Docs 83-100
83. Editorial Note
On May 7, 1962, the Policy Planning Council circulated a revised draft of the paper, "Basic National Security Policy." On May 9, the Council circulated a "short form" of the document, 66 pages long. In a covering memorandum to the May 7 draft, Walt W. Rostow stated his intention, after taking into account suggested changes, to prepare a draft to be circulated by Secretary Rusk to the President and NSC members. "The President will then give instructions for the further consideration of the document." (All in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, BNSP Drafts 5/7/62 etc.)
The revision of May 7, 166 pages in length, drops the two concluding sections on national security planning tasks and the anticipation of crises which had been included in the March 26 draft (see Document 70). The remainder of the paper retains the same basic structure while incorporating many changes.
Part One, formerly titled "Doctrine," is renamed "Principles and Purposes." In numerous places in the text, "principles" is substituted for "doctrine." In an early section on the "Nature of the Communist Threat," a statement retained from the March 26 draft that nuclear war itself "is one threat to the American interest" is followed by new language stating that "the safety of the nation and the possibility of deterring Communist aggression require that we be prepared to face nuclear war in defense of our vital interests, and that this fact be universally understood." Introductory material retains emphasis on the creation of a "free world community," but cautions that its creation is "a task which will remain unfinished for a long time."
In Part Two, "Strategy," a new discussion of tactical nuclear weapons identifies roles for them, such as deterring enemy initiation of tactical nuclear warfare, enhancement of the overall deterrent, selective use in situations in which escalation would be unlikely to result ("notably" at sea and in the air). In use of tactical nuclears, account should be taken of the danger of escalation, ability to "frustrate aggression" without their use, and the political and physical effects of a "local nuclear exchange." The draft continues the emphasis on buildup of non-nuclear general purpose force capability, but introduces the term "dual capability" to describe the capacities of general purpose forces. It states that if "a conflict or priority arises in the training and equipping of general purpose forces as between non-nuclear and nuclear combat, the balance should be struck in such a way as to ensure that the entire requirements of non-nuclear combat are met."
The section on arms control and disarmament states that "the possibility that a nuclear war might result from accident or, more likely, miscalculation or failure of communication is large enough to be an important reason for seeking remedial measures."
In the section on the "Framework of Organization," the term "Northern `Hard Core'" is retained. The draft continues the call, in connection with overall strengthening of the European community, for reduction in the special relationship with the United Kingdom, but states that the change should be "carefully developed and evolutionary, and should avoid the appearance of an abrupt turnaround." The revision retains the remarks regarding the ineffectiveness of SEATO, CENTO, and ANZUS and the need for encouragement of their members to engage in wider regional relationships on non-defense matters, but speaks also of "maintaining fully the Manila Pact [SEATO] as the foundation for the U.S. commitment to Southeast Asia." The section on the United Nations places somewhat greater emphasis on its utility for the achievement of U.S. objectives.
Under "Relations With Communist Regimes," the draft omits in the section on Eastern Europe the former language on playing "`liberation' in a low key" but is otherwise substantively similar to the March 26 draft. In the paragraphs on China, the language from the March 26 draft on PRC "de facto recognition of the independent existence of Taiwan" as a condition for normalization of Sino-U.S. relations is dropped: "The specific kinds of modification that we would require as the price of more normal relations should be the subject of continuing planning study." Regarding Quemoy and Matsu, the draft states: "The removal of GRC forces and/or the disengagement of U.S. prestige from the offshore islands remains an objective of U.S. policy."
In the last section, "The Domestic Base," the revision gives increased prominence to a proposal for solving the balance-of-payments problem through encouragement of gains in U.S. productivity.
84. Letter From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council and Counselor of the Department of State (Rostow) /1/
Washington, May 14, 1962.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, #11 Miscellaneous H. Secret.
Dear Walt:
I have studied your latest revision of the Basic National Security Policy/2/ and am concerned over some aspects of the military policy which it proposes for reasons set forth in my earlier comments and my letter to you of April 23./3/ I will not repeat them in detail here but would, however, like to emphasize several of the points I tried to make.
/2/Reference is to the long draft of May 7; see Document 83.
/3/Document 80. In a May 12 memorandum to Taylor, Smith commented that "most of the points you raised in your letter to Mr. Rostow were not met." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, BNSP Memos and Comments)
For some years I have advocated larger conventional forces which would give us some choice other than all-out retaliation or retreat when faced with Communist aggression. Consequently, I am much pleased to note the added emphasis accorded these forces in your paper. But what concerns me now is that this emphasis may have gone too far.
My basic reason in the past for pressing for larger conventional forces has been to give us flexibility of response to hostile acts of aggression. It has always seemed to me that the aim of our military policy should be to increase the available alternatives in the possible uses of military force and thereby achieve a graduated series of possible responses. The development and use of very low yield atomic weapons for battlefield use has always seemed to me to offer the possibility of a very valuable intermediate stage in any escalating series of responses. If I understand the language of the BNSP, it would reduce this possibility to the point of eliminating it.
It is true that some people in government doubt that we have a rational program for the development and employment of tactical nuclear weapons. Indeed, I am one of them. In the past the emphasis has been too heavily on high yield weapons that are tactical only in the sense that they are delivered by tactical aircraft or Army-type missiles. That is why I have suggested that we should talk not of "tactical" nuclear weapons, but of battlefield nuclear weapons--very small in yield--and of interdiction nuclear weapons. The ambiguity of the present situation has been called to the attention of the President who has directed a thorough study of the question by the Department of Defense./4/ Until that study is complete, we should not adopt language in the BNSP which, in effect, would anticipate, possibly incorrectly, the results of the study. In dealing with this question, we must not forget that the Soviet forces have these weapons--at least the big "tactical" weapons and propose to use them when needed. I doubt that any responsible official in our government would want to take a position on this subject which would, in effect, put U.S. forces on the battlefield with weapons inferior to those of the enemy.
/4/See Document 86.
Another point in your latest revision is the implication that since our problems of actively defending the United States against direct attack by sophisticated weapons are becoming increasingly difficult, we should carefully evaluate new programs to avoid putting too many of our resources in weapons that add little or nothing to the defense of our country./5/ Such guidance does not seem to me to be one that will encourage development of an effective active defense and probably should be modified. I am often impressed with how important Soviet air defense measures are to our war-planners while we seem to attribute little importance to our own.
/5/Both drafts contain language stating that attainment of active defense objectives "will present increasing difficulty as the USSR develops more sophisticated weapons systems; hence, the actual level of resources to be devoted to this mission should be reconsidered frequently and thoroughly." In the March 26 draft, however, an additional sentence reads: "The political and psychological consequences of Soviet acquisition of a real or reputed AICBM system--prior to the U.S.--should be the subject of study and forehanded offsetting action."
Finally, I would like to mention that I believe the paragraph in your previous draft on the conduct of general war, as modified by the Joint Chiefs, should be included in the final version of this paper./6/ Given the total resources we now have invested in our ability to meet this dreaded but, hopefully, unlikely contingency, it would seem essential to provide the military planners some fairly specific guidance on their operations during any such event. Otherwise, planning may take place that does not support national objectives as fully as could otherwise be the case were guidelines provided, and our ability to exercise control over the course of events may diminish drastically.
/6/In the March 26 draft, a paragraph on general war states that because of the difficulty of fixing in advance detailed plans for conducting military operations, the targeting plans and command and control system must be designed to enable Presidential or Presidentially-designated civilian control during an attack. Pre-attack planning should aim at identifying ways to reduce the strategic offensive capabilities of the enemy, particularly counter-city attacks, and "facilitating the conduct of negotiations designed" to end the war on terms consistent with U.S. interests. This paragraph does not appear in the May 7 draft. In the Appendix to Document 76, the JCS expanded and redefined the tasks in general war.
I would be pleased to talk over any of the above comments with you. Also, I would appreciate being kept abreast of the course of this next revision and any change in the method of handling it from those outlined in your May 7 memorandum./7/
Maxwell D. Taylor/8/
/7/See Document 83.
/8/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
85. Letter From the Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Kennan) to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council and Counselor of the Department of State (Rostow)/1/
Belgrade, May 15,1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, BNSP 3/26/62. Secret.
Dear Walt:
I am sorry to have been so long in acknowledging your letter of March 30/2/ and in responding to your suggestion that I comment on the draft of the S/P paper on "Basic National Security Policy." /3/ The present security regulations, which make it impossible to take work home in the evenings and difficult to get at materials for use in the office after hours, have complicated the performance of this sort of work.
/2/Not found.
/3/Reference is to the March 26 draft; see Document 70.
Let me say first that from the technical standpoint, and speaking as one who once held your present responsibilities, I am full of admiration for this paper. I know what the preparation of such a document involves. I cannot recall seeing in the files of our Government a document of such scope remotely so well prepared: so lucid, so comprehensive, so well-written, and so well knitted together. I think you and your associates deserve warmest congratulations.
On the other hand, I find it difficult to advance the sort of comment you invite. When, a year ago last winter, I decided to accept the President's invitation to return to Government, I did so in the awareness that my views on many problems of our relationship to the outside world were hopelessly remote from the concepts prevailing both in our public opinion and within Government. I also recognized that I had been largely unsuccessful in making my own positions understood or in winning support for them both in and out of Government in the years since World War II. The decision to return to Government in the capacity of Ambassador to Yugoslavia marked a deeper decision to abandon this struggle and to try to be useful in a practical way by working loyally within a framework of concept I could not personally share. In this I was guided by admiration and solicitude for the new president and by the recognition that, finding myself in so tiny a minority, I was quite apt to be wrong even where I could not myself perceive the error.
In my daily work here, it has not been hard to perform this act of detachment. Your inquiry now challenges me, however, on a plane so personal that there can be no escape into the official personality, and so broad that there can be no avoiding the underlying issues of public philosophy. The fact is that to take issue properly with your paper, I should have to write one equally long; and this, in the circumstances, is out of the question.
Let me therefore content myself with reminding you, first of some of the broader elements of my disagreement with outlooks and policies reflected in your paper. I shall try just to identify the issues, without arguing them. Here are a few:
1.View of Soviet intentions.
I have never been able to share the wide-spread view of Soviet intentions--a view which made the Stalin and the Khrushchev of the postwar era almost indistinguishable not only from each other but also from the Hitler of the Thirties. I have never believed that there was serious danger of an outright Soviet military attack on western Europe in the recent postwar period--of an attack, that is, that would not be associated with an advanced state of social and political disintegration in the area and could not be portrayed as auxiliary to a major internal social upheaval. I have thought it unlikely that such an attack entered into Soviet aspirations and plans. This being the case, I have never been able to agree with the almost universally held belief (first authoritatively enunciated, I think, by Churchill at Fulton) that only our atomic deterrent had restrained the Russians from launching such an attack./4/ I have always placed more weight on internal economic and social stability in this and other areas than on military defense. This difference of interpretation has affected my attitude towards western policy on a host of occasions, and continues to do so.
/4/Reference is to Winston Churchill's address delivered in March 1946 at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri.
Your paper, to be sure, does not wholly embrace the purely military view of Soviet intentions that prevailed in former years. It gives far greater recognition to prospects for infiltration, guerrilla warfare, use of disaffected local minorities, etc. In this respect, I welcome it as an important advance over earlier thinking. But the old concept shines through in a number of places, as for example on pp. 141-143./5/
/5/These pages deal with alliances, including CENTO, SEATO, and ANZUS.
2. Military policy toward Europe.
It has been my belief that we should not settle for the indefinite communist control of Eastern Europe but should seek to create conditions in Europe which not only give maximum incentive for a gradual detachment of the Eastern European countries from their present exclusive tie to Moscow, but facilitate that detachment to maximum degree. For this reason I have disfavored putting major emphasis on NATO at the cost of the prospects for disengagement, and have felt that we should devise our undertakings in Europe, as was done in the case of the Marshall Plan, in such a way that they could attract and invite participation by the European countries without raising clear-cut issues with respect to their military and political ties with Moscow. With this in mind, I have questioned the soundness of the concepts on which NATO has developed. I would have preferred to see in effect a unilateral guarantee by the United States of the present NATO territory in Europe, rather than the present network of mutual obligation--a guarantee reinforced by a special relationship of military support by the United States for the Brussels Pact. Above all, I have never favored the admission of Germany to NATO, and the development of West Germany's resources and territory as a major component of NATO strength. This, it seemed to me, was clearly in conflict with the goal of German unification, and was bound to make impossible for an indefinite period to come any withdrawal or even any real slackening of the Russian hold on the satellite area. The intensive rearmament of Western Germany meant, in other words, the affirmation and perpetuation of the division of the continent. This error, as I see it, has been and continues to be compounded by the rejection of the Rapacki concepts and by the development of West German and other continental territory as a base for nuclear striking power./6/
/6/In a separate letter to Rostow, also dated May 15, Kennan enclosed an expansion of his views on Germany, NATO, and disengagement. (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, BNSP 3/26/62)
3. Relation of Britain, U.S., and Canada to the Continent.
Your paper embraces the concept, arrived at in the late '40s and early '50s under the direction of Mr. Acheson, that European integration is to be pursued in an area that includes the United Kingdom, and that the closer association of the Western-Continental powers is to proceed in closest association with the Atlantic community as a whole. To this concept, our prestige has now been committed to a most unusual degree.
If you will glance at a Policy Planning Staff paper prepared, I believe, just at the end of 1949 and probably bearing a date in the first weeks of 1950, on the subject of European integration,/7/ you will see that this concept is diametrically opposed to the one I then favored, and still favor. The view I put forward at that time opposed pressing Britain into an association with the Continent. It favored the pursuit of integration--i.e., the bridging of sovereignties--in two groupings: the U.S., U.K., and Canada, on the one hand; the major continental countries, on the other. It recognized that Britain could be made a part of a continental grouping only at the cost of watering down the significance of the latter and preventing it from assuming a form sufficiently advanced to meet the requirements of the German problem. It has taken us a further twelve years of trouble to demonstrate something of the correctness of that prognostication; and we have not yet come to the end of that road.
/7/Reference is uncertain. Kennan was Director of the Policy Planning Staff, March 1948- January 1950, and Counselor, August 1949-July 1951.
The same PPS paper also warned, as I recall it, against any forms of economic association in Western Europe which would not be open, and attractive, for adherence by the Eastern European countries, and in such a way that adherence would not involve questions of Soviet military and political prestige. Today we have, in the example of the Common Market, precisely the situation against which I attempted to warn. It is an arrangement closely connected with the political and military institutions which have been evolved in Western Europe; and we ourselves are the first to insist that the privilege of association with it be denied to anyone not prepared to acknowlege this association as extending into the political field. Meanwhile, as was also predicted in the PPS paper under reference, we have provoked a major crisis in the relations between Britain and the Commonwealth, with the dreadful possibility that Canada itself will lose its internal and external stability, and that one of the deepest sources of our security in North America will thus be jeopardized.
Here again, as you see, we have very fundamental differences, and ones which involve the entire philosophy underlying your paper.
4. The weapons of long-range mass destruction.
For many years, I have advocated a policy designed to free us from all dependence on atomic weapons, as on other weapons of indiscriminate mass destruction, with a view to putting us in a position to seek, at the earliest possible moment and if necessary at the cost of some apparent risk, an agreement with the Russians for the total abandonment of the cultivation, maintenance, and use of this sort of weaponry. To this end, I have urged that we free ourselves as soon as possible from the invidious principle of "first-use" of atomic weapons, which I believe must lead inexorably to a nuclear catastrophe.
Your paper, while again marking a great progress over the concepts of earlier years, retains the principle of "first-use"; and contemplates a continued U.S. dependence on atomic weaponry.
In addition to this, your paper reflects at many points (pp. 35 and 46, for example) the view that there could be a war fought with atomic weapons which would be less than wholly disastrous for us--that there could, in other words, be some pieces worth picking up for those who survived, and that this prospect ought to enter into our thinking and planning. I wholly disagree. As a historian, I confidently submit that if the western world is subjected for the third time in a century to a military holocaust even comparable in severity to those of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945, we have had it. If it is a war with atomic weapons, I do not wish to see the result; and I would rather see my children dead than to have them experience it.
5. Political philosophy, and its relation to policy toward the underdeveloped countries.
Your paper is deeply imbued with a relatively optimistic view of the sources of human behavior. This permits you to see such things as national independence, individual freedom, industrialization, high living standards, social justice, and restraint in foreign policy as all fusing into one harmonious whole. This view, I suspect, is drawn from the example of our own society; and one could argue that such inference was not wholly unwarranted, though here, too, I should have doubts. It is, in any case, a view which, when applied to the great mass of humanity, I cannot share. The ability to harmonize these various elements into the political life of a state is something which, if it exists at all, seems to me to be peculiar to peoples who have had their origins on or near the shores of the North Sea; and here I must attribute it not to any inherent superiority but to the favorable effects of climate and to a fortunate discipline of experience running back over the centuries. This being the case, I cannot expect this example to be readily or generally imitated elsewhere. The various features of civilization to which I referred seem to me to be as a rule in conflict, rather than in harmony, in the affairs of men. Such conflicts exist even in the highly advanced nations, where they are only successfully contained, not resolved. There is often, for example, a conflict between social justice and individual freedom, between egalitarianism and true liberty, between freedom for the nation and freedom for the individual, between democracy and national restraint.
