In a memorandum to Secretary McNamara dated July 15, 1963, President Kennedy wrote that he was "tremendously impressed with the Special Forces Unit in West Germany. However, I am wondering if we are making the best use of this unit?" Kennedy believed that it was a "wasted effort" to keep this unit "where prospects of guerilla action are very slight." Instead "they could be demonstrating and training all over the underdeveloped world where the guerilla actions are rising in intensity." A July 24 memorandum from Taylor to Kennedy noted that some of the six existing Special Forces Units were already operating along the lines suggested by Kennedy. One in Panama had "dispatched Spanish speaking mobile training teams" to nine Central and South American countries, and detachments from the one in Okinawa had conducted demonstrations or counterinsurgency training in six Asian countries. Taylor concluded that "it would appear that the worldwide program for the employment of Army Special Forces is generally consistent with the desires which you have expressed in your memorandum of July 15," but that it was "probable more can be done and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will keep under review the adequacy and employment of the Army Special Forces as well as Air Force Commando and Navy Units."

On July 26, Kennedy sent a memorandum to Rusk stating that he had "been very much impressed by the appearance and demeanor of the special forces I have seen and believe that their presence in other countries can project a U.S. image which will be a very useful political influence. To do so it is important that the size of the cadres be sufficiently large to have an impact. Since the judgment of our Ambassadors in the countries concerned will be dominant in both the decision to introduce the forces and the decision as to their size, I believe that you should send a letter to those Ambassadors in countries where the forces are likely to be employed, calling attention to the importance of these points."

(On March 8, 1962, circular airgram CA-2108, sent to all diplomatic posts, had described U.S. Special Warfare capabilities, and invited addressees to comment "on desirability and political feasibility utilizing these US capabilities to supplement functions of present MAAG/Missions or (where no MAAG/Mission exists) Embassy.")

Circular airgram CA-1507, August 5, drafted jointly in G/PM and OSD and approved by U. Alexis Johnson, was sent to a large number of Latin American, Near Eastern, African, and Asian posts. It stated that the President had "directed that appropriate Country Teams examine the possibility of increased use of U.S. Military Mobile Training Teams (MMTs) which have proved so successful in many areas of the world in preventing and combating subversive insurgency." Additional suggestions by Ambassadors for such training were "invited where applicable and practicable" and where requested by the host government.

In a memorandum for the record dated September 3, Clifton noted that the President had said that CA-1507 "would not get anyone steamed up. It is not a sales job, and he feels it is really a very routine response to what he really wants to do." He "wants a real sales job on why it is going to be so helpful to them, what a good face forces can put on our nation, and how inspiring they are." Clifton suggested that a White House staffer "draft the kind of message that should be sent to the Ambassador and then sell it to State and Defense to send, or else the President might send it." (All these memoranda and cables are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense, Special Warfare Volume II 1962-1963)

Circular airgram CA-5661, dated December 2 and addressed to the same posts as CA-1507, was drafted jointly in S/S and the JCS and cleared throughout the government, including Michael Forrestal at the NSC. It opened by quoting much of Kennedy's July 26 memorandum to Rusk, continued with a detailed description of special warfare units of all the services, and directed all action addressees to comment by January 15, 1964, on the potential appropriateness, with host government approval, of these units for demonstrations, training, or civic action in their countries. (Department of State, Special Group (CI) Files: Lot 68 D 458, SG(CI) General 1963)

134. National Intelligence Estimate/1/

NIE 11-9-63

Washington, July 15, 1963.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, National Intelligence Estimates. Secret; Restricted Data; Limited Distribution. A table of contents is not printed. For complete text, see the Supplement.

A note on the cover sheet reads in part: "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, AEC, and NSA." The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred except the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS TO ORBIT NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Problem

To examine Soviet capabilities and intentions to orbit nuclear weapons, probable Free World reactions to such a development, and Soviet reactions to various US responses./2/

/2/In this estimate, we concentrate primarily on multiorbit bombardment satellite systems, i.e., those designed to complete one or more revolutions of the earth prior to being detonated. We also have included, though at much abbreviated length, consideration of fractional orbit system, i.e., those designed to make less than one revolution of the earth before detonation. Although they do not follow a ballistic trajectory, fractional orbit systems are employed in a manner more closely related to that of an ICBM, and are therefore not germane to most aspects of the problem. [Footnote in the source text.]

