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Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy

Released by the Office of the Historian
Docs 101-113

101. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

 

Washington, July 29, 1962.

 

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meeting 7/9/65. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Raymond L. Garthoff, Johnson's Special Assistant and Executive Secretary of the Special Committee. Copies were sent to Bohlen, Kohler, Kitchen, and Hilsman.

 

SUBJECT
Report to the President on Implications for U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy of Recent Intelligence Estimates

 

As you will recall, the President at the NSC meeting on July 10 requested an inter-departmental review of the policy implications of NIE 11-8-62 and other related intelligence on Soviet military progress, under State chairmanship./2/

 

/2/See Document 97.

 

Our committee now has a draft report on which we shall meet Wednesday,/3/ and which will then be submitted to you and the other Principals concerned for your review preparatory to its submission to the President.

 

/3/August 1; see footnote 5, Document 100.

 

I thought you might want to acquaint yourself with the draft report prior to our meeting on the final version for formal submission to you, and I would of course appreciate any comments you might have at this stage. I also want to alert you to the one disagreement in our considerations.

 

The divergence of view concerns the implications for our own programs of more rapid Soviet advances in anti-missile programs than we had previously expected. In our view, the rapid Soviet development of an anti-ICBM system, and recent initiation of deployment of an anti-IRBM system, counsels a fresh look at our decisions on deployment of an anti-missile system. We do not believe that we should inject ourselves into the controversy within the Pentagon over whether the degree of military utility of the presently developed anti-missile systems, in particular the Nike Zeus, is sufficient to justify at this time a decision on grounds of the military capabilities of that system. Secretary McNamara has concluded that it is not. However, since the question is one of degree, and since there will be powerful political and propaganda repercussions of who is first in deploying anti-missile defenses, we do believe that the question should be reexamined with due weight given to the political considerations favoring deployment as quickly as feasible at least on a limited scale.

 

Paul Nitze and, we understand, Bob McNamara prefer not to raise this question. Nevertheless, it seems to us that there is an appropriate policy implication of the new intelligence, calling for a recommendation to look again at this question. We would like to discuss this subject with you further, at an appropriate time, but I wanted now to outline the difference as it presently stands within our committee. The view of the JCS is not yet clear, and that of Max Taylor is not known. CIA has informally indicated agreement with the view we had advanced, but they prefer not to engage directly on the issue other than to support our reading of the intelligence.

 

Chip Bohlen and Foy Kohler have taken the lead in drawing the foreign policy implications.

 

 

102. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy/1/

 

Washington, July 30, 1962.

 

/1/Source: Department of State, Special Group (CI) Files: Lot 68 D 451, Special Group (CI) 1/1/62-7/31/62. Secret. Attached to an undated covering note from U. Alexis Johnson to the President. Also attached to the note is a similar memorandum from Taylor to the President dated June 2.

 

SUBJECT
Counterinsurgency Activities of the United States Government

 

You have requested a comprehensive progress report from all agencies concerned with counterinsurgency activities. The detailed reports have been submitted to the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) and are transmitted under cover of this memorandum./2/ It is divided into two parts: General Activities of the Special Group (CI), and summary statements from the individual departments and agencies on their accomplishments in this field since January 1961. A separate report on covert activities in support of counterinsurgency is being presented to you under special security procedures./3/ It is proposed to submit similar progress reports every six months, with the next one due January 1, 1963.

 

/2/Not attached.

 

/3/Not found.

 

I. General Activities of the Special Group (CI)

 

Establishment of the Special Group (CI)

 

The Special Group for Counterinsurgency was established on January 18, 1962 to assure the integrated and most effective use of all available resources to prevent and resist subversive insurgency and related forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. While the Special Group (CI) has ranged far and wide in its review of U.S. counterinsurgency activities, certain major functional categories stand out. These are doctrine, organization, training, research and development, paramilitary assets, country internal defense plans, foreign training, and civic action.

 

A. Doctrine

 

In order to reach agreement on the nature of the problem, to establish common objectives, and to assign tasks to the various departments and agencies, it became necessary at the outset to formulate doctrine and policy guidance. The Department of State in collaboration with the other departments and agencies concerned has prepared a statement of national doctrine, which is presently under consideration by the Special Group (CI)./4/

 

/4/The final version of this paper is summarized in Document 106.

 

In developing doctrine, the need for established definitions for the principal terms involved became apparent. Interagency acceptance of an agreed terminology has served to clarify roles and missions between agencies in the field of counterinsurgency.

 

B. Departmental Organization for Counterinsurgency

 

The Special Group (CI) is reviewing the counterinsurgency organization of the respective departments and agencies concerned with these activities. Each department and agency concerned has identified a focal point at the senior level for the coordination of counterinsurgency activities. A chart setting forth the organization for counterinsurgency at the national level is attached to this memorandum./5/

 

/5/Not attached.

 

C. Training

 

A review of the adequacy of training in the counterinsurgency field was undertaken by the Special Group (CI). A recent tabulation of existing and projected training courses indicates that approximately 50,000 officer grade personnel will receive training in the coming year. A five-week interagency course for senior personnel has completed its first session at the Foreign Service Institute. The War Colleges, service schools, and the civilian agencies have established special courses on counterinsurgency.

 

At all levels of instruction, government training institutions concerned with foreign affairs or military training have, where appropriate, included significant segments on counterinsurgency in their curricula. A permanent subcommittee on training has been established by the Special Group (CI). The Secretary of State has proposed a National Academy for Foreign Affairs, which, if approved, will absorb the five-week interagency course mentioned above.

 

D. Research and Development for Counterinsurgency

 

The greatest possible use is being made of South Viet-Nam as a laboratory for technicians and equipment related to the counterinsurgency program. An intense effort is being made to spread the experience acquired in South Viet-Nam, particularly in the Armed Forces. In Washington, a joint DOD/CIA committee is reviewing all United States Research and Development activities related to counterinsurgency to ensure that our current effort is adequate. A final report/6/ will be ready toward the end of the year.

 

/6/Not found.

 

E. Review of Paramilitary Assets

 

Almost a year ago at the termination of the Cuban Study Group, it was decided to make a review of the paramilitary assets of the U.S. and of the likely paramilitary requirements. This review resulted in a series of studies covering U.S. forces and indigenous paramilitary forces world-wide. A final report, setting forth U.S. needs in this field, has been submitted, and a directive issued to appropriate departments to take corrective action relative to the noted deficiencies.

 

F. Country Internal Defense Plans

 

At the time of its establishment, the President assigned three countries (Viet-Nam, Laos, and Thailand) to the cognizance of the Special Group (CI). Subsequently, eight other countries (Burma, Cambodia, Cameroon, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Venezuela, and Iran) have been added because of the potential counterinsurgency situation within them. The Department of State has directed Chiefs of Mission to develop country internal defense plans. These plans will be reviewed by the Special Group (CI) during the first week of September. In the meantime, one plan--that for Colombia--has been approved and returned to the Ambassador for discussion with the host government and subsequent implementation. Another, a preliminary plan for Thailand, has been received and is under consideration.

 

The Group monitors the implementation of counterinsurgency programs in the countries assigned to it, through bi-weekly meetings with the Director of the Southeast Asia Task Force, meetings with Chiefs of Mission at such times as they are in Washington, and through periodic status reports prepared by the Department of State.

 

G. Police Training

 

U.S. supported police programs in selected countries are scrutinized by the Special Group (CI) as one of the important elements of the counterinsurgency effort. Related to this activity has been the establishment at Fort Davis, Panama Canal Zone, of a police academy for the training of Latin American students. The first class, which began July 2, consists of sixty-three students drawn from 15 Latin American countries.

 

H. Civic Action

 

In the period under discussion the Special Group (CI) has encouraged greater emphasis on civic action based on the use of military forces for economic and social development. AID, together with the Department of Defense, conducted surveys in Latin America, the Far East and Near East; developed a new funding formula; and expanded the program during the fiscal year 1962. New programs in twelve countries were initiated, and the program level increased by approximately 8 million dollars. The program involved a broad range of activities in such fields as health, education, construction, agriculture, and irrigation. For fiscal year 1963 the program is to be expanded further. It is expected that the new level will be approximately 20 million dollars, to be funded approximately equally from military and economic aid resources.

 

Maxwell D. Taylor/7/
Chairman, Special Group (CI)

 

/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

 

103. Memorandum for President Kennedy/1/

 

Washington, undated.

 

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Strategic Balance. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. The memorandum was sent jointly to the President by Rusk, McNamara, McCone, and Lemnitzer on August 23. The source text and its attachments are enclosures to a letter from U. Alexis Johnson to Taylor in which Johnson stated that he had accepted McNamara's language on the AICBM question but was "pointing this out to" Rusk in case he wanted to pursue the matter further. There is no record of Rusk having done so. Johnson concluded that he knew "of no other issues of substance except that of the Soviet MRBMs, and nobody has suggested exactly what additional we should do about this."

 

SUBJECT
Report on Implications for U. S. Foreign and Defense Policy of Recent Intelligence Estimates

 

In accordance with your instructions at the 502nd NSC Meeting on July 10, 1962,/2/ a study has been made of the effect on Soviet foreign policy of recent developments in the Soviet military posture, and of the implications of these Soviet military and political developments for U. S. military policy and defense policy. The study was conducted by a special committee composed of senior officials of the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the White House. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State, served as chairman of the Committee, with working groups chaired by Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Charles Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, and Sherman Kent, Assistant Director for National Estimates, CIA. The findings of this study have now been reviewed by us, and we submit the Report of the Special Committee to you.

 

/2/See Document 97.

 

We would like to draw your attention particularly to the following broad conclusions of the study:

 

1. The new estimates of Soviet capabilities for long range attack, and of other Soviet military capabilities, do not require basic revisions or changes either in our foreign policy or in our current defense policy.

 

2. While intending to avoid war, the Soviets expect their growing strategic strength to lend increasing weight to their foreign policies. On a general level, growing Soviet capabilities will strengthen the Soviet leaders' belief in their ability to influence the course of events in all areas of the world. In particular issues involving a direct clash of Soviet-American interests, however, more acute considerations of military risk figure in Soviet calculations.

 

3. The Soviets previously were willing to act only with caution on the basis of a capability which they knew existed mainly in their opponents' minds. Their appraisal of risks may change now that their capability has become real and is growing. We recognize this possibility and its hazards for the period ahead. We nevertheless regard it as likely that the Soviets will not abandon caution in Soviet-American confrontations, including Berlin. We believe they recognize that there are limits to the challenges which they can pose without incurring the risk of military response by the U.S.

 

4. The Soviets will almost certainly test Western, and particularly American, reactions in order to judge whether their gains in strength have so inhibited the U.S. as to widen the scope of action which they can undertake without substantial risk of war. But the depth and vigor of their probing will depend more upon their estimate of U.S. reactions than on their calculations of relative military strength. Accordingly, they will not, in our view, automatically conclude that actions which were heretofore too risky have now become tolerably safe. It is also important to note that the calculations of relative military strength and Western reactions to probes are only part of the host of factors which will affect Soviet decisions.

 

5. It is clear that the Soviet successes with sputniks and ICBM tests in 1957-1958 had much to do with inspiring the confidence which led the USSR to open its challenge on the Berlin question in November 1958. Beyond this general observation, we find no precise relationship in timing between the USSR's Berlin tactics and the progress of its buildup in strategic forces. In particular, the quickening of the tempo of the ICBM program in 1961 seems unlikely to have resulted from any new decisions regarding Berlin. It reflects development and deployment decisions taken several years previously. The fairly regular buildup of intercontinental forces of all kinds projected in the estimate for the next year or so does not suggest that Soviet efforts are concentrated toward reaching some particular force level of any particular time or in relation to any particular situation, e.g., Berlin.

 

6. The Soviet forces now estimated for the period 1962-1967 are of a size and character which remain within the parameters used last fall in developing our own recommended strategic force mix (force levels and weapons systems) for this period. Soviet ICBM forces in particular, are estimated for the period to be approximately of the size forecast in the intelligence estimates dated September 19, 1961,/3/ and they remain substantially less than in the assumed high and median Soviet postures used by DOD in developing our recommended forces last fall. The new estimates indicate that a hardening program may be proceeding somewhat sooner than previously anticipated, but again the total number of hardened sites forecast for the period is still well below our planning assumption figures for 1965 and 1967. Perhaps the principal unknown presented for our planning is the influence which introduction of large yield weapons--and their number--may have on future Soviet offensive and defensive capabilities. While such weapons were taken into account in our force planning last fall, there are still uncertainties as to some of their physical effects which must be resolved before their full military implications can be determined.

 

/3/The September 21, 1961 (NIE 11-8/1-61) estimates of Soviet forces were substantially lower than the June 7, 1961 (NIE 11-8-61) estimates. [Footnote in the source text. For text of NIE 11- 8/1-61, see Document 45. Regarding NIE 11-8-61, see the source note, Document 29.]

 

7. Among the other changes forecast in recent national estimates are the growing submarine-launched missile threat, the rapid Soviet development of an anti-ballistic missile program, larger MRBM-IRBM forces than previously estimated, the possibility of Soviet weapons in space, and the intensifying problem of civil defense.

