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Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy

Released by the Office of the Historian
Docs 58-82

58. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy/1/

 

Washington, November 22, 1961.

 

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, FY 1963 Defense Budget 11/61-12/61. Secret. Forwarded to the President with several other documents, including Document 57. In his November 22 covering memorandum, Bundy commented concerning this memorandum: "Most of the rest of us do not agree with it, but his argument is interesting." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, FY 1963 Defense Budget 11/61-12/61)

 

SUBJECT
Nike-Zeus Program, FY 1963 Budget

 

1. With regard to the Nike-Zeus program, the Department of Defense is faced with the following alternatives:

 

a. Stop the program and start another one, while accepting a further delay in the schedule for operational readiness.

b. Continue the R&D program, but do not go into production.

c. Go into production following the 12 battery program.

d. Go into production with the objective of reaching the NORAD (North American Air Defense Command) goal of 70 batteries.

 

In addition to these, one other has come up in the budget discussions:

 

e. "Hand tool" two batteries and deploy them quickly in order to meet some of the psychological pressures for a missile defense.

 

2. In favor of continuing the Nike-Zeus program in some form is the fact that this is the only system in sight before 1970 which offers a possibility of intercepting ICBMs over cities. Even its critics agree that it should be able to deal with current non-decoyed ICBMs of the type which we are producing. They also recognize that improvements can be injected into the program while production is taking place.

 

A deployment of Nike-Zeus should have a very considerable psychological effect on our own people and upon the Soviet war planners. At a minimum, it will drive the USSR to a decoy program that will be both expensive and restrictive upon the useful payload of their missile warheads.

 

3. On the other hand, it is admitted that the development of decoys will present the Zeus missile-makers with a serious problem. A decoyed attack will result in a significant shrinkage of the area which can be protected by a single Nike battery. The radius of effective coverage will be reduced from 75 miles to something considerably less--perhaps as little as 20 miles--and under certain conditions the present defense system could be penetrated. Later developments can offset these disabilities somewhat by increasing the velocity of the Nike missile so that the time for an effective attack is reduced and more time can be allowed for discrimination. The R&D people can always point out how much this can be improved with further research. But if we wait for the ultimate system we shall be permanently undefended.

 

4. On balance, it appears to me sensible to do two things: to embark upon a limited initial production program for Nike-Zeus, and to accelerate research and development on the radar and missile improvements already in sight with a view toward incorporating them in the later production models. This course has the advantages of affording some protection for certain of our cities, of doing something to offset any psychological gains the Soviets might achieve from their announcement of an anti-ICBM, and of hedging our bets on future improvements. There is no reason to announce now where the missile sites will be located; rather, the batteries should be distributed according to a site priority established by NORAD. While there conceivably is a danger that public opinion would occasion a runaway on the part of the program, there is certainly nothing inevitable about such a development, especially if the Zeus program is brought into prior relation to the offensive elements of our strategic weapon systems, and with civil defense programs as well. The important thing is to embark upon the Nike-Zeus production with enthusiasm and confidence. We have past expressions of pessimism to offset if we are to get a solid psychological return from the decision to go into production.

 

Maxwell D. Taylor/2/

 

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

 

59. National Security Action Memorandum No. 114/1/

 

Washington, November 22, 1961.

 

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 114. Secret. Copies were sent to McNamara, Robert Kennedy, Director of the Bureau of the Budget Bell, Allen Dulles, and General Taylor.

 

TO
The Secretary of State

 

SUBJECT
Training for Friendly Police and Armed Forces in Counter-Insurgency, Counter-Subversion, Riot Control and Related Matters

 

The President has noted the reports received in response to NSAM No. 88/2/ and requests that you make a continuing review in collaboration with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, of the over-all problem of United States support of friendly police and armed forces and their training in riot control, counter-subversion, counter-insurgency, and related operations. Such review should encompass general United States policies, the assignment of departmental responsibilities, and the general size and scope of United States programs. The general object should be to clarify and strengthen these policies and programs while minimizing duplication and conflicts.

 

/2/NSAM No. 88, addressed to the Secretary of Defense, was a request for suggestions concerning U.S. training for Latin American armed forces. (Ibid., NSAM 88)

 

The President further requests that you give him periodic reports on the results of the review, with recommendations of policy and courses of action. Latin America should be the first area covered by the review.

 

To the extent necessary, you should coordinate the review with National Security Action Memorandum No. 56/3/ on the evaluation of paramilitary requirements, with the MAP and foreign aid programs, and with previous Overseas Internal Security Program reviews.

 

/3/Document 33.

 

McGeorge Bundy/4/

 

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

 

60. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy/1/

 

Washington, November 22, 1961.

 

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, DOD Budget 1963 11/61-12/61. Secret.

 

SUBJECT
Support of Conventional Forces in the 1963 Budget

 

1. One of the most important questions posed by the 1963 Budget is the adequacy of the support accorded conventional forces. There is no doubt that this budget makes more ample provisions for this type of force than the previous Eisenhower budgets. But the inadequacy of the support in previous years accentuates the need for a drastic reversal of former budget patterns and a heavy weighing of effort to compensate for this past neglect. Is the 1963 Budget doing enough in light of these considerations?

 

2. The effectiveness of our conventional war forces depends upon several factors: their size, modernization and quantity of equipment, mobility, and geographical location.

 

a. Size of Conventional Forces. The decision to retain a 16-division Army structure along with a 3-division Marine Corps provides a divisional structure which will meet anticipated strategic needs within acceptable limits of risk. However, this structure needs to be filled with adequate trained manpower. The Army considers that it needs 1,055,700 men to support this 16-division program, whereas the Secretary of Defense is now proposing roughly 960,000.

 

It is my understanding that the principal difference between these two figures is represented by the 39,000 reinforcements which have been sent recently to Europe to make our present deployments combat ready. I feel that these men should be kept there as they are necessary for sustained combat. We are not justified to place our troops in the presence of the enemy without giving them all the means necessary to defend themselves.

 

b. Modernization and Quantity of Equipment. The conventional forces have a large backlog of deferred procurement which has delayed their modernization and prevented the accumulation of the stocks necessary to support a war prior to the availability of new production. At the present time, as a result of logistical shortages, it is doubtful that we could sustain more than three or four divisions in action for a significant period in a distant theater such as Southeast Asia while retaining our readiness for combat in other parts of the world. This is not an acceptable strategic position in which to remain. The 1963 Budget should contain all the funds necessary for an accelerated modernization of forces and build-up of war reserve stockages.

 

The Army is receiving 2.6 billion in new money to apply against its shortages. Something over a billion dollars of this sum is necessary to offset wearout and obsolescence. Only a little more than a billion is thus available to offset deferred procurement of the past. In my opinion, at least a billion more should be added to the Army procurement account in FY 1963 to allow it to move forward at a maximum orderly rate to maximum logistic readiness.

 

c. Mobility and Location. The mobility of conventional forces depends both upon their means of transport and their location in relation to areas of employment. The present budget properly emphasizes the need to improve strategic air transport. It does not, however, advance the cause of strategic sea lift. At a minimum, some troop ships and heavy lift cargo vessels should remain in the active fleet under centralized MSTS control and the program for roll on-roll off cargo ships of one per year should be protected.

 

In addition, because of its vastness special measures to increase mobility are necessary in the Pacific in order to reduce the reaction time of conventional forces, particularly of Army forces. One such measure should be the location of an Army division in the Western Pacific, probably in the Philippines. Another measure would be the preparation of one of our Korean divisions for rapid strategic movement. This action would require the replacement by Americans of the Korean personnel now in the structure of one of the American divisions and the preparation of plans to permit its rapid transport from Korea to some other part of the Pacific area.

 

3. The foregoing discussion has concerned itself primarily with Army divisions as these are the easy units for assessing conventional strength. Also, those elements of the Marines, Navy and Air Force which contribute to conventional war-making should receive corresponding attention. In particular, consideration should be given to increasing the Air Force manpower to maintain on active status the present tactical fighter units which are due to return to an inactive status following the termination of the so-called Berlin crisis.

 

4. In summary, the following actions should be considered in order to give greater emphasis on the development of conventional forces in the 1963 Budget:

 

a. An Army personnel ceiling of 1,055,700.

b. An increase of one billion dollars in Army procurement.

c. Increased funds for strategic sea transport.

d. The location of an Army division in the Western Pacific, and the preparation of one of the U.S. divisions in Korea for rapid strategic movement.

e. Retention of the present 25 tactical fighter units in the permanent structure of the Air Force.

 

Maxwell D. Taylor/2/

 

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

 

61. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

 

Washington, November 29, 1961.

 

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/11-2961. Top Secret.

 

SUBJECT
FY 1963 Defense Budget

 

Attached is a copy of a brief memorandum reflecting conversations which my staff has had with General Taylor's people on last weekend's Hyannis Port discussions/2/ of the FY 1963 Defense Budget (Attachment A).

 

/2/One such discussion at Hyannis Port took place the morning of November 24. Present were Kennedy, McNamara, Lemnitzer, Gilpatric, Sorensen, Bell, Taylor, Bundy, Kaysen, Harold Brown, and Wiesner. No memorandum of the meeting has been found. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book)

 

You will note that, whereas the 16-division level was agreed to, apparently Secretary McNamara felt that this could be done within a 960,000 manning level. This would be about 175,000 below current force levels and about 100,000 below what I understand are the service recommendations. How this can be done, of course, remains to be seen. If such economy of personnel can in fact be obtained it will be most desirable. However, our proper concern in State is how the matter comes out publicly. If it comes out in the form of a 16-division force it would meet our purposes. However, as I understand the budget presentation, it is likely to come out in terms of the manning level and, therefore, in terms of a very marked reduction below our current force levels. This has obviously serious implications with respect to our current Berlin strategy, both in its effects on the Soviet Union and on our allies.

 

I recommend that you discuss the matter in the foregoing terms with Secretary McNamara.

 

 

Attachment A/3/

 

/3/ Top Secret. Drafted by Weiss.

 

Memorandum for the Record

 

Washington, November 29, 1961.

 

SUBJECT
FY '63 DOD Budget Decisions

 

1. The following reflects the debriefing received from Colonel Ewell, of General Taylor's staff, on the status of the decisions on the FY '63 DOD Budget as reflected in the series of Presidential meetings held at Hyannis Port over this last weekend:

 

a. General War Offensive Forces. The only major decision was to omit mobile Minutemen. This reflects the consensus judgment that the GWO category was too large. The mobile Minuteman was considered the least soundly justified of the various components within this category.

 

b. General War Defensive Forces. The 12 battery Nike-Zeus program was approved. Apparently the so-called six city program as such, was not agreed to. I take it that this means that the Research and Development and the Production will move forward on the 12 battery program, but that the deployment of the missiles is left open.

 

A Civil Defense program of $700 million per annum, projected over a five year period (for a total of $3.5 billion) was agreed to. As I understand it this represents the mid-range as between a $400 million proposed program and a $900 million program. The lower end of the range would involve maximum individual self help efforts. The $700 million range adds to this, assistance to selected institutions in meeting civil defense requirements (e.g. hospitals). The upper end of the range, the $900 million program, would have included assistance to other major social institutions (particularly in the industrial area).

 

c. General Purpose Forces. The 16, as contrasted to the 14, division level was agreed to. However, the significance of this decision, from a political point of view, was significantly undermined by virtue of the decision reached on the force levels. Apparently, Secretary McNamara proposed a 960 thousand level for meeting the 16 division requirement. This would be about 100 thousand below the minimum service recommendations and about 175 thousand below current force levels. Apparently the President took the initiative in arguing for a higher level and Secretary McNamara was directed to take another look at the numbers implications. (On this point, however, the best guess seems to be that the likely revised recommendations from Secretary McNamara will probably not exceed 980 thousand. In short, we must still accept a fairly sizeable force cut within the new budget.) Finally, there was apparently no discussion of reserves versus regular forces.

 

d. MRBM's. These were approved for Research and Development purposes, I gather with an expression of a certain amount of reluctance on the part of the President. Interestingly enough, part of the justification for the MRBM increment was that it would serve to develop a new generation of mobile missiles which would offset the loss of the mobile Minutemen program. By implication this certainly means that some emphasis will be placed on a mobile land-based weapon. There was no indication that sea versus land deployment was discussed.

 

Seymour Weiss/4/

 

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

 

62. Draft Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Council/1/

 

Washington, December 5, 1961.

 

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, BNSP 1961-1962. Secret. The complete paper is 78 pages long, in addition to the summary printed here. For text, see the Supplement. It forms the attachment to a memorandum from McGhee to the Under Secretary and most Assistant Secretaries, stating that the paper represented a "major effort of the entire Policy Planning Staff during recent months" but would need to "undergo many changes of detail before it can hope to meet general approval." McGhee asked for comments.

 

This paper was discussed at the Secretary's Policy Planning Meeting on December 12. Most speakers were not identified by name. The "emphasis on less developed areas drew favorable comment." While the "idea of a viable community of free nations found favor," it "was pointed out that the community should not become a pretext for the less savory forms of neutralism." Also, "the view was advanced that the paper was too much of an essay and not enough of an action paper, but this would be corrected by Mr. Rostow's proposal for adding Part II to the paper." Rostow stated that the issues in Part II should be limited to those of direct concern to the President. (Summary of discussion, drafter not indicated; ibid.)

 

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

 

[Here follows a table of contents.]

 

Summary

 

1. Introduction. This paper outlines a strategy, which could provide a sense of coherence and direction to our total effort in the national security field. It is not intended to furnish a complete guide to every policy action, but rather to provide an over-all doctrine which will be relevant to the more important issues we face. Our decisions on these issues are most likely to be mutually consistent and reinforcing if they are based on a clearly defined strategic doctrine.

 

2. National Objective. Our basic national purpose is to help in the creation of a world environment in which a nation with values and purposes such as ours can flourish. Such an environment will be one in which countries can concert to promote their progress and security, without losing their freedom in the process. That environment can best be described as a "community of free nations". A sustained US effort toward this end is needed not only to fulfill our positive purposes but also to defeat the Communist' attempts to shape in their own image the order which will emerge from the present era of revolutionary change.

 

I. Needed Tasks

 

3. Constructive Tasks in Less Developed Countries. The community of free nations must be one in which less developed countries can progress toward becoming modern societies. We should use all the instruments of national policy--diplomacy, military aid, programming guidance and technical aid, capital assistance, and trade policy--to help them achieve evolutionary modernization. We should give higher priority to this objective than to the promotion of special ties with these countries or to securing their support for our political policies. We should urge other Atlantic countries and Japan to take the same view, and to act vigorously on it.

 

4. Defensive Tasks. The community of free nations must also be made secure against war and aggression. We should meet indirect aggression, the most urgent threat, primarily by strengthening the total capacity of governments under attack to mount effective politico-military programs in defense of their societies.

 

We should use US forces to defeat direct aggression in such a way as to defeat its purposes with minimum risk of escalation. This will require not only substantial and mobile conventional forces but also a reasonably stable over-all strategic situation, i.e., one which is unlikely to degenerate into general nuclear war under the pressure of crises and limited conflicts. We should seek to create such an environment by maintaining an effective, invulnerable, and flexible nuclear striking force and by prosecuting adequate active and passive nuclear defense programs. The same purpose will be served by an arms control policy which looks to feasible stabilizing measures in the near term, e.g., safeguards against war by miscalculation and against nuclear proliferation, as well as to the long-term goal of general and complete disarmament.