Conclusions

A. We have thus far acquired no evidence that the USSR plans to orbit a nuclear-armed satellite in the near term, or that a program to establish an orbital bombardment capability is at present seriously contemplated by the Soviet leadership. However, the USSR does have the capability of orbiting one or possibly a few nuclear-armed satellites at any time, and at comparatively small cost. (Paras. 1-3, 15-16)

B. The limitations of existing hardware and facilities are such that the nuclear weapons which the Soviets could orbit during 1963-1964 would not add significantly to their military capabilities. Currently operational Soviet ICBMs would be capable of delivering comparable payloads with greater effectiveness. (Paras. 4-14)

C. A variety of political motives, such as the desire to restore the image of the USSR as the preeminent world military power, might nevertheless impel the Soviets to orbit a nuclear weapon in the near term for demonstrative purposes. Such a move would be more likely if the Soviets were already committed to the eventual establishment of an orbital bombardment force, or if convinced that the US was so committed. However, in seeking to impress world opinion, they would also encounter a variety of adverse reactions. Awe and alarm would be accompanied by resentment and dismay, and it would be charged in many quarters that the Soviets had extended the nuclear arms race into a new, more dangerous area. The Soviets would have to consider whether it would serve their interests to risk strong US countermoves, including an ambitious US military space program, and a general intensification of the cold war. (Paras. 17-23)

D. On balance, it appears to us that the disadvantages would outweigh the advantages, and we therefore believe that there is less than an even chance that the USSR will orbit a nuclear weapon in the near term. Nevertheless, the Soviets may weigh the balance differently than we do, and it remains possible that they will exercise their technical capability at any time. (Para. 24)

E. If the USSR should orbit a nuclear weapon for demonstrative purposes, it would almost certainly anticipate some form of US reaction. The Soviets would have to consider the possibility of a US attempt to destroy their satellite, and if the US threatened to do so, they would probably threaten retaliation against US satellites. They would be wary, however, of the risks involved in direct retaliation, including a possible "open war" on all satellites and the accompanying dangers of escalation. Official and popular opinion in most states allied with the US would expect and support US measures to counter the Soviet action. Opinion in the nonaligned states would favor some form of UN "solution." The Soviets themselves might use the UN in an effort to deter US countermoves and to delay or forestall any US military program in space. (Paras. 25-30)

Prospects for 1965-1970

F. Based solely on considerations of cost and effectiveness as we now understand them, it would appear unlikely that the Soviets will during this decade deploy advanced orbital bombardment systems of military significance. We recognize, however, that the Soviets might reach different conclusions as to cost and effectiveness, or that other factors might be more weighty. Moreover, considering the pace of developments in the weapons field in general, it is extremely hazardous to estimate Soviet decisions for a period many years ahead. For these reasons, a firm estimate as to whether the Soviets will deploy an advanced orbital bombardment system within the 1965-1970 period cannot be made at this time. (Paras. 31-34, 45-49)

G. If the Soviets do proceed with an advanced orbital system, we believe that they are more likely to seek a small force of limited effectiveness than a very large and sophisticated one. The weapons of a small force could be maintained continually in orbit or could be held on standby on the ground for deployment as required. In any case, developmental testing of an orbital bombardment system should be observable to us at least a year or two prior to attainment of an accurate, reliable system. (Paras. 35-44, 50)

[Here follows the "Discussion" section. See the Supplement.]

135. Editorial Note

According to a memorandum by William Smith, the entire White House daily staff meeting on July 19, 1963, was devoted to Walt Rostow's presentation "of State Department plans for using strategic studies of various countries as a basis for policy making and programming." Such studies would emphasize especially the smooth coordination of economic and military aid. Two such studies were almost complete, but it was "not clear at this point who would approve them. State would like to have them approved either by some interdepartmental group" or by the President.

Smith wrote that the "economists and budgeteers of the group seemed more interested than the political experts, with the exception of Forrestal." Bundy "questioned the idea most sharply by saying he did not believe that a country-by-country approach was the right way to turn around our aid program. We would be well into Teddy's Administration before the task was completed. He also commented that a paper itself would be of no use unless it was approved as a basis for action, and that its chances for approval depended in part upon its intrinsic merit." Bundy "admitted that analyses of the type suggested would produce information which would be available in time of a crisis and might facilitate action then." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, July 1963)

In a September 23 memorandum to Bundy, Komer stated that he felt that Rostow's effort's were hampered by "trying to kill two birds with one stone." Rostow had started with the idea of the strategic study as an "imaginative reexamination of old shibboleths which could provide a new base for sensible policies," but this objective suffered when Rostow "took on Rusk's mandate to bring under control the variety of overlapping studies" being done by other agencies. "It is just too much to expect that you can at one and the same time (a) produce a penetrating long-range policy analysis; (b) translate it into detailed interagency operational guidance; and (c) get all concerned to sign on." The Policy Planning Council hadn't "the leverage to accomplish what the NSC and OCB couldn't." Despite Rostow's optimism, the agencies were not "going to buy." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Robert Komer 6/63-11/63)

136. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council and Counselor of the Department of State (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, July 23, 1963.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Basic National Security Policy. Secret.

SUBJECT
BNSP

I should report to you the state of the BNSP in the Pentagon.

You will recall that, at Secretary McNamara's request, /2/ you referred the draft BNSP back for another round of work which would give the JCS a chance to thrash out its views with DOD. After that work had gone forward nearly to resolution/3/ Secretary McNamara shifted his earlier favorable view to a judgment that the BNSP was not necessary for the conduct of his business.

/2/No record of this request has been found.

/3/Information on work done during the winter and spring of 1963 by DOD/ISA on a basic national security policy paper is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Basic National Security Policy and in National Defense University, Taylor Papers, BNSP. See also Document 132.

