Docs 114-132
114. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, November 28, 1962.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, 452 10 Jan 62. Top Secret.
Dear Bob: I greatly appreciated having the opportunity to review the series of memoranda which you have prepared for the President of the FY '64 (and forward) Defense Programs. The quality of these memoranda is most impressive and I think the forces, which implementation of the proposals contained therein would produce, are generally consistent with our basic national security policy. In particular, I wish to underline the point which you make in the memorandum on General Purpose Forces/2/ on the need for strategic lift in the face of the difficulties attending the acquisition of bases in troubled parts of the world.
/2/For the final version of this memorandum, see Document 115. Regarding an earlier draft, see footnote 4, Document 107.
I also note that the study of forces required for non-nuclear defense in Europe was predicated on defense of the Rhine./3/ In accordance with the conclusion which we reached at the first Defense Policy Conference,/4/ a study of requirements for a more forward and therefore more politically acceptable defense of the Central Front is under way. I think this is a point well worth mentioning to the President since it could presumably support the need for a subsequent adjustment in General Purpose Force requirements.
/3/This discussion occurs in the section of "US Non-Nuclear Force Requirements Worldwide," which also notes that "the Joint Chiefs believe that military strategy must be based on containing the enemy well forward, placing his forces in jeopardy, and assuming an early counter-offensive, rather than allowing him to take a sizeable amount of territory that can be used as a fait accompli in any pause negotiations." This language paraphrases part of a September 30 memorandum from the JCS to McNamara. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, 110.01 Project #22)
/4/See footnote 5, Document 86.
Of all of the highly important matters touched upon in your memoranda, to my mind the issue which stands out above all others is that relating to the question of the advisability of deploying an anti-ballistic missile defense. One can only be impressed by the technical complexity of the problem. However, what seems to emerge in this discussion is that a system, having considerable operational uncertainties but, nevertheless, promising significant defensive capabilities under certain conditions, could be deployed beginning as early as 1967, were the decision made at this time to do so. Obviously your technical review, which I gather includes a heavy emphasis on alternative trade-off advantages as between investment in ballistic missile defense and competing weapon systems, inclines you to recommend against a decision to deploy at this time. I gather, however, that this is by no means a black and white issue and, in fact, may represent a rather close balance.
I would have no independent judgment on the technical feasibility/cost consideration factors. If, however, these have led to a negative decision, but only in close balance, then I would think that the decision warrants further review in light of the immense political and psychological implications for our entire security posture over the next decade of a negative decision on deployment. Though undoubtedly taken into account in your decision, the extent to which these implications were weighed is not clear from your memorandum. For that reason, I have set out in a separate enclosure to this letter my own views as to the significance which I attach to the development and deployment by the US of an anti-ballistic missile system in the shorter, rather than the longer, time period. It is my feeling that if such a system, having a reasonable degree of technological effectiveness can be deployed beginning as early as 1967, we should carefully consider the advisability of doing so.
Since this is a matter of highest importance, you undoubtedly contemplate it as a principal item for discussion with the President. I am prepared to enter into such discussions whenever the President deems it appropriate.
With warm regards,
Sincerely,
Dean
Enclosure/5/
/5/Top Secret.
SIGNIFICANCE OF AN ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM AS A PART OF US NATIONAL SECURITY UNDERTAKINGS OVER THE NEXT DECADE
1. If the Soviet Union were to deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense system substantially before the United States, such an action could adversely affect the current delicate world power equilibrium and seriously impair the effectiveness with which the US would be able to pursue its national security policy. The basis for this conclusion will be developed in the succeeding paragraphs.
2. In order to explain the basis for the preceding conclusion, it is necessary to clarify a few assumptions which we make.
We accept the obvious fact that any system of ballistic missile defense which we might choose to develop and deploy is at this point in time fraught with great uncertainties and immense technical complexities. From the memorandum prepared by the Secretary of Defense to the President,/6/ we would gather that of the two possible systems, Nike Zeus or Nike X, the latter has greater potentialities than the former. Both, however, would seem to embody considerable uncertainties, with perhaps Nike X being more uncertain if only because it is a newer concept having been subjected to a lesser degree of research and development. In any event, however, accepting the current best estimates of system limitations and reliabilities, we would gather that there is a good likelihood that an anti-ballistic missile system could be developed and deployed having a considerable degree of military effectiveness under certain assumptions. (We gather that it is estimated that deployment of 26 batteries might result in survival of as much as 30 to 40% of our population and production base.)
/6/Document 111.
3. Proceeding from the foregoing, with full recognition of all existing uncertainties, if such a system could be deployed, even accepting its operational limitations, it could have an immense impact on our relations with (a) the Soviets and (b) our Allies.
4. We do not ignore the significance of the tremendous cost implication. But this is a matter which must be placed in the perspective of the value of what it is we are buying. In this connection, we think we need to re-look at, and perhaps somewhat alter our thinking about, the military exchange ratio problem. It seems to us in considering the value of this weapon system to US security, we must go well beyond the weighing of the technical advantages and disadvantages of investment in alternative weapon systems. Though it is difficult, if not impossible, to precisely quantify, we must introduce political and psychological considerations which will weigh so heavily over the future decade. This is particularly significant in terms of the ability of the US to mobilize public will, both within the US and amongst our Allies, to accept the risks inherent in living in a world of such sharply competing ideologies. Thus, while we appreciate the logic which lies behind the thought that the procurement of offensive ballistic weapons may for sometime to come continue to be far less expensive than procurement of an adequate ballistic missile defense system, this is clearly not the whole story. The essential issue is whether the availability of such a system to the Soviets at a time when the West does not have an equal capability will adversely affect the willingness and, therefore, in a very real sense, the capability of the Western Alliance to effectively contest with the Communists. Or to put the question in another and more positive way, whether the availability of a system to the West, even one having admitted technological limitations, will support and, conceivably, even greatly strengthen our willingness to accept difficult, costly and dangerous undertakings so necessary if we are to preserve and succeed in the contest with the Communists.
5. From the DOD memorandum it would appear that the Soviets are now in process of deploying an anti-ballistic missile system around Leningrad. While this program may be limited in its present capabilities, we gather that we have no full understanding of its present capabilities or of its ultimate potentialities. It does, however, seem significant that with a stringency on resources which in any real sense is greater than that under which the US labors, the Soviets have chosen to make the beginning which presumably could, if they project and expand their present effort, result in a sizeable Soviet deployment over the next several years. The Soviets are notable for their determination to make military undertakings serve a political end. It would be surprising if their policy in connection with deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system fails to take account of this relationship.
6. The danger, of course, is that the deployment by the Soviets of an anti-ballistic missile system, during a period when our own defensive posture did not involve such an undertaking, could result in a serious unbalancing of the present power structure, an effort which the Soviets have desperately been trying to accomplish even at the expense of such a risky undertaking as the recent Cuban experience. The change in power balance could occur either because (a) the Soviet system as actually developed proved to be better than we now predict and even conceivably better than the performance which we attribute to our own system (a possibility which however unlikely cannot be overlooked), or (b) because even if the system, in fact, is not as technologically excellent as the preceding assumptions suggest, the Soviets may over-estimate its importance and attempt to use it as a part of a grand political ploy designed to achieve through political means what might not be attainable through actual military means. Either of these two reasons might support a Soviet policy far more active and belligerent than would otherwise be the case. This is not something to be accepted with equanimity.
7. At the same time, the effect upon our Allies, especially in Europe, of a Soviet attainment of ABM defense in the absence of an equal Western effort, must be carefully assessed. It seems entirely likely that the psychological and political impact would be immense, if not immediately, then ultimately, on peoples living under the daily threat of a massive attack as have our European Allies. Presumably the adverse impact can to some extent be mitigated by explaining the limitations of the Soviet system and pointing up our own immense offensive capabilities (the offense-defense trade argument), but this is unlikely to carry the day. It is well worth remembering, that to the people living under the threat of a massive nuclear missile attack, the fact that it may be sounder economics to buy more offensive missiles than defensive ones, will be vitiated if not entirely lost when it is recognized that only defensive missiles offer the possibility of saving lives.
8. In view of the foregoing, it is necessary that we consider not only how important it is that we make a decision to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system, but that we also consider the importance of an earlier, rather than a later, deployment. Were the factor of cost not so heavy the answer would be self-evident, viz., that we should proceed with all speed to deploy the first reasonably technically adequate system which is available, namely the Nike Zeus. However, the cost factor is important and in this connection we are struck by the following factors:
a. That the cost differential between the Nike Zeus and the Nike X, while significant, is not overwhelming. I gather that the former system would cost a total of 15% more than the latter.
b. That the deployment of the Zeus would apparently not represent a total waste in the sense that the Nike X would be built upon and would in some measure be a logical extension of the Nike Zeus. If this is true, this would seem to me a factor of very great significance. To some extent, especially from the political point of view, it would appear that here is a case where we may be able to have at least some of our cake and eat it too.
c. If, as is undoubtedly the case, the Nike Zeus has uncertainties as to its performance, presumably the Nike X must be considered a system of even greater uncertainly. If we understand correctly the normal evolution of weapon systems, they invariably demonstrate problems as they move from development through production, problems which are never fully predictable in advance. The further away from completion of development and from initial production, the greater are the uncertainties likely to be. By this standard one might question whether reliance upon the Nike X might not result in even further delay in achieving actual deployment than the two years beyond Nike Zeus estimated for this system's availability.
9. Consideration of all of the foregoing factors as they bear upon the conduct of our national security policy over the next several years, gives rise to concern over the prospect of a Soviet deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system in the absence of a similar US action. Even if each of the systems have some technological limitations as the DOD studies contemplate to be the case, the political and psychological impact of having, or not having, a system to offset that of the Soviets, would be immense. Thus, even if the Sputniks had no military significance whatsoever, the mere fact that the Soviets were able to orbit their vessel in space before we were, created a serious liability under which we labored for sometime and under which we still labor to some extent even today. Indeed in such circumstances the tendency of the US is to try to overcome lost time through an accelerated effort which may not always result in the most economical use of funds and which can never fully regain lost political ground. This is a prospect which cannot be ignored when considering the anti-ballistic missile problem. It is possible that with the availability to the Soviets of an ABM defense the political and psychological pressures will become so great that we will have no alternative other than to launch an emergency deployment of a system having thereby sacrificed the opportunity to gain a favorable impact through an earlier voluntary undertaking and at the same time having to accept what may be a less economical solution to the problem.
10. There is one last aspect to the problem which, so far as we are aware, has not received any prior consideration. This has to do with the possibility and utility of considering the eventual extension of an anti-ballistic missile system to Europe. As previously indicated, as Soviet capabilities in this field are developed and begin to grow, the pressures upon our European Allies to have a missile defense will mount. The political pressure within the countries will unquestionably be reflected in the make-up of governments and in the manner and extent to which governments can function effectively in support of policies which the US believes important. Even if we are ourselves convinced of the limitations of a ballistic missile defense it is the advantages and virtues of such a system which the Europeans will emphasize. As with the problem of the lack of European knowledge about nuclear weapons and the effects of their employment which now plagues us in our efforts to gain a common strategic concept with our Allies, so too a failure to hold open the promise of a ballistic missile defense may have an analogous effect. While the tremendous cost involved will always represent a practical inhibition to active European interests in this area, we do not think we can exclude or downgrade that interest solely on those grounds. To the contrary, particularly if the US were to encourage the notion that a considerable degree of defense could be bought through deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system, it seems not improbable that the Europeans might well be inclined to invest considerable resources to this end. We recognize, of course, that to some extent this could be counter-productive insofar as it drains away European resources from other defense expenditures, which, from our point of view, we would prefer to see them make. It might, however, have a contrary effect by draining away resources from low priority defense programs. Whether we like it or not, however, the pressures are quite likely to exist. Either we will be able to satisfy them at least to some extent, or we will have to pay the possible serious political price of not being able to meet what the Europeans will probably consider to be a legitimate requirement.
115. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, December 3, 1962./2/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Defense Budget FY 1964 Volume I. Top Secret. This memorandum is 70 double-spaced typewritten pages long.
/2/This date is handwritten on the source text. According to a control sheet, the draft memorandum arrived in the White House on December 4.
SUBJECT
Recommended FY 1964-1968 General Purpose Forces
I have recently completed my review of force levels for the tactical ground, sea, and air force (the General Purpose Forces) and their associated lift forces for the FY 1964-FY 1968 Program. This Program will form the basis for the preparation of the FY 1964 budget. The exact dollar amounts cited in this memorandum are subject to some further refinement during the next year.
My recommendations are as follows:
1. Ground Forces
a. Maintain the current 16 combat-ready Army divisions.
b. Add new provisional air assault and air mobile units, totalling 15,000 personnel, to test the Howze Board/3/ concepts described below.
/3/In a memorandum dated April 19, McNamara directed Secretary of the Army Elvis Stahr to examine ways of achieving sharp increases in mobility. For text, see Alain Enthoven and Wayne K. Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969, pp. 101-104. A board headed by Lieutenant General Hamilton K. Howze undertook the reappraisal. (Final Report of the U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board, August 20; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 3230 (24 Jan 62) Sec 1)
c. Procure in FY 1964 about $3.3 billion of Army equipment, an amount more than double the average of the five years prior to FY 1962.
d. Complete the reorganization of Army divisions to the ROAD structure.
e. Maintain the current active force of three Marine division-wing teams.
2. Land-Based Tactical Air
a. Increase the number of tactical fighter wings from 16 as of July 1, 1961, to 21 fully operational wings by January 1, 1964.
b. Budget $1.3 billion in FY 1964, compared to $1.4 billion in FY 1963, and $0.7 billion in FY 1962, to procure new aircraft for the new wings and for further modernization of the existing wings and to improve conventional war readiness through procurement of increased stocks of modern ordnance and construction of aircraft shelters.
c. Procure additional reconnaissance aircraft to permit an increase in the number of tactical reconnaissance squadrons from 14 to 18 by FY 1966 and 20 by FY 1967, as well as modernize the existing 14 squadrons. Expenditures on reconnaissance aircraft will increase from about $100 million in FY 1963 to $374 million in FY 1964.
3. General Purpose Sea Forces
a. Maintain the current 15 attack carrier strike force.
b. Maintain the current anti-submarine warfare force, including 9 ASW carriers.
c. Maintain the current amphibious lift for the assault elements of the two Marine division-wing teams or equivalent numbers of other forces.
d. Continue to modernize the Navy through a shipbuilding program (for General Purpose Forces) costing about $1.6 billion in FY 1964. This compares with about $1.7 billion in FY 1963, $1.3 billion in FY 1962, and $985 million in FY 1961.
Table 1 following sets forth the recommended forces in more detail. The Service proposals, shown in red after mine on Table 1 where they differ, are described in subsequent sections. Table 2 indicates the costs associated with the recommended program as compared to that proposed by the Service./4/
/4/Neither Table 1 nor Table 2 is printed.
4. Airlift
You will recall that provision was made in the FY 1962 budget amendments and in the FY 1963 budget for major additions to the airlift force. This program will be continued without change in FY 1964 except for the procurement of two additional squadrons of C-130s. The programmed airlift force will increase air-deployment capabilities nearly three-fold in the FY 1963-67 period. Table 2 also shows the costs of the recommended lift forces as compared to Service proposals.
[Here follow Tables 1 and 2.]
The Basis for the Recommendations
The basis for my recommendations can be summarized in three propositions:
1. The forces proposed will be sufficient to counter, by non-nuclear means, a wide spectrum of likely Sino-Soviet Bloc aggression in regions outside of Europe. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff state that in the case of simultaneous, large-scale attacks, the US would be faced with a choice between the use of tactical nuclear weapons or the possible temporary loss of large areas of the Free World.
2. While the forces proposed will not provide adequate non-nuclear forces for NATO, the remedies lie primarily with the other NATO countries rather than with a major increase in US forces. Although the political obstacles loom large, and many of the deficiencies require considerable time to overcome, I think we can demonstrate to our Allies that the NATO non-nuclear inferiority stems from specific remediable deficiencies. The Chiefs state that until adequate forces are available, NATO must be prepared to use tactical nuclear weapons early in any conflict in Western Europe.
3. I consider that the increase in combat effectiveness which we require above present levels can be best achieved in large part through increased quantities and improved quality of equipment and through reallocations from the more marginal units to those that promise a greater contribution to combat, rather than through the addition of large numbers of new units.