 

II. Needed Framework

 

5. The Atlantic Community. To prosecute these constructive and defensive tasks we must mobilize the strength of nations, and groups of nations, which can deploy substantial resources beyond their borders. The European Community is such a grouping; we should vigorously support the movement toward European integration. A major purpose of US foreign policy should be to work toward an effective partnership between Europe and the US, through institutions of the Atlantic Community. We should seek vigorously to strengthen these institutions and the resulting capacity for common action. This partnership should be capable of embracing Japan in the economic sphere at the earliest possible time.

 

6. Other Ties Between Free Nations. We should, at the same time, seek to develop manifold ties, embracing as wide a range of human activities as possible, which will permit the developed and less developed nations to work effectively together, and which will limit their ability to harass each other or to act with utter irresponsibility. We should work to strengthen bilateral ties, regional associations, and the UN to this end. Such relationships are the warp and woof of the community of free nations.

 

7. Relations With Communist Nations. We should try to manage our relations with the Communist nations so that they will not divert us from constructive tasks in the free world, and so that they will promote long-term constructive evolution in the Bloc. To this end:

 

We should seek continuing communication with the Soviets, in business-like attempts to avoid crises and reduce the risk of war, and we should promote exchanges and cooperative ventures conducive to useful change in the USSR. When crises erupt, we should seek to resolve them in a way which will restore equilibrium without incurring the increased costs and risks that would be required to alter the existing balance of advantage drastically in our favor.

 

We should seek contacts, and extend and encourage assistance, designed to encourage helpful trends in Eastern Europe.

 

We should move toward policies which will place the onus for continued hostility between Communist China and the US more squarely on Peiping and thus mobilize greater free world support in resisting Chinese Communist expansion. We should try to create a political climate in which the Sino-Soviet rift will prosper; we should not go out of our way to make it look as though Khrushchev's preference for negotiation over fighting is a vain one; and we should make clear that the contrary Chinese view, if put to the test, is likely to entail swift disaster.

 

Our response to the Soviet ideological offensive should center upon projecting and explaining our own efforts to build a community of free nations. We should promote a free world consensus on this central goal. We should not be drawn away from this goal by a presumed need to react to Communist political and propaganda initiatives, but should seek to keep the focus where it belongs: on our opportunities and affirmative purposes in the free world.

 

[Here follows the body of the paper; see the Supplement.]

 

 

63. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy/1/

 

Washington, December 9, 1961.

 

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, DOD FY 1963 Defense Budget. Top Secret.

 

1. The final decisions on the Defense budget are now before you. In making these decisions, you will bear in mind that you are making a choice which will determine expenditures not only in FY 63, but for the whole of the rest of your administration. These decisions thus will shape the availability of budget resources for non-military programs for this whole period of time, as well as for next year. For this reason, I recommend that you not concur in the suggestion of Secretary McNamara's memorandum of December 7 (attached)/2/ with respect to his currently revised force structure. Instead I suggest that you examine carefully the possibility of a lower strategic striking force for the reasons set forth at some length in my memorandum to you of November 22./3/ Briefly, these reasons are that we do not need as large a force as the DOD proposes to do the military job; and that any error on the side of generosity has the undesirable consequence of stepping up the arms race. In a world of missiles and thermonuclear warheads more arms do not in any simple way add more security. This is not an argument for a smaller force than military need requires, but an argument against adding any substantial margin to what a careful examination of the military situation shows to be necessary.

 

/2/Not found attached. In it McNamara stated that he had that day submitted the FY 1963 defense budget to the Bureau of the Budget and that Director Bell had concurred in his recommendations with a few exceptions. "As we discussed briefly at Hyannis Port, I am proposing to start the funding of 200 fixed Minutemen in FY 1963, an increase of 100 missiles to compensate for the elimination of the mobile Minuteman from the program. Dave would prefer to eliminate mobile Minuteman with no compensating increase." (Ibid.)

 

/3/Document 57.

 

2. I suggest that you consider two alternative programs; one for hardened and dispersed Minuteman and one for Polaris.

 

The alternative Minuteman program would provide for the following force structure:

 

 

as compared with Secretary McNamara's current and original recommendations as shown in the table below:/4/

 

/4/In Document 46, McNamara projected 900 fixed and 100 mobile Minutemen by 1967.

 

 

If this appears too drastic a cut for Secretary McNamara to accept, it might be preferable to propose an alternate program which achieved his original goal of 900 hardened and dispersed Minutemen in 1967, but followed the same rate of buildup as the lower program. I propose in the three fiscal years 63, 64 and 65, i.e., a force structure as follows:

 

 

of military needs without too great a risk as we would become aware of an increase of Soviet missile site construction before their deployment was complete.

 

A slowdown in the rate of procurement and employment of Minuteman forces would bring other significant positive advantages. The missiles now being produced have a number of important technical shortcomings. The goal of 600 in FY 64 can be achieved only by a crash program which permits no time for modifications that can deal with some of these shortcomings. It is expected that after these missiles are in place, a fairly expensive retrofit program will be required to bring them up to desirable standards of performance. The slower the rate of buildup now, the less will be the retrofit requirements later, since the missiles deployed later will be able to incorporate improvements in range and penetration aids from the start. Thus, the present program involves a faster buildup on paper than real capability, and a hidden future cost in expensive retrofitting programs.

 

On Polaris, I suggest that the additional procurement rate for FY 63 be cut to 3 instead of the 6 now proposed and be maintained at 3 per year thereafter. This would cut the 1967 force from 41 to 35, but there would be no change in the number of submarines available before 1965. This change would save $75 million of expenditures in FY 63.

 

All the proposed changes are slow downs in the rate of buildup in our strategic forces, not in any sense reductions in them. They would not affect the prospective strategic balance between U.S. and USSR. Annex I shows the effect of the proposed changes on the total strategic force.

 

3. In addition to these major problems of force structure, there are several other lesser but still important changes from the Secretary's recommendations which ought to be considered.

 

First is the Nike Zeus Program--The case for the Nike Zeus is dubious. If long leadtime production items are funded now, it may be very difficult to resist going ahead with procurement and deployment of this system. It appears desirable to avoid this. Eliminating these items would save $50 million in FY 63.

 

Second, in view of the political problems involved in the future deployment of MRBMs, it would seem desirable to defer the beginnings of development of a specific system until next year. Studies on the comparative merits of land- and sea-based systems, as well as research on command and control, and research and development on stellar guidance will continue at high priority. Postponing the development commitment would save $60 million in FY 63.

 

Finally, the Skybolt will probably fall considerably behind its development schedule. If we recognize this and defer the production, this would save $100 million in FY 63./5/

 

/5/In another memorandum to Kennedy dated December 9, Kaysen stated that a discussion among the President, Sorensen, Bell, and himself had resulted in decisions to defer the decision on long-lead procurement for Nike-Zeus until after the next nuclear test series, continue on Skybolt "if Douglas [aircraft company] can perform," reduce Polaris submarine procurement from six to three a year, and accept "McNamara's original target of 900 Minutemen" but procure them at the rate suggested in the memorandum printed here. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense, Volume II, 11/6-12/61)

 

4. The total savings in FY 63 expenditures over the Secretary's program involved in these recommendations are thus:

 

 

/6/In his memorandum for the record of the White House daily staff meeting on December 11, Ewell reported that the defense budget had been "put to bed with approval of FY 1963 funding of the 100 extra fixed Minutemen," for a total of 200. Nike-Zeus would remain in the "R & D" stage. "The President is not convinced that there is any evidence we want to deploy this system." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings 9-12/61)As presented to Congress, the budget proposed FY 1963 funding of 200 fixed Minutemen with the objective of a total of 1,100 by FY 1967, tentatively 1,200 by FY 1968, and procurement of 6 additional Polaris submarines. ("McNamara Testimony Before Senate Armed Services Committee, January 19, 1963"; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense, Volume III, McNamara Testimony)

 

Carl Kaysen

 

 

Annex I/7/

 

/7/Top Secret.

 

SELECTED STRATEGIC STRIKING FORCES

 

 

 

64. Editorial Note

 

On December 11, 1961, Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Deputy Director (Plans) of Central Intelligence, submitted, as Chairman of the NSC Counter-Guerrilla Warfare Task Force, to McGeorge Bundy and General Taylor a report entitled "Elements of U.S. Strategy To Deal with `Wars of National Liberation.'" (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, CIA General 12/61) See the Supplement. The other members of the Task Force were Edward Lansdale, Walt Rostow, and Henry C. Ramsey of the Policy Planning Council. According to a December 13 memorandum from Rostow to George McGhee, the members served as individuals, not agency representatives. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Dec 61)

 

The report concluded that while there existed a "clear consensus within the U.S. Government as to the magnitude and urgency" of the problem presented by Communist indirect aggression, there was "no single high-level locus of authority and responsibility" to undertake "vitally needed concerting of interagency resources." The Task Force recommended that this function should be added to the responsibilities of the NSC 5412 Special Group, whose Chairman was General Taylor. The Special Group should designate areas where subversive violence was already a "major factor" or a "potentially serious threat." For "critically threatened" countries as designated by the Special Group, the Secretary of State should establish interagency task forces to develop and review action programs.

 

In a December 12 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Robert Komer stated that he had pressed for designation of the Special Group in the report because "Taylor is already heavily involved in this problem area, and expansion of Special Group functions builds on a going concern. Walt and I touched base with Taylor; he is in full agreement." To overcome what Komer believed were problems in obtaining interagency concurrence, "the technique we decided on was to have Bissell transmit the report to you so that you could send a chit to the agencies concerned suggesting that we have an NSC meeting on it." In the margin of his own memorandum, Komer commented: "This is also so it doesn't look like a CIA power play." Concerning the recommendations, Komer wrote: "I had to do them quick and dirty in order to force everybody's hand and avoid another six weeks of delay." Komer believed that the Department of State might "not wholly approve giving Taylor such broad terms of reference." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Komer 11/61-12/61) See the Supplement.

 

In his memorandum for the record of the White House daily staff meeting on December 13, Colonel Ewell stated that Bundy brought up the report and "jumped on the general idea" because he felt it would downgrade the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretaries. "I sense that some very quick action is necessary to get this thing back on the track." In his memorandum of the daily staff meeting on December 15, Ewell wrote: "I mentioned the cold war paper. Bundy said that he had your memorandum from the Special Group. He is generally opposed to the Special Group getting into the consideration of organizational policy. He plans to talk to you about your memorandum. I suspect that Bundy has straightforward reservations about the Special Group--cold war idea, and I also feel that he has deep reservations, which are not quite so straightforward, about letting a strong, decisive group get hold of a block of decisions. This tends to inhibit the free-wheelers around here who find that they are unable to tinker around with the approach to a problem if the policy formulation in its final stages is reserved to a small group. My guess would be that the Bundy-Kaysen-Henry Owen axis is initiating a preventive war on this idea and will try to sink it without a trace." (Both in National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings 9-12/61) Although written for the record, Ewell's memoranda were customarily circulated to Taylor and his staff. The memorandum from the Special Group has not been found. Henry D. Owen was a member of the Policy Planning Council.

 

Apparently a decision had been taken by January 10, 1962, not to assign the new function to the 5412 Special Group, because on this date Lemnitzer commented in a memorandum to Taylor on a draft NSAM, not found, which established a new Special Group (Counter-Insurgency). Lemnitzer advocated that the work of the new Special Group should in the long run not be confined to "those areas in which the Communists have already taken root" but should also concentrate on areas of the "most strategic significance to the United States such as Brazil, in which a well-coordinated, effective National Plan for progress should now be in implementation." Lemnitzer added that it was "wishful thinking" to expect potential Special Group members to have much time to devote to their new functions, and suggested "a small, highly-qualified staff" of six to eight people to prepare recommendations and do "necessary spade work to permit monitoring the over-all accomplishments and/or operations." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 3360 (18 Jan 62) Sec 1) For NSAM No. 124 as issued, see Document 68.

 

 

65. National Security Action Memorandum No. 119/1/

 

Washington, December 18, 1961.

 

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 119. Secret. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, David Bell, Allen Dulles, and General Taylor. In a December 13 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Harold Saunders of the NSC Staff stated that a draft of this NSAM had been approved by General Taylor, DOD/ISA, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Department of State. In an attached memorandum for the President, Saunders argued that an NSAM was necessary because, although most Defense planners accepted the desirability of individual military civic action projects in underdeveloped countries, they lacked a concept for a broad program that would contribute to long-range development. In a December 18 memorandum to Bundy, Komer "agreed" that the NSAM was "marginal, and that we have too many little bits and pieces, largely overlapping, being issued as NSAMs on whole complex internal security problems," but "nonetheless, a jog on civic action is desirable in general," particularly while budget decisions were being made. The memorandum bears Bundy's handwritten approval. (All ibid.)

 

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

 

SUBJECT
Civic Action

 

The President is concerned that we may be missing an opportunity this year to develop methods for supporting whatever contribution military forces can make to economic and social development in less-developed countries. While recognizing that civic action is not universally applicable, he hopes we will take full advantage of its contribution in crisis areas as well as in those where the threat of subversion is more remote.

 

By civic action we mean using military forces on projects useful to the populace at all levels in such fields as training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communication, health, sanitation, and others helpful to economic development.

 

In countries fighting active campaigns against internal subversion, we should encourage local forces to undertake civic action projects as indispensable means of strengthening their society's economic base and establishing a link between army and populace. In countries threatened by external aggression, local forces should participate in civic action projects which do not materially impair performance of the primary military mission. In countries where subversion or attack is less imminent, selected military forces can contribute substantially to economic and social development, and we should make such a contribution a major function of these forces.

 

The President hopes that we can include civic action projects in existing and future military and economic assistance programs wherever practicable and in guidance that will affect future planning. He realizes we will have to develop new procedures for supporting this sort of project but feels that the benefits to be gained in some countries warrant considerable effort on our part. In an emergency, we should also consider using U.S. training teams as catalysts for a more rapid or substantial reorientation.

 

We must coordinate civic action with other programs directed at the same goals. A number of programs--economic and military assistance, political reform, paramilitary activities, police training, Peace Corps, and others--have common goals, but each can make a unique contribution. The President hopes that you might include civic action in any comprehensive study made in connection with NSAM No. 114/2/ or in any regional study such as that requested in NSAM No. 118./3/

 

/2/Document 59.

 

/3/Entitled "Participation of U.S. and Latin American Armed Forces in the Attainment of Common Objectives in Latin America," December 5, 1961. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 114)

 

I would appreciate very much your looking into our efforts to implement this policy and giving special attention to any interdepartmental or procedural problems which may be slowing our program. Would you be so kind as to let me know by 31 March what programs we have built into our FY 62 program and by 1 September what projects of this sort the FY 63 program includes.

 

McGeorge Bundy/4/

 

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Bundy signed the original.

 

 

66. Memorandum for the Record/1/

 

Palm Beach, Florida, January 3, 1962.

 

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-138-69. Top Secret. Drafted by Gilpatric on January 9.

