Docs 133-149
133. Editorial Note
In a memorandum to Secretary McNamara dated July 15, 1963, President Kennedy wrote that he was "tremendously impressed with the Special Forces Unit in West Germany. However, I am wondering if we are making the best use of this unit?" Kennedy believed that it was a "wasted effort" to keep this unit "where prospects of guerilla action are very slight." Instead "they could be demonstrating and training all over the underdeveloped world where the guerilla actions are rising in intensity." A July 24 memorandum from Taylor to Kennedy noted that some of the six existing Special Forces Units were already operating along the lines suggested by Kennedy. One in Panama had "dispatched Spanish speaking mobile training teams" to nine Central and South American countries, and detachments from the one in Okinawa had conducted demonstrations or counterinsurgency training in six Asian countries. Taylor concluded that "it would appear that the worldwide program for the employment of Army Special Forces is generally consistent with the desires which you have expressed in your memorandum of July 15," but that it was "probable more can be done and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will keep under review the adequacy and employment of the Army Special Forces as well as Air Force Commando and Navy Units."
On July 26, Kennedy sent a memorandum to Rusk stating that he had "been very much impressed by the appearance and demeanor of the special forces I have seen and believe that their presence in other countries can project a U.S. image which will be a very useful political influence. To do so it is important that the size of the cadres be sufficiently large to have an impact. Since the judgment of our Ambassadors in the countries concerned will be dominant in both the decision to introduce the forces and the decision as to their size, I believe that you should send a letter to those Ambassadors in countries where the forces are likely to be employed, calling attention to the importance of these points."
(On March 8, 1962, circular airgram CA-2108, sent to all diplomatic posts, had described U.S. Special Warfare capabilities, and invited addressees to comment "on desirability and political feasibility utilizing these US capabilities to supplement functions of present MAAG/Missions or (where no MAAG/Mission exists) Embassy.")
Circular airgram CA-1507, August 5, drafted jointly in G/PM and OSD and approved by U. Alexis Johnson, was sent to a large number of Latin American, Near Eastern, African, and Asian posts. It stated that the President had "directed that appropriate Country Teams examine the possibility of increased use of U.S. Military Mobile Training Teams (MMTs) which have proved so successful in many areas of the world in preventing and combating subversive insurgency." Additional suggestions by Ambassadors for such training were "invited where applicable and practicable" and where requested by the host government.
In a memorandum for the record dated September 3, Clifton noted that the President had said that CA-1507 "would not get anyone steamed up. It is not a sales job, and he feels it is really a very routine response to what he really wants to do." He "wants a real sales job on why it is going to be so helpful to them, what a good face forces can put on our nation, and how inspiring they are." Clifton suggested that a White House staffer "draft the kind of message that should be sent to the Ambassador and then sell it to State and Defense to send, or else the President might send it." (All these memoranda and cables are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense, Special Warfare Volume II 1962-1963)
Circular airgram CA-5661, dated December 2 and addressed to the same posts as CA-1507, was drafted jointly in S/S and the JCS and cleared throughout the government, including Michael Forrestal at the NSC. It opened by quoting much of Kennedy's July 26 memorandum to Rusk, continued with a detailed description of special warfare units of all the services, and directed all action addressees to comment by January 15, 1964, on the potential appropriateness, with host government approval, of these units for demonstrations, training, or civic action in their countries. (Department of State, Special Group (CI) Files: Lot 68 D 458, SG(CI) General 1963)
134. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
NIE 11-9-63
Washington, July 15, 1963.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, National Intelligence Estimates. Secret; Restricted Data; Limited Distribution. A table of contents is not printed. For complete text, see the Supplement.
A note on the cover sheet reads in part: "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, AEC, and NSA." The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred except the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS TO ORBIT NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The Problem
To examine Soviet capabilities and intentions to orbit nuclear weapons, probable Free World reactions to such a development, and Soviet reactions to various US responses./2/
/2/In this estimate, we concentrate primarily on multiorbit bombardment satellite systems, i.e., those designed to complete one or more revolutions of the earth prior to being detonated. We also have included, though at much abbreviated length, consideration of fractional orbit system, i.e., those designed to make less than one revolution of the earth before detonation. Although they do not follow a ballistic trajectory, fractional orbit systems are employed in a manner more closely related to that of an ICBM, and are therefore not germane to most aspects of the problem. [Footnote in the source text.]
Conclusions
A. We have thus far acquired no evidence that the USSR plans to orbit a nuclear-armed satellite in the near term, or that a program to establish an orbital bombardment capability is at present seriously contemplated by the Soviet leadership. However, the USSR does have the capability of orbiting one or possibly a few nuclear-armed satellites at any time, and at comparatively small cost. (Paras. 1-3, 15-16)
B. The limitations of existing hardware and facilities are such that the nuclear weapons which the Soviets could orbit during 1963-1964 would not add significantly to their military capabilities. Currently operational Soviet ICBMs would be capable of delivering comparable payloads with greater effectiveness. (Paras. 4-14)
C. A variety of political motives, such as the desire to restore the image of the USSR as the preeminent world military power, might nevertheless impel the Soviets to orbit a nuclear weapon in the near term for demonstrative purposes. Such a move would be more likely if the Soviets were already committed to the eventual establishment of an orbital bombardment force, or if convinced that the US was so committed. However, in seeking to impress world opinion, they would also encounter a variety of adverse reactions. Awe and alarm would be accompanied by resentment and dismay, and it would be charged in many quarters that the Soviets had extended the nuclear arms race into a new, more dangerous area. The Soviets would have to consider whether it would serve their interests to risk strong US countermoves, including an ambitious US military space program, and a general intensification of the cold war. (Paras. 17-23)
D. On balance, it appears to us that the disadvantages would outweigh the advantages, and we therefore believe that there is less than an even chance that the USSR will orbit a nuclear weapon in the near term. Nevertheless, the Soviets may weigh the balance differently than we do, and it remains possible that they will exercise their technical capability at any time. (Para. 24)
E. If the USSR should orbit a nuclear weapon for demonstrative purposes, it would almost certainly anticipate some form of US reaction. The Soviets would have to consider the possibility of a US attempt to destroy their satellite, and if the US threatened to do so, they would probably threaten retaliation against US satellites. They would be wary, however, of the risks involved in direct retaliation, including a possible "open war" on all satellites and the accompanying dangers of escalation. Official and popular opinion in most states allied with the US would expect and support US measures to counter the Soviet action. Opinion in the nonaligned states would favor some form of UN "solution." The Soviets themselves might use the UN in an effort to deter US countermoves and to delay or forestall any US military program in space. (Paras. 25-30)
Prospects for 1965-1970
F. Based solely on considerations of cost and effectiveness as we now understand them, it would appear unlikely that the Soviets will during this decade deploy advanced orbital bombardment systems of military significance. We recognize, however, that the Soviets might reach different conclusions as to cost and effectiveness, or that other factors might be more weighty. Moreover, considering the pace of developments in the weapons field in general, it is extremely hazardous to estimate Soviet decisions for a period many years ahead. For these reasons, a firm estimate as to whether the Soviets will deploy an advanced orbital bombardment system within the 1965-1970 period cannot be made at this time. (Paras. 31-34, 45-49)
G. If the Soviets do proceed with an advanced orbital system, we believe that they are more likely to seek a small force of limited effectiveness than a very large and sophisticated one. The weapons of a small force could be maintained continually in orbit or could be held on standby on the ground for deployment as required. In any case, developmental testing of an orbital bombardment system should be observable to us at least a year or two prior to attainment of an accurate, reliable system. (Paras. 35-44, 50)
[Here follows the "Discussion" section. See the Supplement.]
135. Editorial Note
According to a memorandum by William Smith, the entire White House daily staff meeting on July 19, 1963, was devoted to Walt Rostow's presentation "of State Department plans for using strategic studies of various countries as a basis for policy making and programming." Such studies would emphasize especially the smooth coordination of economic and military aid. Two such studies were almost complete, but it was "not clear at this point who would approve them. State would like to have them approved either by some interdepartmental group" or by the President.
Smith wrote that the "economists and budgeteers of the group seemed more interested than the political experts, with the exception of Forrestal." Bundy "questioned the idea most sharply by saying he did not believe that a country-by-country approach was the right way to turn around our aid program. We would be well into Teddy's Administration before the task was completed. He also commented that a paper itself would be of no use unless it was approved as a basis for action, and that its chances for approval depended in part upon its intrinsic merit." Bundy "admitted that analyses of the type suggested would produce information which would be available in time of a crisis and might facilitate action then." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, July 1963)
In a September 23 memorandum to Bundy, Komer stated that he felt that Rostow's effort's were hampered by "trying to kill two birds with one stone." Rostow had started with the idea of the strategic study as an "imaginative reexamination of old shibboleths which could provide a new base for sensible policies," but this objective suffered when Rostow "took on Rusk's mandate to bring under control the variety of overlapping studies" being done by other agencies. "It is just too much to expect that you can at one and the same time (a) produce a penetrating long-range policy analysis; (b) translate it into detailed interagency operational guidance; and (c) get all concerned to sign on." The Policy Planning Council hadn't "the leverage to accomplish what the NSC and OCB couldn't." Despite Rostow's optimism, the agencies were not "going to buy." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Robert Komer 6/63-11/63)
136. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council and Counselor of the Department of State (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, July 23, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Basic National Security Policy. Secret.
SUBJECT
BNSP
I should report to you the state of the BNSP in the Pentagon.
You will recall that, at Secretary McNamara's request, /2/ you referred the draft BNSP back for another round of work which would give the JCS a chance to thrash out its views with DOD. After that work had gone forward nearly to resolution/3/ Secretary McNamara shifted his earlier favorable view to a judgment that the BNSP was not necessary for the conduct of his business.
/2/No record of this request has been found.
/3/Information on work done during the winter and spring of 1963 by DOD/ISA on a basic national security policy paper is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Basic National Security Policy and in National Defense University, Taylor Papers, BNSP. See also Document 132.
Henry Rowen reported to me today that there was a discussion between Secretary McNamara and the JCS in which, after expressing his skepticism, Secretary McNamara put the question: "On what problems do you need high level guidance?" Six issues emerged from the JCS;/4/ and Secretary McNamara set in motion work within the Pentagon to generate required guidance./5/
/4/The issues were: targeting capability of strategic retaliatory forces; number of concurrent capabilities to be programmed for conventional forces; amount of capability NATO forces needed to attempt to reach a standoff in a potential theater conflict by non-nuclear means; what, if any, provision was to be made for supporting a satellite revolt; the level of military presence adequate for the United States in the area between Suez and Thailand; and whether U.S. military planners should assume that the United States would not wage large-scale ground operations on the Asian mainland. (Walter S. Poole, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. VIII: 1961-1964 Part I, The Structure of National Defense, p. 18; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Historical Division, Joint Secretariat)
/5/The Joint Chiefs tasked J-5 and the NESC to provide draft answers to the six questions, with the intention of sending the whole package to McNamara. When the drafts reached the JCS in late August, however, the Chiefs decided to "note" the replies and not forward them to McNamara, apparently on the ground that it would be preferable to consider the six issues within the context of the complete JSOP. (Ibid., p.19)
Thus, so far as the Pentagon is now concerned the BNSP is dead.
As you know in this matter, as opposed to the conduct of specific planning operations, I do not feel a sense of personal responsibility for pressing the BNSP forward. I do believe, however, that you and the President should consider seriously the following aspect of the matter: the BNSP was first developed in the Truman Administration and was carried forward in several editions in the Eisenhower Administration. Whatever the limitations inherent in any such document, I doubt that it will redound to the credit of our Administration that we failed to thrash out any successor document. A BNSP obviously cannot substitute for specific policy judgments; and it should not tie the President's hands. But it can provide an occasion for debating and defining the bone structure of policy and communicating it to the troops who never see the four star generals.
My first recommendation is, therefore, that you consider with the President whether or not you wish to consider the BNSP exercise as finished.
If you wish to keep the matter open, we might consider what forms such a document might take in the light of Secretary McNamara's views and the passage of time.
If you decide that we should abandon the exercise, you may wish to consider what form a decent and unobtrusive burial might take; e.g., simply letting it drift off; a NSAM ordering suspension in the light of fast-moving world events; etc.
But before accepting some form of the latter alternatives, I do urge you and the President to pause for a moment on the prior question./6/
/6/Rostow and Rusk met and discussed this memorandum some time before July 30. Rostow later wrote that Rusk agreed to the undertaking of another draft of basic national security policy, which would be discussed with the President and McNamara. According to Rostow, Rusk "mentioned" that if the President did not wish to "promulgate" the paper, he (Rusk) "might table with the NSC for the information of its members your concept of an appropriate policy statement of this kind." (Memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, November 15; Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, BNSP 1963) A draft BNSP dated August 14 is ibid., S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, BNSP Drafts 1963. Additional information on this topic is in Document 146.
137. Memorandum of Conference With President Kennedy/1/
Washington, July 24, 1963, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Clifton Series, Conferences with the President, Volume II, 2/28/63-9/9/63. Top Secret.
OTHERS PRESENT
General Taylor
General Wheeler
Admiral Anderson
General LeMay
General Shoup
Captain Shepard
General McHugh
SIOP
The Chairman presented to the President a new book/2/ which contains a complete summary of the SIOP,/3/ highlighting decisions required for its implementation. The President asked a number of questions and all the Chiefs participated in the discussion. The Chairman emphasized the extreme sensitivity of this document, stating there were only eight copies in existence.
/2/Not identified.
/3/Apparent reference to SIOP-63 (see Document 92). Differences between SIOP-63 and SIOP- 64, formally approved by the JCS in October 1963 with an effective date of January 1, 1964, are indicated in a memorandum from the JCS to McNamara dated November 14, 1962, JCS 2057/360, and Appendix A to Enclosure F to JCS 2956/400, October 16, 1963; both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 3105 (22 Jun 62) Sec. 1.
Army Special Forces
General Wheeler presented to the President the reply to a memorandum which the President had written to the Secretary of Defense on the employment of Army Special Forces./4/ The President stated he thought that the size of the groups being sent was too small to take maximum advantage of the favorable impression they create. General Wheeler stated that the limiting factor on the number of forces employed was often the opposition of the U.S. Ambassador concerned. The President stated that he should communicate with the Ambassadors. (A copy of the President's memorandum on this subject to the Secretary of State is attached.)/5/
/4/Reference is to the July 15 memorandum; see Document 133.
/5/Not attached. It is an earlier version of the President's July 26 memorandum described in Document 133.