The subsequent sections describe in more detail the basis for these propositions, by reviewing, first, the threat and our capabilities in the critical regions of Europe, Southeast Asia, Korea, and the Middle East and second, by examining Service proposals, together with my recommendations for ground forces, tactical air, naval forces, and lift.
I. US NON-NUCLEAR FORCE REQUIREMENTS WORLDWIDE
[Here follows an analysis of force requirements needed to meet possible enemy attacks in Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and in several multi-regional situations.]
Concluding Comments
I interpret these studies/5/ to indicate we have the required active divisions for the initial stages of non-European large scale, single region conflict. It would, however, be necessary to call up priority reserve units at the start of combat to provide additional divisions and non-divisional units to meet the requirements of sustained combat and to reconstitute the strategic reserve. The situations in the study represent major actions of about Korean war size or greater, often near the upper limit of enemy capability. For this scale of conflict, the call-up of the reserves is required.
/5/Reference is to a series of studies, described in the omitted section, ordered by McNamara in the spring of 1962 and prepared by a Chairman's Working Group headed by Vice Admiral Herbert D. Riley, Director of the Joint Staff. (Report of Chairman's Working Group, undated; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 7000 (17 Feb 62))
NATO does not have adequate ground forces, but the deficiencies can most effectively be met by improvement in the quantity and quality of the non-US NATO forces rather than by a larger US contribution./6/ I shall continue to urge our NATO allies to remedy their deficiencies.
/6/The Chiefs state that until NATO countries achieve their force goals the US must be prepared to fill the void or accept a calculated risk. [Footnote in the source text.]
The studies we have carried out are subject, of course, to a considerable margin of error. In contrast to Strategic Forces, for which relatively precise analysis is possible, the General Purpose Forces must be evaluated for a broad range of situations, none of which can be specified with much exactness. Intelligence data for enemy non-nuclear capabilities are of a lower quality than for nuclear forces. Finally the results are highly sensitive to estimates of the quantity and quality of the allied contribution. Nonetheless, I think the study by the Chairman's Working Group, together with the parallel studies carried out by the Army Staff, are as authoritative with respect to ground divisions as the uncertainties of the problem now permit. We will be conducting further studies on requirements and this question will be under my continuing review.
[Here follow the introduction to the section on ground forces and an analysis and discussion of the Howze Board's recommendations concerning a provisional air assault division.]
An Additional Army Infantry Division in FY 1964
The Secretary of the Army/7/ has proposed an additional infantry division for FY 1964, the seventh of that type in the active Army. He views this additional division as a step towards an 18 division active Army./8/ He urges that serious consideration be given to deploying an infantry division to the Philippines in order to assist allies, develop bases of operations, and reduce our reaction time in Southeast Asia./9/ The direct cost to activate, to equip and to operate a ROAD infantry division for five years, with associated non-divisional troops, service-wide support, and combat stocks is about $1.8 billion./10/ The Joint Chiefs also recommend an additional infantry division in FY 1964, but they have not commented on the deployment of a division to the Philippines.
/7/Cyrus Vance.
/8/The Chief of Staff of the Army adds that a substantial increase in ground forces is clearly justified by the increased emphasis on non-nuclear defense. He also notes that nuclear weapons do not provide a clear-cut answer to the problem of defending Europe. [Footnote in the source text.]
/9/In an October 17 memorandum to McNamara, Vance argued: "Such a combat force in this area would provide firm notice of our intentions to friends and enemies alike, and would permit access to trouble spots throughout the regional area." He noted that the "effectiveness of Army forces is increased by their deployment well forward--implementing a forward strategy, deterring overt aggression, motivating allies, and in position to accomplish initial combat tasks should war occur." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, 110.01 Project #22)
/10/A footnote in the source text provides a breakdown of the costs.
I do not support the addition of a division force, of the type recommended, for three reasons:
1. To deploy a division to Southeast Asia would permanently commit a division to a specific area of the world where a clear need for such a unit has not been established. The commitment would tend to become irreversible, add to our balance of payment problem, and would require international negotiations with the host government. On the other hand, the usefulness of additional CONUS divisions is limited by lift capabilities, particularly prior to FY 1966 when substantial numbers of highly productive C-141 aircraft are in the lift forces. Since the lift limitations are in moving equipment rather than personnel, it would be preferable to preposition divisional sets of equipment in Southeast Asia. As discussed below, we already have equipment prepositioned in Okinawa and are making provision for floating depots.
2. Another division at this time would aggravate the serious imbalance between equipment, combat stocks, and number of units described below.
3. An additional infantry division does not promise the significant qualitative improvements in ground combat capability of the air mobile units described in the preceding section. Increased resources for the Army would be better spent on testing this new concept.
[Here follow the conclusion of the section on ground forces and sections on airlift and sealift forces, land-based tactical forces, and naval general purpose forces.]
VI. TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES
The General Purpose Forces also include tactical nuclear forces. We are currently conducting studies on the requirement for these forces and I shall be sending you a separate memorandum on this topic./11/
/11/No DPM on this subject has been found for 1962. For a later discussion of tactical nuclear weapons, see Document 145.
116. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, December 3, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Defense Budget 1964 Miscellaneous Volume I. Secret.
SUBJECT
Defense Department Budget for FY '64
I have now substantially completed my review of the Department of Defense budget for FY 1964. This review was conducted jointly with the Bureau of the Budget, and I have discussed all outstanding issues with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. As shown on Table 1,/2/ I am recommending new obligation authority for Military Functions, Military Assistance, and Civil Defense of $54.4 billion compared with $51.3 billion appropriated by the Congress for FY 1963, $49.4 billion appropriated for FY 1962 after your three budget amendments for that year, and $43.1 billion in the budget presented by President Eisenhower for FY 1962. We estimate that the expenditures in FY 1964 corresponding to this amount of new obligational authority will be $53.1 billion compared with $50.1 billion in FY 1963. Over $1.5 billion of the increase in FY 1964 expenditures results from increases in rates of compensation.
/2/Tables 1-12 were not found.
The forces supported by this budget are summarized in Tables 2 through 12. I have explained my position on the major issues affecting these forces in my earlier memoranda on: Strategic Retaliatory Forces; the B-70 Program; Ballistic Missile Defense; and the General Purpose Forces (tactical ground, sea, and air forces). /3/ The recommended force structure was based on requirements for national security and was not limited by arbitrary budget ceilings. In my review of the budgets proposed by the Services, I have attempted, as last year, to eliminate all non-essential, marginal, and postponable expenditures with the objective of minimizing the cost of supporting the required forces. In total I have reduced the Service proposals by approximately $13 billion.
/3/See Document 112, footnote 3 to Document 107, Document 111, and Document 115.
In developing the program and reviewing the budget proposals, I have had the continuing counsel and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although the force structure does not include all the forces recommended by each of the Services or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff collectively, the Joint Chiefs agree that the program supported by this budget will further increase our combat effectiveness and provide powerful forces in a high state of readiness for defense of the security interests of the United States./4/
/4/In approving the above statement, the Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps retain certain reservations, particularly as regards the rate of modernization and the growth in combat effectiveness of certain US forces in relation to the Sino-Soviet threat. [Footnote in the source text.]
The principal differences in the forces proposed by the Services are the following:
RS-70. The Air Force proposed full concurrent development and an early commitment to deployment.
Minuteman. The Air Force proposed a rapid build-up to a force of 900 by the end of FY '65 and 1950 by 1968.
Polaris. The Navy proposed an improved A-3a missile to replace the A-1 and A-2 missiles.
Nike Zeus. The Army proposed an immediate decision to procure and deploy an improved version of Zeus.
Improved Manned Interceptor. The Air Force proposed accelerated development and a commitment to procure and deploy.
Army Strength. The Army proposed 36,250 additional men for the current 16 Divisions and an additional Infantry Division as well as the new Air Assault Division.
Tactical Air. The Air Force proposed four additional wings of tactical fighters.
Airlift. The Air Force proposed substantially increasing the force objective for C-130-E and C-141 transports.
With the exceptions noted below, I believe that Dave Bell concurs on all of my recommendations. We agree that the following outstanding issues should be brought to your attention:
1. The level of Strategic Nuclear Forces. Three proposals have been made for possible reductions in the program which we discussed with you at Hyannis Port on November 23:/5/
/5/See Document 113.
a. Should we cancel 150 of the 950 Minuteman missiles programmed through FY 1964? If so, should we cancel 150 of the 200 Minuteman missiles approved by the Congress in FY 1963 or the 150 Improved Minuteman missiles recommended in my FY 1964 budget? Dave leans to the first of these alternatives; I remain strongly opposed to any reduction at this tim./6/
/6/In a December 6 memorandum to Bundy, Kaysen stated that Wiesner had proposed a number of cost-cutting alternatives to McNamara's recommendations on strategic retaliatory forces. Of Wiesner's suggestions, Kaysen recommended for particular consideration either substituting 150 improved Minutemen for the last 150 of the already-funded program, and adding 150 more to reach a total of 800, rather than 950, of both types by 1966, or cancelling the entire improved Minuteman program. According to Kaysen, McNamara had stated at a meeting on November 17 that if the figure of 950 was too big, "he would prefer cancelling the improved Minuteman to any other alternative, since he didn't think there was much in the improved Minuteman." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Defense Budget 1964 Miscellaneous Volume I)
b. What is the total number of Minuteman missiles that we should plan for in our Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program? I have recommended a total program of 1300 to be completed by the end of FY '68. Five hundred of these would be Improved Minutemen. If the total number to be programmed is substantially less than 1300, it is doubtful that the development of the Improved Minuteman is worth its cost of $366 million.
c. Should we buy the last six Polaris submarines included in my budget recommendations, completing the programmed force of 41? I understand Dr. Wiesner questions the requirement for more than 35 submarines.
I was informed by the Air Force on November 30 that a cost over-run of approximately $400 million is now anticipated in the approved 800 missile Minuteman program. Because I have had no time to investigate the causes or the validity of this new estimate, I propose to make no change at this time in my budget recommendations. After we have completed our study of this problem next spring, some adjustments will have to be made in either the force structure or the financial program, but I do not contemplate requesting supplemental appropriations.
2. Nike Zeus and Nike-X. General Taylor wants to again recommend to you that we proceed immediately with the procurement and deployment of Nike Zeus. Dave Bell agrees with me that we should not now deploy the Nike Zeus, but he believes that we should develop Nike-X at a reduced rate, since he regards it as an insurance type development which we may never decide to deploy. I still believe that we should develop Nike-X as rapidly as we can and that the provision for its development in my recommended budget will make this possible.
3. Strength for Experimental Air Assault Division. I am recommending that the Army strength be increased by 15,000 by FY 1964 to test the air assault division and other new air units proposed by the Howze Board. Dave Bell is inclined to think that the testing should be done by existing units without an increase in strength./7/
/7/All of McNamara's recommendations were in the defense budget as submitted to the Congress with the general budget on January 17, 1963. For the text of the President's accompanying message concerning defense, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 32-34.
4. Titan III. I understand that Dr. Wiesner questions the desirability of this development. I propose to appoint a review board, which will include Dr. Wiesner, to make a thorough study of the alternative and report in four months. If at that time it appears that Titan III does not offer sufficient advantages over Saturn C-1, I will recommend cancellation and a corresponding reduction in our FY 1964 budget request.
5. Civil Defense. Dr. Wiesner has raised some questions regarding the nature of the civil defense program. I am recommending only $300 million for Civil Defense in FY 1964--I do not believe that we should eliminate the shelter-incentive part of the program.
[Here follow paragraphs on military compensation, family housing, and military assistance.]
Robert S. McNamara/8/
/8/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
117. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
NIE 11-1 -62
Washington, December 5, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110. Secret. A table of contents is not printed. A note on the source text reads in part: "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, AEC, and NSA." The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred except the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET THEATER FORCES
The Problem
To estimate the role and capabilities of the Soviet theater forces, especially against the NATO area in Europe, at present and over the next two years or so.
Foreword
1. As considered in this estimate, the components of the Soviet theater forces include: the ground forces and their weapons; tactical aircraft and missiles; supporting and logistical elements such as transport aircraft; and major portions of the surface naval and submarine fleets. The roles and capabilities of those Soviet forces which would perform other primary military missions, notably long-range striking forces and air and missile defense forces, are the subject of other National Intelligence Estimates.
2. In recent years, Soviets have debated at greater depth than in the past the probable nature of a general nuclear conflict between the Bloc and the West, and the information available to us reflects this increased attention. In this estimate, particularly in Chapters I and IV, we consider mainly the employment of Soviet theater forces in general nuclear war, taking some account of the way in which Soviet plans might be affected if operations were begun on short notice, or after a period of preparation. In Chapter V, we consider at much shorter length the possible employment of these forces in limited nuclear or conventional warfare under the threat of escalation.
3. It should be emphasized that, in discussing Soviet theater forces and their capabilities, we do not take account of the actions of opposing Western forces. In particular, we do not assess the effect of Soviet theater forces of an initial, strategic nuclear exchange. We believe, however, that the effect of such an exchange could be a principal factor governing the ability of Soviet theater forces to carry out their assigned missions in a general war.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS/2/
/2/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, dissents from major aspects of this estimate. For his views, see pages 7-10, immediately following the Summary and Conclusions. [Footnote in the source text. The dissent maintains that the estimate gives insufficent attention to the Soviet military doctrine. This doctrine is said to emphasize that nuclear weapons would play the dominant role in all phases of general war and to lay great stress on surprise and preemption. "No doctrine of limited war, whether nuclear or nonnuclear, has been discussed."]
A. Soviet military doctrine for general nuclear war stresses the use of all types of forces, and not strategic forces alone, from the outset of hostilities. The requirements for general nuclear war, as the Soviets see them, include forces prepared for action during a relatively brief strategic exchange, and forces suitable for protracted theater warfare involving extensive campaigns. Although this position imposes heavy demands on Soviet resources, it is still being sustained after extensive debate within the political and military leadership. We believe that for at least the next few years the Soviets will continue to regard large theater forces as essential. (Paras. 1-5)
B. Soviet doctrine continues to assume the full-scale employment of theater forces from the outset of a general war, with the ultimate objective of annihilating enemy military capabilities and occupying territory. The prospect of nuclear warfare has led to many modifications but no radical revisions in operational doctrine for theater forces. Efforts are being made to adjust organization and training to the requirements of rapid advance and flexible maneuver, to coordinate the employment of tactical nuclear support for Soviet forces, and to ensure destruction of the comparable nuclear means of the enemy. The traditional Soviet concept of combined arms operations has provided a basis for gearing modernized tactical air and missile support to the motorized and armored ground forces. (Paras. 6-11)
C. The ground elements of Soviet theater forces, containing nearly two million men and representing the largest part of the total military establishment, are well-trained and equipped with excellent materiel. Present trends point to a continuing emphasis on firepower and mobility. We estimate that there are about 145 line divisions, approximately 80 of them considered to be combat ready and the remainder at low and cadre strength. The strongest concentrations are in East Germany and in the western and southern border regions of the USSR. If the Soviets were able to mobilize for 30 days before the initiation of hostilities, they could expand their total forces to about 100 combat ready and 125 nonready divisions, although there would be deficiencies in training, equipment, and supporting units. (Paras. 13-16, 46-49)
D. Short-range rockets and road mobile missiles with ranges up to 350 nautical miles are now in the artillery support structure of major Soviet theater commands. Tactical Aviation has been sharply reduced in quantity, and a prime current deficiency is the small number of modern aircraft, particularly fighter bombers. However, there have been qualitative improvements in aircraft and their armament, and this trend will continue. In addition, tactical ballistic and antiaircraft missiles are now available, and theater support could also be afforded by MRBMs and IRBMs in western USSR. These developments provide a net increase in the firepower available to support theater forces in the event of general war, but at the expense of some flexibility. (Paras. 17-21)
E. Organic air transport is now sufficient to airlift simultaneously only one airborne division or the assault echelons of two such divisions; we believe that this capacity may be doubled in the next several years. Amphibious assault capabilities are extremely limited, and there are no indications of significant future improvements. (Paras. 29-30, 33-34)
F. Tactical nuclear support is still limited in quantity and quality, but it has improved markedly over the past few years. Soviet military planners are now in a position to think in terms of committing up to a few hundred nuclear weapons virtually all with yields in the kiloton range, to a typical front operation./3/ Limitations on the quantity and variety of nuclear weapons available to theater forces will have eased by the mid-1960's. The Soviets are probably developing subkiloton weapons, but we have no present evidence of work on delivery systems designed specifically for such weapons. We believe that chemical warfare munitions are available in quantity and would be used extensively in conjunction with nuclear and conventional weapons in general war. (Paras. 25-27, 45)
/3/A front is roughly comparable to a Western army group. [Footnote in the source text.]