You look on the various forms of authoritarianism and despotism, oligarchical and autocratic, as abnormalities--as something to be overcome by better living standards and enlightenment. I, on the contrary, see such forms of government as a part of the natural state of mankind; our system, rather, is the exception and the abnormality. I reflect, furthermore, that some of the most hideous manifestations of modern totalitarianism have come in some of the most highly industrialized and best educated countries. I am therefore skeptical of your whole thesis. I suspect rapid social change itself to be the deepest cause of the political instability and violence. For this reason, I expect no good to come of the sort of precipitate development which you so warmly embrace, particularly in an environment where population growth is to be permitted to run rampant, with all that that implies. Whether absence of encouragement on our part would steady these people down and temper the demand for earlier industrialization, I doubt; but I still think it irresponsible of us to encourage them along this path. By advancing along it ourselves, we have only landed ourselves--as I shall have occasion to say presently--in problems to which we see no answers. How can we, in good conscience, impel others in the same direction?
You have a vision, in particular, of a humane Africa, divided into God knows how many independent states, all with neat borders, U.N. membership, and all the other trappings of sovereignty on the western pattern, and all thrusting happily ahead into the nirvana of an industrial civilization. I see ahead in this area, no matter what we do: primarily childishness, bewilderment, inexperience, violence, racial hatred, and internecine strife of every sort, the repetition (but in an era of devastating weaponry and population explosion) of the long ordeal of political experience out of which the public order of Europe has been bred. I cannot agree that it will always be compatible with the safety of our country to increase the industrial strength of these peoples, to put weapons into their hands, to discourage violence among them, to encourage their proliferation. Divided and weak, they are no menace to us. Given strength, God knows what they will do. I wish them no harm. I would not see us move to injure them. But I regard our American people of this mid-century, with all their faults, as almost the only truly good-humored, well-meaning, and enlightened people of this age in their attitude towards others. The peoples of the southern continents, in particular, have, as I see it, no real belief in world brotherhood, and no spontaneous sense of restraint in world affairs. Aside from what they think they may get out of us at the moment in the way of immediate one-sided aid, they would witness without a quiver of pity or regret the greatest catastrophe of our civilization that the mind could conceive; and most of them would be happy to be in at the kill.
In such circumstances, we should have a policy towards these people, as I see it, devoid of illusions about their probable future, devoid in particular of any fond belief that they are going to grow in our image, based rather on the recognition that their advance to literacy and national consciousness is going to release the most explosive and dangerous forces conceivable, and on a determination to keep ourselves out of the way of these forces and in a position where they cannot damage us.
All this may, of course, involve aid, given for tactical reasons, at one point or another; but then, please, aid without illusions, without false hopes, with clear eyes and the coldest sort of calculation. Perhaps this view is conditioned by a failure to share the great concern so many people feel over the expansion of Russian or Chinese influence into Africa in the absence of major American counter-effort. It is true that this gives me little concern. I think this cauldron of Africa can accept and consume all the manpower and resources the Russians and the Chinese want to ship into it, and that they will have no more profit than we would have by their effort to remake it in their own image. Their ideas of civilization will be just as irrelevant to the approaching chaos of that continent, it seems to me, as will be ours.
6. Multilateral diplomacy.
The view put forward in your paper of what we should seek in the way of a role of the UN in international life is, in general, far closer to my views than that which was entertained in Washington in earlier years. I still have certain fundamental differences, however, with the general tendency of your paper (or do I mistake it?) to seek multilateral channels of diplomacy wherever possible in preference to bilateral ones. Insofar as problems of security are concerned, in the face of the bloc, I am skeptical of the utility of collective and multilateral arrangements, in many instances. I suspect that we lose more, by such arrangements, in the way of promptness and flexibility of action and privacy of decision than we gain in the way of added military and political resources.
My main divergence, however, from the concept put forward in your paper, relates to what can be done in the field of universal international action. Here, I see possibilities which do not seem to me to be recognized in your paper. The target of action ought to be, I think, those aspects of human activity by which the integrity and hopefulness of our national environment is being, or might be, adversely affected--such as, for example, contamination of the atmosphere and of international waters in one way or another, use of outer space, development of Antarctica, manipulation of weather conditions, etc. Here, it seems to me, there is not only an opportunity but a need for an actual narrowing of the concept of international sovereignty, a concept which has been so grievously distorted in this century, and so unwisely and lavishly bestowed on immature political entities.
I have little confidence in multilateral associations based on the principal of unanimity, or even of majority decisions, among a large number of nations which retain, in relation to the matters under discussion, the full prerogatives of absolute sovereignty. In the first case, that of unanimity, the necessary decisions will not be taken; in the second case, they will not be enforced. I am impressed with the advantages, illustrated by the European Iron and Steel Community, of the transfer of sovereignty in the sense of the resigning of actual power of decision within a limited area to an international body. Governments, by and large, are timid and fearful of responsibility. They will happily submit to dicta by an international body having genuine authority, even in instances where, if they had been asked to share responsibility for the decision, they would have been unwilling to do so. I would like, accordingly, to see the establishment of international authorities with real power to do such things as to control all use of outer space, to lay down and to enforce rules for the preservation of the cleanliness and resources of the oceans, to say what can and what cannot be done in the way of pollution of the atmosphere, to administer the Antarctic, etc.
7. The domestic base.
Underlying my misgivings about policy toward the underdeveloped areas are certain fundamental doubts which I have about the trend of our society, and particularly about the concepts which are outlined on pages 208-216 of your paper. These doubts go very deep. I can do no more than to touch on them here. They are the ones that cut to the heart of the whole question of the desirability of a high degree of industrialization, urbanization, and complexity in a society. I can only say that I have come, over the years, to question the absolute application of the principle that the best way to have things done is the way that is mechanically most efficient and involves the least use of human labor. I do not think this is necessarily true, and I have come to feel that the goal of economic and technological policy within a society should not be just to discover the most efficient way of doing things, in terms of human labor output, but rather to discover the ways of doing things which are most beneficial to people themselves, which may be a quite different thing. For this reason, I think that arbitrary decisions ought to be made, of a type that we have never as yet contemplated: decisions as to where to pause on the path of higher industrial efficiency, and what sort of mechanical devices, affecting the patterns of human life, to select among a choice that is now overwhelming in variety. I think, in other words, that what our society now has to ask itself is: What is the good life? How is it led? How is it best encouraged? And I think that we may find that the answers to these questions are wholly different from those which are being automatically produced by a policy of giving free rein to the compulsions of technological efficiency.
In strongest contrast to the authors of your paper, I fail to see any conclusive advantage in the principle of economic growth; on the contrary, I see great dangers in it. I am unable to perceive that a society which is able to discover its deepest values only in a process of constant quantitative multiplication--in a state of instability, that is--is the best society. I would admire more a society that can achieve a state of equilibrium in material and quantitative terms and can seek its development in terms of the improvement and enrichment of the individual human experience.
I am particularly concerned about the principle of unlimited economic "growth," because it involves precisely those features of our contemporary American civilization which give me greatest concern: the progressive over-crowding and urbanization of our territory, the reckless plundering of its resources, and the increasing contamination of its natural elements. All these things are connected with population growth and industrialization. There can be no question but that our form of society is immensely wasteful in terms of natural resources, and essentially unstable just from this standpoint alone. As for population growth, this is not just, or even primarily, a question of feeding people: it is a question of how such things as privacy and access to nature are to be preserved in a crowded and heavily urbanized society. I should have been inclined to regard 150 million as a maximum desirable size for our population. When it gets beyond 200 million, the effects--I am sure--will be appalling. I view this prospect with dismay, not just from the standpoint of what will happen to the land and the water and the air and the minerals, but also from the standpoint of what will happen to the human soul and to the capacity for citizenship; for I regard a certain connection with the land, with growing things, and even with animals, as essential to spiritual health in the case of the great majority of people.
As for the specific reasons which the paper states for maintaining a high growth rate, I would only say the following:
A. Other countries expect to get along, and to maintain their security somehow, with a far smaller flow of resources than that which we are contemplating. I see no great virtue involved in being the world's strongest country in a material and military sense, if this goal is to be pursued at the expense of the deeper human values.
B. I do not see a flow of endlessly increasing resources as related to an improvement in the standard of living. To look at things this way is to accept the most vulgar and wasteful concept of what compromises the good life, and to insist that people lead lives of appalling complexity and artificiality.
C. I see no reason why a country must be in a state of explosive and unnatural expansion in order to play a decent role in world trade. Again, countries far smaller than ours make perfectly respectable contributions in this field. If the developing countries over-produce, I fail to see that it is our responsibility to assure that they can unload this over-production on us. So far as unemployment is concerned, the paper rests on assumptions which I simply cannot accept. I think the real problem of chronic unemployment in our country is very small indeed and could be easily solved. What we call "unemployment" is simply a condition we have created by definition; and what it refers to is primarily people who, in the face of the fact that the government is willing to pay them for doing nothing, prefer not to work at all rather than to accept the opportunities for employment open in our society. We do ourselves the deepest damage by the semantic confusion we produce when we speak of having several million "unemployed", because the condition of these people is wholly different from that which most of the world's people picture when they hear that word.
The above observations are simply suggestive of the extent to which my own thinking has departed from that which is not only reflected in your paper but is already accepted by a large portion of our intellectual community. Having had your position in previous years, I am well aware that every paper of this nature has to constitute, to a large extent, a compromise between the private thinking of the individuals who draft it and that which will find useful acceptance in wider circles. I do not mean, therefore, to criticize or to assign blame when I point out these differences. To be useful and to find acceptance, any paper would have to bow to the spirit of the time and embrace many of the elements which yours does. It is I who am out of step; and it is a good thing that it is you, not I, who occupy the chair in which you now sit. If I am to make my peace with my fellow-countrymen, intellectually, it will have to be in a different way, and in a different forum. I say these things merely to point out why it is difficult for me to comment as you have asked me to do.
[Here follow Kennan's comments on individual passages of the paper.]
86. Memorandum From Secretary Defense McNamara to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)/1/
Washington, May 23, 1962.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Tactical Nuclear Weapons Study. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
A Study of Requirements for Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Continuation of the Study of Requirements for General Purpose Forces
As I indicated in my memo dated 17 February 1962, subject: A Requirements Study for General Purpose Forces,/2/ I would like you to organize a study of requirements for tactical nuclear weapons. I visualize this as a continuation of the General Purpose Forces Study,/3/ carried on by a nucleus of about ten officers from the group conducting that study, beginning no later than July 1. Planning for the study should begin now with selection of leaders and preparation of terms of reference in collaboration with my staff.
/2/Not found.
/3/See Document 115.
I suggest that the first phase of the study be directed by Lt. General Hamilton H. Howze, USA, with Major General Paul S. Emrick, USAF, acting as his deputy. General Howze should continue to direct the Army aviation study,/4/ but both he and General Emrick should be relieved of other assignments until the first phase of the tactical nuclear weapons study is completed. That should be accomplished by 1 October.
/4/See footnote 3, Document 115.
I would like the first phase of the study to concentrate on the use of tactical nuclear weapons in ground and supporting air-to-ground combat in Europe. I believe that our posture, doctrine, and understanding of objectives for use of tactical nuclear weapons in ground combat in Europe is in a very unsatisfactory state.
I am particularly concerned about the basis for requirements for the family of nuclear weapons for Army ground forces from Davy Crockett and artillery rounds to Pershing. What is the purpose of these weapons? In what contingencies would they be used? And to achieve what objectives?
The case for having at least a relatively small number of tactical nuclear weapons in the theatres (for example, a posture composed of nuclear weapons for alert tactical aircraft, based in the theatre primarily for non-nuclear combat anyway, and perhaps several battalions of Pershings to do nuclear interdiction) appears to be based on such political and psychological factors as the following: First, "the psychological position of our allies without United States nuclear weapons in the theatres would be intolerable." Second, "the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in the theatre can help to deter the Soviets from escalating a non-nuclear conflict to a nuclear conflict, by threatening to transform a one-sided nuclear war into a two-sided nuclear war." Third, "having such weapons in the theatre may be useful for purposes of detonating one or few on key military targets in time of crisis as a way of showing our resolve or showing the Soviets the risks inherent in the course of aggression in which they are engaged." But the objectives to be served by a larger posture of tactical atomic weapons and the specific numbers and types of weapons required to meet those objectives are quite unclear.
Are we buying Davy Crockett, Corporal, Sergeant, Lacrosse, Honest John, Pershing, ADM's, etc., to defend Europe in a general nuclear war? If so, is not the return of the investment dubious; does not all the evidence suggest that the long-range strategic forces would be decisive in such a conflict? Moreover, if that were not the case for the planned posture, should we acquire enough strategic weapons to make it so?
Alternatively, is the purpose of these weapons to defend Europe in a nuclear war that is confined to the theatre? If so, a number of questions should be considered. Is such a conflict at all likely? Would we meet a Soviet nuclear attack in Europe without going to general war ourselves? Do we want to devote resources to that contingency? Perhaps it would make more sense for us to contract out of that possibility. On the other hand, would it be to our advantage to go to nuclear war in the theatre in response to a Soviet conventional attack? What evidence supports the notion that the use of nuclear weapons is advantageous to the side with less manpower and superior technology? Is it not at least as plausible that the bilateral use of tactical atomic weapons in Europe would be to our military disadvantage? In any case, is it feasible to defend Europe with nuclear weapons without destroying it? Moreover, are we buying complete capabilities for such a war? Are we buying complete weapons systems in the broad sense, i.e., complete military capabilities able to live and fight in the nuclear environment, or are we buying merely the weapons? Our lines of communication are vulnerable to atomic attack and we seem to be doing nothing to remedy that. How do our men survive fallout? How do we preserve command and control in the tactical atomic environment? These problems do not appear to have been thought out. Rather, it appears that the tactical atomic posture we have bought for our forces in Europe may be preparation for World War II all over again, with nuclear weapons overlaid. If we are not going to buy a complete posture for the fighting of nuclear war in the theatres, but settle for a sort of nuclear facade instead (as we appear to be doing today), then such a facade can probably be procured at substantially less cost and risk than is associated with our program.
In order to clarify and resolve these problems, I believe the study should consider the following questions:
A. Examine the feasibility and outcome (in terms of military position and civil damage) of a tactical-atomic war in Europe limited to the battle zone and growing out of:
1. A Soviet assault using tactical nuclears; and
2. U.S. escalation of a non-nuclear war we are losing.
Would such a war be feasible in the sense that stable limits could be found that would keep it from escalating to an intercontinental nuclear war involving major attacks on the U.S., Allied and Soviet homelands? Would such a war be feasible in the sense that it would be possible to sustain organized military operations despite nuclear attacks on command and control airfields and LOC? Would escalation of a non-nuclear conflict to the tactical nuclear level enable us to defend Europe in circumstances in which we could not do so without the use of nuclear weapons? Which side gains militarily from the bilateral use of nuclear weapons (as opposed to limitation to non-nuclear weapons)?
B. Examine the role of tactical nuclear weapons in a general war initiated by the Soviets. Evaluate the contribution to our success that would be made by the various types of tactical nuclear weapons beyond the results that would be achieved by the use of strategic nuclear weapons. Consider quantitatively the implications for our ground forces of the Soviet use of strategic nuclear weapons against them.
In situations A and B, above, consider the problem of:
1. Vulnerability of NATO military posture to nuclear attack.
2. Collateral damage to European population and industry.
3. Operational effectiveness of each category of tactical nuclear weapon system.
C. What are the minimum essential numbers and types of tactical nuclear weapons required in the theatre for:
1. The psychological effect of reassuring the Europeans that nuclear weapons are committed to their defense.
2. Deterring the Soviets from escalating a non-nuclear conflict to a tactical-atomic conflict limited to the battle zone.
3. Deterring the Soviets from massing their troops for a conventional assault to the extent that they would be vulnerable to nuclear attack.
4. A capability to demonstrate our resolve and to indicate to the Soviets the dangers inherent in the course of aggression in which they are engaged by detonating a few nuclears in Central Europe.
D. Examine the problems of designing genuinely dual-capable ground forces. How do the requirements for conventional and nuclear combat conflict? Compare the effectiveness of dual-capable forces with (1) conventional forces in conventional combat, (2) nuclear forces in nuclear combat. Consider the problems of safety and stability raised by the proximity of field-army tactical nuclear weapons to conventional combat./5/
/5/In a memorandum to Taylor dated October 13, Major William Y. Smith summarized the resulting study, stating that it called for NATO firepower twice as great as that of the Soviets, for 32,000 weapons to counter a possible 5,000 Soviet weapons, and for 4 to 5 different yields ranging from [text not declassified]. He quoted its conclusion that "`in the areas of doctrine of deployment, organizational structure, command and control, and logistics requirements,' the requirements for nuclear and conventional combat conflict." He concluded that the study should be a basis for follow-on ones. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Tactical Nuclear Weapons Study) A draft of the summary and conclusions of the study, entitled "Requirements for Tactical Nuclear Weapons," is ibid.