 

8. Our present re-examination of the situation in light of the latest estimates of Soviet posture indicates that the objectives we have been seeking through our recommended strategic forces mix and other programs are still essentially valid. In brief, these objectives have been: first, to provide the United States with the capability, even under unfavorable circumstances of war outbreak, to deny the Soviet Union the prospect of military victory or of knocking out the U.S. retaliatory force, while at the same time assuring prompt destruction of a high proportion of Soviet nuclear bases and remaining nuclear forces; second, to retain a large protected reserve force for (a) follow-on attacks against Soviet military forces, (b) attacks if necessary against Soviet urban society, and (c) attempting to bring the war to a negotiated end without attacks on cities.

 

9. The general implication of the Soviet military posture and the strategy which it supports would appear to be that the Soviets hope to confront us with continuing political pressure, subversion and various forms of unconventional warfare under the umbrella of their growing strategic power. At the same time, they would hope to capitalize on their conventional military power by the implicit threat of bringing it to bear in situations where they have a local conventional superiority. The broad conclusion to be drawn for our defense policy is to reaffirm the importance of shaping our military posture so as to provide credible military options over a wide spectrum of contingencies from general war at one end to local wars and minor aggressions at the other. It is also important to reaffirm that our own strategic forces must provide a corresponding umbrella under which we may meet Soviet confrontation on lesser scales than general war.

 

10. We judge the greatest hazard to be in the Soviet calculation (or miscalculation) of the risks of particular courses of action as Soviet military capabilities grow. A dangerous change in the calculus of risks would of course be most likely if the Soviets thought they had obtained a temporary military superiority, especially in the field of AICBMs, whether or not we shared that estimate. The current estimates of future Soviet military strength, and current U.S. defense programs, do not lead us to expect such a situation. Nonetheless, it should be a basic task of the United States, if possible, to see to it that this military advantage does not occur and to this end to give the highest priority to the established defense programs of the United States and to continue and, if possible, to increase the effectiveness of our intelligence collection systems, and to conduct effective informational programs to blunt Soviet efforts to exploit politically real or alleged Soviet military advances, such as an anti-missile capability.

 

Secretary of State

 

Secretary of Defense

 

Director of Central Intelligence

 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

 

 

Attachment/4/

 

/4/Top Secret.

 

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INTER-DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON IMPLICATIONS OF NIE 11-8-62 AND RELATED INTELLIGENCE

 

I--Implications Clarifying Soviet Policy

 

1. The evolution of Soviet strategic forces described in NIE 11-8-62, "Soviet Capabilities for Long Range Attack," dated 6 July 1962,/5/ reflects in the first instance the USSR's desire to overcome the advantage which the US had enjoyed in this vital ingredient of the power equation. The Soviet weapons programs are obviously aimed at obtaining greater security for the Bloc and greater freedom for Soviet policy in the face of the immense threat posed by US strategic power. Within the last year, with the availability of a more suitable second-generation missile, a rapidly unfolding deployment program has carried the Soviets farther toward these aims.

 

/5/We have taken into account the estimates in NIE 11-3-61, "Sino-Soviet Air Defense Capabilities through Mid-1966," dated 11 July 1961 (Top Secret), NIE 11-2 -62, "The Soviet Atomic Energy Program," dated 16 May 1962 (Limited Distribution), Annexes A and B of NIE 11-4-61, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1961-1966," dated 24 August 1961 (Top Secret), and Memorandum to Holders of Annexes A and B, NIE 11-4-61, dated 10 January 1962 (Top Secret). [Footnote in the source text. For text of NIE 11-8-62, see Document 96.]

 

Soviet View of the Risks of War

 

2. It is clear, from the trends in Soviet strategic capabilities estimated in NIE 11-8-62, that the Soviet leaders have considered that they can continue to pursue their present political policy, while simultaneously avoiding courses of action involving high risk of general war. If they had not, they would surely have provided themselves with much stronger forces than they now have and would be embarked on a much steeper buildup. Instead, they are building strategic forces at a pace which, while a substantial burden on an already strained economy, is well below their maximum potential. This in turn implies that they intend to pursue courses of action which, in their view, will keep the risks of war under control. It does not assure, however, that they will always estimate these risks correctly.

 

Effect on the Soviet Outlook

 

3. While intending to avoid war, the Soviets expect their strategic strength to lend increasing weight to their foreign policies. On a general level, growing strategic capabilities will strengthen the Soviet leaders' belief in their ability to influence the course of events in all areas of the world. Their sense of the USSR's political weight, its "right" to a voice in all international questions, is closely linked to their appraisal of relative military power. As the gap has grown between their own military strength and that of all other countries save the US, they have increasingly insisted upon their great-power prerogatives and have injected their demands into all sorts of world issues. This attitude has encouraged them to pursue more forward courses of action in remote areas, for example, Southeast Asia. The growing capabilities estimated in NIE 11-8-62 will nourish this tendency.

 

4. In particular issues involving a direct clash of Soviet-American interests, however, more acute considerations of military risk figure in Soviet calculations. The Soviets know the magnitude of Western military strength. We believe that their appraisals of the implications of that strength are realistic. We also think it certain that the USSR has come to appreciate US intelligence capabilities and now credits the US with a fairly accurate estimate of Soviet long-range striking power. At present, the Soviets estimate that each side could inflict great damage on the other, despite their respective defense capabilities, and they believe that the US makes the same estimate. They realize, however, that the US still has a greater capability to damage Soviet territory than they do to damage US territory. Unless some highly effective antimissile system alters the strategic balance, or some unforeseen break-through in offensive weapons occurs, we believe that they will continue to hold this judgment./6/

 

/6/The Soviet antimissile effort enjoys a very high priority, and the USSR is almost certain to deploy an antimissile system--of unknown effectiveness--before the US does. A propaganda campaign is already underway to persuade the world of a marked Soviet advantage in this field. [Footnote in the source text.]

 

Uses of the Soviet Deterrent

 

5. The Soviets hope--indeed they think it all but inevitable--that their growing intercontinental striking power, together with their air defense posture, will so inhibit US policy as to widen the scope of actions which they can undertake without substantial risk of war. During most of the 1950's, the Soviet deterrent consisted mainly of the threat of ground and air attack, and more recently MRBMs, against Western Europe. The Soviets evidently regarded this form of deterrence as insufficient because it could not be applied directly against the US, and their foreign policies reflected a cautious approach to the calculation of risks of war.

 

6. During the same period, however, they were vigorously pursuing the development of new and more effective systems for attacking the US and for protecting themselves against US attack. They evidently believed that the ICBM, by posing a direct threat to the US homeland, would radically increase the force of their deterrent and thus permit them to undertake bolder advances with no increase of risk. By late 1958, they concluded that their ICBM claims, borrowing credibility from their sputnik demonstrations, had begun to achieve this result. At this point, a decade after the Berlin blockade, they felt themselves able to resume the exploitation of the West's geographic vulnerability in Berlin.

 

7. Nearly four years have elapsed, and during this time the Soviet leaders' expectations have sobered. They have acquired a keener appreciation of the difficulties of translating gains in military power into tangible political advances. During much of the period, they had reason to believe that the US was overestimating their ICBM force. Even so, they evidently did not consider that the West was so deterred that they could safely undertake unilateral moves against its vital interests in Berlin.

 

Future Uses of the Deterrent

 

8. NIE 11-8-62 makes it clear, however, that during 1958 and 1959 the USSR in fact had no ICBM capability, and that even in 1960 and 1961 this capability was quite small. But in 1962 the second generation ICBM is being deployed at operational sites, and the USSR almost certainly knows that the US knows, not only of the deployment, but also the actual location of the sites. The Soviets previously were willing to act only with caution on the basis of a capability which they knew existed mainly in their opponents' minds, but their appraisal of risks may change now that their capability has become real and is growing.

 

9. We recognize this possibility and its hazards for the period ahead. We nevertheless regard it as likely that the Soviets will not abandon caution in Soviet-American confrontations, including Berlin. We believe they recognize that there are severe limits to the challenges which can be posed with weapons which the challenger is as concerned as the opponent to avoid using. As before, when their inflated ICBM claims had won considerable acceptance, they will again seek to persuade the West of their determination to advance. They will believe that the US ought to draw the conclusion that, under these circumstances, it can no longer maintain its exposed positions. They will almost certainly test Western, and particularly American, reactions in order to judge whether their gains in strength have had this effect. But the depth and vigor of their probing will depend more upon their estimate of US reactions than on their calculations of relative military strength. Accordingly they will not, in our view, automatically conclude that actions which were heretofore too risky have now become tolerably safe.

 

10. It is also important to note that the calculations of relative military strength and Western reactions to probes are only part of a host of factors which will affect Soviet decisions. The movement of politics within the USSR, the course of intra-Bloc relations, and the nature of opportunities for expansion which arise in the Free World will be fully as important in determining the shape of Soviet foreign policy.

 

The Question of Timing

 

11. It is clear that the Soviet successes with sputniks and ICBM tests in 1957-1958 had much to do with inspiring the confidence which led the USSR to open its challenge on the Berlin question in November 1958. Beyond this general observation, we find no precise relationship in timing between the USSR's Berlin tactics and the progress of its buildup in strategic forces. In particular, the quickening of the tempo of the ICBM program in 1961 seems unlikely to have resulted from any new decisions regarding Berlin. It reflects development and deployment decisions taken several years previously. The fairly regular buildup of intercontinental forces projected in the estimate for the next year or so does not suggest that Soviet efforts are concentrated toward reaching some particular force level at any particular time or in relation to any particular situation, e.g. Berlin.

 

Secrecy

 

12. One additional implication deserves attention. The Soviet long-range forces estimated in NIE 11- 8-62 for the next few years are neither as large nor as well protected as corresponding US forces. In these circumstances, we believe that the Soviet leaders will continue to think it highly important to make it as difficult as possible for the US to acquire targeting information. This in turn implies that they are unlikely to ease their basic attitude toward inspection of arms control agreements. It also indicates that they will continue to attach a very high priority to the countering of Western reconnaissance.

 

II--Implications for US Defense Policy

 

Specific Implications

 

1. We have examined the implications for our defense policy of changes in the Soviet military posture over the next five years, as pro-jected in NIE 11-8 -62 and other pertinent national estimates. Among the changes forecast are several potentially significant developments on which some new light has been shed since earlier estimates, such as:

 

a. A growing sub-launched missile threat.

 

b. A large-yield weapon threat.

 

c. Hardening of ICBM sites.

 

d. Missile readiness and re-load capability.

 

e. Anti-ballistic missile capability.

 

f. Larger MRBM/IRBM forces than previously estimated.

 

2. These developments represent problem areas which require close attention and review of certain US programs. We can, however, tentatively conclude from our examination of estimated changes in the Soviet military posture that these changes, in themselves, presently call for no major alterations in the US strategic retaliatory force structure which was recommended to you by the Department of Defense on 23 September 1961./7/ A fuller basis for judging the validity of this conclusion will be provided by an intensive study of strategic force requirements now being conducted by the JCS, and scheduled for completion on 1 October 1962./8/ The most immediate effect of Soviet developments is likely to be on our research and development programs in areas associated with such matters as large yield weapons effects, penetration aids, and satellite survivability. Our present examination also reaffirms the continuing need to press ahead with programs we have laid out in other fields, including civil defense, air defense, and general purpose forces.

 

/7/See Document 46.

 

/8/Possible reference to "Strategic Nuclear Study" by the Chairman's Special Studies Group," attached to CM-961-62 from Taylor to McNamara, September 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 4611 (6 Jun 62) Sec 1A)

 

3. The Soviet forces now estimated for the period 1962-1967 are of a size and character which remain within the parameters used last fall in developing our own recommended strategic force mix (force levels and weapons systems) for this period. Soviet ICBM forces in particular, are estimated for the period to be approximately of the size previously forecast in our intelligence estimates, and they remain substantially less than in the assumed high and median Soviet postures used by DOD in developing our recommended forces last fall./9/ The new estimates indicate that a hardening program may be proceeding somewhat sooner than previously anticipated, but again the total number of hardened sites forecast for the period is still well below our planning assumption figures for 1965 and 1967. Perhaps the principal unknown presented for our planning is the influence which introduction of large yield weapons--and their number--may have on future Soviet offensive and defensive capabilities. While such weapons were taken into account in our force planning last fall, there are still uncertainties as to some of their physical effects which must be resolved before their full military implications can be determined.

 

/9/A comparison of the latest NIE 11-8-62 ICBM launcher estimate with the NIE 11-8/1-61 figures and the DOD planning assumptions used last fall in calculating our force requirements is shown in Table 1, attached to Annex A. [Footnote in the source text.]

 

4. Our present re-examination of the situation in light of the latest estimates of Soviet posture indicates that the objectives we have been seeking through our recommended strategic forces mix and other programs are still essentially valid. In brief, these objectives have been: first, to provide the United States with the capability, even under unfavorable circumstances of war outbreak, to deny the Soviet Union the prospect of military victory or of knocking out the US retaliatory force, while at the same time assuring prompt destruction of a high proportion of Soviet nuclear bases and remaining nuclear forces; second, to retain a large protected reserve force for (a) follow-on attacks against Soviet military forces, (b) attacks if necessary against Soviet urban society, and (c) attempting to bring the war to a negotiated end without attacks on cities.

 

5. Our present and previous analyses recognize that even in the most favorable case with restraints in targeting on both sides, civil casualties in the United States and Western Europe could be on the order of ten million each, while without restraints during the 1962-1967 period, under many circumstances of war outbreak, they could be on the order of 100 million or more each. As time passes the Soviet potential for doing civil damage to the West will grow; the incentive to actually carry out such attack may, however, diminish.