Henry Rowen reported to me today that there was a discussion between Secretary McNamara and the JCS in which, after expressing his skepticism, Secretary McNamara put the question: "On what problems do you need high level guidance?" Six issues emerged from the JCS;/4/ and Secretary McNamara set in motion work within the Pentagon to generate required guidance./5/

/4/The issues were: targeting capability of strategic retaliatory forces; number of concurrent capabilities to be programmed for conventional forces; amount of capability NATO forces needed to attempt to reach a standoff in a potential theater conflict by non-nuclear means; what, if any, provision was to be made for supporting a satellite revolt; the level of military presence adequate for the United States in the area between Suez and Thailand; and whether U.S. military planners should assume that the United States would not wage large-scale ground operations on the Asian mainland. (Walter S. Poole, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. VIII: 1961-1964 Part I, The Structure of National Defense, p. 18; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Historical Division, Joint Secretariat)

/5/The Joint Chiefs tasked J-5 and the NESC to provide draft answers to the six questions, with the intention of sending the whole package to McNamara. When the drafts reached the JCS in late August, however, the Chiefs decided to "note" the replies and not forward them to McNamara, apparently on the ground that it would be preferable to consider the six issues within the context of the complete JSOP. (Ibid., p.19)

Thus, so far as the Pentagon is now concerned the BNSP is dead.

As you know in this matter, as opposed to the conduct of specific planning operations, I do not feel a sense of personal responsibility for pressing the BNSP forward. I do believe, however, that you and the President should consider seriously the following aspect of the matter: the BNSP was first developed in the Truman Administration and was carried forward in several editions in the Eisenhower Administration. Whatever the limitations inherent in any such document, I doubt that it will redound to the credit of our Administration that we failed to thrash out any successor document. A BNSP obviously cannot substitute for specific policy judgments; and it should not tie the President's hands. But it can provide an occasion for debating and defining the bone structure of policy and communicating it to the troops who never see the four star generals.

My first recommendation is, therefore, that you consider with the President whether or not you wish to consider the BNSP exercise as finished.

If you wish to keep the matter open, we might consider what forms such a document might take in the light of Secretary McNamara's views and the passage of time.

If you decide that we should abandon the exercise, you may wish to consider what form a decent and unobtrusive burial might take; e.g., simply letting it drift off; a NSAM ordering suspension in the light of fast-moving world events; etc.

But before accepting some form of the latter alternatives, I do urge you and the President to pause for a moment on the prior question./6/

/6/Rostow and Rusk met and discussed this memorandum some time before July 30. Rostow later wrote that Rusk agreed to the undertaking of another draft of basic national security policy, which would be discussed with the President and McNamara. According to Rostow, Rusk "mentioned" that if the President did not wish to "promulgate" the paper, he (Rusk) "might table with the NSC for the information of its members your concept of an appropriate policy statement of this kind." (Memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, November 15; Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, BNSP 1963) A draft BNSP dated August 14 is ibid., S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, BNSP Drafts 1963. Additional information on this topic is in Document 146.

137. Memorandum of Conference With President Kennedy/1/

Washington, July 24, 1963, 10 a.m.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Clifton Series, Conferences with the President, Volume II, 2/28/63-9/9/63. Top Secret.

OTHERS PRESENT
General Taylor
General Wheeler
Admiral Anderson
General LeMay
General Shoup
Captain Shepard
General McHugh

SIOP

The Chairman presented to the President a new book/2/ which contains a complete summary of the SIOP,/3/ highlighting decisions required for its implementation. The President asked a number of questions and all the Chiefs participated in the discussion. The Chairman emphasized the extreme sensitivity of this document, stating there were only eight copies in existence.

/2/Not identified.

/3/Apparent reference to SIOP-63 (see Document 92). Differences between SIOP-63 and SIOP- 64, formally approved by the JCS in October 1963 with an effective date of January 1, 1964, are indicated in a memorandum from the JCS to McNamara dated November 14, 1962, JCS 2057/360, and Appendix A to Enclosure F to JCS 2956/400, October 16, 1963; both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 3105 (22 Jun 62) Sec. 1.

Army Special Forces

General Wheeler presented to the President the reply to a memorandum which the President had written to the Secretary of Defense on the employment of Army Special Forces./4/ The President stated he thought that the size of the groups being sent was too small to take maximum advantage of the favorable impression they create. General Wheeler stated that the limiting factor on the number of forces employed was often the opposition of the U.S. Ambassador concerned. The President stated that he should communicate with the Ambassadors. (A copy of the President's memorandum on this subject to the Secretary of State is attached.)/5/

/4/Reference is to the July 15 memorandum; see Document 133.

/5/Not attached. It is an earlier version of the President's July 26 memorandum described in Document 133.

General LeMay stated that he and the Chiefs of Staffs of Latin American Air Forces favor bringing their personnel to the U.S. for training. He also stated that there is a general consensus on the need for increased inter-American planning. He stated that the Inter-American Defense Board is unsatisfactory for this purpose. To make it effective, it should be placed under the OAS, and its personnel changed.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Tazewell Shepard

138. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/

SNIE 13-2-63

Washington, July 24, 1963.

