On January 17, 1961, Theodore Sorensen enclosed with a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy the undated 27-page "Report to Senator Kennedy's National Security Policy Committee." Paul H. Nitze headed this Committee, the other members of which were David K. E. Bruce and Roswell Gilpatric. The report opened with an analysis of defense policy issues. Concerning the first, "Basic Strategic Judgments," the Committee stated in part:

"The most basic issue is between attempting to follow a politically meaningful 'win' capability in general war versus the creation of a secure retaliatory capability.

"Weapons systems and programs necessary for a 'win' capability may differ quite radically from those required for a secure retaliatory capability.

"A true 'win' capability would require accurate and powerful attack systems, first class target acquisition systems, elaborate active and passive defense systems, forces for the prosecution of the second and third phases of a general war and a good recuperation program. It is doubtful whether such a capability is possible within presently foreseeable technology. In any case it would be immensely expensive both economically and politically to make an all out drive toward achieving such a capability. It would also probably require a first or preemptive strike by our side to capitalize in its 'win' possibilities. Furthermore, such a capability would probably be destabilizing--in other words would increase the danger of nuclear war.

"On the other hand there are very great political and military dangers in having merely a punitive retaliatory capability with no possibility of a 'win'. If deterrence were to fail, or threaten to fail, we would be left with no option for military action other than a self-defeating punitive attack.

"A pure retaliatory capability therefore undermines the credibility of the deterrent and gives little or no support to the political aspects of our policy.

"It would therefore seem that in addition to a secure deterrent posture, some admixture of possible 'win' capabilities is called for.

"A general approach to the 'mix' of general war capabilities to be striven for should be determined by the President-elect, as early as full briefing by those knowledgeable in the subject can be arranged."

The Committee called for an early Presidential decision on the degree to which the United States should rely on nuclear weapons in limited wars. It stated that "judgments as to the circumstances under which nuclear war must be accepted as unavoidable, who should have his hand on the safety catches and the triggers of nuclear war and the nature of the original target systems, should deterrence fail, must all be made by the President. These judgments are inherently not delegatable."

Other defense policy issues discussed in the report include specific defense programming decisions, NATO issues, the fiscal and organizational implications of defense policy, and the relationship of disarmament to defense.

The report identified several other issues as having national security implications: the gold drain and the U.S. balance of payments, U.S. representation at the United Nations, and a number of European and other area problems. The report emphasized that the Department of State needed "strengthening in its competence on military problems. State can't give intelligence guidance on politico-military questions unless it has people who in addition to political competence thoroughly understand military matters, including questions of military strategy, tactics and logistics."

The Committee believed that "the top level coordination machinery in the White House [was] peculiarly a matter of the President's personal desires and needs." It suggested that a number of existing interagency advisory committees be brought under the "NSC tent." The Operations Coordinating Board "has been a great generator of useless paper work and might be scrapped and a new start made." The report recommended "a series of ad hoc task forces to develop plans and direct operations on critical upcoming situations involving a high component of secret operations," and mentioned potential groups dealing with Cuba, the Congo, and Indochina, and also a "central secretariat which would service the entire panoply of interagency committees associated with the NSC's work." Such a body "would perform some of the functions of the British Cabinet Secretariat." The full text of the report, which was completed in November 1960, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, NSC Political Committee Report 1/17/61. For further information, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), page 157.

NIE 1-61

Washington, January 17, 1961.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry. Secret. For full text of NIE 1-61, see the Supplement. A note on the cover sheet indicates the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in drafting it. The U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on January 17, except the Atomic Energy Commission representative and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.

ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION

[Here follow sections entitled "Introduction," "The Communist World," "The Emerging Areas," and "Problems of the Western Alliances," comprising approximately two-thirds of the estimate.]

60. Despite a widespread feeling that allout nuclear war is unlikely, the problem posed by the accumulation of offensive weapons of mass destruction by the great powers will remain the major problem of the 1960's. Although we have been unable to agree upon an estimate of the size of the Soviet ICBM program (estimates range from 200--or perhaps even less--to 700 on launcher for mid-1963), the Soviet capability even at the lowest estimated figure will pose a grave threat to the US. To illustrate, if one assumes the number on launcher to be 200 and applies reasonable rates of reliability to the missile, the USSR could detonate in the US in the target area some 1,000 to 1,250 megatons. The even greater delivery capability provided by shorter range missiles and nuclear weapons deliverable by aircraft or submarines and ships poses an additional threat to the US, to US bases overseas, to US allies, and indeed to most of the northern hemisphere.

/2/The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, concurs in the net judgment contained in this paragraph and the succeeding paragraphs that, so far as can now be seen, a general nuclear war would cause enormous damage to all major protagonists and that resort to general nuclear war, under these circumstances, is not a rational course of action. He believes, however, that the intelligence community is unable to adjudge the capability of the US to develop an effective defense against ballistic missiles. [Footnote in the source text.]

/3/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur. As previously stated in his footnote to NIE 11-4-60, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1960-1965," dated 1 December 1960, he feels that we are entering a very critical twenty-four month period in which the USSR may well sense that it has the advantage. The Soviet leaders may press that advantage and offer the US the choice of war or of backing down on an issue heretofore considered vital to our national interests. [Footnote in the source text.]

63. Thus it appears likely that during most of the decade ahead the strategic situation will be one in which both the US and the USSR will possess relatively invulnerable nuclear weapons systems capable of inflicting enormous destruction upon the other. The world must face the possibility that a general nuclear war--brought to pass through accident, design, or miscalculation--would kill many millions of people, destroy the capital accumulation of many decades, render large sections of the earth virtually uninhabitable for a time, and destroy the power of most of the modern nations of the world.

64. This strategic situation does not make general nuclear war impossible, but it does make it a highly irrational response to international disputes. As long as this situation continues, each side will be deterred by fear of the consequences (if by nothing else) from deliberately initiating general war. It is almost certain, moreover, that each side will be deterred from action or policies which involve serious risk of general war. The crucial question is: how will the risks of a given action be judged in the context of circumstances which exists when the action is contemplated? To be more specific: how far will the Soviets--or the Chinese Communists--be emboldened by judging that Western reaction to some Communist aggression will be inhibited by Western aversion to incurring serious risk of general war? To what extent will the Western reaction actually be so inhibited? Such questions as these are likely to be decisive in any sharp international crisis.

65. But apart from the calculation of risks in times of crisis, this strategic situation poses other serious problems for policymakers. How long will it persist? Can either side achieve a clear military superiority? If the situation of mutual deterrence does persist, can nuclear war be prevented from occurring by accident? Can nuclear blackmail be countered? Can nuclear armaments be reduced or eliminated without creating unfair advantage or opportunities for evasion? We do not pretend to offer answers, but only to point out in the paragraphs below some of the military and political problems which we believe this strategic situation has created and will create in the decade ahead.

/4/The Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, believe that the tone of Section V, especially part B of this Section, compares a dynamic Communist Bloc to a static Free World. While emphasizing the capabilities of the Bloc, it gives little or no credit to the capability or determination of the West to shape the course of events.

For example:

a. Paragraph 69 charges "large numbers of people around the world" with acceptance of the Bertrand Russell thesis of preferring Communist chains to nuclear war. The Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, doubt the validity of this assertion.

b. Paragraph 72 forecasts Communist political manipulation in crisis situations so as to try to make Western intervention seem "capricious or imperialistic." Adroitness in the political arena by the West--believed by the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, to be equally possible--appears to be discounted as a factor for consideration. [Footnote in the source text.]

66. There is much ignorance and uncertainty among military and civilian leaders throughout the world--in both Communist and non-Communist countries--about the present and future world military situation. This is due in part to security restrictions between governments and even within governments, in part to the complex technical and operational factors involved in modern military actions, and in part to the fact that the destructive potential of modern weapons is unprecedented in human history. Even among the politically and militarily sophisticated, there is considerable puzzlement and disagreement about the deterrent effect of present and future nuclear capabilities, about the probable behavior of states in critical situations, and about the most suitable and effective strategic doctrines and weapons systems to develop.

67. These problems must trouble the Soviet leaders as much as they trouble those of the West. We do not believe that the Soviet leaders conceive the ICBM to be the final answer to their military problems, and we doubt that they have formed definite ideas about their force structure ten years hence or about the precise role they will assign to military power in their campaign to establish world communism. They now see themselves as emerging from a period of strategic inferiority, and they surely consider it a prime objective not to let the US draw ahead once more. As long as the weapons race persists, they will not be content with a strategic equilibrium, or with the progress they have hitherto made in weapons development. Beyond that, they will continue to carry on scientific and weapons research and development programs with a high sense of urgency in order to find new weapons systems and defenses against existing ones. They would do this even without dream of vast military conquests, simply in the interest of defense. But if they developed a weapons system which gave promise of decided advantage over the US, they would certainly seek to gain maximum profit from it.

/5/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur in this paragraph. It is his belief that the evidence of offensive missile and bomber production and deployment shows a definite intent by the Soviet rulers to achieve a clear military superiority at the earliest practicable date. [Footnote in the source text.]

69. In such a circumstance the Soviet leaders will have substantial advantages. They can create crises and issue threats over comparatively minor matters with a reasonable degree of confidence that one or more of the Western powers will give way because of the risks of general war involved in resisting. In circumstances where they judge the risk is not too great they might engage in military action, possibly with Soviet forces but more probably with other bloc forces or with local revolutionary armed groups. In any case where it appeared that the choice for resisters was one between massive nuclear destruction and compromise of principle (including even surrender of territory), large numbers of people around the world would choose the latter.

70. It is now widely held that, in order to prevent such a paralyzing choice from being presented, it is necessary to have limited war capabilities, so that comparatively minor threats can be countered with appropriate means. But in recent years limited war capabilities in the West have been declining rather than rising. There has been a trend toward the reduction of budgetary allocations for the modernization and mobility of limited-war-capable forces. Two of the US allies, for reasons of national prestige, or because they fear that the US will not always support them, have carried on strategic nuclear weapons programs of their own and have reduced their conventional forces.

71. Even if substantial limited war forces should be available, many of the principles of their political and military use in a nuclear age remain to be developed and to be accepted. It is clear, for example, that only limited objectives can be won by limited means, and that pursuit of broad objectives or extension of the conflict beyond a well defined area of combat threatens expansion into a major war and poses for both sides the question of undertaking a large-scale pre-emptive attack on the enemy's homeland. Even when both parties accept limitations upon their objectives and upon the area of combat, the rules of combat within that established area still pose problems. One of these is that of using nuclear weapons for tactical advantage. The use of nuclear weapons in almost any form would greatly complicate both the military and political problem. It would almost certainly confuse the enemy and the neutrals as to the user's real intentions--as distinct from his announced ones--and alienate large and influential sectors of world opinion from the cause of the user, however just it may have been. The Soviets would presumably regard the use of nuclear weapons in the light of the proposition which they repeatedly assert and probably believe--that limited wars would carry particularly great risks of spreading into general war if nuclear weapons were introduced.