 

6. The new estimates of Soviet posture do not lead us to alter our basic assessment that during this time period we retain a relatively strong military posture in the event of nuclear war, but that the potential civil damage implications are progressively more unfavorable with the passage of time. The latter, of course, applies to both sides, so that the prospect of real victors emerging from any major nuclear war diminishes further.

 

7. In addition to the problem areas given prominence by our latest estimates of Soviet long-range striking forces for the 1962-1967 period, there are several areas of potential significance which merit attention./10/ The most important of these are:

 

/10/In the attached Annex A there is a brief discussion of each of the ten specific problem areas mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 7, together with identification of matters requiring further examination and action in connection with them. The section immediately following sums up the general implications for our defense policy of forecast changes in the Soviet military posture. [Footnote in the source text.]

 

a. The prospect of Soviet anti-satellite activity.

 

b. The possibility of Soviet weapons in space.

 

c. The problem of making clear to Soviets advantages of non-civil targeting.

 

d. The problem of civil defense.

 

8. The rapid Soviet development and initiation of deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems require the US to counter Soviet political and propaganda exploitation of their anti-missile program. Preparation for this contingency should include active informational programs on our own progress and on military limitations on Soviet progress. Decisions on our own anti-missile program should be urgently reconsidered with due weight given to the political considerations./11/

 

/11/See footnote 5, Document 100.

 

General Implications

 

9. It is our view, after examination of the Soviet military posture in light of our most recent intelligence estimates, that the Soviets are pursuing an essentially deterrent military strategy in which their military forces are designed to:

 

a. Support an aggressive political-subversive strategy;

 

b. Deter the West from military action, particularly from initiation of a first strike with nuclear forces;

 

c. Afford the option of conducting partially blunting pre-emptive strikes and retaliatory operations against us in the event mutual strategic deterrence breaks down and a major war should occur.

 

10. Our intelligence estimates indicate an increase in the number of Soviet forces capable of hitting directly at the United States in the 1962-67 period, as well as a general trend of larger warhead yields deliverable by these forces. However, the relative US-USSR military postures during the period do not significantly improve Soviet chances of launching a disarming nuclear strike against us. During this period, the Soviet military posture shows some improvement in surviving nuclear military forces following an initial nuclear exchange, but the Soviet Union would still be left in a militarily inferior position relative to the US under almost all circumstances of war outbreak./12/ The Soviet military posture also increases the Soviet ability to inflict civil damage, already great for most war outbreak situations.

 

/12/The exception would be an out-of-the blue, perfectly executed and coordinated attack on our forces, without our having received any strategic or tactical warning. In this case, U.S. forces surviving might be limited largely to Polaris submarines and carriers at sea, together with airborne alert aircraft and some hardened missiles. This situation could leave neither side with a clear military superiority. For a variety of reasons, this eventuality appears highly improbable. [Footnote in the source text.]

 

11. The general implication of the Soviet military posture and the strategy which it supports would appear to be that the Soviets hope to confront us with continuing political pressure, subversion and various forms of unconventional warfare under the umbrella of their growing strategic power. At the same time, they would hope to capitalize on their conventional military power by the implicit threat of bringing it to bear in situations where they have a local conventional superiority. Thus--barring successful effort on our part to create additional options--such a strategy could, at worst, leave open to us the unpalatable choice of a first strike or swallowing our losses in a series of confrontations at local pressure points around the periphery of the Soviet Bloc. Increased Soviet ability to put direct pressure on the United States (through the threat of larger forces capable of hitting the US) would also open us to added Soviet efforts to separate us from our Allies, and to create divisions among them.

 

12. The broad conclusion to be drawn for our own defense policy is to reaffirm the importance of shaping our military posture so as to provide credible military options over a wide spectrum of contingencies from nuclear war at one end to local wars and minor aggressions at the other. The developments we have considered here, while not of a kind to dictate basic change in our strategy and military posture, do reduce even further the desirability of resort to the high end of the spectrum of nuclear means and consequently increase the importance of developing alternative means of bringing military power to bear around the world.

 

III--Implications for US Foreign Policy

 

1. The estimates contained in NIE 11-8-62 of Soviet capabilities for long-range attack do not require basic revisions or changes in our foreign policy as a whole. This view is predicated on the expectation that the defense policies outlined in Section II of this study are vigorously and effectively carried out. If these policies are effectively implemented, there is no reason to believe, in the period under review, that the correlation of forces in any significant extent will favor the Soviet Union. We can anticipate the continuance of the tensions, strains, and dangers of the cold war. As Soviet strategic capabilities grow the USSR may well judge that it can press more aggressively toward limited objectives without running serious risks of general war. A more aggressive political action by the Soviet Union is, however, not at all certain, and cannot be predicted at this time. Any such development would depend upon a number of factors which, at present cannot be foreseen--in particular, their estimate of relative military strength, and of the Western reactions which they encounter when they try to test the political potency of their strategic strength.

 

2. We judge the greatest hazard to be in the Soviet calculation (or miscalculation) of the risks of particular courses of action as Soviet military capabilities grow. A dangerous change in the calculus of risks would of course be most likely if the Soviets thought they had obtained a temporary military superiority, especially in the field of AICBMs, whether or not we shared that estimate. In such circumstances, the Soviets might seek to exploit a temporary military advantage before the United States could redress the balance. The current estimates of future Soviet military strength, and current US defense programs, do not lead us to expect such a situation. Nonetheless, it should be a basic task of the United States, if possible, to see to it that this military advantage does not occur and to this end to give the highest priority to the established defense programs of the United States and to continue and, if possible, to increase the effectiveness of our intelligence collection systems, and to conduct effective informational programs to blunt Soviet efforts to exploit politically real or alleged Soviet military advances, such as an anti-missile capability.

 

3. In general, however, there is nothing in the estimate contained in NIE 11-8 -62 which would require any substantive change in our foreign policy.

 

 

Annex A/13/

 

/13/Top Secret. Portions of this Annex are printed in Raymond L. Garthoff, Intelligence Assessment and Policymaking: A Decision Point in the Kennedy Administration (Washington: Brookings, 1984), pp. 46-53.

 

SPECIFIC PROBLEM AREAS FOR US DEFENSE POLICY

 

1. Soviet Sub-launched Missile Threat

 

a. It has long appeared likely that the Soviet Union would follow the United States' lead and develop a submarine missile force of some strength. These forces now appear likely to be larger than was previously estimated. Reasonable figures consistent with the estimates in NIE 11-8-62 are about 90 submarines with some 350 missiles by 1967. This is almost double the numbers forecast a year ago for 1966. (See comparison of estimates and explanatory note in Table 2.)/14/ It should be noted that the bulk of the increase is accounted for by cruise missiles (30 submarines with 156 missiles by 1967, compared with none in last year's forecast). There is uncertainty both as to the eventual number of these cruise missile subs (which as estimated will include many more nuclear than diesel-powered types), and their intended use--whether they are intended for attack against land targets as well as surface shipping. The latter presently appears to be their more likely major role.

 

/14/Table 2, entitled "Comparison of Missile Sub Estimates at Selected Periods," is not printed.

 

b. Other aspects of the changing composition of the Soviet missile sub force also present difficulties in assessing the potential threat this force poses. On the one hand, there is an increase in the ballistic missile threat (about 60 submarines in 1967 compared with 48 submarines previously forecast for 1966), and a greater number of nuclear-powered submarines (about 50, compared with 24 submarines previously), which will increase the potential for protracted stationing of these forces at sea. Also, there are strong indications that the Soviets are developing a submerged ballistic missile launch capability. With missiles of ranges estimated at 650 to 2,000 miles, these submarines could increase the difficulties of our ASW task when the Soviets have developed them on an operational scale. On the other hand, while the Soviets are actively pursuing a submerged launch program, these developments at their present stage indicate that a Polaris-type threat has not yet materialized. Furthermore, the component of the Soviet force which combines nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missiles shows no appreciable change from what was previously estimated (25-30 submarines in 1967 compared with 24 submarines previously forecast for 1966).

 

c. Despite the many uncertainties which exist with respect to the potential threat of the Soviet sub-launched missile force, both in terms of weapons and methods of operation, it is apparent that we shall have our work cut out for us in finding ways to deal with this problem. In the future, as the number of nuclear-powered submarines increases, the Soviets may adopt operational practices that would make it very difficult to counter the sub-launched missile threat. In the mid-60's, a portion of the Soviet nuclear-powered submarine missile force will probably be conducting routine patrols within missile range of US targets.

 

d. There are asymmetries, to be sure, in the ASW prospects of the United States as compared with the Soviets. We have certain advantages in terms of access to the seas, transit distances, the use of advanced bases, the SOSUS detection system, and a superior naval technology. So far, it has been possible for the United States to operate submarines on station close to Soviet territory while the Soviets have not done likewise. Nevertheless, if the Soviets continue their technical progress, build the numbers of ships estimated, and keep a substantial portion of their force on station with long-range missiles (although probably a much smaller proportion than we will be able to keep on station), we will be presented with problems of great difficulty.

 

e. Two contrasting cases are of interest in illustrating some of the problems we face. In the first, favorable to us, the Soviet submarine fleet--following current practice--for the most part would not be deployed at war outbreak and virtually some would be in position to launch immediately against the United States. In this case, we could expect our attacks on Soviet naval and submarine bases (some 50 aiming points in the mid 1960's) to kill a large proportion of the missile sub force. The remainder would face further attrition in seeking to reach launch areas. The surviving sub-launched missile threat to the United States in this optimistic case would be minimal in comparison with other Soviet nuclear forces that are likely to survive.

 

f. In a second and more likely case, much less favorable to us, the Soviet submarine fleet would be largely deployed either on a steady-state basis or during a crisis. The survival to time of launch of the Soviet force would depend, in addition to circumstances of war outbreak, on the effectiveness of our sea surveillance, tracking and sub-killing systems. If the Soviets operate their nuclear submarines very carefully, and especially avoid making much noise, a portion of their force will probably be able to avoid detection while on station within missile range of targets in the United States. On the other hand, with presently planned improvements in SOSUS, and if the number of submarines on station is small, we may be able to count and to track them with fair precision. If ordered to fire in a coordinated attack, the Soviet missiles could undoubtedly be launched before the submarines could be destroyed. However, it might be possible through prompt attack to destroy many of the submarines and at least deny the Soviets the prospect of retaining a highly protected reserve force on station.

 

g. The Soviets might be able on occasion to put enough submarine missiles on station by the mid-1960's to present a threat with virtually no tactical warning to our soft bomber and missile bases (submarine missiles are unlikely to have a combination of yield and accuracy to present a major threat to hardened dispersed sites). However, during such periods of tension, extra ground and airborne alert and dispersal measures can be adopted. Other possibilities are the development of a warning system against sub-launched missiles and a shift of bomber operations from coastal to inland bases.

 

h. In terms of future effort, it appears that we should continue to exploit our relative advantage in sea-surveillance capabilities. We cannot count with much confidence on being able to blunt a submarine missile attack; we do have the prospect, however, of being able to keep a fairly close watch over the deployment and movements of enemy submarines.

 

2. Soviet Large Yield Weapon Threat

 

a. Within the next few years, the Soviets will probably have limited numbers of large yield weapons (25-100 MT) deliverable by bombers and probably ICBMs. A few bombs of these yields could already be available. These prospects point to a potentially dangerous problem area. Some of the physical effects of large yield weapons--such as electromagnetic pulse, secondary thermal radiation, communications blackout, large-scale general damage from high-altitude bursts--are not yet fully understood; consequently, the full military implications for our command and control systems, air defenses, soft bomber and missile forces, and other elements of our defense posture remain to be ascertained.

 

b. In connection with our current nuclear test series we are acquiring data which will help reduce some of the present unknowns. To get some needed effects data, larger yield effects tests than are possible in the current series might be necessary to provide a basis for extrapolation to very high yield devices. While it would appear that design fixes can be found to deal with most of the presently identified problems that very large yield weapons may pose for our military systems, such as possible vulnerability of our Minuteman LCC's to electromagnetic pulse effects, it would be unwise at this time to dismiss the potentially serious military implications that Soviet employment of these weapons might have. For example, some recent preliminary investigation suggests that the thermal effects from a 100 MT weapon burst at very high altitude over a bomber base might greatly reduce the number of bombers that would survive to undertake their assigned missions, even with 15 minutes of BMEWS warning. Likewise, the multiple effects of large yield bursts against hardened installations like a Minuteman complex might present a more serious problem than previously thought. (Calculations based on existing data indicate that the advantage over lower yield weapons in this case is not likely to be more than 10-15%, but this is by no means certain.) It must, indeed, be emphasized, that there are still many uncertainties with regard to these and other examples of large yield weapon effects, which can only be determined through further intensive investigation and test.

