serious desire of the United States for a discussion on nuclear cooperation, and that the United States was awaiting de Gaulle's reply to the President's letter to see if a dialog could begin. (Telegram drafted by Bundy and transmitted to the Department for transmission to Paris; ibid., POL FR-US)
President believes you should concentrate discussion on two aspects of de Gaulle's letter. First you should express interest in knowing why de Gaulle says that "under any circumstances, France would have to make tests". President is interested to know what view of technology and of partnership underlies this categorical statement.
Second question interesting to us is de Gaulle assertion that all assistance must imply unacceptable conditions. President has carefully stated desire to cooperate without stating any conditions. FYI: Object remains to put monkey of non-co-operation on General de Gaulle's back, since in fact we remain willing to co-operate./7/ End FYI./8/
/7/In an August 5 letter to Macmillan, Kennedy stated that he thought de Gaulle not only did not want U.S. nuclear help but was unwilling to discuss the matter seriously. The President wanted to send de Gaulle another message to make it plain that it was not the United States that was unwilling to explore the issue. In a message to Bundy received in the White House on August 7, de Zulueta reported that Macmillan was "doubtful about the wisdom of going too fast" with de Gaulle, on the ground that de Gaulle's language on sovereignty would seem to preclude any agreement. (Both in Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban Correspondence 7/12-8/7/63)
/8/On August 8, Ball opened a lengthy memorandum to the President by noting that "particularly since last January, whenever the hand of friendship has been stretched across the sea, General de Gaulle has put a dead fish in it." He went on to give arguments as to why a further nuclear offer to France would disrupt the Atlantic Alliance, isolate Germany, and confirm de Gaulle "in the rightness of his own obduracy." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 FR)
359. Editorial Note
On August 5, 1963, in Moscow, representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States signed the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water. For text, see 14 UST (Pt. 2) 1313, or Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pages 291-293.
Secretary Rusk arrived in the Soviet Union for talks with Soviet leaders on August 3 and departed on August 10. Documentation regarding preparations for and talks during this visit, which included some tripartite discussion of the proposed non-aggression pact, non-diffusion of nuclear weapons, and control posts to monitor troop movements in Europe, is in volume V and volume XV. A summary of the talks is in Topol 184 to Paris, August 10. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) A compendium of telegrams, briefing papers, memoranda of conversation, and other documents relating to Rusk's trip is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2288-2295.
360. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, August 6, 1963, 9:58 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, Correspondence with German Officials, 1963-1964 Vol. II. Secret; Operational Immediate. Drafted in the White House.
374. Eyes only for Ambassador. The following message from the President should be delivered to the Chancellor's office as soon as possible. Unless rumors about Chancellor's discussion with McNamara have spread, there should be no other distribution or discussion of this letter. If rumors about Chancellor's discussion with McNamara or of contents of this letter should begin to spread outside Chancellor's office, you should make recommendation and seek instruction.
"Dear Mr. Chancellor:
Secretary McNamara has just come back and reported to me his long conversation with you./2/ He has suggested that it might be useful for me to send you a letter commenting on some of the things which you and he talked about, and I think his suggestion is a good one. As he reports the conversation, you talked about two major topics. The larger of them is the question of the basic policy of the West toward the Soviet Union, in which, as I understand it, your worry is that the U.S. may be too easily beguiled by the smiles and tricks of the Soviet Government.
/2/In a meeting with Adenauer on July 31, McNamara learned that the Chancellor "did not believe the Moscow agreement was a great success for the United States" and that Adenauer "recommended the greatest possible caution in future negotiations" with the Soviets. Adenauer also repeated German concerns about adherence of East Germany to the treaty and said the treaty would encourage Western complacency. (Memorandum of conversation by McGhee enclosed with airgram A-20 from Bonn, August 2; ibid., Central Files, DEF 18-4) McNamara and Chancellor Adenauer met again on August 5, when the Chancellor voiced the same concerns. A report on the meeting is in telegram 475 from Bonn, August 5, printed in vol. XV, pp. 546-552.
I understand this concern, but I must tell you in all frankness that I do not think it is justified. It seems to me, in fact, as far from the mark as the kind of thing I sometimes hear from political groups in this country who say that it is wrong to trust the democratic commitment and the loyalty to the Alliance of the Federal Republic. The truth is, in my judgment, that one of the wisest things our two countries have done the last fifteen years is to trust each other, and I think the record of the United States Government as a whole, and of this Administration in particular, makes it pretty clear that we are not disposed to be taken in by Soviet duplicity.
I myself believe that it is much too soon to throw our hats in the air because of a single agreement on a single subject, the limited test ban--important as that subject is. I believe that we have reached even this small understanding as much through our strength and resolution as through the process of negotiation, and I recognize, as you do, that we are dealing still with a government which has repeatedly posed threats to the freedom of West Berlin and which, as late as October of last year, undertook a peculiarly dangerous and reckless act of duplicity in Cuba. So we are not under illusions about the Soviet Government, and you may be quite sure that Secretary McNamara, who has pressed so hard and so successfully for a strengthening of Western defenses in the last three years, is not a man who is likely to be lulled into forgetfulness or neglect of his duty by a single limited agreement. It is Secretary McNamara, after all, who has been my chief lieutenant in a process of reinforcement which has added nine billion dollars a year to our defense budget, and has increased the number of our battle-ready divisions by forty per cent. It was with Secretary McNamara that I called up 150,000 Reserves at the height of the Berlin crisis in 1961. And he and I feel, just as you do, that this is no time to let down our guard.
It may be, as you say, that there is some danger of relaxation in Europe, and you can count on us to work energetically against any such tendency. That is one reason why Secretary McNamara has pressed so hard in Bonn to find ways and means of meeting the overseas cost of the great forces which we have placed in Germany for the common defense.
Our own commitment and alertness, of course, have to be world- wide. If the Chinese should break out into new acts of aggression, it is only the United States among Western countries that will have the necessary means and determination for reply. We are the only Western power fully engaged in a two-front struggle in the cold war, and I think there is little reason for any feeling that we are blind to its dangers and demands.
Let me repeat that I do understand and respect your honest concern here, for I recognize also that in a large and varied country like this one there will always be people who can bring you reports that this or that individual or group is spreading dangerous opinions. But such rumors deserve to be set against the reality of what our Governments have done together for fifteen years.
As to the particular question of the limited test ban treaty, I am glad to see both in Secretary McNamara's and in William Tyler's reports/3/ that you do regard it as a success, although you have some specific questions about its possible impact on the status of the regime in East Germany. I too think it a success, for reasons which I stated at length last week and with which I will not bother you again now. I do not think it matters much where a treaty of this kind is signed or who claims the credit for it. The point about the treaty is that it makes sense for the world and that it does not jeopardize the essential security of either side. That is what makes it possible and useful.
/3/Tyler's meeting with Adenauer on July 30 is reported in telegram 394 from Bonn, July 30. The Chancellor stated that initialling of the test ban treaty was a certain success, but that success should not be exaggerated. (Ibid.)
The problem of the status of the East German regime is an important one, and I fully recognize your special concern with it. In our judgment, fully adequate precautions have been taken on this point. We do not think that either as a whole or in its separate parts does the treaty create any danger of increased recognition or international status for the East German regime. The use of the term "states," which goes back a year, and the reference to sovereign rights, which is a product of the more recent negotiations, are both of them standard phrases which do not confer any new standing upon any regime which adheres to the treaty, and this solid legal judgment is one which we are prepared to make clear as often as is necessary. Moreover, we believe that the new process of accession is distinctly advantageous to us from this point of view, in that the Federal Republic, which is recognized by all three depositary governments, has an opportunity to deposit its accession without challenge from any of them, while the Pankow regime will obviously have to confine its accession to the USSR. Thus the process of adherence itself will make it clear which regime is recognized by all, and which is a puppet of one.
Having heard Secretary McNamara's report, I have asked Dean Rusk to follow up with a visit in Bonn over this weekend,/4/ particularly so that you may be able to talk with him about the wider problems of our dealings with the Soviet Union. You will find him both careful and determined. You may be sure that he commands my full confidence. He won his diplomatic spurs in the first hard months of the Korean war, and you may speak to him in full assurance that neither he nor the Government for which he speaks is less deserving of your trust than any with which you have dealt in the past.
/4/August 10-11.