72. From a political point of view, there are also questions about the circumstances in which one can intervene with limited forces. As a general rule and as a result of the experience of Korea, the Communist powers will probably try to avoid clear-cut provocations which would permit the West to bring limited war capabilities to bear. They will instead attempt to use situations which are legally or politically anomalous, that is, situations in which they have a defensible color of right for the use of force or in which the political issue has become or can be made to appear so confused as to make Western intervention seem capricious or imperialistic. Much will depend upon the way in which the issue is presented to the world and is handled by both sides. In many circumstances fear of the spread of the conflict into a general nuclear war might be so great that the intervener would find himself severely condemned by large segments of world opinion.

73. A major problem during the next decade is also posed by the probability that additional nations will acquire a nuclear weapons capability. France already has a program underway, and Communist China and Israel almost certainly have started such weapons programs. Other nations might enter the field if only to counter the power and prestige which their rivals or their enemies might gain through the acquisition of a nuclear capability. Even a small increase in the number of nations possessing nuclear weapons will add to the dangers inherent in critical situations as they arise. An increase in the number of states capable of using nuclear weapons--even as a threat--will also increase the chances for irrational and desperate action. At a minimum, the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities will stir up additional political turmoil by encouraging intransigence in their possessors and by encouraging fear and counteraction among those who might consider themselves threatened.

74. Related to these problems of limited war and spread of nuclear capabilities is the problem of preventing miscalculations which might precipitate general war unintentionally. Whenever international disputes arise there is a natural tendency for the parties concerned to place their forces on an alert status and progressively to strengthen the alert by various forms of deployment. In some cases these might be normal precautions and in some cases they might be intended to frighten the adversary, or both. In any case, there is likely to be considerable concern among neutrals and US allies that the US and the USSR will act in too bellicose a fashion, that both the US and the USSR might become so committed that they would be unable to back down and thus would become involved in war, or that the state of alert on one side or both will become so advanced that, fearing a surprise attack, one would take pre-emptive action against the other. As the decade advances and surprise attack against retaliatory weapons systems loses much of its advantage, compelling reasons for launching a pre-emptive attack will no longer exist. Nevertheless, fear of surprise attack will probably persist and might weigh more heavily in the minds of policymakers than would in fact be justified.

75. Another concern is that general war may come about by sheer accident. The worry here is that with an increasing number and variety of space capsules in orbit or being fired into orbit, with an increasing number of missiles nuclear-armed and on the ready, with strategic air forces airborne and armed with nuclear weapons, with a new and untested ballistic missile early warning system in operation, war could come about through communications failures or anomalies, irrational action by local crews or commanders, or errors in judgment, without either side wishing this to happen. As the decade advances and surprise attack loses some of its advantages, there will no longer be compelling reasons to respond immediately to supposed or actual infringements of air space by presumably hostile missiles or aircraft. Nevertheless, fear of attack might in some circumstances be so great that general war could come about in ways we have noted.

76. In this situation of widespread fear of a general nuclear war, it is natural that the people of the world should look to arms control as a means of reducing the danger. Whatever its motivation, the USSR has carried on a many-sided campaign for general and complete disarmament. The Soviet leaders probably are interested in achieving some degree of disarmament, to an extent which would at least slow down or stop developments which might harm their strategic position or increase the danger of accidental war. During the decade, it is possible that both sides will become sufficiently concerned with stabilizing the balance of terror that some limited agreements may be reached. In any case, it is possible that--in order both to achieve stabilization and to meet world pressures for reducing the danger of war--the two sides will undertake tacit agreements resulting in some degree of arms limitation.

77. Also, the UN is likely to continue to be regarded by its members as an instrument for the prevention of war. If two nations are involved in dispute that threatens to result in a general war which they wish to avoid, the UN might provide a useful forum for airing the dispute and UN action a useful excuse for emerging from the dispute with less than full satisfaction. Moreover, the underdeveloped nations, who are likely to become an increasingly powerful voice in the UN, will almost certainly feel it in their interest to prevent a general war and will therefore exert their influence for the preservation of peace.

78. While there is some reason to expect, therefore, that the UN may play a role in preserving peace, that the present balance of forces will persist or become stabilized, that the limited war concept may be sufficiently capable of development to provide an escape from nuclear blackmail and general nuclear war, and that chances of general war coming about by accident or fear of surprise attack may be reduced, the decade ahead will still be an extremely dangerous one. The Soviets see increasing opportunities for political gains in their new strategic position, in their economic growth, and in the changing situation in the underdeveloped areas. They are almost certain to test these opportunities, and such tests could give rise to serious crises. Berlin and the Offshore Islands exemplify situations in which retreat may become impossible, and civil wars in such areas on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc as Laos could pose grave questions concerning the objectives and rules for the conduct of limited operations. The world contest in the decade ahead will necessarily be conducted in the shadow of this strategic situation, and it will affect the decisions of statesmen everywhere.

Washington, January 24, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, 381 18 Jan 61. Top Secret.

/2/Reference is to a meeting between President Eisenhower and President-elect Kennedy. A memorandum for the record of the conversation is in the Eisenhower Library, Post-Presidential Papers, 1961-1969, John F. Kennedy 1960-1961 (2).

[Here follows discussion of Laos and Cuba.]

1. Secretary Gates stated, "The United States can handle any number of small limited war situations at one time."

2. Secretary Gates stated that the Defense Department had taken the funds authorized by the last Congress over and above what the Department had requested, and had committed these funds to additional airlift capacity and to the design of a new cargo plane.

3. Secretary Gates stated that major problems relating to airlift capacity were:

a. the right to over-fly;
b. the congestion of landing fields.

1. President Eisenhower stated the United States would be better prepared for limited war if we were to bring a division back from NATO and station the division within the continental limits of the United States. He pointed out that such action would ease the gold problem, but would require careful preparation with NATO.

2. President Eisenhower stated that if the order restricting travel of military dependents remains in effect, similar restrictions should apply to the dependents of personnel of other governmental departments, including the State Department.

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.

Washington, January 25, 1961, 10:15 a.m.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Chester V. Clifton Series, Conferences with the President Volume I. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on January 27.

OTHERS PRESENT
General Lemnitzer
General Decker
Admiral Burke
General White
General Shoup
General Clifton
General Goodpaster

The President first told the group that General Clifton would be taking over from me the Defense Liaison functions. He expressed appreciation for the help I have been enabled to give him by staying on for a short while. He said he would hope to make use of General Clifton in order to stay in very close touch with the Chiefs. General Lemnitzer confirmed that it has been valuable to have someone here with whom the Chiefs could take up specific items, and whom they could get to take up questions with the President for them. The President said he is extremely anxious to keep in close contact with the Chiefs. He recognized that he would be seeing General Lemnitzer frequently when he comes to NSC meetings, attends meetings with the Secretary of State, etc.

The President cited as an instance of the kind of help he needed the suggestion that the timing of the SAMOS shot and the Baltic reconnaissance flight should be modified so as to remove them from the date of the release of the RB-47 flyers.

[Here follows discussion of Laos (see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXIV, Document 12), Cuba (see ibid., vol. X, Document 26), and the Congo.]

/2/See Document 3.

The President said he would like to have a memorandum bringing out what, if we were to decide to commit American troops in Laos, we could do in the way of a buildup, in 30 days. He asked that it cover how fast the Viet Minh could come into the situation. General Lemnitzer said they could come in fast, but we could cut their supply lines and limit what they could do.

General Lemnitzer said that if we took units out of our ready forces, we would want to replace them quickly with units from the reserves. General Decker said there are three divisions ready to go in STRAC. Also, the 25th Division, less one RCT, is in Hawaii, with the RCT in Okinawa. There are seven national guard divisions that have been designated to be called in to replace any units committed.

The President asked what efforts have been made to prevent the experience we had with our prisoners of war in Korea. General Decker reported that a code of conduct has been prepared and that there are programs of indoctrination. It is recognized that there would be brainwashing, but the men know much better what to do. General Lemnitzer confirmed that training has been intensive--on occasion involving the acting out of what can be done to maintain order and morale in a prison camp. Admiral Burke observed that those who believe in something can and will stand up in such a situation. General Lemnitzer said he thought the situation was infinitely better than in 1950, when the armed forces were at a very low ebb. The units committed in Korea from Japan were at a low state of training and readiness. The President asked what caliber of people are coming into the service. All present said that the caliber is extremely high. General White said it is proving hard to keep people of this degree of competence after they finish their required service, but he said that the personnel of the Air Force are far superior to what they have had before. General Shoup said the same is true of the Marine Corps. General Decker said that the officers and men of the Army are the best ever. General Lemnitzer added that the authority that was granted to the Army to reject drafted personnel has been of tremendous value. Through screening out the unfit, great savings have been made--for example, four of the Army's five disciplinary barracks have been closed. The President said he would like to have the group think about the problem of how to build up the status of the Army. He said that the other services have advantages which the Army does not seem to have. General Decker said he was delighted to hear this expression by the President and would certainly give it very great attention. Admiral Burke said that in many ways the Navy has the toughest problem, as is reflected now in its rate of reenlistment, which is the lowest in the whole Defense establishment. This arises out of the great amount of time the men must spend at sea. For example, last year the men of a carrier he named (Saratoga?) spent only twenty nights ashore.

The President asked for an expression of opinion regarding the actions that had been taken because of the gold outflow. He noted that this matter is under intensive review. All of the Chiefs said that this has had a very serious impact, extending all the way back into the rate of applications for entrance to the Academies. This has been very rough treatment for personnel, and has created a terrible problem.

The President asked whether the Deputy Director of CIA must be a military man. General Lemnitzer said he thought this was not required but was permissive. General Lemnitzer went on to mention a recent intelligence management study, out of which may soon develop a proposal for a Deputy Director of CIA, making it possible to separate the Director of Central Intelligence from the operating functions.

The President asked as to the status of the Coast Guard, and Admiral Burke told him that it is under the Treasury in peacetime.