 

SUBJECT
President's Meeting with JCS on January 3, 1962

 

At the meeting with the President, besides the Joint Chiefs of Staff (with General Smith in place of General LeMay), were the Vice President, Secretary McNamara, General Taylor, General Harkins, and myself. There follows a summary of the discussion which took place during the meeting:

 

DOD Budget for FY '63

 

At the suggestion of Mr. McNamara each of the Chiefs commented on the results of the budget review and the budget itself as to be presented to Congress.

 

General Lemnitzer declared himself generally well satisfied with the military budget with one reservation, namely, the reduction in the proposed appropriation for military assistance from $1.7 to $1.5 billion. At the President's suggestion General Taylor telephoned Budget Director Bell on this point and reported that Mr. Bell had personally reviewed the MAP budget, particularly with reference to uncommitted and unspent funds, anticipated recoupments from changes in programs, and other aspects of the MAP financial situation, and was sure that the reduction of $200 million in NOA for MAP in 1963 could be made without any reductions in planned programs.

 

In the course of the discussion on MAP the President emphasized the importance of military assistance to Latin American countries and the care that should be taken in selecting Military Attaches and MAAG's in that area.

 

General Decker stated that the Army had been "done well by" in the proposed budget although he considered the personnel ceiling fairly tight and regretted that the PEMA appropriation would not be larger. He noted the Army's position as favoring the earliest possible go-ahead on Nike-Zeus production. He agreed that the program for reorienting the Reserves had military advantages but pointed out the difficulties that would be encountered in reducing the number of National Guard or Reserve Divisions. In response to the President's inquiry, General Decker discussed the problems related to the early release of the 32d Infantry and 49th Armored National Guard divisions.

 

General Smith expressed the reservation of the Air Force on the long-range plans for strategic forces which he believes will result in dangerously lowering in the time period after 1965 the present U.S. nuclear superiority in strategic weapons. In particular, he made the point that in FY '63 an additional 100 hardened and dispersed Minutemen should be funded/2/ plus some $95 million new obligational authority for long-lead time construction for sites for missiles that would be ordered in future years, and the further point that at the very least the B-70 development should be permitted to proceed immediately on a full weapon system basis.

 

/2/That is, 100 in addition to the 200 for which the administration had decided to request funding in FY 1963.

 

In commenting on General Smith's statement the President said that he would be happy to hear General LeMay's presentation on the subject of the strategic force structure, but he pointed out that the Air Force should be prepared to support its position by showing how additional strategic forces would improve the overall military posture of the U.S. vs. the USSR. He and Mr. McNamara made it clear that the decision on strategic force levels was not dictated by availability of funds or other budgetary considerations.

 

General Smith expressed the gratification of the Air Force that the new budget would provide it with five more fighter wings and significant increases in airlift capacity.

 

On the subject of overseas dependents both the President and Mr. McNamara stressed the significance of the balance of payments problem and the alternatives which the U.S. faces if military contributions to the current balance of payments deficit were not reduced.

 

Admiral Anderson said that the new budget will support a "better Navy" and that the Navy can "live with the budget" although maintenance and personnel funds will continue to be tight. He also stated the case for the new carrier proposed in the budget and summarized the reasons for accepting conventional rather than nuclear propulsion for the carrier. Admiral Anderson commented on the shortage of military construction funds and the consequent adverse impact on shore stations. He also discussed the problem presented by the recent expansion of 40 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) ships and 18 ASW squadrons which are not provided for in the 1963 budget.

 

General Shoup stated that the current budget had been better prepared than any previous military financial program he had witnessed in the last seven years. He expressed his concern which Mr. McNamara and General Lemnitzer shared, over the importance of proof-testing new weapons (including warheads). /3/

 

/3/In a memorandum for record of the White House daily staff meeting on January 5, 1962, Ewell stated that he briefed the group on the Palm Beach conferences. "I deliberately told them about Shoup's comments on not knowing whether missiles would work, and added that this was kicked around the table a bit and there was general agreement that there would be some systems tests in the new testing program." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62)

 

[Here follows discussion of Vietnam; see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. II, Document 2.]

 

Roswell L. Gilpatric/4/
Deputy Secretary of Defense

 

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Gilpatric signed the original.

 

 

67. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of Defense McNamara /1/

 

Washington, January 11, 1962.

 

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Defense 1/62-3/62. Secret.

 

I am not satisfied that the Department of Defense, and in particular the Army, is according the necessary degree of attention and effort to the threat of Communist-directed subversive insurgency and guerrilla warfare, although it is clear that these constitute a major form of politico-military conflict for which we must carefully prepare. The effort devoted to this challenge should be comparable in importance to preparations for conventional warfare.

 

I would like you to assure that this new attitude is reflected in the organization, training, equipment and doctrine of the United States Armed Forces, at home and abroad. As I suggested above, at this time I do not see that this degree of effort is being made. The Army has a particularly important role to play, and I would like to find recognition of this importance in Army organization and training. As an immediate step, I should like an Army general officer serving in the immediate area of the Chief of Staff to be designated as the focal point for Army activities directed at this problem. I should like another general officer designated in the Joint Staff to perform a corresponding function there. /2/ I leave it to your judgment whether similar action is necessary in the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.

 

/2/In a January 24 memorandum to the President on counterinsurgency, McNamara stated that the Army had selected Brigadier General William B. Rosson to serve as Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Special Warfare and that a temporary coordinating officer for counterinsurgency had been named to the Joint Staff pending a regular appointment. (Ibid.)

 

I am aware of the work being done under NSAM 56/3/ to inventory U.S. paramilitary and counter-guerrilla assets and to determine future requirements. It is my understanding that a final report on this matter will be available about February 1st, at which time I hope to receive your specific recommendations as to how to proceed./4/

 

/3/Document 33.

 

/4/On February 10, Clifton forwarded to the President an 82-page report on "Cold War Activities of the United States Army, 1 January 1961 to 26 January 1962." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Army, Cold War Activities 2/62) In a February 12 memorandum to Colonel Hoskot, an aide to Secretary of the Army Stahr, Clifton wrote that Kennedy "read it from cover to cover, with appreciation" and raised several questions. Kennedy's questions were answered in a memorandum from Decker to Clifton dated February 26. (All ibid.) On February 19, the Department of Defense circulated a status report on "Guerrilla Warfare and Related Matters." (Ibid., Department of Defense, Special Warfare Volume I, 8/62-12/62)

 

Even before having the benefit of this report, I am sure that the Department of Defense and the Services should be making a thorough review of the training programs for officers, beginning at the Service academy level and carrying through to the National War College, to determine whether sufficient attention is being paid to instruction in subversive insurgency and related forms of indirect aggression. I have previously directed the Army to send selected officers to South Viet-Nam for short periods of orientation and training in order to expose them to the experience of actual conditions of guerrilla warfare. I would like that program expedited and appropriate officers of the other Services included.

 

Additionally, I have directed that the Armed Forces consider giving special training and orientation on guerrilla warfare (and the political implications thereof in countries where Communist threats are evident) for those officers being assigned to MAAG's and as attaches to countries where Communist subversive threats are apparent. To accomplish this, it would seem that a period of training at the Army Special Warfare Center, prior to departure for their posts, would be appropriate in many cases.

 

As you perceive from my foregoing remarks, in preparing to meet "wars of liberation" I should like the Department of Defense to move to a new level of increased activity across the board. I expect to direct similar action in other executive departments which have a part to play in this matter.

 

 

68. National Security Action Memorandum No. 124 /1/

 

Washington, January 18, 1962.

 

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 124. Secret.

 

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Military Representative of the President

 

SUBJECT
Establishment of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency)

 

To assure unity of effort and the use of all available resources with maximum effectiveness in preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and related forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries, a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) is established consisting of the following members:

 

Military Representative of the President, Chairman
The Attorney General
Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Administrator, Agency for International Development/2/

 

/2/ Fowler Hamilton.

 

On invitation:

 

Other department and agency representatives, as deemed necessary

 

The functions of the Special Group (C.I.) will be as follows:

 

a. To insure proper recognition throughout the U. S. Government that subversive insurgency ("wars of liberation") is a major form of politico-military conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare.

 

b. To insure that such recognition is reflected in the organization, training, equipment and doctrine of the U.S. Armed Forces and other U.S. agencies abroad and in the political, economic, intelligence, military aid and informational programs conducted abroad by State, Defense, AID, USIA and CIA. Particular attention will be paid the special training of personnel prior to assignment to MAAG's and to Embassy staffs in countries where counter-insurgency problems exist or may arise.

 

c. To keep under review the adequacy of U. S. resources to deal with actual or potential situations of insurgency or indirect aggression, making timely recommendation of measures to apply, increase or adjust these resources to meet anticipated requirements.

 

d. To insure the development of adequate interdepartmental programs aimed at preventing or defeating subversive insurgency and indirect aggression in countries and regions specifically assigned to the Special Group (C. I.) by the President, and to resolve any interdepartmental problems which might impede their implementation.

 

In performing the above functions, the members of the Special Group (C. I.) will act on behalf of their respective departments and agencies, and will depend for staff support upon their own staffs, and upon such country or regional interdepartmental task forces (normally chaired by a State Department Assistant Secretary) as may be established. The Group will confine itself to establishing broad lines of counter-insurgency policy, subject to my direction and decision as appropriate, insuring a coordinated and unified approach to regional or country programs, and verifying progress in implementation thereof. It will also undertake promptly to make decisions on interdepartmental issues arising out of such programs.

 

The critical areas initially assigned to the Special Group (C. I.) pursuant to paragraph d of this memorandum are set forth in the attached annex./3/

 

John F. Kennedy

 

/3/The annex reads as follows: "I hereby assign to the cognizance of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) the following countries: Laos, South Vietnam, Thailand. JFK"

 

 

69. Summary of President Kennedy's Remarks to the 496th Meeting of the National Security Council /1/

 

Washington, January 18, 1962.

 

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, 496th NSC Meeting. Top Secret; No Distribution. The source text bears no drafting information. The President's remarks partially follow an outline prepared for him by McGeorge Bundy on January 17. (Ibid.) The other item discussed at this meeting was the military aid program.

 

The President began his general discussion of policy problems by expressing his gratitude to all for their work during 1961. He expressed the hope that all concerned would move ahead in the same spirit of increasing cooperation during 1962.

 

The President referred to the Council's responsibility for integrating the work of the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, with the participation of the Treasury Department and other agencies when matters of interest to them were being considered. He asked the members to cooperate in making the Council meetings useful, and ensuring that decisions arising out of the Council meetings were effectively carried out.

 

The President remarked that he had stated the objective of the United States in his State of the Union Message as being the encouragement of a world of free and independent countries. The independence of countries sometimes created problems like those of Yugoslavia and Ghana. Our relations to such countries could never be like those of the Soviet Union to its satellites. We would simply have to live with these difficulties.

 

Moreover, we have an enormous task, in that our responsibilities are world-wide and of great complexity. The British and the French, formerly world powers, are concentrating more and more on problems of Europe, especially as the Common Market develops. This throws increasing weight on us, and it is no wonder that we do not always succeed. When you think only of our problems in Laos, Ghana, the Congo and Latin America, you can recognize the magnitude of the limitations upon what a country with only 6% of the world's population can accomplish.

 

These problems have a high degree of interrelation, in that the political and military factors tie closely together. Thus, for example, the coming fight on U.S. trade policy involves military interests very directly. If we cannot keep up our export surplus, we shall not have the dollar exchange with which to meet our overseas military commitments. We are spending $3 billion a year abroad to maintain our international security position. We must either do a good job of selling abroad or pull back. Our balance of payments position has put a strain on our gold reserves, and while we are not at a point of danger, we are at a point of concern. If confidence in the dollar is not maintained, those holding dollar and gold obligations against us could easily create grave difficulties for us. Any bank in which confidence is weakened faces great dangers. The over-all importance of the balance of payments position to our military security can be understood still more clearly by noting the British experience. The British pull-back of forces from numerous bases throughout the world in the years since World War II has been very largely a response to balance of payments difficulties. We see further pressure of this sort causing British planners to undertake further military reductions overseas.

 

Turning to basic military policy the President remarked that we relied on our nuclear deterrent. There are a number of places where our strength on the ground does not match what the Communists can bring to bear, but they hold back because they think we might use the bomb if they pushed us hard enough. As of now, the credibility of our nuclear deterrent is sufficient to hold our present positions throughout the world. Because Soviet nuclear strength is developing, great emphasis must be placed on other kinds of reinforcement of our military position.

 

In commenting on the nature of the Soviet threat, the President called attention to the January 6, 1961, speech by Khrushchev, which he described as possibly one of the most important speeches of the decade. Khrushchev had made clear the pattern of military and paramilitary infiltration and subversion which could be expected under the guise of "wars of liberation." /2/ The President believed that in response we must strengthen our conventional forces and our capability for military leadership in dealing with that kind of war. This was a matter which required imaginative and outstanding new efforts by all forces.

 

/2/For extracts from the speech, delivered before a meeting of Party organizations of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 555-558.

 

The President specifically praised the discussion of this problem in the January 1962 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette. He felt that all forces--Army, Marine, Air and Navy--must learn how to fight on the edges of the world. The record of the Romans made clear that their success was dependent on their will and ability to fight successfully at the edges of their empire. It was not so clear that we were yet in a position to do the same.

 

Moreover, there were special unsolved problems. When the Chinese get missiles and bombs and nuclear weapons, for example, what effect will that have on our dispositions in Southeast Asia?

 

Turning to aid policy, the President emphasized that we wanted to be sure to have military aid programs and military aid officers who would be alert to the real problems faced in the countries to which they were assigned. The basic danger was usually that of seizure from inside by Communist forces supported by military or paramilitary efforts within and without. The President believed that U.S. military personnel should establish the closest possible relations with military men in the countries to which they are assigned so that there could be mutual trust and, above all, understanding of the real dangers with which the military forces in that country must be prepared to cope--the dangers of subversion and Communist insurgency within the country. The President believed in particular that more emphasis was needed on military assistance to Latin America. He cited the example of President Betancourt of Venezuela who needs such assistance to safeguard his position with the military which may hold the balance of power in that country.

 

The President emphasized that chiefs of U.S. military missions and U.S. Military Attach?s occupy extraordinarily important positions. Such U.S. officers should not act as lobbyists against Washington by always seeking increasing amounts of military assistance. The task of U.S. military officers is to influence their opposite numbers. For example, in Iran we would not wish our military men encouraging the Shah of Iran in resisting a decision to reduce their armed forces to 150,000 men. We do not want our military men making the Iranians any more unhappy than they already are.

 

In concluding this section of his remarks, the President emphasized again the importance of cooperation among all departments and agencies concerned with national security. He thought such cooperation had been very good and he was grateful for it. He cited as an example the interdepartmental efforts to improve the situation in the Dominican Republic. "We are partners," he said, "by necessity and choice."

 

In a brief response, the Secretary of State expressed the gratitude of all present for the chance to serve under the President in working on these great issues. The Secretary noted the surging thrust of nationalism throughout the world and expressed his belief that it was proving a tough and resistant force against Communist imperialism. He noted in particular the President's policy of understanding and support for free and independent nations in all continents, and he said that all would wish to commit themselves afresh to the service of the Administration in these purposes.