/1/Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99. Secret. A table of contents is not printed. For complete text, see the Supplement. A note on the cover sheet reads in part: "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, AEC, and NSA." The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred except the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

COMMUNIST CHINA'S ADVANCED WEAPONS PROGRAM

The Problem

To assess Communist China's progress toward acquisition of a nuclear weapons and missile capability and to estimate the effects of such a development on Chinese policy.

Note to Readers

Since our most recent estimate on Communist China's advanced weapons program/2/ we have received a considerable amount of new information, mainly from photography. This evidence leads us to believe that the Chinese, with Soviet assistance, had embarked in the latter 1950s on a more ambitious advanced weapons program than we had earlier thought likely. We further believe that they are still working on that program though forced to slow its pace materially since 1960. Nevertheless, the gaps in our information remain substantial and we are therefore not able to judge the present state or to project the future development of the Chinese program as a whole with any very high degree of confidence. Specific judgments given below about the stage likely to be reached by the Chinese program at particular dates should be read in the light of this general caution.

/2/NIE 13-2-62, "Chinese Communist Advanced Weapons Capabilities," dated 25 April 1962. (Top Secret) [Footnote in the source text. See Document 81.]

Conclusions

A. Peiping has given high priority to the development of nuclear weapons and missiles. Recent aerial photography has revealed a number of developmental facilities indicating a broad program which diverts Communist China's limited scientific and technological resources from other parts of the economy. (Paras. 2-15 and 19)

B. We have found what we believe to be a plutonium production reactor in China, located at Pao-t'ou. This reactor probably could not have reached criticality before early 1962. If it did go critical at that time, the earliest a first device could be tested, based on plutonium from this reactor alone, would be early 1964. If the Chinese run into even a normal number of difficulties, this date would be postponed to late 1964 or 1965. If the reactor reached criticality later than early 1962--or has not yet done so--the detonation would be even further delayed. Beginning the year after a first detonation the reactor could produce enough material for only one or two crude weapons a year. The Chinese have a few bombers which could carry bulky weapons of early design. (Paras. 4-6 and 17)

C. We believe that the eventual Chinese program calls for nuclear weapons containing both U-235 and plutonium. Such a program would require more plutonium production facilities than the one reactor that has been identified. Neither photographic coverage nor other significant evidence have disclosed another production reactor in China. The possible existence of another reactor cannot be ignored however, nor the possibility that one may be in production. We therefore cannot exclude the possibility that the Chinese could achieve a first detonation at any time. (Para. 7)

D. The gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchou will probably not be able, under the most advantageous circumstances, to produce weapon-grade U-235 before 1966. Considering the great technical difficulties involved and the large amount of additional construction needed, a more likely date for such production is 1968-1969. (Paras. 2 and 3)

E. Peiping is probably concentrating initially on a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) system of basically Soviet design, either the 630 mile SS-3 or the 1,020 mile SS-4. We do not believe that missiles would be ready for deployment before 1967. Because of the time and difficulties involved in producing a missile-compatible warhead, we believe China is not likely to develop such a warhead until 3 or 4 years after a first detonation. (Paras. 16 and 18)

F. The detonation of a nuclear device would boost domestic morale. Although it is possible that the leadership would experience a dangerous degree of overconfidence, we think it more likely that Peiping will concentrate on furthering its established policies to: (1) force its way into world disarmament discussions and other world councils; (2) overawe its neighbors and soften them for Peiping-directed Communist subversion; and (3) tout Chinese-style communism as the best route for an underdeveloped nation to achieve industrial and scientific modernity. In pursuing its policies, Peiping's increased confidence would doubtless be reflected in its approach to conflicts on its periphery./3/ (Paras. 20-27)

[Here follow the "Discussion" section, 8 single-spaced pages, and a map. See the Supplement.]

/3/The Acting Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that China's leaders would recognize their limited capabilities had not altered the real power balance among the major states and could not do so in the future. In particular, they would recognize that they remained unable either to remove or neutralize the US presence in Asia and would not become willing to take significantly greater military risks. [Footnote in the source text.]

139. Memorandum From the Director for Internal Defense in the Office of Politico-Military Affairs (Maechling) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)/1/

Washington, July 29, 1963.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Internal Defense. Confidential. Attached to a covering note from Kitchens to Rostow and all the geographic Assistant Secretaries. A copy was sent to U. Alexis Johnson.

SUBJECT
Future of Special Group (CI)

I assume that after Mike Forrestal returns from vacation you, he, and McGeorge Bundy may get together for your discussion on the scope and terms of reference of the Special Group (CI). I therefore thought it might be helpful for you if I set down some views on the subject, based on my experience with the Group. First, some general comments:

1. The primary utility of the Group rests in its ability to obtain from its members high-level policy decisions on our counter-insurgency effort in the underdeveloped world and to do so rapidly and with a minimum of formality.