The President said he wants to stay very close to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said the American people are very bellicose in their attitudes and objectives with respect to Russia and Cuba, but at the same time, they very strongly do not want to go to war. He said he doubts that they can have this both ways. However, he is sure that, when we are spending $82 billion on our budget, we should be certain we have everything we really need in the military sphere.

As the President concluded the meeting, General Lemnitzer said the Chiefs would welcome very much the chance to continue to meet with the President, and would be very happy if he should visit them in the Pentagon. The President said he would hope to see them frequently, in addition to his meetings with General Lemnitzer. He concluded by saying he had been extremely well impressed with the appearance of the officers in the Inauguration parade. Now he thought it is important to get the non-commissioned officers to feeling that it is highly creditable to be in the service of their country.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

On January 26, 1961, members of the team that had prepared WSEG Report No. 50, "Evaluation of Strategic Offensive Weapons Systems," dated December 27, 1960, gave Secretary McNamara a briefing on the Report. WSEG-50 concluded that intercontinental ballistic missiles would be the most effective strategic weapons by the mid-1960s, that "counterforce alone [did] not appear to be a high confidence measure for preventing unacceptable levels of damage to the U.S. in the event of war," even if the United States struck first, and that the United States "should be able to maintain a strong retaliatory posture even in the face of threats larger by far than any indicated by intelligence estimates." Therefore "both the U.S. and the Soviet Union should be able to maintain a retaliatory force capable of inflicting great damage, which cannot be neutralized by the other side without a major technological breakthrough."

In the face of this "nuclear stalemate," the United States should "develop and maintain a retaliatory force that clearly can do high levels of damage" regardless of how a war started, and should also reduce "the threat of use of strategic forces to issues that can be resolved in no other way." To this end, the United States with its allies should "develop and deploy forces to meet local aggression locally, and in such a manner as to minimize the expansion of the limited war into general war." The summary portion of WSEG-50 is attached to a March 3 covering note from Colonel Benjamin C. Chapla, of the Joint Staff, to McGeorge Bundy in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Bromley Smith Series. For a description of McNamara's briefing based on interview materials, see Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pages 258-262.

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, NSC Organization and Administration 1/26/61-1/29/61. No classification marking. A January 27 covering note from Bromley Smith to Bundy is not printed.

/2/On January 1 President-elect Kennedy appointed McGeorge Bundy to be his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, stating that he intended to consolidate under his direction the NSC Secretariat, the OCB, and a "number of special projects staffs within the White House." Kennedy continued: "I have asked Mr. Bundy to review with care existing staff organization and arrangements, and to simplify them wherever possible toward the end that we may have a single, small, but strongly organized staff unit to assist me in obtaining advice from, and coordinating operations of the government agencies concerned with national security affairs." For full text of Kennedy's statement, see Henry M. Jackson, ed., The National Security Council: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy-Making at the Presidential Level (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 302-303.

It is assumed that the President will make use of the statutory Council on an ad referendum basis and will endeavor to keep it clear of routine review of policies that can be adequately performed at lower levels in the government by planning and operating officials who are aware of and responsive to the over-all policy directions of the Administration. The intent, therefore, of the steps outlined below is to free up the time and attention of the President and his immediate advisors by relieving them of the burden of immediate supervision of the machinery for continuous policy review and adjustment and for insuring the coordinated implementation of such policies while, at the same time, preserving sufficient structure of an institutional character that will insure disciplined orderly performance of these functions with a minimum of personal administration. In addition, the objective is sought of promoting a maximum of lateral coordination among opposite numbers in the operating departments to provide a "nervous system" through which the impact of the President's personality and influence can be registered at the operating level in the various agencies, as well as to provide an alternative route on occasion for operating views to be flushed up to the attention of the top people in the Administration.

The following specific actions are suggested for consideration as a means of moving from the present situation to meet the express wishes of the new Administration with respect to simplifying the process of policy planning and operational coordination in the national security field:

/3/Transition adviser Richard E. Neustadt made a recommendation to abolish the OCB in a December 9, 1960, memorandum to Senator Kennedy. (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Neustadt, Richard E., 1960) On February 18 President Kennedy issued Executive Order No. 10920 abolishing the OCB (26 Federal Register 1463), and on February 19, he issued a statement regarding performance of tasks formerly assigned to the OCB. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 104-105)

/4/It is assumed that the staff and funds provided for the National Security Council will be made available to Mr. Bundy. [Footnote in the source text.]

3. Set up a weekly informal luncheon meeting at the Under Secretary level with the same officials as have been attending the OCB luncheon meeting (Consideration might be given to adding the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors and the Special Assistant to the President (Science and Technology). In addition, Mr. Salinger might be given a standing invitation to attend when he wishes. Consideration might also be given to having both Under Secretaries in the Department of State attend this meeting.).

4. Set up a regular formal weekly meeting of Departmental Representatives (Assistant Secretaries or comparable officers) which would be attended by representatives of the same agencies as are now represented on the Planning Board and the OCB under the chairmanship of a staff assistant to the Special Assistant to the President, who would be charged with the formal aspects of policy review and operational coordination. This weekly meeting would be the device by which the Special Assistant to the President would secure the concurrence of the appropriate agencies in steps to be taken to implement Presidential policy as set forth in formal Operations Plans or more informal interagency memoranda or "treaties." It also would be the body that would secure departmental views as to the need for policy changes and recommendations for inclusion in revised policy statements. The Special Assistant to the President would have the responsibility of determining whether such recommendations need referral to the President or can be put into effect by the concurrence of the principal departments involved. The Special Assistant to the President would also refer policies to this group for recommendation or request them to initiate new statements in response to need.

5. Affirm the present working group setup pending review of the policies for which they have the present responsibility of evaluation in terms of operational requirements and for preparing drafts of Operations Plans. These working groups need re-invigoration. In this connection certain steps need to be taken as soon as the major adjustments described above have taken place. The more important of these steps are: (a) improved backstopping of the working group representation in the departments and agencies participating in the group; (b) improved representation on the working group; and (c) a clear expression of support for this process by the White House and by the heads of the agencies involved. The working groups would normally be chaired by the agency having the principal responsibility. On all geographic working groups this is the Department of State, which is concrete evidence of the primacy of the State Department's coordinating role in this area, but the working group, on the other hand, is part of a Presidentially-established mechanism responsible to and receiving its instructions from a representative of the President.

6. Review and issue a projected schedule of work for the working groups in order to maintain a balanced workload in the weekly meeting of Departmental Representatives and to maintain the principle that every formal statement of policy must be subject to regular review.

Washington, January 30, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, No. 475. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Policies previously approved in NSC which need review

1. The most urgent need is for a review of basic military policy. What is our view of the kind of strategic force we need, the kinds of limited-war forces, the kind of defense for the continental U.S., and the strategy of NATO? What should be your thinking about the great decisions, at crisis moments, on levels of U.S. military action? The urgency of these matters arises from existing papers which in the view of nearly all your civilian advisers place a debatable emphasis (1) on strategic as against limited-war forces, (2) on "strike-first," or "counter-force" strategic planning, as against a "deterrent" or "second-strike" posture, and (3) on decisions-in-advance, as against decisions in the light of all the circumstances. These three forces in combination have created a situation today in which a subordinate commander faced with a substantial Russian military action could start the thermonuclear holocaust on his own initiative if he could not reach you (by failure of communication at either end of the line). There are good arguments for the decisions which led to this situation, but there are arguments on the other side, and it seems absolutely essential that you satisfy yourself, as President, on these basic matters. Moreover, a review of this sort should include at all stages the relevant political questions, and it should go along the whole spectrum from thermonuclear weapons systems to guerrilla action and political infiltration. Our current troubles in Laos and other places seem to arise at least in part from too narrow and conventional thinking about "military" as opposed to "political" problems.

2. Our first problem is to decide how to get these matters studied out so that you personally can make the necessary decisions in the light of your own assessment of the complex issues involved. In the past these matters have generally been settled in the light of pressure and argument mainly from interested parties--the Air Force especially, but others too. All of us are agreed that a better way must be found.

3. My own preference is for an NSC staff study under your own direction, in steady consultation with Jerry Wiesner, and with selected advisors (Killian, Kissinger, Gavin?) from outside. But I think Bob McNamara wants to do this job in the Defense Department (not in the JCS, but in his own office). There is a good deal to be said, from your standpoint, in having two studies, especially if those in charge of them (Nitze and Bundy?) keep each other in full touch as they go along. The matter is of literally life-and-death importance, and it also has plenty of political dynamite in it, so that the more advice you get, the better off you will be.

4. Whatever method you choose, it will be essential (and new) that your men-in-charge have full and candid information about existing plans and thinking in the armed services, and instruction to this effect could usefully be given by you to McNamara and Lemnitzer at the first NSC. (Both of these, as individuals, are in favor of such communication, as far as I know.) And while in my judgment the initial studies should not be made by JCS, there should be full consultation with the military at all stages and a fully military comment to you before you decide anything.

5. While the largest and hardest questions in this can of worms are judgment questions, with a combined military-political-diplomatic meaning, there are also some technical issues which can be attacked best by Wiesner through special studies by qualified scientific leaders. We believe, for example, that Air Force planning is based on very doubtful technical judgments on the damage that will be done by given weapons exploded on given targets. This can be studied by George Kistiakowsky if you wish, and the result might show that we need much less expensive plans than we now have.

/2/February 1; see Document 8.

/3/Entitled "Covert Operations," dated December 28, 1955. (Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Records)

/4/Also on January 30, Bundy prepared a summary of recommendations on techniques for creating task forces to deal with crises. It is described in Bromley K. Smith, Organizational History of the National Security Council During the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations (n.p.: n.d. [1988]), pp. 10-11.

McG. B.

Washington, February 1, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council. Top Secret. The actions were approved by the President on February 2. The source text has minor revisions as of February 6.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

/2/Edward R. Murrow, Director of the U.S. Information Agency.

/3/Allen W. Dulles.

/5/A typed marginal note indicates an action memorandum based on Action No. 2397-c was sent to the Department of State. This was National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No. 3, February 3. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAMs) Regarding the NSAM series, see Document 9.

d. The Secretary of State outlined a new proposed policy on the Congo which was being submitted to the President today after coordination with the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. The President subsequently reviewed and approved the State Department's proposal.

/6/David E. Bell.

(1) A lack of correspondence between military plans and the military budget which resulted in military plans larger than could be implemented by the budgets.

(2) A lack of common assumptions and doctrines among the three military departments, resulting in differing strategic doctrines and appraisals of the threat, which were not adequately understood or taken into account in the budget process.