 

The President then spoke about the following specific items:

 

West Irian. The area is a most unsuitable one for a war in which the United States would be involved. We would not wish to humiliate the Dutch, but on the other hand it would be foolish to have a contest when the Dutch really do want to get out if a dignified method can be found. We should recognize that this territory was likely eventually to go to Indonesia, even though we ourselves might deeply dislike Sukarno as an individual. The real stake here was not West Irian but the fate of Indonesia, the most rich and populous country in the area and one which was the target of energetically pursued Soviet ambitions.

 

Viet-Nam. A really tough case in which the immediate problem is how to cut off a Communist supply line, and in which he knew there was intense and cooperative effort by the departments concerned.

 

Laos. A problem on which there might be serious disagreement. After careful weighing of the risks and an examination of the supply problem, where there was no seaport, we have decided to disengage--to move toward a solution in terms of a neutral and independent Laos. We are continuing in this direction, and we hope that Governor Harriman, who is working on this problem, will be able to work out an effective solution.

 

Cuba. We hope that Castro can be effectively isolated at the coming meeting at Punta del Este, /3/ but we expect this to continue to be a very large problem on which further action might be necessary. The time has not yet come when we must force a solution to the Cuban problem.

 

/3/At their meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay, held January 22-31, the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States voted to exclude Cuba from the Organization.

 

Berlin. There had been no progress in the negotiation up to this point. If that situation persisted, the Soviets could be expected to proceed with a separate peace treaty and there might be a direct test of nerves in the Spring. At such a point the responsibility on the military would be increasingly great. We have to control the developing situation from Washington and a heavy responsibility would rest on the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the military commanders. The President believed that it was important to have prompt and careful study of our contingency plans and to think hard about the ways and means of making decisions that might lead to nuclear war. If there were to be any such war, we must know what it is for, and know what other steps we can take before such war comes.

 

The President then turned to the subject of relations with the press. He thought there were still too many stories appearing which should not have been given to reporters. We do better than others, and the President referred specifically to Bonn and Paris as the worst offenders. But we should improve our own security. We ought not to circulate important papers and cables in a casual way. We ought to be sure that matters on which there may be differences in the Government are not made public if we can avoid it. The President believed that there had been fewer interagency struggles and squabbles in this Administration than in any of which he was aware in recent times. He hoped that this good record could be maintained and improved.

 

Finally, in remarks that were actually given at the opening of the second part of the meeting, the President stated that there were still a number of problems on which study, recommendation and decision took too long. He noted in particular the case of policy toward Yugoslavia. Recommendations had been requested at an NSC meeting three months before, and the matter had come to him for decision only this week. Yet it was not that difficult, and the solution was a relatively simple compromise. The President instructed his own staff and the departments concerned to avoid such delays in the future. /4/

 

/4/The President's remarks were the subject of NSC Action No. 2446, approved by the President on January 22, which reads: "[The NSC] noted the President's information statement to invited officers of the Government principally concerned with the national security affairs of the United States." (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) No list of persons present has been found.

 

 

70. Editorial Note

 

Upon becoming Chairman of the Policy Planning Council and Counselor of the Department of State in November 1961, Walt W. Rostow supervised the preparation of a series of drafts, all entitled "Basic National Security Policy." A draft of February 7, 1962, was circulated within the Department of State only. (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, BNSP Drafts 1/15/62 and 2/7/62) In a memorandum to Secretary Rusk dated February 14, Rostow described the draft as "more analytical than the somewhat oracular texts of earlier basic national security policy papers" and suggested that it might either be circulated by the President after NSC review as an interim guidance, or that a shorter version might be prepared "in the style of an NSC Record of Action." Rostow believed, however, "that it would be difficult to eliminate explanatory material without leaving the policy prescription cryptic or open to serious misunderstanding." (Ibid.)

 

A version dated February 24 is 193 double-spaced pages long. (Ibid., BNSP Draft 2/24/62) The Secretary and other senior Department officers discussed it during a lengthy meeting at Camp David, Maryland, on March 3. For a partial account of this meeting, see Document 73.

 

In his memorandum for the record of the White House daily staff meeting on March 6, at which McGeorge Bundy presided, Colonel Ewell wrote in part: "The President has read Mr. Rostow's draft BNSP. He feels it is quite a good paper, and that everyone should study it thoroughly and give Rostow their comments. Mr. Bundy commented that he felt that the arms control and disarmament were treated with rather a thin brush. He also feels that the first 100 pages are rather superfluous, with the last 100 containing the meat." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62)

 

With a March 26 memorandum to the President, Rostow enclosed a draft BNSP of 285 double-spaced pages, which he described as "semi-final." Rostow stated that "this phase represents a good time for you informally to leave your personal mark on it, while, of course, reserving your final position on the issues it may raise." (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, BNSP Draft 3/26/62) The Department distributed this draft widely throughout the government and to U.S. missions abroad. Many comments received in response are ibid.  See also Documents 75-79 and 85.

 

The March 26 draft, like its two predecessors, opens with an exposition of "Doctrine," or fundamental objectives, and proceeds to a section on "Strategy," or means of implementing these objectives. A third section sets forth specific national security planning tasks, while the fourth and last section details a procedure for anticipating crises.

 

Part One on "Doctrine" sets forth as the major "constructive goal" of U.S. policy an evolving international "free community," defined as one in which nations effectively cooperate "in their areas of interdependence," move forward "in their own ways" toward governments based on "consent and individual freedom," regularly progress in social justice, settle disputes peaceably, increasingly participate in supernational institutions "which transcend and, to some extent, limit the independent powers of the nation-state," and "move progressively" toward an international legal order. U.S. military power must remain at the center of this community to deal with "the flexible arsenal of Communist techniques of aggression" and to support "diplomatic efforts to curb anarchic nationalist impulses." Within this framework of U.S. and allied military power, the United States should work for the attainment of the community objectives listed above.

 

The five major "dimensions" outlined in Part Two on "Strategy" were military policy, policy in the underdeveloped areas, a "framework of organization," policy toward Communist states, and the "national [U.S.] base."

 

Regarding the scale of U.S. strategic retaliatory forces, the paper states that they should be "sufficiently ready and effective so that Sino-Soviet leaders would expect--without question--the Bloc's power position to be worsened drastically as a result of a general nuclear war." They must be "sufficiently invulnerable" so that their survival would not depend on a first strike and controllable enough so that automatic response to perceived threats would not increase the danger of war by miscalculation. In "general war, nuclear weapons will be used from the outset, as determined in advance by the President and subject to his direction and control." Concerning the first strike problem, the paper weighs many issues and concludes that while the United States should not "lock" itself "into first strike plans and assumptions," it should not "so preclude the possibility of launching the first nuclear blow as to deny ourselves the deterrent advantage of Soviet uncertainty on this point." The paper states also that the United States "should not set an absolute requirement that [its] strategic forces be able substantially to destroy all Soviet delivery systems in a first strike." The paper advocates sufficient civil defense to prevent "unnecessary casualties from fall-out" but cautions against "generating unwarranted expectations as to what such programs can accomplish."

 

General purpose forces were to be of increased mobility and capable of containing "non-nuclear aggression short of all-out Soviet or Chinese Communist attack, without using nuclear" weapons. "If a balance must be struck in the training and equipping of these forces as between non-nuclear and nuclear combat, that balance should be struck in favor of non-nuclear combat." A major effort in anti-guerrilla forces, both U.S. and allied, was necessary and it would "not  be sufficient to make counter-guerrilla policy an ancillary objective to be pursued only insofar as it does not interfere with more conventional objectives." While U.S. objectives should be attained whenever possible without nuclear weapons, enemy use of them or overwhelming enemy advantage in conventional forces might compel their use. In such cases, "the primary purpose of the use of a small number of nuclear weapons would be political, rather than military--to convey a signal of U.S. intent" to widen the war, if necessary.

 

The United States had an interest in arms control and disarmament for the following reasons: a second-strike deterrent could be maintained at lower levels of delivery capability if Soviet reductions in arms matched those of the United States; growing Soviet nuclear capacity;  the growing possibility of an expensive nuclear stalemate; the "statistically real if, on the whole, unlikely" possibility of war by accident; and the possibility of nuclear proliferation. Current arms control objectives should "complement our military policy through promoting a stable military environment."

 

In the underdeveloped world, the United States had a military interest in seeing nations not fall under Communist control, an ideological interest in seeing them "evolve in directions" which would "afford a congenial world environment for our own society," and an economic interest that "the resources and the markets of these areas are available to us and to the other industrialized nations of the free world." Toward these ends the draft paper advocated such measures as fine-tuning economic and military aid to the needs of particular countries and encouraging the remaining colonial powers to withdraw gracefully. "In general our basic orientation must be to the modern, progressive, and popularly-based groups within the underdeveloped areas; however, we must recognize that the rise to power of such groups will be a slow and uneven process, and that we may, on occasion, have to accommodate ourselves to less desirable situations."

 

The "framework of organization" referred to alliance systems, economic organizations, the United Nations, and all other international organizations that would serve to "weave together the countries of the free community, draw closer those of the Communist Bloc, and pave the way for the stronger international organizations" which were "essential to the evolutionary development of the free community." The "first and highest priority mission" was to "bind the United States into effective partnership with Europe, Canada, and Japan in the major tasks of defense and modernization within the community of free nations." The paper terms these nations "the northern hard core." Goals regarding Europe include European political integration without destroying the Atlantic Community or NATO, a corresponding reduction in the U.S.-U.K. "special relationship," several of the nuclear sharing schemes then under discussion in NATO, opposition to additional national nuclear programs, and encouragement of the United Kingdom to phase out its independent strategic nuclear program in favor of its participation in a multilateral one.

 

Even though Japan lacked "the domestic political base" to play as great a defense role as the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States should "engage Japanese energies and resources within the free community" so that "this powerful nation, moving forward at an extraordinary rate" would find "a role of dignified world responsibility." This engagement should take place "in the whole area from Karachi to Seoul," in Japan's bilateral relations with the United States, and "in the common enterprises of the north which fall within the work of the OECD."

 

Concerning CENTO, SEATO, and ANZUS the paper observes that "the efforts of the United States to pool the military resources of the area and to provide a feeling of security through regional alliances have not worked out too well," and suggests that the United States, while continuing to support them "for the time being," should "seek to promote other, more broadly-based, and less defense-oriented regional links," with military emphasis being on counter-guerrilla operations.

 

The paper expresses general support for the United Nations but notes that "the UN can and should only play an ancillary role in the major security issues in conflict between East and West." When necessary, the United States should risk "running against the current moods and habits in the UN Assembly" in support of its commitments.

 

Regarding Communist regimes, the draft states that there was both a "new assertiveness," which stemmed from a growing Soviet military power, and "a certain mellowing" of Soviet policy during the post-Stalin period, partly because of realistic Soviet appreciation of the consequences of nuclear war. It was hence necessary to maintain "a constructive as well as a militant track in relations with Communist regimes." Fragmentation within the Bloc would in time "open increased opportunities to deal with Communist nations constructively in terms of limited areas in which our national interests overlap with theirs."

 

In crises, the United States should "try to meet immediate threats in ways which, if possible, reinforce the long-term direction of our policy and minimize the diversionary consequences of our reactions;" for instance, in "the Vietnamese crisis, to increase the degree of mutual involvement and support among non-Communist nations in Asia." Regarding relaxation of tensions, while the United States should "welcome temporary and partial accommodations or detentes," it "should not be diverted by them" from its long-term strategy. The long-term purpose of U.S. policy was to "increase the chance of constructive evolution within that society which might eventually move it to participate in the community of free nations." The "natural forces of fragmentation" in the Bloc made "this long-run hope not wholly illusory."

 

With Eastern Europe, the United States should seek to broaden its contacts and therefore "should play `liberation' in low key," in order to promote "gradual progress" toward an eventual goal of Eastern European countries becoming "members of the free community by a process of peaceful evolution." Regarding China, the paper called for avoiding provocations, "informal negotiations" on minor subjects, and doing nothing which might have the effect of halting the Sino-Soviet split: "we should not so openly favor Khrushchev's point of view as to make it difficult for him to justify it within the Communist camp." The United States "should make clear" that Sino-U.S. relations could be normalized if China modified "its aggressive stance and behavior" and recognized "de facto the existence of an independent Taiwan." Removal of the Nationalist Government from the offshore islands (without diluting otherwise the U.S. military commitment to it) should be "a high priority objective," and the United States should promote the emergence on Taiwan of a "political process increasingly based on popular consent."

 

In the section on "The Domestic Base," the paper called for high domestic growth, "not because rapid growth itself has inherent virtue" but because "a flow of increasing resources" would raise the standard of living, permit the United States to deal with its military responsibilities, and provide a context of prosperity which would make a liberal trading system acceptable to Congress.

 

Part Three of the draft paper treats "national security tasks," which were "major unsolved problems" identified in the course of drafting Parts One and Two. Twenty-five tasks are listed, such as NATO nuclear strategy, the military role in underdeveloped areas, policy toward the Sino-Soviet split, the future of Japan, and U.S. productivity.

 

Part Four, "The Anticipation of Crises," lists 52 potential crises for advance study in the hope of swiftly executing policy if the need arose. Suggested topics include succession crises in the Soviet Union, China, Spain, Portugal, and a number of other countries; "anti-regime" outbreaks in the German Democratic Republic; Soviet intervention in Albania; threatened Communist takeover in Cyprus; military action in the Arab-Israeli conflict; assassination of King Hussein of Jordan; Ghanaian aggression against Togo, Portuguese defeat in Angola; resurgent neutralism in Japan; and a Peronist return to power in Argentina.

 

 

71. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/

 

Washington, February 14, 1962.

 

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, National Security Action Memoranda, NSAM 114. Secret. A copy was sent to Robert Komer.

 

SUBJECT
Police Programs

 

Since I will again be unable to attend the counter-insurgency session Thursday, /2/ I want to urge that we give a good hard push to police programs. I am satisfied by the arguments that they are an essential element in our counter-insurgency effort, particularly in those areas where we are still in the "preventive medicine" phase. /3/

 

/2/February 15.

 

/3/This argument, including use of the term "preventive medicine," had been put to Bundy by Komer very strongly in memoranda dated January 31 and February 7. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Robert Komer 1- 2/62)

 

This being the case, I am concerned by Fowler Hamilton's remarks, as reflected in the minutes of our last meeting (Item 2)./4/ These seem to indicate that police programs are being deemphasized by AID instead of stepped-up, e.g. some are being phased out, responsibility within AID is being diffused, lines of responsibility for such programs are "fuzzy", and there are many differing views as to what kinds of police programs, if any, the US should support.

 

/4/Reference is to the memorandum prepared for the record by Thomas A. Parrott of the NSC Staff of the February 8 meeting of the Counter-Insurgency Group. (Department of State, Special Group (CI) Files: Lot 68 D 451, SG(CI) 1/1-7/31/62)

 

The Group should press on Fowler that it regards police programs, including equipment where necessary, as needing the same type of renewed emphasis which we are currently giving to Special Forces and other aspects of the overall counter-insurgency effort. Given the checkered history of these programs in the aid agency, we might ask Hamilton to consider whether giving them semi-autonomy within AID, earmarking their funds separately, and re-centralizing the police function under him personally might not be essential to protect them adequately. Indeed I wonder whether a Presidential letter to Hamilton/5/ similar to that of 11 January to Bob McNamara/6/ might not be useful. These things do have quite a cathartic effect.