2. The Group is also effective in overcoming bureaucratic roadblocks affecting high-priority projects in the MAP and AID programs, and in resolving interdepartmental policy differences without involving the institutional prestige of the departments or agencies represented on the Group.

3. The Group has also been successful in stimulating, developing, and monitoring programs that either cut across departmental lines of responsibility or require interdepartmental collaboration. Training for counter-insurgency, civic action, and police assistance are examples of this type of activity.

4. The weekly meetings of the Group provide a means for exercising close and continuing control over policies and programs in nine or ten "crisis countries" of the underdeveloped world.

5. The Special Group (CI) has developed an institutional character and some measure of continuity, based on (a) regular meetings; (b) forward planning of agendas; (c) dissemination of minutes; and (d) systematic implementation of decisions. The quarterly reviews of country Internal Defense Plans, together with periodic status reports on training, civic action, police, etc., constitute the backbone of its agendas.

With these considerations in mind, it is evident that the Group exercises a function quite different from other high-level interdepartmental committees, such as the NSC Standing Group. It covers a narrower range of subject matter but does so in greater depth and with more continuity. The question that arises is whether the Group's activities are useful and productive, or whether its work is becoming routine and sterile. In my opinion, there is some indication that we are approaching a period of diminishing returns.

First, the counter-insurgency or internal defense label applies in its literal sense to a very small list of countries. Of the countries under cognizance of the Group, there is an active left-wing insurgency threat only in Vietnam, Laos, and Venezuela. Its application to other countries--both on the Group's critical list and off it--represents in greater or lesser degree a distortion of the concept. Colombia suffers from rural banditry; Ecuador, Guatemala, and Boliva from chronic instability; the threat in Iran will most likely take the form of an attempted coup; while in Thailand the threat is from external infiltration as much as internal.

One consequence of rigid adherence to the counter-insurgency concept is that the list of countries under the cognizance of the Group has remained virtually frozen for eighteen months. This may be justifiable in Southeast Asia, but in Latin America during the past year there have been revolutions, coups, abortive coups, and serious internal upheavals in several Latin American countries not under the Group's cognizance. In other geographic areas, there are serious situations of unrest and violence that merit high-level interdepartmental attention, if only on an ad hoc basis, but have not received it because they are not "insurgency" situations. For example, there is not now any high-level Government committee charged with coordinating our policies and programs in certain key African and Middle Eastern countries where the important factor is the political orientation of the government rather than an insurgent or guerrilla threat. In ex-French Africa our military and police assistance programs, which have been the subject of virtually continual policy differences during the past year, could stand some high-level interdepartmental attention. In the Middle East, the development of interdepartmentally coordinated policies and programs for Syria and Iraq is surely as important as continued surveillance over Guatemala, where the insurgency threat has largely receded.

Another consequence of the counter-insurgency approach is that we have been attacking such important programs as youth, labor, civic action and psychological strategy through the back door. This is better than not attacking it at all, but it distorts the true nature of the problem and may cause us to focus on lower priority situations.

Secondly, this rather doctrinaire counter-insurgency approach to the problems of underdeveloped countries has periodically created a feeling of uneasiness on the part of Mike Forrestal, the Attorney General (and perhaps the President too) that the Group is not coming to grips with the really important issues. As you know, the President has on occasion asked why the Group has not looked into such countries as Brazil. This feeling is likely to be intensified if we are entering an era in which the nature of the Soviet threat shifts to less aggressive but just as deadly forms of cultural and economic penetration.

Accordingly, I believe that the Special Group (CI) must develop a greater degree of flexibility if it is to continue as an effective instrument of government. It must focus on problems that require high-level attention. It should not go on indefinitely monitoring the internal security programs of eight or ten countries. Nor should it distort the complex problem of applying broad policies and programs in youth, labor, information, etc. to crisis areas by labeling them "counter-insurgency".

What I believe we need to do is gradually convert the Special Group (CI) to a "Special Group (Critical Areas)" with terms of reference more flexible than we have now. As I see it, the Group would then perform the following functions:

1. Continue monitoring interdepartmental counter-insurgency programs such as training, civic action, police assistance, etc.

2. Limit its continuing surveillance functions to those countries that face an immediate external or internal insurgency threat--Vietnam, Venezuela, Thailand, and possibly Iran. (Drop Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Laos.)

3. Establish a system of periodic spot surveillance over a wider range of underdeveloped countries, concentrating on those where severe unrest or Soviet penetration poses a critical threat to U.S. interests. These countries would be placed under the Group's cognizance for temporary periods as circumstances require, and kept there only long enough to assure that U.S. policies and programs are being carried out in a coordinated and effective manner.

4. Broaden the functional scope of the Group to cover such programs as youth, labor, psychological strategy, and economic counter-measures, as they apply to all critical areas of the underdeveloped world, not just those that have an insurgency threat.