(3) Military budgets were organized by departments and by in-puts (such as personnel, procurement, etc.), but not by out-puts (such as strategic deterrence, limited war capabilities, etc.), making if difficult to determine what objectives were being fulfilled.

(4) The perspective of the military budgets have been generally short-range, rather than being decided on the basis of five-year or longer range objectives.

b. The Secretary of Defense reported that, with reference to the FY 1961 and 1962 military budgets, the following actions were being taken:

/7/On January 28, McNamara recommended, and the President approved, this action. Financing was effected by earlier allocation of previously appropriated funds. (Memorandum from McNamara to Kennedy, January 28, and memorandum from McNamara to Secretary of the Navy John Connally, also January 28; both attached to JCS 1620/334 from the Joint Secretariat to the JCS, February 8; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 9050/4720 (28 Jan 61))

(2) An increase in the airlift capacity of 50 transport aircraft, including 30 jets.

(3) A complete re-appraisal of the FY 1962 military budget, to be completed about March 1, 1961, based on studies by four groups, each headed by a senior official of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, on strategic weapons, requirements for limited war, selected weapons research and development programs, and base and installation requirements.

c. The Secretary of Defense reported further that, in collaboration with the Director, Bureau of the Budget, he would develop, between March 1 and July 1, 1961, guidelines for the President's consideration as to the FY 1963 military budget.

/8/See footnote 3, Document 10.

e. The President requested that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with other interested agencies, should examine means for placing more emphasis on the development of counter-guerrilla forces.

/9/A typed marginal note indicates an action memorandum based on Action No. 2398-f was sent to the Bureau of the Budget. This was NSAM No. 1, February 3. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAMs)

/10/Typed marginal notes indicate action memoranda based on Actions No. 2398-e and-g were sent to the Department of Defense. These were NSAM Nos. 2, February 3, and 4, February 4. (Ibid.)

/11/A typed marginal note indicates an action memorandum based on Action No. 2399-a was sent to the Bureau of the Budget. This was NSAM No. 5, February 3. (Ibid.)

b. Noted, in answer to the President's request, that the Secretary of State was submitting certain recommendations clarifying the relation between the educational exchange program and the foreign information program; and that the Director, U.S. Information Agency, would be submitting recommendations regarding that agency's program.

/12/A typed marginal note indicates an action memorandum based on Action No. 2399-c was sent to the Bureau of the Budget. This was NSAM No. 6, February 3. (Ibid.)

Deferred discussion of this subject, with the understanding that the Secretary of State would, after appropriate consultation, recommend to the President certain immediate changes in current U.S. policy on Africa, to permit more flexible action in economic support of certain new governments.

The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs reported that in response to the President's desires a different organization and procedures would henceforth be used in the work of the National Security Council, involving fewer and smaller staff groups composed of more senior personnel. Policy recommendations would be brought to the NSC without being obscured by inter-agency processing but with adequate previous consultation and the presentation of counter-proposals. The preparation of such recommendations would require the full cooperation of all agencies in providing access to essential information.

Washington, February 3, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, NSAMs. Top Secret Attachment.

Dear Dean:

The President has asked me to start to keep track of directives and requests which he makes in the area of national security affairs. Such requests and actions may come from memoranda of his, from phone calls which he makes or asks one of his assistants to make, or they may come from discussions which he has directly with members of the Administration in private meetings, or they may come out of the discussions of the National Security Council. Wherever they come from, he is eager to keep track of the things which he personally initiates.

/2/Enclosed is NSAM No. 3; see footnote 5, Document 8.

It is not our intention to pester the departments and agencies with untimely follow-up messages on these action memoranda, and I have the strong impression, from my brief experience, that departments and agencies will always be acting just as fast as they can to respond to the President's directives. At the same time, it is obviously important to him to have some orderly procedure for follow-up. So we will try to keep track over here as each problem is acted on, and will bother you only if in the normally brisk dispatch of business we are not in the position to tell the President what is happening.

I hope that this method of action may seem sensible to you, and if you have any questions I hope you will let me know.

Sincerely,

Mac

Washington, February 4, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/2-461. Secret. Drafted by Henry Owen of the Policy Planning Council and cleared in EUR and FE. Another copy is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, State 2/2/61-2/16/61.

Dear Bob:

/2/See Document 8.

/3/This memorandum, dated June 30, 1960, emphasized increasing U.S. capability for operations short of general war and for counter-guerrilla activities. (Enclosure to memorandum from McGhee to Rusk, January 27, 1961; Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, BNSP 1961-1962) The memorandum printed below closely follows the format and much of the substance of the June 30 memorandum, but with even greater emphasis on non-nuclear options in Europe and on counter-guerrilla capabilities elsewhere.

We will give this matter continuing study and will advise you of any further thoughts we may have.

I would be glad to discuss these considerations with you, or to have them discussed by our staffs, if you believe that this would be helpful.

I am sending a copy of this paper to Dave Bell.

Sincerely,

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.

/5/Secret.

SUBJECT
Foreign Policy Considerations Bearing on the US Defense Posture

1. General War Deterrent. An effective, invulnerable, and reliable US nuclear retaliatory force is required both to deter general war and to frustrate nuclear blackmail.

(a) Its effectiveness must be evident so that both the USSR and our allies will feel no uncertainty on this point.

(b) Its invulnerability must be such that (i) the Communists and our allies will realize that it could not be destroyed; (ii) we will not need to use it hastily or preemptively in a grave crisis, in order to prevent its being crippled by a possible Soviet attack; (iii) we will not, in the event of such a crisis, have to take such "crash" measures to enhance its invulnerability as the Soviets would be likely to consider evidence of impending attack.

(c) Its reliability must (i) be such as to minimize the risk of accidental war; (ii) not be so dependent on bases and forces on foreign territory as to cause the Soviets to believe that they could blunt its effectiveness by pressing our allies to limit the use of their territory or forces for this purpose.

Effective civil defense measures will also be required to make credible our deterrent to general war.

2. Limited Operations. A mobile, substantial, and flexible US capability for operations short of general war is essential to meet the threat of limited aggression, which is likely to assume increasing importance in the years ahead.

(a) Its mobility must be such that our allies and the Communists will realize that it can respond promptly to threats in any part of the world.

(b) Its size must be sufficiently substantial so that the US will be able to respond effectively to limited aggressions involving sizeable Communist forces, without requiring the redeployment of our force contributions to NATO and without crippling the base for partial or complete mobilization in the US.

(c) Its flexibility must be such as to enable the US (i) to respond in each case with a use of force appropriate to the threat, and (ii) to achieve its military objective in case of non-nuclear attack without use of nuclear weapons, if the President so decides at the time, in the light of relevant considerations--including likely Communist and free world reactions. We attach the greatest importance to "raising the threshold" beyond which the President might have to decide to initiate the use of nuclear weapons.

3. Counter-Guerrilla Capabilities. An improved capability to deal with threats to the internal security of free-world states, such as the threat of guerrilla insurgency, is urgently needed. These threats have recently been stepped up by the Communists and their allies, and it is likely they will be further expanded and extended. Free world capabilities to meet these threats must include US ability to give to the indigenous elements charged with maintaining internal security in individual countries advice, training and assistance which is tailored to the tasks they face.

4. Guerrilla Capabilities. Increased and improved guerrilla capabilities could also make a substantial contribution to defense of the free world. This will require that the US and other selected free world countries maintain special forces, which are trained and equipped for guerrilla tasks.

In addition to these basic considerations, two regional requirements are sufficiently important to merit special notice.

5. NATO. A cohesive NATO alliance, based on a convincing US commitment and a strategy in which our allies continue to have confidence, is essential.

(a) A convincing US commitment involves a continuing US willingness to station substantial US military forces in Europe and to commit US-manned MRBM's in Europe or in European waters to NATO during the next few years. Our allies view the presence and commitment of US forces as an essential element of the assurance that we will respond, despite growing Soviet nuclear capabilities, to future threats against the Treaty area in Europe. In the absence of a reduction in the Soviet threat, any reduction in the over-all combat effectiveness of US NATO-committed forces in Europe would seriously damage allied cohesion, as well as weaken our negotiating position vis-?-vis the USSR.

(b) A strategy in which our allies have confidence will be one that gives NATO the option of responding without nuclear weapons to substantial attack on NATO Europe by Soviet ready non-nuclear forces, for a long enough period to enforce a pause which would give the Soviets time to appreciate the wider risks of the course on which they are embarked and provide an opportunity for negotiations. This will require (i) Shield non-nuclear forces adequate to discharge this mission, which means not only pressing European countries to build up and modernize Shield forces but also ensuring that US forces in the Shield have fully modern weapons; (ii) arrangements to ensure that such Shield nuclear capabilities as may be required to deter more massive Soviet aggression will not be automatically used in the event Shield forces become engaged against forces not themselves using nuclear weapons.

6. Asian Periphery of the Bloc. The free world's military posture along the Asian rim of the Bloc should be capable of rapid response to a wide spectrum of threats. Chinese Communist policy is likely to pose such threats, with emphasis on infiltration and guerrilla warfare, with greater urgency in the years ahead.

Threatened free world states in the area will be best able to concentrate on the tasks of maintaining internal security and eliminating guerrilla insurgency, where it is present, if they do not have to keep an undue proportion of their forces inactive to guard against overt invasion.

It is, therefore, important not only to have mobile, flexible and substantial US forces (para. 2) but also to have them deployed in forward areas of the western Pacific, in order to present our allies and the Communists with tangible evidence of our capacity to respond to aggression. As a related task, the State and Defense Departments and CIA should give urgent attention to improving the morale and fighting effectiveness of non-Western forces with whom we are allied or closely associated.

Washington, February 6, 1961, 11:05 a.m.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Chester V. Clifton Series, Conferences with the President, Volume I. Top Secret. Drafted by Clifton.

OTHERS PRESENT
General Lemnitzer
General Decker
Admiral Burke
General White
General Shoup
General Clifton

The President asked General Decker if the magazine which prepared the extensive "sell" on the Nike/Zeus was his magazine. There was some confusion because both Missiles and Rockets and Army Magazine had come out within the last week.

General Decker explained to the President Army Magazine and its relation to the Association of the U.S. Army. Then the Chiefs told about the various associations, including the Navy League and the Air Force Association, and the magazines published, both officially and unofficially.

/2/By President Eisenhower.