With warm personal regards,
Sincerely, John F. Kennedy
His Excellency
Dr. Konrad Adenauer
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Bonn"
Ball
361. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, August 10, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. The source text does not indicate a transmission time; the telegram was received at 10:56 p.m. and relayed to White House at 11:30 p.m.
Secto 59. Following summary based on uncleared memorandum of conversation./2/
/2/The memorandum of this conversation is ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
After Secretary and Chancellor had conferred privately for more than an hour late in afternoon, they joined larger group for discussion of Test Ban Treaty which lasted another hour and a half. At conclusion of frank series of exchanges, Chancellor expressed his satisfaction with clarification of US position which he had received and said he thought that, on this basis, he could probably carry through German adherence to treaty.
Chancellor began by lengthy exposition of German concerns about Test Ban Treaty. He pointed out that:
1. In this new treaty provision had been made for three depositary states rather than one as in 1962 draft tabled at Geneva.
2. In Article 4 there was specific language "in exercising national sovereignty", whereas 1962 text withdrawal article contained no such language. These four words were superfluous. Quite clearly Soviets had put them in the treaty, as well as providing for three depositaries, in order to take care of Soviet Zone. If in "exercising national sovereignty", Soviet zone could in a year withdraw from treaty, then by implication it now had such "national sovereignty". Acceptance of these words would have very bad effect on reunification prospects, and ran counter to repeated assurances received from US that Federal Republic alone entitled to speak for German people as a whole.
3. Therefore German Government had great hesitation re adherence to treaty though, in view of US leadership in achieving treaty, government would like very much to be able to adhere. Bundestag and Bundesrat approval would be necessary. Chancellor estimated that four-fifths of CDU/CSU faction in Bundestag was against adherence. He also referred to evidence from SPD refugee leader that SPD also had serious objections. Thus chances of getting a decent majority, or even a majority, for adherence in Bundestag were not favorable.
Secretary responded by stressing:
1. US believes very strongly that human survival depended on finding some way, step by step, to bring nuclear weapons under control. We signed treaty because we thought it was in US interests. We were not trying to dictate to Federal Republic which had to make its own decision regarding adherence to treaty. We also believed signature of treaty was in interest of general community of states, and hoped Federal Republic would find itself able to join many states which would sign or adhere to it.
2. One factor which moved us toward more general type of disarmament arrangement, such as Test Ban Treaty, was desire to avoid anything that would discriminate specifically against Germany. That is why we would want world-wide agreement on nuclear non-proliferation. As Chancellor aware, Soviets had pressed us on this later point repeatedly within German and Berlin context.
3. Another aspect of particular importance to us was Mainland China. We looked to day when country of 700 million people would acquire own nuclear weapons. We were practically only power which has existing commitments to neighboring countries and would have to deal with this problem when it arises. Therefore we had strong incentive to try to bring all possible pressure on Red China to try to avoid its development of nuclear weapons. This had, however, confronted us with certain complexities which also had bearing on GDR problem. We did not recognize Peiping, but would not want formal considerations to give Red China an excuse for not adhering to test ban. We believed that international law and practice is clear on point that adherence to multilateral treaty does not involve recognition of signers who are not recognized.
4. We are and have been concerned with problem of Soviet Zone, not just because of Federal Republic but on our own account. Of all NATO members, we had least to do with GDR and have done least to give it status. We do not believe its status would be changed by this treaty or by deposit of signature only in Moscow.
5. Re point on Article 4, this was a shortened substitute for Article 3 of earlier draft. Actually Soviets had objected strongly to any clause in treaty on withdrawal, claiming that any signatory could exercise its national sovereignty and simply denounce treaty. We wanted to put some limit on such exercise of sovereignty and felt ability to withdraw from treaty should be qualified in advance. Therefore we valued some withdrawal procedure. If Soviets resumed testing, we would not limit our action to withdrawal but would regard treaty as so injured in central point that we would not be bound by it. Words "in exercising national sovereignty" thus were remnant of Soviet argument that sovereignty itself gives right of withdrawal. These words did not come up in any way in connection with East German problem. We made clear throughout discussion that nothing in this treaty could affect our nonrecognition policy towards GDR. Soviets on their part had some harsh things to say re Nationalist China.
6. We expected to make our attitude on these matters clear in presentation to Senate.
Adenauer said there seemed to be agreement that four words "in exercising national sovereignty" were fully superfluous in text. Their inclusion was good example of Soviet mastery of dialectics, which should be studied by all officers of Foreign Ministries.
At this point the Secretary asked Chayes to read portions of statement to be made before Senate in article-by-article review of provisions of treaty. After Chayes had concluded, Chancellor commented that mental acrobatics involved in formulations which he had just heard were excellent. Whoever had written them did not need any further study of dialectics. Chancellor questioned specifically what US would do if Soviets transmitted GDR adherence. Chayes quoted text of proposed statement to Senate that we would not accept such notification. Aden-auer queried as to what specific reply to Soviets would be. After some discussion, Chayes pointed out that our thinking was that it would be along line of reply which we had given Swiss at time of transmission of GDR adherence to Geneva prisoners of war convention./3/ We said that we did not recognize GDR but, because of kind of agreement it was, we took note of fact that GDR had stated intention to abide by provisions of convention. Federal Republic, he pointed out, had sent practically identical note to Swiss at that time.
/3/The German Democratic Republic had adhered on November 30, 1956, to the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva on August 12, 1949. For text, see 6 UST 3316.
Carstens then summarized for Chancellor conclusions which Chayes and German Foreign Office legal experts had arrived at earlier in afternoon as follows:
1. GDR subscription to treaty in Moscow would create no contractual relationship between US and GDR. Thus GDR would not be recognized and would not be a treaty partner with respect to US.
2. GDR takes only a unilateral commitment to abide by provisions of treaty.
3. GDR therefore has no right to participate in procedures envisaged in treaty.
4. US will send back notification of GDR adherence received from Soviets with appropriate statement./4/
/4/This the United States did in a note dated August 16, 1963. For partial text, see Treaties in Force, 1964, p. 264.
Adenauer was obviously impressed by clear US position. He asked whether we believed UK held same views. Chayes responded that all these points had not been discussed specifically with British, since in talks with German legal experts penetration into problem had been much deeper. However, he supposed British would not have any objections to this analysis as the logical consequence of three-depositaries arrangement. Secretary observed that UK had participated in Moscow discussions on recognition which foreshadowed this result.
Carstens added that US would also transmit position which he had explained to third countries to help influence their attitudes analogously.
Chancellor commented that, on basis of this analysis, he thought he could carry through German adherence with his people. Secretary said he was happy to hear this. We were prepared to work further on points that might arise. We would keep in close touch with Federal Government. Although we tried to anticipate all questions, Senate committee hearings might bring out a few we had not thought of. He urged complete secrecy as to his intended remarks to Senate, since it would be highly embarrassing to have members of committee read what he was going to say to them beforehand in press. Chancellor concluded discussion by remarking that Secretary had not come to Bonn in vain.
Comment: At dinner this evening, Chancellor during toast noted that visit had been successful in producing a basis for positive German action on adherence. Foreign Office officials present were obviously elated. Some were talking in terms of German signature of treaty before it went into effect rather than mere adherence. German Cabinet meets on Monday,/5/ and they hope definitive decision will be taken then. Foreign Affairs Committee of Bundestag will convene on Friday./6/
/5/August 13.
/6/In an August 17 letter to Kennedy, Adenauer stated that his Cabinet had that day decided to accede to the treaty. The Federal Republic welcomed cessation of nuclear tests as much as any country, and had to that extent welcomed the treaty from the outset, but had had misgivings rising from its need to "keep alive the hope of those who are still forced to live under Communist coercion." The Chancellor asked that in future East-West negotiations the Federal Republic be consulted "sufficiently early" so as to avoid situations "such as the one we have just overcome." (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Adenauer's Correspondence with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, 1963-1964 vol. II) In his August 19 reply, Kennedy acknowledged the need to "maintain the closest contacts on future problems of mutual interest." (Ibid., President Kennedy and Johnson's Correspondence with German Officials, 1963-1964 Vol. II)
Rusk
362. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, August 13, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson on August 15.