 

c. With reservations as to what further study of large-yield weapons effects may indicate, the following implications of possible Soviet employment of such weapons can be drawn from our war gaming and other analyses to date. First, the military outcome in the mid-60's in terms of relative force survival under various circumstances of war outbreak and targeting policies does not appear to be appreciably affected. A major study of United States strategic force requirements now scheduled for completion by 1 October 1962 will, among other things, provide a reassessment of our tentative conclusions on this issue. Second, while a definitive assessment of the direct military advantages of using large yield weapons will depend on factors not yet determinable, such weapons would certainly lend themselves to a Soviet deterrent strategy with strong "terror" overtones. Third, the magnitude of civil damage ensuing as a result of use of large yield weapons would depend heavily on the targeting strategy employed by the Soviets--military, urban-industrial, or mixed. Variations in civil damage from use of high yield weapons are more sensitive to the kind of targeting elected in military attack cases than in urban-industrial or mixed attacks. For example, assuming that 60% of the US population is afforded fall-out protection consistent with our present civil defense goals for the mid-60's, tentative estimates for illustrative cases in this period would be:

 

(1) If the Soviets should strike first, employing a discriminating military attack (assigning their high yield weapons, ground burst, only against hardened targets, and air-bursting all other weapons), collateral civil damage would bring approximately 20 million United States casualties. If the Soviets strike first, attacking military targets less discriminately (i.e., ground bursting on all targets), United States casualties could number about 85 million if large yield weapons were used, and 55 million if only smaller yield weapons were used.

 

(2) For urban-industrial and mixed targeting cases, with a Soviet first strike, civil damage does not prove greatly sensitive to large yield weapons, where fall-out protection is assumed as above. Civil casualties for the United States would be on the order of 135 million with only lower yield weapons, while the additional employment of large yield weapons would probably increase this casualty level by no more than 10 million.

 

(3) If the United States were to strike first, with the Soviets receiving little warning, a Soviet retaliatory attack directed against military targets and employing large yield as well as lower yield weapons (all ground burst), would bring about 35 million casualties. If the Soviet retaliatory attack were directed against urban-industrial targets, United States casualties would number around 100 million. For smaller yield weapons only, the casualties for the respective cases would be 20 and 90 million.

 

3. Hardening of Soviet ICBM Sites

 

a. Our latest intelligence [three illegible words] Soviet ICBM hardening, based on evidence which has only recently become available, indicate that a probable hardening program has got underway slightly earlier than hitherto estimated. Some 10-25 hardened operational sites are now expected to be available in 1963, whereas initial hardening was not previously considered as a possibility until a year later.

 

b. It is not presently clear what type of hardening the Soviets are electing as a protective measure. Our estimates have tended toward the probability that the initial Soviet measures would provide only semi-hardening (approximately 25 PSI), but the most recent evidence available to us tentatively suggests that the Soviet program from the outset may involve somewhat greater hardening.

 

c. If semi-hardening still proves to be the case, it would not appreciably alter the effectiveness of our target destruction capabilities in 1963 and thereafter. We had previously estimated that hard-category Soviet sites (100 to 300 PSI or more) would begin to appear in 1965. By this time, improvements in our Minuteman force will give us reasonable expectation of adequate destruction capabilities against such targets. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Further improvements are anticipated by 1967. These Minuteman accuracies are better than the planning factors used last fall in calculating our force requirements in the 1965-67 period. The spread of assumed numbers of hard (300-PSI) Soviet sites used in last fall's calculations also involved larger numbers of such sites than estimated either in present or previous NIE's (See Table 1)./15/

 

/15/Table 1, entitled "Soviet ICBM Forces at Selected Periods," is not printed.

 

d. However, some possible difficulty might occur should the Soviets introduce these hard-category sites in greater numbers than have been hitherto estimated for later 1963 and 1964, that is--before the improved Minuteman becomes available. Such a development could degrade our target destruction capabilities somewhat in this intervening period. We could reassign some Atlas E and F and Titan I and II missiles against additional hard-category sites, but this would be at the cost of target coverage flexibility. The extent of this potential problem is clearly sensitive to: (a) our ability to meet our own operational missile schedules; (b) our criteria for second-strike destruction assurance against hard-category sites; and (c) the actual number of such sites which will have to be dealt with and their degree of hardening. The latter factor highlights the importance of getting a good intelligence fix on the Soviet hardening program.

 

e. In general, evidence that previous Soviet reliance on soft sites is giving way to a hardening concept does not surprise us. It does, however, reaffirm the importance of our R&D programs for improving the accuracies of our missiles. Carried through, these programs should to a considerable degree offset the effects of the Soviet hardening program after 1965.

 

4. Missile Readiness and Re-fire Capability

 

a. Our latest intelligence estimates indicate that the Soviets are working to improve the readiness and reaction times of their medium and long-range missile units, and that they are investing in measures to provide a re-fire capability. Present Soviet procedures for firing initial and subsequent salvoes are relatively slow and complicated, and design limitations of their current missile systems appear to preclude attainment of readiness conditions approaching those of US systems. Nevertheless, some improvement can be expected. These trends, together with the beginning of an ICBM hardening program previously discussed, reflect a Soviet effort to increase the survivability of their missile force. This would have the effect of making it easier for the Soviets to defer decision in any ambiguous situation. It would also place their forces in a somewhat better posture than at present for attempting to carry out preemptive and retaliatory operations.

 

b. With regard to Soviet refire doctrine and capabilities, several points are worth noting in connection with our own planning. In Soviet eyes, the size of their missile force may be regarded not in terms of numbers of launchers, but launchers plus re-fire. (While the evidence is not firm on this point, we believe an average of two missiles is provided per launcher.) This could lead the Soviets to place somewhat greater weight on the potential of their missile force than circumstances may warrant. Our estimates indicate that Soviet time to re-fire is measured in hours (perhaps 10 hours minimum for ICBM's, and about 4 to 6 hours for MRBM's), which means that in fact, under any likely circumstances of war outbreak and with our planned targeting, the bulk of Soviet launchers would not survive for a second round of fire. Soviet re-load capabilities to date are associated with soft sites. It is not clear whether their hardened sites will be adaptable to re-fire. Should the latter prove to be the case, we would, of course, want to insure that hardened sites were not left to deliver further fire. Even if complete destruction of a hardened site should not be attempted, a weapon detonated in the vicinity could render such a site unfit for re-fire for an indefinite period.

 

c. For our own part, the pros and cons of developing a re-fire capability from our hardened sites have already been weighed, and it has been considered that such a program is not worth undertaking. This conclusion still appears valid.

 

5. Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Capability

 

a. Our examination of this problem area in light of relevant technological factors and the latest intelligence on Soviet anti-missile developments suggests that the military implications of Soviet anti-ballistic missile capabilities in the mid-60's should not be underestimated, even though the military impact is likely to be less immediate than the psychological impact, which could be considerable.

 

b. In a military context, the advantages enjoyed by offensive delivery systems over defensive systems do not seem likely to be significantly narrowed by ABM developments within the next few years. However, this situation cannot be taken for granted without substantial efforts to keep it that way. Our programs for development of multiple warheads and other penetration aids, which have been greatly expanded in the last couple of years, attest to the seriousness which has come to be attached to the problem of assuring that our strategic missile delivery systems will not be seriously degraded by future Soviet ABM capabilities.

 

c. Our penetration aids programs should probably keep pace with Soviet ABM capabilities foreseeable in the mid-60's. Our first decoy capability (Atlas F) will become available in about a year. Initial decoy capabilities for the A-2 Polaris and Minuteman are scheduled for early 1963 and late 1964 respectively. Our advanced ballistic missile re-entry system research program will provide basic technology from which to design new re-entry systems for any of our projected ballistic missile programs over the longer term. If our present intelligence estimates are borne out, the Soviets are not likely to achieve more than limited deployment of a defensive system against ICBM's in the 1963-66 period. Nevertheless, we face many complex technical problems and, partly owing to our pay-load capacities, some difficult compromises between warhead and penetration packages. Should the Soviets rely on phased array, low frequency radars for their ABM system rather than high frequency radars, and this now seems likely, a considerable amount of our penetration aids work may have to be revised.

 

d. One factor which should tend to operate to our advantage during the period of the mid-60's, at least, is the probable Soviet intention to give priority to major urban areas in deploying their initial anti-ICBM defenses. While it will be important for us to retain the ability to penetrate ABM-defended urban centers, it would appear that the main task of penetrating to military targets removed from such centers will not be greatly affected. Over a period of time the Soviets are likely to extend the deployment of their ABM defenses, as they did with their SAM defenses, but the huge expense and time required for comparable Soviet ABM deployment would seem to allow us room to work out ways of dealing with the situation.

 

e. Notwithstanding the likely inadequacies of such Soviet ABM systems as can be foreseen for the mid-60's, it should be recognized that Soviet claims and possible demonstrations of a capability in this field could have significant psychological repercussions. Unless forehanded United States counter-programs are carried out, Soviet exploitation of ABM claims could help to establish a public image of Soviet military advantage and erode the confidence of our Allies in United States military superiority./16/

 

/16/See footnote 4, Document 100.

 

f. Soviet advances with anti-ballistic missile systems require the U.S. to counter Soviet political and propaganda exploitation of their unfolding anti-missile capability. Preparation for this contingency should include active informational programs on our own progress, and on military limitations on Soviet progress.

 

g. Soviet advances in development and initiation of deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems also call for continuing review of decisions on our own anti-missile program with due weight given to the political considerations. The US should continue vigorous prosecution of current programs to overcome the technical obstacles to development of militarily useful anti-missile defenses./17/

 

/17/See footnotes 3 and 4, Document 100.

 

6. Soviet MRBM/IRBM Forces

 

a. Our latest intelligence estimates indicate that the Soviets are building a larger MRBM/IRBM force than previously estimated--roughly, to a level of 550-650 launchers in the mid-60's rather than 350-450. The present size of their force on good evidence, is approximately 500 operational launchers, of which about 90% are deployed against the European area. Some of these launchers may be alternates, not assigned to a first salvo. The increase anticipated for the period of the mid-60's, which amounts in effect to about 50 additional aiming points (200 more launchers, at 4 launchers per aiming point), does not present a major new problem in terms of our own previously recommended force levels.

 

b. It is estimated, however, that beginning about 1965-67 the Soviets may introduce hardened or mobile MRBM/IRBM systems to provide greater survivability for a portion of their force. Should this occur, some change in our own programs for dealing with the MRBM/IRBM threat may be necessary, and we would be well advised to examine factors bearing on this potential problem. Studies now underway in the Department of Defense are taking this problem into account.

 

c. With respect to the Soviet MRBM/IRBM force as it is presently configured, the larger number of launchers available does not seem to offer any significant advantages to the Soviets under some circumstances of war outbreak. If we strike first, little more of this highly vulnerable force will survive than if it were somewhat smaller. If the Soviets strike first, they already have such weight of attack against Europe that the additional MRBM/IRBM forces seem to make little difference. However, under some intermediate circumstances, the Soviets might consider it important to have the additional assurance of a larger missile force posed against Europe. The pattern of deployment of this force also shows that the Soviets count on it, particularly on its IRBM elements, to insure neutralization of United States overseas bases and installations outside the immediate area of Western Europe. This is another factor which may seem to them to justify some redundancy with respect to this force.

 

d. European reaction to the estimate of a larger Soviet MRBM threat is a factor to be considered. Our frank handling of earlier estimates of this threat and reaffirmation of our commitments through such means as our actions on Berlin seem to have prevented acute anxiety on the part of the Europeans. The new larger estimate could give rise to concern, however, and therefore suggests the desirability of continuing our program of frankness, more detailed discussion of nuclear matters, and meaningful reassurances--through our actions--on the extent and firmness of our commitment.

 

7. Soviet Anti-Satellite Capability

 

a. The high premium which the Soviets probably attach to being able to take physical countermeasures against certain of our satellite programs provides a strong incentive for early development of an anti-satellite capability. The USSR is conceded to be technically capable of developing a limited anti-satellite capability as soon as, or perhaps before, achieving an anti-missile capability. Studies we have undertaken in this area indicate that by use of decoys and other techniques, originally developed in some cases for other purposes, we can probably negate to a significant extent any Soviet resort to physical attack against our satellites. The important thing at this point is to push forward with programs utilizing existing hardware and techniques that will give us a near-term capability to insure survival of our satellites at the time we are studying longer-term measures to preserve our future capabilities against more sophisticated threats.

 

b. On the other side of the coin, development of our own capabilities to take physical countermeasures against Soviet satellites should not be allowed to lag. Such capabilities-in-being could become particularly significant in the event the Soviets should suddenly confront us with a weapons-in-space situation, a subject discussed separately below. We now have underway a preliminary exploration of the problems of developing an anti-satellite capability. In this connection, a Nike-Zeus lash-up for firing from Kwajalein against a satellite has been authorized and should give us an initial capability by the Spring of 1963. This program is being conducted without publicity, since we stand more to gain than the Soviets by the unimpeded use of satellites and do not wish to precipitate an open competition in anti-satellite weapons.

 

8. Possibility of Soviet Weapons in Space

 

a. Our present intelligence projections do not ascribe to the Soviets an effort within the foreseeable future to place weapons in space for delivery against targets on earth. The military shortcomings of space platform systems of bombardment, compared with available terrestrial means for weapons' delivery, constitute a strong argument against the likelihood of an early Soviet weapons-in-space effort, even though the Soviets probably are now technically capable of it.

 

b. However, if the Soviets, as appears likely, are pursuing a strategy of building a deterrent force with a potent "terror" component, then the incentive for early placement of some weapons in space may exist, with considerations of military utility being secondary. Should the Soviets decide that weapons in space--or even the claim of weapons in space, which we would find it difficult to disprove--would serve as a useful threat in some future crisis situation, the United States and its Allies would be confronted with a novel and awkward situation. Although this possibility may at the present moment strike us as somewhat remote, it would appear useful to give further thought to what our response in such a situation would be, particularly if a Soviet claim of weapons-in-space were coupled with a series of menacing actions at some trouble-spot on earth, like Berlin. At the very least, it might be well to undertake a program to deflate in advance the psychological impact of such a development.