A transcript of a State-Defense Policy Conference, held on October 10 and devoted largely to NATO topics, quotes McNamara as saying with reference to tactical nuclear weapons: "Our own studies, not being definitive, don't persuade." (Attachment to memorandum from J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, to George Ball, November 10; Department of Statement, Central Files, 740.5/10-1062)
Eventually (after the October 1 deadline), I would like the group doing this study to study the requirements for tactical nuclear weapons for fleet air defense, ASW, and theatre air defense. In each case, the advantages to ourselves of escalating a non-nuclear conflict to a bilateral nuclear conflict should be analyzed.
I would also like you to make plans to continue indefinitely the work on the Requirements Study for General Purpose Forces in the area of non-nuclear combat. This work should be carried on by a small group (perhaps 12) of highly qualified and carefully selected officers. This group should continue to develop, refine, and improve upon the work now underway. I think that the development of systematic quantitative methods is especially needed in this area. I am sure that after the current study is completed on July 1, my staff and I will have questions, comments and suggestions For continuation.
In general, this group should consider the following questions about the General Purpose Forces Study:
(a) Given the contingencies and situations defined for the study, are the answers correct and reliable?
(b) Are there unexplored possibilities for substitution of other weapon systems and forces that would make it possible to do the same job at a lower cost?
(c) Do the analyses suggest that other situations and objectives should be considered?
I have asked Mr. Hitch to represent me in providing guidance on the development of the studies to both groups.
Would you please present to me, no later than June 15, your plans for carrying out these requests./6/
/6/ A "Further Study of Requirements for Tactical Nuclear Weapons," prepared by the CJCS Special Studies Group (Tactical Nuclear Branch) and dated April 1963, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 4610 (20 Dec 62) Sec 2A. Another copy is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series 4/63. For a partial summary of both the October 1962 and April 1963 JCS studies, as well as a statement of McNamara's views regarding them, see Document 153.
Robert S. McNamara/7/
/7/Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.
87. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, May 25, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Maxwell D. Taylor 5/62. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Study of Requirements for Tactical Atomic Weapons
As a continuation of his General Purpose Forces Study/2/ which is nearing completion, Secretary McNamara has directed a comprehensive study of requirements for tactical nuclear weapons to begin no later than July 1./3/ The first phase which concentrates on the use of tactical nuclear weapons in ground and supporting air-to-ground combat in Europe will be completed by October 1. This is a much needed effort to clarify doctrine and objectives in an area where much cloudiness has existed up to now.
/2/See Document 115.
/3/See Document 86.
In connection with this matter, I recently took a fresh look at what we know about Soviet tactical atomic weapons. Thanks to the intelligence source with which you are familiar, we have quite a bit of comparatively new data. We are reasonably sure, for example, that the Soviets have developed tactical weapons for large caliber mortars, artillery pieces, certain free rockets and short-range guided missiles, all of which are now in the hands of the ground forces. Ranges vary from 11 to 300 nautical miles and yields from 5 KT to several megatons.
Current Soviet military literature indicates a clear intention to use these atomic weapons from the outset of any major operation in general war. We have recently acquired the account of a Soviet army group exercise in the Carpathians held in July 1961. The exercise consisted of an army group attack against NATO forces on a 250-mile front, using some 25 divisions. The plan of attack corroborated known Soviet military doctrine which calls for the allocation to an army group of 250 to 300 nuclear weapons with a total yield of from 120 to 150 megatons. In the exercise, 60 to 75 of these weapons were used in a surprise first strike against the opposing nuclear-equipped forces and against troop concentration targets down to company size. About 70 warheads were physically moved about in the area of the exercise. The foregoing figures were exclusive of airplane-delivered weapons.
The conduct of the maneuver suggested the U.S. thinking on tactical weapons which was current about 1955. The Soviets show a similar lack of appreciation of weapons effects which would result in this maneuver from the high megaton dosage of the battlefield. They appear to ignore the obstacles (craters, contamination, forest fires, and blown-down trees) which their own weapons would create. They are also at a loss to know how to find appropriate targets for the overwhelming fire power in the hands of their troops.
The Soviets are showing parallel concern to ours over the command and control of atomic weapons. Soviet control procedures governing the tactical employment of nuclear weapons appear to be highly centralized and designed to prevent use except at the direction of the High Command. Evidence indicates certain basic procedural steps, including (1) a specific decision by Khrushchev and the Party leaders authorizing the use of nuclear weapons; (2) a determination by the High Command Minister of Defense that a military requirement for nuclear weapons exists on a given army group front and the specific notification to the major field commanders that nuclear weapons may be released for use, as well as a simultaneous notification to stockpile commanders that weapons have been released; and (3) specific authorization by commanders of the rank of an army commander or above for nuclear weapons to be released for designated tactical use.
In connection with the review of our own policy on tactical atomic weapons, it will be important to take a hard look at what the Soviets are doing or may do./4/ I detect an emotional resistance in some quarters to the expansion of the tactical nuclear weapon systems in spite of the obvious need to have them if the enemy does./5/ In my judgment, the issue is not whether to have tactical atomic weapons but rather how to improve them down to the fractional kiloton yields which offer the possibility of a separate stage in escalation short of the use of weapons of mass destruction./6/
/4/In a May 24 memorandum to McNamara, Taylor requested that the "Study Group should include in its research a review of USSR posture, doctrine and tactics in the field of tactical nuclear weapons." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Maxwell D. Taylor 5/62)
/5/In a May 3 memorandum to Taylor, Legere wrote: "Flushed with anticipation over Norstad's and JCS's military requirement for modernization [of NATO forces] through MRBMs, the technipols roll up their light artillery for the opening phase of the next battle in the campaign to denuclearize Europe: down with tactical nuclear weapons. We (Ewell-Smith-Legere) called this one cold, if I may say so." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Tactical Nuclear Weapons Study) General Lauris C. Norstad was Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. In an April 16 memorandum to Taylor, Ewell described Kaysen, Wiesner, Owen, Rowen, and Alain Enthoven as "what one might term the anti-nuclear wrecking crew." (Ibid., T-129-69)
/6/The President's handwritten marginal note next to this sentence reads: "Can this be done?"
Maxwell D. Taylor
88. Memorandum From Major William Y. Smith to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/
Washington, May 31, 1962.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, WYS Chronological File April-June 1962. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
NIE on Soviet Nuclear Weapons Stockpile 1962-64/2/
/2/Reference is to NIE 11-2A-62, "The Soviet Atomic Energy Program," dated May 16. (Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-62)
1. The "billboard" effect of this NIE is that the Soviets, in the US estimate, are about 4-5 years behind us in their thinking on a suitable nuclear strategy, but their planning may not evolve along the same lines that ours has.
2. The major divergency in US and USSR thinking concerns tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviets apparently will not have, by 1964, incorporated low yield (fractional kiloton) nuclear weapons into their inventory; the lowest yield we credit them with is 3 KT. (Chart, p 32). Since 1958 the Soviets nevertheless have emphasized more the use of nuclear weapons in support of field forces (p 13). Furthermore, the indications are that this emphasis will increase in the future (p 27). Thus at a time in which US planning calls for a decreased emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons, Soviet thinking is calling for an increased one. The implications of these divergent trends have not yet been fully explored. They should be; hopefully the study on tactical nuclear weapons/3/ will do so. Also, if the Soviets find they cannot fight using large yield tactical weapons because of fear of self-inflicted damage on USSR troops, our possession of low yield weapons could possibly give us a step in escalation not open to the Soviets. This also should be looked at.
/3/See Document 86.
3. Other points of interest in the NIE are:
a. Soviet military policy places a high priority on preparedness for general war, which the USSR planners assume would commence in most cases with massive nuclear attacks on the homelands of the opponents. They do not conclude that this exchange would necessarily decide the outcome of the war (p 6).
b. By mid 1962 it is estimated the Soviets will have 800-1200 aircraft delivered nuclear weapons; 35-50 operational ICBM launchers (100 ICBMs); 350 MRBM and IRBM launchers (1000 IRBMs and MRBMs); and 35 missile launching submarines (100 SLBMs) (p 11).
c. Considering all factors, the Soviets will have between 2000 and 3000 nuclear weapons to support theater forces, with a total yield between 70 and 130 MT (p 17).
d. The general trend in yields of weapons for Soviet offensive delivery systems will be upwards (p 22).
e. By mid 1964 the Soviets are estimated to have 150-275 operational ICBM launchers; 450 IRBM/MRBM launchers; 35 SLBM submarines. About 700 missiles for long range attack thus will be added to the Soviet forces (p 25). (Note: This means evidently that the Soviets will have some 1900-2000 ICBMs, IRBM/MRBMs, and SLBMs by mid 1964 plus 800-1200 aircraft delivered weapons.)
f. Soviet nuclear testing indicates continued interest in the development of nuclear weapons for air defense purposes. It is estimated that the Soviets could deploy an AICBM for defense against missiles of 50-500 n.m. in 1963-64, and against ICBMs 1963-66. Both systems will almost certainly employ nuclear warheads (p 28).
g. The NIE makes one reference to the Soviet planned use of CW weapons (p 13).
4. Soviet use of nuclear weapons for defense against missiles and aircraft--as well as our own--raises the real possibility that the first use of nuclear weapons in any limited conflict may be in an air defense role. Would the US be willing to have its conventional missile and aircraft offensive capabilities rendered ineffective by nuclear weapons without using such weapons in return? Would the Soviets? The effects of these possible developments on possible escalation of the conflict is another area worthy of exploration.
W.Y.S./4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
89. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) to Secretary of Defense McNamara /1/
Washington, June 5, 1962.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3543, 381 (Relo) BNSP (31 Mar 62). Secret. A stamped notation on the source text reads: "Dep Sec has seen."
In your review of the draft of Basic National Security Policy you deleted the bracketed portion of the following passage on page 35, Section D:/2/
/2/Reference is to the May 7 draft; see Document 83.
"D. Strategic Forces
9. Scale and Character of Strategic Forces. Attainment of a stable military environment requires strategic forces sufficiently effective so that Sino-Soviet leaders would expect--without question--the Bloc's present power position [relative to the US] to be worsened drastically as a result of a general nuclear war. In assessing the appropriate scale of a US effort designed to meet this requirement it should be borne in mind that the Soviet calculus must take into account not merely relative [US]-Soviet strength after a nuclear exchange but also its consequences for the Communist position in Eastern Europe, for the relative power of Communist China, and for the possibilities of maintaining Communist control over the Russian base."/3/
/3/All brackets are in the source text.
It seems to me that the resulting position is too weak. To say that our strategic forces should only be able to worsen the Bloc's power position in a general nuclear war is to set too modest an objective. The ability to worsen the Bloc's power position as the result of a general nuclear war would be easily satisfied in an absolute sense with a much less effective strategic retaliatory force than we provide for in our present 5-year plan. The concept of the relative strength of the U.S. to that of the Soviet Union seems to me important to state clearly. Below are two formulations for you to consider as alternatives to the first sentence in the quoted passage:
1. Attainment of a stable international military and political environment requires strategic forces sufficiently effective that Sino-Soviet leaders would expect the Bloc's military position relative to the U.S. and its allies to be worsened as the result of a general nuclear war.
2. Attainment of a stable international military and political environment requires strategic forces sufficiently effective that Sino-Soviet leaders would expect the Bloc's military position relative to the U.S. and its allies to be inferior after a general nuclear war./4/
/4/McNamara wrote in the margin: "Paul, I prefer the original less the bracketed portions. The concept of a `worsened relative military position after a general nuclear war' is not a meaningful one to me when each side has the capacity to destroy the other's civilization. RMcN"
Paul H. Nitze
90. Editorial Note
On June 6, 1962, the Policy Planning Council circulated a revised, 182-page draft of the paper "Basic National Security Policy." Once again, the paper's fundamental structure remained unchanged, while numerous passages were rewritten or amended. Among the changes are the following:
In Part One, "Principles and Purposes," new language calls for accelerating "constructive changes in the character and policies of the Communist regimes, to erode the grip of Communism on peoples under its rule and to facilitate their absorption into the community of free nations." In a brief segment concerning U.S. regional objectives, there is renewed emphasis on the special importance of Iran and language on the need to make resolution of South Asian issues such as the Kashmir and Pushtu questions "a major objective of our diplomacy."
In Part Two, "A Strategy," under "Military Policy," a new sentence states that a major mission of U.S. forces is, in the event of war, "to bring about a conclusion of hostilities on terms acceptable to the U.S. and its allies." A section on general war notes that while precise plans for the conduct of operations in such a conflict cannot be drawn up in advance, preparations against that possibility should aim at: reducing enemy strategic offensive capabilities, particularly ability to "mount repetitive attacks against U.S. population centers;" retaining forces for use against enemy population centers and other "major elements of enemy strength;" and "facilitating the conduct of negotiations designed to bring the war to an end on terms which are consistent with U.S. interests, as set forth in this paper." A very similar paragraph appears in the March 26 draft but is missing from the May 7 draft.
A section on covert operations contains the added language, with respect to such actions, that the United States "cannot accept an asymmetry which allows Communist probes into the free community without possibility of riposte."
In a paragraph on current policy, also under "Military Policy," a new sentence is added to the paragraph (see Document 70) stating that the United States should not set an absolute requirement that its strategic forces be able to destroy substantially all Soviet nuclear delivery systems in a first strike. "Such an objective does not appear practical." New introductory material appears in the section on tactical nuclear weapons. It is unchanged in the portion of the June 22 draft printed as Document 93.
The paper states, still under "Military Policy," that U.S. arms control planning should be integrated with military planning. New language in the June 6 draft expands this idea: "On the one hand, in proposing an arms control measure, we must take into account its effect on relative military capabilities and support of national strategy. At the same time, military contingency plans, research and development, and programming of armed forces and armaments should reflect an awareness of the extent to which they affect stability in the military environment, the evolution of weapons and doctrine, and the likelihood of unauthorized use of weapons." (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, BNSP 6/6/62)
91. National Security Action Memorandum No. 162/1/
Washington, June 19, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 162. Secret.
TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, United States Information Agency
SUBJECT
Development of U.S. and Indigenous Police, Paramilitary and Military Resources
The President has approved the following statement and proposed assignments of responsibilities to various agencies as recommended by the Special Group (Counterinsurgency):
The study of U.S. and indigenous paramilitary resources pursuant to NSAM 56/2/ reflects gratifying progress in the development of an adequate U.S. capability to support both the training and active operations in indigenous paramilitary forces. Certain deficiencies, however, were clearly revealed. The deficiencies, to which all efforts and shortcomings to date are related, should be the basis upon which internal defense requirements are established for each country to be assisted.
/2/Document 33.
1. Country Internal Defense Plans
With one or two exceptions, there exist no outline plans to unify and orchestrate U.S. internal defense programs and activities in friendly countries facing a threat of subversive insurgency, or which provide strategic guidance for assisting such countries to maintain internal security. The Department of State has prepared a list identifying the countries facing a threat of subversive insurgency and will direct the formulation of outline plans for internal defense (Country Internal Defense Plans) by the Country Team in each such country which encompass the total U.S.-supported internal defense field. These plans will include the military, police, intelligence and psychological measures comprising a well rounded internal defense plan and will be consistent with the military, economic, political and social measures constituting the overall country plan. Such plans should be completed and in the hands of the Department of State by September 1, 1962, available for review by the Special Group (Counterinsurgency). From that time on, in accordance with the provisions of NSAM 124,/3/ the Special Group will keep these country internal defense plans under periodic review, and insure prompt resolution of interdepartmental problems arising in connection with their implementation.
/3/Document 68.
2. Improvement of Personnel Programs of Agencies Concerned with Unconventional Warfare
A study will be made by the Armed Forces and appropriate civil agencies concerned with unconventional warfare activities of how to improve their personnel programs. Particular attention will be directed to the following:
(a) Personnel programming for officers and men, including establishment of career programs which protect the special skills and professional qualifications of personnel assigned to unconventional warfare duties.
(b) Ability to perform efficiently in foreign areas in conditions of stress and danger for prolonged periods.
(c) Morale factors such as family housing, tours of duty, hardship allowances, hazardous duty pay, special recognition such as rewards.
3. Orientation of Personnel
As part of the current effort to train more personnel in the problems confronting underdeveloped societies, both civil and military agencies of the Government will assign, where feasible and subject to the availability of funds and personnel, middle-grade and senior officers to temporary duty for orientation purposes in selected countries experiencing internal security problems.
4. Deployment of Counterinsurgency Personnel
In order to insure a timely deployment of qualified counterinsurgency specialists to impending crisis areas, CIA and AID will take action to insure that adequate qualified personnel with paramilitary skills are available. Periodic reports of progress to achieve this objective will be submitted to the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) by CIA and AID.