If so broadened in purpose, a "Special Group (Critical Areas)" should operate in much the same way that it does now. A small White House staff of one or two officers would continue to be essential--not to recreate an OCB or generate paperwork, but to assist State in the forward planning of agendas and to flush out the problems that need high-level exposure. (No single department or agency can accomplish the latter.) As before, the primary purpose of the Group would be to expose program deficiencies, overcome bureaucratic obstacles, and force decisions on critical issues.

In writing the above I don't mean to imply that our counter-insurgency effort has become "passe". I do, however, think that the Group's efforts will become less productive unless it recognizes that the Soviet threat in the underdeveloped world may increasingly assume forms other than insurgency.

Charles Maechling, Jr./2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

140. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, August 28, 1963.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense Volume V, July-November 1963. Secret.

Last November at Hyannis Port/2/ I informed you that we would restudy Titan III to see whether, despite its overlap with Saturn C1/C1B in payload capacity, it seemed desirable to proceed. You will recall that the Titan III program was justified, in part, on the grounds that the cost per Titan launch would be so much less than per Saturn launch that the savings over the life of the program would approximately offset the development costs. The study of the costs and of the other elements of the program has been carried out by the Air Force. At the same time, preliminary development work has continued.

/2/The President was in Hyannis Port for the Thanksgiving weekend, November 21-25, 1962. See Document 113.

Since last Fall the contracts for Titan III have been finalized. Ninety-five percent of the cost of the development program which has been negotiated is represented by incentive contracts. This should be, and indeed is, a strong influence in keeping the development cost close to the estimated total of $875 million. Firing of 120" rockets which in modified form will be used for the strap on boosters has been carried out. Development of the other components of the system has continued on schedule. We anticipate the first test flight of the core (this includes the two stages based on the Titan II ICBM and the transtage) in August 1964 and of the full Titan III C in April 1965.

With respect to the desirability of Titan III, I conclude that, on the basis of the best estimates that can be made of its development cost, production and launch cost, and reliability as compared to those of Saturn, and the expected number of payloads in the 1966-75 period, Titan III will probably very much more than pay for its development. Recognizing the uncertainties in all of these factors, we have also examined the situation with some assumptions less favorable to Titan III. Under these circumstances we conclude that Titan III will nevertheless roughly pay for itself. I know that others have made still more pessimistic estimates. However, even with some slight economic deficiency, I believe the insurance that we purchase by the Titan III development makes it a desirable investment. This insurance is the capability to launch space payloads on very short notice or into narrow time windows, and the possibility of converting Titan III into a weapon system of large payload capacity, both of which are offered by its combination of storable and solid fuels. Therefore the Department of Defense plans to proceed with the development of the Titan III./3/

Robert S. McNamara

/3/An attached note from Spurgeon Keeny to Bundy stated that Jerome Wiesner "still questions the necessity of undertaking the project at all and the wisdom of the specific forum of the proposal if the project is undertaken," but added that Wiesner did not plan further opposition since McNamara had taken his objections into account in making his decision. Wiesner set forth his views at length in a July 8 memorandum to Harold Brown. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense Volume V, July-November 1963)

141. Summary Record of the 517th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/

Washington, September 12, 1963, 11 a.m.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, 517th NSC Meeting. Top Secret. Drafted by Smith. The 21 attendees at this meeting in the Cabinet Room included the President, Rusk, McNamara, Dillon, Robert Kennedy, Seaborg, McCone, Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, Sorensen, and eight members of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee headed by General Leon W. Johnson. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)

Report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee

General Taylor presented the Net Evaluation Subcommittee report/2/ and introduced General Leon Johnson, with the suggestion that the President might wish to question him about the report.

/2/The Report has not been found. In a memorandum to Bundy dated August 28, Colonel Smith stated that the briefing would cover the report's conclusions concerning projected results of general war at various intervals in the 1963-1968 period. Casualties and damage in the United States would "increase over the years. Soviet damage and capabilities will remain somewhat constant (because their capabilities are increasing). Probably the major NESC conclusion is that during the years 1964 through 1968 neither the US nor the USSR can emerge from a full nuclear exchange without suffering very severe damage and high casualties, no matter which side initiates the war." Smith held that the study raised one major issue. U.S. "offensive and defensive weapons currently programmed will not reduce damage from a full nuclear exchange to an acceptable level. Consequently, there is a need for development of new offensive and defensive weapons." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, WYS Chron File, Apr-Sep 63)

The President asked whether, even if we attack the USSR first, the loss to the U.S. would be unacceptable to political leaders. General Johnson replied that it would be, i.e. even if we preempt, surviving Soviet capability is sufficient to produce an unacceptable loss in the U.S.

The President asked whether then in fact we are in a period of nuclear stalemate. General Johnson replied that we are.

Referring to a statement of the Air Force Association which appeared in this morning's Washington Post,/3/ the President asked how we could obtain nuclear superiority as recommended by the Air Force Association. General Johnson said this was a very difficult question to answer. He acknowledged that there is no way, no matter what we do, to avoid unacceptable damage in the U.S. if nuclear war breaks out. He later acknowledged that it would be impossible for us to achieve nuclear superiority.