The President asked if there were any limitations on the U.S. operating from Japanese bases against the Soviet Union with atomic weapons. The Joint Chiefs answered those questions. The President asked, if we decided to make the first strike, could we eliminate the Soviet strikeback? The Joint Chiefs answered no, the USSR could strike back and especially in the missile age it is becoming more and more difficult to actually know where the targets are--that is, the Soviet Union capabilities--and we couldn't possibly get them all. Their estimate was that under any circumstances the Soviet Union could strike back hard.

/3/Not further identified.

The President mentioned guerrilla activities in Laos, the Congo and Viet-Nam and asked what we are doing in each of the Services on this type of training. He asked especially if the guerrilla activity which we are going to face in the future on an intensified basis by the enemy couldn't have some effect on our MAAG training efforts. There was a long discussion on this point and the President said, "Maybe you would like to give me a short memorandum on Viet-Nam, especially as far as our guerrilla efforts in that area are concerned."

/4/This request eventuated in an undated memorandum from Decker to the President, attached to a note from Lemnitzer to Clifton, February 16. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense, Special Warfare Volume I) In a February 18 memorandum to Lemnitzer, Clifton listed the detailed questions on guerrilla training posed by the President after his reading of Decker's memorandum. (Ibid.)

The President also asked if we should do more about bringing more Laotians out of Laos, training them and sending them back in. Are we doing enough in this field?

The President said there is obviously going to be more guerrilla and counter-guerrilla activity in Africa and Asia in the near future. He then asked what plans they had to step up our own training and plans in those two spheres, and asked if they had learned anything from the other nations on this matter. General Lemnitzer responded that we have studied the British experience in Malaya and the French experience in Southeast Asia, and we have been training some CIA people, but, obviously, we are not doing enough.

General Lemnitzer then mentioned the memorandum here on the airlift and sealift readiness posture of Laos and how detailed it is. He said that he would turn it over to me for briefing. The President indicated he wanted to be briefed on this subject and he asked them if the memorandum gave him any information on the relative buildup from North Viet-Nam over the roads that could be accomplished in the same thirty days which he had asked for before. The Chiefs responded that there was nothing like that in this report, and they thought it might not be meaningful because, obviously, they could put a lot more Communists in there than we could get ourselves if they so decided. The President emphasized again that he wanted their best opinion on what the Viet-Namese could do in the same thirty days, and they promised him a reply.

/5/Not found attached; see Document 12.

The President asked the Chiefs about the reenlistment rate, especially in SAC. All three Chiefs gave the President a rundown on the reenlistment rate and emphasized that his "gold widow" decision was going to be a help.

There then ensued a discussion of the efforts in the Services to hold down the spending of American dollars by the Service people in lieu of having the dependents refused the opportunity to go overseas. The President directed that the Services take every measure possible to indoctrinate our people on the importance of this matter, even though there was no good way of measuring whether the men and their families were saving money or not. General Decker mentioned the U.S. Savings Bond program and the Soldiers Deposits program as good steps to cut down the amount of money. None of the Chiefs had any idea of restricting the amount of funds that a man was paid in American currency. The President reiterated that he hoped that they would take open and strong measures to win the voluntary compliance with the spirit of this order so that he would never again have to consider taking the dependents away from them.

The President asked Admiral Burke about the water supply in Guantanamo. Admiral Burke told him that we had a three-week water supply available by shipping and that we could keep this up with some strain on the logistics supply line.

In conclusion, the President directed that they give some attention to guerrilla activities in relation to their future position in the Congo, especially concerning training of intelligence teams and our advisory groups, if and when they were to go in there.

After the meeting, General Lemnitzer expressed his concern with our having all these papers and the backup material in considerable detail. I assured General Lemnitzer that after I had briefed the President, I would keep the papers around for two weeks and return them to him, and I would not give them wide distribution around the staff because they held so much rather planning type information.

CVC
Brig. Gen., U.S. Army
Military Aide to the President

Washington, February 6, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, JCS General 1961. Top Secret. Drafted by Clifton.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their meeting with the President today, told him that the B-52G is being tested, but that they, on February 4th, resumed the 12 sorties a day level of airborne alert.

They also told the President that the Defense Department goal is 1/8 of the B-52 forces on continuous alert--that is the goal for this year.

General Lemnitzer said that Secretary McNamara, after his visit to Omaha and SAC this week end, is asking whether or not they can go to 1/4 on continuous alert and he has asked for the estimate of additional costs in men and money.

CVC
Brig. Gen., U.S. Army
Military Aide to the President

/2/In an August 8 memorandum to McNamara, Lemnitzer stated that SAC had put 50 percent of its forces on ground alert as of July 15. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, 1961 General, 381 8 Aug 61)

Washington, February 6, 1961, 9:15 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 147, Secretary's Staff Meetings. Secret. Drafted by Stoessel.

The Secretary welcomed the President to the staff meeting and invited him to comment. The President expressed his appreciation to the Secretary and the Under Secretaries for the work they were doing. He said that the positions of the Assistant Secretaries, as well as those of Mr. Murrow, Mr. Berle and Mr. McCloy are extremely responsible and carry as much importance as those of Cabinet officers. The decisions they make affect all areas of the world. The President desires a close relationship with the Assistant Secretaries and he hoped that this was the first of many meetings with them.

The Secretary noted that the confidence of the President in the State Department places even more responsibility on the officers of the Department in the discharge of their functions.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

/2/Reference is to Organizing for National Security: Inquiry of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Vol. 1, Hearings, Vol. 2, Studies and Background Material, and Vol. 3, Staff Reports and Recommendations (Washington, 1961). This report of a subcommittee, which was established in July 1959 with Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington as its Chairman, includes hearings held and reports prepared during the Second Session of the Eighty-Sixth Congress and the First Session of the Eighty-Seventh. This reference is apparently to the section in vol. 3 entitled "The Secretary of State and the National Security Process" (pp. 41-56), which had been released on January 28.

On February 7, 1961, The New York Times carried a story that asserted that studies made by the Kennedy administration since inauguration day showed tentatively that no "missile gap" existed in favor of the Soviet Union. On that day, the administration termed this report inaccurate but would not comment on assertions that the Times article and other similar accounts were based on a background briefing by Secretary of Defense McNamara. In a February 16 letter to Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois, Senate Minority Leader, McNamara denied that he had told newsmen that the United States was "neither in a superior or an inferior position vis-?-vis the Soviet Union." He stated also: "I have emphasized that acting on the President's instructions, we have already begun to move so that there will be no such gap in the months ahead." (The New York Times, February 7, 1961) For additional information, see Document 129.

Washington, February 9, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council. Top Secret. The actions were approved by the President on February 11.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and the record of Actions No. 2402 on significant world developments affecting U.S. security and 2403 on crises in Laos, the Congo, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic.]

/2/See Document 8.

/3/"Basic National Security Policy," dated August 5, 1959. (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5906 Series) For text, see Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. III, Document 70.

/4/These subparagraphs concerned U.S. policy on the sharing of nuclear weapons with individual allies and with NATO. A typed marginal note indicates action on Action No. 2404-a would be initiated by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

/5/Paragraph 38 enunciated the U.S. policy of relying on former colonial powers to influence and support their former dependencies.

/6/A typed marginal note indicates an action memorandum based on Action No. 2404-b was sent to the Department of State.

Washington, February 14, 1961, 9:15 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 147, Secretary's Staff Meetings. Secret. Drafted by Stoessel.

[Here follows discussion of intelligence matters and an exhibit in Moscow.]

Mr. McGhee said that the OCB was to be abolished and that certain of the functions of the OCB, such as interdepartmental clearances and the implementation of decisions, would in the future be supervised on a regional basis by the geographic bureaus. Mr. McGhee thought each bureau should have a planning advisor. Also, an effort will be made to draw the missions abroad more closely into the planning operation.

The Secretary came in at this point.

/2/In a February 13 memorandum to Bowles, McGhee stated that the NSC had "decided regional and country policies formerly prepared by the Planning Board will, in the future, be the responsibility of the Department, except in cases where critical security considerations prevail. In addition, the OCB is to be abolished and the Department is in the future expected to assume responsibility for coordination and carrying out of programs and plans based on these policies." McGhee expected that the geographical bureaus would exercise, through their planning advisers, most of the old Planning Board functions and some of the responsibility for policy implementation inherited from the OCB, but that an official at the Deputy Under Secretary level would be needed to bring about interagency coordination of policy implementation. (Ibid., S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Admin 1961)

[Here follows discussion of the economy.]

WJS

17. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, February 20, 1961

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Defense Volume I, Review FY 1961 & 1962 Mil Prog and Budgets, 2/21/61. Top Secret.

Dear Mr. President:

I have now completed my initial review of the Eisenhower Administration FY 1961 and FY 1962 budgets for the Department of Defense. The attached memorandum explains the basis on which the review has been made and summarizes the changes I am recommending for your consideration. In reaching these recommendations, I have been aided in the definition of national security objectives by the advice of Secretary Rusk and members of your staff. The proposed budget changes have been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose individual opinions on specific recommendations are recorded in Annex C./2/

/2/Not printed.

The task of thinking through the implications of national security objectives for military force structure is a tremendously complex and necessarily a continuing one. This review of the current budget has been able to deal with only the most urgent and obvious problems. Existing analyses on some of the central issues of general nuclear war made it possible to penetrate most deeply into this area. However, here, as with limited war, much more study is required, and will be undertaken as a matter of urgency before the FY 1963 budget is presented.

My recommendations relating to the expansion or contraction of our domestic and foreign bases and installations are not included in this paper. A separate report on this subject will be submitted approximately March 1./3/ I believe the report will indicate that such action as might be taken in FY 1962 to terminate operations at unneeded facilities will have little effect on FY 1962 expenditures, although the savings which would result in future years may be substantial.

/3/Not further identified.

Sincerely,

Robert S. McNamara/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Attachment/5/

/5/Top Secret. Attachments entitled "Strategic and Continental Air Defense Proposals" (24 pages), "Limited War Proposals" (9 pages), and "Research and Development Proposals" (18 pages) are not printed. No later version of this memorandum, which is marked "Draft," has been found. It was Secretary McNamara's practice to label many memoranda to the President on budgetary proposals as "drafts." Regarding draft Presidential memoranda, or "DPMs," see footnote 2, Document 50.

MEMORANDUM ON REVIEW OF FY 1961 AND FY 1962 MILITARY PROGRAMS AND BUDGETS

Summary of Proposed Changes

The proposed changes in the FY 1961 and FY 1962 military budgets are summarized below in the conventional budget categories.

The Eisenhower FY 1961 and FY 1962 Budgets and the Proposed Changes (New Obligational Authority in Millions of Dollars)

We estimate that these changes alone, without taking into account action already taken to accelerate expenditures within the limits of existing obligational authority, would increase defense expenditures during FY 1961 by $60 million and during FY 1962 by $740 million.