 

9. Problem of Making Clear to Soviets Advantages of Non-Civil Targeting

 

a. One important element in the development of our own strategy has been to include in our plans the option of using restraint to the extent that circumstances warrant in civil targeting. Corollary to this has been the attempt to design our forces and provide options for their use so as to exert pressures on the Soviets to minimize civil targeting in the event of nuclear conflict. As to be expected, there has been conspicuous Soviet refusal (exemplified by Khrushchev's recent utterances on this subject) to take a public line responsive to a civil damage-limiting concept. What we know of private Soviet discourse on the subject, as reflected in NIE 11-8-62, does not indicate that the Soviets have given much thought to minimizing civil damage in a strategic exchange. Clearly, we cannot count on the Soviet Union using restraint in its targeting policies, even in self-interest. Nevertheless, the stakes involved would seem to warrant continued effort to influence the Soviets in this direction. In this connection, planning on our side to ensure a protected reserve force which could be used in a controlled and deliberate way to threaten Soviet cities or remaining military forces after any initial counter-force strikes would appear to be among the more persuasive "educational" tools at our disposal. Our presently recommended forces and the targeting options they permit can fulfill this function.

 

b. It is also worth noting that two developments in the Soviet military posture--missile hardening and nuclear subs--give the Soviets the possibility of having a protected force of their own. With a protected force they would be in a better position to go along with a policy of restraint and damage-limiting targeting, providing they can be brought to recognize its advantages.

 

10. Civil Defense Problem

 

a. Soviet capabilities--as now projected through the mid-60's in submarine launched missiles, in ICBM's and in large-yield weapons--confirm the urgency of the civil defense problem, but do not change the basic objectives of our program. As currently developed, this program calls for protection of the population from the fallout threat. It offers no guarantee against the blast effects of a potential attack. In the mid-range period, this shelter program would be very effective in saving lives in case of attacks primarily against military targets. (See page 5, paragraphs 2c (1) and (3).) If attacks were launched against large urban-industrial areas, there would be very large numbers of fatalities in any event, although fallout shelters would make a significant difference. The currently projected program (about two-thirds complete in the mid-60's) would reduce total US casualties, under a Soviet first strike, approximately on the following order in several illustrative cases:

 

 

b. The potential thermal threat of large yield weapons might change the degree of protection currently established for the civil defense program. However, more data are required as to the magnitude of the thermal threat, fire spread, and the likelihood of the employment of very large yield weapons in the high-altitude thermal mode. More variables could affect the latter--weather conditions, density of burnable materials in target areas, and loss of blast and fallout effects of the weapon. Until such more definite information is available, there will be no basis to change current civil defense policy.

 

c. Attempts to encourage non-civil targeting options, discussed earlier, have a close bearing on our civil defense effort as well as that of the USSR. Increased emphasis on fallout protection would appear to be a logical corollary to development of non-civil targeting options, since fallout protection would be required to minimize collateral population casualties resulting from attacks against military forces. Otherwise, the potential advantages of targeting restraint would be lowered on both sides.

 

d. As now laid out, the US fallout shelter program will be substantially completed by 1967-68, provided the passage of the Shelter Incentives Legislation does not slip beyond the next session of Congress. Projected Soviet capabilities require that there be no slippage in the current schedule, and may in fact call for acceleration towards the end of the mid-range period. Further, if response from the public and all levels of government does not develop the number of shelter spaces required, consideration may be necessary for an increase in the federal share of the program.

 

e. In light of recent Congressional action which threatens the planned civil defense program, we would like to emphasize that our latest estimates of Soviet developments re-emphasize the importance of our planned civil defense program in saving lives in the event of war, and that this program is an integral part of our over-all national defense posture, which will be adversely affected if civil defense measures are allowed to fall by the wayside.

 

 

104. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy/1/

 

Washington, August 23, 1962.

 

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense 7/62 -8/62. Top Secret.

 

SUBJECT
Comments on "Report on Implications for U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy of Recent Soviet Intelligence"

 

1. Although I agree with most of the subject report,/2/ I do not feel that it sets forth clearly enough the following considerations which are certain to have an important bearing on future Soviet political behavior.

 

/2/Document 103.

 

a. Preponderant Soviet Military Strength in Europe

 

Since World War II, the Soviets have given top priority to the maintenance of undisputed military superiority over the NATO forces in Western Europe. To this end, in recent years they have given emphasis both to conventional forces (which include relatively high yield tactical atomic weapons) and to medium range nuclear missiles sited on Soviet soil. They continue to expand this formidable MRBM array, the effective neutralization of which is beyond the present means of NATO or of the U.S. This combination of unconventional and nuclear strength in Europe has the effect of allaying the deep fear of the Russian leaders of a revanchist Germany, and of providing a potent tool for the intimidation of Western Europe, particularly when the extent of the exposure of NATO to the MRBM is fully appreciated.

 

b. Soviet Moves to Upset the "Balance of Terror"

 

Vis-?-vis the United States, the Soviet position is much less secure. Soviet leaders must appreciate their inferiority in certain aspects of the preparations for general nuclear war, particularly in numbers of strategic weapons and delivery vehicles and in early warning means. However, it is clear that they are not content to live with this inferiority and intend to correct it, if possible, tilting the scale in their favor and upsetting the present "balance of terror." Toward these ends, the Soviets are steadily increasing their offensive strength in deployed ICBM's and in missile-launching submarines, and are augmenting the invulnerability of the ICBM's by hardening and perhaps by concealment of launching sites. A growing appreciation of the effectiveness of U.S. reconnaissance capabilities has probably been a shock to Soviet leaders who may be expected to accelerate these programs in order to correct the weaknesses which they know that we have detected.

 

The attention paid by the Soviets to the defensive aspects of general war preparations is particularly notable. The effort to offset our superior bomber force by a very extensive system of SAM defenses has been going on for several years and still continues. Recent intelligence indicates the probability of deployment of an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) which may have already begun. Whatever we may think or say about the effectiveness of this ABM, the Soviets probably feel that it will pay for its cost in giving some degree of protection to Russian cities and in gaining prestige abroad and morale at home. The Soviets probably hope by these efforts to move from the present strategic situation where the U.S. holds the balance of nuclear superiority largely through manned bombers with neither side having an acceptable missile defense, to one where the U.S. offensive strength against military targets is neutralized by an invulnerable Russian missile force on land and sea and the Soviet homeland defenses are significantly better than those of the U.S. The "balance of terror" then would be tipped in favor of the USSR.

 

c. Possible Trends in Soviet Political Behavior

 

With the declining U.S. superiority in the strategic field, it is reasonable to expect that the Soviets may increasingly press in Europe to gain local advantages without risking general war. If, beyond this, they succeed in upsetting the "balance of terror" in their favor--particularly if they beat the U.S. to an effective ABM while the U.S. remains unprotected against missile attacks--the potential limits of Soviet aggressiveness are greatly extended. It is not hard to visualize as a consequence a Western Europe swinging to neutralism as the precariousness of the situation becomes clear.

 

d. Adequacy of U.S. Programs

 

Events do not need to turn out as forecast above if the U.S. and NATO will otherwise. It is possible to offset Soviet strength in Europe by increased NATO conventional forces supported by improved tactical nuclear weapons and by a quick-reaction medium range missile capable of neutralizing or at least threatening the Soviet MRBM's. To insure continuation of comparative stability in the "balance of terror," the U.S. must take a decision without delay with regard to the deployment of Nike-Zeus and accept the need to give a higher priority to the requirements of continental air defense in the formulation of the FY 1964 budget. I feel that these points need to come out clearly in the subject report.

 

Maxwell D. Taylor

 

 

105. National Security Action Memorandum No. 182/1/

 

Washington, August 24, 1962.

 

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S -NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 182. Secret.

 

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Director, U.S. Information Agency
The Military Representative of the President

 

SUBJECT
Counterinsurgency Doctrine

 

The President has approved the document entitled "U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy",/2/ which sets forth a national counterinsurgency doctrine for the use of U.S. departments and agencies concerned with the internal defense of overseas areas threatened by subversive insurgency, and has directed its promulgation to serve as basic policy guidance to diplomatic missions, consular personnel, and military commands abroad; to government departments and agencies at home; and to the government educational system. The addressees of this NSAM will take action to insure that the policies set forth in the document are reflected in departmental and agency operations and in such additional instructions and guidance as may be required to assure uniformity of effort. They will also initiate the formulation of the internal doctrine, tactics, and techniques appropriate to their own department or agency, based upon "U.S. Overseas Defense Policy." These studies when completed will be reviewed by the Special Group (CI).

 

/2/A copy of this 39-page paper, dated August 6, is attached to a memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Rusk dated August 8. (Ibid., Special Group (CI) Files: Lot 68 D 451, Special Group (CI) 8/1/62-10/31/62) Another copy dated September 1962 is substantively identical but lacks two annexes. (Ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 182) For a summary, see Document 106. According to Johnson, the role of the CIA was "given only an abbreviated treatment in the basic document; for security reasons its function is being separately described in a companion paper to be distributed to qualified recipients." The companion paper has not been found.

 

The Department of State in consultation with the other addressees of this memorandum is assigned the task of keeping the "U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy" up to date, making such modification as changes in policy or practical experience may require, and publishing revised editions as necessary.

 

McGeorge Bundy

 

 

106. Editorial Note

 

Under date of September 1962, the paper on "U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy" approved by the White House in NSAM No. 182 (Document 105) was widely distributed within the U.S. Government and U.S. Missions abroad. The paper opens with an analysis of Communist insurgencies that emphasizes their origin as political responses to the stress of modern economic development and continues with a description of stages of insurgency. The U.S. role should run the gamut from "Immunization of vulnerable societies not yet seriously threatened by communist subversion or insurgency" through defeat of "subversive insurgency in countries actively threatened by assisting the government under attack with military as well as non-military means." One goal is to "minimize the likelihood of direct U.S. military involvement in internal war by maximizing indigenous capabilities" of defeating insurgency. U.S. strategy should not "assume a stance against revolution, per se, as an historical means of change." Therefore non-Communist insurgency should be "examined on its merits in the light of U.S. interests."

 

The paper recommends land reform, civil action, community development, education, cultivation of existing and emerging elites, police assistance, and diplomatic suasion as preferred means of bringing about successful and largely indigenous counterinsurgency efforts. "Anticipating, preventing and defeating communist-directed insurgency requires a blend of civil and military capabilities and actions to which each U.S. agency at the Country Team level must contribute." In countering insurgency, however, "the major effort must be indigenous since insurgency is a uniquely local problem involving the aspirations and allegiance of local people."

 

In Washington, the paper charges the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) with assuring "a coordinated and unified approach to regional or country programs," verifying progress in their implementation, and making "decisions on inter-departmental issues arising out of such programs." The Department of State is "responsible for providing overall policy guidance and assuring the coordination of internal defense programs." The Secretary of State will determine whether there shall be a military assistance program for a country. The Agency for International Development is responsible for administering economic aid programs in support of community development and civic action. AID is also to strengthen the capability of police and paramilitary organizations to "enforce the law and maintain public order with the minimum use of force," to "counter communist-inspired or exploited subversion or insurgency," and to encourage "the development of responsible and humane police administration" and judicial procedure.

 

The Department of Defense is assigned a wide variety of roles, such as training of U.S. forces in counterinsurgency, military assistance, preparation of military sections of country defense plans, and the support of civilian and military counterinsurgency programs in affected countries with the assistance of AID and CIA. The CIA "is an active participant in the U.S. Internal Defense effort at both the national and the country team levels" and its role "will be carried out in accordance with the provisions of statutory authority and executive direction." The USIA "will orient its programs toward immunizing the vulnerable sectors of developing societies against communist propaganda and subversive activities, and helping the modernization process to maturity without impairing the progressive enhancement of sovereignty and national values of the recipient country."

 

Annex A requires the Department of Defense to "support the CIA in clandestine operations assigned to that agency" and to be "prepared to execute assigned paramilitary operations, wholly or partly covert, which require significant numbers of militarily trained personnel, amounts of military equipment, or military experience of a kind and level peculiar to the Armed Services." Annex B is a glossary of terms. (Department of State, Special Group (CI) Files: Lot 68 D 451, Special Group (CI) 8/1/62-10/31/62)

 

 

107. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/

 

Washington, November 14, 1962.

 

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Defense Budget FY 1964, Miscellaneous Volume I. Top Secret.

 

1. For your first look at McNamara's defense budget memoranda/2/ I pass on my own first reactions. In general, I think this is a very polished job indeed. The discussions of the RS -70 and the ballistic missile defense problems are particularly excellent./3/ By way of sharper comment I would call your attention to two items--strategic retaliatory forces and the naval component of general purpose forces./4/

 

/2/In 1962 McNamara sent to the President seven draft Presidential memoranda (DPMs) on strategy, procurement, and the defense budget. A version of the draft memorandum of "Proposed Major Changes in Military Compensation," dated October 15, is ibid., Volume I. Another DPM, labeled "Preliminary Draft," deals with "The Naval Shipbuilding Program" and is dated October 31. (Ibid.) The others are cited below.