 

/5/Document 72.

 

/6/Document 67.

 

McGeorge Bundy/7/

 

/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

 

72. National Security Action Memorandum No. 132/1/

 

Washington, February 19, 1962.

 

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Interdepartmental Committee on Police. Secret. Copies were sent to Rusk, McNamara, Robert Kennedy, McCone, Bell, General Taylor, and the Director of the Peace Corps. Another copy of this memorandum indicates that it apparently was sent as a letter to Fowler. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, National Security Action Memoranda, NSAM 114) Several NSAMs with lower numbers have later dates. A February 19 note from Komer to Bundy states that Komer drafted this text. Komer commented: "Frank Coffin's weak follow-up on police programs last Thursday convinces me that now is the time for a hortatory JFK prod to Hamilton." Coffin was Deputy Administrator of AID. Parrott's memorandum for the record of the meeting of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) held on Thursday, February 15, is in Department of State, Special Group (CI) Files: Lot 68 D 451, SG(CI) 1/1-7/31/62.

 

TO
The Honorable Fowler Hamilton
The Administrator
Agency for International Development

 

SUBJECT
Support of Local Police Forces for Internal Security and Counter-Insurgency Purposes

 

As you know, I desire the appropriate agencies of this Government to give utmost attention and emphasis to programs designed to counter Communist indirect aggression, which I regard as a grave threat during the 1960s. I have already written the Secretary of Defense "to move to a new level of increased activity across the board" in the counter-insurgency field. /2/

 

/2/Document 67.

 

Police assistance programs, including those under the aegis of your agency, are also a crucial element in our response to this challenge. I understand that there has been some tendency toward de-emphasizing them under the new aid criteria developed by your agency. I recognize that such programs may seem marginal in terms of focusing our energies on those key sectors which will contribute most to sustained economic growth. But I regard them as justified on a different though related basis, i.e., that of contributing to internal security and resisting Communist-supported insurgency.

 

I am further aware that police programs, as a relatively minor facet of the functions of the aid agency, may have tended to receive little emphasis as a result. Therefore, I would like you to consider various ways and means of giving the police program greater autonomy within AID, if this seems necessary in order to protect it from neglect.

 

I fully recognize that police programs must be looked at on a case-by-case basis and that in some instances they can indeed be cut back or eliminated. I simply wish to insure that before doing so we have taken fully into account the importance of the counter-insurgency objective as I view it.

 

In sum, I should like AID to review carefully its role in the support of local police forces for internal security and counter-insurgency purposes, and to recommend to me through the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) what new or renewed emphases are desirable./3/

 

/3/In NSAM No. 146, dated April 20, President Kennedy tasked the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, and the Directors of Central Intelligence and the Bureau of the Budget with establishing an interagency committee to recommend means of aiding police forces in "newly emerging countries to assure that they can maintain order without excessive use of violence." In addition, the committee was to consider "whether the organizational location of technical assistance on police training should remain under AID or be handled in some other manner." (Department of State, S/S -NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 146) The memorandum accompanying the report of the Interagency Committee on Police Assistance Programs is Document 99.

 

John F. Kennedy/4/

 

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Kennedy signed the original.

 

 

73. Memorandum for the Record /1/

 

Washington, March 5, 1962.

 

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, State Department, General, Volume IV. Top Secret. Drafted by Hilsman. Marked for the attention of Thomas L. Hughes, Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research, and Allan Evans, Deputy Director for Research.

 

In the Basic National Security Policy meeting,/2/ my major contribution was to pick up Bob Good's statement/3/ and to deliver it along the following lines.

 

/2/Held at Camp David on Saturday, March 3.

 

/3/Robert C. Good, Director, Office of Research and Analysis for Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. His statement was not found.

 

I started off by saying that according to the Saturday Evening Post, INR was supposed to be the Devil's Advocate, so I was about to advocate some deviltry.

 

I began by saying that the basic concept here reminded me very much of our discussions in the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research concerning the Free World System, and saying that I had been Paul Nitze's principal collaborator in that but that some reservations ought to be made.

 

I said that we don't have as great leverage to create a community of values/4/ as the paper suggests nor does a failure to do this give the Communists as much of an opportunity as the paper suggests.

 

/4/The drafts of February 14 and March 26 spoke in similar terms of the importance of the United States encouraging the emergence of a free world community sharing common democratic political values. See Document 70.

 

In the foreseeable future the lesser developed countries are not susceptible to such organization by either side.

 

In Latin America, the United States has a great opportunity but not so in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.

 

In these areas the notion of an order sponsored by the West is either irrelevant or suspect. It is irrelevant because these nations are largely preoccupied with creating a viable national order of their own. It is suspect because one of the goals of these nations is precisely to disentangle themselves from the old colonial order.

 

The assertion that governments by consent and respect for individual liberty will play a larger role in these countries seems to us to be questionable. In fact, it might be the reverse. The problem in the lesser developed countries is precisely to accumulate power at the center. They must develop a capacity to assemble information and skills at the center; to develop a capacity to reach decisions about a society as a whole at the center; and to develop a capacity to carry out those decisions effectively.

 

This first priority task of developing power, authority, and skills at the center, is not always consistent with at least the forms of western parliamentary democracy; if all the above is so, then in these parts of the world our goal may be less to assure an environment of sustained progress, higher standards of wealth, social justice and so on, and more so to play the game that the Communists are not permitted to swing the balance in their favor.

 

We do not suggest that we should repudiate the effort to create a world order based on a community of value. It is a question of appropriate emphasis.

 

If our prior objective is to create a community of values, we are bound to suffer disillusionment. If we are careless about how we talk about it, we will alienate many on ideological grounds. If we emphasize too much using our resources in helping those who share our values, we will lose flexibility in offsetting Soviet advances.

 

The Secretary immediately challenged me by saying that he thought I should examine this question empirically, that if I looked at the world country by country, he was sure that I would find that most of the nations did in fact share our basic values. He said that the charter of the United Nations was really an expression of our national goals and of the national goals of all countries. I argued that in a discussion in the Washington Center, I had often taken the position that in countries like Ceylon, for example, it was interesting to see that although the elites there frequently criticized the United States, when it came to a choice, they generally acted for western values. My point was one of emphasis.

 

To my amazement, my major support came from Harlan Cleveland,/5/ who said that he thought INR had a good point here and that there were other ways of expressing consent than the forms of parliamentary democracy. This made a little headway with the Secretary who made a distinction between a dictatorship and a monopoly of political power at the top, citing Pakistan where Ayub/6/ would certainly not be replaced by any democratic process, but that if you walked around the streets of the towns or cities in Pakistan, you do not have the impression of a dictatorship.

 

/5/Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

 

/6/Field Marshal Mohammed Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan.

 

George McGhee challenged my point, however, which gave me a good opportunity, because after talking about how dependent he was on coffee plantation worker in Colombia for his coffee and how the plantation worker was dependent upon George for drinking coffee, he cited that he had worked hard to get Nitze's paper into the Draper Report./7/

 

/7/On November 24, 1958, President Eisenhower appointed William H. Draper, Jr., to head the President's Committee To Study the U.S. Military Assistance Program. On June 3, 1959, the Committee submitted to the President its Report on the Organization and Administration of the Military Assistance Program (Washington, 1959).

 

This gave me the opportunity to remind him that I was co-author of that piece that he had worked so hard to get in and that I was not in a position of saying that we should junk it, or, that is, junk the concept, that I was in the same position that Max Millikan and others found themselves in after they wrote the book about "A Proposal"/8/ and found themselves coming to Washington and making speeches against their own book, because they had thought it had been oversold. My point was not that we should not try to build in the direction of a community of shared values but that we should not be oversold on the possibilities of developing a community of shared values. In the process of this, the Secretary suggested that we in INR might sponsor a study with External Research funds on the "Forms of Consent" in other parts of the world.

 

/8/Max F. Millikan and Walt W. Rostow, A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957). The book called for an expanded long-term program of U.S. participation in the economic development of underdeveloped areas.

 

There are two actions that should follow from this:

 

The first is that under Allan Evans' general supervision, we should pull together all the comments by the different offices on the basic national security policy paper into one INR document./9/

 

/9/This document took the form of Research Memorandum INR-62 from Hughes to Rostow, March 6. (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, BNSP, 1961-1962)

 

The second action is that we should at least look into the possibility of an External Research Study on the "Forms of Consent in Other Parts of the World."

 

It may be this is merely a part of our political development studies or possibly that we ask the people involved in the political development studies to write a separate paper on this particular subject. In any event, I leave it to my colleagues to explore whether or not we should do something about this, and, if so, what form it should take.

 

Roger Hilsman/10/

 

/10/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

 

74. Memorandum From Thomas A. Parrott to President Kennedy/1/

 

Washington, March 22, 1962.

 

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense Special Warfare II 1962-1963. Secret.

 

In accordance with General Clifton's request, listed below are some of the more important actions taken in recent weeks in the general field of counter-insurgency. There has not been time to coordinate this paper with the members of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency); however, it has been distributed to the Group today, and any significant comments or additions will be forwarded to you.

 

A. Organization

 

1. The Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) was established by NSAM 124, 18 January 1962./2/ The regular members are:

 

/2/Document 68.

 

General Taylor, Chairman
The Attorney General
Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Administrator, Agency for International Development.

 

Other key officials are invited to meetings as appropriate. Meetings are held weekly/3/ and last a minimum of two hours, usually considerably longer.

 

/3/Meetings were normally held on Thursdays. A chronological set of memoranda of these meetings is in Department of State, Special Group (CI) Files: Lot 68 D 451, SG(CI).

 

2. The Group has brought Laos, Vietnam and Thailand under its direct cognizance. Cambodia was considered carefully and it was decided that that country was not appropriate for the specific attention of the Group. At the request of the State Department, the Ambassador has written a comprehensive survey of conditions in the country. Colombia is currently being examined, and the Group will meet with the Ambassador. The Yarborough Report on Colombia/4/ has been reviewed.

 

/4/Not further identified.

 

B. Specific Subjects Considered by the Special Group (CI)

 

1. Training

 

a. General Taylor visited the following schools, to stimulate reorientation of their curricula toward counter-insurgency: National War College; Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg; Strategic Intelligence School; Military Assistance Institute; Foreign Service Institute; CIA Training Center.

 

b. NSAM 131, "Training Objectives for Counter-Insurgency," was issued on 13 March 1962./5/ Appropriate departments and agencies were directed to establish adequate training for their officers of junior, middle and senior grades, with provision for cross-training.

 

/5/Not printed. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 131)

 

c. Preliminary plans for a "Modernization Institute" have been discussed with you. Details, and alternatives, are being developed by the Bureau of the Budget. Interim summer courses have been approved. Emphasis is being placed on the development of "political sophistication" in military officers, in connection with the approach to counter-insurgency training.

 

2. Vietnam

 

a. Weekly reports of the inter-agency Task Force/6/ are reviewed by the Special Group at each meeting. Corrective action along counter-insurgency lines is directed by the Group on a continuing basis. Special attention has been focused on: improvement of the military command structure; prisoner of war interrogation; provincial surveys; and Border Ranger Forces. The economic programs in South Vietnam have been under review to assure that they are properly oriented toward counter-insurgency.

 

/6/Copies of some of these reports are ibid., Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, and in Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Vietnam.

 

b. The Hilsman Report/7/ was reviewed and a copy sent to General Harkins.

 

/7/"A Strategic Concept for Vietnam," dated February 2. (Ibid., Reports and Memos, 1/62-2/62) It is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. II, Document 42.

 

3. Thailand

 

All programs have been reviewed with the Ambassador. Special attention has been given to: reorientation of the Thai military forces; strengthening and re-equipping of the Border Police; new roads and irrigation projects; political communications programs; telecommunications networks. Projects in all of these fields are under way.

 

4. Police Programs

 

a. AID was directed by a Presidential letter of 19 February 1962/8/ to examine all these programs and to strengthen them as required.

 

/8/Document 72.

 

b. A schedule has been established for the opening of the Inter-American Police Academy, in Panama (1 July 1962).

 

c. The Department of State has submitted an interim report on the United States policy toward internal defense in foreign countries, as required by NSAM 114./9/ A report of an interdepartmental assessment team which made a survey of the internal security situation in ten South American countries was forwarded to the White House on 20 February 1962. Africa is now under review.

 

/9/Document 59.

 

5. Miscellaneous

 

a. The Group has recommended approval of the policy principles outlined by the Department of State, with reference to NSAM 118, "Participation of U.S. and Latin American Armed Forces in the Attainment of Common Objectives in Latin America."/10/

 

/10/See footnote 3, Document 65.

 

b. A committee is at work defining various terms relating to counter-insurgency, and assuring that understanding of them is uniform throughout the government.

 

c. The South America Assessment Team's report was considered by the Special Group (CI). It was believed to be outside of the terms of reference of the Group, and was referred to the Department of State for coordination of departmental responses.

 

d. An Army report on Cold War Programs in Latin America/11/ has been noted by the Group.

 

/11/Not further identified.

 

e. In response to NSAM 119, on Civic Action,/12/ special assessment teams are now returning to Washington after surveys in Korea, Burma and seven Latin American countries. A report is to be made to you before the end of March on the additional projects which can be implemented by AID and DOD during the remainder of FY 1962.

 

/12/Document 65.

 

f. The Special Group (CI) has agreed that counter-insurgency matters relating to Latin America should be the responsibility of the projected Latin America Policy Committee, except for individual countries may be assigned to the Group for special consideration.

 

C. Other Activities

 

The Special Group (CI) has monitored the following activities in the counter-insurgency field. These were initiated, at your direction, before the establishment of the Group.

 

1. A military command has been set up in South Vietnam, under the direction of General Harkins.

 

2. The Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg has been enlarged, and more foreign students are being provided for.

 

3. The Special Forces have acquired a distinctive article of uniform (green beret).

 

4. The scope of guerrilla warfare training in the armed services has been expanded.

 

5. South Vietnam is being used as a training command for selected senior colonels and some brigadier generals.

 

6. Senior officers are being educated in counter-insurgency, and steps are under way to assure that such training and aptitudes are taken into account in future promotions to general officer and flag rank.

 

7. Officers selected for MAAG and attach? assignments are receiving counter-insurgency training.

 

8. The rank of the Commander of the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg has been raised to Brigadier General.

 

9. Specially qualified general and flag officers have been appointed in each of the services and in the Joint Staff, to coordinate counter-insurgency matters.

 

10. Senior staff officers are being sent to three geographical areas which have counter-insurgency problems, for the purpose of acquiring direct area knowledge which can be of use in carrying out their duties in Washington.

 

11. An inventory of U.S. and indigenous paramilitary assets (NSAM 56)/13/ is almost complete.

 

/13/Document 33.

 

12. Test centers have been established in South Vietnam and in Thailand to field test Research and Development items applicable to counter-guerrilla warfare. DOD has initiated a review of counter-insurgency materiel requirements. A preliminary report will be ready within a week.