G. Although tactical nuclear delivery systems are integral to Soviet theater forces, the nuclear weapons themselves do not appear to be in their custody. Such weapons are normally stored in depots operated by the Ministry of Defense and located within the USSR. Soviet procedures for controlling these weapons ensure the national leadership that they will not be used without authorization. Existing procedures, together with deficiencies in logistical support, appear to penalize the Soviets in terms of operational readiness and rapid response for tactical nuclear weapons employment. (Paras. 22-24)
H. The Soviets probably consider the East European Satellite forces to a be a sizable but problematic asset, because of their varying levels of effectiveness and reliability. In the event of war, however, the USSR would probably employ some Satellite forces in combined combat operations, by integrating selected Satellite divisions, corps, or even field armies directly into major Soviet commands. Other Satellite units would be retained under national command for security, reserve, and other functions. (Paras. 36-37, 41-42)
I. The principal operations of Soviet theater forces in general war would be directed against NATO in Europe. The Soviets plan to move massive forces rapidly toward the Channel coast in the initial days of such a war. This campaign would probably be augmented by operations in Scandinavia, operations toward the Mediterranean, and operations toward the exits of the Baltic and Black Seas. The Soviet submarine fleet would contribute to the campaign against Western Europe by interdiction operations against the highly important Atlantic supply lines. Other peripheral areas, notably the Far East, apparently have lesser priority for theater force operations. Soviet capabilities to conduct theater force operations against North America are limited to minor airborne and amphibious attacks against Alaska and other Arctic bases. (Paras. 44, 59)
J. Although Soviet theater forces are formidable, especially in the area facing NATO in Europe, they continue to have certain limitations beyond those of tactical nuclear support. In the initial period of a general war, a significant portion of the tactical fighters would need to be assigned to interceptor as well as to ground attack missions. In offensive operations, the highly mechanized group forces are in constant danger of outrunning their logistic support. Finally, existing command and control systems do not permit the Soviets to exercise their traditional strict supervision over subordinates in the widely extended deployment requirement on the nuclear battlefield. (Para. 45)
K. The Soviets currently have 22 line divisions and 1,200 tactical aircraft stationed in East Germany and Poland. In a situation in which surprise or pre-emption were overriding considerations, they could launch an attack against Western Europe without prior buildup. If circumstances permitted, however, the USSR would seek to assemble a considerably larger striking force, primarily of Soviet but probably including some Satellite units. This force could comprise three fronts with a total of 50-60 divisions and 2,000 tactical aircraft. We estimate that under non-combat conditions, such a striking force could be built up in East Germany and western Czechoslovakia within 30 days, and a theater reserve could be provided for backup. The ability of these and other Soviet theater forces to carry out their assigned general war campaigns could be governed principally by the effects of the initial nuclear exchange. (Paras. 53-58)
L. The adjustments in Soviet theater forces in the past few years have not materially impaired their capabilities to conduct nonnuclear operations. The USSR's highly mechanized forces have favorable characteristics for the dispersed operations required because of the constant possibility of escalation to nuclear warfare. Over the past two years, the nonnuclear firepower of ground units has not been significantly altered, but the supporting nonnuclear firepower which can be delivered by tactical aircraft has decreased. There are indications that the Soviets have recently given recognition to the possibility of nonnuclear war with NATO forces in Europe. They probably intend to retain capabilities for conventional warfare against NATO, but they do not appear to have revised their expectation that any major conflict with NATO would be nuclear from the start or would probably escalate. (Paras. 63-66)
M. The Soviets have evidently not elaborated any doctrine for limited nuclear warfare by theater forces, involving the use of tactical weapons only. We think they would be severely handicapped in any attempts to conduct such warfare at present. Moreover, thus far the Soviets appear to think that limited nuclear conflict in the NATO area would almost certainly escalate to general war. (Para. 67)
[Here follow the "Views of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF" and the "Discussion" section, totaling 31 pages, plus 7 pages of tables and 1 map.]
118. Editorial Note
On December 7, 1962, President Kennedy visited Offutt Air Force Base near Omaha, Nebraska, where he and other officials received a briefing by officers of the Strategic Air Command. Among those present at the briefing were Vice President Johnson, Secretary of Defense McNamara, all of the Joint Chiefs except General Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, and General Power. In his memorandum for the record of the White House daily staff meeting on December 10, Colonel Legere reported on the President's visit as follows:
"Komer asked how the Omaha part of the President's weekend trip had gone. Bundy said that the SAC people out there, although they did an excellent technical job, seemed to be speaking from two underlying convictions: firstly, that the Soviets probably had about four times as many missiles as the rest of the intelligence community, including the USAF, seemed to think; and secondly, that the really neat and clean way to get around all these complexities was to strike first. Bundy said that of course the President had not reacted with any such comments, but Bundy's clear implication was that the President felt that way." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group December 1962-January 1963)
119. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
JSCM-952-62
Washington, December 7, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, BNSP 1962. Top Secret. Another copy is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, 381 (Relo) BNSP 31 Mar 62.
SUBJECT
Review of Basic National Security Policy--Short Version (U)
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the Basic National Security Policy (BNSP) draft short version, dated 2 August 1962./2/
/2/Concerning the August 2 draft, which is a condensation of the June 22 draft, see the source note, Document 93.
2. In response to Mr. U.A. Johnson's suggestion that appropriate extracts of the document be fowarded, through the National Security Council, for approval by the President,/3/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it inadvisable to attempt to identify and isolate purely military portions of basic national security policy. A proper interpretation of military objectives and the delineation of missions and tasks for the armed forces depends on a thorough knowledge and understanding of the entirety of national objectives and policies which relate to national security. Fragmentation of the BNSP for the purpose of piecemeal submission to the President well might lead to a dilution of the essential inter-relationship of the various elements of national policy--political, economic, and military. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a completely balanced version of BNSP rather than a series of compartmented excerpts is urgently needed in order to provide, in one document, the amplifying background necessary to an adequate understanding of the policies upon which military planning and implementing actions must be based.
/3/Johnson made this suggestion in an October 15 letter to McNamara, with which he forwarded the August 2 draft BNSP. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/10-1562)
3. With respect to the military implications of certain expressions of policy in the draft document, dated 2 August 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider, inter alia, that implementation of our national strategy requires an over-all military capability adequate to respond effectively, together with our Allies, to the present and foreseeable enemy threat in all of its various forms and intensities. This combined military capability must cover the full spectrum of force, and must be able not only to prevent the enemy from attaining his goals, but also to accomplish other related US objectives to force a conclusion of hostilities on terms advantageous/4/ to the United States and its Allies.
/4/Rather than "acceptable," as specified in the August 2 draft.
4. In more specific terms, US military forces must be capable of conducting operations employing strategic nuclear, tactical nuclear, and conventional weapons. Strategic nuclear capabilities required for general war, in which the total resources of the nation are committed, do not of themselves preclude a concurrent military requirement for adequate capabilities to employ appropriate nuclear weapons in the lesser circumstances of limited war. US forces should not be foreclosed by policy from developing, possessing, and, if necessary employing weapons which permit the application of optional levels of force depending on the circumstances. Present and forecast Soviet capabilities to employ tactical nuclear weapons render more urgent the necessity of clarifying this aspect of US policy.
5. To provide a sound basis for broad military planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the approved BNSP contain a statement of the continuing nature of the over-all threat as well as US regional interests and objectives. They recommend substantive modifications in other areas of the proposed policy:
a. Paragraphs relating to arms control and disarmament should be expanded and clarified.
b. The military requirements for and composition of a NATO MRBM force should not be specified as a matter of basic policy.
c. Nuclear assistance to Allies, including continued nuclear assistance to the United Kingdom and provision of assistance to France, should not be discouraged in basic policy.
d. The "two-China" problem, including US policy regarding the Chinese Offshore Islands, should be reconsidered.
While it is recognized that policy statements on the above topics represent national policy as reflected in other documents, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that these policies should be modified.
6. In other matters of specific military interest the Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned over certain omissions and inadequacies in the draft policy that require additional precision and clarity. For example, in the basic mission of US forces, there is inadequate recognition of the existence and requirement for unilateral US action in circumstances short of direct attack; the draft policy provides only for supplementing friendly and Allied powers.
7. Specific changes recommended, together with supporting comments, are contained in the Appendix hereto. /5/
/5/In this 73-page appendix, not printed, the JCS proposed specific modifications of the August 22 draft to incorporate most of the points made above but recommended deleting all of the language on China until completion of reconsideration of China policy.
8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the modified version of the 2 August 1962 draft of BNSP, incorporating their proposed changes and appended hereto, constitutes an acceptable expression of basic national security policy for military purposes. They recommend that the document modified as indicated herein be forwarded for National Security Council and Presidential consideration as a matter of priority./6/
/6/In a memorandum to McNamara also dated December 7, Taylor recommended "withholding action" on this recommendation. "The immediate requirement is to provide the Chiefs with a basis for the development of JSOP 68, a need which can be met by your noting or approving this draft BNSP. To seek governmental approval" would take so long "that it would not be available in approved form to assist the Chiefs in the development of the next JSOP. I doubt the wisdom of pressing for higher action on this document at this time." (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, BNSP 1962)
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Maxwell D. Taylor
120. Address by Secretary of Defense McNamara at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/1/
Paris, December 14, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-2162. Top Secret. The source text is the enclosure to circular airgram CA-6769, December 21. The Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council was held December 13-15 in Paris.
Mr. Chairman, Gentlemen:
I appreciate the opportunity to make some remarks today on the relationship among Alliance strategy, defense budgets and military force, and to submit for your consideration some suggestions as to how we might proceed to obtain a more effective common defense. Despite the great strides made during the past thirteen years, we are in some danger of letting our strategic concepts, forces, and defense budgets get out of touch with international and technological developments. I would like to suggest, therefore, that the Alliance take a fresh and comprehensive look at the threats we are likely to face, at the ways we might meet them, at the forces we should have, and at the funds that we should allocate to procure and support those forces.
War in the Nuclear age
For the greater part of its history NATO has concentrated on the threat of a massive Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Although General Norstad introduced as early as 1957 the idea that a Soviet attack might be limited, and proposed enforcing a "pause" to counter it, we have tended too much to fix our strategy, our budgets, and our forces on the threat as originally conceived in 1949. I doubt that we have drawn the full implication of the maturing nuclear age on the evolving nature of the dangers facing us.
In wars prior to the advent of nuclear weapons, damage was reparable and victory attainable. But after a full nuclear exchange such as the Soviet Bloc and the NATO Alliance are now able to carry out, the fatalities might well exceed 150,000,000. As I observed at Athens,/2/ such damage is not certain--but it is probable. In such a situation the devastation would be complete and victory a meaningless term. Responsible political and military leaders are constantly aware of this reality of the nuclear age.
/2/See Document 82.
Even during the years when the West possessed a virtual nuclear monopoly, that nuclear superiority did not serve as a universal deterrent against all forms of Communist political and military aggression. Still less does it do so today, and even less can we count on it to do so in the future. This is not to say that nuclear weapons will never be used, but that this use becomes rational only when the alternative would be even worse than nuclear war; for example, a surrender to Communist aggression. We in the West must maintain nuclear forces so large as to preclude such a possibility and to deter the first use of nuclear weapons by our opponents. But it is becoming increasingly clear that such forces by themselves will not prevent less violent acts of political and military aggression. If the Alliance's foreign policies are to rest on military power which can be used in political and military crises of less intensity than those involving the very survival of one or more of its members, then that military power must include effective non-nuclear forces and the ability to concentrate that power where it is most needed.
The Cuban experience is consistent with this view. During the Cuban crisis, Soviet nuclear power was in effect neutralized by U.S. nuclear power. In the Caribbean area, the United States had superior non-nuclear land, sea and air forces which were quite capable of destroying the Soviet missiles. The Soviet Union's non-nuclear forces in the area were inferior. Since the controversy between the United States and the Soviet Union was not over the issue of Soviet national survival, the Soviet Union was not prepared to use its nuclear power. And it had no other force it could effectively use. We faced a challenge which forced us to support diplomacy with military action; in this action military and diplomatic moves were meshed; there was an effort on both sides to localize the confrontation. And, perhaps, most significantly, the forces that were the cutting edge of action were the non-nuclear ones. Nuclear force was not irrelevant but it was in the background. Non-nuclear forces were our sword, our nuclear forces were our shield.
The situation in Europe is of course very different. Nevertheless, the confrontation in Cuba may throw light on certain of the military and political threats which NATO must be prepared to face. I believe that most probable threat is not a nuclear attack or even an all-out conventional attack on Western Europe. It seems far more likely that the Soviets will continue to engage in probes, tests, exploitation of weak spots and efforts to divide. These may be bold and backed by impressive force, but given their careful calculation of risks, their emphasis on keeping events under control and their preference for a blend of political and military action, the Soviets are likely to be attracted by other and more tempting programs than nuclear war, or events certain to lead to it. There can be little doubt that such a Soviet strategy presents us with a most serious threat. Therefore, should we not emphasize more the cases in which our position would be gravely weakened unless we can apply effective counter-pressure with non-nuclear forces and emphasize less those situations of major attack in which nuclear weapons must be used. Against the latter contingencies NATO already has very formidable deterrents indeed.
It is quite likely, of course, that the nature of the Soviet threat has changed precisely because NATO has constructed an adequate deterrent to more ambitious actions. That deterrent will be maintained and strengthened. But I would suggest that NATO's problems in the 1960's are radically different from those of the late forties and that it is time for us to discard those solutions and strategies that are no longer in tune with the times.
Perspectives for the Future
If we were to agree that the sudden massive Soviet assault on Europe is a most unlikely contingency, how should this affect our planning? The possibilities are many. Witness some of the events of the past ten years: the suppression of uprisings in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Soviet aid on a substantial scale to the United Arab Republic and Iraq, attempts at subversion in Africa, pressure on Berlin, and a rash but supple move into Cuba.
We should expect analogous indirect or direct challenges to the security of members of the Alliance to continue in the future. Members of the Alliance are concerned with the containment of the Communist threat in parts of the world outside of Europe. In such situations, there may be conflict, the conflict may spread, and military responses by the Alliance may become necessary.
One can easily imagine such circumstances arising in the Middle East and Africa. What is more difficult to support is that the appropriate response would involve the use of nuclear weapons.
We should not exclude Soviet subversion and political aggression backed up by military measures in areas of even more direct and immediate concern to Europe. Such countries as Finland, Austria, and Sweden are geographically vulnerable and might, in some circumstances, become targets for these tactics. We could not remain indifferent to actions in these areas that would upset the military balance in Europe and threaten our security.
We also cannot exclude the possibility of spontaneous events that would bring heightened danger of conflict--that is, events outside the control of either NATO or the Soviet Union.
There is, more directly, the ever-present danger of Soviet incursions into NATO territory itself. Berlin is the most exposed area, but the flanks and the center also contain potential targets of military pressure and attack.
Should any of these more likely contingencies arise, they would be highly dangerous. Inaction, or weak action, could result in a serious setback, a missed opportunity, or even disaster. Nor can we entirely discount the possibility that such limited conflicts might lead to a major Soviet attack. Such an attack might involve the use of nuclear weapons locally in Europe. It might even be the grand non-nuclear invasion of Western Europe. Or it might take the form of an all-out nuclear assault although this is still more doubtful.
A review of these contingencies suggests, first, the conflicts most likely to occur will almost certainly begin in a non-nuclear fashion. Second, NATO or some of its members may have to take a military counter-initiative. Third, if we can manage local conflicts successfully against a background of increased and adequate strength, we will not have to meet the remote contingencies. Fourth, our military posture should be as relevant to the likely as to the unlikely contingencies.