 

/3/Kaysen apparently saw copies of early versions of DPMs on "The B- 70 Program" and "Ballistic Missile Defense," sent by McNamara to the JCS on September 28 and October 6, respectively. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 7000 (28 Sep 62) Sec 1 and ibid., JMF 4740 (6 Oct 62), respectively) The final version of the missile paper is Document 111. In the B-70 paper as sent to Kennedy on November 20, McNamara recommended addition of $50 million to B-70 funds, but opposed continuing the RS-70, whose primary mission was to locate residual targets after a missile exchange, on the ground that in such a situation, "the value of a mop-up capability [was] not likely to be great." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, DOD Budget Vol I)

 

/4/McNamara circulated initial versions of the DPMs on "Recommended General Purpose Forces" and "Recommended Strategic Retaliatory Forces" to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on October 31 and November 5, respectively. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JCS 2285/85, JMF 7000 (17 Feb 62) Sec 3 and ibid., JCS 1800/636, JMF 7000 (5 Nov 62), respectively) For the final versions, see Documents 115 and 112.

 

2. On strategic retaliatory forces, I think McNamara has now come around to buying the arguments that some of us were making last year. These arguments, however, are like the different arguments he himself made last year, justifying no particular numbers, and I still think it is true that he is buying more in the way of missiles than we need. The real purpose of his paper is more a defense against service demands for a bigger force than justification of the forces he has requested. I have only one suggestion as to how this observation can be translated into practical terms. This goes to the buildup of Minutemen in relation to the buildup of improved Minutemen (Table, p. 2). If possible, it seems to me there would be some virtue in delaying the buildup from 600 to 800 Minutemen, adding 150 improved Minutemen to the 600-level force in 1966, and building up improved Minutemen more rapidly thereafter, if this then appears appropriate. I am looking into the question of how much would be saved by this change in scheduling now, and what difference it would make to the outcomes of the net evaluation calculations presented in the Appendix.

 

3. The naval portion of the cost of general purpose forces is substantial, yet there is no justification in logical terms for the naval forces similar to that offered for ground and air forces. There is no analysis of the relation between the kind of navy we want and the kind of wars we wish to be prepared to fight. I find it hard to resist the conclusion that we are maintaining 15 attack carriers by an expensive replacement schedule, and that we are building 6-8 attack submarines per year to maintain that force at its present size for reasons that have more to do with the continuance of past programs than they had to do with a sharp analysis of needs. As a horseback judgment I would think that a billion dollars taken from naval general purpose forces by cutting down the size of the fleet somewhat and put into increasing army and air force logistic support would add to the kind of fighting capability which McNamara is looking for. Or alternatively, it might be a way to save a billion dollars.

 

C.K.

 

P.S. I have not read the Continental Air Defense portion which just came in./5/

 

/5/Reference is to a draft memorandum to the President, "Continental Air Defense," dated November 11. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Defense Budget FY 1964, Vol I)

 

 

108. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy/1/

 

Washington, November 16, 1962.

 

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, NSC Organization and Administration. No classification marking. This memorandum was apparently written in response to remarks by former President Eisenhower and in preparation for the President's news conference on November 20. The subject of the memorandum was not raised at the news conference.

 

SUBJECT
The National Security Council and Supporting Staff Organization

 

When we came in, it was the very strong feeling of most of those connected with the new Administration that the Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board had both become rather rigid and paper-ridden organizations. Neither of them seemed likely to be responsive to a new Chief Executive and his principal cabinet officers. Your Secretaries of State and Defense argued strongly that a more streamlined organization would be better for your particular purposes, and the Secretary of State in particular believed that it was most important to emphasize the operational responsibility of his department, as against the rather diffuse authority of staff committees without the power of decision. This impatience with much of the existing staff machinery was shared by a number of advisers who had had experience of it in the Eisenhower Administration--notably Douglas Dillon, and later John McCone.

 

It is probably also true that we did not promptly develop fully adequate new procedures of our own. The State Department has not proved to be as effective an agency of executive management as we hoped, and above all it has not shown the capacity for inter-departmental coordination which we hoped to force upon it. This, in my judgment, is largely because neither the Secretary nor the Under Secretary has taken the lead in this direction, so that the burden has fallen on George McGhee and Alexis Johnson, who simply lack the necessary standing and authority. Under a strong President, even more than a relatively inactive one, there can be no final coordination except from the White House.

 

We have always had, however, rather more organization then General Eisenhower probably recognizes. We have, for example, kept in our service the most effective professional members of the National Security Council staff, and we have added to them such notably qualified staff officers as Forrestal, Komer, Kaysen, and now Colonel Legere. We have instituted a system of administrative follow-up on Presidential decisions which works both by formal memorandum and by informal and continuous communication.

 

We have also increased the administrative support and certain important inter-departmental committees. This is notably true of the 5412 committee which is run with a much better and more thorough staff process than was true in January 1961, and the same applies to the Special Group for Counter-Insurgency, organized under General Taylor's leadership.

 

The National Security Council as such has seemed to us a much too cumbersome instrument for intensive use, but in the course of the recent Cuban crisis, you have instituted an Executive Committee which so far has worked unusually well. We are thinking of continuing the Executive Committee with a wider mandate on a regular weekly basis, and it is probable that certain continuing subcommittees may also be useful.

 

It will remain true that our operating style will be somewhat different from General Eisenhower's. Your own instinct is to work closely with the men who are most directly concerned with a particular problem, and to seek advice from a wider and more varied circle than General Eisenhower used. For this reason, your tendency is to use frequent small meetings with those who have an immediate concern with a problem--Laos, the Congo, the Defense budget, nuclear testing, Cuba, Berlin, and balance of payments. This is simply the way you do your job, and I see no chance that you will want to take the opposite course of reviewing the agreed papers laboriously ground forward by a third-level bureaucracy and presented to you through the medium of weekly meetings of 30 or 40 people.

 

As I reread John McCone's memorandum,/2/ I think that much of General Eisenhower's criticism may be directed against phenomena which were more characteristic of our first few months than of your present operations. I think that it may be worthwhile to emphasize both that we have learned a lot in the last year and a half, and that your own staff have never publicly engaged in any criticism whatever of General Eisenhower's choice of staff methods. What we have said and what I, at least, have deeply believed, is that different Presidents are bound to have different administrative methods. General Eisenhower is a believer in a military concept of staff operations, and you govern by direct personal involvement and decision.

 

/2/Not further identified.

 

McG. B./3/

 

/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

 

 

109. Editorial Note

 

On November 20, 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to Secretary of Defense McNamara a memorandum (JCSM-907-62) on his recommendations for FY 1964-1968 strategic retaliatory forces (see footnote 3, Document 107). The Chiefs' memorandum reads in part:

 

"3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have serious reservations concerning certain portions of the rationale contained in the draft memorandum. It is agreed that a full first-strike capability as defined in the subject paper is not feasible in the time period under consideration. Neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor the Air Force recommend such a concept. Below is a quotation taken from an Air Force Study, part of which was contained in the draft memorandum. The underlining has been added to indicate an omitted portion.

 

"`The Air Force has never counseled a "full" first-strike capability in the sense of indemnifying the United States completely from serious consequences. The Air Force has rather supported the development of forces which provide the United States a first-strike capability credible to the Soviet Union, as well as to our Allies, by virtue of our ability to limit damage to the United States and our Allies to levels acceptable in light of the circumstances and the alternatives available.'

 

"4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a first-strike capability is both feasible and desirable, although the degree or level of attainment is a matter of judgment and depends upon the US reaction to a changing Soviet capability. They consider the definition of adequate US first-strike capability to be that military power required to conduct a nuclear attack against the Sino-Soviet Bloc, prior to its striking the United States, that would degrade substantially the capability of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to inflict damage on the United States and Free World forces, economic structure, and society to the extent that the United States and its Allies would emerge with a relative power advantage over the Sino-Soviet Bloc. A first-strike, or a pre-emptive option, provides the United States and its Allies increased latitude within the total spectrum of military possibilities. It is also fundamental in maintaining the cohesion of the free-world alliances. For example, a capability for pre-emption is essential if the United States is to convince the NATO Alliance of its determination to employ external forces when such is necessary to prevent the over-running of Europe by Soviet forces. A first-strike capability is a credible threat which, if employed firmly and judiciously in consort with other major elements of national military power, can serve to confine and prevent escalation of lesser levels of conflict. In light of this, a first-strike option is required to meet our military commitments and provide for guarantees already made by the United States to its NATO Allies. The degree to which a first-strike capability has deterred limited aggression is difficult to determine since we are unable to assess Soviet behavior had the United States possessed a lesser capability. The Soviets have shown restraint in their actions and have carefully avoided direct commitment of Russian forces to limited aggression.

 

"5. If the rationale presented in the draft memorandum is intended to suggest that there are no circumstances in which we will initiate the use of strategic forces, then we believe that we must face fully the cost of other alternatives, such as matching the Soviet Union in other areas of military strength, including those areas in which it now possesses a clear margin of advantage. The ultimate strength of our position among the nations of the Free World has resided in the realization on the part of our enemies that an interest identified as vital to the United States will be defended with whatever means are necessary. The ultimate level of defense rests with the possession of a clear military superiority by the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that in the interest of added flexibility the ability to execute a coercive strategy would be a desirable option, if attainable. A coercive strategy is based on the ability to threaten such great destruction of Soviet population, either after the USSR has expended most of its strategic nuclear strength or after most of this strength has been destroyed, that the Soviets would be willing to accept an end to hostilities on terms favorable to the United States and its Allies without further strategic nuclear exchange. We recommended that the desirability of such a strategy continue to be recognized as an available option under pre-emptive circumstances.

 

"6. The force levels and composition contained in the draft memorandum, as related to Minuteman and Skybolt, do not reflect the previous recommendation provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The US strategic nuclear forces as shown in JSOP-67 and the Skybolt program have been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are considered necessary if the United States is to maintain the clear margin of superiority over its potential adversaries.

 

"7. If the GAM-87 program is discontinued and its contribution is not replaced by an equivalent capability, the result will be a substantial degradation in the over-all strategic capability. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that provision of 100 additional Minuteman missiles by 1968 does not constitute a capability equivalent to the 1012 Skybolt missile program.

 

"8. The cancellation of the Skybolt could have political implications since the British decision to participate in the Skybolt program required the British to reject the Blue Streak missile which they have developed. This was a contentious and almost unprecedented departure from previous British policy of using domestic resources for their aircraft programs. If the British elect to continue the program on their own it could have considerable impact on the other important elements of their national military strength together with their NATO contribution. If they cancel their portion of the program, within the context of the present agreement, an equivalent capability will be required or we must accept the alternative of a further degraded capability. Perhaps the most accurate measurement of the impact on the combined Allied capability is contained in a recent statement from USCINCEUR concerning 1967 and 1968 force objectives. He recommends a force of 120 medium UK bombers, 72 of which would be equipped with Skybolts. The task of this bomber force is to conduct operations in coordination with the US Strategic Air Command." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JCS 1800/644, JMF 7000 (5 Nov 62); another copy is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 B 3542, 110.01 Package 1, 12 April 62)

 

For the final version of McNamara's draft memorandum to the President, see Document 112. Force recommendations for JSOP (Joint Strategic Operations Plan) 67 are in a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs to McNamara dated August 27. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JCS 2143/170, JMF 3130 (24 Oct 61) Sec 3) The "Air Force study" quoted by the Joint Chiefs in the November 20 memorandum has not been further identified.

 

 

110. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

 

CM-128-62

 

Washington, November 20, 1962.

 

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, 110.01 Package I--12 Apr 62. Top Secret.

 

SUBJECT
Recommended Fiscal Year 1964-1968 Strategic Retaliatory Forces

 

1. In JCSM-907-62/2/ I forwarded the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the proposed draft memorandum to the President on the above subject. /3/ While I am generally in agreement with the views of the Chiefs, I would like to express in this memorandum a differing opinion on the Skybolt air-to-ground missile program, the cancellation of which is the most important single issue in your memorandum.

 

/2/See Document 109.

 

/3/See footnote 4, Document 107. For the final version, see Document 112.

 

2. The basic question in the Skybolt issue is how much we should pay to extend the useful life of the B-52 bombers by providing penetration assistance in the form of air-to-ground missiles. The argument in favor of providing this assistance is the need to continue to exploit the asset of the manned strategic bomber, waning though that asset be, in order to superimpose its delivery capacity upon the impressive megatonnage which can be delivered by our long range missiles in the 1968 time frame. Since the B-52s will at that time represent an important part of the total potential weight of our strategic attack in a retaliatory situation with warning, it would seem prudent to retain this delivery system during the next few years if, by giving it penetration aids, we can assure bombs on target for a significant percentage of its delivery capacity.

 

3. Your proposed letter to the President/4/ would meet the requirements for assisting the B-52s in FY 1968 by providing 100 more Minuteman missiles and 172 more Hound Dogs, both additions being primarily for air defense suppression in support of the B-52s. The total programmed Hound Dogs would thus increase from 408 to 580 in FY 1968. In compensation for these additions, you propose to cancel the 1012 Skybolts originally programmed for 1968 with a net saving by this substitution of approximately 1.3 billion dollars. The question then becomes whether this is an acceptable substitution or whether, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated, your proposed program would result in a "substantial degradation in the over-all strategic capability."

 

/4/Reference is to the proposed DPM mentioned in paragraph 1.

 

4. My conclusion is that, while the decision is a close one, the facts as I know them do not establish a compelling case for the judgment of the Chiefs cited above. This conclusion rests upon the following considerations.

 

5. While the B-52 bomber fleet is still important during the next few years in contributing to our deterrent posture, the target system left to attack by bombers after penetration tends to decline in importance as missiles take over the most important targets which require attack with minimum delay. Hence, the price paid for the penetration of the B-52s should not be too high. Furthermore, the penetration aids bought should become available quickly or they will not have concurrent availability with the useful remaining life of the B-52s.