 

TA Parrott
Assistant to General Taylor

 

 

75. Letter from the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council and Counselor of the Department of State (Rostow)/1/

 

New York, April 9, 1962.

 

/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, BNSP 3/26/62. Secret.

 

Dear Walt: I have gone over with interest your paper on Basic National Security Policy/2/ and take the liberty of submitting a few comments.

 

/2/Reference is to the March 26 draft of "Basic National Security Policy;" see Document 70.

 

The paper obviously covers a great deal of ground and with much of what is said I am in entire agreement. What troubles me about it is primarily a matter of emphasis and balance, not so much what is said as what is not said.

 

It seems to me (1) that the paper concentrates almost entirely on the contest with Communism and how to win it, and (2) that, even within that restricted framework, disproportionate emphasis is laid on the military factor. Certainly no one would deny that the successful conduct of the struggle with Communism is central to the maintenance of our national security and national purposes, or that a very strong military deterrent together with other military, including counterguerilla, capabilities are vital components of a successful national strategy./3/ My concern is that certain other equally important elements are passed over very cursorily, leaving the impression that their place in our national strategy is relatively inconsequential.

 

/3/Next to this sentence Rostow wrote the following marginal note: "I don't, but I can see how he would."

 

I have felt, long before taking on my present job, that the multilateral framework existing in the United Nations and its related agencies created for the United States both opportunities and duties which can contribute substantially to the achievement of our national purposes. Even if one narrows his interest to the struggle against Communism, certainly the eventual orientation of the Afro-Asians and Latin-Americans is a factor which in a hot war could be most significant, in a prolonged cold war competition could be decisive.

 

Our two chief instruments for influencing these nations are (1) economic and military aid and (2) our policies and tactics in the UN and its subsidiaries. Of course there are many other of our national purposes and national interests which are closely involved in the UN and which have little or nothing to do with our struggle against Communism. Yet the original draft of the Security Policy paper/4/ touched on the UN only in the most sketchy fashion and, while the re-draft is an improvement, it still falls decidedly short of what I would consider adequate to balance other elements in the paper. I therefore strongly urge that this section be again reviewed with IO and substantially more of the material supplied to S/P by IO be incorporated. We have submitted detailed comments to IO for this purpose.

 

/4/Apparent reference to the February 24 draft, the first of the Rostow drafts to be widely circulated.

 

Another most significant area in which it seems to me the paper is seriously out of balance is in the relative emphasis it places, on the one hand, on the development of military and political means of combating the Communist threat and, on the other, the development of equally essential means of controlling nuclear weapons systems which, as they are refined, magnified and proliferated, tend to become an even more critical threat to our national security and our national purposes. True, the latter subject is dealt with in the paper but it seems to be largely subordinated to the other aim in a fashion which makes me doubt whether, if the directives of the paper were scrupulously followed, we should ever escape from the self-defeating, even though temporarily necessary, escalation in which we are now engaged.

 

To be more specific, in the basic section entitled "The Setting", pp 3-5, there is only the most tangential and cloudy reference to the fact that an essential element of the setting is that at present our national security could be largely nullified and most of our national purposes frustrated in a matter of days or hours, simply by accident or miscalculation. (In this connection I would contest most strenuously the assertion (p. 78) that "The possibilities of a nuclear war coming about by accident or miscalculation are statistically real if, on the whole, unlikely.")

 

Proceeding from this incomplete account of the setting, the paper immediately moves on to "The Clash" and "The Threat" which concentrate almost exclusively on dealing with the Communist threat. The paper then proceeds to an "Outline of Strategy" in which Military Policy is given a probably unavoidable priority but in which that policy is described in terms of "a stable military environment", than which no imaginable conception could under present circumstances be in my opinion more unrealistic or more dangerously misleading. Is it in fact possible to recall any time in history when the military environment has been less stable or more perilous to humanity and to civilization?

 

Later in this 285 page document "Arms Control" is briefly treated pp. 76-84. In the section on "Relations with Communist Nations" there are three paragraphs pp. 176-178 on "The possibility of a detente" and "Negotiation", but these two subjects are treated very gingerly as though both detente and negotiation were instruments more likely to profit totalitarian than democratic states, an assumption for which I see no justification.

 

Let me reiterate in conclusion that with much of the paper I am in enthusiastic agreement. The extensive attention given throughout to "building a community of free nations", which involves both strengthening our ties with Western Europe, and contributing to the economic and political development of Latin America, Asia and Africa, is certainly admirable. So are many of the proposals, military and non-military, for dealing more effectively with the Communist threat.

 

But I remain deeply troubled by what seems to me the dangerous underemphasis on the threat of uncontrolled nuclear weapons systems to our national security, and on the failure to recognize and utilize adequately multilateral instrumentalities for the pursuit of our national goals.

 

Sincerely yours,

 

Adlai E. Stevenson

 

 

76. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

 

Washington, April 12, 1962.

 

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Folder 40A22. Secret. Forwarded to Taylor with a covering note from Vice Admiral Herbert D. Riley, Director of the Joint Staff. Another copy is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, BNSP 3/26/52.

 

JCSM-277-62

 

SUBJECT
Basic National Security Policy (U)

 

1. The Department of State draft Basic National Security Policy/2/ referred to in the memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) dated 31 March 1962/3/ has been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

 

/2/Reference is to the March 26 draft; see Document 70.

 

/3/Not found.

 

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the Department of State draft will meet their requirements for national guidance in discharge of their statutory responsibilities if the substance of the modifications accompanying this memorandum is incorporated therein. These modifications conform with the earlier views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Basic National Security Policy submitted to you in July 1961,/4/ which are hereby reaffirmed.

 

/4/See Document 39.

 

3. The following general comments are submitted. Specific comments are attached hereto./5/

 

/5/A 20-page Appendix is attached to the Department of State copy cited in the source note above. One change requested is that language in the March 26 draft calling for conventional forces "sufficiently substantial so that they could, in conjunction with available allied troops, contain non-nuclear aggression short of all out Soviet or Chinese Communist attack without using nuclear weapons" be changed to a specification for forces able to contain the attack "long enough to demonstrate our determination to resist even at the risk of expansion of the conflict to nuclear war."

 

a. Over-all: The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it essential that security policy which results from the current considerations specifically recognizes that effective deterrence to any sort of military threat, or to an expansion of any conflict, has as its basis the evident military capability to defeat the forces being deterred. While many other variable factors contribute to effective deterrence, this requirement to defeat the enemy is constant and must be satisfied.

 

b. Over-all: The Joint Chiefs of Staff also consider it essential that the policy provide for control of sea areas and sea lanes vital to the survival of the United States, to the protection of our maritime commerce, and to the support of US and Allied forces overseas.

 

c. In Part I: Doctrine. There appears to be undue emphasis throughout the section that divisive factors in the Communist Bloc such as nationalism, desire for improved standards of living, and impulses for human freedom move toward "a reduction in thrust toward the external world. . ." While these forces tend in this direction, insufficient emphasis is placed upon the still existing strong Police State apparatuses--police, party, military--immediately available to check these tendencies before any threat to the regime can occur, or the probable use of these instruments should the men in power require them.

 

d. In Part II: A Strategy. The NATO strategy now included in Chapter III, The Framework of Organizations, paragraphs 13-17, pages 129-135, would be more appropriate for inclusion in Chapter I Military Policy./6/

 

/6/The equivalent section of the May 7 draft remains in the section on "Framework of Organization." See Document 83.

 

e. In Part III: National Security Council Planning Tasks. The list includes many of the significant unresolved problems affecting Basic National Security Policy. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the terms of reference and specific tasks outlined are not appropriate for NSC action and Presidential decision. As you will note, many of the military studies are currently being conducted under more specific terms of reference as developed within the Department of Defense. It is suggested that Part III be forwarded only for information and approval of the statement of the problem and that the Department responsible for conducting the studies develop specific tasks with consideration for the draft terms of reference.

 

f. Part IV: The Anticipation of Crises

 

(1) This concept has been addressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their recommendations forwarded in JCSM-562-61, dated 30 November 1961, subject, "National Cold War Procedures". /7/

 

/7/Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JCS 1735/598, JMF 3310 (12 Jun 61))

 

(2) It is noted in reviewing Part IV that no consideration has been given to the desirability of the United States creating crises to our own advantage. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that it would be desirable to have the organization capability in-being for this eventuality.

 

g. The security classification of Secret is considered inadequate for control of this document. A Top Secret classification coupled with an injunction to authorize dissemination only on a "need to know" basis is considered appropriate for the Part II: A Strategy, with other sections classified according to content.

 

h. The general theme that there has been a shift in the communist threat from direct to indirect aggression does not acknowledge that this situation has been created, to a great extent, by US and Allied capabilities to deter overt communist aggression. The US goal must be to maintain forces which, at a minimum, confine the communist activities to indirect aggression while at the same time, provide the capabilities to cope effectively with that situation.

 

i. As the economy of the European nations improves, they should provide a greater proportion of the forces in Europe.

 

j. It is noted that the document--by stressing stability, peace and the theme of co-existence--does not give the true thrust of the new BNSP which is much more forcefully stated in paragraph 6, The Projection Abroad of US Purposes, page 214. It is suggested that this paragraph be inserted at the end of paragraph 1, Introduction./8/

 

/8/This paragraph reads: "It is also essential to project abroad a more clear and vivid concept of our aims and of the measures we are taking to move towards them. The understandable difficulties within a pluralistic society of developing and presenting such a concept make it all the more important that the government act consistently and with vigor to project a positive image of U.S. intentions, as developed in this paper, and to dissipate the corrosive conception that our policy is defensive, negative, and reactive." The paragraph is expanded in the May 7 draft (see Document 83), but remains in the section on "The Domestic Base."

 

k. The utility of the document would be improved if condensed as much as practicable without sacrificing continuity or completeness. It should also be rearranged to provide a concise statement of basic principles, long-range objectives and short-range objectives.

 

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the draft volume of BNSP is currently under review by the several departments of the Government. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it essential that they be afforded an opportunity to review this document again when the changes have been incorporated, and prior to its submission to the National Security Council. In this regard, it would appear most appropriate, and advantageous to later review, if the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or their representatives, could be invited to participate actively in the collection of comments and the preparation of this redraft--particularly those areas concerning the military aspects of national security policy.

 

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

 

L.L. Lemnitzer/9/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

 

/9/Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.

 

 

77. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council and Counselor of the Department of State (Rostow)/1/

 

Washington, April 13, 1962.

 

/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, BNSP Draft 3/26/62. No classification marking.

 

I have been unconscionably slow in responding to your great draft of BNSP./2/ Even now I am still pulling together my detailed thoughts, but I want to send you a few comments in connection with the preparation of the agenda for Tuesday./3/

 

/2/Reference is to the March 26 draft; see Document 70.

 

/3/April 17. Apparent reference to a meeting of the Planning Group, no record of which has been found. In a 10-page memorandum to Rostow dated April 23, Bundy reiterated the points he made in this memorandum and then made a detailed critique of the paper. At many points he objected to terms such as "national strategy," "hard core," and "ideology." He called for separation of Parts Three and Four from the draft paper and a drastic reduction in the number of planning tasks. (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, BNSP Draft 3/26/62)

 

I myself question whether, when we come to action, we shall want to approve as national policy a document anything like as long or as fully argued as this one. I doubt very much if we can achieve consensus or clear Presidential approval on anything as comprehensive as this, and I also think that, to secure effective attention to the things we really do care about, we need to put them more sharply and briefly. This pudding has most of the plums, but I think they should be pulled out and made more feasible.

 

I have a grave reservation about the notions implied by the words "doctrine" and "strategy" in connection with basic policy. They imply that our attitudes are "doctrinaire" and our activities all bound by some single "strategic" concept. I think neither proposition is correct, and I much prefer the simple and traditional word "policy." I do not think this is just a terminological difference.

 

The paper seems to me to imply a kind of equal and adequate effort everywhere, and I think both abroad and at home we have to have a clear sense of limits, and of priorities.

 

Having said all this, I regard the paper as much the most important forward move that has taken place in the area of framing basic policy positions since we came in, and for its military passages alone it seems to me to justify its existence.

 

These are brief and sweeping comments, and I will try to be ready to justify them specifically on Tuesday.

 

McG. B./4/

 

/4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

 

 

78. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Rowen) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

 

Washington, April 14, 1962.

 

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JCS 2101/469, JMF 3001 (26 Mar 62). Secret. Enclosed with a note from the Secretaries of the Joint Staff to the JCS dated April 20.

 

SUBJECT
Draft Basic National Security Policy (BNSP)

 

The Tuesday luncheon meeting of the Planning Group is scheduled to discuss the draft BNSP (Tab A)/2/ on 17 April 1962./3/

 

/2/Reference is to the March 26 draft; see Document 70.

 

/3/No record of this meeting has been found.

 

The draft BNSP is a commendable effort to describe a coherent national security policy. It goes far toward meeting the frequently expressed need for a "grand design" to which diverse activities and day-to-day designs of government can be related. The key concepts in this design appear to be four:

 

(1) Free World defense

(2) Free World construction

(3) Communication with the Communist world

(4) As a result of the first three concepts, containment and ultimate alteration of the Communist world in a direction more favorable to our national interests.

 

On the whole, the coverage of (1) and (2) is quite good. It is in (3) and (4) where the BNSP seems to require some clarification. ISA comments on selected portions only of the draft BNSP are attached and are summarized herewith:/4/

 

/4/None of the enclosures is printed.

 

Defense of the Free World (Inclosure 1)

 

That more explicit observations as expressed in the inclosure be included in the BNSP.

 

Political Decisions in Nuclear War (Inclosure 2)

 

Revise to: indicate broadly the level and nature of nuclear warfare decisions held centralized by the President; and include reference to the inviolability of the legal chain of military command in executing such Presidential decisions.

 

European Community Compared with an Atlantic Community (Inclosure 3)

 

Revise to reflect: Before settling finally on a policy of supporting full European unity and a relationship of partnership between a united Europe and the U.S., the U.S. should carefully study the feasibility and the relative desirability of selective moves in the direction of strengthening Atlantic political as well as economic and military ties.

 

Policy Toward Satellites (Inclosure 4)

 

Revise to reflect that the threat of instability in Satellite countries imposes some restraint on Soviet aggressiveness and that we should therefore find ways to remind the Soviet leadership of this vulnerability.

 

Policy Toward the Far East (Inclosure 5)

 

Revise to reflect:

 

a. That military policy toward the Far East, covering nations which are (a) allied or friendly, (b) neutral, and (c) hostile, should be covered more fully and in greater detail, in order to provide greater guidance to those responsible for its execution.

 

b. That the status, present and projected, of the GRC and its relationship to Communist China, as visualized in U.S. strategy, be clarified.

 

c. That any policy leading toward abandoning the offshore islands be carefully examined in all its ramifications, especially with respect to its timing, before adoption.

 

d. That existing treaties covering the Far East be re-examined with a view to increasing their effectiveness, prior to creating substitute pacts.