SUBJECT
Meeting with JCS on Test Ban
At their request, the Secretary met with the JCS at 11:00 a.m. on August 13 to follow up on the Secretary's letter of August 2 in reply to General Taylor's letter of July 27/2/ on certain questions of the JCS with respect to the test ban treaty. All members of the JCS, including General Shoup, were present as well as General Ingelido, secretary to the JCS. In addition to Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Harriman, Deputy Under Secretary Johnson, and William Foster, Director of ACDA, were present.
/2/Rusk's August 2 letter has not been found. Taylor's July 27 letter is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban, Congressional Relations I, 5/63-7/63. See the Supplement.
In reply to a question on the subject, the Secretary categorically stated that Article I of the treaty in no way inhibited our ability to use nuclear weapons in either general or limited hostilities and pointed out that this had been made categorically clear in the President's speech,/3/ the Secretary's speech at the time of signing the treaty,/4/ the President's message transmitting the treaty to the Senate,/5/ and the Secretary's testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee./6/ It was not a "ban the bomb" treaty. Mr Harriman stated that, when he had raised the subject with Gromyko, the latter had appeared to be baffled as to our reason for raising the question./7/
/3/See footnote 2, Document 353.
/4/Text transmitted in Secto 39 from Moscow, August 7. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)
/5/Dated August 8; printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 622-624.
/6/Given on August 12; printed in Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, pp. 10-25.
/7/See paragraph 3, Document 353.
In reply to questions with respect to Plowshare, the Secretary stated that we were entitled under the treaty to go ahead with underground experimentation for Plowshare and that Plowshare operations would not be prohibited if the dispersal of fission products downwind did not contravene the terms of the treaty. He understood that one of the objectives of the AEC with respect to Plowshare was to minimize and direct fission products from Plowshare explosions downward into the earth. He thought, for example, that under the treaty we and Panama could probably agree to the use of nuclear explosions to dig a new canal as long as the fission products did not extend beyond Panama. However, Orion would clearly be prohibited.
In response to questions from General LeMay as to whether the explosion of a device placed "one foot underground" would constitute an atmospheric explosion prohibited under the treaty or would be classed as an underground explosion, particularly if it was a "clean" weapon without fission products, the Secretary said that the answer was not foreclosed but he felt it would not be wise to attempt to codify all the many possible contingencies and he would prefer to leave this question open as he had attempted to do in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee. However, it was quite clear that one could not put a little dirt over a weapon and call it an underground test as a pretext for what was in fact an atmospheric test. One foot was probably too shallow, but he was not willing at this time to attempt to define what would be "deep enough".
In response to a question by General Taylor on the definition of "extraordinary events", the Secretary stated that the resumption of testing by the Soviet Union would clearly be such an event. A single explosion of a nuclear device by the Chinese Communists would not necessarily be such an event but he did not feel there would be "much life left in the treaty" if the Chinese Communists undertook extensive testing. On the other hand, a massive conventional aggression such as a Chinese Communist attack on Korea might well be considered such an event if we so desired. The Secretary pointed out that, against Soviet opposition, we had held firm for a very flexible withdrawal provision such as the present clause, and he felt that it was imperative that we maintain a high state of readiness for resuming testing in the atmosphere in the event the treaty was abrogated. The Secretary did not feel that the Soviets would automatically abrogate the treaty in the event of a French atmospheric test and, in any event, he understood that it would probably be a year or two before the French would engage in such tests. However, it would of course be up to the Soviet Union what it did in the face of French testing.
Mr. Ball pointed out that, under the treaty, the test was not only whether it was an "extraordinary event" but also whether it jeopardized national security.
Mr. Harriman pointed out that the Soviets regard the French problem as being different from that of Communist China and that the Soviets are very anxious to bring maximum pressure on Communist China.
The Secretary emphasized that he had tried to warn people not to read too much into the treaty and that, while the differences between the Chinese Communists and the Soviets now appear to be very deep, such totalitarian regimes are capable of reversing course overnight, and again emphasized the importance of our maintaining a high state of readiness to resume tests if the necessity should arise.
In reply to a question from General LeMay on what the Secretary saw as the political advantages of the treaty, the Secretary stated that it could contribute to what appears to be a split between the Soviets and the Chinese Communists and that it may lead to further favorable developments in our relations with the Soviets. Khrushchev was in trouble at home over the allocation of Soviet resources as between military and civilian needs and may be attempting to hold back the pace of nuclear developments which are making heavy resource demands on the Soviet economy. However, the worst thing possible would be to regard this treaty as ending the cold war and becoming euphoric about it. At best, it is only a step. It remains to be seen whether there can be other steps. The Secretary remarked parenthetically that Khrushchev had told him he was planning to reduce the Soviet military budget but of course it is very difficult to know whether he in fact does so.
The Secretary said that it was likely the question would be raised as to whether the JCS were consulted with respect to the treaty and noted that he had been asked why a representative of the JCS was not present at the Moscow negotiations. In this connection the Secretary noted that the substance of the Moscow negotiations was very tightly controlled from Washington and that the job in Moscow was largely one of negotiating the draft. Thus, the substantive decisions were being made in Washington. In this connection, General Taylor noted that he had been given access to the communications from our negotiating delegation in Moscow, had briefed the other members of the JCS on them, and there had been opportunity to enter objections if anyone desired. The Secretary noted that we had tabled essential elements of this treaty a year ago in Geneva, that it would be understandable if during the interim the Joint Staff had not focused on the subject in the belief that nothing was really going to come of the proposal, and also during the past year attention had been focused on the inspection provisions of a comprehensive treaty as well as on the problems of a super-bomb. He suggested that it would be well for ACDA and the JCS to arrange a review of the proposals that are now on the table at Geneva. Mr. Foster said he would arrange this and noted that Khrushchev had expressed interest in the control of military budgets and a proposal for a study of this under appropriate conditions was ready to be tabled at Geneva.
General Taylor made available to the Secretary the agreed JCS views on the treaty/8/ and stated that in general they have no problem except with the statement, as contained in the President's message of transmittal to the Senate, to the effect that the United States will be better off security-wise under this treaty than under a condition of unlimited testing./9/ He said that, speaking in a strict military sense, they have some trouble with this, while recognizing that in a wider political sense it may be correct.
/8/The unclassified version of this statement forms part of Taylor's testimony given to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 15; see ibid., pp. 272-276. A classified version dated August 12 is enclosure A to JCS 1731/711-30, JMF 3050 (26 July 63) Sec 3. A copy is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Test Ban 15, Post Trip.
/9/An analysis of this aspect of the President's message is in an August 13 memorandum from Major Smith to General Taylor. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, WYS Chron File)
After a quick perusal, the Secretary indicated satisfaction with the JCS statement of their views and said he felt that their concerns had been covered in the positions being taken by the Administration./10/
/10/Other information given to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the administration includes the enclosures to two letters from Wiesner to Taylor dated August 6 and 8. (Both in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban and the U.S. Military) With a letter to Senator Pastore dated August 14, Bundy enclosed a memorandum setting forth the White House view on "the relation of the anti-ballistic-missile problem to the limited test ban treaty." (Ibid., Test Ban, Congressional)
363. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, August 13, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban General 8/63. Secret. Drafted by Bundy.
On August 13, at 4:30, the President and Dr. Seaborg discussed a number of matters relating to future policy under the limited test ban treaty.
1. The President made it clear that the U.S. will maintain an active program of underground testing; total yields of such testing are expected to be greater than in recent years. The President stated that he expects to approve all underground tests which have substantial value for the national security, and that the underground testing program as a whole will be such as to ensure continued vitality in the two great laboratories.
2. Dr. Seaborg presented a number of alternative levels of readiness for resumed testing in the environments prohibited by the test ban in the event of violation by others, or U.S. withdrawal. The President decided that the U.S. ought to maintain a readiness for very prompt proof testing in the event of violation by others, and a readiness for development and effects testing in all three environments, beginning not more than three months after a decision to resume such testing.
3. The President decided that existing and planned preparations for the maintenance of Johnston Island as a base for such test readiness should be made public promptly.
4. The President and Dr. Seaborg agreed that the French nuclear weapons program satisfies the technical criteria for cooperation in this field under the McMahon Act.
5. The President and Dr. Seaborg agreed that Dr. Seaborg could draw fully on these decisions and conclusions in his public testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the limited test ban treaty./2/ It was further agreed that Dr. Seaborg would refer all questions relating to political aspects of our relations with France to the Department of State.