This is not to say that we should ignore the remote contingencies of nuclear or major non-nuclear attack. Quite the contrary. It makes a great deal of sense to prepare for the unlikely--especially when the lack of preparation would bring about catastrophic consequences.
Accordingly, I wish to take up two questions as urgent matters for the Alliance: first, what additional capabilities do we need in order to meet the real challenges that are apt to face us; second, what resources will be needed over the next five years in order to reach these goals?
Strategic Nuclear Posture
Since I have recently reported to you at length on the strategic nuclear posture of the Alliance, there are only a few additional points on this subject that I wish to bring to your attention. This awesome capability would naturally be the decisive element in any major nuclear war. In its deterrent function it remains a necessary--but not sufficient--condition of flexibility and initiative in other realms. The United States, in recognition of these facts, has every intention of maintaining the forces adequate to these two tasks. Plans are also in hand to increase the choices open to the strategic forces and to permit the exercise of the greatest discrimination possible in the conduct of strategic attacks if these forces should be called into play. U. S. programs, extending to 1968, provide, within the limits permitted by technology, timely and coordinated coverage of major strategic forces that might threaten the Alliance.
It is the view of the United States, in the light of this assessment, that Alliance expenditures in the strategic nuclear field--$15 billion per year in the case of the U. S. alone--remain adequate for the contingency of general nuclear war and its deterrence. The addition of nuclear vehicles in current programs is already producing sharply declining marginal returns, partly because of the investments already made, but also because the Soviets are moving steadily toward a land-based and sea-based strategic nuclear force protected by hardening, mobility and dispersal. A basic change is taking place in the nuclear relationship between NATO and the Soviet Union. Both sides are rapidly increasing their nuclear strength. NATO is and will undoubtedly remain ahead in most relevant dimensions: number of warheads and major delivery vehicles, degree of protection, diversity of systems, and effectiveness of command and control. But the benefits of this military advantage will be sharply reduced as compared with those of the 1940's and 1950's. In the circumstances of the 1960's, it now appears that general nuclear war is likely to be even more devastating than appeared probable when I spoke to you at Athens, however much we might try further to strengthen our offensive capabilities.
If military considerations alone were at issue, I would therefore recommend against the commitment of Alliance resources to strategic nuclear forces beyond those now programmed. It does not follow, however, that some shift within present strategic nuclear programs may not be desirable, because of course the problem is not military alone. It is political, and its political meaning is of great importance. We in the United States are deeply interested in having these matters so managed that all members of the Alliance can have full confidence in the effectiveness and reliability of NATO's strategic nuclear strength. We fully recognize that this is a problem for the Alliance as a whole and that no single member of the Alliance can or should attempt to monopolize responsibility or authority.
We have an inescapable political, legal, and moral responsibility for the management of the awesome power which our government controls. We have an equal responsibility to deal faithfully with the Alliance. In our effort to discharge this double responsibility we are seeking to make progress in two major directions.
The first is the expansion of understanding, consultation, and advance planning for the handling of the strategic deterrent. Inasmuch as more than 95 percent of strategic Alliance strength is American, we have a special duty here, and we want to do more to fulfill it. We are accelerating programs already begun for this purpose, and we are determined to search with you for new and stronger instruments of active consultation.
Our second effort is to explore the ways and means by which the Alliance as a whole might come to share effectively in the actual operations, manning, deployment and support of the strategic deterrent. For reasons we have expressed before we doubt if the best solution here is an expanding series of separate national efforts (though we have no desire to reopen an argument on which feelings are strong)--and so we have been assisting in the exploration of a possible multilateral arrangement. We shall continue in the effort, and I want to make it very clear that in this exploration our central interest is to assist as best we can in meeting the legitimate security interests of our European partners. In great measure, necessarily, judgment on what is wanted and needed must come from our European friends, but we emphasize again our readiness to help to the limit in exploring every one of the relevant questions of technique, deployment, control, financing, and policy--and our equal readiness to join with others in the necessary action to create a multilateral force.
The Tactical Nuclear Posture
What we may need in the tactical nuclear field is a more difficult question to answer. As one of the more remote contingencies, the Alliance must recognize and prepare for the possibility that the Soviets would initiate the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Furthermore, since NATO, even with appropriate non-nuclear increases, could not expect to have non-nuclear superiority everywhere, there are situations in which the Alliance might perceive an apparent advantage in using nuclear weapons locally. Alternatively, it has been suggested we might wish to use nuclear weapons on a large scale, but try to limit their use geographically. As I observed at Athens, however, we see no effective operational boundary which could be counted on to restrict such a war according to intensity or area. In particular, because of the problems of target acquisition and troop densities, the pressure to employ large-yield nuclear weapons to support a tactical nuclear engagement would almost certainly rise. And in all likelihood the accompanying civilian damage would be extremely great.
At this juncture, however, it is premature to suggest specific changes in our tactical nuclear programs. Because of the great strategic and tactical nuclear power already at our disposal, we have time. I strongly urge that we use the time not only to review our programs but also to re-examine the assumption that tactical use of nuclear weapons by both sides would generally be to the advantage of the Alliance.
I want to make it perfectly clear that it is our intention to maintain and to increase tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. However, I doubt that they are the means by which we can compensate for non-nuclear weaknesses.
The Non-Nuclear Posture
It seems to me to be quite clear that a stronger non-nuclear posture would confer large political benefits on the Alliance, and especially on its European members. It would give them a sense of freedom and initiative that primary reliance on nuclear power does not provide. It would enhance their bargaining power with the Soviet Union. It would enhance the attractive power of Western Europe to Eastern Europe.
In the contingencies I earlier categorized as likely, non-nuclear force may very well have to be used locally, in strength, and very probably against Soviet forces. We may find it necessary to conduct a probe in strength, to block Soviet forces from a threatening deployment, to repel a Soviet incursion into NATO territory, or to apply force in one locality in order to relieve enemy pressure against a different area. For this we need strong, deployable forces, with adequate air and sea lift, and pre-stocking of supplies and equipment, forces that are exercised realistically in peacetime.
Essential to this ability to deploy and use non-nuclear strength locally is a strong non-nuclear forward defense. We will want to be able to take action without dangerously weakening our defensive position. Such action is made more perilous if it leaves us vulnerable to a Soviet counter-action. Moreover, the stronger our non-nuclear forces, the more time we will have to develop and exploit advantageous courses of action--local and global, diplomatic and military.
In reviewing the prospects for a stronger non-nuclear posture, let us look at the overall strengths of the two sides. On most overall measures NATO has a position of some superiority in non-nuclear arms over the Warsaw Pact countries. It has more men under arms, 6 million to 4 million. It has more tactical aircraft worldwide, 15,000 to about 10,000. It has more major combat ships, 730 to 610. In terms of basic resources that bear especially on non-nuclear strength, it has far greater industrial resources and manpower. We are superior in a wide range of technical skills and our population aggregates 490 million as against 320 million. Of course not all of these resources are directly applicable in any particular locality on short notice. But this is true on both sides. Just as members of NATO have military interests, and forces, in the Far and Middle East, so do the Soviets. In short, our problem is not resources, but the low effectiveness of many of our forces, the likelihood that the Soviets will have the military initiative, and the Soviet position of operating in a geographically more compact area.
[Here follows discussion of NATO and Warsaw Pact force dispositions and of the "forward strategy."]
121. Memorandum of Conference With President Kennedy/1/
Palm Beach, Florida, December 27, 1962, 10:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Chester V. Clifton Series, JCS/Kennedy 12/62-1/63. Top Secret. Drafted by Clifton on January 10, 1963. A memorandum for the record by Clifton of the same date is attached to the source text. In the same file are several copies of a draft memorandum of the conference prepared by Clifton on January 2, which bear detailed corrections made by each of the Joint Chiefs. Most of these changes are incorporated in the memorandum printed here. McNamara wrote on his copy of the draft that "the 'minutes' are not quite in accord with my recollection of the discussion but I see nothing so important as to require change." A copy of McNamara's handwritten notes of the conference are in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, Palm Beach Notes on JCS Views.
Kennedy's Appointment Book indicates that the President met with the Chiefs only from 10:15 to 10:40 a.m. (Kennedy Library) No record of this conference has been found.
OTHERS PRESENT
Secretary McNamara
Deputy Secretary Gilpatric
General Taylor
General Wheeler
Admiral Anderson
General LeMay
General Shoup
General Clifton
Secretary McNamara and General Taylor stated that they had discussed the defense budget thoroughly with the Joint Chiefs and the Service Secretaries and had also given the President their views beforehand. They wanted the Joint Chiefs to do the talking at this meeting and they would comment as the discussion grew.
Admiral Anderson summarized the Navy viewpoint and included the comment that for the Joint Chiefs it was a difficult period of transition in two respects; first, the technological advances in weaponry were tremendous; and, second, they had to recognize that we were approaching a point where both sides hold a Sword of Damocles (in the nuclear sense) over the Soviet and the free world heads which could inhibit the use of nuclear weapons against each other's homeland while fairly large-scale war with conventional forces--including war at sea--might take place.
Although this is the 1964 budget, Admiral Anderson pointed out, it really forecasts in many respects what the 1968-70 capabilities would be. Consequently, it has long-range connotations. For the Navy, he found two major difficulties for Fiscal 1964: personnel is too limited to be really adequate, and the funds for operations, spare parts and maintenance were less than required. In spite of this, however, they were going to do the job and meet commitments. To meet one of these problems, he hoped to reduce the tempo of operations wherever possible. He pleaded that in these areas, the Navy be given more control over the decisions about their operations and about the handling of their personnel. He pointed out that new ships take more people than old ships take in the era of technological change, and that the Navy actually needed 685,000 people, which would be an increase of 20,000. Instead, they have an allowance of 670,000. So they will be undermanned in some areas. In some cases they would have to man standby ships with 20% crew strength and either transfer some ships to the reserves or call up reserves in case of an emergency. The personnel hurts especially in the short-term area.
For the long-term, the Navy's greatest concern is the adequacy of the shipbuilding program to replace old ships. From the Navy's request, their shipbuilding program was reduced by a half-dozen ships. The program is well balanced but it leaves the Navy with the knowledge that in 1970 there will be a greater percentage of over-age ships than should be in the fleet. As an example, the Navy asked for eight nuclear attack submarines and the number was reduced to six. The lead time on a submarine is 40-plus months. Aircraft procurement is less than needed--for example, the Navy asked for 180 F-4-Hs and it was reduced to 132.
In research and development, Admiral Anderson was convinced the Navy could use more money; at the same time he pledged that the Navy could and would use the money they have in the best way possible to meet its requirements. He reiterated his pleas for more Navy authority, with more attention being paid to professional judgment in all of the fields he mentioned.
The President asked about the progress on surface-to-surface missiles.
Admiral Anderson reported much progress in adapting surface-to-air missiles to the surface-to-surface role, but they hadn't fully licked the problem. Work in this area continues.
The President asked about Soviet ships carrying surface-to-surface missiles and Admiral Anderson confirmed his statement and said that primary reliance for countering them at the present time is attack by naval aircraft.
The President asked, in relation to the missiles in Cuba, about the 30-40 mile range missiles that are on shore which would keep the fleet way out. Admiral Anderson answered that they would have to knock those out by either carrier- or land-based air before making a landing in their vicinity.
In the field of antisubmarine warfare, Admiral Anderson stated that there was no magic breakthrough in sight, and that current developments are incremental in continuing improvements over past capabilities. He said that they would keep working on the problem but that we should have no illusions as to its magnitude even though we had considerable success in the Cuban operations over Soviet conventionally powered submarines. He also pointed out the important contributions on the part of our allies, indicating his apprehension that the British interest in achieving an independent nuclear capability might result in a decrease of British naval capabilities in ASW and meeting worldwide commitments.
General Wheeler stated that the 1964 budget was most satisfactory from the Army point of view and that, as Mr. McNamara had pointed out in a general purpose forces paper,/2/ the Army would be in the best shape it has been since Korea. There are $3.3 billions of PEMA funds, of which $3.2 billion is in new obligational authority. This would give the Army sufficient funds to procure the initial complement of combat equipment required for the 16 active and 6 priority reserve divisions plus such replacements, spares and combat consumables as are necessary to permit 16 divisions to operate in combat for the period between D-Day and the time when the production resources of the country can furnish equipment at a rate equal to combat consumption.
/2/Document 115.
General Wheeler pointed out that the two greatest problems were personnel and Nike-Zeus. He spoke at some length about the Army personnel situation with a 960,000 ceiling. Of this number, 406,000 people are devoted to other than direct divisional activity. Of the remaining 554,000, there are 70,000 in Alaska, the Caribbean area, and Berlin which had to be there but which would not really be counted on for combat capabilities outside of those areas. This leaves the Army with a "division slice" of about 36,000 for a division and its combat support elements. The Army asked for more people, especially for artillery battalions, signal units, etc. The result of this 960,000 ceiling would be that the Army would have to depend on the reserves earlier in a war than they would really like to. Meanwhile, General Wheeler is going over the Army layer by layer to cut functions and to cut people, and he feels that the greatest savings can only be made by cutting functions.
In regard to Nike-Zeus, there was a rather lengthy discussion with the President, Secretary McNamara, General Taylor and General Wheeler, in which they analyzed the results of a missile defense and discussed the Soviet capabilities. The President made the point that at the present reading there is a $9 billion deficit in the government budget for FY 1964. He said that it would just be too expensive to buy the proportionate share of $19 billion spread over ten years for Nike-Zeus at this stage.
The President questioned our forces in Europe and the advisability of trying to maintain the equivalent of a six-division force with a logistic base enabling it to fight for 60-90 days when the NATO allies were not building the conventional forces to make a 90-day conventional warfare a possibility. The French have a 5-10 day supply basis, the Germans hopefully would have 90 days in the near future, and in substance NATO would only have 18 divisions, plus or minus a few spare parts which could be put on a 90-day basis, unless the allies improve their effort.
General Wheeler stated, and it was the consensus, that our only realistic approach was to get the allies to move forward on the conventional force program.
In a discussion of the need for the equivalent of six divisions, as opposed to a lesser number, General Wheeler pointed out the fact that our air bases are forward in Germany and must be protected until they can be effective in carrying out their part of the mission, even if we opt for a shorter period (10 days) from D-Day to the use of nuclear weapons. This led the President to question the advisability of the U.S. keeping a total of 257,000 people there to support six divisions on a 60- to 90-day basis, if future strategy dictates our earlier resort to nuclear warfare.
The President said that U.S. forces in Europe would have to be "thinned out" unless NATO allies improved their readiness and supported the forward strategy. He said that he expects Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs to make a judgment during 1963 about whether this effort with our allies is going to be successful or unsuccessful. As a corollary, he said that he felt that a judgment would also have to be made on whether we, along with our allies, can ever fight a conventional war for 60-90 days in Europe, and if we decide that a non-nuclear war for that long is not a real possibility, then we should certainly examine the level of supply that we now plan as essential. This corollary judgment would be especially applicable if our allies don't come through with the necessary cooperation to make conventional warfare a possibility.
Admiral Anderson remarked that some of our allies would never make a realistic contribution comparable to that of the United States until they were again genuinely afraid of the threat to their homelands.
The President reiterated what Prime Minister Macmillan told him about President de Gaulle's attitude/3/ and the question that it raised; how much in depth must we keep in Europe as we are faced with a decision to draw back and resort to nuclear warfare? Throughout the President's discussion there was emphasis on the gold outflow which must be reduced.
/3/Not further identified.
General LeMay said that we might force the Europeans to do more by actually pulling out some of the ground forces.
General Taylor pointed out that Spain might be brought into NATO to assist in this conventional buildup, and General LeMay praised the agreement that we have with the Spanish. The President countered this, stating that the attitude of the Spanish in cashing every dollar they earn for gold and hurting us by this method hardly encourages the advisability of doing much more with Spain. He pointed out that our gold reserve now stands at $15.75 billion, and that there is a $12 billion floor on this gold cache, leaving us a $3.75 billion cushion, which is being eaten up at the rate of $2.5 billion a year. He stated that unless we stop the gold outflow in a hurry we will have reached the floor, and by 1964 we will have to have some new decisions.