/3/The statement was printed in The Washington Post, September 12, 1963.

Secretary McNamara said that Defense Department studies showed that even if we spend $80 billion more than we are now spending, we would still have 30 million fatalities in the U.S. in the 1968 time period, even if we made the first strike against the USSR.

The President said these fatality figures were much higher than those he had heard recently in Omaha./4/ As he recalled it, SAC estimated 12 million casualties.

/4/See Document 118.

General Taylor said these were higher casualty figures than the President had ever seen. Today's figures include two new factors:

1. Soviet weapons were targeted on U.S. cities.

2. The use by the Soviets of huge megaton weapons was included in the computations for the first time.

The President said that de Gaulle believed that even the small nuclear force he is planning will be big enough to cause unacceptable damage to the USSR. He asked why we need to have as much defense as we have if, as it appears, the strategy is based on the assumption that even if we strike first we cannot protect the security of the U.S. in nuclear warfare.

General Johnson replied that no matter what we do we can't get below 51 million casualties in the event of a nuclear exchange. We can, however, bring down this number by undertaking additional weapons programs.

The President asked if this doesn't get us into the overkill business. General Johnson replied in the negative. We can cut down U.S. losses if we knock out more Soviet missiles by having more U.S. missiles and more accurate U.S. missiles. We estimate that we can save 20% in megatonnage down in the U.S. if we can achieve more accurate missiles. The more Soviet missiles we can destroy the less the loss to us. There is no question but that we can increase the accuracy of our missiles. The Soviets are not competing with us on numbers of missiles. They need, according to our calculation, only 1200 weapons. They, of course, can increase the megatonnage by enlarging the size of their weapons.

General Johnson said that his personal conclusions from this study were three:

1. We have to get better weapons, especially anti-ballistic missile weapons, to increase the number of Soviet missiles that we keep from landing in the U.S.

2. We must perfect ways of stopping missiles fired by Soviet submarines.

3. We must pay greater attention to chemical and biological warfare weapons. The problem with such weapons to date has been that the incubation period is three days, but conceivably could be brought down to one day.

General Johnson pointed out that each of the strategies used against the USSR resulted in at least 140 million fatalities in the USSR. Our problem is how to catch more of the Soviet missiles before they are launched and how to destroy more of the missiles in the air over the U.S.

Secretary McNamara said there was no way of launching a no-alert attack against the USSR which would be acceptable. No such attack, according to the calculations, could be carried out without 30 million U.S. fatalities--an obviously unacceptable number. Under conditions existing in 1968 with our forces on the alert, only 300 warheads are used to produce the casualties in the Soviet Union. Ninety-five percent of our force is for non-fatality purposes. Thus, preemption today or in 1968 is not an acceptable course of action.

Secretary McNamara said the President deserved an answer to his question as to why we have to have so large a force. The answer lies in the fact that there are many uncertainties in the equations presented in today's report. The factors included in the report are probable, but they do not represent the entire range of possibilities. By introducing pessimistic factors, the estimates given today are drastically changed. He said the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are studying our current force level and they would be recommending a force level to meet a reasonable anticipated situation. The Chiefs are now considering the range of our weapons in relation to the range of anticipated factors.

General Johnson said he had concluded from the calculations that we could fight a limited war using nuclear weapons without fear that the Soviets would reply by going to all-out war. He said that the Russians have obviously made similar calculations, and, seeing the unsatisfactory estimated results of an all-out nuclear war, would not escalate a limited war even if we used tactical nuclear weapons.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the deep schizophrenia involved in the present nuclear situation. If Congress knew the conclusions presented in the report, the Administration could get funds for aid and information programs which are the resources we must rely on in our effort to prevent all-out nuclear war.

Mr. Bundy called attention to the fact that this study and the existence of the sub-committee itself had been one of the few government projects which had been kept secret.

Mr. McCone asked General Johnson what he thought would happen to our capability, if, in an arms agreement, we accepted a percentage reduction in the number of our weapons. He doubted such a percentage cut would have much effect. Secretary Rusk agreed that we would have to go very deep in an arms cut to have a substantial effect on our capability. General Taylor said: "That is, if the Russians honestly carry out a comparable cut."

The President said he concluded from the report that the forces which will be used under present circumstances are conventional, limited and tactical. General Johnson agreed, adding that nuclear war is impossible if rational men control governments.

Secretary Rusk said he agreed, but he did not get much comfort from this fact because, if both sides believed that neither side would use nuclear weapons, one side or the other would be tempted to act in a way which would push the other side beyond its tolerance level. He added that a response to pressure might be suicidal, being prompted by a desire to get it over with. He referred to the current situation as "This God Damn poker game."

General Taylor agreed that the conclusions of the report did mean that there was a low possibility of escalation. Secretary Rusk repeated his view that we can't assume that nuclear war won't happen and referred again to suicidal tendencies. He wondered who else could be exposed to the conclusions of the sub-committee.

The President again said that preemption was not possible for us and that that was a valuable conclusion growing out of an excellent report.