 

6. In this respect, I am impressed with the danger that the Skybolt program with its present test difficulties which it must overcome would arrive too late to contribute long to the usefulness of the B-52s. Even if kept upon schedule, the Skybolt will not be available in numbers before 1966 and it is difficult to foresee much use for the B-52s in the 1970 era. With a little slippage in the Skybolt program, we would have an expensive auxiliary weapon system which, like BOMARC, arrived too late to perform a remunerative mission.

 

7. Assuming that we concede the need of reinforcing the penetration capability of the B-52s, is it necessary to go for a new and complicated system such as Skybolt? This question raises the matter of relative capabilities of Hound Dog and of Skybolt, a matter about which the experts disagree. My over-all impression is that the advantages attributed to Skybolt are not sufficiently impressive to provide a clear margin of superiority over Hound Dog if supplemented by other penetration aids. If  -52s with Hound Dog are preceded with an adequate number of Minuteman missiles provided for air defense suppression, and if maximum effort is put on ECM in support of the B-52s, it would seem to me that the over-all penetrability of the force would be comparable to that which may be obtained from a successful Skybolt program.

 

8. My lukewarmness for spending any substantial sum for a new standoff missile for the B-52s results from my own doubt as to the long-term effectiveness of the manned bomber in the strategic mission. Henceforth, in the missile age, all aircraft on the ground will be highly vulnerable to surprise attack and the B-52s are no exception. Under conditions of surprise attack, they are unlikely to make a significant contribution to our over-all strategic effort. In the other extreme case, a U.S. preemptive attack, the B-52 forces will not be necessary to add to the destruction of the enemy, which can be accomplished in large measures by other means. Only in the case of U.S. retaliation after receiving tactical warning does it appear that the B-52 mission may be an important one. In this situation, the Skybolt could be a valuable weapon, although how much better than the combination of the Hound Dog plus Minuteman is difficult to say.

 

9. In conclusion, although the choice is a narrow one, I would support the cancellation of the Skybolt program and the addition of Minuteman missiles and Hound Dogs to compensate therefor. Because of the uncertainty of the size and nature of the air suppression target system to be struck, I do not have a feel for the adequacy of the numbers which you suggest, namely 100 more Minuteman missiles and 172 more Hound Dogs. My over-all judgment on the Skybolt issues results from a conviction of the over-all redundancy of our nuclear strategic strike capability to deter the USSR or to attack those targets which must be struck to destroy or to cripple the enemy. I am also impressed with the greater priority of need for other important programs which compete for our resources, such as the antimissile missile program, the program for the modernization and increase of conventional forces, and projects to increase the reliability and the penetrability of our long-range missiles. Even if the decision is taken to continue the Skybolt program, I should like to be assured that these more important programs receive the weight of fiscal support necessary for their success, before making provision for a relatively marginal program such as Skybolt.

 

Maxwell D. Taylor/5/

 

/5/Printed from a copy that indicates Taylor signed the original.

 

 

111. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy/1/

 

Washington, November 20, 1962.

 

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, FY 1964 Defense Budget Volume I. Top Secret.

 

SUBJECT
Ballistic Missile Defense

 

In 1961, the Army proposed full development of the Nike-Zeus and deployment of the system for the defense of 27 cities. The development program recommended by the Army was approved but, because of limitations in the effectiveness of the system, deployment of Nike-Zeus was disapproved. Congress appropriated $384 million in FY 1963 for ballistic missile defense development, including $274 million for Nike-Zeus.

 

During the past year we have gained a much broader understanding of the problems of ballistic missile defense, the level of defense that may be achieved, and the characteristics of the most effective system. The technical opportunities offered by alternatives to or modifications of Nike-Zeus were thoroughly examined by the Army. This effort led to the initial design of four major improvements:

 

1. Use of the Zeus discrimination radar as a high volume, lower accuracy target tracker.

 

2. Modification of the Zeus missile to reduce the minimum intercept altitude.

 

3. Development of a new high acceleration missile (Sprint); this missile would increase the time available for discrimination.

 

4. Development of a new phased array radar; this radar could simultaneously acquire, evaluate, and track a large number of objects.

 

The addition of (1.) and (2.) above to the Nike-Zeus yields Improved Nike Zeus. Nike Zeus Improved plus (3.) and (4.) provide Nike Zeus Augmented A and Nike Zeus Augmented B respectively. A system based on (3.) and (4.) (plus some small number of Zeus missiles) is Nike-X.

 

New programs are now proposed to incorporate these developments. Our currently approved program, the new Army proposal, and my recommendation for the future are briefly summarized below.

 

The Current Approved Program

 

Continue development and tests of the Nike-Zeus system and limited development of the phased array radar. Development costs for this program for FY 1964 through FY 1967 total $600 million. Initial deployment of this system, if it appeared worthwhile, could begin within four years of the time a deployment decision is made.

 

The Proposed Army Program

 

Develop both the Improved and Augmented Nike-Zeus systems and the Nike-X system. Sixteen Zeus batteries for twelve urban areas would be deployed beginning in 1967. Ten Nike-X batteries, for ten additional urban areas, would be deployed beginning in 1969. Sprint missiles and array radars would also be added to the first 16 batteries, and the Zeus missiles would be redistributed over all 26 batteries. Development costs for this program, beyond FY 1963, would total $1.4 billion, and the initial costs for a 26 battery defense would total around $12.2 billion. The twenty-two urban areas around which these batteries would be deployed include approximately 30 percent of our population.

 

The Recommended Program

 

Develop fully only the Nike-X system. (The Nike-Zeus test program would be reduced below the currently approved level and would be limited to the study of re-entry phenomena and defense techniques, including anti-satellite defense.) Development costs for this program, beyond FY 1963, would total around $1.3 billion. A decision to deploy the Nike-X system would be deferred until mid-1964. The first Nike-X batteries could be deployed in 1969 and a 26 battery defense could be completed three or four years later. The initial costs for a 26 battery defense would total around $11.7 billion.

 

The estimated costs of the Current Program, the Proposed Army Program, and my Recommended Program are summarized in Table 1.

 

[Here follows Table 1.]

 

The program recommended by the Army to begin deployment of a composite system incorporating the Improved and Augmented Nike-Zeus systems instead of the Nike-X development (and possible deployment) does not seem to me to provide an interim defense capability which is worth the minimum of $2.7 billion additional which it requires. This interim deployment proposal has the additional undesirable effect of providing, at completion of deployment, a heterogeneous system of somewhat lower quality than Nike-X. It also commits us at this time to the deployment of a ballistic missile defense system, which my recommendation does not. Without being convinced that the Nike-X system should eventually be deployed, I recommend that we proceed vigorously with its development on a schedule which will preserve the option of the earliest possible deployment.

 

The rationale for these recommendations is briefly summarized below:

 

1. The proposed Army program represents a substantial improvement over the Nike Zeus. The final Army system is almost as good as Nike-X against various types of determined attacks. However, in its early stages the Army deployment is a marginal effectiveness due to its limited target handling capability. Even in the final deployment the vulnerability of parts of the Army system to modest blast effects and the lower traffic handling capability make it somewhat inferior. The major arguments for the Improved/Augmented system are its earlier availability and the insurance it provides against unexpected problems in developing an advanced system.

 

2. The Nike -X system promises a sufficient capability to insure a more equal contest with offensive weapons and tactics. A Nike -X defense would probably still cost more than the cost of offensive weapons which could overcome this defense; such a defense, however, would significantly reduce the damage from any given number of weapons targeted against our cities. For the same deployment cost, Nike -X will provide a more effective system than the Army's program, although the first units would be delayed two years.

 

3. The recommended program will make a potentially satisfactory deployment option available at the earliest possible time without a current financial commitment for procurement planning.

 

The remainder of this paper discusses in detail:/2/

 

/2/Sections III-VI are not printed. At the close of Section VI, in which he outlined a number of technical problems, McNamara stated: "I therefore recommend against making a commitment now to deploy either Nike -X or the Army's systems. I believe, however, that anti-missile defense is so important in the strategic equation that we must be willing to make very substantial development expenditures even if the probability of deployment is rather low."

 

I. The Views of the JCS on Ballistic Missile Defense.

II. Additional Strategic Considerations.

III. A Description of the Alternative Systems.

IV. Effectiveness of the Alternative Systems.

V. Relation of Active Defense and Civil Defense.

VI. Some Key Issues.

 

I. VIEWS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the various options available for terminal ballistic missile defense. The Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations support the program proposed by the Secretary of the Army; they understood, however, that the Army program would cost only $380 million more than my recommended program instead of around $3 billion more. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force recommends that the Nike -X and Nike -Zeus research and development programs and Nike-Zeus tests should be conducted, but that a decision should not be taken at this time to begin deployment. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff supports the views of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations.

 

The following salient factors were presented by the Chiefs in support of their position:/3/

 

/3/Paragraphs a and b below partially summarize Appendix A to a November 10 memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JCS 2012/219, JMF 4740 (6 Oct 62))

 

a. Chief of Staff Army and Chief of Naval Operations:

 

(1) Militarily, the most glaring present deficiency in the U.S. military posture is the lack of an anti-ballistic missile capability. CINCNORAD emphasizes that ballistic missile defense has first priority.

 

(2) There is growing evidence of a substantial Soviet AICBM effort. The extent of damage that the military and scientific prestige of the United States will suffer, if the Soviets are credited with a major achievement in this area, is most impressive.

 

(3) The absence of an anti-ballistic missile capability subjects the United States to the possibility of significant damage or public humiliation at the hands of minor powers who acquire a missile capability. Our recent experiences in the Cuban crisis stress the relevance of this concern.

 

(4) Without a defense, major urban areas are exposed to accidental, irrational, and unauthorized attacks.

 

(5) The program recommended by the Army will provide a defense two to three years earlier than possible with a Nike-X program. By 1973 the effectiveness of these deployments is comparable. A defense in the earlier years is considered vital to the security of the United States.

 

(6) The attainment of a much needed hard point defense capability using Nike-X components should be considered.

 

b. Chief of Staff Air Force:

 

(1) Parallel research and development of the Nike-X and Nike-Zeus proposals, to gain knowledge essential to the ultimate achievement of both an effective defense and an effective penetration capability, appears justified.

 

(2) A decision now for production constitutes acceptance before any measure of the defense system effectiveness has been established.

 

(3) A decision to deploy active ballistic missile defense should depend, in part, on the required complementary civil defense program.

 

(4) The terminal defense systems now attainable or forecast do not provide an effective defense for urban areas. They may have application to defense of selected and hardened elements of the national military comment structure.

 

In supporting the views of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff believes that it is of vital national importance to embark at once upon a production and deployment program as recommended by the Secretary of the Army. /4/

 

/4/Taylor's views are in a separate November 10 memorandum to McNamara, CM-103-62. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, 471.94 16 Aug 62)

 

II. ADDITIONAL STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

 

The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff describe a number of the strategic considerations associated with a decision to deploy a ballistic missile defense. A broader range of strategic and economic considerations, together with the technical situation at the time, will determine whether such a defense should eventually be deployed. These additional arguments for deployment of a less than perfect ballistic missile defense are also pertinent:

 

a. A ballistic missile defense of limited capability would contribute to the deterrence of large attacks by raising doubt about the attacker's ability to penetrate. Such a defense, even though limited, greatly complicates the design and tactics for offensive weapons. The Soviets may not pursue an extensive penetration aids program even though it is in their interest to do so; if penetration aids are developed, the total yield of an attack would be considerably degraded by the weight penalty.

 

b. A ballistic missile defense system with the effectiveness of Nike-X would significantly reduce the damage from a given number of weapons directed against our urban areas. Only a small proportion of the Soviet missiles may be used for an attack on urban targets in a general war in which either we or they initiate a counter-force strike.

 

On the opposite side of the issue, the following additional arguments are relevant:

 

a. Deployment of a ballistic missile defense would almost surely provoke a Soviet reaction. This reaction could be a penetration aids program, an increase in the number of missiles, or the deployment of very large yield weapons. The nature and scale of their response depends, in large part, on the cost of the actions necessary to overcome our defense. Some idea of their response can be gained from our own experience. The cost of our penetration aids program will be less than one-fifth the cost of a ballistic missile defense system and the lead time for improved penetration aids is substantially shorter. The incremental cost of the number of missiles required to overcome a good ballistic missile defense would be from one-tenth to one-half the cost of the defense. We cannot be sure the Soviets would respond on a scale necessary to overcome our defense, but the economic advantage is definitely in favor of the offense.

 

b. The value of a defense against a relatively small missile force in the hands of a minor power has been noted. Minor powers, however, could still threaten cities with a population of around one million that are not defended. /5/

 

/5/In a November 10 memorandum to McNamara, Wiesner enclosed the "Report of the AICBM Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee on the Nike Zeus System." The Panel found that the "present Nike Zeus, because of its technical recommendations, would be inadequate to deal with the anticipated threat," and recommended that it not be deployed "in its present form." The Panel concluded that systems "growing out of the basic Nike Zeus concept" gave promise for the future, and that one using phased array radar and a high-acceleration interceptor should be intensively developed before commitment to deployment, which should be preceded by basic decisions on the role of AICBM and civil defense in the U.S. defense posture. (Ibid.)

 

[Here follow sections III-VI.]