The proposed net additions to the budgets can be restated in the three major categories reflecting the task force studies:

(1) Resources going into forces whose mission is primarily associated with general nuclear war;

(2) Resources going into forces whose mission would primarily be limited war; and,

(3) Resources going to research and development not included in (1) and (2) above.

Proposed Net Changes

Detailed proposals are explained in the attachments under these three headings.

National Security Objectives

Our review of the defense budget has focused on the adequacy of our present and planned military forces to accomplish major national security objectives. Task Forces were appointed in the areas of Strategic and Continental Air Defense, Limited War, and Research and Development to carry out this review and to examine the need for additional forces in each of these areas.

The following are the national security objectives in terms of which we believe the adequacy of our defenses should be examined:

Deter Deliberate Attack

We must deter deliberate nuclear attack on the United States and our major allies by making it clear to potential enemies that, in all circumstances, such an attack would result in unacceptable losses to the attacker. This deterrence depends critically upon our ability to strike back after a direct Soviet attack designed to destroy our retaliatory forces. It does not depend upon a pre-attack comparison of numbers of missiles, or of forces in general, except in a most indirect way. We must have survivable retaliatory power.

The reality of our power to strike back must be clear to the Communists, to our allies, and to ourselves. The success of our deterrent should not depend merely upon enemy caution in the face of uncertainties about our retaliatory power. Such a dependence upon uncertainties could undermine our resolve in time of crisis, and is dangerous because enemy leaders may not be cautious.

Stability and Safety

Also of great concern, and perhaps more likely, is the chance that war could come in an irrational or unpremeditated fashion--possibly by the mistaken triggering of alert forces, by miscalculation by one side of the opponent's intentions, by irrational or pathological actions by individuals, by spread and escalation of local wars, or by nuclear attack by a minor power.

Our posture should be designed to avoid these dangers. This can be done (1) by reducing the probability that individual triggering incidents can occur, and (2) even more important, by reducing the probability that such incidents would lead to war. Decisions, not incidents, cause war. For this reason also we must avoid exposed strategic systems that depend for their survival on quick decisions that might have to be made in ambiguous circumstances.

We are therefore taking steps to reduce the dependence of our retaliatory power on quick decisions. We want to reassure our allies and our enemies that we do not need to act hastily or preemptively in order to be able to retaliate. We must not be forced in a crisis to take "crash" actions for the protection of our forces that might be interpreted as evidence of impending attack.

Improved War Outcome

The conduct and outcome of a big nuclear war is worth caring about, more than any war in history. The success of deterrence cannot be guaranteed. If nuclear war comes and is unlimited and uncontrolled, it would be suicidal. We must do what we can to prevent this disaster, to improve the war's outcome, to terminate it under favorable military conditions, and to limit damage to our allies and ourselves.

One of the most effective ways of limiting damage to this country if nuclear war comes, although admittedly we cannot place great confidence in it, is for us to use our nuclear force in a careful and discriminating way. This may be a necessary condition for inducing the enemy not to attack our civil society in wholesale fashion.

But for this strategy to be feasible, our forces must be well protected not only against a sudden attack, but also against re-attack. A long wartime endurance capability is necessary if we are to use our forces with deliberation and discrimination. In short, our nuclear forces must be controllable not only in peacetime, but in war. This means making the command and control of our forces so well protected that we can maintain responsiveness to Presidential authority.

Beyond this, we require a combination of active air defense, civil defense, and the ability to attack vulnerable parts of the enemy's military forces. The best balance among these at any particular time will of course depend on the costs and effectiveness of each in the light of choices made by the Sino-Soviet Bloc. We should maintain broad flexibility to shift the emphasis of our strategy as conditions change.

Reassure and Protect Major Allies

If we provide strategic capabilities that meet all the above objectives, we shall satisfy an essential prerequisite for successful local defense and diplomacy elsewhere in the world. In the case of our NATO allies, we must have a strategy for their protection in which they can have confidence. Our common strategy must be one which is clearly in their interest as well as ours. The U.S. must maintain substantial forces in Europe; we must also persuade our allies of their responsibility to increase their own forces. Moreover, an increased emphasis should be placed on non-nuclear capabilities.

Reassure and Protect the Rest of the Free World

In most other areas of the world, the main burden of local defense against overt attack must be borne by indigenous forces, reinforced by strong highly mobile U.S. forces, some of which must be deployed in forward areas. This means having a substantial airlift and sealift capacity and prestocked overseas bases. The main responsibility against subversion and guerrilla warfare must rest on indigenous populations and forces, but given the great likelihood and seriousness of this threat, we must be prepared to make a substantial contribution in the form of forces trained in this type of warfare.

A Broadly Flexible Posture

While it is implicit in the above objectives, a broadly flexible posture that can serve us well in a wide range of contingencies deserves so much emphasis as to be listed as a separate objective. We are not required to make many decisions in the face of major uncertainties about future enemy objectives and capabilities and about our own. These factors interact to compound the uncertainty. In these circumstances, it is essential that we adopt an insurance philosophy and hedge against uncertainty by buying alternative future options for our military capabilities. We must procure "lead time" reduction, making decisions now to buy particular kinds of productive capability that we may never use. We must start development programs in the full realization that, because of changed and unforeseen circumstances, some may not be needed by the time they are completed. We must try to design our posture so that its effectiveness will not be seriously degraded by changes in objectives or circumstances. Our recommended changes in the budget reflect this philosophy.

Major Weaknesses in Existing Posture

(1) Strategic and Continental Air Defense

In our review of the currently planned posture for general war, we have found major vulnerabilities or deficiencies in the following areas:

Command and Control of Forces

The chain of command from the President down to our strategic offensive and defensive weapon systems is highly vulnerable in almost every link. The destruction of about a dozen sites, most of which are soft, none of which is adequately hardened, would deprive U.S. forces of all high-level command and control. Moreover, the communications connecting the various headquarters with each other and with the forces are soft, concentrated, and highly vulnerable to missile attack.

Without the survival of at least some of these sites (including the one containing the President, his successor, or designated replacement) with their communications, there can be no authorized response in the event of a nuclear attack on the U.S. Moreover, destruction of these sites would deprive our forces of essential orders for self-protection and for subsequent conduct of the war, as well as the order to execute retaliatory action. We should not count on the enemy being deterred by the belief that some of our forces may attack without authorization in the event our control is knocked out. Moreover, the vulnerability of the U.S. high-level command undermines the positive control system, making our forces both more accident prone and less likely to respond when they should.

The programs we propose now are intended to provide simultaneously for engineering development and an interim capability for survivable command and control of forces. We intend in the future to emphasize the development of command and control systems with greater endurance and flexibility under conditions of thermonuclear attack.

However, these programs do not provide a high-confidence solution to the problem of the survival of the President (or his successor or designated replacement) in the face of a surprise missile attack. This problem requires the urgent attention of the President and the National Security Council.

The Bomber Force

Today our strategic deterrence is almost totally dependent on our bomber force. This force is soft and concentrated on about 60 bases. Its current mode of protection is warning and alert response. About one-third of the bomber force is kept on a 15-minute ground alert. The two-thirds of the bombers which are not on alert are completely unprotected, except in periods of tension, or after strategic warning has been received. However, both the programmed warning systems and the decision-making part of the alert response are unreliable. Moreover, this posture contributes to the kind of instability which it is one of our objectives to avoid.

Active Bomber and Missile Defenses

The U.S. anti-bomber defense system is highly vulnerable to ballistic missile attack. Its control is centralized in a few soft vulnerable SAGE centers, without which the operation of the system would be seriously degraded. The BOMARC missile is completely, and the interceptors are almost completely, dependent on SAGE. The destruction of the SAGE centers would give enemy bombers essentially a free ride over the U.S. to the hardened ICBM sites. This would make it possible for the enemy to destroy U.S. hardened ICBM's with bombers when it cannot do so with missiles (if the bombers arrive prior to the launching of the U.S. missiles).

Over the next few years we intend to reorient the anti-bomber component of the air defense system. Changing circumstances will make the massive bomber attack a less likely and less important threat than before. Nevertheless, we do believe that we must continue to possess a defense against attack by small numbers of bombers.

We do not now have, nor can we have until the late 1960's, if then, an effective active defense against ballistic missiles. This is a serious and undesirable deficiency. Moreover, the cost of the Nike-Zeus system, the only system we can now expect to be able to deploy before 1970, appears to be very high. A 70 battery program, which would protect about 40% of our population, would cost, all told, about $14 billion, possibly more. Further, it is far from clear that the system would be effective during the period when it could be operational, the late 1960's. Therefore, we are recommending only a small expenditure on long lead time production items in order to buy about a year during which to reconsider this difficult problem.

However, our civil society does not need to be completely defenseless against missile attack. In some circumstances we could drastically reduce the casualties we would suffer in a thermonuclear war by a civil defense program. Although protecting people in cities from the direct blast, thermal and radiation effects would be extremely expensive and uncertain in outcome, it may be neither in our interest nor the enemy's to engage in wholesale city attack. And protection against fallout, which could cause most of the casualties, does appear feasible. While civil defense is not a Defense Department responsibility, the success of many of our programs depends on some expansion in civil defense.

Missile Reliability

The reliability of the U.S. strategic missile systems under operational conditions is uncertain and may be less than anticipated. There has been no systematic approach to a determination of missile reliability. Additional test firings are required for both the determination and improvement of missile system operational reliability.

Protected Missiles

The retaliatory power of the United States is now very dependent on soft or poorly protected bombers and missiles and will remain so for the next year or two. It is very important that we bring this period to an end as soon as possible. Therefore, we are recommending acceleration of the Polaris program and authorization of construction of the industrial base required to double Minuteman production should this later appear necessary.

Inflexibility

Perhaps our most fundamental weakness in the strategic area is the lack of flexibility in our ability to respond. With a vulnerable strategic force, with the expectation that the tempo of actions in nuclear war would be incredibly fast, we have been forced into a single strategy for retaliation. At the present time we have little ability to make decisions in the event of an attack. Our forces might have to be committed at a point when little is known of the extent of damage to our military forces or civil society or the size of force the enemy has left. The possibilities of a catastrophic mistake loom large. Our response would be a reflex action varying in scale only as determined by the size of our surviving force. We must move as rapidly as possible not only to create the survivable forces and control systems necessary to give us a range of choice, but also to develop strategies at the highest level for a wide range of general war contingencies.