General LeMay stated that he and the Chiefs of Staffs of Latin American Air Forces favor bringing their personnel to the U.S. for training. He also stated that there is a general consensus on the need for increased inter-American planning. He stated that the Inter-American Defense Board is unsatisfactory for this purpose. To make it effective, it should be placed under the OAS, and its personnel changed.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]
Tazewell Shepard
138. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/
SNIE 13-2-63
Washington, July 24, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99. Secret. A table of contents is not printed. For complete text, see the Supplement. A note on the cover sheet reads in part: "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, AEC, and NSA." The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred except the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
COMMUNIST CHINA'S ADVANCED WEAPONS PROGRAM
The Problem
To assess Communist China's progress toward acquisition of a nuclear weapons and missile capability and to estimate the effects of such a development on Chinese policy.
Note to Readers
Since our most recent estimate on Communist China's advanced weapons program/2/ we have received a considerable amount of new information, mainly from photography. This evidence leads us to believe that the Chinese, with Soviet assistance, had embarked in the latter 1950s on a more ambitious advanced weapons program than we had earlier thought likely. We further believe that they are still working on that program though forced to slow its pace materially since 1960. Nevertheless, the gaps in our information remain substantial and we are therefore not able to judge the present state or to project the future development of the Chinese program as a whole with any very high degree of confidence. Specific judgments given below about the stage likely to be reached by the Chinese program at particular dates should be read in the light of this general caution.
/2/NIE 13-2-62, "Chinese Communist Advanced Weapons Capabilities," dated 25 April 1962. (Top Secret) [Footnote in the source text. See Document 81.]
Conclusions
A. Peiping has given high priority to the development of nuclear weapons and missiles. Recent aerial photography has revealed a number of developmental facilities indicating a broad program which diverts Communist China's limited scientific and technological resources from other parts of the economy. (Paras. 2-15 and 19)
B. We have found what we believe to be a plutonium production reactor in China, located at Pao-t'ou. This reactor probably could not have reached criticality before early 1962. If it did go critical at that time, the earliest a first device could be tested, based on plutonium from this reactor alone, would be early 1964. If the Chinese run into even a normal number of difficulties, this date would be postponed to late 1964 or 1965. If the reactor reached criticality later than early 1962--or has not yet done so--the detonation would be even further delayed. Beginning the year after a first detonation the reactor could produce enough material for only one or two crude weapons a year. The Chinese have a few bombers which could carry bulky weapons of early design. (Paras. 4-6 and 17)
C. We believe that the eventual Chinese program calls for nuclear weapons containing both U-235 and plutonium. Such a program would require more plutonium production facilities than the one reactor that has been identified. Neither photographic coverage nor other significant evidence have disclosed another production reactor in China. The possible existence of another reactor cannot be ignored however, nor the possibility that one may be in production. We therefore cannot exclude the possibility that the Chinese could achieve a first detonation at any time. (Para. 7)
D. The gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchou will probably not be able, under the most advantageous circumstances, to produce weapon-grade U-235 before 1966. Considering the great technical difficulties involved and the large amount of additional construction needed, a more likely date for such production is 1968-1969. (Paras. 2 and 3)
E. Peiping is probably concentrating initially on a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) system of basically Soviet design, either the 630 mile SS-3 or the 1,020 mile SS-4. We do not believe that missiles would be ready for deployment before 1967. Because of the time and difficulties involved in producing a missile-compatible warhead, we believe China is not likely to develop such a warhead until 3 or 4 years after a first detonation. (Paras. 16 and 18)
F. The detonation of a nuclear device would boost domestic morale. Although it is possible that the leadership would experience a dangerous degree of overconfidence, we think it more likely that Peiping will concentrate on furthering its established policies to: (1) force its way into world disarmament discussions and other world councils; (2) overawe its neighbors and soften them for Peiping-directed Communist subversion; and (3) tout Chinese-style communism as the best route for an underdeveloped nation to achieve industrial and scientific modernity. In pursuing its policies, Peiping's increased confidence would doubtless be reflected in its approach to conflicts on its periphery./3/ (Paras. 20-27)
[Here follow the "Discussion" section, 8 single-spaced pages, and a map. See the Supplement.]
/3/The Acting Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that China's leaders would recognize their limited capabilities had not altered the real power balance among the major states and could not do so in the future. In particular, they would recognize that they remained unable either to remove or neutralize the US presence in Asia and would not become willing to take significantly greater military risks. [Footnote in the source text.]
139. Memorandum From the Director for Internal Defense in the Office of Politico-Military Affairs (Maechling) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)/1/
Washington, July 29, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Internal Defense. Confidential. Attached to a covering note from Kitchens to Rostow and all the geographic Assistant Secretaries. A copy was sent to U. Alexis Johnson.
SUBJECT
Future of Special Group (CI)
I assume that after Mike Forrestal returns from vacation you, he, and McGeorge Bundy may get together for your discussion on the scope and terms of reference of the Special Group (CI). I therefore thought it might be helpful for you if I set down some views on the subject, based on my experience with the Group. First, some general comments:
1. The primary utility of the Group rests in its ability to obtain from its members high-level policy decisions on our counter-insurgency effort in the underdeveloped world and to do so rapidly and with a minimum of formality.
2. The Group is also effective in overcoming bureaucratic roadblocks affecting high-priority projects in the MAP and AID programs, and in resolving interdepartmental policy differences without involving the institutional prestige of the departments or agencies represented on the Group.
3. The Group has also been successful in stimulating, developing, and monitoring programs that either cut across departmental lines of responsibility or require interdepartmental collaboration. Training for counter-insurgency, civic action, and police assistance are examples of this type of activity.
4. The weekly meetings of the Group provide a means for exercising close and continuing control over policies and programs in nine or ten "crisis countries" of the underdeveloped world.
5. The Special Group (CI) has developed an institutional character and some measure of continuity, based on (a) regular meetings; (b) forward planning of agendas; (c) dissemination of minutes; and (d) systematic implementation of decisions. The quarterly reviews of country Internal Defense Plans, together with periodic status reports on training, civic action, police, etc., constitute the backbone of its agendas.
With these considerations in mind, it is evident that the Group exercises a function quite different from other high-level interdepartmental committees, such as the NSC Standing Group. It covers a narrower range of subject matter but does so in greater depth and with more continuity. The question that arises is whether the Group's activities are useful and productive, or whether its work is becoming routine and sterile. In my opinion, there is some indication that we are approaching a period of diminishing returns.
First, the counter-insurgency or internal defense label applies in its literal sense to a very small list of countries. Of the countries under cognizance of the Group, there is an active left-wing insurgency threat only in Vietnam, Laos, and Venezuela. Its application to other countries--both on the Group's critical list and off it--represents in greater or lesser degree a distortion of the concept. Colombia suffers from rural banditry; Ecuador, Guatemala, and Boliva from chronic instability; the threat in Iran will most likely take the form of an attempted coup; while in Thailand the threat is from external infiltration as much as internal.
One consequence of rigid adherence to the counter-insurgency concept is that the list of countries under the cognizance of the Group has remained virtually frozen for eighteen months. This may be justifiable in Southeast Asia, but in Latin America during the past year there have been revolutions, coups, abortive coups, and serious internal upheavals in several Latin American countries not under the Group's cognizance. In other geographic areas, there are serious situations of unrest and violence that merit high-level interdepartmental attention, if only on an ad hoc basis, but have not received it because they are not "insurgency" situations. For example, there is not now any high-level Government committee charged with coordinating our policies and programs in certain key African and Middle Eastern countries where the important factor is the political orientation of the government rather than an insurgent or guerrilla threat. In ex-French Africa our military and police assistance programs, which have been the subject of virtually continual policy differences during the past year, could stand some high-level interdepartmental attention. In the Middle East, the development of interdepartmentally coordinated policies and programs for Syria and Iraq is surely as important as continued surveillance over Guatemala, where the insurgency threat has largely receded.
Another consequence of the counter-insurgency approach is that we have been attacking such important programs as youth, labor, civic action and psychological strategy through the back door. This is better than not attacking it at all, but it distorts the true nature of the problem and may cause us to focus on lower priority situations.
Secondly, this rather doctrinaire counter-insurgency approach to the problems of underdeveloped countries has periodically created a feeling of uneasiness on the part of Mike Forrestal, the Attorney General (and perhaps the President too) that the Group is not coming to grips with the really important issues. As you know, the President has on occasion asked why the Group has not looked into such countries as Brazil. This feeling is likely to be intensified if we are entering an era in which the nature of the Soviet threat shifts to less aggressive but just as deadly forms of cultural and economic penetration.
Accordingly, I believe that the Special Group (CI) must develop a greater degree of flexibility if it is to continue as an effective instrument of government. It must focus on problems that require high-level attention. It should not go on indefinitely monitoring the internal security programs of eight or ten countries. Nor should it distort the complex problem of applying broad policies and programs in youth, labor, information, etc. to crisis areas by labeling them "counter-insurgency".
What I believe we need to do is gradually convert the Special Group (CI) to a "Special Group (Critical Areas)" with terms of reference more flexible than we have now. As I see it, the Group would then perform the following functions:
1. Continue monitoring interdepartmental counter-insurgency programs such as training, civic action, police assistance, etc.
2. Limit its continuing surveillance functions to those countries that face an immediate external or internal insurgency threat--Vietnam, Venezuela, Thailand, and possibly Iran. (Drop Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Laos.)
3. Establish a system of periodic spot surveillance over a wider range of underdeveloped countries, concentrating on those where severe unrest or Soviet penetration poses a critical threat to U.S. interests. These countries would be placed under the Group's cognizance for temporary periods as circumstances require, and kept there only long enough to assure that U.S. policies and programs are being carried out in a coordinated and effective manner.
4. Broaden the functional scope of the Group to cover such programs as youth, labor, psychological strategy, and economic counter-measures, as they apply to all critical areas of the underdeveloped world, not just those that have an insurgency threat.
If so broadened in purpose, a "Special Group (Critical Areas)" should operate in much the same way that it does now. A small White House staff of one or two officers would continue to be essential--not to recreate an OCB or generate paperwork, but to assist State in the forward planning of agendas and to flush out the problems that need high-level exposure. (No single department or agency can accomplish the latter.) As before, the primary purpose of the Group would be to expose program deficiencies, overcome bureaucratic obstacles, and force decisions on critical issues.
In writing the above I don't mean to imply that our counter-insurgency effort has become "passe". I do, however, think that the Group's efforts will become less productive unless it recognizes that the Soviet threat in the underdeveloped world may increasingly assume forms other than insurgency.
Charles Maechling, Jr./2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
140. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, August 28, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense Volume V, July-November 1963. Secret.
Last November at Hyannis Port/2/ I informed you that we would restudy Titan III to see whether, despite its overlap with Saturn C1/C1B in payload capacity, it seemed desirable to proceed. You will recall that the Titan III program was justified, in part, on the grounds that the cost per Titan launch would be so much less than per Saturn launch that the savings over the life of the program would approximately offset the development costs. The study of the costs and of the other elements of the program has been carried out by the Air Force. At the same time, preliminary development work has continued.
/2/The President was in Hyannis Port for the Thanksgiving weekend, November 21-25, 1962. See Document 113.
Since last Fall the contracts for Titan III have been finalized. Ninety-five percent of the cost of the development program which has been negotiated is represented by incentive contracts. This should be, and indeed is, a strong influence in keeping the development cost close to the estimated total of $875 million. Firing of 120" rockets which in modified form will be used for the strap on boosters has been carried out. Development of the other components of the system has continued on schedule. We anticipate the first test flight of the core (this includes the two stages based on the Titan II ICBM and the transtage) in August 1964 and of the full Titan III C in April 1965.
With respect to the desirability of Titan III, I conclude that, on the basis of the best estimates that can be made of its development cost, production and launch cost, and reliability as compared to those of Saturn, and the expected number of payloads in the 1966-75 period, Titan III will probably very much more than pay for its development. Recognizing the uncertainties in all of these factors, we have also examined the situation with some assumptions less favorable to Titan III. Under these circumstances we conclude that Titan III will nevertheless roughly pay for itself. I know that others have made still more pessimistic estimates. However, even with some slight economic deficiency, I believe the insurance that we purchase by the Titan III development makes it a desirable investment. This insurance is the capability to launch space payloads on very short notice or into narrow time windows, and the possibility of converting Titan III into a weapon system of large payload capacity, both of which are offered by its combination of storable and solid fuels. Therefore the Department of Defense plans to proceed with the development of the Titan III./3/
Robert S. McNamara
/3/An attached note from Spurgeon Keeny to Bundy stated that Jerome Wiesner "still questions the necessity of undertaking the project at all and the wisdom of the specific forum of the proposal if the project is undertaken," but added that Wiesner did not plan further opposition since McNamara had taken his objections into account in making his decision. Wiesner set forth his views at length in a July 8 memorandum to Harold Brown. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense Volume V, July-November 1963)
141. Summary Record of the 517th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, September 12, 1963, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, 517th NSC Meeting. Top Secret. Drafted by Smith. The 21 attendees at this meeting in the Cabinet Room included the President, Rusk, McNamara, Dillon, Robert Kennedy, Seaborg, McCone, Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, Sorensen, and eight members of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee headed by General Leon W. Johnson. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)
Report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee
General Taylor presented the Net Evaluation Subcommittee report/2/ and introduced General Leon Johnson, with the suggestion that the President might wish to question him about the report.
/2/The Report has not been found. In a memorandum to Bundy dated August 28, Colonel Smith stated that the briefing would cover the report's conclusions concerning projected results of general war at various intervals in the 1963-1968 period. Casualties and damage in the United States would "increase over the years. Soviet damage and capabilities will remain somewhat constant (because their capabilities are increasing). Probably the major NESC conclusion is that during the years 1964 through 1968 neither the US nor the USSR can emerge from a full nuclear exchange without suffering very severe damage and high casualties, no matter which side initiates the war." Smith held that the study raised one major issue. U.S. "offensive and defensive weapons currently programmed will not reduce damage from a full nuclear exchange to an acceptable level. Consequently, there is a need for development of new offensive and defensive weapons." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, WYS Chron File, Apr-Sep 63)
The President asked whether, even if we attack the USSR first, the loss to the U.S. would be unacceptable to political leaders. General Johnson replied that it would be, i.e. even if we preempt, surviving Soviet capability is sufficient to produce an unacceptable loss in the U.S.
The President asked whether then in fact we are in a period of nuclear stalemate. General Johnson replied that we are.