The President questioned also the 30% of infrastructure for NATO that we pay. Secretary McNamara pointed out that infrastructure would soon be up for renegotiation. There was mention of a flat statement to NATO that 20% is going to be our new percentage, take it or leave it. The President mentioned that the U.S. is spending a larger percentage of its gross national product on defense than any of our allies, and that we have a larger proportion of men in the armed forces compared to the number of people in our country than any of the other allies. Secretary McNamara said that we would probably just have to pull 50,000 to 70,000 people out in order to reduce the gold costs, and promised that he would submit a plan for the withdrawal of 50,000 to 70,000 men from Europe.
All agreed that we must concentrate on the NATO area in the next few months to see if NATO couldn't solve this problem.
In regard to Nike-Zeus, the President asked if the Army could assure production and deployment on a schedule to be effective in 1967. There followed a lengthy discussion, with General Wheeler leading, on the two-stage deployment problem and the difference in costs between the Army's $19 billion idea and the Department of Defense $16.2 billion idea. In Fiscal 1964 the difference in investment costs would be only $270 million. Secretary McNamara pointed out that we already have $370 million in Nike-Zeus research and development and an additional $100 million for research and development in allied fields which helps Nike-Zeus. This he felt was all that could be afforded. There followed a discussion about whether or not we would ever use Nike-Zeus, the factors involving a Soviet decision to attack either our hard missile sites or our cities, and the number of people that a $19 billion program might save.
The President then turned to General LeMay who opened with a statement that in his five years of budget planning this had been the best with the greatest amount of agreement among the Chiefs and the best feeling of support from their civilian superiors, including the President, that the Joint Chiefs had ever had.
Concerning his misgivings, he feels that the Air Force assault forces are too small, specifically needing four more squadrons of C-130s to meet requirements. This would mean fifteen planes per squadron at $2.5 million each. As far as aircraft replacement is concerned, General LeMay felt that we are "putting off the day" and we are eventually building up trouble for ourselves. General LeMay mentioned the reserve callup and the efficiency of the reserve forces and their reaction to the Cuban situation.
Changing the subject to tactical fighters, he stated that we are now overcommitted and that our modernization is too slow. The Air Force had asked for a second source for the F-4-C, which had been turned down, in spite of the fact that the increase in fighter production from twelve to fifteen a month is still all going to the Navy until Fiscal 1964.
In regard to air defense, General LeMay pointed out that there was not much in the budget for it, and that the F-106 is the newest fighter-interceptor and even that aircraft is out of production; therefore, we should seek a replacement. He stated that the Air Force had asked for a Mach-3, 1200-mile range fighter, with improved radar, a project which had been turned down. He pointed out that the Soviet Union was equipping its bomber force with air-to-ground missiles which could be launched at greater range from our targets and that this new fighter was an essential, in his option.
He also mentioned that as far as the military aspects of space are concerned, we are not going fast enough.
General LeMay emphasized that his biggest worry is in the strategic field and that the trend is bad. He felt that the trend is toward an all-missile force, and he has two or three objections; first, with an all-missile force we were simplifying the Russian program; secondly, we were moving away from the flexibility that we now have in our strategic forces; and third, intelligence estimates indicate that more flexibility is needed, not less. He stated that he had given all these arguments to the Secretary and had been properly heard, but his misgivings were still strong.
The President then questioned the group in regard to the number of Minutemen, Polaris and Titan missiles, and opened a discussion on the Soviet missile capability. All this was discussed at some length and General LeMay pointed out again that our main objective was not to match missile for missile but to deter any war from starting. The basic question to answer is: what will deter the Soviet Union? His own answer was that the flexibility of the mixed force was much more potent in deterrence--especially in deterring the conventional war--than an all-missile force.
The President pointed out that he had two concerns about this budget: transport, both sea and air, and communications.
There was some discussion about the lead time on the C-130. The Chiefs felt that it is roughly eighteen months, but Secretary McNamara believes that it is more like 9-12 months lead time.
General Shoup was asked to comment and he stated that the Marine Corps would spend 2% of the defense budget, and so far as he was concerned, when materials to be procured with 1964 funds are on hand, the Marines were the best they had ever been in peacetime. Their personnel has a small problem as the enlistments ebbed and flowed, but this could be overcome. Further, the Marine Corps reserves were in better shape than they had ever been in and could make a real contribution. General LeMay gave the President one quote: "War is not efficient," and consequently, its needs and its plans couldn't be run by computer efficiency measurements.
In summarizing, the President pointed out that this Administration had put more money in defense in the past two years than any other previous Administration. He pointed out that we have almost had war in Laos, we had almost had war in Cuba, and we had had an ultimatum in Berlin. We have also been engaged in Soviet Viet-Nam almost constantly for twenty-two months. It was quite apparent to him that more dollars were needed rather than less. He also stated that in the foreseeable future we would have at least as many troubles, and that in Latin America we could anticipate even more problems than we had faced so far. He stated that we had gone from $44 billion up to $49 billion and that we are now at $52 billion, making a more intensive effort in free world defense than had ever been planned.
The President said that he is very interested in what we do in this field and he wants to be sure that we are doing enough. He charged the Joint Chiefs to be constantly mindful of this. He also pointed out that they had to be mindful--although it was not their primary concern--that he was facing a budget with a $9 billion deficit and that this had to enter into the Chiefs' consideration as they surveyed the needs to make sure that we are doing enough.
The President directed that the Chiefs review the transport problem, both sea and air, with Secretary McNamara and give him a report before they lock up this 1964 budget. Admiral Anderson commented that they should immediately put some LSTs on the list and that it would call for a small addition to the Navy budget, but he could get them out of moth balls and man them with a bare minimum of caretaker crews and have them ready to haul the heavy weapons in case we are faced with the possibility of another Cuban situation.
The President also directed that they look once more at the fighter aircraft situation and give him a report on that.
The President pointed out to the Joint Chiefs and Secretary McNamara that although we feel that the present Cuban situation is dormant, we must assume that someday we may have to go into Cuba, and when it happens, we must be prepared to do it as quickly as possible, with a minimum of destruction. Therefore, they must provide for this contingency as they look into one, two, three, or four years ahead.
The President pointed out that he felt this was a possibility in the next few years whether he was President or not, and that they had to plan for this.
Discussion of Cuba followed which included a statement by the President that in any planning we must make sure that our "political work" is well done. If there are defections to our side we must be ready to handle them and exploit them.
The discussion which followed involved the "civil affairs and military government" planning, as well as the special forces planning, in connection with Cuba.
The President then discussed the Cuban Brigade, and the training of Cubans that is now taking place.
An additional note on the budget was raised by Admiral Anderson. He pointed out that our military construction was going to be a problem that would not go away. Even though we are holding it to a minimum at the present, eventually all the Services would need some new facilities.
In summary, the President asked that they look over the situation in Europe, that they review the transport situation, that they maintain their present efforts on communications, and that they search for even other occasions to prevent the balance of payments from getting out of control.
As to Nike-Zeus, the President stated that it was his decision to stay with the budget as it is now proposed.
Finally, the President said that it would almost seem that Europe is getting a "free-ride" and that on both the political and defense side, this situation with our NATO allies had to be changed this year.
General Taylor presented a Joint Chiefs of Staff proposal on testimony before Congressional committees which was approved (copy attached). /4/
/4/Not printed.
Secretary McNamara indicated that only he, Secretary Gilpatric, and the Chiefs would reveal any Joint Chiefs of Staff decisions or positions as per the memorandum./5/
/5/Following this meeting, the President met with McNamara and Gilpatric and decided that no further changes would be made at that time in the sealift and tactical aircraft programs as then reflected in the Department of Defense budget submission for FY 1964 and that 72 additional C-130E transport aircraft would be proposed for funding in FY 1964. (Memorandum for the record by Gilpatric, January 2, 1963; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Chester V. Clifton Series, JCS/Kennedy 12/62-1/63)
C. V. Clifton/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
122. Editorial Note
At the meeting of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on January 3, 1963, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy "emphasized that the President looks upon the Group as having wider responsibilities than the members seem to interpret them to be. He suggested that the members give consideration to what the Group should now be doing." After U. Alexis Johnson, who had replaced General Taylor as Chairman of the Special Group (CI) following the latter's confirmation as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarked that the Group was operating according to its terms of reference in monitoring programs it had helped to establish, Kennedy commented that although these were the terms of reference, he felt that the monitoring of programs was too restrictive, and that "the members should give thought to redefining the Group's responsibilities." (Memorandum by Thomas W. Davis, Jr., Executive Secretary of the Group; Department of State, Special Group (CI) Files: Lot 68 D 451, SG(CI) 11/1/62-12/30/62)
In a memorandum to the Special Group (CI) dated January 22, Johnson wrote that whatever "degree of success the group may have had is due to the fact that it had specific terms of reference in a well-defined field clearly of interdepartmental character," and that enlarging its role would "adversely impinge" on the work of other interdepartmental mechanisms, including ad hoc working groups as well as the NSC and the NSC Executive Committee. (Ibid., SG(CI) 1/17/63-3/7/63)
In another general discussion of the Special Group (CI) during its meeting on January 24, Taylor opened by saying that it had "a pretty good charter now. He does not think that the committee should be overloaded." Gilpatric thought the Group was not "following through." Robert Kennedy agreed and stated that the monitoring of established programs should be done at a lower level. The Group should do "something additional," such as taking an overall look at countries which might be potential trouble spots, and "figure out solutions and report to the President. Emphasis should be on anticipating trouble." It was "time to apply the talents of this Group to other countries which do not necessarily have a CI problem."
AID Director Bell remarked that other interagency committees were in some cases doing for particular areas the job the Attorney General wanted done. Bundy stated: "If the Group develops in this way, it would simply interpose another level between the troops [working level] and the President. Why do this?"
The record of the meeting indicates that after Taylor pointed out that the Group was not in the "command channel," the meeting ended with a consensus that while "layering" might not be a problem, it would be necessary for the Group to have a permanent staff, possibly with a full time chairman, to perform the surveillance function of identifying trouble spots. The Attorney General agreed to draft a revision of the terms of reference in NSAM No. 124. (Memorandum by Thomas A. Parrott, Jr., January 24, with covering note of same date to Bundy; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group 7/3/62-5/20/63) No such draft revision has been found.
Additional information on this question is ibid., Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense, Special Warfare Volume II 1962-1963. See also Document 139.
123. Editorial Note
In a memorandum dated January 17, 1963, to the holders of NSC 5906/1, Bromley Smith stated that the President had authorized the rescission of NSC 5906/1, to be effective immediately. "For the present, current policy guidance is to be found in existing major statements of the President and Cabinet Officers, both classified and unclassified." (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Rescissions of NSC Documents) This action was part of an ongoing program of rescissions of outdated NSC policy papers. Further information on this program is ibid. and ibid., NSC Administration 1961-1965. NSC 5906/1, "Basic National Security Policy," August 5, 1959, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, volume III, Document 70.
124. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, January 19, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, 508th NSC Meeting. Secret.
In your NSC talk next Tuesday,/2/ could you say a few words about our policy toward the major neutrals? These are words best said privately at this juncture but words which need saying nonetheless. Many officials, some high up, get so annoyed at the words and antics of a Sukarno and a Nasser that they question the underlying rationale of our policy shift.
/2/January 22; see Document 125.
Yet I am convinced that one of the major potential successes of your Administration may flow from our more flexible policy toward the Nehrus, Nassers, Sukarnos, Ben Bellas, and their ilk. This marks a genuine departure from previous policy (though the last Administration was gradually shifting in this direction). We are still in the early phases of this enterprise and it isn't yet paying great dividends. But if we look on it as a long-term investment, and remain undisturbed by any short-term fluctuations, it will eventually show real capital gains.
To me, the underlying rationale for this policy is that in the game of competitive co-existence, we can hardly afford to let the major neutralists become clients primarily of Moscow. The Soviets have made a major effort in this direction, but with the glittering exception of India, we have only recently begun to compete.
Regrettably, the benefits of such a policy take less the form of visible support for US positions than the largely negative form of refraining from actions which would be most unfavorable to our interests. Yet, if we think Nasser is misbehaving in the Yemen or Sukarno again showing undue territorial appetite, we need merely ask ourselves how much more difficult they would be if they didn't feel a real concern lest they sacrifice actual and prospective aid from us. The trouble is that this is hardly a convincing public rationale for giving aid.
Other problems arise from the simple fact that the policies of Nasser or Sukarno cut across those of many other US friends; hence we are constantly put in the position of being asked to choose between them. It would be simpler, for example, to choose up sides in Yemen than to take the present middle road. Yet to do so would cost us more with one side than we would gain with the other. Similarly, in Southeast Asia, why spend billions containing Communist pressures on the mainland while leaving the Communists a free hand in the rich archipelago behind?
Those who cavil over our Nasser or Sukarno policy also ignore the absence of any realistic alternative. We tried to get rid of Sukarno in 58--and failed. Unless we think we can do so again we simply have to sweat him out. This is not to advocate an exclusively soft approach, but to use the stick without the carrot has failed again and again (as with the Aswan Dam).
It failed because it ran athwart of the strong nationalist attitudes of the new Afro-Asian countries. Yet this very nationalism, which to date has naturally focused on the former colonial powers and their associates, will increasingly bring them into conflict with an expansionist Bloc. This has already happened in India, where it was Peiping's blunder (plus our skill in capitalizing on it) which has led to a shift in India's attitude toward them and us. This will happen elsewhere if we let it mature. Time is on side here.
A few words on this policy would forestall any misreading of your tactical interest in sharp words or actions when needed./3/
/3/In a January 21 memorandum to the President suggesting topics for the next day's NSC meeting, Bundy wrote that he agreed with Komer "that we should be strong in our assistance in competing for the neutrals, using both carrot and stick," and attached Komer's "strong memorandum" to his own. (Kennedy Libarary, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, 508th NSC Meeting)
Bob Komer
125. Record of the 508th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, January 22, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, 508th NSC Meeting. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information but it is on White House stationery. There are four other accounts of this meeting, which was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. An undated account labeled "Done by CIA rapporteur" is ibid. See the Supplement. Another, also undated and entitled "Mr. Hilsman's Remarks at Director's Meeting," is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Hilsman Papers, National Security, Hilsman Summary of President's Views 1/22/63. The other two are cited in footnotes 2 and 3 below. See the Supplement.
There were 57 people attending this meeting, including the Vice President, all of the Joint Chiefs, 7 Department of Defense officials headed by McNamara, 16 Department of State officials led by Rusk, McCone and 3 other CIA officials, Dillon, Kermit Gordon, McGeorge Bundy, Sorensen, Wiesner, and Kaysen. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book)
REMARKS OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MEETING OF JANUARY 22, 1963
The President began his discussion of national security problems by calling attention to the worldwide responsibilities of the United States. While we fully recognize our responsibilities, other states are not carrying their fair share of the burden.
Cuba
The major lesson of the Cuban crisis, the President said, was the paramount importance of timing. Both sides, the United States and the USSR, need sufficient time to consider alternative courses of action. Our objective was and is to protect our national interests while trying to avoid a nuclear exchange which, if it happened, would be a defeat for both sides. In handling crises, it is important that the Russians have enough time to debate their action. If they are forced to react in an hour or two, they may react in a spasm and resort to nuclear war./2/ We, too, looking back on the quarantine vs. air strike decision,/3/ took several days to discuss and understand the advantages and disadvantages of the alternatives. The reason for building up NATO conventional forces is to gain greater control over the timing of a showdown in Europe provoked by the Russians.
/2/In a memorandum for the record dated January 22, Taylor summarized the President on this point as follows: "The advantage of taking the second course was the fact that the Soviets had time to consider alternatives and turn back the ships, thus avoiding a spasmodic response which might have initiated nuclear war." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Taylor CJCS Memos)
/3/A Department of State memorandum of this meeting, also dated January 22, reads in part: "He pointed out that it was a `very close thing' between a U.S. decision to mount an air strike against the Soviet installations and the final decision, the quarantine." (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/1-2363)
The President pointed out that we must always be in a position to threaten Cuba as a possible riposte to Russian pressure against us in Berlin. We must always be ready to move immediately against Cuba in the event we decide such action would be a more effective response to a Soviet initiative than a nuclear response. We can use Cuba to limit Soviet actions in the way the Russians use Berlin to limit our actions./4/
/4/On this point, the Department of State memorandum reads: "Also he said, we should be prepared to move not only in Cuba but perhaps in Berlin simultaneously. We now have a hostage in this hemisphere just as the Russians have had one in Berlin for several years."