 

 

112. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy/1/

 

Washington, November 21, 1962.

 

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Defense Budget FY 1964 Volume I. Top Secret.

 

SUBJECT
Recommended FY 1964-FY 1968 Strategic Retaliatory Forces (U)

 

I have recently completed my review of the long-range nuclear delivery forces and their associated support for FY 1964-FY 1968. The program recommended will form the basis for the preparation of the FY 1964 budget. This memorandum summarizes the main factors I have taken into consideration in determining United States requirements for these forces.

 

My recommendations concerning the B-70 program are the subject of another memorandum/2/ and these will not be discussed in this paper.

 

/2/Document 111.

 

I recommend that you approve, for inclusion in the FY 1964 budget, the development and procurement of the following operational missiles and aircraft to supplement our Long Range Nuclear Delivery Forces:

 

 

After a careful evaluation of the GAM-87 (Skybolt), and for reasons that I shall make clear later in this memorandum, I recommend the cancellation of the program. This action will result in savings of $568 million in FY 1964 and of about $2.5 billion over the period FY 1963-FY 1968, of which about $600 million is for warheads and $1.9 billion is for Skybolt development and production. Further, as a partial offset to this reduction, I recommend approval of 100 additional Improved Minutemen by end-FY 1968.

 

Moreover, I recommend that we adopt, for planning purposes, the force structure summarized in the following table. Where they differ from my recommendations, the forces proposed by the Services are shown beneath mine in parentheses.

 

RECOMMENDED AND SERVICE-PROPOSED FORCES/a/

 

 

 

[1 entry not declassified]

 

/a/The Service proposed forces, where different from the Recommended forces, are shown in parentheses. The Air Force has also proposed the procurement of the MRBM force, with costs to be shared by NATO. This proposal is not discussed in this memorandum.

 

/b/Includes 100 Improved Minutemen programmed by FY 1968 in place of the Skybolt missiles.

 

/c/Includes National Emergency Airborne Command Post and Post-Attack Command and Control System aircraft.

 

/d/Thor and Jupiter assigned to NATO are not considered as part of the U.S. force in the structure in the discussion in this memorandum.

 

/e/Bombers have flexibility in the choice of weapons and yields. For purposes of this table, current average loadings are assumed for the B-47's and B-52's; B-58's are assumed to carry planned loadings.

 

The estimated Total Obligational Authority required to procure and operate these forces over this period is shown in the following table. The difference between the Total Obligational Authority required to finance the forces I am recommending and that required to finance the forces recommended by the individual Services is shown on the second line.

 

Total Obligational Authority End-Fiscal Year/f/
(billions of dollars)

 

	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1964-1968
Secretary of Defense Recommendations	8.64	7.74	5.52	4.68	3.71	3.42	25.07
Service Proposals	+.58	+1.93	+2.26	+3.52	+3.54	+1.25	+12.50

 

/f/Includes costs of B/RS-70 programs. Excludes MMRBM's.

 

Over the five years, 1964-1968, the complete cost to buy and operate the aircraft and missiles recommended by the Air Force and the Polaris recommended by the Navy exceeds the cost of the forces I am recommending by approximately $12.5 billion, of which about $5 billion is for the RS-70. (The Air Force plan would entail additional costs for the RS-70 in later years.) As will be shown later in this paper, the extra capability provided by the individual Service proposals runs up against strongly diminishing returns and yields very little in terms of extra target destruction. In my judgment, it is an increment not worth the cost of $12.5 billion over the five year period.

 

The forces I am recommending differ from the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs in the following respects. First, the JCS have stated a requirement for an additional 100 operational Minutemen by end-FY 1965. The costs of such an increase in FY 1963 and FY 1964 would amount to approximately $500 million. Second, the JCS recommend a force of 1,200 Minutemen by end-FY 1967. (My recommended force reaches 1,150 by that time.) Third, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations, recommend that the Skybolt program be continued as proposed by the Air Force./3/ The Chairman of the JCS supports my recommendation to cancel this program./4/

 

/3/See Document 109.

 

/4/See Document 110.

 

As well as these forces, I recommend that we continue development and procurement of the Post-Attack Command and Control System (PACCS) airborne system and initiation of construction of a Deep Underground Survivable Center. The airborne system consists of 17 airborne command posts (ABNCP's) and 36 B-47 communications relay aircraft. To date, 12 KC-135A command post aircraft are in place and one is maintained continuously airborne. All 17 ABNCP's are scheduled to be in place by June of 1963 and the relay aircraft by May 1963. The KC-135B ABNCP's with improved communications will be in place at the end of 1964. The approved investment costs for the airborne system are $162 million (plus $26 million R&D), with a level-off annual operating cost of $36.5 million. Additional funds will be needed as continued improvements to communications and command center capability evolve.

 

I recommend initiation of construction for a Deep Underground Command Post for SAC in FY 1964. This would be operational in 1967-1969 and would provide a highly survivable, long-endurance center for post-strike control. The initial cost is estimated to be on the order of $155 million.

 

The following sections describe in greater detail the basis for my recommendations, by reviewing, first, strategic objectives, the Soviet-Bloc nuclear threat and our target destruction capabilities, general nuclear war outcomes, and second, the particular key decisions to be made this year.

 

I. General Basis for Force Level Recommendations

 

In order to provide a firm basis for determining the capabilities of Strategic Retaliatory Forces in general nuclear war missions, I asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish a Special Studies Group which would have, as one of its tasks, to examine strategic objectives and force requirements on a continuing basis. This Group analyzed the comparative capabilities of alternative strategic forces for the 1968 period. These studies, in addition to other studies by the Services and my staff, supplemented the advice of the Joint Chiefs and, together with that advice, provided the basis for my recommendations.

 

General Nuclear War Objectives

 

The forces I am recommending have been chosen, primarily, to satisfy two requirements. They are, first, to provide the United States with a secure, protected retaliatory force able to survive any attack within enemy capabilities and capable of striking back and destroying Soviet urban society, if necessary, in a controlled and deliberate way; and, second, to deny the enemy the prospect of achieving a military victory by attacking our forces. The forces I am recommending should thereby give any rational Soviet decisionmaker the strongest possible incentives to avoid a nuclear attack on ourselves or our allies.

 

However, I recognize that despite our possession of a most powerful deterrent, nuclear war may break out in an accidental or unpremeditated way, or as the consequence of enemy irrationality or miscalculation. Therefore, I believe that we should take all measures that offer a reasonable prospect of effectively limiting damage to ourselves and our allies in the event that deterrence fails and thermonuclear war does occur. Such measures include active anti-bomber and anti-missile defenses and civil defenses. Strategic offensive forces can also make an important contribution by striking back against Soviet bomber bases, missile sites, and other vulnerable elements of Soviet follow-on forces. In some circumstances, our counterattack may succeed in blunting the Soviet attack and make a substantial contribution to the damage-limiting objectives. The forces and program I am recommending meet this requirement.

 

It has become clear to me that the Air Force proposals, both for the RS-70 and for the rest of their Strategic Retaliatory Forces are based on the objective of achieving a first-strike capability. In the words of an Air Force report to me:

 

"The Air Force has rather supported the development of forces which provide the United States a first-strike capability credible to the Soviet Union, as well as to our Allies, by virtue of our ability to limit damage to the United States and our Allies to levels acceptable in light of the circumstances and the alternatives available."/5/

 

/5/The source of the quotation is not identified. In the memorandum cited in footnote 3 above, the JCS denied favoring a first strike capability in the sense of protecting the United States completely from serious consequences. But they did want the United States to retain a relative power over the "Sino-Soviet Bloc," and stated that a preemptive option would provide "increased latitude within the total spectrum of military possibilities."

 

Of course, any force designed primarily for a controlled second-strike, and for the limiting of damage to the U.S. and its Allies, will inevitably have in it to an important degree a first-strike capability. What is at issue here is whether our forces should be augmented beyond what I am recommending in an attempt to achieve a capability to start a thermonuclear war in which the resulting damage to ourselves and our Allies could be considered acceptable on some reasonable definition of the term.

 

In my memorandum to you on this subject last year,/6/ I defined a "full first-strike capability" as a capability that "would be achieved if our forces were so large and so effective, in relation to those of the Soviet Union, that we would be able to attack and reduce Soviet retaliatory power to the point at which it could not cause severe damage to U.S. population and industry." I indicated then and I reaffirm now my belief that the "full first-strike capability"--and I now include the Air Force's variant of it--should be rejected as a U.S. policy objective. This is for several reasons.

 

/6/Document 46.

 

a. It is almost certainly infeasible.

 

By this I mean that the same means for achieving a secure, protected retaliatory force able to survive any attack and be capable of striking back that we are using are also available to the Soviets. In particular, I was recently informed by the JCS that the Soviet Union now has a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capability which, if unopposed, would permit deployment of nearly 100 missiles against CONUS. The Soviets also have submarine-launched cruise missiles. The NIE now estimates/7/ that by mid-1967, the Soviets will have some 186 SLBM's and 156 cruise missiles. Although we have an effective capability to sink enemy submarines in a protracted war at sea, we have no realistic prospect of being able to destroy a major part of deployed enemy SLBM forces in a sudden attack, thereby preventing Soviet retaliation after a U.S. attack. Moreover, like ourselves, the Soviets can harden their land-based missiles. Recent intelligence indicates that they are beginning to harden both their IRBM's and their ICBM's. They have the further option of protecting these forces with active ballistic missile defenses, a choice which appears uneconomic to us, but which may be attractive to them. There is a problem of uncertainty of location of some of their missile sites. Furthermore, I am convinced that we would not be able to achieve tactical surprise, especially in the kinds of crisis circumstances in which a first-strike capability might be relevant. Thus, the Soviets would be able to launch some of their retaliatory forces before we had destroyed their bases.

 

/7/The NIE has not been identified.

 

Finally, it is clear to me that the forces proposed by the Air Force itself cannot give us this capability. For example, in mid-1968, under very favorable circumstances, the Air Force proposed force would at best be able to reduce Soviet strategic forces to roughly 100 surviving ICBM's (for example, assume that we locate and target about 93 per cent of a force of 700 missiles and destroy in time about 93 per cent of the missiles we target). In addition, approximately 100 submarine-launched missiles could be at sea. If these remaining forces were targeted against U.S. cities, they could inflict roughly 50 million direct fatalities in the United States, even with fallout protection. I do not consider this an "acceptable" level of damage.

 

I have said almost certainly infeasible because I can think of at least two reasons why it might not prove to be infeasible. First, the Soviets could blunder and leave themselves vulnerable to a U.S. first-strike. I do not consider this to be a very likely possibility. As I indicated earlier, already the Soviets are deploying SLBM's and hardened ICBM's and IRBM's. Moreover, even if they were to be so foolish as to leave themselves vulnerable to a U.S. first-strike, because of the presence of diminishing returns in target destruction, the extra forces proposed by the Air Force do not appear to add a great deal. The possible circumstances in which the Air Force proposed forces would provide the U.S. with a good first-strike capability and those proposed by me would not seem unclear and improbable.

 

Secondly, one might argue that we could hope to achieve a satisfactory outcome by combining a good first-strike capability with a coercive strategy. That is, we might try to knock out most of the Soviet strategic nuclear forces, while keeping Russian cities intact, and then coerce the Soviets into avoiding our cities (by the threat of controlled reprisal) and accepting our peace terms. In this case we would be counting on our ability to destroy their will, not their ability, to destroy our cities. I believe that the coercive strategy is a sensible and desirable option to have in second-strike circumstances in which we are trying to make the best of a bad situation. There the only justification it requires is a reasonable possibility that it might work. But it would be foolish to count on it working to the point that it would form the basis for a belief that we could strike first without retaliation. Moreover, there are limits to the extent to which extra strategic retaliatory forces help in these circumstances once we have a protected capability to destroy essentially all of their urban society.

 

b. It is neither necessary nor particularly useful.

 

The threat of U.S. first-strike has long since been shown to be ineffective in deterring limited provocations and aggression. Therefore, it has been necessary to build up our theatre forces at levels at which they would be adequate to meet our commitments without resort to nuclear weapons. We have made a great deal of progress toward this objective in the past two years, and we plan further progress.

 

c. It would be extremely costly.

 

A "full" or "credible" first-strike capability, even if feasible, would cost much more than the costs of the Air Force proposed Strategic Retaliatory Forces. As well as much larger and more effective Strategic Retaliatory Forces, such a capability would require very large expenditures on Civil Defense and Continental Air and Missile Defenses.

 

For these reasons, the following discussion is limited to evaluation of the recommended and alternative forces in second-strike conditions. Although I examine the capability of these forces to destroy Soviet military targets in a second-strike, I want to make it clear that an ability to destroy 100 per cent of these targets is not one that I think we can possibly attain. Rather, I believe that we should stop augmenting our forces for this purpose when the extra capability the increments offer is small in relation to the extra costs.

 

The Soviet Long-Range Nuclear Threat

 

We have intelligence estimates of the Soviet strategic forces through 1967./8/ These estimates have been extrapolated for 1968 in the following table which summarizes the size and composition of the Soviet forces. The Low numbers represent the smaller force estimated by USIB; the Medium numbers correspond to the upper bound of the range projected by USIB; the High force corresponds to the upper bound of the range indicated by the Air Force in its dissent from the majority view.

 

/8/NIE 11-8-62, July 6, 1962. [Footnote in the source text. See Document 96.]

 

SOVIET STRATEGIC RETALIATORY FORCES