Referring to a statement of the Air Force Association which appeared in this morning's Washington Post,/3/ the President asked how we could obtain nuclear superiority as recommended by the Air Force Association. General Johnson said this was a very difficult question to answer. He acknowledged that there is no way, no matter what we do, to avoid unacceptable damage in the U.S. if nuclear war breaks out. He later acknowledged that it would be impossible for us to achieve nuclear superiority.
/3/The statement was printed in The Washington Post, September 12, 1963.
Secretary McNamara said that Defense Department studies showed that even if we spend $80 billion more than we are now spending, we would still have 30 million fatalities in the U.S. in the 1968 time period, even if we made the first strike against the USSR.
The President said these fatality figures were much higher than those he had heard recently in Omaha./4/ As he recalled it, SAC estimated 12 million casualties.
/4/See Document 118.
General Taylor said these were higher casualty figures than the President had ever seen. Today's figures include two new factors:
1. Soviet weapons were targeted on U.S. cities.
2. The use by the Soviets of huge megaton weapons was included in the computations for the first time.
The President said that de Gaulle believed that even the small nuclear force he is planning will be big enough to cause unacceptable damage to the USSR. He asked why we need to have as much defense as we have if, as it appears, the strategy is based on the assumption that even if we strike first we cannot protect the security of the U.S. in nuclear warfare.
General Johnson replied that no matter what we do we can't get below 51 million casualties in the event of a nuclear exchange. We can, however, bring down this number by undertaking additional weapons programs.
The President asked if this doesn't get us into the overkill business. General Johnson replied in the negative. We can cut down U.S. losses if we knock out more Soviet missiles by having more U.S. missiles and more accurate U.S. missiles. We estimate that we can save 20% in megatonnage down in the U.S. if we can achieve more accurate missiles. The more Soviet missiles we can destroy the less the loss to us. There is no question but that we can increase the accuracy of our missiles. The Soviets are not competing with us on numbers of missiles. They need, according to our calculation, only 1200 weapons. They, of course, can increase the megatonnage by enlarging the size of their weapons.
General Johnson said that his personal conclusions from this study were three:
1. We have to get better weapons, especially anti-ballistic missile weapons, to increase the number of Soviet missiles that we keep from landing in the U.S.
2. We must perfect ways of stopping missiles fired by Soviet submarines.
3. We must pay greater attention to chemical and biological warfare weapons. The problem with such weapons to date has been that the incubation period is three days, but conceivably could be brought down to one day.
General Johnson pointed out that each of the strategies used against the USSR resulted in at least 140 million fatalities in the USSR. Our problem is how to catch more of the Soviet missiles before they are launched and how to destroy more of the missiles in the air over the U.S.
Secretary McNamara said there was no way of launching a no-alert attack against the USSR which would be acceptable. No such attack, according to the calculations, could be carried out without 30 million U.S. fatalities--an obviously unacceptable number. Under conditions existing in 1968 with our forces on the alert, only 300 warheads are used to produce the casualties in the Soviet Union. Ninety-five percent of our force is for non-fatality purposes. Thus, preemption today or in 1968 is not an acceptable course of action.
Secretary McNamara said the President deserved an answer to his question as to why we have to have so large a force. The answer lies in the fact that there are many uncertainties in the equations presented in today's report. The factors included in the report are probable, but they do not represent the entire range of possibilities. By introducing pessimistic factors, the estimates given today are drastically changed. He said the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are studying our current force level and they would be recommending a force level to meet a reasonable anticipated situation. The Chiefs are now considering the range of our weapons in relation to the range of anticipated factors.
General Johnson said he had concluded from the calculations that we could fight a limited war using nuclear weapons without fear that the Soviets would reply by going to all-out war. He said that the Russians have obviously made similar calculations, and, seeing the unsatisfactory estimated results of an all-out nuclear war, would not escalate a limited war even if we used tactical nuclear weapons.
Secretary Rusk called attention to the deep schizophrenia involved in the present nuclear situation. If Congress knew the conclusions presented in the report, the Administration could get funds for aid and information programs which are the resources we must rely on in our effort to prevent all-out nuclear war.
Mr. Bundy called attention to the fact that this study and the existence of the sub-committee itself had been one of the few government projects which had been kept secret.
Mr. McCone asked General Johnson what he thought would happen to our capability, if, in an arms agreement, we accepted a percentage reduction in the number of our weapons. He doubted such a percentage cut would have much effect. Secretary Rusk agreed that we would have to go very deep in an arms cut to have a substantial effect on our capability. General Taylor said: "That is, if the Russians honestly carry out a comparable cut."
The President said he concluded from the report that the forces which will be used under present circumstances are conventional, limited and tactical. General Johnson agreed, adding that nuclear war is impossible if rational men control governments.
Secretary Rusk said he agreed, but he did not get much comfort from this fact because, if both sides believed that neither side would use nuclear weapons, one side or the other would be tempted to act in a way which would push the other side beyond its tolerance level. He added that a response to pressure might be suicidal, being prompted by a desire to get it over with. He referred to the current situation as "This God Damn poker game."
General Taylor agreed that the conclusions of the report did mean that there was a low possibility of escalation. Secretary Rusk repeated his view that we can't assume that nuclear war won't happen and referred again to suicidal tendencies. He wondered who else could be exposed to the conclusions of the sub-committee.
The President again said that preemption was not possible for us and that that was a valuable conclusion growing out of an excellent report.
Secretary Dillon returned to the subject of publicizing the conclusions of the report. He recalled that a similar report three years ago indicated that we would be doing much more damage to the Soviet Union than they would do to us. Today's report indicated damage would be more nearly equal. Consequently, he thought that it would be easier for us to make public the conclusions of this report.
Secretary Rusk said we could get out the basic facts of the report without identifying it. Some of the information was already in the public domain.
General Taylor suggested that the intelligence community should review the report before any decision is made about making it public. He thought that the war game held on SIOP was better to use as a basis of judgment because this war game dealt with an actual situation in the current year.
The President thought that at some time we might consider making some of the report available to some of the Congressional leaders./5/
/5/NSC Action No. 2470, dated September 12, states that the Council: "Discussed the report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee." (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
(Attached is a copy of notes taken by the sub-committee members of the National Security Council discussion.)
Bromley Smith/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Attachment/7/
/7/Top Secret.
RESUME OF DISCUSSION DURING NESC BRIEFING OF 12 SEPTEMBER 1963
Speaker--President--Is the level of damage we receive after we pre-empt against the Russians unacceptable?
Answer--Gen. Johnson--Yes (followed by a description of the range of US fatalities resulting from the study through the years 1964 through 1968).
Speaker--President--I have read the statement in this morning's paper by the Air Force Association. What is meant by their reference to nuclear superiority versus nuclear stalemate? How could you get superiority?
Answer--Gen. Johnson--Stated he believed the members of the Committee of the Air Force Association which drafted the resolution did not have the facts as brought out in the report being presented at this time. (The last subsidiary attack was explained.)
Speaker--Mr. McNamara--Indicated he had a study conducted examining the scale of fatalities after having added 80 billion dollars to the defense budget for blast shelters, increased weapons systems--both offensive and defensive. Under all of these conditions in the 1968 time period, the minimum number of fatalities was in excess of 30 million.
Speaker--President--At Omaha I remember being briefed that if we pre-empt our casualties may be on the order of 12 million.
Answer--Gen. Taylor--That briefing was related to the present SIOP.
Gen. Johnson--The variance rests in the difference in targeting objectives of the Soviets. The weight of effort devoted to urban industrial targets was the key to the variation in US casualties. The results of the Omaha report were obtained by the Soviets firing their retaliation counter force, this did not seem reasonable.
Speaker--Mr. Rusk--Does your study deal with any effects other than the direct weapon effects--such as disease, pestilence?
Answer--Gen. Johnson--No. However, the AEC made a study of the long term effects and basically concluded that not enough was known in this area. As a consequence, a letter was sent to Dr. Johnson, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, recommending additional efforts to provide answers on long term effects./8/
/8/Neither the study nor the letter to Gerald W. Johnson has been identified.
Speaker--President--Why do we need as much as we've got?
Answer--Gen. Johnson--Explained the reason was to reduce the damage and fatalities to our country. Improvement in US systems is of particular importance. Also the development of an ABM defensive system would be of greatest significance, particularly when deployed in an area such as the eastern segment of the US where approximately 70% of the population is concentrated.
Speaker--President--In the discussion the President asked about our conclusions from the offset attack on 23 cities.
Answer--Gen. Johnson--Discussed the results of the attack.
Speaker--President--If we can't pre-empt and reduce fatalities, then what? Why do we have as much as we've got? Doesn't it get into the overkill business?
Answer--Gen. Johnson--Indicated that the Soviet knows without any doubt that we can destroy him due to the size of our force. In effect, there should be no margin for error in his assessment of our capabilities. Effort must now be expended to improve the systems in reliability and accuracy. Certainly along with this is the importance of multiple forces--bombers, SLBMs, ICBMs--to compound the Soviet problem. The statement on overkill has been exaggerated since our expectancy of damage against the Soviet time sensitive ICBMs in 1964 was calculated as no higher than 20%, whereas the 1968 estimate reached 70%. If this expectancy were increased to 90%, the overall megatonnage down on the US would be reduced by 20%.
Answer--Mr. McNamara--Gen. Johnson's group has assumed probable planning factors and they seem to me to be reasonable assumptions. They do not represent all the possible factors so we must decide whether we are protecting ourselves against pessimistic factors of Soviet capabilities. By assuming a range of US forces we have calculated a range of US and Soviet fatalities. Large changes in forces result in only small changes in fatalities.
Speaker--President--Why does he have a smaller force?
Answer--Gen. Johnson--Soviet may consider he has sufficient force with which to deter, especially when viewed in relation to the scale of fatalities he is given the capability to produce in this country. (Described manner in which assessments are carried out and assistance rendered by NMCSSC.)
Speaker--Gen. Johnson--Volunteered that he would be very disturbed if the President considered this report indicated that we could reduce our forces and/or not continue to increase to those programmed. If a reduction should take place, the relative position of the US and Soviets would become less in our favor. The President said he understood.
Speaker--Gen. Johnson--Discussed the need for an effective ABM defense; emphasis on Laser and Casaba-Howitzer, intercepting sub-launched missile in boost phase. Also brought in new efforts in chemical and biological warfare such that biological warfare may be adaptable to strategic purposes.
Speaker--Mr. McCone--What would be the effect on casualties of incremental cuts in US and Soviet forces in the event of arms reduction?
Answer--Mr. Rusk--It would be necessary to go very deep into the forces by such cuts before there would be any significant effect.
Speaker--President--Would it be advantageous to tell the Soviets what probable casualties may result from an exchange in order to convince them of the possible outcome?
Speaker--Mr. Bundy--This report is one state secret which has been well kept and it would be a mistake to cite figures from it. There would then be a precedent for someone to ask about any comparable figures from next year's report.
Speaker--Mr. Rusk--I believe such figures for casualties have already been made public. The President has spoken of it on some occasions.
Speaker--Gen. Taylor--I think we should ask the intelligence community how much information of this nature has already gotten out (i.e., casualty figures). (Mr. McCone accepted the query and a review of official US and Soviet statements will be made.)
Speaker--Mr. Rusk--Asked about the difference in results between a high state of alert and no alert.
Answer--Gen. Johnson--This comparison was not made in the study.
Speaker--President--What about pre-empt today with the Soviets in a low state of alert?
Answer--Mr. McNamara--(Today's situation not actually answered.) In the many studies I have had done for me I have not found a situation in which a pre-empt during a low-alert condition would be advantageous. Under no circumstances have I been able to get US casualties under 30 million. In fact, I have not been able to get them down to 30 million. In 1968 we can have 3000 warheads and 5000 MT on alert. Of this force, 95 percent will be used in counterforce attacks or for purposes other than to create casualties. They can destroy us with a few weapons and we can do the same to them. Therefore, pre-empt is not advantageous for either side.
Speaker--Gen. Taylor--The question then is whether we are justified in continuing military targeting.
Answer--Gen. Johnson--Indicated this had to be continued for the potential reduction it made in US casualties.
Speaker--Mr. Rusk--Gen. DeGaulle can sit on the sidelines with five weapons and deter.
Speaker--President--Is that why DeGaulle is satisfied with a small force?
Answer--Mr. Rusk--According to Gen. DeGaulle, he can inflict unacceptable damage on anyone.
Speaker--President--DeGaulle is then using atomic weapons as a trip-wire.
Speaker--Gen. Johnson--Gen. Peter Gallois (French)/9/ told me, when I was stationed at SHAPE, that certain elements in France believed that in time NATO would collapse and that the fight would be between the US and the Soviets. At that time the French wanted to be able to sit on the side lines and say to the Soviets--Don't touch us, if you do, it will cost you five Hiroshimas.
/9/Pierre Gallois, former head of the French Air Force.
Speaker--President--He believed this was probably correct and that DeGaulle would not use nuclear weapons to defend Hamburg.
Speaker--President--Consider the study to be very good and helpful. Asked how long worked on it and who composed the group.
Answer--Gen. Johnson--Explained the foregoing. Also explained why today's force was not too large.
Speaker--President--This argues in favor of a conventional force.
Speaker--Gen. Johnson--Stated that he was convinced from this report that you could resort to nuclear weapons in a limited situation without it expanding into allout nuclear war.
Speaker--President--I have been told that if I ever released a nuclear weapon on the battlefield I should start a pre-emptive attack on the Soviet Union as the use of nuclear weapons was bound to escalate and we might as well get the advantage by going first.
Speaker--Gen. Johnson--Stated he did not consider this necessarily true under the circumstances which exist.
Speaker--President--Since pre-emption does not show any advantage--and the Russians also recognize this--it is possible that the US could use tactical nuclear weapons in Laos without the Soviets assuming we would also use them in Europe on the slightest provocation. (This is not an assured understanding of the comment as made--it came in garbled in its import and intent.)
The meeting was concluded by a discussion of the manner in which this information could be released to Congressional groups. It was finally agreed that the source (NESC) should be protected and when the information is finally released, it should appear as though originating from another agency.
142. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council and Counselor of the Department of State (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk /1/
Washington, September 17, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, National Security. Confidential. Other copies are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Policy Planning 7/63- 9/63, and ibid., President's Office Files, Rostow 1962-1963.
SUBJECT
State of the World
At a morning meeting, I believe on September 4, you observed that you could well use a psychiatrist around the table and in dealing with the world. This is an interim effort by the Planning Council to make some shape of the phenomena which stirred your remark. A more systematic and precise review of the state of the world and its policy implications will be developed in S/P during the autumn./2/
/2/The projected study has not been found.