/2/For Seaborg's testimony before this Committee on August 14, see Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, pp. 205-269.
McG. B./3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
364. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services (Russell)/1/
Washington, August 23, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban and the U.S. Military. Top Secret.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Set forth below is the Top Secret annex to my letter to you of this date./2/
/2/For text of the letter, see Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, pp. 977-981.
In addition to the assurances and standards concerning Safeguard (a),/3/ which I set out in my unclassified letter, the following can be said about existing plans to maintain a vigorous underground test program:/4/
/3/For enumeration of the safeguards, see ibid., pp. 274-275.
/4/In his unclassified letter, Gilpatric stated that the "standards established governing the type and magnitude of tests to be conducted will not be more restrictive than the spirit of the treaty limitations." In Major Smith's memorandum of the White House daily staff meeting on August 21, Bundy was reported as saying, with regard to a proposed definition of what constituted an underground test, that "we should keep our position [on the definition of an underground test] indefinite because we do not know what the needs for testing will be 10 years from now. He said the success of treaties depended on their ?artful interpretation' and made it clear that we will leave as many things as open-ended as we can." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-204-69, Chairman's Staff Group August 1963)
The fiscal year 1964 underground test program was [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] tests. (The monies to fund this testing program are provided for in the Department of Defense and Atomic Energy Commission appropriation bills, at present awaiting action by the Congress.) This figure of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] somewhat low in view of the addition of the requirements which flow from the new restrictions on atmospheric tests to the requirements that already exist for the underground program. Although it is the quality rather than the number of tests which is of primary importance, the requirements for testing in the immediate future will probably average [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] tests per month. As a result of changing needs, added experience, and improved techniques, this estimate may change in either direction.
Actions are now being taken preparatory to augmenting the current (Niblick) underground test program and future programs to include additional underground tests of higher yield as well as more elaborate and complex effects tests. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The Niblick underground program will also be continued in the area of nuclear weapons research, and in the development of [1 line of source text not declassified].
The AEC, in conjunction with the DOD, will develop new techniques for effects testing underground. Current techniques for warhead vulnerability testing will be improved. Continuous study will seek to develop methods of conducting meaningful effects tests beyond those associated with the warhead itself. In addition, component and precursor tests directed at strengthening our readiness to resume atmospheric testing on short notice will be carried out.
With respect to Safeguard (d), I state in my unclassified letter that the intelligence community has increased its activities and will continue to increase its activities to cope with the new conditions under the treaty. I state also that the Administration has under consideration proposals by which our present Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS) resources can be augmented to enhance our capabilities. The proposals now being reviewed, placed in the context of present and programmed capabilities of the AEDS, can be summarized as follows:
Meaning of "Threshold." It is necessary to realize, in the first instance, that there are no sharp "thresholds" marking the limits of the capability to detect and identify nuclear events. A country might make the judgment that it would consider a detection and identification system to be good if it could identify events with 3/4 probability. This would give a potential violator a 1/4 chance of getting by with a violation and a 3/4 chance of getting caught. Whether a potential violator would be deterred by a 3/4 chance of getting caught requires a separate judgment, which depends on many factors--political, military, etc.--and would involve an assessment of the incentives he has to cheat, as well as the risks attendant to discovery of the violation. If, for a given set of conditions, a shot could be identified as such with a 3/4 probability, then a shot would have to be of substantially lower yield to have a 3/4 probability of evading identification. One could call the latter the "threshold of evasion," and it is clearly substantially lower than the former, the "threshold of identification."
The estimated thresholds given in this letter, except where clearly labeled otherwise, are "thresholds of identification." That is, they reflect a requirement for a high probability of identification. For a high probability of evasion, all thresholds would be substantially reduced.
Tests in the Atmosphere, at High Altitude, and in Space. The AEDS has a current capability of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions between the surface and 10 km altitude with a 60-90% probability for 5 KT within the USSR and China and for 200-500 KT in the least favorable remote areas of the world. At other altitude ranges, by the end of FY 64 the programmed AEDS will include essentially all of the facilities needed to detect and identify with that same confidence nuclear tests of the yields indicated in columns (2) and (4) of the table which appears on the next page./5/
/5/For text of the table, entitled "Programmed and Augmented Capabilities of AEDS to Detect and Identify Nuclear Tests with 60-90% Probability," see the Supplement.
As can be seen from the table, the threshold of the programmed system for detection and identification of nuclear tests at various altitudes varies from as small as 1 KT to as large as 100 KT at some altitudes over the USSR and China. And, since the programmed AEDS has been oriented primarily toward detection of tests in the USSR and China, its programmed capabilities for tests from the low atmosphere to as high as 10,000 km in remote areas of the Southern Hemisphere show thresholds as large as a megaton or more for high confidence of detection and identification.
The system will be improved as necessary, taking into account the considerable difficulties for the USSR and China in successfully carrying out useful clandestine tests in remote areas. The improvement can be made by programming additional ground-based detection stations, utilizing a variety of geophysical detection methods with which AEDS has had experience. The AEDS can be augmented to produce the detection and identification thresholds indicated under columns (3) and (5) of the table on page 4. With such detection and identification thresholds applicable, tests throughout the altitude ranges and geophysical areas indicated would have to be conducted at yields in the very low kiloton range in order to have high confidence in escaping detection.
Also, as indicated by Secretary McNamara in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 13, it is within the capability of US technology to supplement this ground-based detection network by satellite-based sensors. No decision has been made with respect to satellites, and their possible contribution is not reflected in the table. Such satellites would detect radiations from nuclear tests in the atmosphere and space. The combined system would force a violator to even lower yields to escape detection between the surface of the earth and 1 million km and, with the extreme sensitivity considered possible with satellite-based detectors, would force him to test at 10s or even 100s of millions of kilometers from the earth to avoid detection by the combined system. A simplified system of satellites, if found to be necessary, could provide a substantial enhancement to the identification capability of the ground-based system. A satellite designed to provide information essential to such a system is scheduled for launch in September or October.
Underwater
The seismic element of the AEDS can detect underwater tests of about 0.5 KT in the territorial waters and seas adjacent to the USSR and China, and of about 0.5-10 KT in ocean areas remote from the USSR and China. This capability could be improved by installation of a hydroacoustic system. This system would provide capability for detecting tests as low as a small fraction of 1 KT throughout most of the open oceans of the world down to depths of about 3,000 feet. The addition of a water sampling capability would permit identification of nuclear tests in the oceans through identifying radioactive debris obtained by sampling the waters.
Underground
The existing seismic component of the AEDS has a detection threshold for fully tamped underground explosions in the USSR of about 1 KT for explosions in hard rock such as granite, with the threshold yield increasing in less consolidated rocks until it rises to about 10-20 KT in dry alluvium. The system can determine the location of the explosion site within 5-50 kilometers in the USSR. The lower number corresponds to those areas where previous data have provided a calibration. The capability of the seismic system to distinguish between underground nuclear tests and many earthquakes is limited. During a period when all tests but those underground are banned, the likelihood is that the USSR will accelerate its underground testing program. It is important therefore that the AEDS be capable of providing improved intelligence on the number and yields of Soviet tests being conducted underground. Since these tests would be permitted under the Treaty, it is reasonable to assume that, for reasons of economy, these tests would take place at the known Soviet testing sites. Such tests would be reported by the AEDS as having occurred at a particular known test site.
Study of the problem indicates that the seismic portion of the AEDS can be augmented to improve the detection threshold by about a factor of two and to improve the precision of epicenter location. Improvement in this direction will be made. A proposal for accomplishing it is to accelerate the change-over from existing equipment to improved equipment, to install three additional high-class stations, to incorporate one existing research station with the AEDS, and to construct one new station with somewhat simpler instrumentation.
I hope that the details in this letter, together with the assurances and standards in the unclassified letter, provide you with the information you desired.
Sincerely,
Roswell Gilpatric
365. Editorial Note
In a conversation held at the White House on August 26, 1963, President Kennedy discussed a number of issues with Ambassador Dobrynin. Regarding possible atmospheric testing by other powers, Llewellyn Thompson's memorandum of the conversation reads as follows:
"Dobrynin said that when Harriman was in Moscow, he had mentioned an exchange of letters between the President and General de Gaulle. He asked whether the President thought the French would continue tests.