Western Europe
Turning to Europe, the President recalled that de Gaulle's current policy is no different than that he has been advocating since 1958 when he first proposed to President Eisenhower a U.S.-U.K.- France directorate giving France, in effect, a veto on our use of nuclear weapons. The suggestion was turned down because it would have broken up NATO. This Administration agrees it was a correct decision. The turndown of de Gaulle's proposal was not, however, the reason why he is behaving as he now is. Even if we had given France nuclear weapons, de Gaulle would have tried to restore France to a predominant position in Europe. For years, in speeches and in his memoirs, de Gaulle has expressed his view that France must be a dominant power speaking to the USSR and the West as an equal, dependent on no one.
In analyzing de Gaulle's present actions, the President said de Gaulle did not question our support of Europe. The proof that he does not fear we would desert him is the deployment of only a small number of French troops opposite the Russians in Germany. He relies on our power to protect him while he launches his policies based solely on the self-interest of France. Having been turned down by the U.S. and U.K. on the directorate, de Gaulle turned to Germany. This helps to keep Germany from looking to the Russians. It does threaten NATO which de Gaulle strongly opposes.
As to the Common Market, the President said that if Great Britain joined, Europe would be strengthened and stabilized. We favor the U.K. joining even though it will cost the U.S. considerable trade. If France keeps Britain out, this will be a setback for us but a more severe setback for the U.K.
Our interest, the President continued, is to strengthen the NATO multilateral force concept, even though de Gaulle is opposed, because a multilateral force will increase our influence in Europe and provide a way to guide NATO and keep it strong. We have to live with de Gaulle. One way to respond is to strengthen NATO and push for a multilateral nuclear force which will weaken de Gaulle's control of the Six./5/ We should not be overly distressed because the problems caused by de Gaulle are not crucial in the sense that our problems in Latin America are.
/5/Taylor's memorandum summarizes the President as saying at this point: "It is through the multilateral concept that we increase the dependence of the European nations on the United States and tie these nations closer to us. Thus, we thwart de Gaulle who wants to cause a split between Europe and the United States."
U.S. Trade Negotiations
The President then summarized the guidelines for forthcoming trade negotiations. In the present situation, we must be very careful to protect U.S. interests. Our balance of payments problem is serious, it is not now under control, and it must be righted at the latest by the end of 1964. If we do not do so, there will be pressure against the dollar and Congress will be demanding reductions on our foreign programs.
One effort we must make, the President continued, is to seek to prevent European states from taking actions which make our balance of payments problem worse. For example, we maintain large forces in Germany. We must firmly oppose West Germany if it increases its agricultural production to our detriment. We have not yet reached the point of wheat against troops but we cannot continue to pay for the military protection of Europe while the NATO states are not paying their fair share and living off the "fat of the land." We have been very generous to Europe and it is now time for us to look out for ourselves, knowing full well that the Europeans will not do anything for us simply because we have in the past helped them. No longer dependent on the U.S. for economic assistance, the European states are less subject to our influence. If the French and other European powers acquire a nuclear capability they would be in a position to be entirely independent and we might be on the outside looking in. We must exploit our military and political position to ensure that our economic interests are protected.
Attitude Toward Neutrals
Referring to criticism by those who say we are treating neutrals as favorably as allies, the President said he did not believe such criticism was sound but we shouldn't be over-confident ourselves. For example, the Pakistanis oppose our giving military assistance to the Indians. Despite the fact that the Pakistanis are our allies, we must recognize the importance of India. If the Indians joined the Chinese, we would have no free South Asia. Our aim is to make the sub-continent of Asia strong. Even under present Indian leadership, we can work with India just as we must use our ally Pakistan to achieve our aim of keeping the sub-continent out of the Communist camp. We cannot permit all those who call themselves neutrals to join the Communist bloc. Therefore, we must keep our ties to Nasser and other neutralists even if we do not like many things they do because, if we lose them, the balance of power could swing against us.
Assistance to Foreign Countries
The President said he wanted to make clear that we are giving aid to foreign countries in order to increase the security of the United States--not primarily for humanitarian reasons. AID programs should be tested against the contribution they make toward improving our national security. Recalling that the military could always get Congress to appropriate funds for military assistance, the President asked that Defense Department officials help sell Congress on economic assistance. Some Congressmen will try to cut the heart out of the AID program. Should they succeed, we would be in real danger. A major effort is required to prevent this. We must make every effort to keep countries out of the Communist bloc. Once a country is in, we know from experience that it is very difficult to get it out. We cannot risk the possibility of four or five countries suddenly turning Communist just because we did not give them economic and military aid. An outside group is now reviewing the existing AID program for the purpose of ensuring that our assistance to foreign countries will best serve our own national interest./6/
/6/Reference is to the Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free World, headed by retired General Lucius D. Clay. See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IX, Document 161.
Domestic Issues
In introducing his remarks on domestic issues, the President emphasized the major effort which has been made to hold down the budget deficit now estimated at about $12 billion. The current budget shows increases only for defense, space and the fixed charge of interest on the national debt.
Our economic growth rate over the past ten years, he continued, has been too slow, particularly in view of the great increase in our population.
We must avoid another recession which would endanger our gold position and have a bad psychological effect on the American people. In comparison with the Russians who are making a major effort to improve their domestic economy, we must not give the impression of just drifting lest other states draw the conclusion that we cannot deal with our domestic economic problems.
An unbalanced budget as such is not worrisome especially when we realize that our present deficit is a reflection of the hot and cold war we have been fighting during the past fifteen years. The new tax bill is very important in this respect because if it is passed by the Congress we will be in much better shape.
It is unnecessary to point out that all these matters, AID, defense, economic growth and the tax program are all related. If we become weaker, economically, our influence abroad will be reduced. If this happens, the entire Free World position weakens. It is basic to our national security to have a strong domestic economy.
Defense Problems
Recalling recent decisions limiting or halting certain military programs, e.g. the B-70, Skybolt, and Nike-Zeus, the President said we are going forward with large defense and space programs. If the necessity develops, we will do even more, but there is a limit to how much we can do.
One of our big tasks is to persuade our colleagues in Europe to increase their defense forces. If we are to keep six divisions in Europe, the European states must do more. Why should we have in Europe supplies adequate to fight for ninety days when the European forces around our troops have only enough supplies to fight for two or three days? Our forces in Europe are further forward than the troops of de Gaulle who, instead of committing his divisions to NATO, is banking on us to defend him by maintaining our present military position in Europe. While recognizing the military interests of the Free World, we should consider very hard the narrower interests of the United States.
Test Ban Negotiations
The President reviewed the background of the current negotiations with the USSR on a test ban treaty. Our primary purpose in trying to get a treaty with Russia is to halt or delay the development of an atomic capability by the Chinese Communists./7/ We will have a difficult time protecting the free areas of Asia if the Chinese get nuclear weapons. A test ban including only the USSR, the British, and the U.S. would not be very meaningful except in regard to the Chinese problem which the Russians are believed to be as concerned about as we are. If we get a treaty we think we can live with, all of us must support it in order to overcome Congressional opposition which undoubtedly will develop.
/7/Concerning this point, the Department of State memorandum reads: "He thought a test ban agreement might produce pressure against development of such a [Chinese nuclear] capability. Any negotiations that can hold back the Chinese Communists are most important, he said, because they loom as our major antagonists of the late 60's and beyond."
Concluding his remarks, the President thanked the assembled officers for their cooperation, commented on the harmonious relations which exist among the Departments and Agencies, and expressed the hope that during the coming year we could build on the solid foundation which now exists./8/
/8/NSC Action No. 2460, dated January 22, states that the Council: "Noted the President's informal statement on major national security problems." (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) According to Legere's memorandum of the White House staff meeting on January 23, "Bundy called the President's talk a `bravura' performance, and the expression `mood music' was also applied to specific subjects which the President covered." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, White House Memoranda)
126. Editorial Note
On January 23, 1963, Secretary Rusk designated the Policy Planning Council as the center within the Department of State for coordinating country planning and for minimizing duplication of planning "on both a Departmental and interdepartmental basis." This action followed agreement by the Tuesday Planning Group on September 1, 1962, of a series of "Experimental Strategic Country Studies" to be initiated by the Council. (Memorandum entitled "Strategic Country Studies," attached to letter from U. Alexis Johnson to Nitze, January 23, 1963; Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Policy Planning 1963) The Tuesday Planning Group was an interagency subcabinet planning mechanism chaired by Walt Rostow, with White House, Defense, Treasury, USIA, and CIA membership, generally at the rank of Assistant Secretary or equivalent.
On February 28, Rusk sent to the President a memorandum drafted by Walt Rostow entitled "Critical Planning Tasks." The memorandum described the status of some 32 Basic National Planning Tasks (see Documents 70 and 83), 8 Strategic Studies on individual countries, all in Latin America and Africa, and 13 Political Contingency Plans. Rusk requested that the President "meet soon with a few of your key advisers to review the state of national security planning and, especially, to isolate those planning tasks you personally regard as critical." (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, BNSP 1963)
Although Legere reported, in his memorandum of the White House daily staff meeting on March 1, that "both Bundy and Komer felt that such a diffuse paper would not get very far with the President," Bundy on April 12 forwarded the memorandum to the President with the suggestion that he meet the next week with Rostow, Rusk, and "a very few others." Bundy's "own guess" was that Rostow needed "a real sense of your own interest and some sense of priorities," and he concluded that perhaps some long-range problems could be considered in the new Standing Committee (see Document 131). (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, WYS Chron File, and Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meetings General 4/63-5/63, respectively) No record has been found of any such meeting as Bundy proposed.
For additional information on this topic, see Document 135.
127. Editorial Note
In a memorandum for the record of the White House daily staff meeting on February 4, 1963, Legere wrote:
"If the meeting this morning had any significance, and I think it did, it was less due to anything specific that was said than it was due to an expression of general opinion among the group, particularly Bundy and Kaysen. In a discussion which began by focusing on General de Gaulle once again, Bundy said in the most serious way that he felt there was really no logic whatever to `nuclear policy.' What he meant by this was that the military planners who calculate that we will win if only we can kill 100 million Russians while they are killing 30 million Americans are living in total dreamland. He said that `the President is certainly not going to win the next election on this issue'; I am not sure what that means either, but believe that Bundy meant to say that the President considers a nuclear Armageddon totally unrealistic." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, White House Memoranda)
128. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) (Johnson) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, March 14, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group 7/3/62-5/20/63. Secret. Drafted by Thomas W. Davis of the White House Staff and Charles W. Maechling, Jr., Director for Internal Defense in the Office of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State. NSAM No. 204, November 7, 1962, designated U. Alexis Johnson as Chairman of the Special Group (CI). (Ibid., NSAM 204)
SUBJECT
Progress in the Counter-Insurgency Program
The last progress report on counter-insurgency activities of the United States Government was presented to you on July 30, 1962,/2/ and included both a review of Special Group (CI) activities and a full report from each department and agency on their respective achievements in this area since January, 1961. Since then, the Group has continued to encourage establishment of new programs by the departments and agencies, as appropriate, to monitor implementation of Internal Defense Plans for those countries specifically assigned to the Group, to keep under review the senior counter-insurgency training programs, to encourage expansion of civic action programs, and to push police support programs, both in Washington and abroad.
/2/Document 102.
The Group continues to function as a high-level committee whose purpose is to maintain global surveillance of the Communist insurgency threat and to insure that immediate action is taken to counter the threat. Implementation of the Group's decisions continues to be the responsibility of the departments and agencies whose heads are represented on the Group. To avoid bureaucratization, and the proliferation of paper work, the Group has no institutional substructure except for a Subcommittee on Training, whose duty is to keep the broad interdepartmental training effort in counter-insurgency under continuous review, and the Special Group Assistants, who are senior departmental officers responsible for staffing the principals of the Group. It is the latter which is responsible for rapid implementation of policy, as exemplified in the emergency program of riot control and internal security assistance to Latin American countries during the Cuban crisis.
The following paragraphs are intended to supply you with current information relating to the major efforts of the counter-insurgency program.
a. Doctrine. During the summer the Group approved a national doctrine for counter-insurgency entitled "U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy." It was subsequently issued under a National Security Action Memorandum as national policy/3/ and was disseminated to all diplomatic and consular posts abroad, to major military commands and within the Government's school system. Its purpose is to furnish policy and doctrinal guidance to all United States activities concerned with internal defense of less developed countries.
/3/See Document 105 and footnote 2 thereto.
b. Internal Defense Plans. In order better to organize United States Government operations in the field for the purpose of countering the insurgency threat, Internal Defense Plans have been prepared for all the countries you have assigned to the Group (Bolivia, Cambodia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Iran, Laos, Thailand, Venezuela, and Viet-Nam) with the exception of Laos, where, owing to the unique situation, an Internal Defense Plan is not considered to be useful at this time. In addition, a number of other posts have voluntarily initiated Internal Defense Plans in response to the above-mentioned policy paper.
c. Training. In response to your wishes expressed in NSAM 131,/4/ training programs on counter-insurgency have been established by each department and agency concerned with foreign activities abroad. Under these programs instruction has been given to over 22,150 military and civilian officers since the July progress report.
/4/In NSAM No. 131, dated March 13, 1962, and signed by McGeorge Bundy, the President directed several measures to increase government-wide training objectives for counter-insurgency. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 131)
State--6,176
Defense--12,700
AID--1,594
CIA--963
USIA--721
In addition, within the military services alone, it is planned that counter-insurgency training will reach over 24,000 officers during the next four months. In general, the training program has been carried out through the inclusion of counter-insurgency instruction within the context of regular career courses.
In addition, counter-insurgency training has been included in over twenty-seven major military exercises which have taken place during the last six months. Military mobile counter-insurgency training teams have been deployed to forty countries, representing an increase from seventy-nine to one hundred fourteen teams.
Police training was provided to foreign police officers from twenty-nine countries through training programs in the United States, and at the Inter-American Police Academy in Panama. One hundred twenty-one Latin American police officers received instruction at the Academy, while two hundred seventy-two trainees from various parts of the world received instruction in the United States.
At the senior level, the new Interdepartmental Seminar on Problems of Development and Internal Defense was established at the Foreign Service Institute last June to provide training for senior personnel going abroad to responsible positions in crisis areas. The Seminar will offer five sessions of five weeks each during 1963. Two hundred seventy-eight personnel from State, Defense, AID, USIA, and CIA have graduated from the Seminar to date.
d. Review of Paramilitary Assets. As you are aware, in June, 1961 it was decided to make a review of the paramilitary assets of the United States and of the likely requirements for their use. The completed report indicated that in some cases our resources are inadequate. Action is being taken by the responsible departments and agencies to overcome the deficiencies. A six-months study to identify research and development areas in need of emphasis was completed in December. A report will shortly be submitted to the Group, setting forth what has been done by the two agencies concerned to overcome the deficiencies noted in the study.
e. Civic Action. In the field of civic action the Group has continued to encourage expansion, both within the areas of large scale activities such as Latin America and Southeast Asia, and in the yet untapped areas of the Near East and Africa. In Africa civic action programs are planned for Senegal and Liberia. In the Near East programs are under way in Jordan, Iran, and Pakistan. In Southeast Asia a significant program has recently been initiated in Indonesia, where it is believed that the planned civic action program can make a significant contribution to the economic development of the country and the productive employment of the military forces. In all, civic action programs currently being funded total over $72 million, of which $40 million are for South Viet-Nam.
f. Police Assistance. An expanded and reinvigorated program of police assistance to underdeveloped countries has been initiated during the past six months. The worldwide level of this program has increased from about $14 million in FY 1962 to about $30 million in FY 1963. We currently provide advice, assistance, and equipment through police advisory missions to thirty countries and have centralized the administration of the program in a new Office of Public Safety located within AID. New missions are being planned for eight other countries.