We have begun by considering the specific items which stimulated your comment and others of a similar kind. They include the new positive Japanese approach to trade with China; Cambodia both accepting Soviet military equipment and joining Communist China in refusing to sign the test ban agreement; de Gaulle speculating airily about the unification of Viet-Nam; the Pakistani flirtation with Peking, including the opening up of an air route between the two countries; Rumania's sassiness with Moscow; Cuba's failure to sign the test ban agreement; and, if you like, Stockholm's 462 of September 9/3/ reporting the Chicom Ambassador in Stockholm promising to come to Sweden's aid if the Soviets should ever attack that country.
/3/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1-1 CHICOM-SWE)
What accounts for this odd state of affairs?
What should we do about it?
I believe there are five elements which have converged to produce this situation, of which one is basic, the other four being aspects of recent developments.
1. There is, above all, the underlying fact that the historical trend in our time is towards the diffusion of effective power away from both Moscow and Washington. Although that diffusion is least marked in nuclear affairs, it evidently extends to the nuclear problem, given current French and U.K. policies and attitudes; Chinese Communist policy; and stirrings elsewhere towards command over nuclear arms. But, while nuclear weapons are enormously destructive, they can be used rationally only in very narrow circumstances and as a tool of diplomatic pressure only under special circumstances. Thus, despite the concentration of nuclear power in the U.S. and the USSR, effective diplomatic, political, and economic power continues its trend towards diffusion. This does not mean that we are incapable of influencing the shape of events by means of our military and economic power and through political leadership. It does mean that we must increasingly work by organizing diffuse centers of power and influence within the Free World rather than by decisions made cozily in Washington. The problem is most pronounced in our relations with Western Europe, but extends to Japan, Latin America, and the other less developed areas. The trend is, of course, masked at moments of acute East-West confrontation, such as the Berlin and Cuba missile crises of last year. But all our dispositions must take into account this underlying drift of history.
2. This underlying tendency is, of course, reinforced and brought to the surface by the easing of tensions which followed our successful dealing with the Berlin and Cuban crises of last year. As indicated above, a U.S.-Soviet confrontation reestablishes the surface, at least, of bipolarity, since such confrontations are tests of will in the shadow of relative nuclear capabilities which only we and the USSR now massively command. In 1962 we emerged successfully from such nuclear tests of will over Berlin and Cuba. There is a real sense in which we are now facing the consequences of our success last year.
3. Quite aside from the easing of tensions, our engagement with the Soviet Union in even superficially amicable negotiations, even over a very narrow range (such as the test ban), stirs two images around the world which reinforce the natural impulse of nations to pursue what they conceive to be their national advantage, in old-fashioned regional terms. First, the image that the U.S. and the Soviet Union may get together at their expense to protect themselves from the dangers of assertive nationalism in general and nuclear weapons in particular. The second image is that, perhaps, the cold war is on the way to its end; that U.S. concern with the rest of the world is declining; and that the restraints, disciplines, and intrusions on conventional nationalism are being (and can safely be) withdrawn or diminished.
4. There is the reduced fear of communism on the international scene brought about by the setback to Khrushchev in his various post-Sputnik adventures and, despite Peking's big talk, by the growing sense in some parts of the world that Communist China is a relatively weak state in power terms, although the fear of Communist China remains strong in South and Southeast Asia. There is, in short, rightly or wrongly, a simple reduction in fear of communism.
5. Finally, there is the fact of the Sino-Soviet split. The split has reduced the pretensions and vitality of communism as a doctrine and an international movement; but it has, to a degree, also reshaped the arena of world power. We have tended to look at it in terms of Peking's more aggressive ideological line and in terms of Peking's unwillingness to sign the test ban treaty while pursuing a national nuclear capability. The other side of the medal is, of course, that Communist China, increasingly detached from Russia, assumes the form of just another nation in an increasingly diffused arena of world power. And other nations see the possibility of using relations with this increasingly detached China as a means to advance parochial national interests. Within the Bloc, Rumania and Cuba, as well as Albania, have played this game; outside the Bloc, we can see Japan and Pakistan looking at China from this new perspective--and, in a corner of their minds, even France and Canada. Moreover, the Chinese Communists' effort to reduce their dependence on Moscow has produced a reciprocal Chinese movement to strengthen their national position on the world scene by widening trade and other contacts with the non-Communist world, excepting the United States. This is yielding an increased dependence on the West which, in fact, may prove, in the short and middle term, a more meaningful fact than Peking's tough ideological language or even the possibility of its acquiring some kind of nuclear capability, given the realities of China's economic situation over the foreseeable future and the real nature of modern military technology as opposed to a nuclear explosion.
Taken all together, these five factors have appeared to yield, within a relatively few months after the Cuban missile showdown, a quite remarkable appearance of fragmentation in both blocs; although, as I say, what is really involved is the emergence of a situation which permits the underlying trend towards power diffusion to assert itself more strongly than it was permitted to do in the tenser atmosphere of 1961-62. Specifically, the situation poses for us the danger of diluting the unity of the Free World; releasing local enmities which could yield dangerous regional conflicts; opening up opportunities for communist exploitation; etc.
Now, in broad terms, what do we do about it?
First, we must husband all those levers of influence which permit us to exercise that degree of continuing control over a still dangerous environment necessary to protect our vital interests. We should not, of course, struggle against every manifestation of this diffusion of power. It has many elements of potential advantage to us. And, besides, (in Khrushchev's phrase about his Eastern European satellites) quite a few countries are "getting too big to spank." But we need to keep it under tolerable control in certain directions. We need, therefore, to look at our military capabilities more clearly as a double asset: a continuing deterrent against communist adventures, but also--and equally--as an essential element in maintaining minimum stability in parts of the world which are inherently explosive if left to themselves; e.g., Korea, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, important areas in Africa, parts of Latin America and Germany. In the latter case it is evident that the maintenance of the Germans on a collective course with the U.S. and the West hinges critically on the continued effective military presence of the U.S. side by side with them. Despite balance of payments pressures and despite the temptations of a period of detente, we must be more explicit than we have in the past in recognizing and accepting this second stabilizing role of the U.S. military presence, in the form of useable force, in every part of the world. Similarly, we must struggle against all difficulties to maintain the foreign aid lever in our hands or strongly under our influence (as through the IBRD, Alliance for Progress institutions, etc.). It is a simple fact, largely unappreciated, that the dependence of many countries on U.S. foreign aid (including their dependence on PL 480 for the feeding of decisive urban populations) is an essential damper on nationalist emotions and policies which, without that damper, could easily rip open many regions of the world, producing results damaging in themselves and opportunities for Communist exploitation.
Second, against this background of useable power and influence, we must dramatize before our own people and the world the limits of the detente. Here Khrushchev has helped us by his reiteration of the theme that there shall be no ideological coexistence. We should explain what that means in terms of other forms of Communist enterprise. I am thinking here not merely of the continued violence of communism in parts of Latin America but the insidious effects of detente on Italian and Greek domestic politics--a kind of making local communism respectable. We may face in post-de Gaulle France a serious form of this softening in the domestic political fiber of the West. Similarly, we should not miss that element in Moscow's debate with Peking which asserts that a period of detente and peaceful coexistence will heighten the "inner contradictions" of the West. They are counting on divisions within the Alliance and on their systematic exploitation. It is our duty, then, to educate the Free World, within our limits, to the dangers and problems of an atmosphere of detente as well as to the enjoyment and exploitation of its real advantages and possibilities.
Third, on the constructive side, despite the difficulties, we must press forward with all those enterprises which would bind together regions of the West in collective enterprises. Despite de Gaulle, there is a great deal to do in NATO which can be done and which the detente does not necessarily preclude; for example, the MLF; movement towards a common strategy; intensified political consultation both on East-West matters and on problems within the Free World outside NATO (e.g., the implications for NATO of the Chicom acquisition of nuclear weapons); work on trade, monetary affairs, aid, etc. The impulses within Latin America to make something serious out of the Alliance for Progress are, I believe, stronger than we often think. There is work to be done on the organizational side of the Alliance for Progress and in giving to it a more vital and effective strategy. In the Pacific there is the impulse of Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Malaya to take a greater hand in their own fate; and we have the capacity to help organize these impulses instructively. Over a period of time we have, of course, both the challenge and the possibility of making something more stable out of the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East. The general point is that in the Free World--and here we have a marked advantage over the Communist bloc as presently organized--the atmosphere of detente and the assertion of more familiar nationalist impulses does not eliminate all the areas of common interest within the West, nor does it preclude continued movement forward in joint ventures which would, in effect, organize the world of diffusing power into a world of diffused responsibility.
There are two other major dimensions of policy which evidently flow from the present state of the world: the art of playing the diffusion of power within the Communist world in ways which advance our interests; and the problem of maintaining at home an understanding of this new environment--its problems and possibilities--and the effective will to deal with it. This is a more subtle and difficult--if essentially more wholesome--environment than the eyeball-to-eyeball world of 1961-62. We shall leave prescription under these two headings for the later S/P effort.
143. Highlights From the Policy Planning Meeting/1/
Washington, September 19, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Secretary's Policy Planning Meetings.
Confidential. The source text, which is dated September 28, bears no drafting information. No list of participants is given, but they were customarily the Secretary, other principals of the Department, Assistant Secretaries, Bureau chiefs, and the heads or deputies of ACDA, AID, and USIA.
SUBJECT
State of the World
Noting that this was the kind of paper most people think S/P writes, but rarely does, Mr. Rostow briefly summarized the State of the World memo./2/ The following principal observations were made.
/2/Document 142.
1. One element of additional complexity was the competition between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union to exploit regional disputes within the Free World, e.g., Indo-Pakistan and Arab-Israeli relations.
2. Given inherent limitations on the effective application of military force and even of economic power it is important to build up cultural, legal and other forms of constructive U.S. influence. The long-run impact of the training of lawyers within the British Commonwealth in Anglo-Saxon law was cited as well as the long-run impact from the immersion of colonials in French culture.
3. The role of economic assistance as a factor limiting the freedom of action of ambitious nations to engage in disruptive regional policies required further thought, since it bore on aid criteria.
4. Without excessive self-congratulation the U.S. had utilized its power in the postwar years on the whole for rather grand international purposes rather than for national aggrandizement. It was not clear that accretions of power and influence to others were being now disciplined to the same extent. How might one use the UN and other instruments for enlarging the sense of responsibility? It might even be interesting to list the various nations of the world and score them on the degree to which their enlarging freedom of action was being used in constructive and responsible ways.
5. Observations were made on the limits as well as the potentials of using the presence of U.S. armed forces as a stabilizing factor. Their presence, if too overt and oppressive, could help produce instabilities.
6. It was suggested that the memo and a summary of the comments made at the meeting be sent to all Chiefs of Mission to acquaint officers abroad with some of the speculative thinking now proceeding in Washington./3/
/3/A note in the margin indicates that copies of this memorandum, and apparently of the "State of the World" paper, went out to all Chiefs of Mission on September 28.
7. It was also felt that a four or five page digest derived from the paper might be used to good advantage in discussions with foreign dignitaries./4/
/4/In a September 20 memorandum to Taylor, Smith commented that Rostow's "descriptions were better than his prescription," which amounted to "a conclusion that we should face a changed world situation with `more of the same.'" Smith believed that Rostow's prescriptions did not recognize the diffusion of power "of which he speaks." Instead the United States might try to mold diffusion to its own purposes, substituting "temporary appearances for permanent military presences" and accepting that foreign aid would be increasingly economic, not military, thereby seeking "controlled instability through policies accepting and encouraging moderate change." An alternative would be to attempt to maintain the bipolar world by allocating enormous resources to the East-West conflict, with the objective of bringing about collapse of the "Bloc" through economic overstrain. "Given our American ethic, the first alternative seems the only acceptable route, but the second merits evaluation." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, 40B2-B4)
144. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
NIE 11-8-63
Washington, October 18, 1963.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry. Top Secret; Restricted Data; Controlled Dissemination. A more highly classified version of this document is ibid. A table of contents is not printed. For complete text, see the Supplement. A note on the cover sheet reads in part: "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, AEC, and NSA." The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred, except the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK
The Problem
To estimate probable trends in the strength and deployment of Soviet weapon systems suitable for strategic attack, and in Soviet capabilities for such attack, projecting forward for about six years./2/
/2/The weapon systems considered are ground-launched missiles with ranges of 600 nautical miles or more, submarine-launched missiles, heavy and medium bombers, air-to-surface missiles, and advanced delivery and support systems such as orbital and suborbital vehicles. [Footnote in the source text.]
Summary and Conclusions
Trends in Strategic Attack Forces to Mid-1965
1. The Soviet leaders look upon long range strike forces as a major element of their strategic position, intended to support their political objectives, to deter the West from resort to military action, and to fight a war should one occur. The available evidence supports the view that they are attempting to build forces which they regard as appropriate to these objectives rather than forces with which they could launch a deliberate attack on the West and count on reducing retaliation to levels that would be in any sense tolerable. (Paragraph 34)
2. Current Soviet military doctrine holds that a general war could begin with little or no warning, stresses the critical importance of the initial period in determining its outcome, and asserts that enormous advantages accrue to the side striking the first blow. However, the official doctrine also holds that the initial nuclear exchange might not determine the outcome, and that in any event large theater forces are necessary to prosecute a general war successfully. These views, when related to the strategic capabilities now deployed and programmed by the West, impose high and complex requirements upon the Soviet military establishment. Among the chief constraints in meeting these requirements are cost and skilled manpower. The Soviet strategic posture has also been heavily influenced by a concentration on the Eurasian theater, and by an apparent lag in military thinking on the implications of advanced weapons. Soviet military policy and doctrine have been considerably modified in recent years, and the process of change is continuing. However, for the immediate future, Soviet forces for long range attack will be characterized by capabilities against Eurasia far exceeding those against North America. (Paragraphs 35-37)
3. ICBM Forces. Evidence acquired during the past year has led us to modify our estimates as to the size and composition of the Soviet ICBM force in the near term. The most important single development was the interruption of the deployment program during the summer and fall of 1962. The primary reasons for this interruption appear to have been technical, including a probable modification to the second-generation SS-7 ICBM system and persisting difficulties in development of the SS-8. Whatever the reason, however, it is clear that 1962 was a year of reappraisal, in which Soviet planners apparently made important new decisions with respect to their ICBM program. Some of these, for example curtailment of SS-8 deployment, are already evident. For the near term, the result is a somewhat smaller force than previously estimated. (Paragraphs 39-40)
4. We have now identified a total of 18 ICBM complexes, all of which were begun before December 1961. The complexes now contain a total of about 220 launchers in various stages of construction. We estimate that 105-120 ICBM launchers, including about 20 hard silos, were operational as of 1 October 1963./3/ An additional 15 launchers were probably operational at Tyuratam.