(2) Forces for Limited War

The analysis of our capabilities for limited war reveals weaknesses in the following areas:

Over-emphasis on General War in Tactical Forces

Our forces designed to fight overseas, those we would call on to fight in limited conflict, are, in fact, strongly oriented in their war plans, current capabilities, materiel procurement, and research and development, towards general nuclear war. This is at the expense of their ability to wage limited and especially non-nuclear war. Yet because of their vulnerability these forces make only a modest contribution to the deterrence of general nuclear war. And survival abroad depends even more on fast and therefore risky decisions than survival of forces in the U.S. The problems of stability with our strategic forces discussed above are even more acute with nuclear forces overseas. This is not to say that these forces have no contribution to make to a big nuclear war. They can help. And because some ability to deliver nuclear weapons from within a local theater could have important tactical advantages (e.g., timeliness of delivery, choice of targets, warhead yield) the ability to deliver nuclear weapons with limited war forces should be retained. However, their major job lies elsewhere and we should make sharper division of labor between long-range nuclear and shorter range non-nuclear capabilities.

In concentrating on nuclear war, we have in recent years neglected our ability to wage non-nuclear war and have severely limited our range of policy choices. We cannot hope successfully to meet local Communist aggression at all conceivable points. But we can raise the threshold of our local non-nuclear defense capability, and reduce our dependence on nuclear war, a type of warfare which it will increasingly be in our interest to avoid. In sum, the primary mission of our overseas forces should be made non-nuclear warfare.

Sub-limited War Capabilities

The free world is faced in some parts of the world with a political-military threat that our military forces and those we support are not well designed to combat. We have too little ability to deal with guerrilla forces, insurrections, subversion. Much of our past effort to create guerrilla and anti-guerrilla capabilities, and it is a useful effort, has been aimed at general war. A greater effort in sub-limited war capabilities oriented towards Southeast Asia, the Mid-East, Africa and Latin America is needed.

Research and Development

We are doing too little research and development on non-nuclear weapons. The favored subjects: strategic systems, air defense, space, have received an overwhelming proportion of our research effort. However, technology promises great improvements in non-nuclear armaments as well, and it is important to be in the forefront of these developments. Accordingly, a substantial increase in this kind of research and development is recommended.

Transporting and Supporting Forces Abroad

Our capacity to move forces in sizeable numbers on short notice and to be able to support them is too small. The timely arrival of a modest U.S. and Allied force to crisis areas could avoid the need for a much larger commitment later. More sea and air transport is needed, but transport is not enough. The prestocking of heavy mat?riel and fuel and the availability of bases abroad is equally important and a greater effort is recommended. Although some of the bases used by our strategic force have lost most of their former value for general war, we and our Allies will remain critically dependent on overseas bases for limited war, and in some regions (Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Africa), more may be needed.

Training and Readiness

Many of our limited war forces are inadequately trained for non-nuclear war. We need more large scale deployment exercises for all Services, but especially joint Army-Air Force training in limited war operations.

Mat?riel

Our principal deficiencies in materiel for limited war also stem from focusing on nuclear capabilities. Most of the equipment is nominally designed for dual nuclear and non-nuclear war but in many instances the non-nuclear capabilities are small. This is notably true with our tactical aircraft. In addition, some important new advances in ammunition and bombs need much more vigorous development and procurement. Here we can make a sizeable qualitative jump in our limited war capabilities.

In general our recommendations are directed toward removal of current dangerous inflexibilities and vulnerabilities in our posture. It is imperative that adequate strategic retaliatory power be made secure. Beyond this indispensable requirement, we seek a responsible, controlled power of selective response that can appropriately meet a wide range of possible threats. The recommended improvements will permit us to lessen greatly our dangerous dependence upon blunt and indiscriminate nuclear responses to attacks directed either against the United States or our Allies.

Annex "A"/6/

/6/Top Secret. The Annex is marked "Draft."

U.S. STRATEGIC FORCE STRUCTURE

Changes in Strategic Offensive Force Structure Implied by FY 1961 and FY 1962 Budget Proposals

Table 1

Total U.S. Forces Currently Programmed
(Operational Bombers, Missiles on Launcher, End FY)

Table 2

Total U.S. Forces as Proposed
(Operational Bombers, Missiles on Launcher, End FY)

Moreover, the action proposed to double the Minuteman production capacity and to procure the long-lead items for additional production and deployment gives us the flexibility, should it become desirable to do so, to increase the force deployed by the end of Calendar Year 1964 by about 50%.

Of these forces, the alert bombers, hardened or mobile ICBM's, and Polaris at sea have much greater survival potential in the face of attack than the rest of the force. The comparison in terms of these elements is shown in the two following tables:

Table 3

U.S. Alert Forces Currently Programmed
(Alert Bombers, Hardened or Mobile ICBM's, Polaris on Station, End FY)

*These forces are loaded with nuclear weapons with a total yield of approximately [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Since most of these weapons are in bombers on ground alert, their retaliatory capability is highly vulnerable to missile attack until our warning and control systems are much improved. But if no bombers are destroyed on the ground, weapons with a total yield of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] are expected to reach bomb release line.

Table 4

U.S. Alert Forces as Proposed
(Alert Bombers, Hardened or Mobile ICBM's, Polaris on Station, End FY)

Annex "B"/7/

/7/Top Secret. The Annex is marked "Draft."

U.S. vs. SOVIET MISSILE STRENGTH

/a/U.S. data are before adjustment for changes in the Eisenhower program and are from the following sources (adjusted downward to reflect a realistic level of "Operational ICBM Launchers"):

(1) Air Force Ballistic Missile Program Status Report, 31 Dec 1960.

(2) Appendix E, USAF Program Guidance, June 60.

(3) Appendix E, USAF Program Guidance, December 60.

(4) OP 311 Submarine Section OPNAV.

(5) R&D Missile Section OPNAV.

(6) Special Projects Office for Polaris Program, Bureau of Weapons.

*Includes three SSBN's working up and therefore not fully operational

/b/Soviet data for "Production," "Operational Inventory," and "In-Commission" are from NIE 11-8-60, pages 29 and 30. [For partial text of NIE 11-8-60, "Soviet Capabilities for Long Range Attack Through Mid-1956," dated August 1, 1960, see Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. III, Document 111.

/c/The number of Soviet "Operational ICBM Launchers" are from NIE 11-4-60, pages 52, 53 and 54, where it is stated that:

(1) "Since there is insufficient direct evidence to establish the scale and pace of the present Soviet ICBM production and deployment program, we have based our estimate in part on various indirect forms of evidence and on argument and analysis deduced from more general considerations. These latter include such things as the strategic ideas which appear to govern Soviet military policy, our appreciation of the strategic capabilities which Soviet military planners might expect to derive from given numbers of ICBMs, our general knowledge of Soviet military production practices, and our sense of the tempo at which the present program is being conducted."

(2) "We have examined the tasks and problems involved in the production and deployment of ICBMs thru the elaboration of three illustrative Soviet programs ("A", "B", "C"). They represent the range of judgments based on the direct and indirect evidence available to us, regarding the scale and tempo of Soviet effort."

(3) "With reference to the illustrative programs presented above, the members of the United States Intelligence Board have concluded as follows:

"The Director of Central Intelligence considers that Program "A" should be regarded as the nearest approximation of the actual Soviet program.

"The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that Program "B" approximates the most likely Soviet program.

"The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, and the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, believe that the Soviet planners would regard the advantages to be gained from having a large ICBM force in the near term as justifying the effort required for a program which would be toward the high side of the range defined by illustrative programs "A" and "B". Further, these members consider that in the light of factors discussed in paragraph (4) it will continue to grow within the "A"-"B" range during the 1962-1963 period.

"The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy, believe that illustrative program "C" most nearly approximates the actual Soviet program."

(4)"The present Soviet ICBM program is, of course, subject to change as the period progresses. Soviet planning for the period beyond 1961 will be substantially affected by the actual development of US retaliatory forces, the prospects for a greatly improved Soviet ICBM, and the prospects, on each side, for an effective defense against ICBM's, as well as the general development of the world situation and of relations between the US and the USSR. Our estimates for future years must be reviewed in the light of such developments and of such additional evidence as we may obtain regarding the actual progress of the Soviet program. They must therefore be regarded as highly tentative. For these reasons, we have not projected even a tentative estimate beyond 1963." [NIE 11-4-60, dated December 1, 1960, entitled "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1960-1965," is in Department of State, INR-NIE Files.]

The Soviet Union is estimated to have a force of submarine-launched missiles during the years 1960-1963 approximately equal to our own. /d/

/d/NIE 11-8-60, pages 22 and 23.

The number of ICBM missiles launched (successful and unsuccessful) as of 14 February 1961 is estimated to be:

/e/From the submarine. There have been 61 other firings in the R&D program.

Note: The difference in the approach to missile development in the two countries may explain, in part, the difference in test firings.

Washington, February 23, 1961, 5:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Chester V. Clifton Series, Conferences with the President Volume I. Top Secret. Drafted by Clifton. Documentation on the JCS response to a number of President Kennedy's requests for information made at this meeting is ibid., Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense, Special Warfare Volume I.

OTHERS PRESENT
General Lemnitzer
General Decker
Admiral Burke
General White
General Shoup
Mr. Rostow
General Goodpaster
General Clifton

/2/Not further identified.

The President also instructed General Lemnitzer to make an effort in the next few days to find out how these military Latin Americans feel about Castro; from a military viewpoint, what would they do from their countries to offset his regime; and does Castro represent a threat to their countries? The President instructed the Chiefs to do this quietly and unofficially. They assured him they could get information of this kind within the next few days while our escort officers are still with the Latin Americans.

/3/Not further identified.

In the discussion on guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare, the President asked several questions which General Decker and others answered:

How many are in training in the Special Forces of the Army? Decker: 1100 at Fort Bragg, 346 in Germany, 364 in Okinawa.

How do we intend to use these forces--in what kind of war? Decker: In all kinds of war--cold war, limited war, and even in general war, if it occurred.

How many people in our MAAG in Viet-Nam are skilled in guerrilla warfare operations? Decker: There are three officers in the MAAG in Viet-Nam who include this kind of training with their more general training. We had a team of 30, but the MAAG Chief had requests for the team to pull out. Our program was based on training Vietnamese who, in turn, trained others. General Decker made the point that in some areas we don't have authority to train the military personnel and we have to have the host government invite us to participate in this training.