Summary. Recognition has been obtained throughout the United States Government that subversive insurgency is a major form of politico/military conflict. Necessary adjustments have been made within the organizations of the several departments and agencies. Counter-insurgency doctrine has been developed, and issued as national policy. Emphasis has been given to counter-insurgency throughout the Government's school systems concerned with foreign affairs. Research and development activities of the military and intelligence services have been reviewed and adjusted to counter-insurgency needs. Paramilitary resources, civic action programs, and police support programs have all been expanded. Internal Defense Plans have been prepared for the countries assigned to the Group./5/
/5/A June 25 memorandum, signed for Taylor by Goodpaster, reports on military counterinsurgency programs (including civic action) from December 1962 to June 1963. (Ibid., Special Group (CI) Files: Lot 68 D 451, SG(CI) 6/20/63-8/1/63)
U. Alexis Johnson/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that indicates Johnson signed the original.
129. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense's Special Assistant (Yarmolinsky) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, March 15, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Missile Gap 2/63-5/63. Secret. Marked "weekend reading."
This is in response to your request for an addendum to our "Missile Gap" memorandum to the President./2/ You asked that we focus on precisely what happened in January-February 1961 which led to Mr. McNamara's background remarks on the non-existence of a missile gap. /3/In terms of additional intelligence or a reappraisal of Soviet or U.S. strength, the fact is that nothing happened. As noted in our previous memorandum, the term "missile gap" was an extremely fuzzy one, and it was almost impossible to discuss the subject without saying something which was misleading, or at least sure to be interpreted in a misleading way. In short, there was, and was not, a missile gap in early 1961, depending on whether you included Polaris or not; whether you were worried that the Air Force estimate might be right or not; whether you were thinking of a strategically significant gap or merely a comparison of raw numbers, regardless of the practical significance; and whether you were talking about something now or something we feared was coming. It was under these circumstances that reporters came away from Mr. McNamara's background briefing with the impression that he had said there was no gap./4/
/2/In a March 4 memorandum to the President, McNamara described the missile gap controversy from 1956 onwards. He stated that comparison of the high side of estimates from NIEs in the fall of 1960 with projected ICBM inventories still indicated a possible 1962 missile gap; that by June 1961 it was "apparent that Soviet ICBM deployment had not proceeded as rapidly as was previously estimated" and that the "most dramatic downward revision in estimates" took place in September 1961. (Ibid.) For the forecasts made in June and September 1961, see Documents 29 and 45. For a formal estimate of Soviet ICBM activity, which was not revised for the remainder of 1960, see NIE 11-8-60, August 1, 1960, in Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. III, Document 111.
/3/Bundy made his request during a telephone call to Yarmolinsky on March 4: "I called him March 4 to say that we wanted more on the immediate period when we said there was no missile gap--Dec 60-Feb 61." (Handwritten note on memorandum from Yarmolinsky to Bundy enclosing McNamara's March 4 memorandum cited in footnote 2 above)
/4/See Document 14.
Given the disinclination of the Secretary of Defense to say anything to imply that the U.S. was no longer confident it could defend its vital interests, and taking into account the stories by responsible observers suggesting the contrary, it is not surprising that the Secretary took this line. (See, for example, Richard Rovere's Letter from Washington for 11 January 1961, which is attached.)/5/ For, given the confusions in which the whole "missile gap" controversy was immersed, the Secretary could not say anything without being misleading, and he naturally preferred to lean towards the chance of being misinterpreted on the side of confidence in U.S. ability to defend itself.
/5/Not attached. The article was published in The New Yorker, January 11, 1961.
If we are asked, in a political context, what was the difference between Mr. McNamara denying there was a gap and the Eisenhower Administration saying the same thing, the answer is this: Under Eisenhower, the denial that there was no gap was accompanied by a belief, at the highest levels, that our defense posture was adequate; under the new Administration, the denial was accompanied by an intense awareness that although we were not in immediate great danger, urgent immediate steps were nevertheless needed to improve our defense position. Thus, although there was little difference in what Defense officials said about the missile gap before and after January 1961, there were major differences in what was done about the missile gap and the whole range of defense deficiencies which this term had come to symbolize./6/
Adam
/6/In a May 15 memorandum to Bundy, President Kennedy wrote in part: "The report that we got was too superficial. I want to be able to demonstrate that there was a military and intelligence lag in the previous administration that started the missile gap." (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, McGeorge Bundy 1962-1963) A May 31 memorandum from Nitze to Bundy encloses a 24-page memorandum by Lawrence McQuade, Special Assistant to Nitze, entitled "Where Did the Missile Gap Go?" With another memorandum to Bundy, dated June 17, Nitze enclosed a 20-page study on public statements made by various participants in the missile-gap controversy. (Both ibid., National Security Files, Subject Series, Missile Gap 6/63-7/63)
130. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
NIE 11-4-63
Washington, March 22, 1963.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, National Intelligence Estimates. Top Secret; Limited Distribution; Controlled Dissemination. A table of contents and Annexes A, B, and C (30 pages of tables) are not printed. See the Supplement. A note on the cover sheet reads in part: "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, AEC, and NSA." The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred except the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES, 1962-1967
The Problem
To review significant developments in Soviet military thinking, policy, and programs, to assess the current Soviet military posture, and to estimate main trends in Soviet military capabilities and policies over the next five years.
Scope Note
This estimate presents our main conclusions on the broad range of major Soviet military problems. It includes, inter alia, summary versions of recent National Intelligence Estimates, updated as appropriate, devoted to individual military missions and other related questions.
Summary and Conclusions
Basic Views on War
A. The Soviets see military power as serving two basic purposes: defense of their system and support for its expansion. Thus, one of the most important objectives of Soviet military policy is to deter general war while the USSR prosecutes its foreign policies by means short of actual hostilities involving Soviet forces. The Soviets recognize that their deterrent must be credible in the sense that it rests upon powerful military forces. They also recognize that deterrence may fail in some key confrontation in which either they or their opponents come to feel that vital interests are under challenge. Against this contingency they wish to have a combination of offensive and defensive capabilities which will enable them to seize the initiative if possible, to survive enemy nuclear attack, and to go on to prosecute the war. We do not believe, however, that the Soviets base their military planning or their general policy upon the expectation that they will be able to achieve, within the foreseeable future, a military posture which would make rational the deliberate initiation of general war or conscious acceptance of grave risks of such a war. (Paras. 1-3)
B. A number of Soviet statements in recent years have expressed the view that limited war involving the major nuclear powers would inevitably escalate into general war. While such statements are intended in part to deter the West from local use of force, this official view also reflects a genuine Soviet fear of the consequences of becoming directly engaged in limited war involving Soviet and US forces. This probably also extends to involvement of Soviet forces with certain Allied forces in highly critical areas, notably Western forces in the European area. Nevertheless, they might employ their own forces to achieve local gains in some area adjacent to Bloc territory if they judged that the West, either because it was deterred by Soviet nuclear power or for some other reason, would not make an effective military response. They would probably employ Soviet forces as necessary if some Western military action on the periphery of the Bloc threatened the integrity of the Bloc itself. Should the USSR become directly involved in a limited war with US or Allied forces, we believe that the Soviets would not necessarily expand it immediately into general war, but that they would probably employ only that force which they thought necessary to achieve their local objectives. They would also seek to prevent escalation by political means. (Paras. 4-5)
C. The Soviets recognize another type of limited military conflict, termed a "war of national liberation," in which pro-Soviet or anti-Western forces challenge colonial or pro-Western regimes in a primarily internal struggle. The Soviets have rendered active assistance in some such conflicts, and little or none in others, depending upon such practical factors as accessibility, the risk of defeat, and the attitude of other powers involved. In addition, the USSR has given military assistance to friendly, non-Bloc regimes. As new and favorable opportunities arise, the Soviets will continue to offer these various kinds of assistance. We believe, however, that they will remain chary of any great commitment of prestige to the support of belligerents over whom they do not exercise substantial control or in circumstances in which they feel that winning is unlikely, and they will seek to avoid risk of widened hostilities which might result from "wars of national liberation." (Paras. 6-8)
General Trends in Military Doctrine and Policy
D. Current Soviet military policy stems from Khrushchev's plan, announced in January 1960, to cut back the size of the armed forces and to place main reliance on nuclear and missile forces. The plan reflected his view that a general war is almost certain to be short, with victory decided in the strategic nuclear exchange, and with conventional arms playing a quite secondary role. Khrushchev's plan was accepted only reluctantly by the military leadership; both the plan and its strategic justification have since undergone substantial modification. Present Soviet military doctrine holds that a general war will inevitably involve the massive use of nuclear weapons; it will begin with a strategic exchange, and its course and outcome may well be decided in its initial phase. Hence, doctrinal discussion emphasizes the importance of seizing the initiative by pre-emptive attack if, in the Soviet view, general war becomes imminent and unavoidable. However, the current doctrine holds that such a conflict will not necessarily be short, and it supports both the building of strategic attack and defense capabilities and the maintenance of large theater and naval forces. (Paras. 13-16)
E. The Soviet leaders evidently believe that the present overall military relationship, in which each side can exert a strong deterrent upon the other, will probably continue for some time to come. However, they almost certainly regard the present strategic posture of the USSR as inferior to that of the US, and they are aware of the continuing buildup of US forces for intercontinental attack programmed for the next few years. In this situation, they probably do not expect to be able to obtain a clear strategic superiority over the US, but we believe that the Soviets are far from willing to accept a position of strategic inferiority. Our evidence does not indicate that the Soviets are attempting to outstrip or even match the US in numbers of weapons for intercontinental attack; we believe, however, that they will attempt to offset US superiority by other means./2/ (Paras. 21-26)
/2/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, agrees that the Soviets probably do not expect to be able to achieve a position of clear strategic superiority over the US during the time period of this estimate and that they are far from willing to accept a position of strategic inferiority. However, he believes that the USSR is pursuing an intensive research and development effort in the hope of attaining technological breakthroughs which, when translated into weapon systems, will result in a clear strategic superiority at a later date. [Footnote in the source text.]
F. The Soviets may see a possible solution to their strategic confrontation with the US in a combination of antimissile defenses plus very effective though numerically inferior intercontinental striking forces. We believe that deployment of antimissile defenses may be the largest new Soviet military program in the period of this estimate. Hardened ICBM's and submerged-launch submarine missiles will contribute to Soviet strategic capabilities. In addition, over the next few years the Soviet arsenal will probably come to include new large ICBMs, armed with very high-yield warheads or capable of global ranges. Moreover, the USSR is almost certainly investigating the feasibility of space systems for military support and offensive and defensive weapons. (Paras. 27-28)
G. Official statements and military writings suggest that the Soviet leaders see in technological achievements the means by which they may improve their total strategic position relative to that of the US. They have made scientific military research and the development of new weapons matters of high urgency, and they have a demonstrated ability to concentrate human and material resources on priority objectives. If they develop new concepts or new weapons which give promise of military and political advantages, they will seek to add them rapidly to their arsenal and to gain maximum benefit from them. Thus, during the next five years, we expect the Soviets to be working on even more advanced weapons with which they may hope to enhance their strategic capabilities at a later date./3/ (Para. 30)
/3/See the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, footnote to Conclusion E. [Footnote in the source text.]
H. The USSR's military programs and space efforts impose costly demands upon Soviet resources. The effort to modernize and strengthen all arms of the Soviet forces simultaneously squeezes hard on resources available for investment and consumption goals to which the leadership is strongly committed. Thus, Khrushchev may once again seek a reduction in resources devoted to theater forces on the grounds that growing nuclear capabilities will permit this cutback without endangering Soviet security. But while such a reduction would reduce expenditures for military pay and release manpower to the economy, it would not significantly reduce the demands of the defense establishment on critically scarce, high quality resources and highly skilled manpower. (Paras. 40-46)
I. Despite the possibility of a future reduction in theater forces, Khrushchev's 27 February speech indicates that the Soviet leadership has recently taken economic decisions which reaffirm military priorities at the expense of consumer aspirations; beyond this it may reflect a decision to increase military spending above previously planned levels. The Soviet economy is capable of bearing a heavier military burden, but not without sacrifices in the program to raise living standards and perhaps also reductions in the future rate of industrial growth. For the present, the Soviets appear to have chosen to risk these consequences, but we believe that the problem of resource allocation will continue to plague the Soviet leadership. (Para. 47)
J. Soviet military policy will continue to be shaped, not only by a variety of strategic, technical, economic, and political factors, but also by differing views about the relative importance of these factors, and shifting compromises among these views. As a result, we believe that the numerous aspects of this policy will not always be wholly consistent with each other, and that force structure and future programming will reflect neither a fully-integrated strategic doctrine nor a firm timetable for achieving specific force levels. We do not believe that the Soviets conceive of existing weapon systems as the answer to their military problem, or that they have fixed and inflexible plans for their force structure in the period five to 10 years from now. Barring some major technical advance in weaponry, we believe that Soviet military policy is likely to continue along current lines, and that for at least the next few years large standing forces of all types will be maintained. Even in the absence of such an advance, however, we cannot exclude the possibility of new departures in military policy, perhaps resulting in major changes in the composition of the Soviet military establishment and in the relative emphasis given to forces designed to accomplish the major military missions. (Paras. 29-30)
Forces for Long Range Attack
K. Although missile forces for attack on Eurasia continue to grow, major emphasis in the building of long-range striking forces has evidently shifted to forces for intercontinental attack, primarily ICBMs. We estimate Soviet ICBM strength at the end of 1962 at 80-85 operational launchers, including a few silo-type hardened launchers. By mid-1964, the force will probably have reached 250-325, including 75-100 silos. The Soviet ICBM force estimated for the next two years will consist primarily of missiles equipped with warheads in the low megaton range; it could include a few missiles with very high-yield warheads. We believe that the major trends in this force to 1967 will be: growth of the force to some hundreds of launchers; hardening of a significant portion of the force; and availability of some missiles capable of delivering very high-yield warheads (up to 100 MT). /4,/5/ (Paras. 48-57)
/4/The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, dissents to this projection of force levels. Since the Soviet ICBM launcher construction program for second generation systems has been under way for nearly three years and has resulted in only some 80 operational launchers, it appears most unrealistic to him to estimate that from 175 to 250 operational launchers will become operational during the next 16 to 17 months. He therefore estimates as follows:
[Here follows a table that shows estimates of approximate totals of 175-225 operational ICBM launchers, including 30-50 hard launchers, by mid-1964.] [Footnote in the source text.]
/5/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that available intelligence, collected over a long period of time, provides a basis for differing interpretations of the magnitude of the Soviet ICBM program and the approximate time required for site construction. Experience has shown that even with the best available intelligence, and where evidence appeared to be complete, continuing analysis had indicated that ICBM launch sites exist which were not initially identified. Because of the history of expanding ICBM locations and the absence of complete, up-to-date intelligence, he believes that undetected launchers in varying degrees of construction, now exist at the confirmed complexes. Further, he also believes there are additional complexes mostly under construction at yet unidentified locations. He would therefore estimate the number of operational ICBM launchers, including those at the Tyuratam test range, through mid-1964 as follows:
[Here follows a table that shows estimates of approximate totals of 300-450 operational ICBM launchers, including 100-150 hard launchers, by mid-1964.] [Footnote in the source text.]
L. The Soviets now have operational about 45 ballistic missile submarines--nine of them nuclear-powered--which carry a combined total of about 125 short-range (350 n.m.) missiles designed for surfaced launching. The USSR is developing longer range missiles for launching from submerged submarines. In addition, the Soviets have developed submarine-launched cruise missiles, which are probably designed primarily for use against ships but could be employed against land targets. In mid-1967, the Soviets will probably have more than two dozen nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and about 20 nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines. By that time, they will probably have initiated routine submarine patrols within missile range of the US. (Paras. 64-68)
M. Soviet Long Range Aviation, by reason of its equipment, basing and deployment, is much better suited for Eurasian operations than for intercontinental attack. However, the Soviets have given considerable emphasis to aerial refueling and to Arctic training. Excluding combat attrition, we estimate that the Soviets could put about 200 aircraft over North America on two-way missions; of these, about half would be heavy bombers. Long Range Aviation now comprises about 170-200 heavy bombers and tankers and about 950 jet medium bombers and tankers. We continue to estimate a gradual decline in numerical strength. A portion of the Badger medium bomber force will be replaced by the new supersonic Blinder, already in units, but our evidence does not indicate that any new heavy bomber is being developed for operational use. By mid-1967, Long Range Aviation will probably comprise some 110-140 heavy bombers and about 750 mediums./6/ (Paras. 69-75)
/6/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not consider that this paragraph accurately reflects the capability of the USSR to put aircraft over North America on two-way missions. He believes that with due consideration of all relevant factors, such as number of aircraft in Long Range Aviation, numbers of aircraft tanker configured and peak availability rate, the Soviets could commit about 750 aircraft to initial two-way attacks on North America. From this number committed, about 300 bombers could reach North American targets.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, further estimates that a follow-on heavy bomber will probably be introduced in about 1964. The continued development of large aircraft capable of supersonic speed, and research in applicable materials, structures, and other components substantiate the Soviets interest in large supersonic vehicles and suggest an intent to increase their strategic attack capability by such means. The Bounder probably has served a most useful purpose as a test bed for many components, aerodynamic advancements, and a structural design which are directly applicable to a follow-on heavy bomber capable of supersonic speeds. He estimates the total Soviet heavy bomber and tanker strength will remain at approximately 200 aircraft throughout the period of this estimate, present strength levels being maintained by the introduction of modest numbers of a new heavy bomber. [Footnote in the source text.]