"The President replied that he thought that for the next year or so the French would only test under ground. He said he had written to General de Gaulle to see if there was some way he could assist him in being able to subscribe to the Test Ban. The General had replied that he thought any assistance we could give would only be under limitations that were unacceptable to him. The President expressed the opinion he did not think General de Gaulle wanted assistance. He then asked Dobrynin what China would do about testing.
"Dobrynin said he did not know, but that the Soviets were not worried. He said how many bombs could the Chinese acquire?
"The President pointed out that they would not need many, and thought their position would be somewhat like that of the French.
"Dobrynin admitted that the Chinese felt entitled to have some bombs of their own, but that this would not affect the balance of power. He thought that when they had acquired some bombs and saw the effects of them, they would be more cautious.
"The President observed that the Soviets appeared to be worried about the Germans five or ten years from now and said that we had to think about the Chinese over a similar period of time." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6)
The full text of this memorandum is printed in volume V, Document 213. For the exchange of correspondence between Kennedy and de Gaulle, see Documents 352 and 358.
366. Editorial Note
On September 24, 1963, the U.S. Senate gave its consent to the Limited Test Ban Treaty, with no reservations, by a vote of 80 to 19. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee had previously approved the treaty by a vote of 16 to 1 on August 29 and reported it out on September 4. President Kennedy signed the instruments of ratification on October 7, and the treaty entered into force on October 10 when the instruments of ratification were exchanged in similar ceremonies in Washington, Moscow, and London. (14 UST 1313)
Concerning the ratification process, see Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Eighth Congress, First Session, on Executive M (Washington, 1963) and The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, on Executive M, 88th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1963), which was issued on September 3.
Although it did not have formal jurisdiction in the matter, the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services also heard testimony on the treaty and issued a negative report on September 3. See Military Aspects and Implications of Nuclear Test Ban Proposals and Related Matters: Hearings Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Eighty-Eighth Congress, First Session, Parts 1 and 2 (Washington, 1964) and Investigation of the Preparedness Program: Interim Report by Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Under the Authority of S. Res. 75 (88th Cong., 1st Sess.) on the Military Implications of the Proposed Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (Washington, 1963).
367. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to the White House/1/
Washington, October 4, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-9. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text indicates Ball saw this memorandum.
Following is a summary of the meeting yesterday evening, 6-8 p.m., between the Secretary of State, Gromyko, and Lord Home./2/
/2/A 15-page memorandum of this conversation, drafted by Akalovsky, is ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
They first discussed the banning of nuclear weapons in outer space and rapidly agreed to tell the press that agreement on this had been reached in principle and that the appropriate form of the agreement/3/ would be worked out later. Gromyko then asked that an agreement on a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw powers be concluded "in the spirit of the Moscow treaty." Home pressed Gromyko on the possibility of the Soviet Government making a parallel declaration guaranteeing the security of West Berlin but Gromyko reacted strongly against this. He said Berlin was part of a bigger problem and that it was totally unacceptable to the Soviet Government to specify West Berlin, or any other individual problem. Gromyko then said "under any circumstances, whether an NAP is concluded or not, we insist that we must move forward with the task of signing a peace treaty for Germany." He repeated that signing a nonaggression pact would create a more favorable atmosphere for the solution of other problems which had not yet been solved, and he mentioned specifically Laos. The Secretary and Lord Home continued to press Gromyko on connecting Berlin with an NAP, without success. It was then agreed to leave the matter for the time being.
/3/According to Akalovsky's memorandum, Rusk told Gromyko that while there was agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union not to put "weapons of mass destruction" on the moon or in outer space, the United States had "the problem of form" because it had "just gone through the test ban debate in Congress."
Gromyko then raised his proposal for the reduction of military budgets. The Secretary of State and Lord Home pointed out the major difficulty of establishing a basis for a realistic comparison of items listed in different budgets. This would need an elaborate system of checks and inspection. Gromyko continued to insist that there should be proportionate reduction. Home suggested to Gromyko that further studies might be made to see if it were possible to find a basis for comparison of budgets. Gromyko said that if the questions of verification and control were introduced this would complicate matters hopelessly. The Secretary suggested that the best way of bringing about the reduction of military budgets was to make a real progress in disarmament and hoped that Gromyko would give some thought to the US proposal for the mutual destruction of certain weapons, e.g.: bombers. Gromyko objected that this was a different subject and came under the heading of "reduction of armaments." The Secretary said that he was prepared to ask Mr. Foster to come to New York to have confidential talks with Soviet officials to see whether progress might be made on finding a basis for comparison of budgets. He said the US could not just agree to a percentage reduction, such as Gromyko had suggested.
The Secretary then referred to observation posts and said these were being considered carefully in NATO. He asked Gromyko what he had meant by saying that these should be "coordinated with other measures." Gromyko said flatly that observation posts would only be useful if accompanied by certain practical measures: (1) reduction of forces, and (2) denuclearized zones. Altogether, he said, these measures would be effective in promoting confidence. Otherwise it would not be useful to have observation posts. To have observation posts separately would just create suspicion, and "this would be one-sided and not objective." Lord Home maintained that observation posts would have value by themselves but Gromyko said that to maintain great concentrations of troops at the same time would not be statesmanlike. The Secretary spoke on nuclear-free zones and said that there were two areas, Latin America and Africa, which could be considered to meet the criteria for genuinely free zones: (1) no launching sites for nuclear weapons, and (2) the zone would not be a likely target for nuclear weapons. He said that for Germany to be really nuclear-free we must first solve those very problems which make Germany a likely target area.
Nondissemination was briefly discussed. Gromyko said it was a serious problem and that the MLF was a serious obstacle, so it was not possible to say anything publicly which would make it seem as though agreement had been reached on nondissemination, whereas in reality there was disagreement.
Gromyko said he regretted that the United States and the UK had not advanced any new proposals on Germany which would facilitate their task. As for disarmament, "the general state of this problem could not be worse." He said that sometimes the Soviet Government wondered whether it was worthwhile continuing discussions in Geneva. He said there were nothing but speeches there and that everybody went round in a circle. He asked that his remarks not be interpreted as meaning that the Soviet Union intended to withdraw from the Geneva talks. He said Western powers were not approaching the problem of disarmament seriously. Even when the Soviet Union raised the possibility of a reduction of military budgets, Western powers immediately raised objections.
The discussion concluded with arrangements as to what the press should be told.
368. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
JCSM-776-63
Washington, October 8, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Disarmament. Secret.
SUBJECT
Criteria for Militarily Acceptable Comprehensive Arms Control and Disarmament Proposals (U)
1. In April and May 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff addressed provisions of the US "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World," the treaty outline which was tabled by the United States at Geneva on 18 April 1962./2/ In JCSM-389-62, dated 19 May 1962,/3/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff delineated certain deficiencies in the treaty which made it contrary to US interests. In August 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reconsidered their previous positions and observed that, although subsequent studies might cause them to alter these views, the positions remained valid. Concurrently, they considered criteria for determining the military acceptability of any disarmament proposal. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that it is timely to correlate these actions and state their current views on the tabled draft treaty outline.
/2/For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 351-382.
/3/Document 185.
2. In addressing arms control and disarmament proposals in the past, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have found that certain carefully considered criteria have proved useful when applied to specific proposals. Such criteria which pertain to a comprehensive disarmament treaty are listed in the Appendix./4/ (These criteria would not necessarily apply unmodified to a limited disarmament treaty.) When the principal provisions of the US treaty outline are evaluated against these criteria, they are found deficient in supporting the national interest in the following respects:
/4/Attached but not printed.
a. There is no specific provision for participation in Stage I by Communist China or all other militarily significant states.
b. There is no provision for an effective control organization to be operational prior to start of Stage I reductions or limitations.
c. The treaty outline describes a verification system (Zonal Inspection Concept) which has not been tested, evaluated, and proved reliable even on a limited test basis.
d. Armaments are listed by categories in a manner which could be disadvantageous to the United States; that is, the categories highlight strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (Cat. 1 and 2) and AICBMs (Cat. 5).
e. Stage I limitations on armaments production preclude modernization of authorized retained armaments and the testing of prototypes of new armaments.
f. The treaty outline does not contain a withdrawal clause which would permit US withdrawal for reasonable cause and without undue delay.