Secretary Dillon returned to the subject of publicizing the conclusions of the report. He recalled that a similar report three years ago indicated that we would be doing much more damage to the Soviet Union than they would do to us. Today's report indicated damage would be more nearly equal. Consequently, he thought that it would be easier for us to make public the conclusions of this report.

Secretary Rusk said we could get out the basic facts of the report without identifying it. Some of the information was already in the public domain.

General Taylor suggested that the intelligence community should review the report before any decision is made about making it public. He thought that the war game held on SIOP was better to use as a basis of judgment because this war game dealt with an actual situation in the current year.

The President thought that at some time we might consider making some of the report available to some of the Congressional leaders./5/

/5/NSC Action No. 2470, dated September 12, states that the Council: "Discussed the report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee." (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

(Attached is a copy of notes taken by the sub-committee members of the National Security Council discussion.)

Bromley Smith/6/

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Attachment/7/

/7/Top Secret.

RESUME OF DISCUSSION DURING NESC BRIEFING OF 12 SEPTEMBER 1963

Speaker--President--Is the level of damage we receive after we pre-empt against the Russians unacceptable?

Answer--Gen. Johnson--Yes (followed by a description of the range of US fatalities resulting from the study through the years 1964 through 1968).

Speaker--President--I have read the statement in this morning's paper by the Air Force Association. What is meant by their reference to nuclear superiority versus nuclear stalemate? How could you get superiority?

Answer--Gen. Johnson--Stated he believed the members of the Committee of the Air Force Association which drafted the resolution did not have the facts as brought out in the report being presented at this time. (The last subsidiary attack was explained.)

Speaker--Mr. McNamara--Indicated he had a study conducted examining the scale of fatalities after having added 80 billion dollars to the defense budget for blast shelters, increased weapons systems--both offensive and defensive. Under all of these conditions in the 1968 time period, the minimum number of fatalities was in excess of 30 million.

Speaker--President--At Omaha I remember being briefed that if we pre-empt our casualties may be on the order of 12 million.

Answer--Gen. Taylor--That briefing was related to the present SIOP.

Gen. Johnson--The variance rests in the difference in targeting objectives of the Soviets. The weight of effort devoted to urban industrial targets was the key to the variation in US casualties. The results of the Omaha report were obtained by the Soviets firing their retaliation counter force, this did not seem reasonable.

Speaker--Mr. Rusk--Does your study deal with any effects other than the direct weapon effects--such as disease, pestilence?

Answer--Gen. Johnson--No. However, the AEC made a study of the long term effects and basically concluded that not enough was known in this area. As a consequence, a letter was sent to Dr. Johnson, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, recommending additional efforts to provide answers on long term effects./8/

/8/Neither the study nor the letter to Gerald W. Johnson has been identified.

Speaker--President--Why do we need as much as we've got?

Answer--Gen. Johnson--Explained the reason was to reduce the damage and fatalities to our country. Improvement in US systems is of particular importance. Also the development of an ABM defensive system would be of greatest significance, particularly when deployed in an area such as the eastern segment of the US where approximately 70% of the population is concentrated.

Speaker--President--In the discussion the President asked about our conclusions from the offset attack on 23 cities.

Answer--Gen. Johnson--Discussed the results of the attack.

Speaker--President--If we can't pre-empt and reduce fatalities, then what? Why do we have as much as we've got? Doesn't it get into the overkill business?

Answer--Gen. Johnson--Indicated that the Soviet knows without any doubt that we can destroy him due to the size of our force. In effect, there should be no margin for error in his assessment of our capabilities. Effort must now be expended to improve the systems in reliability and accuracy. Certainly along with this is the importance of multiple forces--bombers, SLBMs, ICBMs--to compound the Soviet problem. The statement on overkill has been exaggerated since our expectancy of damage against the Soviet time sensitive ICBMs in 1964 was calculated as no higher than 20%, whereas the 1968 estimate reached 70%. If this expectancy were increased to 90%, the overall megatonnage down on the US would be reduced by 20%.

Answer--Mr. McNamara--Gen. Johnson's group has assumed probable planning factors and they seem to me to be reasonable assumptions. They do not represent all the possible factors so we must decide whether we are protecting ourselves against pessimistic factors of Soviet capabilities. By assuming a range of US forces we have calculated a range of US and Soviet fatalities. Large changes in forces result in only small changes in fatalities.

Speaker--President--Why does he have a smaller force?

Answer--Gen. Johnson--Soviet may consider he has sufficient force with which to deter, especially when viewed in relation to the scale of fatalities he is given the capability to produce in this country. (Described manner in which assessments are carried out and assistance rendered by NMCSSC.)

Speaker--Gen. Johnson--Volunteered that he would be very disturbed if the President considered this report indicated that we could reduce our forces and/or not continue to increase to those programmed. If a reduction should take place, the relative position of the US and Soviets would become less in our favor. The President said he understood.

Speaker--Gen. Johnson--Discussed the need for an effective ABM defense; emphasis on Laser and Casaba-Howitzer, intercepting sub-launched missile in boost phase. Also br