 

Potential or Limitations of Conventional Forces (Inclosure 6)

 

Revise to reflect:

 

a. The desirability as an objective of general purpose forces which along with Allied forces are sufficiently strong and mobile to cope with major Soviet or Chinese Communist non-nuclear attacks, without resorting to nuclear weapons, simultaneously on two distant fronts. However, a distinction should be made between the importance of various areas and the feasibility of defending them without the use of nuclear weapons.

 

b. That efforts to develop adequate counter-insurgency capabilities in our own as well as Allied forces and to put more emphasis on economic as distinct from military assistance programs not be carried to the point that conventional capabilities are seriously degraded in countries exposed to overt aggression and such aggression therefore made more tempting.

 

JCS Comments:

 

The comments of the JCS are attached and are summarized herewith:/5/

 

/5/Not found attached; reference is to Document 76.

 

JCS Comments	Recommended OSD Position
a. Effective deterrence must have as its basis the evident military capability to defeat the forces being deterred.	a.  Concur, with some elaboration of the word "defeat" in the general war context in the light of the consequences of nuclear war.
b.  Provide for control of vital sea areas and sea lanes.	b.  Concur.
c.  Undue emphasis on divisive factors in the Communist Bloc.	c.  Broadly concur.
d.  Move NATO strategy from Chapter III to Chapter I.	d.  Concur.
e.  Terms of reference and specific tasks of National Security Policy planning tasks are not appropriate for NSC action and Presidential decision. Forward Part III formally for information and approval of the statement of the problem.	e.  Concur.
f.  It would be desirable to have the organizational capability in-being to create crises to our own advantage.	f.  OSD recommends that the point be further developed before a position is taken.
g.  Upgrade the classification to Top Secret coupled with dissemination of Part II on a "need-to-know" basis.	g.  OSD believes that document should be screened for minimum feasible classification.
h.  U.S. maintain forces which, at a minimum, confine the Communist activities to indirect aggression, while at the same time, provide the capabilities to cope effectively with that situation.	h.  Concur.
i.  European nations should provide greater proportion of the forces in Europe.	i.  Concur.
j.  Insert Para. 6, page 214, at end of para. 1, Introduction.	j.  Concur.
k.  Condense and rearrange the BNSP as much as practicable.	k. Concur.
l.  JCS review BNSP again prior to its submission to the NSC. Representatives of JCS participate in the preparation of the redraft.	l.  Concur.

 

An advance copy of this memorandum with inclosures and the comments of the JCS have been provided to Mr. Rostow. This was necessary in order to meet the deadline for State's reproduction requirements. State understands that this copy is subject to your review.

 

It is recommended that the Secretary of Defense:

 

a. Authorize use of this memorandum and that from the JCS (Tabbed) as a basis for discussion by the OSD representative with Mr. Rostow at the Planning Group meeting, 17 April 1962./6/

 

/6/A note by Gilpatric in the margin beside this paragraph reads: "4/16/62 approved. RG" In a memorandum for the record of a conversation held with McNamara on April 18, Taylor wrote: "The Secretary likes this document [the March 26 draft] as a form of general guidance, but recognizes that considerable work has to be done upon the language. He appreciates the fact that to make it a text for strict guidance to the departments would require extensive and time-consuming editing, an exercise which he does not consider remunerative." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, #11 Miscellaneous (H))

 

b. Sign the attached memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff./7/

 

/7/This memorandum transmitted Rowen's memorandum to the JCS.

 

Henry S. Rowen

 

 

79. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council and Counselor of the Department of State (Rostow)/1/

 

Washington, April 16, 1962.

 

/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, BNSP 3/26/62. Secret.

 

SUBJECT
Comments on March 26 Draft BNSP

 

1. The world as viewed in this document divides neatly into two parts--a free world and a Communist world. Although the ambiguous position of a nation like Yugoslavia is recognized in detail, such details are not reflected in the grand scheme. The free world is defined by exclusion as simply the whole world minus the Communist bloc, and is referred to either as the free community or as the evolving free community of nations. In this context our security policy rests on two simple propositions. First, we should guard the boundaries of the free world, i.e., prevent any movement of nations from the free world to the Bloc (pp 8-11, 14-16). Second, this is a feasible task. We can always succeed in preventing any undesirable change by the proper combination of the threat of military force, the application of military force, including counter-subversive and counter-guerrilla force, and the provision of economic aid. The use of other instruments of diplomacy is also recognized, but given a lesser place (pp 22-31).

 

2. These axioms imply two further propositions. First, Communism is an aberration on the path of political-economic development. No nation becomes Communist mainly because the Communist forces within it form the best organized, most aggressive, most able political group whose appeal to rising political elites--university students, army officers, would-be prophets of national development--is strong enough to carry the day. Not only did Marx not proclaim the universal truth; he proclaimed the universal myth, false in all instances. It is Communist subversion and indirect aggressions, Soviet or Chinese led, not social revolution internally generated, that is the cause.

 

That the present balance of membership between the free community of nations and the Communist bloc is the optimum balance is the second major corollary of the two fundamental propositions. Indeed if the world does divide neatly into two parts and the smaller part is trying to expand at the expense of the larger, there is something obvious about the proposition that it is in the interests of the larger part to resist such a shift. Even at this level of analysis, however, obvious does not equal correct. If, for example, we were to observe that the costs of our resisting expansion are related to the strength of the expansive impulse on the other side and, further, if we suspected that the strength of the expansive impulses might obey the familiar dynamic law of proportionality to the difference between the present situation and the pre-set goal (e.g., world domination), then we can see a simple counter-example to the truth of the obvious proposition.

 

3. There is an alternative view of the world which appears more useful for the purposes of defining national policy. From our own perspective, the world is divided into at least three, rather than two, parts, the boundary lines of which are by no means well-defined or firm. One part consists of the U.S. and the nations most closely associated with it in terms of fundamental security interests: the NATO Alliance. Another group consists of the Sino-Soviet bloc. Other nations have attachments to these two groups of different degrees of permanence and strength. The essential problem of our security policy is at the minimum to prevent a significant shift in the balance of power between the two polar groups and, to the extent consistent with other constraints on our policy, to increase the unity, power and influence of our own group at the expense of the Bloc. The constraints which operate to limit the means available and appropriate to this purpose fall broadly into two classes: those arising from our nature as an individualistic, voluntaristic, democratic society and those arising from the limitations of our own power and that of the group of nations with whom we are most intimately bound. An important part of the limitations of our own power arises from the fact that, while the other NATO nations have goals closely similar to ours, they are not in fact identical, and we deal with them by consensus rather than direction. Although, logically, it falls into the first category of constraints on our policy, the awful character of thermonuclear war deserves mention as a separate constraint. Its consequences for the character and possibly the survival of our civil society are such that it becomes an instrument of policy whose uses are sharply limited.

 

From the polar Soviet perspective the world looks much the same, and our problem is to some extent the converse of theirs. We say "to some extent" because the role of an ideological doctrine in the Soviet world perspective has no parallel in our own world view. The doctrine of freedom in individual and national choice is not one that readily fills a parallel role to the doctrine of universal class struggle ending in the ultimate triumph of communism.

 

The draft BNSP cogently states the significance of the revolution of modernization which is sweeping the under-developed two-thirds of the world as the environment in which the contest between ourselves and the Bloc is taking place. It also properly states our hopes in respect to this struggle. However, we must interpose a calculus of cost between our hopes and our goals, and it is in this calculus of cost that the draft is deficient.

 

4. It is clear that an entirely different order of priority attaches to maintaining the integrity and unity of the inner group of nations with which we are closely allied. This high priority is reflected both in the major significance that NATO has in our military policy and in the framework of organizational arrangements for economic and political cooperation within the North Atlantic community. Our military commitments to defend at least these areas is on a par with our military commitment to the defense of the United States itself. This commitment is central to the intimacy of political and economic relations within the area. It is an important question as to how far we extend this framework to include Australia, New Zealand and Japan. One question that arises in this connection, is the extent to which China will grow to possess military power that threatens these nations to the same extent that Soviet military power threatens Western Europe.

 

5. For the other parts of the world, our commitments are hard to state in general a priori terms. In general, we do, as the draft states, wish to help nations on the path to modernization and self-realization, with a political orientation at least neutral as between ourselves and the Bloc, other things being equal. And by the same token, other things being equal, we wish to prevent, if we can, any nation from joining the Bloc, or orienting itself strongly to it. But it is difficult to say something less general and abstract. In a given situation, we must evaluate all factors to decide what kind of extension of Bloc influence or power raises what kind of questions for us of countering it on the one hand; and on the other, what means to attempt to counter it are available at what costs and with what prospects of success. In general, it would appear safe to say that in most cases we would resist direct expansion of Bloc power by overt military means, but even here it is difficult to make strong over-all commitments. If the Chinese Communists infiltrate Burma, and follow this infiltration by an overt march across the borders of Burma, which the Burmese do not resist, are we prepared in fact to respond? If not, can we successfully communicate to the Chinese Communists the sense that we are? If after five more years of growth of Soviet influence in the Afghan Army, that Army revolts, overthrows the present regime and invites the assistance of the Soviets in their revolt, how should we be prepared to respond?

 

At all those lesser levels of violence covered by the phrase "indirect aggression and subversion," the difficulty of stating any general policy line is even greater. A primary instrument--perhaps even in fact a necessary condition--in successful resistance to indirect aggression is local leadership with a will to resist and significant popular support (though not necessarily majority support in any conventional sense). There is a serious problem of how far we in fact are able to go, as well as how far we are ready to go in creating such governments where they do not exist. If Nkrumah/2/ allows himself to be influenced more and more by Moscow-trained and Moscow-oriented members of his government, can we in fact do much about it and even if we can, should we try?

 

/2/Kwame Nkrumah, President of Ghana.

 

6. The conclusion to be drawn with respect to our policy in the large part of the world outside our own central group and the Soviet Bloc is that we proceed here on a case-by-case method. To be sure we start with some sense of relevant priorities, some calculus of costs and returns. It is obviously of far greater importance to our own policy goals to keep India on its present somewhat western-oriented neutral path than it is to keep Burma from being infiltrated by Chinese Communists, and we should behave accordingly. In Latin America, it is far more important to try to keep Argentina and Brazil economically progressing and politically stable than it is to prevent Georgetown from becoming a quasi-Communist capital.

 

7. The perspective here sketched has obvious implications for both aid policy and military policy. While it remains true that there are reasons for giving aid not intimately connected with the orientation of a nation in the contest between ourselves and the Bloc, it also remains true that we cannot ignore this contest in determining aid priorities. The whole argument for giving Latin America a special priority is a political one, not one based on development criteria.

 

What we are prepared to defend by military means, and what we state or suggest we are prepared to defend, is still the key element in the application of our power. Ultimately it is these commitments, explicit and implicit, which form the framework of our foreign policy, since they give substantive content to the term "vital interest" used in a literal sense. Therefore, the difference in perspective suggested here makes an important difference in the way we view our military responsibilities and accordingly in the way we determine our military needs.

 

8. If these criticisms and comments are well taken, one appropriate way to meet them is by changing the organization in the draft so that it reflects priorities in our security policy to a greater extent than it now does. In particular, it would appear appropriate immediately after discussion of the nature of the threat and the world environment in which it operates to discuss our relations with NATO; to follow this by discussion of other areas of strong interest, e.g., Latin America and Japan; and then to discuss other parts of the world in general terms along the lines of the present draft.

 

CK

 

 

80. Letter From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council and Counselor of the Department of State (Rostow)/1/

 

Washington, April 23, 1962.

 

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-138-69. Secret.

 

Dear Walt:

 

The Easter week end allowed me to re-read the text of your Basic National Security Policy,/2/ and to develop several additional thoughts beyond those previously submitted to you.

 

/2/Reference is to the March 26 draft; see Document 70.

 

a. Dual Capability Military Forces

 

I feel that the BNSP should contain a clear statement of policy with regard to the dual capability desired in our Armed Forces. This refers, of course, to their ability for sustained combat, either with or without the use of atomic weapons. Several years ago the Army made this dual capability its objective and has developed its forces with reasonable consistency to this principle. The Air Force, and to a lesser degree the Navy, went the other way, assuming that atomic weapons would henceforth be used with little limitation. For them to change completely now would be a very expensive operation, and with respect to strategic weapons, undesirable--all the more reason for giving specific guidance.

 

b. The Role of Tactical Atomic Weapons

 

To my knowledge there has never been a comprehensive statement of national policy on the role of tactical atomic weapons in the Armed Forces. Such statements as have been made on this subject have been confused by failure to define what are tactical atomic weapons. In the course of time, this term has come to mean those weapons employed by the Army or delivered by tactical aircraft. Thus, they vary in yield from the very small Army Davy Crockett to the megaton weapons transportable in tactical aircraft.

 

Obviously, there is little in common either as to use or effects of weapons of such differing characteristics. In my view, we should divide this category into two parts: One, those for short-range battlefield employment varying in yield from a few tons of TNT to a few KT; the second, the interdiction weapons which would include the higher yields among the present tactical weapons. The interdiction weapons would be used to keep hostile ground forces from the battlefield. The small atomic weapons would be used to destroy the enemy at relatively close range with discrimination and without significant fallout hazard to our own troops or friendly populations. Something like this needs to be said in the BNSP.

 

c. Modernization of NATO Forces

 

I do not believe that the present text of the BNSP recognizes specifically the need to modernize NATO atomic weapons. I was impressed during my recent visit to Europe with the interest, particularly of the Germans, in our modernization policy. They will never be content to be told that the weapons on the continent will gradually disappear to be replaced by better ones over the horizon, perhaps, in the United States. It is perfectly clear that the so-called external nuclear forces have no application to the battlefield requirements which can be met only by the small atomic weapons mentioned in the preceding paragraph. To Germans concerned with the safety of Hamburg and Munich, it is no reassurance to know that SAC or, for that matter, a NATO MRBM force at sea is looking after their interests.

 

d. Resistance to Aggression Without Using Atomic Weapons

 

Is it impossible for the BNSP to give some guidance as to the size of an aggression which we should be able to meet without resort to atomic weapons? I understand the difficulty of expressing dimensions, but am often impressed with the difference in time apparently present in the minds of people discussing the "pause" to be imposed by conventional weapons. To some in General Norstad's headquarters, this seems to mean a very short time, or perhaps no time at all after contact with the enemy has been made. Elsewhere one talks in term of days, or perhaps weeks. Between these extremes, there is a very wide range of requirements in friendly forces to impose the pause. It would be interesting to war game a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict to determine the difference in forces required to hold one day against a full onslaught versus the forces needed to hold for eight days.

 

e. A Multilateral NATO MRBM Force

 

With completely smooth sailing, it will take five or six years to produce the weapons and organization necessary for the multilateral NATO MRBM force as presently conceived. If this force has any utility--and its utility can be argued--it is to satisfy the Germans who, reportedly, have a deep feeling on this subject. If the latter is true, will they be willing to wait five or six years to get it? I would think that if we are sincere in supporting this later force, we would be scrounging about to get an interim solution in a much shorter time based on the employment of existing weapons. I find nothing in the BNSP on this subject.