N. We estimate that the Soviet MRBM and IRBM force now comprises about 600 completed launch positions, deployed for the most part in western USSR within range of NATO targets in Europe. The bulk of these launch positions are soft, but a few silo-type hardened sites are probably operational. We believe that deployment of soft sites will have been virtually completed early this year, leveling off at about 600 launch positions; the hardened component of the force will continue to grow, probably reaching about 100-150 launchers in mid-1964. It is possible that as many as half of the soft launch positions are alternates, in which case the first salvo capability of the force would be considerably smaller, although still large enough to devastate Western Europe. (Paras. 58-63)
O. In the event of general war in the period of this estimate, the USSR would almost certainly employ against the US a mixed force of ICBMs, missile submarines, and bomber aircraft. By the mid-1960's, the USSR will have acquired a substantially increased ICBM and submarine-launched missile capability to deliver nuclear weapons against the US, in addition to its already formidable forces for strikes in Eurasia. Significant portions of these forces will be relatively invulnerable to attack. The Soviets will be in a position to strike pre-emptively at the fixed bases of an important segment of the US nuclear delivery force, and they will have some prospect that a portion of their own force could survive an initial US attack and retaliate with high-yield weapons. With the forces which we estimate, however, the Soviets could still not expect to destroy the growing force of US hardened, airborne, seaborne, and fast reaction nuclear delivery vehicles. (Paras. 78-81)
Air and Missile Defense Forces
P. The significant improvements in the Soviet air defense system noted during recent years will be extended during the next few years, and successful penetration by manned bombers will therefore require increasingly sophisticated forms of attack. The Soviet air defense capability can be degraded by the increasingly complex forms of attack which the West will be able to employ, including air-launched missiles of present and more advanced types, penetration tactics, and electronic countermeasures. Even in such circumstances, the Soviets would probably expect to destroy a number of the attackers. We doubt, however, that they would be confident that they could reduce the weight of attack to a point where the resulting damage to the USSR would be acceptable. Unless and until the USSR is able to deploy a substantial number of advanced ABM defenses, the USSR's air and missile defense deficiencies and uncertainties will sharply increase as ballistic missiles assume a larger proportion of the West's total nuclear delivery capability. (Paras. 82, 89-105)
Q. The major development which we foresee in Soviet defense is the advent of a capability against ballistic missiles. For more than five years, the Soviets have been conducting a high priority and extensive program to develop antimissile defenses, and we estimate that several different ABM systems are under development. We believe that in 1963 the Soviets will achieve some operational capability with an ABM system now being deployed around Leningrad. We have no basis for determining its effectiveness, but doubt that it would be effective against missiles employing decoys or other countermeasures. The USSR is probably also developing an antisatellite system. (Paras. 83-84, 88)
R. To counter the more complex long-range ballistic missile threat of the mid-1960's, the Soviets may seek to improve the Leningrad system, or may develop a more advanced system, or both. In any case, the USSR is likely to defer additional ABM deployment until a better system is available. If the Soviets develop an ABM system which they regard as reasonably effective against long-range missiles, a vigorous deployment program will probably be undertaken. We believe that such a program would contemplate the defense of some 20-25 principal Soviet cities and would require some five or six years to complete. We have no basis for judging whether or when the Soviets would consider their ABM system effective enough to warrant the initiation of such a program. (Paras. 85-86)
Theater Forces
S. The longstanding Soviet concern with concepts and forces for campaigns in adjoining theaters, especially in Europe, has resulted in a formidable theater force, strong in armor, battlefield mobility, and units in being. The tactical nuclear delivery capabilities of these forces are still limited, but they have been improved markedly over the past few years. In offensive operations, rapidly advancing theater forces would be in constant danger of outrunning their logistical tail, which is heavily dependent on railroads. Finally, the Soviets have traditionally exercised very strict supervision over the actions of their subordinates, but existing command and control systems do not permit this strict supervision over the widely extended deployment required on the nuclear battlefield or under the threat of use of nuclear weapons. (Paras. 106-124)
Naval Forces
T. The USSR's capabilities to conduct naval warfare in the open seas rest primarily upon the submarine force, which is capable of mounting a large-scale torpedo attack and mining campaign against Allied naval targets and sea communications in the eastern North Atlantic and northwestern Pacific. Its capabilities for operations near the continental US are more limited, but are growing. Capabilities against carrier task forces have been improved by the conversion of jet bombers to employ anti-ship missiles, by the introduction of submarines equipped with cruise-type missiles, and by increased air reconnaissance of open ocean areas by Long Range and Naval Aviation. The Soviets have also placed increasing emphasis on improvement of ASW forces in coastal areas and in the open seas. We believe the Soviet Navy is capable of carrying out fairly effective ASW operations in coastal areas, but that it has a negligible ASW capability in the open seas. Despite the effort which they almost certainly are devoting to this problem, we believe that over the next five years, the USSR will be able to achieve only a limited capability to detect, identify, localize, and maintain surveillance on submarines operating in the open seas./7/ (Paras. 125-147)
/7/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, would delete the last sentence and substitute the following:
While over the next five years, it is probable that the USSR will have only a limited ASW capability in the open seas, it must be recognized that the effort being applied by the USSR toward solution of the ASW problem will reduce current deficiencies and possibly could result in marked improvement in Soviet open seas capabilities. [Footnote in the source text.]
[Here follows the "Discussion" section, 45 pages of text. See the Supplement.]
131. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, April 2, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meetings, General 4/63-5/63. Secret.
SUBJECT
A Standing Committee of the National Security Council/2/
/2/On the source text the word "Standing" in Bundy's handwriting replaces the typed phrase "Plans and Operations." The proposed committee is referred to throughout the memorandum as the Plans and Operations Committee.
As you know, there has been considerable discussion in recent months of the need for strengthening interdepartmental planning and coordination on major national security issues. We made a major step forward at the time of the October crisis when you established a working senior committee of advisers, first by your de facto choice of individuals for the work of the first week, and then by formally establishing the Executive Committee of the NSC on October 22./3/ The Executive Committee, with you and the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense on hand, is a good instrument for major interdepartmental decision. It is not so good for lesser matters of coordination, and it has not proved effective at all, except during the extraordinary week of October 16-22, in the process of forward planning.
/3/The formal instrument for establishing the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, known also as EXCOM, was NSAM No. 196, dated October 22. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 196) The 42 meetings of the Executive Committee were held through March 29, 1963, and were largely, although not exclusively, devoted to Cuba.
I have talked at some length with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, Averell Harriman, and others, in an effort to find a new pattern which would help in both planning and operations. I have come out with the following guidelines:
1. One new committee should be responsible for planning and operations at the level short of your own controlling judgment. We have done well in this Administration not to let planning get separated from the responsibility for action, and vice versa. We should not abandon this principle now.
2. The committee should be established at a sufficiently senior level so that it is not merely a staff exercise. In my judgment, this means that with four exceptions its membership should be parallel to that of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council. It should include such men as the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, Ed Murrow, John McCone, and probably Max Taylor. The people it should not include, in my judgment, are the President and Vice President, and the two Cabinet officers with a final responsibility for policy advice to you, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. Neither of these two Cabinet officers can speak in committee without engaging the whole weight of a great advisory department, and both of them have preferred not to be pinned to any procedure in which their direct responsibilities to you might somehow be absorbed in a committee process.
3. The Plans and Operations Committee should be chaired from the White House, presumably by me, but it should rely mainly upon State, Defense, and CIA for staff work. For this reason, it is of the greatest importance that the State representative be a man with a broad and continuous operational responsibility, but also with time and energy for this particular assignment. I think it clear that the right man, on these grounds, is Averell Harriman, using the Policy Planning Council for plans and the several bureaus for operational problems. Of course, nothing should prevent the presence at relevant sessions of any officer of the State Department (on a number of problems George Ball would probably wish to come and on some the Secretary might want to break his own rule), but it is critical to the success of such a committee that there be a single senior member of the State Department to whom I can turn for daily business, and on this basis, Averell is the logical man in the logical job.
4. The committee should meet weekly, and it should have as little continuing infrastructure as possible. Except for State, Defense, and CIA--its members should attend as individuals and not as representatives of agencies. If a man cannot come, in other words, no one automatically comes in his place--except in the case of State, Defense, and CIA, where the departments simply have to be included.
In sum, what I recommend is that you establish a Plans and Operations Committee on this general basis. My recommendation is that its initial composition should be as follows:
The Political Under Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and the Director, for State, Defense, and CIA, respectively; the following as members by your personal appointment: Douglas Dillon, Robert Kennedy, Edward Murrow, Dave Bell, Maxwell Taylor (subject to his agreement--he is terribly stretched), Theodore Sorensen, and Llewellyn Thompson./4/ The chairman of this committee should be myself, and its administrative support should be provided by Mr. Bromley Smith.
/4/On the source text Llewellyn Thompson's name is crossed out. Bundy's marginal note reads: "ad hoc".
5. The Plans and Operations Committee should not occupy itself with business better handled through other channels. In particular it should not try to get on the cables or to replace the manifold arrangements through which your own executive business is now conducted. Still less should it be concerned with matters of daily Departmental operation. It should, instead, be alert to planning problems that are a little less ripe than today's required decisions: like Cuba a year from now--or China in 1965. It should serve as a ready medium for review of ongoing programs with strongly interdepartmental aspects: I think of overseas base planning, of counter-insurgency support, and of information policy as examples. It should be used for the occasional discursive review of drastic alternatives to existing policy, and its members should be encouraged to table unorthodox ideas for such review. It would be a logical plan [place?] for occasional review of Intelligence estimates in progress, from the point of view of their relevance to Plans and Operations.
6. If you approve of this general proposal, I shall work out a formal memorandum for your signature after checking again with those most closely concerned./5/
/5/No memorandum has been found. All the people suggested by Bundy except Thompson and Dillon became members of the new Standing Group, which held its first meeting on March 29. Henry H. Fowler, Under Secretary of the Treasury, became a member in Dillon's place. Of the 14 meetings held through October 1, 10 concerned Cuba in whole or in part. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meetings 1963) A previous, smaller Standing Group, consisting of U. Alexis Johnson as Chairman, Roswell Gilpatric, John McCone, and McGeorge Bundy, held 15 meetings on a wide variety of topics from January 5 through August 3, 1962. (Ibid., Standing Group Meetings 1962)
McG. B./6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
132. Memorandum From the JCS Chairman's Special Assistant (Goodpaster) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze)/1/
Washington, April 20, 1963.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, BNSP. Top Secret. Attached to a covering note from Major Smith to Nitze.
SUBJECT
Major Military Issues in Basic National Security Policy
1. Attached is the document that I believe should be distributed for the discussions between the Secretary and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on basic national security policy. The document consists of three parts:
a. A brief covering memorandum explaining the procedures used in developing the material.
b. A summary of the six major issues.
c. A three-column (State, JCS, OSD/ISA) tabulation of the issues as extracted from the appropriate draft BNSP documents./2/
/2/Not found attached.
2. With your concurrence I will have the document circulated to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
A. J. Goodpaster/3/
Major General, USA
/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Goodpaster signed the original.
Attachment/4/
Washington, April 20, 1963.
/4/Top Secret.
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE/5/
/5/In his memoirs, Nitze wrote that he sent a "memorandum" summarizing six issues to McNamara "in the spring of 1963 and asked him to resolve them. He refused and sent it back with the comment that he didn't believe there was anything to be gained by the formulation of such a document. He suggested that a reading of the President's and his (McNamara's) public statements was sufficient to delineate our national security policy." (Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision: A Memoir (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), p. 252)
SUBJECT
Major Military Issues in Basic National Security Policy
1. Attached are six major issues with military implications extracted from various draft BNSP documents. In three columns are shown the view of:
a. The State Department (from their 2 August 1962 draft of BNSP);/6/
/6/See the source note, Document 93.
b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (from the 7 December 1962 JCS comments on the State Department draft BNSP); /7/ and
/7/Document 119.
c. OSD/ISA (from the 25 March 1963 ISA revision of the State Department draft, taking into consideration the JCS comments of December 1962)./8/
/8/Not printed. Copies are in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, BNSP Drafts, and ibid., S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Basic National Security Policy.
Covering the detailed views is a brief summation of the State Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and OSD/ISA positions on these issues. The Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, prepared the materials in coordination with OSD/ISA.
2. The issues in the attachments cover selected major divergencies in the present draft versions of the BNSP. Other points of issue would undoubtedly arise in the consideration of any complete document.
3. This memorandum and its attachments will be used as the basis for discussion of basic policy issues at the forthcoming meeting of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to be scheduled when the Chairman returns./9/
/9/Concerning a meeting between McNamara and the Joint Chiefs on this issue, see Document 136.
Attachment/10/
/10/Top Secret.
DRAFT
SELECTED ISSUES IN BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
Summary
Attachment 1: Strategic Retaliatory Forces
Neither the State Department nor OSD/ISA believe a first strike against substantially all Soviet nuclear delivery systems appears practical; hence, they do not think it desirable as a policy directive, and would not increase strategic forces for attainment of this goal. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the other hand, believe a first strike capability is both feasible and desirable, both for deterrence and to lessen the probability of defeat should general war occur. They recognize that the degree of success will depend upon US force levels and on US reaction to changing Soviet capabilities.
Attachment 2: General Purpose Forces
The Joint Chiefs of Staff would give essential non-nuclear and nuclear requirements equal priority, emphasize the dual capability of these forces, and thus would not attempt to have general purpose forces large enough to defeat a major Soviet conventional assault with conventional forces only. Rather, they would have Allied forces equipped with tactical nuclear weapons for deterrence and for use if necessary. The State Department would give priority to conventional forces build-up, and would defer on a doctrine for the use of tactical nuclear weapons pending completion of studies on the subject. The State Department would not now plan to defeat a major Soviet assault with conventional weapons but would set this as a desirable goal in the future. OSD/ISA agrees with State on giving priority to conventional forces and the limited value of tactical nuclear weapons. ISA would establish interim conventional force goals at the MC 26/4 level.
Attachment 3: NATO Policy
The divergent views on the role and size of conventional and tactical nuclear forces outlined in the issue above on General Purpose forces are highlighted again in the NATO section. The State Department and OSD/ISA believe the Soviet conventional threat in Europe is somewhat less than do the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, the State Department and OSD/ISA would have the US adopt as basic policy endorsement of a sea based, multilateral mix-manned MRBM for NATO. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while recognizing the national decision on this point, would not write the decision in the basic policy document because of the evolving nature of this problem.
Attachment 4: Arms Control and Disarmament
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that arms control agreements should include all major powers. OSD/ISA and the State Department believe in partial agreements. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would link arms control and disarmament agreements, and their implementation, more explicitly to military security implications, the possible consequences of Soviet sudden abrogation, and our treaty commitments than would either OSD/ISA or the State Department. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would thus move more cautiously in this field.
Attachment 5: Communist China
The State Department and OSD/ISA would adopt a "two China" policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff oppose adoption of such a policy without a thorough analysis of its implications.
Attachment 6: Research and Development
The State Department and OSD/ISA advocate that the US seek a selective superiority in military technology, with especial emphasis on conventional weapons. Neither would stress military space research. OSD/ISA would recognize the need to increase the means to reduce damage to the US in general war but emphasizes the difficulties attendant to, and the questionable value of, current AICBM programs and other advanced research programs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would have the US seek across-the-board military technological superiority.
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