3. It is noted that at the end of Stage III, the United States would be dependent upon the United Nations for defense against aggression. The extent of this treaty far exceeds any measures the United States has been willing to take in the past in its relations with other nations of the world. The negotiations conducted to date suggest that General and Complete Disarmament (GCD), with its very serious limitations on sovereignty, is not attainable within the foreseeable future and should not be the objective of a proposed treaty text at the present time. It appears rather that GCD should stand as an ultimate goal and that we should turn our attention toward the achievement of more feasible agreements. In the present state of the world, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are opposed to entrusting the defense of the United States to the United Nations or any outside agency.
4. As interest in GCD has waned, the interest in negotiating separate measures has grown. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have long advocated that disarmament should progress by phased and safeguarded measures designed to approach disarmament gradually, and to provide the USSR an opportunity to display its sincerity. Such partial steps would be conducive to the decline which must precede substantial disarmament. Any effective arms control measure must have a verification system capable of insuring compliance with the provisions of the agreement, and this system must be in operation at the time the agreement becomes effective. Risk of war (ROW) measures which might be acceptable to both sides could constitute the beginning of an inspection system, one which could later be extended to the verification of disarmament meas-ures.
5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that arms control proposals could be planned which would meet their criteria, be acceptable to our Allies, provide a basis for subsequent agreement on an arms control program, and be more negotiable than the treaties now dormant in Geneva. Such proposals could commence with an agreement on an observation post plan. If this plan could not be negotiated in its entirety, other ROW measures could also be considered. The following list might be suitable subjects for negotiation with the Soviets:
a. Observation posts with limited mobility.
b. Partial aerial surveillance.
c. Mobile observation teams.
d. Full aerial surveillance.
After these measures had been in effect and tested for a sufficient period, both sides would have the nucleus of an inspection system for arms control agreements. If verification is accomplished in small steps through the successful implementation of the ROW measures then other arms control measures could be considered.
6. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that in its totality, the US treaty outline presents unwarranted risk to the security of the United States because of the vague, incomplete, and untested safeguards described therein, and consider that entering into such a treaty would be detrimental to US interests. They suggest that some limited disarmament measures could be undertaken after a framework for verification has been established and preferably after ROW agreements have proved effective./5/
/5/In a November 7 letter to Foster, McNamara agreed that general and complete disarmament was not attainable within the foreseeable future and that the United States should turn its attention toward the achievement of more feasible arrangements. He also supported the JCS arguments that controls needed additional study, that the proposed zonal inspection system was inadequate, and that the treaty outline should contain a withdrawal clause that would permit U.S. withdrawal for reasonable cause and without undue delay. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Disarmament)
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Maxwell D. Taylor/6/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/6/Printed from a copy that indicates General Taylor signed the original.
369. Editorial Note
The Committee of Principals considered the "bombs in orbit" proposal on October 8, 1963. The memorandum of the meeting indicates that the United States had introduced the term "weapons of mass destruction" in preference to "nuclear weapons" because there was concern, apparently in the Department of Defense, to leave the way open for orbiting nuclear anti-satellite systems, even though Rusk pointed out and the JCS acknowledged that putting some nuclear weapons in orbit would involve withdrawing from the arrangement. According to the memorandum, Nitze stated that while no one had a clear idea "of why we needed to leave the interpretation open," the main concern was weapons of mass destruction and "there seemed to be no reason to tie our hands on other weapons." Rusk "said that the term 'weapons of mass destruction' would be generally understood to include all nuclear weapons. If we were asked whether this were the case and if we said anything but 'yes,' we had better not go into the arrangement at all." The JCS representative then agreed with this position. On this point, a memorandum of the meeting's conclusion reads: "'Weapons of mass destruction' would have to be interpreted as including all nuclear weapons. The U.S. could accept specific reference to nuclear weapons should the Soviet Union prefer that approach."
At the meeting, Under Secretary Ball reported that President Kennedy thought that the agreement should not take the form of an executive agreement and that a General Assembly resolution "would avoid Congressional problems." It was then agreed that the United States would make an accompanying statement which would take the place of any withdrawal clause such as would appear in a more formal agreement. (Memorandum of meeting and memorandum of conclusions, both October 8 and both drafted by W.E. Cathright of ACDA/IR; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Committee of Principals) Both are in the Supplement. A packet of materials embodying these recommendations was subsequently forwarded to the White House. (Memorandum with attachments from Foster to Rusk, October 9; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18) Regarding decisions reached by Kennedy and Gromyko at a meeting held on October 10, see the source note, Document 370.
For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1884 (XVIII), "Stationing Weapons of Mass Destruction in Outer Space," adopted by acclamation on October 17, see Documents on Disarmament, 1963, page 538. Ambassador Stevenson's accompanying statement dated October 16 is ibid., pages 535-537. See also Document 371.
370. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, October 10, 1963, 4-6:10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by S on October 16 and by the White House on October 21. The ending time of the meeting, which was held at the White House, is from the President's Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library) Separate memoranda of conversation were prepared on the subjects of Cuba, Berlin, steps to be taken after the Test Ban Treaty, U.S.-USSR relations, U.S.-USSR trade relations, nuclear non-dissemination, observation posts, the proposed non-aggression pact, military budgets, and bombs in orbit. Regarding the last, the President and Gromyko agreed that it should be handled in the form of an agreed U.S.-Soviet draft U.N. resolution, perhaps to be cosponsored by other members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. The memoranda of conversation on U.S.-USSR relations and U.S.-USSR trade relations are printed in vol. V, Documents 222 and 223. The memorandum of conversation on Cuba is printed in Volume XI; that on Berlin in vol. XV, pp. 591-594.
SUBJECT
Disarmament
PARTICIPANTS
US
The President
The Secretary
Ambassador Thompson
Assistant Secretary Tyler
Mr. Akalovsky, ACDA/IR
USSR
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Sukhodrev, Foreign Ministry
Mr. Gromyko then said he wished to make some comments on the problem of disarmament. Noting that disarmament negotiations had been going on for years on end, he said that the Soviet Government sometimes wondered whether there was any use discussing disarmament in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. However, he pointed out that this remark should not be interpreted as meaning that the USSR would not continue to participate in the work of that Committee. He said he had raised the disarmament problem not in order to start arguing about, but because the USSR believed the situation in this field could not be worse. As to the arguments used by both sides in discussing this problem, these were well known to both of them and indeed could be referred to by number. He wondered what the President's view was as to what could be done in this area. Although perhaps not all the problems in disarmament field could be resolved right away, the Soviet Union believed that the approach of general and complete disarmament was realistic, because if disarmament were to be taken up in pieces many difficulties would arise, such as change in the correlation of forces, etc.
The President agreed that since both our countries had subscribed to the concept of general and complete disarmament, they ought to stay at it in Geneva, although not much progress had been made so far. He hoped the Soviet Union would stay. He said he was not very optimistic that we would disarm totally in one or even three stages, but he believed that it was psychologically good to keep working at this problem because this did have some influence on the levels of arms.
Mr. Gromyko asked whether there was any chance of France's participating in the discussion.
The President observed that de Gaulle had made some proposals, with the details of which we were not familiar. He said he did not know what chance there was of the French joining in the discussion.
The Secretary said he wished to make two comments on this point: first, he believed that Geneva was a convenient forum for us to talk. Some of our allies were there and we could make preparations for our discussions more easily. Thus the Geneva arrangement could help us to move ahead. The second comment he wanted to make was that in spite of this we were not committed to any particular forum. In other words, while we had not heard anything from them on this score, if the French were to say that they would join, but not in Geneva, we should see what other useful arrangement could be made. However, now we should go ahead in Geneva unless something better should come along./2/
/2/Rusk discussed disarmament again with Gromyko on the evening of October 10. A memorandum of the conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. See the Supplement. Rusk also discussed disarmament with Mikoyan in the course of a general conversation held the afternoon of November 26. (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) A telegraphic report of the meeting is printed in vol. V, Document 238.
The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee did not reconvene in 1963. For U.N. Resolution 1908 (XVIII) of November 27, regarding General and Complete Disarmament, see Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 624-625.
371. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Missions/1/
Washington, October 15, 1963, 6:57 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18 UN. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Cathright and cleared in the Department by G/PM, ACDA, UNP, EUR, RPM, and P and by DOD/ISA, AEC, and the White House. Approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Sent to the capitals of the members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and to Ankara, Athens, Belgrade, Bonn, Brussels, Canberra, Copenhagen, The Hague, Lisbon, Oslo, Taipei, Tokyo, Wellington, Geneva, and USUN.