In response to questions, it was stated that we are putting 75 more people into the Laotian training program. We have already trained 7000 Laotians. Altogether, we have trained 14,000 people in the Southeast Asian area. We now have a team with each of the 21 Laotian battalions. In addition, there are 1200 Meo tribesmen in the hills who have been trained by our people.

The President asked General Decker's judgment, in line with Khrushchev's speech, on what our course of action (as far as training is concerned) should be in Iran and in Viet-Nam.

A general discussion then brought out the following points: That we now respond, in the military assistance program, to country requests as to what kind of training and what kind of equipment they want. The country requests are screened thoroughly by the "country team" and then, back here, before we furnish them the equipment or the training. It was stated that certainly more emphasis can be given to guerrilla and counter-guerrilla training. We can also examine our programs carefully to see that more light equipment is put into the program--the kind that a man can carry with him. In regard to equipment, General Decker pointed out that one of our most valuable contributions is radio direction-finding equipment in order that guerrillas can be located. Usually, guerrilla teams have some sort of radio communication, and we can locate them promptly if we have teams trained with this direction-finding equipment. This is vital to counter-guerrilla operations because guerrillas are in small groups and move so rapidly.

In response to the President's questions, General Decker showed him some pictures of our Special Forces and described their organization. An "A" team has 12 men. "B" and "C" teams are organized to control the "A" teams. General Decker finally estimated that we have approximately 100 "A" teams in the three Special Force centers. The "A" teams include linguists, communications, intelligence, and medical personnel. Their jobs are to train anywhere up to 500 men each, and that the "B" and "C" teams then help control the "A" teams and the trained guerrillas.

In response to the President's questions, the JCS emphasized that the teams in Germany are essential; they are aimed at the satellites in case of a war where guerrillas would be trained to operate against Soviet lines of communication.

/4/General Lansdale reported on his January 2-14 trip to Vietnam in a January 17 memorandum to Secretary of Defense Gates; see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 2.

General Decker pointed out that in the MAP program an additional 20,000 strength was being considered for South Viet-Nam. General Lemnitzer added that approximately 6,000 of the 20,000 are to be used in this unconventional warfare approach. The President asked General Decker to get in touch with the Military Assistance Group in Viet-Nam and find out, from their viewpoint, what the situation is in regard to additional training.

The President brought up the subject of a rather large-scale Communist effort in Ecuador and indications that Castro was probably the source of some of this activity. He asked: "What are we doing to help Ecuador train and prepare to offset this?"

Responses from the group brought out that the State Department has to negotiate for additional people to be introduced into these countries. General Decker said that a first "must" was to teach the people counter-intelligence operations; and secondly, then help them train their own forces in these matters. General Decker added that guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations have not been emphasized in our Latin American MAAG efforts.

The President then directed that the JCS make "a sort of analysis" of what we can do around the world in building anti-guerrilla forces. He especially wanted comments on each Latin American country. He pointed out that each year as we go to Congress on military aid, he would get more support if we emphasized this type of activity--"giving friendly nations the kind of military assistance they are most likely to need."

General White suggested that the JCS take a look at our guidance to our Military Assistance Advisory Groups in Latin America. In his discussion, he cited Colombia.

Returning to the discussion of Castro in Cuba, and the opinions of the Latin American military people whom they had just talked with, Admiral Burke said that the consensus of the military was that their governments are really moving too slowly in countering the Communist activities in Latin America. The present governments, he said, are not too eager to go into this training large-scale, because they are afraid of dissident groups in their own countries rising up and taking over the government when they are well-equipped and trained. General Lemnitzer commented that our engineer equipment had made a considerable contribution to these countries in repairing roads, bridges, and airfields--in effect, although it is not contemplated in our military assistance, it is most helpful in improving the economies and communications of the countries, and ultimately leads to stability. He commented that we might review our military aid program to see that more of this kind of material is usefully provided.

Admiral Burke commented that a great deal of local pride is involved and we should emphasize items that help their local prestige. For example, we are helping them build a naval academy in Ecuador. Its cost is only $30,000. The Ecuadorans are doing most of the work and are very pleased with this kind of contribution.

General White discussed what the Communists are doing in these areas. He mentioned a small thermo-generator being given wide distribution--a little generator that can light one single lamp bulb or run a radio--and that the Communists are getting great credit for this small physical improvement. He felt we could examine our own efforts in this line.

General Decker mentioned the school that is opening in the Canal Zone in June for Latin American countries and stated that we would see that the guerrilla and counter-guerrilla training would be emphasized.

General Lemnitzer mentioned that many of our escort officers and briefers spoke in Spanish. General White pointed out that the A-2, an Air Force general, gave his whole briefing in Spanish. The President asked if he mentioned Castro at all. General Lemnitzer said that he would check on this.

It was at this point that the President asked them to take a reading on how the Latin American military people felt about the Castro threat.

Turning to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the President asked him for a brief resume of their activities in this field. General Shoup stated that the Marines had a different approach to this problem: The Marines felt that we should be allowed to go in and be guerrillas by direct action; that the Marines are always ready to go in and blow up bridges and tear up the countryside and then, if necessary, they can go into action to teach other guerrillas. Fundamentally, he stated, the Marines don't want to train someone else. They would rather go in and do the job themselves, and then take on indigenous help and, finally, train them to do likewise. General Shoup made it clear that the Marines have no such mission of training other people, but that they would gladly do it if so directed.

The President pointed out that it is not always possible for us to take direct action and that, for most of the problems that face us now, we will have to satisfy ourselves with training the people of these various countries to do their own guerrilla and anti-guerrilla operations, "realizing, of course, that this would disappoint the Marine Corps, but that into each life, some disappointment must fall."

General Shoup then discussed the force-reconnaissance company, the reconnaissance battalion in each division, their missions and training. He pointed out that in the Philippines the Marines have a radio that only exposes itself for 30 seconds to communicate with other forces. He added that the Marines work very successfully with submarines and can invade other areas without discovery. He explained the language training of the Marines and that the linguists are added to the force as the mission is assigned.

The President then mentioned that Ambassador Thompson told him that it is his opinion that, in the future, no Soviets will actually cross their own borders to enter into these operations and, therefore, for the time being, we will have to prepare other forces to protect themselves. The President added that we will have to do more to help those countries (with whom we are associated) to do more for themselves. He mentioned the threat that 15,000 men from North Viet-Nam will be enough to overwhelm South Viet-Nam, and that Viet-Nam "will fall this year." The President felt that, if this threat had any basis of realization, certainly we must face up to it promptly.

/5/Held in Bangkok March 27-29.

Admiral Burke stated frankly that some of our troubles came from the Ambassadors in these areas who head the "country teams." He felt that there is frequently resentment about the U.S. team's military activities; that the Ambassadors generally want nothing undercover going on in their areas--things that they cannot face publicly; and that the MAAG people then feel suppressed and, finally lose heart and enthusiasm. Admiral Burke felt that we must change this. The President then asked what can we do about SEATO in this connection. He stated that he would talk to Secretary Rusk and see if that would be a channel which could interest the State Department in furthering this effort. He pointed out that the Malayan example was a very successful one and might be applied to some of our trouble spots. Again, he mentioned Cuba, Viet-Nam, and possibly Iran.

General Lemnitzer volunteered that they might work out a joint State-Defense message to all Ambassadors to get their reaction and thoughts--country by country--on this new approach. He also volunteered that they would get a report from Iran in this field; and they would hold discussion on what kind of proposals could be made at the SEATO conference.

The President asked where this sort of training and activity was centered in the Pentagon. General Decker responded that it is handled in the Organization and Training Division of Army Operations under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and he has recently appointed General Heintges, who has been in Laos for the last year and a half, as the director of this activity in the Army staff.

The President then requested that they give him a report concerning Viet-Nam. He wanted them to specifically indicate how many people we could and should train and by what date these people could be effective. They were to consider whether we should make a direct approach to Viet-Nam, or propose this at a SEATO conference.

On the subject of atomic weapons, there was a discussion of two major command and control areas, including the Holifield Report, and the JCS assured him that they were preparing briefings on both subjects and would be asking him for time to present such briefings.

The President then asked them to discuss Berlin--including the steps that the East Germans and the Soviet Union might take, and what we should do to counter them. Again, the JCS told him that they would present to him a briefing of all our contingency plans, and urged that this be done rather soon so that he would be prepared in his analysis of the Berlin problem.

The President then asked about the military situation in Laos and what our next steps should be. The JCS reported that the situation is now stable. They pointed out that the loyal government would like to take Plaines des Jarres, but that it was pretty slow going.

Turning to the presentation by Secretary McNamara on an increased budget for defense, he asked if it was essential that we have an additional 13,000 personnel--"Can't we get them elsewhere?"

The JCS outlined the personnel problems in some detail, mentioning the needs in SAC, and the Polaris crews; and Admiral Burke outlined some of the steps the Navy is taking to meet these new requirements. The new attack transport (ship) was discussed, and the President was told why the World War II type transport was no longer adequate. In addition, the strain on personnel caused by RB-47 wings, missile commands, nuclear submarines, and support forces, were discussed. The President inquired about the level of manning of the Marine divisions and the use of reserves.

The final discussion led by the President was on intelligence and the differences between the Army, the Air Force, and the Dulles conclusions based on the same intelligence. He wanted to know on what basis these differences arose. General Lemnitzer responded with a discussion of the intelligence problem, pointing out that, in the last analysis, the course of action, based on the intelligence estimates, had to be a Presidential decision.

The President concluded the meeting by indicating that at the next session he would like to discuss the atomic weapons problems that were scheduled for this agenda. Mention was made of the AEC-Defense paper that was already being worked on with Mr. Bundy, but the Chiefs agreed that they would prepare such briefings for the next meeting with the President.

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

/7/Not found attached. The notes list the President's requests for action and information made at this meeting in summary form. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Chester V. Clifton Series, Conferences with the President Volume I)

Washington, February 28, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, McGeorge Bundy 2/61-4/61. No classification marking. Copies were sent to the President and Larry O'Donnell.

/2/No questions on the subject of this guidance were asked at the President's news conference on March 1. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 135-143.

I think the best answer is the straight one: he is spending more time on national security affairs than on any other class of problems and he is meeting frequently with those most directly concerned with each specific question. He finds this method on the whole more effective than frequent scheduled meetings of the whole group, but he does expect to have formal NSC meetings from time to time when it seems appropriate.

A survey of the President's calendar for the first month indicates that he met twice formally with the NSC and fifteen times with interdepartmental groups concerned with particular problems. In addition, of course, he had frequent individual conferences with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other senior officials in the national security area.

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.