/3/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, estimates that 145-160 ICBM launchers were operational as of 1 October 1963. See his footnote on page 15 at paragraph 60. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. Of the three Soviet ICBM systems now in the field, the SS-7 has been the most successful in development and is the most widely deployed. Deployment of the large, first generation SS-6 was limited to four launchers at one complex. Deployment of the SS-8 had extended to four complexes before the program was interrupted. However, SS-8 deployment has now been curtailed, and it is believed that expansion of the ICBM force over the next year or so will be primarily in terms of the SS-7.
6. We estimate the number of Soviet ICBM launchers operational in mid-1964 at 205-235, and in mid-1965 at 250-350 (these totals include some 20-25 launchers at Tyuratam)./4/ The force in this period will consist almost entirely of second-generation ICBMs; a few new type ICBMs could be operational by about mid-1965. We now believe that the SS-8 which we previously considered might be a very large missile, is comparable to the SS-7 in payload capacity./5/ At present, both of these ICBMs probably carry [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] warheads; initial deployment of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] warheads with these ICBMs could begin in 1964. If new nosecones are developed, improved second generation missiles armed with higher yield warheads [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] could enter service by 1965, and the few SS-6's in the field could be retrofitted to carry [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Thus, it is probable that the great bulk of the Soviet ICBM force through mid-1965 will carry warheads in the 3-6 MT range. By mid-1965, the accuracy of the bulk of the force can probably be improved to about 1.0 n.m. CEP; if new guidance systems are introduced, some portion could achieve CEP's of 0.5-1.0 n.m.
/4/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, estimates 215-250 operational ICBM launchers by mid-1964, and 300-350 by mid-1965. See footnote, page 15. [Footnote in the source text.]
/5/The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believe that a confident selection between possible SS-8 delivery capabilities cannot be made at this time. In their opinion, available evidence and analysis do not permit excluding the possibility that the SS-8 may carry a nosecone of 10,000 lbs or a little more. [3 lines of source text not declassified] [Footnote in the source text.]
7. The Soviet ICBM force represents a formidable nuclear delivery capability, but cannot maintain a constant readiness state approaching its US counterpart, and is vulnerable since about 80-85 percent of the present force is in soft sites. Successive modifications of soft sites have probably brought some improvement in reaction time, but procedures are still relatively slow, cumbersome, and complicated. We estimate that by mid-1965, about one-third of the ICBMs will be in hard silos, enhancing both the survivability and the reaction time of the force.
8. MRBM/IRBM Forces. We have now identified about 675 launch positions for the 1,050 n.m. (SS-4) MRBMs and 2,200 n.m. (SS-5) IRBMs, of which almost 600 are soft and the remainder are deployed in hard silos. Considering the target coverage and geographic disposition of the force, together with evidence of a cessation or slowdown in site construction, we believe that deployment of MRBMs and IRBMs in the USSR is about complete. We therefore estimate that by mid-1964 this force will have levelled off at about 700-750 launch positions, including 90-110 in hard silos. Soviet MRBMs and IRBMs can presently carry warheads with maximum yields of 2-3 MT.
9. We continue to have difficulty in understanding the Soviet rationale for building such a massive capability to attack European targets. One factor influencing Soviet decisions was undoubtedly the strategic emphasis on Europe, and the concept of a hostage Europe probably played a part. Soviet planning to strike a wide variety of targets, including some in support of the theater forces, may also have exerted an upward pressure on the size of the force, particularly if most of these missiles were to be equipped with kiloton warheads. Finally, a contributing military factor may have been a desire to attain survivability through numbers. (Paragraph 65)
10. We now believe that virtually all MRBM and IRBM launch sites are primary firing positions, i.e., positions which are manned and equipped to participate in an initial salvo. There has been much evidence that the Soviets intend to provide a substantial refire capability for this force, and our evidence on missile production indicates that, by mid-1965, each soft site could have a second-salvo missile available. The same operational deficiencies which characterize the Soviet ICBM force--vulnerability, slow reaction time, and cumbersome procedures--appear in Soviet MRBM and IRBM forces. These have been alleviated somewhat by deployment of a part of the force in hard silos. A further improvement may be made by introduction of an improved missile system. We believe that a new MRBM could be operational in small numbers by mid-1965. (Paragraphs 68-73)
11. Submarine Missile Forces. Current Soviet submarine missile forces are the outgrowth of decisions taken in the middle 1950's to develop quickly a fairly extensive but unsophisticated capability. The USSR now has about 50 ballistic missile submarines, including 11 of the nuclear-powered H class; all are equipped with short range (350 n.m.) missiles capable of delivering warheads [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The mission originally envisaged for these submarines probably included participation in initial strategic attacks. However, they have now evidently been assigned to second-strike roles, partly because of the growth in numbers of ground-launched systems, but probably also because of Soviet recognition of their limitations. Although this force represents a considerable potential threat, its operational effectiveness is limited by the small number of missiles per submarine (2 or 3), the short range of the missiles, the need to surface before launching, the operational limitations of the diesel-powered units, and the unreliability of some nuclear powered units. These shortcomings probably account for the continued absence of essential operational training cruises to likely combat areas. (Paragraphs 74-76)
12. There is evidence that the Soviets recognize these deficiencies and that improved missiles and submarines will become operational in the near future. Development is far advanced on a new 700 n.m. ballistic missile designed for submerged launching. This missile will almost certainly be incorporated in any new class of ballistic missile submarine which appears in the near future; it could possibly be retrofitted into existing types as well. While we have no direct evidence, it seems probable that at least one new submarine class (either nuclear or diesel-powered) is under development to employ the new missile and that the first units could enter service in the near future. It is likely that new designs will incorporate more than the three missile tubes carried by the older classes. We estimate that by mid-1965 the Soviet force of ballistic missile submarines will have grown to a total of 55-65, including some 15-20 nuclear-powered submarines. (Paragraphs 86-87, 88-89)
13. In addition to ballistic missile submarines, the USSR now has operational some 19 submarines capable of surface launching 300 n.m. cruise missiles. Six of these are nuclear-powered E class, each equipped with six launchers; the rest are diesel-powered units equipped with two or four launchers each. This system was designed primarily for low altitude (1,000-3,000 feet) attack on ships at sea, but it can also be employed against land targets. We believe that the Soviets may now be placing additional emphasis on the cruise missile submarine program. We estimate that by mid-1965 this force will have grown to 25-30 submarines, including 10-12 nuclear-powered. (Paragraphs 82-85, 88-89)
14. Thus, we believe that in the near future the Soviets will bring into service submarine weapon systems better suited to attacks on Eurasian and North American land targets as well as Western naval forces at sea. Further, we continue to believe that by the mid-1960's at least some Soviet missile submarines will be engaging in routine patrols in open ocean areas. (Paragraphs 75, 90- 93)
15. Long Range Bomber Forces. Continued investment in improving Long Range Aviation indicates that the USSR plans to maintain sizable bomber forces for at least the near term. Improvements over the past few years include introduction of a new medium bomber, introduction of air-to-surface missiles, and improved aerial refueling capabilities. Maritime reconnaissance is a secondary role of Long Range Aviation, and the use of both heavy and medium bombers in this role has been increasing. (Paragraph 94)
16. We estimate that Long Range Aviation comprises about 180-205 heavy bombers and tankers and 940-975 medium bombers and tankers. The heavy bomber force includes 95-105 Bison jet bombers and 85-100 Bear turbo prop bombers. Of the medium bombers, about 40-50 are Blinders, with supersonic dash capability, and the remainder are Badgers. There are an additional 360-370 Badgers and 10-20 Blinders in Naval Aviation. Blinder is the only bomber known to be in current production, but there are indications that there may be some new production of Bear in addition to modification. Although research and development on heavy aircraft is under way, no replacement for Bear or Bison is in sight, and we consider it highly unlikely that a new heavy bomber could enter inventory before 1966. We estimate that in mid-1965 Long Range Aviation will comprise 170-200 heavy bombers and tankers and 825-925 medium bombers and tankers. /6/
/6/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, estimates the medium bomber/tanker force level for mid-1965 at 925-1025 aircraft. He considers the heavy bomber/tanker force will remain at approximately 200 aircraft although the Bear/Bison mix may vary somewhat. Introduction of a longer endurance aircraft based on the Bear could begin in late 1964 or early 1965. See his footnote to page 23, paragraph 98 of the Discussion. [Footnote in the source text.]
17. Soviet Long Range Aviation, by reason of its equipment, basing, and deployment, is much better suited for Eurasian operations than for intercontinental attack. The capabilities of the Bison and Badger aircraft which make up the bulk of the force are restricted by their limited range. The emphasis on aerial refueling and Arctic training of the past several years reflect Soviet efforts to overcome this limitation on capabilities for intercontinental attack. (Paragraphs 99-104)
18. In view of the training patterns of recent years, the capacity of the principal Arctic staging bases, and the range capabilities of Soviet bombers, we believe that an aircraft attack against the US (except Alaska) would involve heavy bombers almost exclusively. Considering the requirements for Arctic staging and refueling, and allowing for non-combat attrition, we estimate that, by committing their entire heavy bomber force to this mission, the Soviets could put 90-115 of these aircraft over the US on two-way missions. The scale of an initial intercontinental attack could be increased by the use of refueled Badgers on two-way missions. Considering all operational factors, we estimate that the Soviets could put up to 150 of these medium bombers over target areas in Greenland, Canada, Alaska and portions of northwestern US. Initial attacks would probably be mounted in successive waves and extend over a considerable number of hours./7/
/7/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, considers this paragraph seriously underestimates the manned aircraft threat to the continental United States. In the event war should eventuate and the USSR attacks the United States with nuclear weapons, he believes this will be an all-out effort aimed at putting a maximum number of weapons on US targets. He would therefore estimate that the number of aircraft, including Badgers on one-way missions, could exceed 500. See his footnote to pages 22, 23, paragraph 102 of the Discussion. [Footnote in the source text.]
Trends in Strategic Attack Forces, 1966-1969
19. No well-defined strategic concept appears to have governed the long range strike forces which the Soviets have deployed to date, but a number of characteristics can be discerned in the building of these forces. Research and development programs have been vigorous. In contrast, the scale and pace of deployment programs have been uneven. This behavior has reflected, in part, technical problems and economic constraints, but it also suggests that the USSR is willing to tolerate a condition of limited intercontinental capabilities and considerable vulnerability over a long period of time. (Paragraph 125)
20. Perhaps the most consistent patterns apparent in Soviet policy toward long range strike forces over the past several years are to be found in the increased allocation of resources to this mission, the numerical expansion of these forces, the improvement of various weapon systems for long range attack, emphasis on high yield weapons, and continuing interest in diversified capabilities. During this period, emphasis has shifted from weapon systems best suited for Eurasian use to intercontinental systems. Our estimates for the next two years suggest, in the main, a continuation of these broad trends. The forces which we project for mid-1965 are stronger, both numerically and qualitatively, but they represent no substantial change in the overall strategic posture of the USSR vis-?-vis the West. (Paragraphs 126-128)
21. The prospects for the later 1960's are far less clear. We believe that the desire for an effective deterrent will remain one of the primary concerns of Soviet policy. None of the evidence available to us suggests, however, that the USSR contemplates forces designed to neutralize US strike forces in a single blow, nor do the Soviets appear to be seeking to match the US in numbers of delivery vehicles. Other programs, particularly strategic defense and space, will continue to compete with strategic attack programs, not only for resources but for scarce skills and quality materials. In general, we believe that the USSR would have great economic difficulty in pursuing a policy which called for antimissile defenses of major cities, competition with the US in space, and the higher sides of our estimates for long range strike forces which appear below. (Paragraphs 130-135)
22. Soviet long-range strike forces could also be heavily affected by political factors. In the present and prospective strategic situation which confronts the USSR, there is much which argues for a policy of safeguarding national security through some fairly moderate level of military strength or even, more radically, through international agreements to limit or reverse the arms race. Moreover, Khrushchev's advocacy of higher priority for certain civilian economic programs appears to be growing stronger. These political and military considerations suggest, not that the Soviets will cut back on their strategic programs, but rather that they are unlikely to undertake large-scale programs on a crash basis. Indeed, current trends in development and deployment indicate that in the absence of an arms limitation agreement, the Soviets will continue improving their capabilities, but at a moderate pace. In framing the estimates which follow, we have attempted to take into consideration the various factors--strategic, economic, military, political, and technical--which could influence the size and composition of Soviet long range strike forces deployed by mid-1969. (Paragraphs 136-138)
23. The ICBM Force. Our analysis of Soviet programming to date, and of the possible impact of new systems as well as other factors, indicates that by mid-1969 the USSR probably will have acquired a force of some 400-700 operational ICBM launchers. /8//9/ Currently operational systems will still make up the largest part of the force, but it will probably also include significant numbers of follow-on or improved ICBMs. In general, any new ICBM systems to be deployed in quantity during the 1960's would need to be under development already or to begin development shortly. (Paragraphs 139-141, 151, 155, 164)
/8/The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy, believes the force level is likely to be toward the low side (400) of the estimate presented here. See his footnote to paragraph 153, page 33, of the Discussion. [Footnote in the source text.]
/9/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, considers the Soviet ICBM force by mid-1969 could range from 600 to as high as 1,000 operational ICBM launchers, depending on whether a new, small, easily-deployed system is introduced in the 1965-1966 period. See his footnote to the Table on page 33, paragraph 153 of the Discussion. [Footnote in the source text.]