 

A final general comment would be to suggest the inclusion of more unresolved points in your Part Three. I am sure that the comments which you have received from those reading the BNSP reveal disagreement on a good many points which are now in the foreword part of the text. Where a solution to the disagreements is not possible in the relatively short time available, you might want to move the issues back into your Part Three. Here we would find our unfinished business and our homework for a number of months to come.

 

Hoping that I am not too late for the foregoing observations,

 

Sincerely,

 

Maxwell D. Taylor/3/

 

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

 

81. Editorial Note

 

On April 25, 1962, the U.S. Intelligence Board circulated NIE 13-2-62, "Chinese Communist Advanced Weapons Capabilities." The Estimate acknowledged important gaps in available information and therefore did not attempt to predict the year in which deployment of a complete weapons system would probably begin. Regarding a Chinese nuclear test, the Estimate concluded: "Assuming an accelerated and highly successful program for the production of plutonium since 1960, the Chinese Communists could detonate an all-plutonium device in early 1963. However, in the light of all the evidence, it is unlikely that the Chinese will meet such a schedule. We believe that the first Chinese test would probably be delayed beyond 1963, perhaps by as much as several years." The Air Force dissented, believing that a plutonium explosion was "likely" by 1963 and that if this occurred, it would be within Chinese capabilities to test a thermonuclear device "by the end of the decade." The Navy, on the other hand, believed there was insufficient evidence to make any "reliable estimate of the Chinese Communist program in the development of nuclear weapons."

 

The Estimate also concluded that a nuclear weapons program had been underway in China since the early 1950s, and a guided missile program since the late 1950s; that the Chinese program had received substantial Soviet assistance until about mid-1960; that any attempt to mass-produce advanced weapons would be difficult for China; that China would need 2 or more years after its first nuclear test to develop fission weapons for nuclear warheads, and that it would probably not undertake to develop surface-to-air missiles until at least the mid-1960s; that "within the next few years, the Chinese could begin to deploy short-range (up to 350 n.m.) surface-to-surface missiles with nonnuclear warheads"; and that "in more advanced fields--submarine missile systems, IRBMs, ICBMs, antimissile systems, and thermonuclear weapons--China [was] not likely to achieve independent capabilities during the 1960s." (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry) For complete text, see the Supplement.

 

 

82. Address by Secretary of Defense McNamara at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/1/

 

Athens, May 5, 1962.

 

/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Europe. Top Secret. Attached to Instruction No. CW-9106, May 15. The Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council was held in Athens May 4-6. Secretary McNamara delivered a similar address in unclassified form in Ann Arbor, Michigan, on June 16. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 9, 1962, p. 64.

 

[Here follows an introductory section.]

 

I. General Nuclear War and Its Deterrence

 

Nuclear technology has revolutionized warfare over the past seventeen years. The unprecedented destructiveness of these arms has radically changed ways of thinking about conflict among nations. It has properly focused great attention and efforts by the Alliance on the prevention of conflict. Nevertheless, the U.S. has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible basic military strategy in general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, our principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces while attempting to preserve the fabric as well as the integrity of allied society. Specifically, our studies indicate that a strategy which targets nuclear forces only against cities or a mixture of civil and military targets has serious limitations for the purpose of deterrence and for the conduct of general nuclear war.

 

In our best judgment, destroying enemy forces while preserving our own societies is--within the limits inherent in the great power of nuclear weapons--a not wholly unattainable military objective. Even if very substantial exchanges of nuclear weapons were to occur, the damage suffered by the belligerents would vary over wide ranges, depending upon the targets that are hit. If both sides were to confine their attacks to important military targets, damage, while high, would nevertheless be significantly lower than if urban-industrial areas were also attacked. As an example, our studies of a hypothetical general nuclear war occurring in 1966 show that, with the conflict starting under one particular set of circumstances, and with the Soviets confining their attacks to military targets, the United States under present civil defense plans might suffer 25 million deaths and Europe might suffer somewhat fewer. On the other hand, were the Soviets to attack urban-industrial as well as military targets, the United States might incur 75 million deaths and Europe would have to face the prospect of losing 115 million people. While both sets of figures make grim reading, the first set is preferable to the second. There are others like them.

 

In the light of these findings the United States has developed its plans in order to permit a variety of strategic choices. We have also instituted a number of programs which will enable the Alliance to engage in a controlled and flexible nuclear response in the event that deterrence should fail. Whether the Soviet Union will do likewise must remain uncertain. All we can say is that the Kremlin has very strong incentives--in large part provided by the nuclear strength of the Alliance--to adopt similar strategies and programs. Thus, we calculate that in 1966, if the Alliance were to limit its retaliatory attack to miltary targets in the Soviet Union, while holding superior forces in reserve, the Soviets might suffer around 25 million deaths, whereas if we attack urban-industrial targets in the wake of a Soviet strike against European and American cities, the Soviets would suffer at least 100 million deaths.

 

Other factors besides target strategies of the belligerents would determine the damage in a thermo-nuclear war. The yields of the warheads used in a nuclear exchange would make a significant difference in the amount of blast, thermal, and fallout damage; and it is possible to match the yields to the particular targets under attack and so reduce damage to civilians. Furthermore, as the accuracy of missiles improves, the belligerents could attack targets with greater assurance of destroying them; they could also reduce the yields with which they strike. If they so choose, they could regulate the height at which they burst their weapons and thereby affect the amount of fallout that is distributed. The existence of civil defenses also could have a significant impact on the number of deaths, especially if only military targets are attacked so that the principal danger to most civilians is from fallout. Depending on these and other factors, the number of deaths could vary over a wide range--by four times or more. The more discriminating the attacks, the less the damage.

 

I have raised these points because we think they are relevant to allied defense policies now and in the future. In particular, we believe that they have important implications for the general war posture of the Alliance and the role that NATO should assign to nuclear forces in its grand strategy.

 

II. The General War Posture of the Alliance

 

Perhaps the most important implication of these observations is that nuclear superiority has important meanings. I want to stress that for the most relevant planning period--through the mid 1960's--there can be little question about the ability of the Alliance to maintain nuclear superiority over the Sino-Soviet Bloc. During the coming fiscal year the United States plans to spend close to $15 billion on its nuclear weapons to assure such superiority.

 

[Here follows a description of the U.S. strategic retaliatory arsenal, target coverage of the threat to Europe, survivability and control, and indivisibility of control.]

 

III. The Role of General War Strength in Alliance Strategy

 

What does the Alliance accomplish by creating this complex machinery to maintain nuclear superiority over the Sino-Soviet Bloc? And what is the impact on NATO's policies of both the grave damage that would result from nuclear war and the great variations in that damage under different strategies?

 

My Government feels that the strategic capabilities I have described have important political consequences. The Alliance continues to possess much of the diplomatic freedom that it has enjoyed in the past. We can confidently reject the missile threats that Mr. Krushchev so imprudently brandishes. If the Soviets or their satellites impinge on our interests we can resist with considerable confidence that our antagonists will not wish to escalate the conflict. The question at issue now is the point at which NATO, not the Soviets, would wish to escalate a non-nuclear conflict.

 

As the President has indicated on a number of occasions, the United States is prepared to respond immediately with nuclear weapons to the use of nuclear weapons against one or more members of the Alliance. The United States is also prepared to counter with nuclear weapons any Soviet conventional attack so strong that it cannot be dealt with by conventional means. But let us be quite clear what we are saying and what we have to face. Owing to our non-nuclear deficiencies, there is, first, a high probability that in an ambiguous situation the West, not the East, would have to make the decision to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Secondly, there is the almost certain prospect that, despite our nuclear superiority and our ability to destroy the Soviet target system, all of us will suffer deeply in the event of major nuclear war.

 

The Berlin crisis exemplifies a type of threat that we should expect to face elsewhere in the NATO area. In such a crisis the provocation, while severe, does not immediately require or justify our most violent reaction. Also as such a crisis develops, as military force is threatened or becomes engaged--even in limited quantities--the increasingly alert nuclear posture of the belligerents makes the prospective outcome of a nuclear attack for both sides even less attractive.

 

In short, faced with the more likely contingencies, NATO, not the Soviets, would have to make the momentous decision to use nuclear weapons, and we would do so in the knowledge that the consequences might be catastrophic for all of us.

 

We in the United States are prepared to accept our share of this responsibility. And we believe that the combination of our nuclear superiority and a strategy of controlled response gives us some hope of minimizing damage in the event that we have to fulfill our pledge. But I would be less than candid if I pretended to you that the United States regards this as a desirable prospect or believes that the Alliance should depend solely on our nuclear power to deter the Soviet Union from actions not involving a massive commitment of Soviet force. Surely an Alliance with the wealth, talent, and expression that we possess can find a better way than this to meet our common threat.

 

We shall continue to maintain powerful nuclear forces for the Alliance as a whole. They will continue to provide the Alliance a strong sanction against Soviet first use of nuclear weapons. Under some circumstances they may be the only instrument with which we can counter Soviet non-nuclear aggression, in which case we should use them. But, in our view, the threat of general war should constitute only one of the several weapons in our arsenal and one to be used with prudence. On this question I can see no valid reason for a fundamental difference of view on the two sides of the Atlantic.

 

IV. Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons

 

Our great nuclear superiority for general war does not solve all our problems of deterring and dealing with less than all-out direct assault. What, then, is the prospect that NATO can fall back on the local or tactical use of nuclear weapons? Battlefield nuclear weapons were introduced in NATO at a time when our Shield forces were weak and the Soviet atomic stockpile was small. In these circumstances it was reasonable to hope that NATO might very quickly halt a Soviet advance into Western Europe by unilateral application of nuclear weapons on or near the battlefield. Using nuclear weapons tactically might still accomplish a desired end in the early 1960's. Consequently, we continue to maintain substantial nuclear forces within the European theater and we now have over [omission in the source text] nuclear weapons of various yields stockpiled in Europe.

 

But how much dependence should NATO place on these capabilities? We should succeed in deterring the Soviets from initiating the use of nuclear weapons, and the presence of these weapons in Europe helps to prevent Soviet use locally. But NATO can no longer expect to avoid nuclear retaliation in the event that it initiates their use. Even a local nuclear exchange could have consequences for Europe that are most painful to contemplate. Further, such an exchange would be unlikely to give us any marked military advantage. It could rapidly lead to general nuclear war.

 

To be sure, a very limited use of nuclear weapons, primarily for purposes of demonstrating our will and intent to employ such weapons, might bring Soviet aggression to a halt without substantial retaliation, and without escalation. This is a next-to-last option we cannot dismiss. But prospects for success are not high, and I hesitate to predict what the political consequences would be of taking such action. It is also conceivable that the limited tactical use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield would not broaden a conventional engagement or radically transform it. But we do not rate these prospects very highly.

 

Highly dispersed nuclear weapons in the hands of troops would be difficult to control centrally. Accidents and unauthorized acts could well occur on both sides. Furthermore, the pressures on the Soviets to respond in kind, the great flexibility of nuclear systems, the enormous firepower contained in a single weapon, the ease and accuracy with which that firepower can be called in from unattacked and hence undamaged distant bases, the crucial importance of air superiority in nuclear operations--all these considerations suggest to us that local nuclear war would be a transient but highly destructive phenomenon.

 

I realize there is a school of thought which believes that the United States and the Soviet Union might seek to use Europe as a nuclear battleground and thus avoid attacks on one another's homelands. Not only does my government emphatically reject such a view; we also regard it as unrealistic. It ignores the basic facts of nuclear warfare I have described; it contemplates geographical limits unrelated to the actualities of target locations, and of the varied sources from which attacks would come. Any substantial nuclear operation in Europe inevitably would involve both forces and targets in the U.S. and USSR. It is possible, as I have mentioned, that a small, demonstrative use of nuclear weapons could be contained locally, and possibly, distant nuclear operations in less vital locations outside the NATO area, or at sea, may be limitable. But there is likely to be no effective operational boundary, or set of mutual restraints, which could restrict large-scale nuclear war to NATO Europe and the satellites. As we understand the dynamics of nuclear warfare, we believe that a local nuclear engagement would do grave damage to Europe, be militarily ineffective, and would probably expand very rapidly into general nuclear war.

 

V. Non-Nuclear Forces and Deterrence

 

With the Alliance possessing the strength and the strategy I have described, it is most unlikely that the Soviet Union will launch a nuclear attack on NATO. But there are other forms of aggression, and in December I mentioned our concern that the threat of general war might be adequate against many lesser Soviet actions, political as well as military. Some such hostile actions we could thwart now; others we might not. To deal with these others, how can we convincingly show that aggression, if continued, would lead to a situation where the danger of nuclear war was very great indeed? Let us assume two situations:

 

In the first, the NATO front is lightly covered by our forces. In the event of deep penetration by Soviet non-nuclear forces which our forces cannot prevent, the only military options open to Alliance forces are immediate nuclear response or defeat. This might be true even for a minor Soviet challenge.

 

In the second, we assume the NATO front firmly held under a concept of forward strategy. Ready and able to deal with any Soviet non-nuclear attack less that all-out, NATO forces guard positively from the frontier against any quick strike or ambiguous aggression. The NATO front can be broken only by massive application of Soviet power. In such a major fight, if Western forces were thrown back, Alliance nuclear action would follow.

 

If you were on the other side, which situation would you consider more laden with a real risk of nuclear war with all its consequences? Which would make you more inclined to refrain from a series of actions designed, step by step, to erode NATO's interests? To us the answer is clear.

 

In the first situation, it simply is not credible that NATO, or anyone else, would respond to a given small step--the first slice of salami--with immediate use of nuclear weapons. Nor is it credible that a chain of small actions, no one of which is catastrophic, would evoke a response of general nuclear war. We regard it as much more evident that NATO would find it politically possible to act in effective defense of its interests from the second posture than from the first.

 

The development of recent events concerning Berlin may provide relevant evidence of the utility of limited but decisive action. Although it would be premature to announce the end of this crisis, and in any case we cannot be certain of the influences that most affect Kremlin policy, it is not unlikely that the NATO non-nuclear buildup conveyed to the Soviets the right message about Berlin. When the Soviets began menacing Berlin, they may have entertained doubts about Western determination; clearly they were not deterred from their initial steps by our previous nuclear threats. But the creation of greater new non-nuclear strength has reinforced our overall deterrent, and the aggression has not occurred. It was not simply the substantial increase in NATO manpower and the addition of the equivalent of four combat-ready divisions, 88 more ships and 19 more air squadrons, but the meaning which their addition conveyed of our determination that may have given the Soviets second thoughts.

 

For the kinds of conflicts we think most likely to arise in the NATO area, non-nuclear capabilities appear to be clearly the sort the Alliance would wish to use at the outset. The purpose of our common effort is the defense of the populations and territories of NATO. To achieve this, at least initially, with non-nuclear means requires that our non-nuclear defense begin where the populations and territories begin. A truly forward deployment, along the lines General Norstad has advocated, we consider an urgent need of the Alliance.

 

Let me make clear however that we do not believe that a forward defense must be able to defeat in non-nuclear action every conceivable element of Soviet strength that might be thrown against it. Our nuclear forces would rapidly come into play if an all-out attack developed. We believe the Soviets can hardly doubt that; hence, we think it quite improbable that a major attack would develop out of a crisis.

 

[Here follows a description of NATO force dispositions and then-current U.S. views on Alliance decisions.]