[Heading and 3 paragraphs (22 lines of source text) not declassified]
6. Increased Use of Third Country Personnel
The Department of Defense, in collaboration with the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency, will undertake a study to determine on a selective basis the feasibility of the concept of the increased use of third-country personnel in paramilitary operations. Particular attention will be given to the following:
[1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified]
b. The feasibility of using third-country military or paramilitary forces to operate under their own or other national auspices in crisis areas.
7. Exploitation of Minorities
In view of the success which has resulted from CIA/US Army Special Forces efforts with tribal groups in Southeast Asia, continuing efforts will be made to determine the most feasible method of achieving similar results in other critical areas. On a selective basis, CIA and the Department of Defense will make studies of specific groups where there is reason to believe there exists an exploitable minority paramilitary capability.
8. Improvement of Indigenous Intelligence Organizations
Recent experience shows that most underdeveloped countries need more efficient intelligence coordination and dissemination systems to counter subversive insurgency. Therefore, the CIA will expand its present training and support efforts to achieve needed improvements in indigenous intelligence organizations and that other U.S. agencies contribute to this CIA coordinated program.
9. Research and Development for Counterinsurgency
The Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency will carry in their research and development programs a special section devoted to the requirements of counterinsurgency. The Special Group (Counterinsurgency) will follow up on this action and receive reports from time to time with regard to progress in developing modern equipment suitable to meet the requirements of counterinsurgency./4/
/4/By NSAM No. 165, dated June 16, the President added to the Group's purview eight countries "sufficiently threatened by Communist-inspired insurgency to warrant the specific interest of the Group." They were Burma, Cambodia, Cameroon, Iran, Ecuador, Colombia, Guatemala, and Venezuela. (NSAM No. 165, signed by Bundy; Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, NSAMs 1962) A July 6 memorandum from Lemnitzer to the Special Group summarizes the development of U.S. and indigenous police, paramilitary, and military resources in implementation of NSAMs No. 124 and 162. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 162)
McGeorge Bundy
92. Editorial Note
On June 20, 1962, Secretary of Defense McNamara was briefed on SIOP-63 at the Strategic Air Command Headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base near Omaha, Nebraska. Materials from this briefing have not been found. In a memorandum dated June 19 to McNamara, Fred A. Payne, Deputy Director of Defense Engineering for Strategic and Defensive Systems, and Alain Enthoven, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, stated that "since the SIOP-63 guidance had been responsively followed, there will be no need for disapproval." Desired directions of change could be included "in the periodic updatings which have to be made anyway to take account of changes in our force structure and in the target system." Potential problem areas were: [text not declassified]. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 B 3542, 684 SIOP 63)
In a July 13 memorandum to Lemnitzer, McNamara confirmed oral requests made of General Power during the Offutt briefing. They included tables showing for each option the weapons and megatonnage programmed, the damage expectancy, the survivability of Soviet delivery forces, and the casualty rates. McNamara called for wargaming to develop these estimates by October 1 and stated that Enthoven would "represent me in the development of this data." (Ibid.)
In telegram JCS 5481, sent to SAC and theater commanders on July 28, the JCS relayed some of McNamara's instructions and stated that "SIOP-63 with its flexible features will be effective 1 August 1962." (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office, Secretary of Defense Cable Files)
A memorandum from Captain Tazewell Shepard, Jr., Naval Aide to the President, August 1, states that Lemnitzer told the President "at the SIOP briefing last spring that the President could not implement the SIOP without consultation with Defense" and that therefore his emergency briefcase or "satchel" contained no information [text not declassified]. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, WYS Chron File Jul-Sep 62 (4)) No other record has been found of a SIOP briefing given the President in the spring of 1962. Concerning the briefing given the President on September 13, 1961, see Document 42.
On September 14, a team from the Joint Staff briefed the President on SIOP-63. In a September 22 memorandum to the President, Lemnitzer enclosed the briefing materials, stating that due "to the changeable nature of this current operational plan and the extreme sensitivity of the concepts and information contained therein, it is suggested that it be retained, when not in use by you, in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint War Room. Utilizing this procedure the data can be revised and kept current as required. The book can be made available for your use at any time since only a few minutes are required to deliver it to the White House." The attachment to Lemnitzer's memorandum has not been found. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 3105 (8 Mar 61) (3) Sec 4) A proposed outline for the briefing is attached to the memorandum from Vice Admiral Herbert D. Riley, Director of the Joint Staff, to Lemnitzer. (Ibid.)
The guidance for SIOP-64 forms the appendix to a November 14 memorandum signed for the JCS by Major General John A. Heintges, Deputy Director of the JCS, to McNamara. In the memorandum, the JCS stated that the changes in the guidance were "minor in nature," that they did "not represent a departure from the basic philosophy expressed in the guidance for SIOP-63," and that significant departure from SIOP-63 was "neither necessary nor desirable for the development of SIOP-64." (Ibid. JMF 3105 (22 Jun 62) Sec 1)
93. Draft Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Council /1/
Washington, June 22, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, BNSP Draft 6/22/62. Secret. For information on previous drafts, see Documents 70, 83, and 90. The underlined text represents the portions that were intended to be included in short version of the paper, which was circulated on August 2. (Attachment to memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McNamara, October 15; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, 381 (Relo) BNSP 31 Mar 62)
BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
[Here follow a table of contents and Part One, "Principles and Purposes."]
PART TWO: A STRATEGY
I. Military Policy
A. The Role of U.S. Force
1. Force and policy. The positive and constructive objectives of national policy depend intimately and in a variety of ways on the existence of appropriate U.S. forces and the evident will to use them to protect vital interests of the free community. Now and for the foreseeable future U.S. military policy is a crucial determinant of the fate of the free community because our military strength is proportionately great in relation to our population and command over resources, and because the security of our allies is intimately dependent on our strength and will to exercise it. There is hardly a diplomatic relationship we conduct that is not colored by an assessment of U.S. military power and of the circumstances in which we are likely to bring it into play. In generating this power the motivation of men in the expert employment of weapons of war continues as a responsibility of the population at large. It is brought to and maintained at a fine edge of effectiveness by the nation's military services, which provide a basic source of leadership for present and future generations of military men.
2. Major Missions. To sustain the free community, U.S. forces have four major missions:
a. To deter or deal with a direct nuclear assault against the U.S. or other vital areas.
b. To supplement allied and friendly forces in deterring or countering Communist non-nuclear attacks on the free community or in sea areas or on lines of communication vital to its survival.
c. To support friendly peoples against Communist and Communist-inspired efforts to undermine their governments and fragment their societies through subversive, paramilitary and guerrilla operations.
d. In the event of war to conduct hostilities so as to minimize damage to the U.S. and its allies, preserve their interests, frustrate opposing military forces, and bring about a conclusion of hostilities on terms acceptable to the U.S. and its allies. It is in the interest of the United States to achieve its wartime objectives while limiting the destructiveness of warfare, whether it be non-nuclear or nuclear, local or global; in this sense, it is a goal of U.S. policy that any war be a limited war.
For all these missions it should be recognized that effective deterrence has as its basis the evident military capability to prevent a potential enemy from achieving greater gain than loss by using force. While many other factors contribute to deterrence, this requirement for such a capability is constant and must be satisfied.
3. Supplementary Tasks. U.S. forces have three other important missions:
a. To provide within the free community a sense of security against Communist incursions and Communist political and psychological pressures, including threats of nuclear or non-nuclear attack against the U.S. or its allies.
b. To support American diplomatic and other efforts to minimize conflicts within the free community, to work toward peaceful adjustment of disputes and differences, and otherwise to promote U.S. and free world objectives.
c. To contribute, both directly and through military assistance and training programs, to the constructive modernization of underdeveloped nations.
4. The Special Imperatives of a Nuclear-Missile Age. The nature and consequences of nuclear war conducted with present and foreseeable delivery vehicles call for a military policy which can accomplish the purposes indicated above with a minimum likelihood that we would have to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in order to defend vital interests and, more generally, with a minimum risk of escalation toward general nuclear war.
The number of U.S. casualties and the scale of U.S. civil damage consequent on a major nuclear exchange is already great. It will increase with the passage of time.
The population of our European Allies is even more exposed.
These facts heighten the requirement for a policy aimed at limiting civil damage in the event of a major nuclear war; for generating, so far as possible, adequate non-nuclear defense alternatives; for maintaining--both to deter attack, to influence enemy targeting and to conduct operations--strong flexible, survivable and controlled strategic nuclear forces; and for seeking effectively inspected measures of arms control which would limit mutual powers of destruction while not reducing the free community's relative capacity to deter or to deal with Communist attack.
B. The Objective: A Stable International Military Environment
5. Objectives of U.S. Military Policy. The fundamental objective of U.S. military policy which flows from these considerations is to create a military environment which will permit us to:
a. achieve maximum deterrence of deliberate aggression, and especially aggression with nuclear weapons.
b. minimize the likelihood of uncalculated, unpremeditated or unintended nuclear conflicts; to reduce the likelihood of accidents, misinterpretations of incidents and intentions, false alarms or unauthorized actions within any nation (including the U.S. or its allies); and to reduce the possibility that such actions might trigger major nuclear war.
c. deal successfully with aggression in ways which will not readily escalate and, especially, which will not deteriorate into general war under the pressure of crises and limited conflicts.
6. The Prospects for Stability. With care and prudence we may thus hope to create an environment which will reduce both the incentives of others to use force in international affairs and the instabilities inherent in an age of nuclear and missile armaments. The rest of this chapter examines the implications of this objective for the design and employment of major elements of U.S. military power: strategic forces; defense forces; general purpose forces; and anti-guerrilla forces. It also examines arms control and disarmament policy as an integral part of national security policy.
C. The Threat
7. Communist Strategy. A persistent characteristic of Communist military strategy has been its searching attention to specific gaps--regional and technical--in the defense of the free community. It has been, thus far, an evident purpose of Communist strategy to avoid a direct confrontation not only with U.S. main strength, but with positions of relative strength within the free community of other nations as well. Soviet policy appears to be based on pressure against particular areas of vulnerability (e.g., Northern Azerbaijan, Greece, Berlin, Indochina, South Korea, etc.) and particular types of vulnerability (e.g., the geographical position of Berlin, the inadequate defenses against subversion and guerrilla warfare in Laos and South Viet-Nam, etc.)
8. Future Threats. Given foreseeable U.S. nuclear capabilities, including, in particular, our powerful ability to strike second, it is estimated that the USSR will not deliberately take actions which would bring about general nuclear war. There is, nevertheless, always a possibility that the Soviets may miscalculate U.S. capabilities or misjudge U.S. intentions. They may calculate that their growing nuclear strength makes non-nuclear aggression, especially against areas believed to be not vital to U.S. interests, a feasible course of action. They may also under-estimate the importance attached by the U.S. to particular interests or areas, and initiate action in the belief that the U.S. will not respond. Accordingly, it is a first charge on U.S. military policy to make grossly unattractive and unprofitable a direct Soviet assault on the U.S. or on other vital areas, notably Western Europe. But a major lesson of postwar history is that U.S. and allied policy must also achieve, to the maximum degree possible, a closing off of all areas of vulnerability, if we wish to minimize the number and effectiveness of Communist probes. It is this lesson which calls for the U.S. and its allies to develop a fuller range of military capabilities, capable of covering as much as feasible of the free community, if they are to create a stable overall military environment.
The major gap in the U.S. and allied spectrum of capabilities lies at the non-nuclear end--both with respect to conventional forces and those whose mission is counterinsurgency. Although the military stance of the free community is basically defensive, the U.S. and its allies also require capabilities for limited overt and covert action in areas under Communist control. Such action must be carefully weighed in the light of particular circumstances, costs, and risks; but the U.S. cannot accept an asymmetry which allows Communist probes into the free community without possibility of riposte.
D. Strategic Forces
9. Scale and Character of Strategic Nuclear Forces. Attainment of a stable military environment requires strategic nuclear forces sufficiently effective so that Sino-Soviet leaders would expect--without question--the Bloc's present power position to be worsened drastically as a result of a general nuclear war. In assessing the appropriate scale of a U.S. effort designed to meet this requirement it should be borne in mind that the Soviet calculus must take into account not merely relative Soviet strength after a nuclear exchange but also its consequences for the Communist position in Eastern Europe, for the relative power of Communist China, and for the possibilities of maintaining Communist control over the Russian base.
To meet the objectives indicated above the U.S. should, for the relevant planning period through the mid-1960's, maintain a sophisticated mix of delivery vehicles so dispersed, hardened, mobile and controlled that:
a. the USSR could not count with confidence, despite any technological break-through it might reasonably expect to score, upon neutralizing or blunting a large proportion of U.S. retaliatory power;
b. the U.S. could, even under unfavorable circumstances (e.g., an initial Soviet surprise attack), substantially reduce the military capabilities of the enemy.
To achieve not only the objectives indicated above, but also greater stability in the international military environment, our U.S. strategic forces and plans for their use should be designed so that they will continue an element of stability in grave international crises. Thus, our strategic nuclear forces should be sufficiently invulnerable so that their survival and effectiveness need not rest (i) on the U.S. striking first; (ii) on the U.S. taking in a crisis such "crash measures" to reduce these forces' vulnerability as the Soviets might consider evidence of impending attack or as would materially reduce the forces' operational effectiveness; (iii) on an instant U.S. response to ambiguous evidence of impending enemy attack.
10. Presidential Control. The planning and design of U.S. strategic forces should offer an increasingly wide range of options, at alternative levels of violence and against alternative target systems, which the President or authorities pre-designated by him could review in advance and choose among in the event. Our strategic forces must increasingly be susceptible of discriminating and controlled use, under centralized military command, in accordance with such high level decisions. Highly survivable command, control, and communication systems should be developed and maintained (i) which provide for authorization by the President, or authorities pre-designated by him in case he is unable to function, of initial use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, especially including periods of great tension or hostilities; (ii) which ensure, insofar as feasible, that conduct and termination of operations are also continuously and sensitively responsive to political decisions by the President or authorities pre-designated by him. The expectations of individuals about the occasions on which nuclear weapons would be used, and the methods of using them, should not be allowed to narrow to the point that flexibility in execution is in any way reduced.
11. General war may come about in a variety of ways (through pre-meditated attack, preemption, escalation, or inadvertence) and may take different forms, dependent upon the time when it occurs, the accuracy of U.S. intelligence estimates, the kinds of targets the enemy chooses to attack, and the capabilities of the U.S. to prevent repetitive or follow-up strikes. To fix in advance a specific pattern for the conduct of operations is virtually impossible, and our targeting plans and command-control system must, as has been indicated, be designed so as to enable the direction of operations by the President and authorities designated by him before or during the conflict. Within these limitations, pre-attack strategic nuclear planning and preparations will be aimed at:
a. reducing the strategic nuclear offensive capabilities of the enemy, and particularly his ability to mount repetitive attacks against U.S. and Allied population centers.
b. retaining ready, survivable strategic nuclear forces under centralized control for possible selective use against his urban-industrial centers; against other major elements of enemy strength; and for use in other ways which will contribute to c. below.
c. facilitating the conduct of negotiations designed to bring the war to an end on terms which are consistent with U.S. interests, as set forth in this paper.
The prospect of confronting reserve U.S. nuclear forces after any attack may give a potential enemy powerful incentive to refrain from planning or executing unrestricted attacks on U.S. or Allied civil society. Such ready forces, held in reserve and threatening--by their very exist-ence--surviving enemy targets, may also conceivably extend deterrence into the wartime period, and thus destroy the will of surviving enemy leaders to pursue unrestricted attacks or to continue the war. Moreover, the goal of ending hostilities on acceptable terms requires that plans and operational decisions preclude the prospect of an unarmed U.S. confronting armed opponents. For all these reasons, it is essential--whatever the size, composition and effectiveness of U.S. strategic forces--that the U.S. not disarm itself, by expending all ready strategic nuclear forces in initial attacks.
12. Optimum Use of Strategic Nuclear Weapons. A major problem in connection with the design and use of these strategic forces relates to the optimum use of nuclear weapons if we must initiate such use.
On the one hand, since 1945 American policy has ruled out the initiation of nuclear attack on the Soviet Union as a means of bringing the cold war to an end and providing a definite victory for the Free World. Aside from its violation of our moral and political tradition a policy of initiating nuclear war was always shadowed by its consequences for Western Europe; and its rationality on strictly military grounds has been gradually reduced with the Soviet acquisition of medium and long-range nuclear delivery capabilities.
On the other hand, we are committed explicitly to defend the populations and territory of Western Europe, and we have similar though implicit commitments to use nuclear weapons rather than accept major defeat in Asia and the Middle East.
This situation immediately raises the question of whether, if we initiated use of nuclear weapons, a limited use of nuclear weapons with a concomitant risk of escalation of nuclear engagement by the other side would be the sensible course to follow, or whether an initial strike against Soviet strategic nuclear delivery systems would be the optimum course.
At the present time this question--involving complex problems of intelligence assessment and projection as well as evolving military technology--is subject to legitimate debate. The answer may well vary according to circumstances which cannot be foreseen in advance.