691. Paris deliver Durbrow 8:00 a.m. October 16. General Assembly resolution being introduced probably sponsored by 17 active members ENDC, which would, in effect, call upon states to refrain from placing nuclear weapons or other weapons mass destruction in orbit around earth, from installing such weapons on celestial bodies, and from stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner./2/ In connection consideration of matter by General Assembly both U.S. and Soviet Union will make statements supporting resolution.
/2/See Document 369.
As appropriate and emphasizing such points as may be most useful locally, addressees may draw on following points in such public and private explanations of our approach this matter as may be considered necessary:
1. Resolution does not represent new policy for U.S. Our intention not to place weapons of mass destruction in orbit was first made clear in statement by Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric September 5, 1962,/3/ and has been confirmed by President and other U.S. spokesmen on number of occasions.
/3/See Document 226.
2. Our policy reflects our assessment that for foreseeable future placing in orbit of weapons of mass destruction would not give military advantage to either side and that both sides have a mutual interest in avoiding race for such weapons. Following considerations are pertinent:
a. Chief problem presented by orbital vehicles carrying weapons mass destruction would for some time to come be psychological. Such weapons might be "terror" weapons but more costly and less effective militarily than ballistic missiles. We have neither need nor desire this type weapon and can safely rely on deterrent strength afforded by hardened and dispersed ICBM's and mobile systems such as Polaris.
b. In building our deterrent forces, we have emphasized importance of eliminating any possibility of accident. Earth-based delivery systems are more reliable and are more readily controlled than would be case with orbital systems. Accordingly, deployment of latter might increase risk of accidental war. All countries have interest in avoiding this.
3. Although we made our own intentions clear some time ago, Gromyko's statement of September 19 before the General Assembly/4/ (a year after Gilpatric's statement) was first clear indication Soviet intentions and of their willingness separate matter from other aspects arms control and disarmament. Since we not going to place bombs in orbit, it is in our interest and that of other countries to get Soviet Union clearly on record. While resolution would be a recommendation only and would not be legally binding, it would express view of GA that placing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit undesirable. Since impact of such weapons would be primarily psychological rather than military, we think resolution will be useful political barrier to such a Soviet extension of arms race.
/4/See Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 509-524.
4. If the Soviet Union should, in violation of its declared intent, place bombs in orbit for psychological purposes, they would have to reveal presence of such weapons and would, of course, have to pay political price. Therefore, resolution is to some extent self-policing. We have capabilities for detecting presence of objects in orbit although without inspection it is not possible to be certain whether a particular object is carrying a weapon of mass destruction. We could detect any suspicious build-up of vehicles in orbits which might be suitable for deploying weapons mass destruction. Accordingly since threat is low, we prepared at present to rely on own capabilities.
5. It should be recognized that in rapidly advancing field such as exploration and use of outer space, unforeseen events might make it desirable have additional assurance at a future time. We would feel free seek such assurance as might be necessary and would, of course, retain freedom of action if satisfactory assurance were not forthcoming. FYI. In this connection, if asked why U.S. Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World calls for inspection of space vehicles whereas inspection not provided in resolution, you should point out that if deterrent forces were being substantially reduced under disarmament program, it would be important have full assurance weapons of mass destruction were not being placed in orbit. End FYI.
6. Since we did not plan to place weapons of mass destruction in orbit, resolution would not cause any alteration of our space activities. Nor would resolution relieve us of necessity of taking such precautions as may be necessary from standpoint our security, such as research and development on possible orbital systems which other side might at some time deploy and on appropriate countermeasures. Although we do not, therefore, intend let down our guard, we expect resolution will be a useful step in avoiding extension of arms race to outer space.
Rusk
372. National Security Action Memorandum No. 269/1/
Washington, October 31, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 269. Secret.
TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology
SUBJECT
Procedure for Approval of Certain Nuclear Tests/2/
/2/In a May 15 memorandum to holders of NSAM No. 210, McGeorge Bundy stated that the President had approved [text not declassified] for FY 1964. In an August 30 memorandum to the same group, however, Bundy stated that Kennedy had requested a review of that program. (Both ibid., NSAM 210) Regarding NSAM No. 210, see Document 259.
The President has directed that the following procedure be instituted for the review and approval of nuclear tests that might violate or be regarded as violating the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. A nuclear test that is intended to be fully contained underground will be included in this category if there is a significant possibility that the test will place measurable amounts of radioactive debris beyond the boundaries of the United States under circumstances in which the debris could be credibly related to the test. Any other nuclear test which by its nature could reasonably give rise to domestic or foreign charges of a violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty will be included in this category even though the sponsoring agency believes that the charges would prove to be unfounded.
1. In planning the nuclear test program, the Atomic Energy Commission and Department of Defense will make every effort to avoid tests that might be regarded as being a violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. It is recognized that this will be a matter of judgment since the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty does not contain precise technical criteria as to the nature of prohibited tests.
2. If the Atomic Energy Commission or the Secretary of Defense believes after careful study that a particular test should remain in the program despite the possibility that it might give rise to a claimed violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the sponsoring agency will submit the test for review by a committee, under the chairmanship of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, composed of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, or their designated representatives./3/
/3/In a November 6 memorandum to holders of NSAMs No. 210 and 269, McGeorge Bundy stated that because of the close similarity of the composition and functions of the committees established under those NSAMs, they would be combined into one "Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests." Members were to be the same as those designated above, with the addition of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
3. In support of the proposals for each nuclear test of this type, the sponsoring agency will prepare for the reviewing committee a detailed study of the importance of the proposed test and the possible direct or indirect effects associated with the test that might be regarded as evidence of a violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The study of effects associated with the test will include an analysis of a) the anticipated distribution of particulate and gaseous radioactive debris under the full range of possible meteorological conditions; b) the extent to which blast, electromagnetic, and other direct radiation phenomena associated with the test will occur in the atmosphere; c) the possibility that various foreign countries would be able to detect the anticipated level of radioactive debris and other phenomena associated with the tests with their detection instrumentation; d) visible phenomena in the vicinity of the test site; and e) planned or expected publicity.
4. The reviewing committee will be given sufficient notice of proposals for nuclear tests of this type to permit adequate consideration by the committee and any necessary action with minimum impact on the program in question.
5. If the committee finds that the proposed test is acceptable under the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the committee will submit its recommendation to the President for his approval. No test of this type will be conducted without the approval of the President after the procedure prescribed in this memorandum./4/
/4/[text not declassified] The paper describes at length measures taken to make the underground tests conform with the Limited Test Ban Treaty. ("AEC Actions To Insure Weapons Tests Will Be Conducted Within the Terms of the Partial Test Ban Treaty"; Johnson Library, National Security File, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing, General, Volume I)
McGeorge Bundy
373. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to the Committee of Principals/1/
Washington, December 12, 1963.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, ACDA Pubs, Volume I, 1 of 2. Secret. Lyndon B. Johnson became President following the assassination of President Kennedy on November 22 in Dallas, Texas.
SUBJECT
Draft U.S. Proposal for a Separable First Stage Disarmament Plan/2/
/2/Attached but not printed.
On January 21 the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) will be resumed. ACDA is currently up-dating a number of existing position papers. In some instances minor modifications or elaborations with respect to individual topics may be recommended. ACDA is also preparing a new paper dealing with proposals to establish observation posts to reduce the danger of surprise conventional attack. Within the next few days ACDA will forward the first of these position papers to the interested agencies.
The April 18, 1962 Treaty Outline/3/ was submitted to the ENDC for the purpose of stimulating an informed discussion of the problems implicit in reaching the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. This purpose has largely been achieved, with the result that the sense of the members of the ENDC is that while most of them still retain general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world as an ultimate goal, their primary interest is in discussing measures of arms control and disarmament which they hope can be accomplished in the foreseeable future; in a very real sense there is now general acceptance of the U.S. objective set forth at the time of the opening of the ENDC in President Kennedy's letter to the Secretary of State:/4/ "The objective should be to define in treaty terms the widest area of agreement that can be implemented at the earliest possible time while still continuing your maximum efforts to achieve agreement on those other aspects which present more difficulty."
/3/For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 351-382.