24. We believe that the Soviets are most certainly engaged in both improvement of existing ICBM systems and development of new systems, as well as to a continuing space effort. However, the available evidence does not indicate the specific nature of planned improvements to existing ICBMs or of follow-on systems. Our views on the Soviet need to correct current deficiencies, on tendencies in Soviet missile design, and on Soviet technical capabilities heavily affect our judgments about likely new and improved systems.
a. Very Large ICBMs. We continue to believe that the Soviets are developing a large vehicle (with a million or more pounds of thrust), which could be used as a space booster, as a "global" rocket, or as a carrier for warheads yielding up to 100 MT. If test firings begin within the next few months, such a large vehicle could probably have an initial operational capability as an ICBM in the period mid-1965 to mid-1966. Initial deployed sites would probably be soft, but the Soviets might find it feasible to incorporate hardening at some stage in the program. (Paragraph 144)
b. Standard-Size Follow-on ICBMs. We believe the Soviets would consider the primary qualitative improvements needed in the bulk of the ICBM force to be increased survivability, shorter reaction time, higher accuracy, and decreased logistic and personnel support. These requirements can probably be met almost as well, and at much lower cost, by improvement to the SS-7 as by a follow-on system in its general weight class. Improved SS-7's may be deployed in new configurations, possibly including semi-hard or single-silo hard sites. (Paragraphs 145-146)
c. Smaller Follow-on ICBMs. Soviet development of an ICBM system similar to the US Minuteman would run counter to trends thus far discernible in Soviet long range missile systems, and Soviet technology necessary for large grain solid propellants is weak. However, some of the operational attributes of the Minuteman concept would reduce the main deficiency in the Soviet force--namely its vulnerability to US attack--and might also reduce maintenance requirements. A new missile somewhat smaller than SS-7 and using improved propellants could reach operational status during the period. We believe it likely that such a new smaller missile would be deployed in hard sites. We believe that test firings of such a new smaller missile would not start for about a year and that operational launchers would not exist at deployed sites until 1966-1967. Should the Soviets elect to deploy a new missile in soft or semi-hard sites, test firings could begin in the near future, with an initial operational capability occurring in about mid-1965. (Paragraphs 147-148)
25. We believe that deployment of currently operational missiles in soft launch sites will cease by the mid-1960s. The low side of our estimate for 1969 (400 launchers) assumes that, in addition to deployment of a few very large ICBMs which begin to enter operational inventory in mid-1966, the Soviets will at about the same time introduce either a new, somewhat smaller ICBM or an improved SS-7, possibly in single-launcher hard sites. A moderate buildup of this sort, with emphasis on hardening, would in our view be consistent with a Soviet effort to maintain and improve the credibility of its deterrent. The reasons why the Soviet force might develop in this manner include such economic considerations as the need to devote more resources to the civilian economy or to antimissile and space programs as well as political factors. (Paragraph 151)
26. The high side of our estimate for mid-1969 (700 launchers), takes into account the possibility that the deployment of soft launchers, perhaps including some semi-hardened sites, is carried somewhat further than in the preceding alternative; that a very large system is introduced somewhat earlier than 1966; and that over 200 launchers of a new type--an improved SS-7 or a new, somewhat smaller hard system, possible in single silo sites--are deployed. Such a buildup might reflect not only a Soviet concern for deterrence, but also an effort to put the USSR in a somewhat better position to undertake a preemptive attack if a Western strike appeared imminent and unavoidable. (Paragraph 152)
27. Although the force levels indicated by the upper and lower limits of the range are derived from technical and strategic considerations, other force compositions and force levels within this general range are equally possible. The Soviets would recognize that forces within this range fell far short of those required for a preemptive attack which might reduce devastation of the USSR to an acceptable level, but in any case, the force would include a protected component capable of devastating retaliatory blows if it survived. (Paragraph 153)
28. MRBM and IRBM Forces. We believe that Soviet MRBM/IRBM force levels will remain fairly constant in the 1966-1969 period at about 700-750 launchers. The developments which we can foresee in Western forces are not likely to add to potential Soviet MRBM/IRBM targets in a major way, although we do not exclude the possibility that a general strengthening of NATO forces would result in some incremental expansion. Improvements in Soviet MRBM/IRBM capabilities in this period are more likely to be qualitative than quantitative. The Soviets may be developing a new MRBM, and it is possible that they also contemplate a new IRBM. If two separate systems are developed, the IRBM would probably phase in a year or so after the MRBM, i.e., in about 1966-1967. It is also possible that the Soviets have elected to work toward a single follow-on system which could cover all MRBM and IRBM ranges. In either event, follow-on systems are likely to feature hard or possibly mobile deployment. If, as we estimate, the size of the force remains fairly stable, improved systems will be deployed to supersede present systems, and may have largely replaced currently operational MRBMs by 1969. (Paragraphs 154-158)
29. Submarine Missile Forces. We think that the Soviets will continue to consider missile submarines an important adjunct to their ground-launched missile capabilities, and we expect the requirement for capabilities to attack surface naval formations to continue. Thus we estimate continued construction of both ballistic missile and cruise missile submarines in this period. Although we have no specific evidence, we believe that longer range submarine-launched ballistic missile systems could become operational in about the 1966-1967 period. We do not anticipate significant technical changes in the cruise missile submarine force. (Paragraphs 159- 163)
30. The size of Soviet missile submarine forces will depend upon a number of factors including the availability of militarily competitive but less expensive delivery systems (especially hardened ICBMs), construction capabilities, and allocation of nuclear submarines to other naval missions. Considering all factors, including estimated construction programs, and the possibilities for improved systems, we believe that by 1969 the Soviets will have 65-80 ballistic missile submarines operational, of which 25-35 will be nuclear-powered. At that time, we estimate a cruise missile submarine force of 40-60 of which 20-30 will be nuclear-powered. (Paragraph 164)
31. Long Range Bombers. We estimate that by 1969 Long Range Aviation will have gradually declined in total strength to about 130-175 heavy bombers and tankers and 400-650 medium bombers and tankers. We believe that it will still consist of aircraft types now in service: Bisons, Bears, Badgers, and Blinders, with the last of these comprising about half of the medium bomber force. Considering the types and quantities of missile delivery systems they are likely to have, as well as the probable continued availability of existing heavy bomber types, we think it unlikely that the Soviets will bring any follow-on heavy bomber to operational service in the period of this estimate. However, the Soviets have the technical capability of developing and producing new, high-performance military aircraft of intercontinental range for operational use in the 1966-1969 period, should they come to consider this necessary or worthwhile. In the later 1960s they would probably employ bomber forces in follow-on, rather than initial attacks and for increasingly specialized missions./10/ (Paragraphs 165-166)
/10/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, disagrees with this paragraph since he thinks that the Soviets will continue to consider manned strategic aircraft an important adjunct to their ground launched missile capabilities. He estimates that the USSR will introduce a follow-on heavy bomber. He further estimates the heavy bomber force will remain at about 200 or somewhat larger, depending on the timing of an expected follow-on bomber, and that by mid-1969 the medium bomber/tanker force probably still will include about 900 aircraft. See his footnote to the Table on page 36 and to paragraph 167. [Footnote in the source text.]
32. Space Weapons. On the basis of evidence presently available, we are unable to determine the existence of Soviet plans or programs for the military use of space. However, we believe that the USSR almost certainly is investigating the feasibility of space systems for military support and offensive and defensive weapons. For accomplishing military missions, we think that during the 1966-1969 period, orbital weapons will not compare favorably with ICBMs in terms of cost and effectiveness. Based on these considerations as we now understand them, it would appear unlikely that the Soviets will during this decade deploy orbital bombardment systems of military significance. Moreover, we believe that the USSR would probably recognize that a Soviet deployment of nuclear weapons in space would produce an unfavorable reaction in other countries and strong US counteractions. Further, if the Soviets enter into a formal obligation to refrain from orbiting nuclear weapons, this will constitute still another factor inhibiting such deployment. (Paragraphs 168-171)
33. We recognize, however, that the Soviets might reach different conclusions as to cost and effectiveness, and in some future phase of East-West relations, political inhibitions might lose their effectiveness. Moreover, considering the pace of developments in the weapons field in general, it is extremely hazardous to estimate Soviet decisions for a period many years ahead. For these reasons, a firm estimate as to whether the Soviets will deploy an orbital bombardment system within the 1966-1969 period cannot be made at this time. (Paragraphs 172-173)
Discussion
I. Soviet Policy Toward Strategic Attack Forces
34. The Soviet leaders look upon long range strike forces as a major element of their strategic position, intended to support their political objectives, to deter the West from resort to military action, and to fight a war should one occur. The available evidence supports the view that they are attempting to build forces which they regard as appropriate to these objectives, rather than aiming at forces with which they could launch a deliberate attack on the West and count on reducing retaliation to levels that would be in any sense tolerable.
35. Soviet policy toward long range strike forces is heavily affected by the Soviet view of the character of future war. This Soviet view has become increasingly complicated in the last several years as the result of a continuing debate over the implication of modern weaponry for military doctrine. This debate persists, and may lead to further important changes, but at the present state it has produced several official conclusions which bear on long range capabilities:
(a) General war might begin in a variety of ways, including circumstances which provided very short warning times.
(b) The initial period is of critical importance and might determine the outcome.
(c) Enormous advantages accrue to the side striking the first blow.
(d) But the initial nuclear exchange might not determine the outcome, and in any event large ground campaigns would follow.
36. These propositions, when related to the strategic capabilities now deployed and programmed by the West, impose high and complex requirements upon Soviet long range strike forces. Among the chief constraints in meeting these requirements are cost and skilled manpower, which pose distinct problems to Soviet decision-makers. One of these problems is the proper balance of expenditure among military needs, the space program, and the civil economy. Another is the proper allocation of military funds among the various force components. This problem is made particularly acute by the insistence of the military leadership that all arms of service, including large theater forces, are necessary to prosecute a general war successfully and to provide the USSR with flexibility in a variety of possible circumstances.
37. Two other main factors have been involved in the past decisions which have determined present Soviet capabilities for long range attack. One is a concentration on the Eurasian theater, which is traceable to traditional Soviet preoccupation with this area as well as to the higher costs and greater technical complexity of intercontinental weapon systems. The other is an apparent lag in military thinking, which seems to have been relatively slow in working out some of the more sophisticated implications of advanced weapons. Both these factors are now changing, but for the immediate future Soviet forces for long range attack will be characterized by capabilities against Eurasia far exceeding those against North America, and by a considerable deficiency in certain performance characteristics--chiefly survivability and reaction times--relative to corresponding US forces.
38. A continuing Soviet emphasis on high yield weapons for long range striking forces was indicated by the 1961-1962 nuclear test series. The USSR's nuclear testing program has provided it with a wide variety of weapons for strategic delivery, with yields up to 100 MT. As new weapons enter the inventory they will progressively improve the total nuclear delivery capabilities of the strategic striking forces.
[Here follow the body of the paper and two annexes, totaling 41 additional pages. See the Supplement.]
145. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, November 14, 1963.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 7000 (3 Jan 64) Sec 1A. Top Secret. This draft memorandum is Tab II of "Department of Defense Draft Memoranda for the President: Recommended FY 1965-1969 Defense Programs," dated December 19. Another copy is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 US. An earlier version of the draft memorandum, which was circulated to the JCS for comment, is dated October 9. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JCS 1800/774, JMF 7000 (1 Oct 63))
SUBJECT
Recommended FY 1965-FY 1969 Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces (U)
Our program for strategic defense is approaching a threshold where a major national decision should be made whether to base our strategic posture primarily on strong offensive forces or to provide the elements of a balanced defense against a nuclear attack. A choice between these fundamental alternatives involves the following arguments:
(a) Our strategic offensive forces, alone, should deter a calculated Soviet first strike. Additional offensive forces would contribute most to defense by reducing the probability of general nuclear attack. The nation may not be willing to provide the resources for an expanded strategic defense program, including the requisite civil defense, in view of the limited effectiveness of such a program. Moreover, a level of defense that threatened the credibility of the Soviet deterrent would probably be countered, at some fraction of the cost of the defense, by additional expenditures for offensive weapons.
(b) A nuclear war, however, may result from other conditions--an accident, an uncontrolled attack by a Soviet field commander, a catalytic attack by a third nation, or from a deep crisis in which the Soviets act irrationally or are willing to accept greater damage. Balanced defense forces would significantly raise the level of attack that would cause serious damage under such, probably most likely, conditions of war outbreak. For any given level of Soviet forces, balanced defense forces would allow the U.S. to take greater risks to achieve a favorable outcome from such crisis periods. Although the Soviets could overcome our defense by somewhat smaller expenditures than the cost of our defense, they may not so respond for a period of time, due to constraints on specific economic resources or competing demands for these resources. And last, a balanced strategic defense program would provide a more favorable environment for disarmament negotiations, permitting the U.S. to accept a smaller number of known or undetected offensive weapons maintained by any potential enemy.
Our present strategic defense force provides only a nominal capability to reduce the damage of a nuclear attack and is not consistent with any rational strategic posture. The ultimate choice between these fundamental alternatives should be implemented either by a phased reduction of our present programs to meet limited defense objectives or by programs to provide the basic elements of an effective defense. The import of this decision should be recognized: This decision should be addressed at the level of the aggregate strategic defense program as the effectiveness of each major element depends critically on the scale of the other elements. A decision to improve our continental air defense force is not consistent with a decision against deploying a ballistic missile defense system. A decision to deploy Nike X is not consistent with a decision against a fallout shelter system. A decision on any one of the major elements implies a choice of strategic postures which should not be made by default./2/ At this time, I do not believe an intelligent choice can be made between these fundamental alternatives. The recommended strategic defense program, consequently, provides only those elements required to meet limited defense objectives and to provide the technical and organizational base for later decisions on the major elements.
/2/"The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that their interdependence is not so absolute that difficulties in one of these programs should restrict advancement in another." [Footnote in the source text. The quotation is from a November 6 JCS memorandum to McNamara. (Ibid., JCS 1800/774-2, JMF 7000 (1 Oct 63)) It stated that "measured against a postulated Soviet threat which has not decreased in proportion to the proposed reduction in US forces, the recommended program provides insufficient defensive strength." This deficiency was caused by premature reliance on anticipated surveillance, warning and control equipment, and postponement of missile defense and new interceptor systems.]
For comparison, the following paragraphs summarize the characteristics, costs, and effectiveness of three alternate strategic defense programs.
1. Summary of a Low Alternate Program
Choice of a strategic posture based primarily on strong offensive forces should lead to a phased reduction of present programs to a level sufficient to meet limited, feasible defense objectives. A low alternate strategic defense program would include the following basic elements:
(a) The continental air defense forces would be reduced by FY 1969 to include only 25 active interceptor squadrons, a surface-to-air missile defense of selected hardened sites, and a minimum surveillance, warning, and control system. The ANG interceptor squadrons and the bomber warning lines would be deleted.
(b) The missile warning and space surveillance systems would be maintained and improved to alert, launch, and control our offensive systems. The Nike Zeus test program would be maintained as part of the Nike X Army development and to gather data to design our offensive penetration aid systems. The Nike X and Defender program would be limited to development work only.
(c) The civil defense program would include an expanded shelter survey program and the associated provisioning and shelter management programs but would include no direct assistance for shelter construction. This program, at most, would provide 140 million low-shielded shelter spaces by 1970.
2. Summary of High Alternate Program
A balanced strategic defense program would include the following basic elements:
(a) A 12 squadron force of advanced interceptors would be deployed by FY 1970; the ANG interceptor force would be re-equipped with the best interceptors released from the active force. A part of the surface-to-air missile force would be re-sited for defense of selected hardened sites. A reorganization of the air defense surveillance, warning, and control system would provide a more flexible, survivable system at a lower annual cost.