13. Current Policy. In order not to foreclose this issue of optimum initial U.S. use of nuclear weapons, it is important to preserve utmost flexibility in our plans and posture. Three propositions warrant special comment in this connection.
a. We should try to convey to the Soviets: (i) That we do not intend to mount an initial strategic strike if their forces do not transgress the frontiers of the free community; (ii) that if they do we would strike first under certain circumstances if this was necessary in order to protect our vital interests; (iii) that we are not so prone to mount an initial strategic strike in the event of grave crises or limited conflict as to maximize the incentive for the Soviets to take a pre-emptive action in these contingencies. This is, in effect, the manifold message we have conveyed with respect to West Berlin.
b. We must not lock ourselves into plans and assumptions regarding an initial U.S. strategic strike against Soviet nuclear delivery systems, which could play somewhat the same role in a major international crisis that the great powers' mobilization and war plans played in 1914, e.g., create such pressures for early military moves, in order to destroy enemy nuclear forces, as to deny diplomacy the time it needs to resolve the crisis peacefully.
c. We have not and should not set an absolute requirement that our strategic forces be able substantially to destroy all Soviet nuclear delivery systems in a first strike. For one thing, such an objective does not appear practical.
E. Active and Passive Defense
14. Active Defense. The prime objectives of active defense systems are to improve stability by:
a. helping to protect U.S. retaliatory forces;
b. preventing the enemy from cheaply and easily wreaking devastation on U.S. population and industrial center;
c. accomplishing maximum attrition of the attacking force and complicating enemy planning.
Attainment of the second of these objectives will present increasing difficulty as the USSR develops more sophisticated weapons systems; hence, the actual level of resources to be devoted to this mission should be reconsidered frequently and thoroughly.
15. Passive Defense. Passive defense measures will not preclude the USSR from inflicting heavy damage on the U.S. should it wish to do so. If it were the primary enemy purpose to overcome passive defense measures, there are numerous weapons options available to him. A more reasonable assumption, however, is that the allocation of resources to long-term and costly development of inter-continental weapons systems would not be significantly affected by U.S. measures of passive defense designed to reduce loss of life from nuclear attack. In the light of the various circumstances under which hostilities might be conducted, passive defense has three main purposes:
a. To prevent or limit avoidable fatalities or casualties from nuclear conflict not involving massive attack directly upon U.S. population centers. This purpose can be separated into two parts: the first, limitation of casualties and fatalities from blast, heat and other immediate effects of nuclear detonations; the second, limitation of casualties and fatalities from fallout, spreading fires and other indirect effects of nuclear detonations. The first can be accomplished only through a combination of active and passive defense measures; systems to accomplish this on a nation-wide basis are not yet sufficiently efficient to warrant their adoption. The second can be attained by a system of fallout shelters, together with local organization, planning and training to use the system.
b. To maintain continuity at all feasible levels of government. This will require particular attention to such tasks as establishing and promulgating lines of succession to official positions; providing for the safekeeping of essential records; establishing control centers and alternative sites for government emergency operations; and providing for the protection and maximum use of essential government personnel, resources and facilities.
c. To strengthen, mobilize and plan for the management of the nation's resources in the interest of current and future national security. In this connection, continuing attention must be given to planning, training, stockpiling, research and development, and other preparations necessary to: (i) the stabilization and organized direction of the civilian economy in times of national emergency; (ii) the prompt initiation of post-attack industrial rehabilitation programs necessary to national survival, rehabilitation and recovery; and (iii) the proper organization of remaining human and material resources.
These passive defense steps are essential, lest the U.S. socio-economic system collapse or be distorted into an unacceptable form even following an attack of limited scale not directed primarily against our civil society. Sustained effort and public education by the Federal Government will be required for their execution. Care should be taken, however, not to generate unwarranted expectations as to what such programs can accomplish, not to allow these measures to divert public attention and energies from other needed national security tasks.
F. General Purpose Forces
16. Scale and Nature. A third major element in our effort to achieve a balanced and stable international military environment should be the maintenance of U.S. and allied general purpose forces adequate, not only to accomplish prescribed general war tasks but also, in situations less than general war, to use force within certain limits to defend allied and friendly peoples and areas without taking actions involving a high probability of nuclear war.
In determining the scale of U.S. non-nuclear forces needed to meet this requirement, three conceivable types of Sino-Soviet ground-air non-nuclear attack should be considered: (i) major assault, based on full use of forces in being which are deployed or readily deployable to the area under attack; (ii) lesser forms of aggression, at any level up to major assault; (iii) all-out assault, based on full mobilization and use of all manpower and material reserves.
U.S. general purposes forces should be strong enough in combination with available allied forces:
(i) to frustrate, without using nuclear weapons, major non-nuclear assault by Sino-Soviet forces against areas where vital U.S. interests are involved, long enough--at a minimum/2/--to give the Communists a full opportunity to appreciate the risks of the course on which they are embarked and then to afford diplomacy an adequate opportunity to end the conflict;
/2/That is, in cases where U.S. and allied strength is not sufficient--or could not be made sufficient, with a minor build-up--to permit defense against major assault without a time limit. [Footnote in the source text.]
(ii) to frustrate in sustained combat, without using nuclear weapons and without any time limits, non-nuclear aggression at any level less than major assault by Soviet or Chinese Communist ground and air forces;
(iii) to contribute to general war missions in the event of all-out Sino-Soviet attack, so long as this does not significantly interfere with or detract from the general purpose forces' primary missions, which are to deter and deal with conflicts less than general war.
In addition, general purpose forces should be able to maintain, without using nuclear weapons, control of required sea bases and sea-areas in the face of non-nuclear naval and air attack against such sea lanes and sea areas.
General purpose forces should be increased in quantity and improve in quality (e.g., through modernization of materiel stocks) as necessary to attain the above objectives. In so doing, account should be taken of the fact that, although the reserve call-up of 1961 was under the then existing circumstances as essential military and political act, we cannot assume the threats we will face will be so infrequent, dramatic and unambiguous as to make recurring reserve call-ups (except as indicated in paragraph 23) a politically feasible or technically desirable means of meeting the objectives outlined above.
U.S. general purpose forces should also be:
a. Sufficiently mobile so that they could respond promptly and simultaneously in needed numbers to two substantial threats in areas where such threats can reasonably be expected and where they would directly threaten vital U.S. interests--notably in Europe and Southeast Asia.
b. So trained, organized, and equipped as not in any way to be dependent on nuclear weapons in such sustained combat as may be necessary fully to discharge the missions prescribed under (i) and (ii), above, in regard to major Communist assault and lesser aggressions.
c. Afforded sufficient logistic support (including advance construction and pre-stocking, where feasible, of needed facilities in or near possible overseas combat areas) to permit discharge of the missions indicated above.
A longer term, but clearly desirable, objective of U.S. policy would be to create U.S. general purpose forces sufficiently substantial so that they could frustrate, in conjunction with available allied forces and by non-nuclear means, major Sino-Soviet non-nuclear assault against a maximum number of those areas involving vital U.S. interests, without any time limit. Prompt consideration should be given to the question of whether steps additional to those called for in the preceding paragraphs should eventually be taken to achieve this objective, in respect to both U.S. and allied forces. The resources available to the U.S. and its allies in manpower, financial and production terms place this objective within our capabilities. Action to achieve the objective, however, would require difficult political decisions for the people of both the U.S. and its allies. New approaches to this problem should be studied intensively.
The possibility should be examined that, even with an increase in free world non-nuclear strength within likely limits, U.S. and allied forces might not be able to frustrate major non-nuclear assault in some regions without (or, in the event the opponent were to respond in kind, even with) local use of nuclear weapons, so that the threat of U.S. initial use of strategic nuclear weapons would remain essential to deterring attack on these areas. The political and military implications of any such conclusion should be the subject of urgent study.
17. Contingency Planning. Within the limits of capabilities which exist or are to be firmly planned in accordance with the policy set forth in paragraph 16, contingency plans should exist for a non-nuclear response by general purpose forces to each likely form of Communist non-nuclear aggression short of all-out attack. Preparations should be such as to permit immediate execution of these plans.
18. Conduct of Local War. In conducting local war the U.S. should:
a. seek to bring the war to a conclusion on terms satisfactory to the U.S., and make clear to the enemy the specific political objectives for which the U.S. is fighting where this will contribute to doing so;
b. be prepared to fight locally in direct conflict with Sino-Soviet forces;
c. protect the interests of the friendly people involved;
d. seek to control the scope of intensity of the conflict to minimize the risk of escalation to general war, recognizing that this may sometimes require controlled and deliberate intensification of the conflict;
e. conduct military operations so as to limit damage in the area of conflict and enhance allied solidarity and effectiveness.
19. Deployment and Use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons. We can no longer expect to avoid nuclear retaliation if we initiate the use of nuclear weapons, tactically or otherwise. Even a local nuclear exchange could have consequences, for example, for Europe that are most painful to contemplate. Such an exchange would be unlikely to give us any marked military advantage. It could rapidly lead to general nuclear war.
A very limited use of nuclear weapons, primarily for purposes of demonstrating our will and intent to use such weapons, might bring Soviet aggression to a halt without substantial retaliation, and without escalation. This is a next-to-last option we cannot dismiss. But prospects for success are not high, and there might be acutely undesirable political consequences from taking such action.
It is also conceivable that the limited tactical use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield would not broaden a conventional engagement or radically transform it. But these prospects are not rated very highly.
Highly dispersed nuclear weapons in the hands of troops would be difficult to control centrally. Accidents and unauthorized acts could well occur on both sides. Furthermore, the pressures on the Soviets to respond in kind, the great flexibility of nuclear systems, the enormous firepower contained in a single weapon, the ease and accuracy with which that firepower can be called in from unattacked and hence undamaged distant bases, the crucial importance of air superiority in nuclear operations--all these considerations suggest that local nuclear war would be a transient but highly destructive phenomenon.
Studies of the use of nuclear weapons, either for battlefield or interdiction purposes, are under way and should be urgently prosecuted. Pending the completion of these studies, tentative guidelines are:
a. Scale and Nature: U.S. forces should have sufficient tactical nuclear capabilities (i) to deter enemy initiation of tactical nuclear warfare; (ii) to enhance (in conjunction with a manifest U.S. intent to use nuclear weapons, if necessary) the primary deterrent, which is and will continue to be, posed by U.S. non-nuclear and strategic nuclear capabilities, to major or all-out Communist non-nuclear assault; (iii) to be able to use tactical nuclear weapons selectively for military advantage, if circumstances should arise (e.g., at sea or in the air) where we would gain militarily from a local nuclear exchange and where such an exchange would be unlikely to cause escalation; (iv) to permit a very limited use against valid military targets in other circumstances, primarily in order to demonstrate our will to resist aggression.
b. Organization and Deployment: U.S. and allied tactical nuclear capabilities should be so deployed, and their command and control should be so organized as: (i) to preserve carefully the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons; (ii) to ensure that initial use of tactical nuclear weapons--even after non-nuclear hostilities have begun--will take place only on the President's decision; (iii) to ensure that continuing control will be exercised over use of tactical nuclear weapons, within limitations established by the President at as high a level of authority as is consistent with the character of the conflict and the likely grave consequences of a nuclear mistake. In order to accomplish the purposes indicated above and ensure that nuclear weapons are as immune to accidental or deliberate unauthorized use as is consistent with their operational effectiveness: (i) High priority should be given to incorporating, as a matter of urgency, all needed and operationally feasible technical safeguards in nuclear weapons specified by the President in allied and in U.S. hands; (ii) U.S. custodians of warheads in allied hands should be given the training, equipment, [2-1/2 lines of underscored source text not declassified]; (iii) Periodic review of these arrangements and safeguards and of the state, command and control, organization, and deployment of U.S. and allied nuclear weapons and of their nuclear components should be undertaken to ensure that they are the optimum from the standpoints indicated above.
c. Use: Tactical nuclear weapons should be used in local war only when it is clear that the objectives stated in paragraph 18 would be furthered by, and could not be attained without, use of nuclear weapons. In determining whether this condition exists and, if so, how nuclear weapons should be used, account should be taken of: (i) our ability or inability to frustrate the aggression without using nuclear weapons; (ii) the likely military effects of a local two-way nuclear exchange; (iii) the political effects of such a local nuclear exchange--both locally and worldwide; (iv) the physical effects of the exchange for the country being fought over; (v) the chances of exchange escalating into general nuclear war.
G. Counter-Guerrilla Forces
20. The Task. A fourth major element in a stable military environment must be the generation of allied and U.S. forces and policies capable of making the imposition of guerrilla war on nations of the free community unprofitable to the Communists. Given the preponderant role of local forces in deterring guerrilla war and conducting counter-guerrilla operations it follows that:
a. Preventive Action: Special steps should be taken to make vulnerable nations more aware of Communist tactics in this field and of the civil and military conditions in the free community which make such tactics feasible and attractive. Recognizing the importance and non-military factors in this connection, emphasis should be placed on devising and implementing economic and political--as well as military--programs aimed at preventing situations that could lead to guerrilla warfare. We must identify such areas of potential or current vulnerability in advance; focus the attention of foreign governments and our own instruments of policy on preventive action; and generate the local and U.S. forces, civil and military, capable of dealing with them in the most forehanded way possible.
b. Crisis Situations: When guerrilla conflict erupts we should seek to mobilize effective local defense, supported by necessary political and economic programs, at the earliest possible stage of the conflict. Our objectives, where appropriate and feasible, should be to: (i) maintain the independent and territorial integrity of the nation attacked; (ii) minimize the scope of direct U.S. involvement, so far as consistent with this objective and our commitments; (iii) minimize the risk of escalation to local conventional or to nuclear war.
c. U.S. Programs: The development of hardware, techniques, and tactics appropriate to guerrilla warfare should receive high priority in U.S. training and production programs, as necessary to achieve the purposes set forth under (a) and (b) above.
21. The Border Problem in Guerrilla Warfare. Although main reliance is placed on local dissidents or converts to Communism by guerrilla forces, the conduct by the Communists of guerrilla war sometimes involves the infiltration from outside of key personnel and material, as well as external inspiration and stimulation of the operation. Since it may, therefore, be difficult to conduct successful counter-guerrilla operations where an open frontier with a Communist country exists:
a. The U.S. should heighten the free community's awareness of the element of international aggression involved in outside support for guerrilla operations, so as to deter border crossings and other forces of support, and to provide a basis for possible sanctions.
b. The U.S. should seek to close off open frontiers or to control the flow of supplies from outside the country--a move in which an international presence may sometimes be helpful, although experience to date is not encouraging on this point.
c. The U.S. should consider the application of selected, measured sanctions against the aggressor, if necessary to prevent the defeat of the free community nation under attack, in ways which would minimize--but nevertheless confront--the possibility of escalation.
22. The Role of Allies. With respect to allied participation in the deterrence and conduct of guerrilla war, it is U.S. policy:
a. To generate local forces--through formal alliance arrangements or otherwise--which will deter guerrilla warfare, if possible, and provide time for the mobilization of effective countermeasures, should deterrence fail.
b. To rally diplomatic, civic and military support for the nation under attack from the maximum number of nations of the free community, taking into account, with respect to civic and military contributions, the relative political acceptability, in particular regions, of the presence of various of our allies.
H. Other Missions of U.S. Forces
23. Subsidiary Tasks. The subsidiary missions assigned the armed forces (see paragraph A, 3 above) impose only minor additional specialized military requirements, but these must be given particular attention lest they be lost to sight. The accomplishment of these missions depends on a mutual awareness among civilian and military officials of the particular contributions the armed forces can make, and a willingness to offer and to accept those contributions. This in turn implies an even better reciprocal flow of information, closer liaison, and more cross-education than has sometimes been achieved in the past. U.S. military forces at home and abroad, because of their size, geographical distribution, and versatile nonmilitary capabilities continue to have great impact in various countries and exert strong influence on all our political, economic, and psychological policies. This influence should be used to our advantage.
I. Supporting Programs
The following programs provide support for all the types of U.S. forces and missions described in this chapter.
24. Reserve Forces. With due regard for political and psychological difficulties, the training, equipment, and orientation of reserve forces should be altered to fit them better for:
a. Manning active defense systems.
b. Augmenting active forces in contingencies which require rapid but limited mobilization.
c. Providing reinforcements in the event of protracted local conflicts.
d. Fulfilling a significant supporting role as a secondary mission in civil defense, when civil defense plans and concepts have developed to the point where specific useful missions can be assigned to reserve units.
e. Providing additional forces and expanded base for large scale mobilization in major emergencies.
f. Provision of units to augment or replenish the strategic reserve in the CONUS.
While selected high priority units should be readied to augment or replenish the strategic reserve in the continental U.S. reserve call-ups should so far as practicable be limited to organized units and individuals with the least prior service.
25. Overseas Bases and Facilities. Although the development of ballistic missile technology has reduced the need for strategic air and missile bases overseas, the possibility of U.S. engagement in local wars or in anti-guerrilla operations creates a new need for tactical bases, overflight rights, and contingency arrangements. Moreover, requirements for peace-time storage, communications, tracking, and intelligence facilities are increasing.