/4/Dated March 13, 1962; for text, see ibid., pp. 90-91.
We should therefore begin an examination within the Government of a disarmament proposal that would enable us to take the initiative in this new focus for negotiations and which would at the same time facilitate a more realistic exploration of Soviet attitudes than is possible either within the ambitious context of present GCD discussions or the very limited context of individual "confidence-building" measures. The attached draft of a separable first step plan is submitted for the purpose of initiating a policy review which would meet these requirements.
The proposal, for the reasons set forth in the attached draft, is limited to major armaments used for the delivery of nuclear weapons. ACDA does not believe, however, that either during our forthcoming governmental considerations or in subsequent negotiations, the possibility of enlarging the plan to cover other elements of national military capability should be excluded. It would be helpful to have the views of others on this point.
The most significant act in implementing the proposal would of course be the production cut-off rather than the reductions themselves. Here again, while the reasons set forth in the paper argue for not limiting a proposal to a production cut-off, this is a matter that should be considered in full in interagency consultations.
A further significant element of this proposal is the focus of formal inspection (aside from unilateral national capabilities) on production facilities and armaments that are to be destroyed. If this focus can be made safely--and in the context of this proposal on major nuclear delivery vehicles ACDA believes this to be the case--it offers the possibility of a major breakthrough in negotiations.
It is recognized that there are many arguments that can be raised against a proposal of this nature, or against any proposal that is apt to offer possibilities for serious negotiations with the Soviet Union within the context of the present world scene. From a strategic standpoint, the basic argument for this proposal would appear to be as follows:
The U.S. already has a strong, invulnerable strategic force. The build-up on this force is beginning to level off, and probably would be near its end by the time agreement could be reached. The Soviets, on the other hand, are apparently on an earlier portion of their build-up. To allow them to continue would result in a degradation of our present strategic advantage. If we can arrest their building program even at the expense of a percentage reduction of strategic forces on both sides, we will be much better off and they will save the economic resources involved. Far from decreasing our ability or willingness to use nuclears if need be, this should help to preserve it.
It is anticipated that following discussion by Deputies in the near future, the proposal, with suitable modifications, would be discussed by the Committee of Principals.
William C. Foster
374. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to Senator John Stennis/1/
Washington, December 17, 1963.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/AE Files: FRC 69 A 2243, 388.3, 58 AWT USSR Tests (1961-1965). Secret; Restricted Data. John Stennis of Mississippi chaired the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to your letter of December 6, 1963,/2/ I am pleased to provide the following information on the Defense Department's portion of the "safeguards" program. The attached table provides a comparison of the FY-1964 effort to our proposed program for FY-1965./3/
/2/Not found.
/3/For text, see the Supplement.
In support of the first safeguard, underground testing, we are planning or preparing for a series [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] and in depth from near surface down to 1500 feet. Preparations are continuing for the deep (1500') underground test which is designed to help us learn more about the design of very hard structures. [1 line of source text not declassified] could be conducted during FY-64 and FY-65, provided they fall within the final definition of allowable underground testing. These tests are being designed to obtain the maximum possible weapons effects information. The FY-1965 budget includes $22.6 million for underground testing.
In support of the second safeguard, maintenance of laboratory facilities and programs, FY-1965 Defense budget includes $49.3 million for nuclear weapons effects research and the DOD portion of RDT&E associated with nuclear weapons development. The effects research program includes laboratory and theoretical investigation of air blast and ground shock, water blast and shock effects, thermal and nuclear radiation, electro-magnetic phenomenon and biomedical effects. The weapons development includes fuzing and firing systems, retardation systems, ballistic cases, aircraft compatibility testing, and vulnerability tests.
With regard to the third safeguard, maintenance of a stand-by atmospheric test capability, we have budgeted approximately $77 million in FY-1965. Improvement of the test facility at Johnston Island was mostly financed in FY-1963-64 at a cost of about $37 million. Other preparations will include research, development and procurement of long lead time instrumentation and instrument carriers; the maintenance of all this equipment and a joint task force in being.
Specific preparations are being made for the following high altitude atmospheric and underwater tests: Seven shots ranging from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] at altitudes from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to study reentry and blackout effects; two near-surface bursts [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for studying electromagnetic pulse effects; and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] shots at various depths underwater plus [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] air burst to study underwater effects and air blast damage to ships.
By 1 January 1965 we should have a capability to begin atmospheric and underwater effects tests within six months of notice, stockpile proof tests within about two months, operational systems tests within about two to three months and weapons development in about three months.
In support of the fourth safeguard, we are augmenting the Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS). About $34 million has already been invested in this system and operating costs currently run about $25 million per year. We now propose to invest another $100 million during the period FY-1964 to 1969. During the same period, the operating cost will increase to about $40 million annually. To continue development of seismic and other ground-based detection systems, and particularly to further develop a satellite-based system, the Vela program would be increased to $62 million in FY-65 as compared to $51 million in FY-64. This would provide for the launching of another experimental detection satellite in addition to the two launched this fiscal year.
I trust that this information will be of help to you, and I will be pleased to provide more detailed data as the program progresses.
Sincerely,
Roswell L. Gilpatric/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Gilpatric signed the original.
375. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, December 19, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret.
SUBJECT
Meeting on Arms Control Issues, 14-15 December 1963, Executive Office Building
On Saturday and Sunday, all-day meetings were held on disarmament problems and particularly on a draft ACDA separable first stage disarmament proposal/2/ which has not yet been put in the mill for clearance. The meeting included, in addition to ACDA, representatives of the Defense Department and Armed Services, the White House, CIA, Atomic Energy Commission, and others interested in the field. The Department was represented by Mr. Rostow and Mr. Garthoff and myself, and Mr. Johnson participated in the closing session.
/2/See Document 373.
In brief, the proposal provides for a thirty percent cut in strategic weapons and delivery systems with no cut in conventional armaments. Submarines would not be included. ACDA will re-examine its proposal in the light of the discussion, on which there was considerable criticism, or at least difficulties, which were brought out in the discussion.
One of the most interesting points made on the ACDA proposal itself was a statement by John McNaughton of the Defense Department that one reason Defense favored an across-the-board cut, including conventional arms, was that it was otherwise impossible to equalize the effect among the three Armed Services.
So far as the Department is concerned, and possible actions on our part, the most significant point which evolved from the discussion was that repeatedly it was brought out that we need to have discussions with the Germans in greater depth on these matters. [In?] Several of the papers prepared,/3/ and in my own contribution to the discussion, the view was expressed that it was highly unlikely that any significant cut in armaments could be made without prior, or simultaneous, progress in political settlements, most important of which is the German problem. Even in discussing straight disarmament measures, the attitude of the German Government is a key one. I mentioned that through the Pugwash and other meetings of this type, we had done a great deal to educate the Soviets in the realities of disarmament problems and it seemed strange that we had not done so with the Germans. One of the difficulties is, of course, that the Germans tend to be so suspicious of our intentions, or at least were under Adenauer, that it is difficult to have a frank and open discussion of all the factors involved. Another, and related point, is that any such discussion is handicapped because of the limited extent to which we have disclosed our intelligence about the Soviet Union and the reliability of our estimates, which, in turn, involves some disclosure of our methods. It was agreed that Alexis Johnson would have another look at this latter problem to see whether further disclosures are advisable.
/3/A number of papers prepared for this meeting, largely of ACDA and DOD origin, are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, ACDA Pubs, Volume I, 1 of 2)
I raised the problem of the difficulty of having discussions of this nature with the Germans without bringing in at least the British and French. It would probably be impossible to set up with the Germans a Pugwash type of discussion, although, to some extent, this might be considered. Since at the recent NATO meeting it was suggested that the Ambassadorial group look into the possibility of developing further proposals on the German problem, this might be a useful peg for starting such discussions. In any event, it was brought out in the meeting that it would be best to approach this problem from the point of view of seeing how we could bring about German reunification or progress toward this goal rather than to approach it from the straight disarmament point of view, which the Germans might interpret as our trying to find a way to withdraw from Europe.
It is suggested that consideration might be given to having the President prepare the ground for discussions of this type with the Germans without being specific about how this would be handled. A suggested briefing paper for the President is attached./4/
/4/Not printed. A December 21 memorandum from Wiesner to President Johnson reflects the same general conclusions and recommendations. (Ibid.)
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