(b) A ballistic missile defense of the 22 largest urban areas would be deployed by FY 1973. The missile warning and space surveillance systems and the Defender program would be maintained.
(c) An expanded civil defense program would provide 185 million shelter spaces with the necessary provisions for warning, shelter habitation, and post-attack recovery by 1970. Active thermal counter-measures would also be deployed at the 22 largest urban areas on a schedule consistent with deployment of Nike X.
3. Summary of the Recommended Program
The recommended strategic defense program for FY 1965 must be recognized as an interim program, providing those elements that are common to the low and high alternate programs and those necessary to provide the base for later decision on the major new elements./3/ This force includes the following basic elements:
/3/In addition, certain forces not required for either of the alternative programs have been included at the request of the JCS. [Footnote in the source text.]
(a) The active interceptor force will be reduced by normal attrition to 38 squadrons by FY 1969; the ANG interceptor force will be substantially re-equipped with F-102s withdrawn from the theaters and maintained at a 22 squadron level through FY 1969. A part of the surface-to-air missiles will be re-sited for defense of selected hardened sites, with the remainder of the force maintained for urban area defense. Development of two new control systems will provide a basis for the ultimate replacement of SAGE.
(b) The missile warning and space surveillance systems will include several new elements for SLBM detection and space tracking. The Nike Zeus, Nike X, and Defender development programs will be maintained on a priority schedule to provide a technical base for a later decision on the production and deployment of a ballistic missile defense.
(c ) The civil defense program would be revised consistent with the low or high alternate programs, dependent on Congressional action on the proposed FY 1964 program.
4. Estimated Costs of Alternate Active Defense Programs
The estimated costs of the approved active defense programs and the three alternate programs are presented below.
(Millions of Dollars)
|
|
FY62 |
FY63 |
FY64 |
FY65 |
FY66 |
FY67 |
FY68 |
FY69 |
Total FY65-69 |
|
Air Defense/a/ |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Approved |
2125 |
1946 |
1962 |
1708 |
1649 |
1610 |
1597 |
|
|
|
Low Alternate |
|
|
|
1467 |
1370 |
1188 |
1038 |
882 |
5945 |
|
High Alternate |
|
|
|
2101 |
2293 |
2325 |
1964 |
1294 |
9977 |
|
Recommended |
|
|
|
1754 |
1632 |
1587 |
1565 |
1482 |
8020 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ballistic Missile Defense/b/ |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Approved |
570 |
550 |
582 |
614 |
547 |
458 |
393 |
|
|
|
Low Alternate |
|
|
|
614 |
535 |
463 |
399 |
355 |
2366 |
|
High Alternate |
|
|
|
709 |
1267 |
2649 |
3350 |
3339 |
11314 |
|
Recommended |
|
|
|
614 |
535 |
463 |
399 |
355 |
2366 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total Active Defense/c/ |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Approved |
2695 |
2496 |
2544 |
2322 |
2196 |
2068 |
1990 |
|
|
|
Low Alternate |
|
|
|
2080 |
1905 |
1651 |
1437 |
1237 |
8311 |
|
High Alternate |
|
|
|
2810 |
2560 |
4974 |
5314 |
4633 |
21291 |
|
Recommended |
|
|
|
2368 |
2167 |
2050 |
1964 |
1837 |
10386 |
/a/Air Defense total includes both Service and Guard weapons, the surveillance, warning and control system, the command and support for all approved continental air and missile defense systems, and R&D for new air defense systems.
/b/Ballistic missile defense total includes missile warning and space surveillance systems, investment and operating costs for Nike X, and the Nike Zeus, Nike X, and Defender R&D programs.
/c/A complete presentation of the total expenditures for strategic defense would include the cost of the CONUS ASW forces and the civil defense program. The annual cost of the CONUS ASW forces is now around $1.1 billion and will be slightly reduced as a result of the changes recommended in the ASW memorandum. The estimated costs of the approved civil defense program and alternate programs consistent with the alternate active defense programs is presented below:
(Millions of Dollars)
|
|
FY62 |
FY63 |
FY64 |
FY65 |
FY66 |
FY67 |
FY68 |
FY69 |
Total FY63-69 |
|
Civil Defense |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Approved |
250 |
128 |
347 |
300 |
300 |
300 |
300 |
|
|
|
Low Alternate |
|
|
|
273 |
247 |
140 |
199 |
195 |
1054 |
|
High Alternate |
|
|
|
557 |
732 |
750 |
783 |
598 |
3420 |
5. Effectiveness of the Present Program
A strategic defense program should contribute to three important objectives:
(a) attack warning to alert, launch, and control the strategic offense and defense forces;
(b) defend the national and military command centers and those military forces necessary to control and terminate the war; and
(c) limit damage to U.S. population and industry.
The present warning systems, with several minor improvements, are adequate for the next several years. The primary response to the changed warning environment of the late 1960s will involve changes in our strategic forces to reduce dependence on warning and changes in operational procedures to make use of shorter warning times.
The present strategic defense force, unfortunately, provides only a nominal capability to limit damage to U.S. population and industry and is not sited for effective defense of the critical command centers and military forces. At the present time, the damage resulting from a Soviet attack would be limited primarily by the number and capability of Soviet offensive weapons, the effectiveness of our counterforce response, and the effect of coercive tactics on Soviet intentions and targeting. Our present strategic defense forces are comparable to a building with fragile walls and no roof or foundation. The air defense force is a costly product of earlier planning for a large all-bomber threat, and is critically vulnerable to a small ballistic missile attack; under favorable conditions this force could probably destroy around 100 bombers, but most of the bombers would penetrate to their priority targets. /4/
/4/The JCS believe this statement is based on conditions more favorable to the enemy which now appear unrealistic. [Footnote in the source text. According to the JCS memorandum cited in footnote 1 above, the statement was "based upon most favorable conditions for the enemy which appear unrealistic."]
With no defense against ballistic missiles, a 50 missile attack would kill more than 30 million people and a 200 missile attack would kill most of our urban population. The CONUS ASW force provides a capability to destroy around 30 percent of a follow-on attack by Soviet diesel-powered missile submarines but provides only a limited capability against the growing nuclear-powered submarine force. With full utilization of the present fallout shelter spaces, a Soviet attack on military targets only would kill more than 30 million people; no increase in active defenses alone would significantly increase the survivors from a determined Soviet attack in the absence of a complete fallout shelter system. Without a balanced strategic defense, a determined Soviet attack in the late 1960s would probably kill around two-thirds of the U. S. population. The present force, at most, could provide some defense of our hardened military forces, and a substantial re-siting would be required to achieve this capability. Our present strategic defense program, in summary, is larger than necessary to meet limited, feasible defense objectives and is grossly inadequate to provide an effective defense of population and industry.
6. Effectiveness of a Low Alternate Program
A reduction of the present program should be accompanied by a reduction of the missions for which they are charged. A low alternate strategic defense program would provide a negligible capability to increase the population surviving a determined Soviet attack but would still contribute to several valuable objectives.
The smaller interceptor force considered would be adequate/5/ for peacetime airspace surveillance and policing, a defense against an airborne attack by a third power, and defense against intra-war reconnaissance; as over half of the present 40 active squadrons are co-located with SAC, the distribution of a 25 squadron force over the available non-co-located bases would present a comparable number of aiming points. A re-siting of a small proportion of the surface-to-air missile force would provide an effective defense of selected hardened national and military command centers and missile fields, where none now exists. The forward bomber warning lines could be deleted,/6/ as the contiguous radars now provide more warning to our strategic forces than is available against a ballistic missile attack.
/5/The JCS state the force may be inadequate in an age of super-sonic transports. [Footnote in the source text.]
/6/The JCS believe these should be retained as long as there is a manned bomber threat. [Footnote in the source text.]
A continuation of the ballistic missile defense R&D programs may not be appropriate unless eventual deployment of Nike X or a similar system for defense of urban areas is expected. (A ballistic missile defense of hardened command centers and missile fields does not now appear competitive with other means of reducing the vulnerability of these systems.) The missile warning and space surveillance systems and the Nike Zeus test program are requisite to maintain the effectiveness of our strategic offensive forces.
A Congressional decision against the proposed shelter development legislation would limit any additional fallout shelter spaces to those that could be identified by an expanded shelter survey program. At most, this program would provide 140 million shelter spaces (with a protection factor of 20 or more) by 1970. This lower program, including the associated shelter stocking and management programs, would increase the proportion of population surviving a determined Soviet attack from around one-third to over 40 percent.
Against the range of feasible defense objectives, this low alternate program would be nearly as effective and significantly less costly than the approved program.
7. Effectiveness of a High Alternate Program
The high alternate program outlined in this memorandum would provide the basic elements of a balanced strategic defense on a schedule which makes full use of the available technology and minimizes the annual fluctuations of funding requirements. A nationwide fallout shelter system with the necessary provisions for warning, shelter habitation, and post-attack recovery, would be the most effective component of a balanced program; for a total cost to the economy of around $7 billion, this program would increase the proportion of the population surviving a determined Soviet attack in 1970 from around one-third to around one-half. The improved air defense program and a ballistic missile defense of the 22 largest urban areas, for a total cost (including five years operations) of around $25 billion, would further increase the population surviving to around two-thirds. The air defense program would also provide a considerably improved defense of the hardened command centers and missile fields. The active defense systems provide an additional capability to moderate damage to our industrial structure, for which there appears to be no substitute short of a major program to disperse and/or harden industrial facilities.
Depending on the scale of a potential attack, the desired level of defense, and the amount of resources required, some additions to these programs should be considered later. These include the deployment of a new surface-to-air missile defense against bombers and cruise missiles in the areas defended by a ballistic missile defense, deployment of Nike X at smaller urban areas, and additional thermal countermeasures. An additional $20 billion for a combination of these programs would increase the proportion surviving to around three-fourths against a constant Soviet threat or would provide a comparable level of defense against a somewhat larger attack.
8. Effectiveness of the Recommended Program
The recommended strategic defense program provides a capability comparable to that of the approved program. The air defense program includes one substantial improvement, where a minimal capability now exists--an effective air defense of selected hardened command centers and missile fields; the program also includes a modernization of the ANG interceptor force and the control system developments necessary for the replacement of SAGE with a more survivable, flexible system. The recommended program, however, should not be judged primarily by present capability, but by potential future capability. This program differs from the low alternate program, primarily, by providing the technical and organizational base necessary for possible deployment of a balanced defense force at some later time.
The sections following discuss the major alternative programs for each major component of a balanced defense, the analysis relevant to a choice among these alternatives, and outline the recommended programs. Part I outlines the air defense program. Part II outlines the ballistic missile defense program. The related ASW and civil defense programs are presented in separate memoranda./7/
/7/None printed.
146. Editorial Note
In a memorandum to Secretary Rusk dated November 15, 1963, Rostow enclosed two drafts of a basic national security policy. One, dated November 8, was a 14-page paper described by Rostow as "the essence." The other was a much longer paper dated November 11. Rostow stated that while the papers had benefited from interagency discussion of previous drafts, they had not been seen by anyone outside the Policy Planning Council. He stated that he continued to believe "that promulgation of a BNSP would contribute in important ways to effective, coordinated execution of U.S. policy." No record has been found of action by Rusk on this memorandum or its attachments during the remainder of 1963. The memorandum is in Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, BNSP 1963; the two drafts are ibid., S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, TS-BNSP.
147. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, November 22, 1963.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Defense Budget 1965 Section 2. Secret.
SUBJECT
22 November Budget Meeting with Secretary McNamara/2/
/2/No meeting was held on November 22, the day President Kennedy was assassinated. A meeting was held on November 16 among McNamara, Bundy, Gordon, Wiesner, and others. (Memorandum for the record by J.S. Hoover, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Budget); ibid.)
The briefing paper prepared by the Bureau of the Budget/3/ presents a good summary of the four OSD white papers/4/ and covers all of the key budget issues to be discussed with Secretary McNamara today. I have the following general comments on these papers:
/3/Dated November 20. (Ibid.)
/4/Reference is to semifinal versions of three DPMs and the final version of one. They are cited in footnotes below.
(1) Strategic Retaliatory Forces. While not abandoning the concept of "damage limiting" capabilities, Secretary McNamara in this very interesting paper/5/ continues to shift the focus of his strategic doctrine away from the concept of "damage limiting" counterforces to the concept of "assured destruction" of the Soviet Union. Within this context the central issue is the proper size for the Minuteman force. The analysis presented makes it clear that we have a capability for "assured destruction" of the Soviet Union entirely independent of the MM force. This is significant since the previous draft of this document/6/ that I believe you read went through an elaborate and unimpressive argument in an attempt to demonstrate that under certain extremely pessimistic assumptions one could justify the entire force of 1200 MM force under the requirement for an "assured destruction" of the Soviet Union. The rationale for the MM force level is tied exclusively to the "damage limiting" concept. However, examination of the table on page 19 of the OSD paper/7/ shows that the "damage limiting" strategy is at best not very effective in a second strike situation and that diminishing returns have set in long before one reaches the proposed OSD MM force level of 1200. When the Soviets initiate the attack, a force of 1200 MM does not appear to be significantly more effective in reducing fatalities than a force of 950 MM./8/
/5/"Recommended FY 1965-FY 1969 Strategic Retaliatory Forces," dated November 13. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 US)
/6/The August 31 version of the strategic DPM is attached to a September 2 memorandum from McNamara to Taylor. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 7000 (31 Aug 61) Sec 1)
/7/Reference is to the chart entitled "U.S. Fatalities Assuming the Soviets Initiate the Attack" in the strategic DPM. The chart is unchanged in the final version, Document 151.
/8/Kaysen made a similar argument regarding the August 31 draft of the strategic DPM. (Memorandum to Bundy, October 25, with 8-page attachment; Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Defense Budget 1965 Section 2)
As compared with last year, the new OSD proposals essentially involve a reduction in MM force levels by 100 MM from 1300 to 1200, a slippage of one year in achieving these goals (FY 68 to FY 69), and an acceleration in the retrofit program of improved MM for MM in existing silos. I do not believe that the OSD paper makes a real case either for the total force level or for the urgency in the improved MM program, even in the most pessimistic contingencies. (If one chooses to be pessimistic about future adverse technological developments, I think that it would be wiser to begin to invest strategic funds in advance systems development such as the Polaris B-3 missile rather than build up of the MM force beyond 950 since it is conceivable that in the 70's the MM may prove more vulnerable than we are now willing to admit.) While I think the improved MM is a sensible program which overcomes some of the serious limitations of the MM system, it is being pushed on a very tight concurrency schedule for which there appears to be no military justification. /9/
/9/Bundy wrote "agreed" in the margin next to this sentence.