To meet vital needs the U.S. should maintain an adequate system of overseas facilities for local war, military counter-insurgency operations, general war, and peacetime missions, together with the arrangements necessary for their support.
This base structure must be clearly and fully capable of supporting U.S. and allied forces in their preparation for, and conduct of, local war, wherever such war may occur throughout the world. Where local logistic limitations exist which would not prevent optimum deployment of U.S. and allied forces to a country which we would propose to defend in local war, prompt and vigorous remedial action should be taken, e.g., building more transport and other facilities in the host country or pre-stocking existing facilities in or near their country.
We should seek to limit dependence on a single base, or a group of bases, and should examine with urgency, in view of the growing nationalist and neutralist pressure on existing U.S. bases, the possibilities of maintaining services essential to U.S. security by acquiring new bases, and by developing new or applying existing technologies, which would reduce our dependence on overseas bases in general. Given the increasing diplomatic and political cost of maintaining base and facility rights overseas, and the pressure that maintenance of such bases and facilities exerts on our balance of payments position, we should make every effort to dispose in whole or in part of outmoded or unnecessary facilities, to hold new requirements to a minimum and, where needed, to secure additional rights to use existing foreign military and civil facilities.
26. Military Aid. This is dealt with in Chapter Two, following.
27. Research and Development. To maintain effective deterrence over the full spectrum of force, the free community must prosecute research and development efforts over a broad front. The U.S. should pursue research and development to maintain a selective superiority in military technology that is increasingly responsive to our political and military objectives. New emphasis should be given to research and development in two fields which have enjoyed less attention than their importance warrants:
a. We should give high priority to weapons and equipment designed to improve our capabilities in sustained non-nuclear combat. We should support mutually with certain allies selected non-nuclear research and development for military application in improving such non-nuclear capabilities.
b. We should give new emphasis to weapons which will help less developed countries cope with guerrilla and local external threats.
To these ends, continuing efforts should be devoted to promoting basic scientific research (both within the military and the civilian agencies of government), to uncovering and applying technological discoveries and innovations (using both governmental and private research and development facilities), and to expediting their translation into military equipment. However, the wide range of possible improvements, the cost of changing models and making adaptations, and the nation's over-all requirement for scarce research and development resources, indicate a need for focusing more sharply on developments of significant import and for eschewing marginal improvements or those which do not remedy basic defects of existing weapons systems.
We should also seek, through research and development, to devise new capabilities for limited countermeasures against Communist pressures short of the overt use of substantial force.
28. Chemical and Biological Warfare. United States military forces should have a capability to use and defend against chemical and biological weapons. Chemical and biological weapons should only be used in case of direct decision by the President that such use is warranted by the political military situation, except for the use of: (i) existing smoke, incendiary, and riot control agents in appropriate military operations, and (2) riot control agents in suppressing civil disturbances.
J. Arms Control and Disarmament
29. The U.S. Interest in Arms Control and Disarmament. The fifth and final element in the effort to maintain a stable military environment is our policy toward arms control and disarmament. The U.S. security interest in arms control and disarmament derives directly from the following characteristics of U.S. military policy and of the present and foreseeable military environment:
a. Continuation of existing trends is likely to yield an increasing number of powers which command nuclear capabilities and means of delivery--on the whole a destabilizing factor, contrary to the U.S. interest.
b. The possibility that a nuclear war might result from accident or--more likely--from miscalculation, misinterpretation of incidents, false alarms or unauthorized actions, or failure of communication--is large enough to be an important reason for seeking remedial measures.
c. The prospect over the coming years, in the absence of arms limitation, is for (i) continuing U.S. ability to inflict a high level of damage on the USSR; (ii) substantial increase in the Soviet capacity to inflict civil damage on the U.S. in all-out nuclear exchange; (iii) continuing substantial expenditures of resources and scarce talent in efforts to maintain a stable military environment.
d. Since the U.S. does not intend to initiate nuclear attack on nations ruled by Communist regimes except in riposte to prior Communist aggression, the U.S. cannot exploit the technical advantages of unprovoked, secretly planned, and surprise nuclear assault.
e. A persuasive second-strike deterrent can be maintained at lower levels of U.S. nuclear delivery capabilities than at present, without necessarily jeopardizing U.S. objectives, if we are assured that our own reductions in capabilities are matched appropriately by the USSR.
30. Objectives of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Policy. In the light of these considerations, U.S. arms control and disarmament policy should form a major element of our national policy and, as such, should seek to complement our military policy in enhancing U.S. security by promoting a stable military environment and developing the means of limiting damage should war occur. To this end the following objectives (which are not necessarily listed in order of priority) should be sought:
a. The U.S. should seek to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities to nations not now controlling such capabilities.
b. It should seek to reduce the likelihood of hostilities occurring through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication.
c. It should seek to limit the capabilities of enemy states to undertake aggression against the U.S. and its allies, to reduce the risk of war, and to decrease the destructiveness of war should it occur, through substantial safeguarded reductions in armaments and other measures by the major powers, short of general and complete disarmament.
d. It should, as a long-term goal, seek to promote the political and military conditions under which the use or threat of force as an instrument of national policy would be reduced and finally eliminated, through an agreed total program of general and complete disarmament under effective international controls in a world effectively organized for peace.
Each of these four categories of measures is discussed below.
31. Steps to Prevent Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Capabilities. In order to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation, emphasis should be placed on seeking not only a safeguarded cessation of nuclear testing but also a safeguarded cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and an agreement under which nuclear powers would commit themselves not to relinquish control over nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. An agreement not to disseminate nuclear weapons should be couched in terms that would not call into question either existing NATO custodial arrangements or any contemplated allied multi-lateral arrangement.
32. Initial Measures to Reduce the Likelihood of Accident, Miscalculation or Failure of Communication. Even if the Soviets do not share the U.S. image of the future of the world in the degree necessary to negotiate major arms reductions programs, they may come to recognize the serious dangers of accident, miscalculation and failure of communication and thus be willing to join the U.S. in limited measures to reduce those dangers. Such measures might include advance notification of military movements, creation of some facility for direct, secure, and instantaneous communication between national military command centers of the two sides, establishment of observation posts and arrangements to reduce the risk of surprise attack, and establishment of an International Commission to Reduce the Risk of War in which the U.S. and the USSR would consider further steps to promote stability, reduce tensions, dampen military crises, and minimize the need for hasty military responses. The U.S. should, even before such a Commission is established, urgently seek out opportunities informally to discuss such measures with the USSR to try to alert it to the importance and nature of the problem.
33. Limited Disarmament Measures.
Limited disarmament measures, though short of general and complete disarmament, might still be substantial and comprehensive. They might include reducing and limiting strategic nuclear delivery capabilities; reducing and limiting conventional armaments and armed forces; and insuring the peaceful uses of outer space. In negotiating limited measures, the U.S. should seek to the maximum possible extent to redress the imbalance in conventional land armaments existing between NATO and the Bloc. Such measures might reduce the risk of war, limit the cost of military programs, and reduce the destructiveness of war, if it occurs.
34. General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World.
The U.S. should continue to evidence its willingness to negotiate a program and a treaty for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.
Such a program would involve the reduction and eventual elimination of national military capabilities except those required for maintaining internal order and for an international peace force--to be carried out by balanced, equitable, and safeguarded steps for the concurrent regulation and reduction of both nuclear and non-nuclear armed forces and armaments where appropriate, under effective verification procedures which would be reciprocal or international and would be responsive to the required amount of security dependent on the extent and kind of retained armaments. Parallel to the curtailment of national military power, such a program would promote the growth of more effective means for keeping the peace, including: renunciation of subversion and indirect aggression as instruments of policy, development of the rule of international law, improvement of procedures for settling international disputes, and development of an international peace force capable of effectively protecting all nations against breaches of the peace.
Given Soviet attitudes and policies, general and complete disarmament is unlikely of attainment in the near future. The U.S. should: (a) continue to favor such a policy, while underlining candidly its radical implications for international law and effective peace-keeping machinery; and (b) at the same time seek the more limited and feasible arms control measures set forth above.
35. Evaluation.
In evaluating arms control and disarmament measures primary consideration should, of course, be given to the degree of military risk or military advantage involved. In addition, the following factors should be weighed: the dangers inherent in the continuation of uncontrolled increases in the proliferation of armaments, the possible effect of a proposed measure on the ability of the U.S. to carry out its foreign policy, and its probable effect on over-all Communist policy and on the evolution of the Bloc.
36. Inspection and Verification.
Adequate verification must accompany arms control and disarmament. There should be effective verification of: (i) destruction of armaments or their conversion to peaceful uses; (ii) cessation or limitation of production, testing, or other specified activities; (iii) the fact that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces are not exceeded. A continuing attempt should be made to devise inspection techniques which would fully exploit technological progress, and the degree of inspection should be related to the technical need and the degree of risk to the national security involved. Some arms control measures conceivably may be assured without formal inspection machinery or may be subject to verification through national intelligence collection capabilities.
37. Arms Control and Military Planning.
It is essential that U.S. arms control planning and research be integrated with U.S. military planning. Both are directed toward improving U.S. military security, and they will only achieve this objective if they are carried forward in close concert. On the one hand, in proposing an arms control measure, we must take into account its effect on relative military capabilities and support of national strategy. At the same time, military contingency plans, research and development, and programming of armed forces and armaments should reflect an awareness of the extent to which they affect stability in the military environment, the evolution of weapons and doctrine, and the likelihood of unauthorized use of weapons.
38. Dissemination of Arms Control Knowledge.
The increasing U.S. knowledge and understanding of arms control matters should be disseminated not only to other Western powers but also to the neutrals and to the Soviet Bloc. Informal conferences, consultations, and meetings should be encouraged both within the West and on an East-West basis where we can be assured that U.S. participation will be competent, responsible, and responsive to the national interest.
39. Regional Arms Races in Newly Developing Areas.
The development of regional arms races for purposes of prestige or external adventures should be discouraged where possible. Any opportunity for tacit or explicit agreements to limit such competition should be fully exploited. We should constantly be alert to means for creating or embracing such opportunities.
[Here follow sections on "Arms Control and Disarmament," "Policy Towards the Underdeveloped Areas," "The Framework of Organization," "Relations With Communist Regimes," and "The Domestic Base."]
94. Editorial Note
By June 1962 there was considerable discussion within the U.S. Government of the ultimate disposition of the paper on "Basic National Security Policy" (see Documents 70, 83, 90, and 93). At times consideration of the question was intermingled with that of the publicity the paper had received, a development described in Document 95.
On June 13, 1962, Secretary McNamara, in a letter covering a list of changes in the May 7 draft proposed by his Department, wrote Secretary Rusk that "the thrust of the proposed policy seems highly suitable," and that as "between the short and the long versions of the paper, I believe the long version to be the preferable format. The shorter one lacks the amplifying background so necessary to full understanding of policy statements as well as to setting the tone of policy." McNamara suggested that more sensitive portions of the final version might be excerpted and distributed in an NSAM. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 3001 (26 Nov 62))
At the White House daily staff meeting on June 20, according to a memorandum for the record by Colonel Ewell, "there was a long discussion of the BNSP due to its having broken into the papers again recently." McGeorge Bundy decided to obtain the paper "without having Rusk take an official position on it." Then "Bundy would try to find out what the President actually wanted to do with it." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings, May-September 1962)
In a June 28 memorandum to McNamara, Assistant Secretary of Defense Nitze indicated that by that time the June 22 draft paper was with the President. Nitze pointed out that the Department of State regarded it as unlikely that the President "would simply approve it forthwith," and that it "would recommend to the President reconsidering such a decision." Nitze concluded: "State plans no action until the President has indicated his wishes on the BNSP, in the expectation that DOD and JCS will then have a further opportunity to express themselves." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, 381 (Relo) BNSP 31 Mar 62)
In his memorandum for the record of the White House daily staff meeting on July 2, Ewell wrote:
"The BNSP was mentioned. No one knows how Bundy plans to handle this. Kaysen said he really didn't care as he was opposed to publishing the document. He felt that it had served a useful purpose in its development and should be just thrown away. (My reading on this statement is that Kaysen doesn't like certain portions of the document and would just as soon see it killed. My guess would be that Kaysen's major disagreement is the fact that the document comes out for a position of strength in Europe and continued efforts to build Western-oriented strength in Southeast Asia. He has previously indicated he is for a modus vivendi by Western concessions in Europe and is not opposed to a neutralist Southeast Asia. I would therefore hazard the guess that he feels that the BNSP is too tough and should not be published.)" (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings, May-September 1962)
On July 10, McGeorge Bundy told Henry Owen, Vice Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, that the President had not yet made up his mind on the next steps, and asked that Rusk send a memorandum with his recommendations in the matter. (Memorandum from Owen to Rusk, July 10; Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, May-July 1962; memorandum and attachment returned to sender) Rostow's repeated drafts of a memorandum for Rusk to send to the President were returned for revision. (Memorandum from John Ford, Executive Secretary of the Policy Planning Council, to Rostow, August 22; ibid., July-August 1962) Rostow's last effort is in the enclosure to a memorandum from Ball to the Secretary dated September 11, in which Ball stated "For reasons which you and I have discussed, I would hope that we could resolve this issue short of the White House." A marginal note indicates Rostow's memorandum was not sent. (Ibid., S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, BNSP 1961-1962)
In his memorandum for the record of the White House daily staff meeting on August 10, Ewell wrote that Bundy "felt the big document would never fly although Rostow is still trying to push it. He felt that a military version should be prepared to replace the old version now in existence." Ewell told him of the Joint Staff's fear that it would be bypassed in the final review process and Bundy assured him that its views would be taken into account.
At a State-JCS meeting on October 5, Taylor stated that the Joint Chiefs had never seen the latest draft (the August 2 short form) and wanted to. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State, suggested that the Chiefs receive the military portions only. "General Wheeler said that for the JCS this would be like having the Book of Revelations without ever having seen Genesis." After Johnson agreed to send the entire short draft, "General Taylor said that he felt that the BNSP should be like the British Constitution and Mr. Johnson agreed that getting it engraved in concrete was not good. General Taylor then remarked that any document which gains the acceptance of everyone must of necessity be so compromised that it will be used by everyone to further his own ends." (Memorandum of the substance of discussion at State-JCS meeting; ibid., S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, State-JCS Meetings 1962)
95. Editorial Note
On June 26, 1962,Walt W. Rostow and George W. Ball testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with respect to their work on the Department of State drafts of "Basic National Security Policy." This testimony was occasioned by a series of news accounts of the drafts, especially two articles by Willard Edwards that appeared in the Chicago Tribune on June 17-18. Edwards stated that the main theme of the paper was that Soviet domestic and foreign policies were "mellowing," but that military and intelligence officials who had seen the draft believed that it adduced no evidence to support this assertion.
In his testimony, Rostow stated that "mellowing" was "not a word of my choice" and that although there were significant changes in the Soviet Union which held a long-term hope of liberalization they did "not affect current policy." They might "in the long run, as Secretary Dulles used to point out," but meanwhile there were dangerous confrontations in Berlin, South Vietnam, and Laos. Rostow then gave extensive testimony on his views on a wide range of foreign policy and national security topics.
Members of the Committee requested copies of the current draft, but Ball refused on the ground that it was a document "under the control of the National Security Council," and therefore any such request would have to be made directly to the President. On July 3, Rusk stated before the Committee that he would ask the President about possible publication of Rostow's testimony given on June 26. Edwards' articles, the testimony of Ball and Rostow, and Rusk's remarks are all printed in Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Together With Joint Sessions With the Senate Armed Services Committee (Historical Series), Volume XIV, Eighty-seventh Congress, Second Session, 1962 (Washington, 1986), pages 551-611, 615.
The term "a certain mellowing," used with regard to liberalizing trends in the Soviet Union, occurs in both the March 26 and May 7 drafts of "Basic National Security Policy," but is dropped in the draft of June 22. See Documents 70 and 93.
At his press conference on June 27, President Kennedy was asked whether he had assigned the writing of the paper to Rostow "or did he just undertake it on his own to interpret policies of the Government?" Kennedy stated that "we have in the National Security Council voluminous papers from the Fifties which are the general guide of policy lines in the United States. But there have been a good many changes since the nineteen-fifties." He continued: "We are examining to see guerilla warfare, anti-insurgency, what should be our military policy in it, what should be our force levels. These are matters which both the State Department and the Department of Defense are examining and will come through to the National Security Council and to see whether there should be any changes in the policies that we laid down--were laid down in the nineteen-fifties." He concluded: "I have not studied the paper; the Secretary of State has it. But Mr. Rostow is acting under instructions and acting very responsibly." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pages 509-517) See also Document 70 and Walt W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pages 174-176 and 645-646.
96. National Intelligence Estimate /1/
NIE 11-8-62
Washington, July 6, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meeting 7/9/62. Top Secret. A note on the cover sheet indicates the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The note reads in part: "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, AEC, and NSA." The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred except the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR LONG RANGE ATTACK
The Problem
To estimate probable trends in the strength and deployment of Soviet weapon systems suitable for long range attack, and in Soviet capabilities for such attack, projecting forward for about five years./2/
/2/The weapon systems considered are ground-launched missiles with ranges of 700 nautical miles (n.m.) or more, submarine-launched missiles, heavy and medium bombers, air-to-surface missiles, and advanced delivery and supporting systems such as orbital and suborbital vehicles. Emphasis is placed on those systems designed primarily to attack land targets in North America, and in Eurasia and its periphery. [Footnote in the source text.]
Conclusions
1. Major new developments are evident in Soviet programs for long range striking forces. First, as forces for attack on Eurasia are reaching planned levels, greater emphasis is being placed on forces for intercontinental attack, especially ICBMs. Second, the Soviets are attempting to improve their capabilities for both preemptive and retaliatory action, by measures designed to shorten reaction times and increase survivability.
2. The tempo of the ICBM program has quickened. The present relatively modest force level of about 50 operational launchers will probably grow substantially, reaching some 125-175 launchers in mid-1963 and 200-300 in mid-1964./3/-/4/ From 1963 onwards, an increasing proportion of the ICBM force will probably be deployed at launch sites having some degree of hardening.
/3/The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that the number of Soviet ICBM launchers is unlikely to exceed the low side of the ranges shown for mid-1963 and mid-1964. [Footnote in the source text.]
/4/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, estimates the number of operational launchers as follows: mid-1962, 75-100; mid-1963, 175-250; and mid-1964, 300-450. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. The USSR is developing a submerged-launch ballistic missile submarine system, with medium or intermediate range missiles. This improved system will probably be incorporated into some portion of the 40 or so existing ballistic missile submarines, and into a new submarine class. Soviet submarines armed with cruise-type missiles are also capable of attacking land targets. Within the next few years, Soviet nuclear-powered missile submarines will probably be conducting regular patrols within firing range of the US.
4. For employment against Eurasia, the Soviets have built formidable missile and bomber forces, which they will continue to maintain and improve. Their limited bomber capability against North America will be tailored increasingly to conduct missions supplementary to ballistic missile attack.
5. The weight of nuclear attack which the USSR could launch will increase with the growth of long range striking forces and a general upward trend in weapon yields. Within the next few years, limited numbers of very high yield weapons in the 25-100 megaton range will be available for delivery by bombers and probably ICBMs. Ground-launched missile units are believed to have more than one missile per launcher, to provide a refire capability.
6. In the mid-1960's, the principal Soviet forces for attack on North America will be increasing numbers of ICBM launchers, supplemented by increasing numbers of nuclear-powered missile submarines and decreasing numbers of bombers. In a preemptive attack at that time, the USSR would be able to strike at the fixed bases of an important segment of the US nuclear delivery capability. Moreover, it would have some prospect that a portion of its own long range striking forces could survive an initial US attack and go on to retaliate.
7. With the long range striking forces we estimate it will have in the mid-1960's, however, the USSR could not expect to destroy the hardened, airborne, seaborne, and fast reaction nuclear delivery capabilities of the US.
Discussion
Soviet Policy Toward Long Range Striking Forces
8. The Soviets regard forces for long range attack as essential for supporting an aggressive political posture, deterring the West from resort to military action, and fighting a war as effectively as possible should one occur. In our view, they are building forces which they regard as appropriate to these objectives rather than attempting to achieve the very high degree of superiority required to launch a deliberate attack on the West. Efforts to gear their forces better for both preemptive and retaliatory operations, along with greater emphasis upon forces capable of attacking the US, are the major new developments in the Soviet programs for long range striking forces.
9. In building these forces, the Soviets put initial stress on creating a massive capability against Eurasia and its periphery. Intercontinental capabilities were not neglected, but deployment of medium range delivery systems occurred earlier and in much larger numbers. This pattern is probably changing. We believe that deployment of medium range systems is approaching the planned level, and that major emphasis is now being given to further development of forces for intercontinental attack, primarily ICBMs.
Major Weapon Programs, 1962-1964
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
10. The tempo of ICBM development and deployment has quickened noticeably in the past year or two. While present force levels are relatively modest, there is good evidence that the Soviets have been conducting high priority R&D on new ICBM systems, with concurrent construction of deployment complexes. Moreover, the Soviets are probably building new sites with some degree of hardening.
11. Development and Deployment. During the past 18 months, activity on the Soviet ICBM test range has intensified, with firings of three different types of ICBMs. The most urgent recent program at Tyuratam has been the development of the second generation SS-7 ICBM system, which is now being deployed. Testing of the SS-8 ICBM has proceeded at a slower pace; it could be available for operational use in 1963. Firings of the first generation SS-6 ICBM, which probably became operational in 1960, have been at a reduced pace. We believe that within the next year or so the Soviets will begin firing new ICBMs or space vehicles which are as yet unknown to US intelligence.
12. The urgency apparent in the development of the second generation ICBM almost certainly relates to a Soviet decision to deploy the first generation system in only limited numbers. The SS-6 ICBM is a very large vehicle of nearly half a million pounds gross takeoff weight, with nonstorable liquid propellants and radio-inertial guidance. Ground control and support facilities are correspondingly large and include rail service direct to launchers. The second generation SS-7 ICBM is simpler and considerably less bulky, and probably employs storable liquid propellants and all-inertial guidance. A typical SS-7 complex consists of a rail-served support area and eight or more launchers, which are deployed in pairs and are road-served.
13. Probable Hardening. All currently operational Soviet launchers are deployed at soft, fixed sites, but we believe the Soviets have probably initiated a program to construct launch sites having some degree of hardening. Considering past Soviet practices, we estimate that there will be two ICBM launchers at each site. The first of these new sites will probably be operational in early 1963. It is probable that such sites are to employ either the SS-7 ICBM with redesigned ground support equipment or the SS-8 ICBM. Our information on the SS-8 system is inadequate to determine whether the missile employed is even larger than the SS-6 or whether it is smaller than the SS-7.
14. Estimated Force Levels to 1964. The ICBM force will increase substantially above its present level in the next year or so. Our estimate of the growth of the force in this period is affected, on the one hand, by the increasing tempo of the Soviet program, and on the other hand, by the greater time and effort required to build hardened launch sites. Considering these factors, together with all the other evidence available to us, we estimate as follows the size and composition of the ICBM force to 1964:/5/-/6/
/5/The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that the number of Soviet ICBM launchers is unlikely to exceed the low side of the ranges shown for mid-1963 and mid-1964. [Footnote in the source text.]
/6/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, estimates about 75-100 operational ICBM launchers in mid-1962. He would estimate the force levels through 1964 as follows:
[Here follows a table that shows totals of 250-300 SS-7 launchers and 50-150 hardened launch sites by mid-1964.] [Footnote in the source text.]
OPERATIONAL SOVIET ICBM LAUNCHERS, 1962-1964
|
|
Mid-1962 |
Mid-1963 |
Mid-1964 |
|
Soft 1st Generation (SS-6)? |
6-10 |
6-10 |
6-10 |
|
Soft 1st Generation (SS-7)?. |
40-45 |
110-140 |
150-200 |
|
Hardened????????... |
|
10-25 |
50-100 |
|
Approximate Total???.. |
50 |
125-175 |
200-300 |
Medium and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
15. MRBM and IRBM sites, each with four pads, are soft, fixed, and road-served. More than 90 percent are deployed in a broad belt of Western USSR stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, within range of NATO targets in Norway, most of Western Europe, and Turkey. A lesser concentration of sites in the Soviet Far East is capable of bringing Japan, Korea, and Okinawa under fire. A few sites in south central USSR are within range of US and Allied military installations in Turkey and Pakistan. IRBMs could extend the target coverage from these various areas to include all of Spain, North Africa, Taiwan, and the northern Philippines.
16. We estimate that the USSR now has about 500 operational MRBM and IRBM launch pads. We do not have evidence that all of the launch pads are manned, and it is possible that some of them represent alternate firing positions. The site construction program has probably slowed but not ceased. The force will probably grow over the next year or two to a total of about 55-650 launch pads (including some 50-100 IRBMs), after which it will probably level off.
Operational Procedures of Missile Units
17. ICBM, IRBM, and MRBM units are believed to have refire capabilities. Although the evidence is not firm, we believe that an average of two missiles is provided for each launch pad. Preparation to fire initial and subsequent salvoes probably requires a number of hours. Sophisticated methods of attaining a high degree of simultaneity and flexibility in operations are not believed to be employed. The USSR is working to reduce the reaction and refire times of strategic missile units, but current system designs will preclude the constant maintenance of readiness conditions approaching those of US systems.
Submarine-Launched Missiles
18. The Soviets now have operational about 40 long range ballistic missile submarines, including 7 diesel-powered "Z" class, 25 diesel-powered "G" class, and 10 nuclear-powered "H" class submarines. This force carries a total of about 120 ballistic missiles with ranges up to 350 n.m. The effectiveness of these submarines is limited by the small number of missiles each carries, the short range of the missiles, and the requirement for submarines to surface for launching. There is reliable evidence, however, that the Soviets are now developing a capability to launch ballistic missiles from submerged submarines. The range of the missiles may be either 650 or 2,000 n.m. A program to retrofit some portion of the existing force of about 35 "G" and "H" class submarines will probably begin soon. All of these submarines could be so equipped within the next two or four years. A new nuclear-powered submarine class is probably also under development to employ this new missile system; we estimate that the first submarine could become operational in 1963-1964. The probable numbers of ballistic missile submarines in Soviet operational units through mid-1964 are estimated as follow:
SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES 1962-1964
|
|
Mid-1962 |
Mid-1963 |
Mid-1964 |
|
Diesel-powered???. |
32 |
32-35 |
32-35 |
|
Nuclear-powered??.. |
10 |
12-15 |
15-20 |
19. The Soviet Navy has also developed 350 n.m. submarine-launched cruise missile systems, designed primarily for low altitude, supersonic attack against Western surface ships, particularly carrier task forces. They are now carried by a few converted diesel-powered submarines and at least four nuclear-powered submarines. We believe that the Soviets are now extending their capability to attack land targets with missiles of this type.
Long Range Aviation
20. Soviet Long Range Aviation, by reason of its equipment, basing, and deployment, is much better suited to Eurasian operations than to intercontinental attack. We estimate that as of mid-1962 Long Range Aviation comprises some 165 heavy bombers and 950 jet medium bombers. /7/ Virtually all of the medium bombers are Badgers, but a few supersonic Blinders have probably now been delivered to units. It is unlikely that a new heavy bomber will be developed for operational use./8/ Recent trends indicate little change in total aircraft strength over the next two years.
/7/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the heavy bomber force will have the composition included in the following table:
[Here follows a table that shows totals of 115 Bison bombers, 75 Bear bombers, and 10 follow-on heavy tankers by mid-1964.] [Footnote in the source text.]
/8/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that a follow-on heavy bomber will be introduced in 1964. The continued research and development of large supersonic aircraft substantiates the Soviets' interest in large supersonic vehicles and indicates their intent to increase their strategic attack capabilities by such means. [Footnote in the source text.]
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF LONG RANGE AVIATION 1962-1964
|
Bombers and Tankers |
Mid-1962 |
Mid-1963 |
Mid-1964 |
|
Heavy |
|
|
|
|
Bison?????. |
110 |
110 |
100 |
|
Bear?????... |
55 |
55 |
50 |
|
Total??????? |
165 |
165 |
150 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Medium |
|
|
|
|
Badger????... |
950 |
900 |
800 |
|
Blinder????? |
a few |
50 |
100 |
|
Total????? |
950 |
950 |
900 |
21. In attempting to overcome the range limitations of Long Range Aviation for intercontinental attack, the Soviets have given considerable emphasis to aerial refueling and Arctic training in Badger and Bison units. Most of the Bears have been modified to deliver 350 n.m. air-to-surface missiles. We believe that the Soviets might plan to commit as many as 400-500 aircraft to initial attacks on North America. Considering a variety of operational factors, but excluding combat attrition, we estimate that the Soviets could now put about 200 bombers over North America on two-way missions in initial attacks; of these nearly half could be heavy bombers. The patterns of Arctic training and base utilization indicate that aircraft would probably be staged through a few bases in successive waves over a number of hours. /9/
/9/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the Soviets would use a number of bases for staging and would not be restricted in their mode of attack. He further believes that the Soviets could commit about 750 aircraft to initial two-way attacks on North America. Considering operational factors and allowing for noncombat attrition, about 300 bombers could reach North American targets. [Footnote in the source text.]
Nuclear Weapons
22. The present Soviet stockpile consists almost entirely of weapons developed from nuclear tests conducted prior to the 1961 test series. Most of the weapons allotted to Long Range Aviation are probably high-yield types ranging from about 100 KT to 8 MT. Ballistic missiles now in service could deliver warheads with maximum yields in the megaton range. MRBMs are probably also equipped with lower yield warheads. Naval cruise-type missiles and air-to-surface missiles are probably armed with warheads of low or medium yield for use against ships, but could deliver warheads in the low megaton range against land or coastal targets. The general trend in the yields of weapons allotted to long range attack will probably be upwards. A few very high yield bombs of 25 MT, or even 100 MT, could now be available. It is possible that a few ICBMs capable of delivering these very high yield weapons could be available within the next two years./10/
/10/For a detailed discussion of Soviet nuclear weapon characteristics, see NIE 11-2-62, "The Soviet Atomic Energy Program," dated 18 May 1962, Top Secret (Limited Distribution). [Footnote in the source text.]
Trends in Long Range Striking Forces, 1965-1967
23. In the middle 1960's the USSR will continue to strengthen and modernize its long range striking forces, with emphasis on those systems capable of attacking the US. The effort devoted to long range attack forces will be affected by the competing demands of other essential military and nonmilitary programs. We cannot estimate with confidence the decisions the Soviet leaders will make or the success they are likely to achieve in various weapons programs. However, we believe that while a mixed striking capability will be retained, the ICBM will be the dominant weapon.
ICBM Forces
24. The Soviet ICBM program will be influenced by a variety of factors: Soviet strategic concepts, technical improvements, other Soviet weapons programs, the nature and size of Western forces, and the international situation. These factors place broad limits on the future Soviet ICBM force but do not lead us too particular program. For this reason we can only estimate the Soviet force level within a broad range. All things considered, we believe the Soviet force level in mid-1967 will be within the range of 300-600 operational launchers. The majority of launchers will probably have a degree of hardening, including some fully hardened. To achieve the high side of the range, the USSR would need to commit resources throughout this period at rates at least as high as those now evident in the ICBM program. Many of the launchers will probably have more than one missile available, to provide a refire capability. Our estimate, reflecting the considerable range of uncertainty in any figures for this period, is as follows:
OPERATIONAL SOVIET ICBM LAUNCHERS
1965-1967/11/-/12/
/11/The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that the force level is likely to be towards the low side of the estimate presented in the table above. [Footnote in the source text.]
/12/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes the operational Soviet ICBM launchers for the period 1965-1967 will be as follows:
[Here follows a table that shows totals of 250-300 soft ICBM launchers, 150-200 hard launchers, and about 300 fully hard launchers by mid 1967.] [Footnote in the source text.]
|
|
Mid-1965 |
Mid-1966 |
Mid-1967 |
|
Soft?????.. |
150-250 |
150-250 |
150-250 |
|
Hardened??? |
100-175 |
120-250 |
125-250 |
|
Fully Hard??? |
0-a few |
a few-25 |
25-100 |
|
Approx. Total?.. |
250-425 |
275-525 |
300-600 |
25. The smaller force would give the Soviets high assurance in an initial attack of destroying US soft fixed nuclear bases, semihardened ICBM sites, communication and control facilities, and the principal US metropolitan areas. The larger force would provide an additional attack capability against some hardened targets, control centers, and other elements contributing to US striking and defensive strength, and would increase the Soviet retaliatory capability. We believe that the programmed buildup in US intercontinental attack forces makes it increasingly unlikely that the Soviets would judge that they could launch an attack on US nuclear forces and inflict sufficient damage to assure that resulting damage to the USSR was acceptable.
26. The accuracy, reliability, and reaction time of the ICBM force will improve. Better command, communications, and other equipment will increase its flexibility and capability for simultaneous attack. The bulk of the force will probably be equipped with warheads in the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] range, but a number of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] missiles and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] missiles will probably be available. To improve the survivability of the force, the Soviets will probably continue to deploy ICBMs at launchers which are dispersed and have some degree of hardening. They will also probably develop a fully hardened system which we believe could become operational in 1965 or 1966.
MRBM and IRBM Forces
27. Soviet strength in these systems will probably have been stabilized before 1965 at approximately 550-650 operational launch pads. To improve the survivability of the MRBM force, the Soviets may also develop road mobile or hardened systems.