In view of the above, I agree with the BOB proposals to hold the MM force level at 950, to slip the schedule of improved MM program slightly, and to delay the retrofit program of improved MM for MM. Nevertheless, Secretary McNamara will undoubtedly argue, persuasively, that it is impossible for Congressional and Pentagon political reasons to cut the force objectives below 1200 and that an acceleration of the improved MM program is necessary to sell even this modest objective./10/
/10/Bundy wrote "I doubt this" in the margin next to this paragraph. In a budget discussion held November 27, McNamara did not accept the Bureau of the Budget proposals for a reduced Minuteman force level and slippage in improved Minuteman production, and it was agreed that the issues would be submitted to President Johnson. (Memorandum from Keeny to Bundy, November 30; Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Defense Budget 1965 Section 2) In a December 9 memorandum to President Johnson, Kermit Gordon recommended holding the Minuteman force level at 950 in FY 1965, but did not oppose McNamara's eventual force goal of 1,200. (Ibid.)
I believe that there is an additional issue here as to whether it is really necessary to fire 10 percent of the missile force annually as part of the reliability program. I do not believe that this many firings are necessary to obtain adequate reliability statistics. Such a large number of firings would also appear to be rather provocative as the size of the MM force grows (e.g. one every four or five days by FY 65 and one every three days in FY 69).
There is no real reason to continue the B-70 program; however, given the amount of our investment, I believe that it would be politically impossible to cancel the program without any flights. I believe a practical solution to this problem would be the cancellation of the third aircraft which the BOB estimates would save $80 million./11/
/11/At the November 27 meeting, McNamara agreed to cut back one of three programmed B-70s "provided a positive decision was made on handling of the classified project with which you are familiar."
(2) Continental Air and Missile Defense. This paper/12/ essentially pushes all significant policy issues into the future. It is an unusual document that appears to have been written by supporters of a very large continental defense program who were directed to support a very small program. Since OSD is not prepared to face the policy issues involved, it only appears practical at this time to question whether the recommended program is in fact consistent with future decisions to go either to a smaller or much larger continental defense effort. The points raised by the BOB all appear valid with the exception of the objections to BMEWS improvement. I believe that, unless these can be shown to be technically unsound, they are probably justified given our existing investment in BMEWS and alert B-52 aircraft.
/12/Reference is to Document 145.
The civil defense question is not really covered in the OSD paper and the discussion of this subject in the BOB briefing paper is not very helpful. The basic issue on civil defense is whether we should attempt to get additional shelter spaces through an incentive program as Secretary Pittman/13/ proposes or whether we should take the steps necessary to make the shelters we have already identified useable as OST proposes. Secretary McNamara has asked Mr. Gilpatric and Jerry to discuss this question separately and I assume, therefore, it will not be discussed at the meeting today, other than to establish a fiscal ceiling.
/13/Steuart L. Pittman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Civil Defense).
(3) ASW. The principal budget issue in the ASW area is the force level and procurement of SSN (nuclear attack submarines). Unfortunately, the OSD paper/14/ sheds little real light on this question. The paper does not make a convincing case for the use of large numbers of SSN submarines and admittedly presents no rationale for the proposed force level other than it will provide a better basis from which to build a force if it is found to be necessary. While the BOB proposal to entirely eliminate production of SSN submarines is very appealing, I am afraid that it is a bit too harsh to be acceptable. A good argument can certainly be made that some continuing production capacity should be retained. Therefore, I would propose building three or four SSN's in FY 65 rather than the six proposed by OSD or the nine proposed by the Navy./15/ Secretary McNamara will undoubtedly take the position that he has already cut the Navy as much as he possibly can on this highly emotional item./16/
/14/"Anti-Submarine Warfare Forces FY 1965-1969," November 9. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 US)
/15/Bundy made a similar recommendation in a December 5 memorandum to McNamara. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Defense Budget 1965 Section 2)
/16/The final version of the ASW DPM, dated December 11, retains the recommendation that SSN procurement continue at six boats per year. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 7000 (3 Jan 64) Sec 1A)
(4) General Purpose Forces. This is an excellent paper/17/ which arrived at important policy conclusions with which I agree. If there are important budget issues in this area, they have been carefully disguised by the OSD and have not been identified by the BOB.
Spurgeon Keeny/18/
/17/"Recommended FY 1965-FY 1969 Army and Marine Corps General Purpose Forces," November 15. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 US) The final version of this paper is Document 153.
/18/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
148. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, December 4, 1963.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, December 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Major Smith.
[Here follows discussion of forthcoming travel and scheduled meetings of administration officials, U.S. policy toward Venezuela, and military assistance procedures.]
6. Strategic Policy Papers. Cooper used the discussion on the State Department to remind Bundy that some of Rostow's strategic policy papers/2/ were reaching the point of signature, and he wondered whether the White House was prepared to accept them or whether the work would have been in vain. He said that if the papers were not used, a lot of talented and well-meaning bureaucrats would be dissatisfied; they would have spent long months working on them for nothing. On the other hand, if they were to be used, the procedures for getting them approved as outlined by Rostow should be carefully scrutinized.
/2/The Strategic Country Studies were by this time known officially as National Policy Papers.
This led to a long discussion--one of several in the last few months--on the Rostow papers, and there is no other subject that makes Bundy's staff bristle as much as this one. The exchanges, as they seldom do, become sharp and direct. Bundy himself, concerned essentially with operational matters, seems not to believe the papers will be of much value in determining policies because they may be out of date before they are finished. His basic approach, as he admitted today, has been that since he could not stop the Rostow papers from being developed, he could, if necessary, ignore them. Other people at the table, who are more planners than operators--Ken Hansen,/3/ for example--think the papers may have some value. But the issues are seldom joined directly. Instead they flit by in shorthand remarks.
/3/Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
The discussion was fairly long and, as noted, at times caustic. It dealt essentially with three questions, although in no particular logical sequence: (1) Are the Rostow papers worth the trouble? (2) How will they be approved? and (3) What will their relation be to the Long Range Assistance Strategies and the Internal Defense Plans?/4/
/4/These were series of country policy papers prepared under the auspices of the Agency for International Development and the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency), respectively.
With respect to their value, the consensus was that, quite naturally, some will be good and some bad. If the split is 50-50, that will be about what is expected. The good ones should be used, the poor ones junked. Bundy thought that some attrition would be beneficial in order to set a standard. With respect to level of approval, Bundy seemed to think, and everyone agreed, that this would depend upon the subject of the paper and its interest in the White House. Some papers could be approved by the departments and need go no further. Others should come to the White House, this determination being made by the White House staff officer responsible for the country under study. Bundy looked on the White House role as being the right to intervene without any obligation to do so. He agreed with Bromley Smith's point that no procedure should be established which allowed only disagreements to come forward. The President is often as interested in what the department heads have agreed on as he is on what they disagreed. In other words, if the White House is interested, it will be interested across-the-board. Bundy closed this phase of the discussion by saying that he would closely review the Rostow-proposed procedures for approving the papers to see that they meet White House needs./5/
/5/In a memorandum to Department of State officials dated December 2, Rostow stated that on November 19 Rusk had approved a recommendation that he review and formally sign National Policy Papers "following their approval by the appropriate interdepartmental committee under the Chairmanship of an Assistant Secretary of State." (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Basic National Security Policy 1963) A manual of procedures issued on January 6, 1964, for the national policy papers prescribed signature by the Secretary of State after a lengthy interagency approval process which was to include some White House participation. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Department of State, Policy Planning Volume I)
Although the relationship of the Rostow papers to the Long Range Assistance Strategies and the Internal Defense Plans has not yet been completely decided, the Secretary of State has said that these latter two documents should be folded into the strategic policy studies. Given the view that the Secretary of State should take stronger control over foreign affairs, the White House staff feels that it cannot very well object to a Secretary of State decision to do just that in case of the Rostow papers, although the Rostow approach is not considered necessarily the best way to proceed.
One major objection Bundy referred to several times, possibly because Hansen kept mentioning the potential budget impact of these papers, was that the Rostow documents could not be programming documents. He said you could not make programming decisions in a policy document and, when asked where these would be made, did not answer directly, although it was clear he believed they would be made in the budget. Bundy made another interesting (and valid) observation in stating that there should not be a Rostow paper for every country. There are some countries where the policy could be set by the Secretary of State, and other, less important, countries where the policy could be effectively set by a level even below the Secretary of State. The Principals just would not have time to acquaint themselves intimately with the details of each country.
In summary, the discussion reached no recognized conclusions, and the role of the strategic policy papers remains unsettled, although it seems they may be more important than Bundy now wishes./6/ (I believe he recognizes this, which partially explains his irritation when they are discussed.) At any rate, I suggest that the JCS look the Rostow papers over carefully when they are referred for comment.
/6/On December 24, Rostow stated in a memorandum to Rusk that the "town tends to view the seriousness of any program in accordance with the nature of the directive creating it" and recommended, with support from the Department of Defense and AID, that the directive establishing procedures for the national policy papers be issued in the form of an NSAM. (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Planning 1963) Rusk approved this procedure on January 7, 1964, and on February 11 McGeorge Bundy signed NSAM No. 281, addressed to 13 agency heads, which stated that the President had "vested in the Secretary of State the responsibility for the promulgation of certain national policy papers." (Ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 281)
7. Bundy's Status. In the discussion of putting material on cards for the President,/7/ it seemed to me this was not Bundy's way of operating. Later, in the MLF discussion, he repeated a remark he has made several times lately, that a decision will have to be made as to whether the White House will continue to monitor certain programs closely or whether they will be left to the State Department. Klein, who is more sensitive to these things than I, also connected Bundy's remark on publishing President Kennedy's letter to the State Department,/8/ telling the Secretary to take over foreign affairs if he wished, as yet another sign of Bundy's uncertain status at present. The only conclusion I can reach thus far is that the issue of Bundy's retention perhaps is not yet completely settled. In an earlier report, I believe I commented that Bundy could well end up with more power if he stays. It is not inconsistent to add that if he sees himself with much less power, he will decide to go.
WYS
/7/This is a reference to discussion in the omitted portion of memorandum.
/8/Not further identified.
149. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, December 5, 1963.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Volume I. No classification marking.
SUBJECT
Remarks to the National Security Council/2/
/2/See Document 150.
The following is cast in the form of a short talk by you, but it is really intended only as a memorandum of what you said this morning for you to draw on as you please.
1. I want to say a word of welcome to the Speaker who will be with us from time to time when his very heavy duties permit it./3/ I hope that all members of the Council will show the same readiness to keep him fully informed in this great field that they showed to me as Vice President.
/3/Representative John McCormack of Massachusetts was, as Speaker of the House, Johnson's successor in the event of the President's death in office.
And I want to welcome you all to the first NSC meeting of this Administration. Most of us have served together now for nearly three years; I know the quality of your work and place great reliance on all of you.
2. This Council is the formal meeting place for the men in the Executive Branch who have top responsibility for the safety of our nation. I want you to know that I look on these matters of security as the No. 1 business of the Government, and I propose to run my own office and my own business with that priority. Not all the work of National Security can be done in meetings of this Council, and I expect to go on with special meetings for special purposes, but I do plan to use this Council from time to time as a forum in which these matters can be examined. I welcome candid and open expression of views and differences of opinion, and I also welcome the opportunity which these meetings give for making my own positions clear.
As a beginning, I want to take a few minutes this afternoon to state the essentials of U.S. policy as I see it.
4. The greatest single requirement on the world's statesmen today is that we should find a way to ensure the survival of civilization in this nuclear age. This group knows better than most what a general nuclear war would be like, and my view is simple: such a war would be the death of all our hopes, and it is our task to see that it does not happen.
5. From this there follow two basic rules for U.S. policy: (1) we must be strong, and (2) we must be temperate.
6. On strength and the need for fully effective defenses I yield to no one. I have been concerned with the strength and effectiveness of our Armed Forces for 30 years, and I mean to continue with energy the great work which Bob McNamara and the Defense Department have carried forward in the last three years. He and I have reemphasized the need for economy in recent days and we mean it--but we do not mean the kind of economy cuts into the necessary strength of the Armed Forces. The basic improvement in the balance of power which has taken place in the last three years is one-half of the explanation for the sense of hope that was developing in President Kennedy's last months. I have not become President to give away this advantage.
7. But we must be temperate, too. One of my first concerns after the terrible event of November 22 was to make it clear to the Soviet Government and to Mr. Khrushchev personally that the U.S. will go its part of the way in every effort to make peace more secure. I do not agree with everything Walter Lippmann/4/ says, but I do agree with him on the importance of the progress we made in this area, too, in the last three years. I made this point forcefully to Mr. Mikoyan/5/ at the same time that I was emphasizing our continued and intense interest in the strength of our alliances to such men as Chancellor Erhard and Prime Minister Douglas-Home./6/ I strongly supported the limited test ban treaty and I want Bill Foster to know that I look on his work as part of National Security, just as much as the work of Bob McNamara.
/4/Walter S. Lippmann, author, foreign policy analyst, and syndicated newspaper columnist.
/5/Anastas I. Mikoyan, First Vice Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers and full member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.
/6/Ludwig Erhard, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Sir Alec Douglas-Home, British Prime Minister.
8. I won't take your time today to give views on all the major issues we will be working on together, but I do wish to signal my concern on two specific issues:
(1) We are heavily committed in South Vietnam with 18,000 Americans there, and we should all of us let no day go by without asking whether we are doing everything we can to win the struggle there.
(2) We have to live on the same world with the Soviet Union, but we do not have to accept Communist subversion in this Hemisphere--or, indeed, in any free country that can use our help effectively. But especially in this Hemisphere I think we should let no day pass without asking what more we can do against Communist subversion and against the Castro government in particular.
I have scheduled separate meetings on both these subjects next week.
9. But being against subversion is not just a matter of fighting Communism. We have the positive job of helping to make the democratic system effective and attractive, both in our own country and wherever we have influence. This positive job, too, is of first importance.
10. I'll make just one more comment: We are all here to serve the interest of the United States, but I think we can serve that interest better if we always remember that the other man sees things in his own way. We need to show patience and understanding of other systems as well as our own, and each of us should ask himself when he deals with other nations how he would feel if he were in the other man's place.
11. The business of this meeting is to hear the intelligence assessment of the current situation in the Soviet Union, and I will ask Mr. McCone to take over.
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