Submarine-Launched Forces
28. Soviet planners will probably look upon submarine missile forces as an important supplement to their ICBM strength because of their relative invulnerability and their capability for varying the direction and nature of attacks on the US. We believe that the number of nuclear-powered submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles will be on the order of 25-30 in mid-1967. The Soviets will probably also have about two dozen nuclear submarines equipped with cruise-type missiles. In addition, diesel-powered missile submarines will remain in operation. The ranges of submarine-launched missiles may be extended to as much as 2,000 n.m. for ballistic missiles, and to 650 n.m. for cruise missiles. By the mid-1960's, some Soviet nuclear-powered missile submarines will probably be conducting regular patrols within missile range of US coasts.
Bomber Forces
29. With the growth and improvement of missile capabilities, the Soviets would probably plan to employ bomber forces in follow-on attacks after initial missile strikes had been delivered or to supplement the retaliatory blow if the USSR were attacked first. Aircraft equipped with improved penetration aids and nuclear weapons would probably be used for increasingly specialized missions, such as armed reconnaissance and attacks on hard targets. By mid-1967, Long Range Aviation will probably include some 750 medium bombers, about one-third of them supersonic Blinders. Heavy bomber strength will probably have been reduced to about 100 aircraft. We estimate as follows the strength of Long Range Aviation in the mid-1960's:
|
Bombers and Tankers |
Mid-1965 |
Mid-1966 |
Mid-1967 |
|
Heavy/13/ |
|
|
|
|
Bison?????... |
90 |
80 |
70 |
|
Bear??????. |
45 |
40 |
35 |
|
Total???????.. |
135 |
120 |
105 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Medium |
|
|
|
|
Badger?????. |
700 |
600 |
500 |
|
Blinder?????. |
150 |
200 |
250 |
|
Total???????.. |
850 |
800 |
750 |
/13/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the heavy bomber force will have the composition included in the following table (see footnotes 7 and 8):[Here follows a table that shows totals of 90 Bison bombers, 50 Bear bombers, and 60 follow-on heavy tankers by mid-1967.] [Footnote in the source text.]
Space Systems
30. We have no evidence of Soviet plans or programs for the military use of space. We think it highly unlikely, however, that the USSR would omit this field in its vigorous search for qualitative improvements in its military posture and for achievements with which to support claims of superiority. We believe that the Soviets could launch reconnaissance, communications, meteorological, navigation, or geodetic satellites at any time. There is no evidence that the Soviets are working to develop offensive space weapon systems, but the course of the Soviet space program to date suggests that any effort in this field would be directed toward an orbital bombardment vehicle. It would be technically feasible for the Soviets to launch weapons of limited capability into orbit in the mid-1960's, but we do not believe they could achieve an effective offensive capability by the end of the decade./14/
/14/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that a Soviet orbital bombardment capability could be achieved prior to the end of the decade. Based on technical considerations and using a (large) SS-8 booster and techniques known to exist today or to be within Soviet capability, he believes that such a system could be developed as early as 1965. This system could be composed of orbital vehicles of 30,000 pounds gross weight, which could deorbit a very high yield weapon to a CEP of 4 n.m. initially and later to 1.8 n.m. [Footnote in the source text.]
Implications of Capabilities
31. The capabilities of Soviet long range striking forces will be only in part a function of the numbers of weapons available, their performance, and the adequacy of supporting elements. Equally critical will be the way in which the Soviets employ their striking forces, their ability to maximize the effects of these forces under the various circumstances in which war could begin, and their assessment of Western capabilities and plans.
32. The current Soviet targeting concept reflects the view that even a general nuclear war is likely to be protracted and that victory requires the reduction of all elements of the Western warmaking potential. These elements include: the bases of strategic delivery systems; nuclear weapons facilities; communication and governmental centers; military and war supporting industry. We have no evidence that avoidance of heavy civilian casualties is among the objectives underlying Soviet targeting.
33. Should the Soviets conclude that the West was irrevocably committed to an imminent nuclear attack on the USSR, they would launch their available ready forces in a pre-emptive attack designed to blunt the expected Western blow. The mixed force which they have available for such operations would permit flexibility of tactics and complicate Western defensive problems, but would pose severe difficulties of coordination. Initial missile and bomber attacks against the US would probably extend over a period of many hours, and those against Eurasia over at least a few hours. We believe that at present the Soviets would plan to employ few if any missile submarines in initial attacks against the US; initiation of routine submarine patrols within missile range of the US could change this situation.
34. By the mid-1960's, the USSR will have acquired a substantial missile capability to deliver nuclear weapons against the US, in addition to its already formidable forces for strikes in Eurasia. Significant portions of this force will be relatively invulnerable to attack. The Soviets will be in a position to strike pre-emptively at the fixed bases of an important segment of the US nuclear delivery force, and they will have some prospect that a portion of their own force could survive an initial US attack and retaliate with high yield nuclear weapons. With the long range striking forces we estimate that they will have in the mid-1960's, however, the Soviets could still not expect to destroy the growing numbers of US hardened, airborne, seaborne, and fast reaction nuclear delivery vehicles./15/
/15/On July 7, Rusk "noted the possible need of an immediate increase in our Polaris program" on the basis of this estimate, and "felt" that a senior group should study the "implications of the new information which we now have on Soviet capabilities. He questioned whether there might not be additional need for disarmament or on the other hand, had we not reached a point where superiority alone had become irrelevant." (Briefing of Secretary Rusk held July 7; Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meeting 7/9/62)
[Here follow a glossary and a set of tables.]
97. Editorial Note
At the 501st and 502d meetings of the National Security Council on July 9 and 10, 1962, the Council considered NIE 11-8-62 (Document 96). At the July 9 meeting, the Council was briefed on the NIE by John McCone and Howard Stoertz of the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency. Summary non-substantive minutes of the meeting are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC 7/19/63. In NSC Action No. 2452, the Council noted the briefing and agreed to discuss the implications of NIE 11-8-62 the next day. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
No full minutes of the July 10 meeting have been found, but NSC Action No. 2453 states that the Council discussed the conclusion of the NIE and noted the President's request that "a study be made of the effect on the conduct of Soviet foreign policy of the Soviet military posture summarized" in the NIE, to include military implications of the estimate for the United States. The study was to be made by a special committee chaired by the Department of State representative and including representatives of the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the White House. The committee's report was to be ready by August 15. (Ibid.) For the report, see Document 103. McCone's partial description of the July 10 meeting is Document 98.
98. Notes for Action/1/
Washington, July 10, 1962.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 9, Folder 5, DCI Memoranda 3/1/62-4/30/65. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone.
NOTES FOR DCI ACTION
1. At today's meeting/2/ Secretary Rusk discussed a plan of the State Department to advise certain allies and neutrals of the board aspects of our satellite reconnaissance program. Rusk read from a draft paper which had been prepared for this purpose. CIA must follow this carefully and so should DOD as this has serious security implications and must not be carried too far in view of the known Soviet penetrations of both our allies and certain free nations.
/2/Reference is to the 502d NSC meeting; see Document 97.
Action: Discuss with Scoville.
2. The President indicated the appointment of a working committee to examine the implications of the Soviet rising long-range attack capability on their policy in disputed areas, most particularly Berlin. Committee to be headed by Alexis Johnson, DOD represented by Paul Nitze, and CIA to nominate a senior person as our representative. In the discussion McCone proposed the National Board of Estimates be used, and this was agreed. The Johnson subcommittee should prepare the definition of the problem for the Board. The President further directed that this committee should report to a committee of principals composed of Rusk, McNamara, McCone, with Lemnitzer representing JCS, and General Taylor the White House.
3. In discussing the NIE 11-8,/3/ McNamara gave the following figures as representative of the number of ICBM and MRBM sites in the Soviet Union (as contrasted with launchers). For 1967 the National Intelligence Estimate 11-8 gave a low of 363 and a high of 538; the Air Force in dissent had a low of 488 and a high of 663.
/3/Presumably McNamara is referring to NIE 11-8-62, Document 96.
On September 23, 1961, Secretary McNamara presented a paper to the President/4/ which was used for the purpose of our long-range strike force capability in which he used the Soviet figures as a low of 550 and a high of 1400. McNamara made the point that to offset a Soviet capability of the magnitude indicated in his figures, he felt comfortable with the USIB estimate. Not mentioned, but pertinent, is the destructive power of the weapons as now envisaged in 11-8, as contrasted with the size of warheads envisaged last September.
/4/Possible reference to Document 46.
John A. McCone/5/
Director
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
99. Memorandum From the Interagency Committee on Police Assistance Programs to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, July 20, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Interdepartmental Committee on Police. Secret.
SUBJECT
Report of Committee on Police Assistance Programs
There is hereby submitted the report of the interagency committee created pursuant to your request in National Security Action Memorandum 146./2/
/2/The 22-page report is not printed. (Ibid.) Regarding NSAM No. 146, see footnote 3, Document 72.
Briefly, the Committee believes that the U.S. police assistance programs form a very important but neglected part of our intensified effort to help emerging nations counter subversion and insurgency. Such programs are particularly helpful as "preventive medicine", since the police are normally responsible for coping with urban and rural dissidence before it reaches major proportions. Moreover, police assistance costs very little in comparison to the potential return. For example, in the peak year of FY 1958 the cost of AID programs in 21 countries, involving 690,000 police, totaled only about $14,000,000. In that year, DOD programs ran $5,800,000 in 5 countries. It is also worth noting that the Bloc has not to date provided much competition in this field. We and our allies should continue to pre-empt them in this highly sensitive area.
However, police programs in general, despite their repeated highest level endorsement since 1954, have not received the U.S. Government attention they deserve. The most serious weakness has been lack of strong central direction by the responsible agencies and comparative neglect by their policy-level officials over the past several years. We have also identified serious technical shortcomings that limit the effectiveness of our programs.
The Committee further believes that we have set our program sights too low. The U.S. should increase its emphasis on the use of police programs as counter-insurgency tools wherever there is a clearly demonstrable need. After a quick survey, we feel that the U.S. could perhaps usefully invest up to double the present program level over the next year or so, if adequate personnel can be found. Thereafter we would envisage a more gradual increase, but almost certainly a continued substantial one in view of the increasing number of new countries needing such help. Indeed, we doubt that there is another aspect of the U.S. internal defense effort where greater gains can be realized at such small cost.
But police assistance programs will not reach their full potential unless the program is given more vigorous management. While the Committee believes that this management should be civilian in character, and thus should remain logically in AID, this agency must greatly strengthen its capabilities to manage police programs if the objective is to be achieved.
Much improved training, both of foreign police personnel and of U.S. trainers, is another pressing need. Since present U.S. facilities are wholly inadequate, there should be established in the U.S. an international police academy for this purpose. Detailed studies should immediately be undertaken to this end. The U.S. needs to develop a professional cadre of experienced police advisors, few of whom exist at present.
Therefore, the Committee recommends that you approve the following recommendations which are designed to overcome these shortcomings and to give proper focus to a key element in the U.S. internal defense effort:/3/
/3/In NSAM No. 177, dated August 7, President Kennedy approved all of the numbered recommendations below and put them into the form of a directive. (Department of State, S/S- NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Interdepartmental Committee on Police)
1. That the U.S. give considerably greater emphasis to police assistance programs in appropriate less developed countries where there is an actual or potential threat of internal subversion or insurgency; to this end, while individual programs should be subject to normal review processes, AID should envisage very substantial increases in the global level of the FY 1963 program, with further increases in subsequent years where there is a demonstrated need. DOD should also give, where appropriate, increased emphasis to the police aspects of existing MAP programs.
2. That the Committee's statement of the role and function of police programs and criteria for their initiation in the attached report be the basis for guidance in Washington and to the field; that, using this guidance, AID insure that Washington agencies and country teams give appropriate priority to police assistance, including equipment where needed.
3. That, subject to the general policy guidance of the Department of State in internal defense matters, the Administrator of AID be charged, in his capacity as coordinator of U.S. aid programs, with responsibility for coordination and vigorous leadership of all police assistance programs; that he establish an interagency police group, to be chaired by his designee, to assist him in this responsibility.
4. That AID be charged with operating and funding responsibility for all such programs, except for their covert aspects and for those programs which the Administrator of AID decides should be carried out by the Department of Defense.
5. That to carry out its responsibilities, AID establish an office specifically charged with police matters, staffed with sufficient qualified personnel to: (a) provide centralized professional and technical planning guidance to the country teams, police missions and State and AID regional bureaus; (b) provide professional and technical guidance and professional and technical supervision in implementing programs; (c) establish and supervise training requirements for U.S. police technicians, and standards of evaluating professional competence; (d) to conduct surveys and program evaluations; (e) to provide an essential repository of technical knowledge based on research in the latest techniques of controlling subversion and mass violence; that AID appoint a senior professional to head this office, responsible to the Special Assistant-Internal Defense with direct access to the Deputy Administrator; that while line responsibility for AID police programs remains with each regional AID bureau, sufficient professional personnel should be assigned to the new Office to provide the centralized staff support outlined above.
6. That AID promptly devise methods for improving recruitment and training of personnel especially suitable for work with foreign police forces; that other U.S. agencies cooperate in making qualified personnel available for duty with the police assistance program without prejudice to their career status.
7. That AID should initiate the necessary studies and interdepartmental coordination looking toward early establishment of an international police academy under Government management to coordinate training more closely with U.S. internal defense objectives and tighten U.S. Government control over all training to improve its quality and insure its responsiveness to need.
8. That, to protect police programs, with their primarily internal defense rationale, from suffering as marginal competitors with primarily economic development projects, AID and the Bureau of the Budget should develop some means of providing the necessary degree of funding autonomy, such as creating a new AID line item for "internal defense" in the FY 1964 budget or funding through the Military Assistance Program though keeping the program in AID.
9. That AID develop ways to expedite delivery of equipment, perhaps through stockpiling standard items.
10. That, whenever possible, we coordinate our police effort with similar programs of other friendly Western countries to assure that they are complementary; that we encourage such countries to provide similar assistance where appropriate but not rely exclusively on them for this purpose; that our aims in this respect should be to assure that adequate Western assistance is available to any country which needs it and to deny the police assistance field to the Communist Bloc.
11. That the Administrator of AID, as coordinator of U.S. aid programs, be charged with carrying out the above recommendations, and that he report to you no later than 1 December 1962 on progress made; that this report include his revised FY 1963 and proposed FY 1964 program level.
12. That the Special Group (C-I) review the implementation of this report in accordance with the responsibilities assigned under National Security Action Memorandum 124./4/
/4/Document 68.
FC/5/
AID Member
/5/Frank Coffin was the AID representative.
Henry Rowen
DOD Member
[name not declassified]
CIA Member
Robert Amory, Jr.
BOB Member
Courtney Evans
Justice Member
RW Komer
WH Staff Member
U. Alexis Johnson
Chairman and State Member
100. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor) /1/
Washington, July 28, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meeting 7/9/62. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Also addressed to General Lemnitzer, Nitze, and Sherman Kent, Assistant Director for National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency. Copies were sent to Bohlen, Kohler, Hilsman, General Holtoner, and Garthoff.
SUBJECT
Draft Report of Special Inter-departmental Committee on the Implications of NIE 11-8-62 and Related Intelligence
Attached is the draft Report of our Committee, as prepared by the Bohlen and Nitze working groups./2/
/2/Not printed. For text of the final report, see Document 103. Johnson was Chairman of the Special Inter-Agency Committee that prepared the draft report pursuant to NSC Action No. 2453 (see Document 97). The Committee was made up of three working groups. Nitze headed the group that reviewed U.S. defense programs; Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to Secretary Rusk, headed a group that analyzed Soviet political and military policy; and Kent directed an intelligence group.
It is my understanding that there is full agreement except for the question of the inclusion or non-inclusion of paragraph 8 of section II on "Implications for US Defense Policy" (p. 8), and the corresponding paragraphs 5.f. and g. of Annex A (p. 10 of the Annex)./3/ Mr. Nitze, as the representative of the Secretary of Defense, does not wish to include those paragraphs, and proposes an alternative concluding sentence to paragraph 5. e. of the Annex to use in place of them. The sentence which he proposes follows:
/3/These paragraphs were reworded in the final report; see Document 103.
"In addition to our penetration aids program, two other current US programs have an important bearing on this problem: first, a vigorous continuation of our own efforts to overcome the technical obstacles and develop militarily useful ABM defenses; second, an information program designed to counter Soviet political and propaganda exploitation of the ABM issue."/4/
/4/Paragraph 5e was unchanged in the Annex to the final report, but part of this language was incorporated in the revised paragraph 5g.
I propose that we meet in my office at 3:30 P.M. on Wednesday, August 1, to discuss the difference noted above and to approve a final draft of the Report for submission to our Principals. /5/
/5/No record of this meeting has been found. In the second of three attachments to an August 1 memorandum to Taylor, Smith wrote: "Mr. Nitze's argument rests principally on his implicit assumption that the Nike Zeus has not solved the technical problems inherent in an anti-missile defense system. He should be asked to detail his reasoning. Then the Committee can better decide whether these technical disadvantages outweigh the political advantages of early deployment." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, WYS Chronological File, July-September 1962 (4))
I want to thank and to commend the chairmen and members of the working groups who have drafted the Report.
U. Alexis Johnson/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears Johnson's signature in an unidentified hand.
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