Docs 73-108
Latin American Security
73. Editorial Note
At a meeting of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 23, 1961, there was some discussion of Latin America during a general discussion of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare. According to a memorandum of the meeting by Defense Liaison Officer Brigadier General C.V. Clifton, USA, dated February 27, JCS Chairman General Lemnitzer reported briefly on a meeting with Latin American military representatives, and the President asked Lemnitzer to try to find out "how these military Latin Americans feel about Castro; from a military viewpoint, what would they do from their countries to offset his regime; and does Castro represent a threat to their countries?" The President requested a JCS analysis of what the United States could do around the world to build anti-guerrilla forces, and indicated that he especially wanted comments on each Latin American country. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Clifton Series, JCS Conferences with the President) The text of Clifton's memorandum of the meeting is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VIII, Document 18.
74. Editorial Note
At the 478th meeting of the National Security Council on April 22, 1961, the Council discussed U.S. policy toward Cuba and, in NSC Action No. 2406, approved by the President on April 24, took several actions relating to Cuba. In NSC Action No. 2406-f, the Council
"Noted that an interdepartmental study group would be considering an increase in U.S. assistance to Latin American countries in matters relating to internal security and counter-guerrilla activities, and agreed that a representative of the Department of Justice should be added to this group."
In NSC Action No. 2406-h, the Council
"Noted the President's directive that the possibility be studied of creating a Caribbean Security Agency, to which we and the other Caribbean countries would contribute forces, and to whom any nation attacked could appeal for help." (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)
In National Security Action Memorandum No. 44, from the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy to Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara, April 25, Bundy called attention to NSC Action No. 2406-h and requested that they undertake the study as soon as possible and present their preliminary views at the next NSC meeting. (Department of State, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 44)
At the 483d meeting of the National Security Council on May 5 the Council discussed U.S. policy toward Cuba and, in NSC Action No. 2422, approved by the President on May 16, took several actions relating to Cuba. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95) For text of NSC Action No. 2422-k, see Document 113. The complete texts of NSC Actions No. 2406 and 2422 and related material are printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume X.
75. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts in the American Republics/1/
Washington, May 10, 1961, 4:14 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5-1061. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by William G. Bowdler of the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs and Jamison; cleared in draft by Coerr, Task Force on Latin America Chairman Adolph A. Berle, and Assistant Special Counsel to the President Richard N. Goodwin; and approved by Achilles. Sent to Guatemala, Tegucigalpa, San Salvador, Managua, San Jose, Panama, Bogot#, Caracas, and Port au Prince and repeated to Mexico City, Ciudad Trujillo, London, Paris, The Hague, Ottawa, and USUN for Stevenson.
1761. One of decisions taken at high level review of problems posed by Castro regime (Depcirtel 1755)/2/ was to explore possibility of establishing Caribbean Security Arrangement within OAS framework to improve capabilities of Caribbean countries to protect themselves against both external and internal threats of Castro-Communism. Given below is brief description of essential elements of arrangement. Before preparing plan for presentation to foreign officials we desire soonest views of Embassy in consultation with Defense members country team on its feasibility as well as probable receptiveness local government.
/2/Circular telegram 1755, May 8, sent to all Embassies in Latin America, stated that a decision had been made "to seek as promptly as possible inter-American program to condemn, isolate, and weaken Castro regime and assist other governments to counter its subversive activity." (Ibid., 737.00/5-861) For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. X, Document 211.
1. Rationale. Primary US objective in Latin America and only long-term solution to basic problems of area is to advance as rapidly as possible in social and economic development, thereby giving mass of people greater stake in functioning of their own government. This process will take time. Castro-Communism in meantime can be expected attempt infiltrate and subvert established governments and to disrupt positive development program. It is essential build up defenses against this danger so Latin American countries can get on with development plans.
Area most immediately vulnerable to Castro-Communism is Caribbean. States bordering Caribbean basin have special interest adopt new techniques to cope with this threat.
2. Membership. Arrangement would include governments which have demonstrated awareness of danger posed by Castro-Communism and which USG has reason to believe would be interested in joining with US in such arrangement: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Haiti, Colombia and Venezuela. Given its attitude on Cuban situation, Mexico undoubtedly would not be interested in plan. Dominican Republic under present conditions would not be invited to participate until acceptable post-Trujillo government is formed. Parties to arrangement would make known, however, that one of its purposes was to protect entire island of Hispaniola. Arrangement also might be elaborated provided concurrence metropol governments obtained, to place protective arm around West Indies.
3. Commitments. Each participant in arrangement would:
a) Pledge to assist at their request other participants threatened by indirect aggression and subversion directed or supported by Castro-Communism.
b) Each state would earmark and train military units for a Caribbean Security Force. In event of emergency stemming from such a situation this force could be used in whole or in part at request of threatened state and with approval of state contributing elements.
4. Immediate Steps. While details of arrangement are worked out among participating countries, USG would be prepared, at request of any threatened participating state, to establish a system of surveillance in Caribbean to seek out and prevent, in territorial waters of requesting state, landing on part of Castro-Communist elements of armed forces or supplies, and otherwise assisting governments to identify and frustrate armed assistance to subversive elements. Such a system could subsequently form part of operations plan for the Caribbean Security Force with participation of units from other states parties to arrangement.
5. Intermediate Steps. Arrangement would have bilateral and eventually multilateral aspects. Intermediate phase would involve bilateral agreements between USG and other participating states, incorporating commitments specified in paragraph 3 above. Depending upon Congressional authorization where additional funds are involved, USG prepared to negotiate agreement with each participant to help build up internal security and military capabilities for internal and external defense, or, in cases of governments with which US already has MAP agreements to redefine "missions important to the defense of the Western Hemisphere" to indicate maintenance of constitutional order in existing cases. Assistance would be pursuant to requirements determined by survey team now in area.
6. Long-range Relationship to OAS. Eventually bilateral commitments could be multilateralized through agreement, negotiated among participating states, establishing arrangement under OAS as one of "special treaties" on collective security referred to in Article 25 of OAS Charter. It would be given further OAS context by having states participating in arrangement reach agreement in advance on salient points and submit these to OAS when it meets to consider Cuban problem. OAS could take note that Castro regime presents special threat to Caribbean area countries and authorize them to work out special measures among themselves to insure their own security. Participating states could utilize Inter-American Defense Board to develop security plan built around Caribbean Security Force.
Bowles
76. Draft Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense/1/
Washington, May 19, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 720.5/6-2861. Secret. The source text incorporates revisions after May 19 and is filed with a covering memorandum of June 28 from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Haydn Williams to Berle. Williams recommended sending the draft to the National Security Council for consideration, but other attached memoranda indicate that it was not sent.
U.S. POLICY FOR THE SECURITY OF LATIN AMERICA IN THESIXTIES
Part I--Introduction
Latin America is militarily important to the security of the United States. It is an area on which we are dependent for bases and strategic resources in peace and war. The Cuban experience makes it plain that the fall of additional Latin American nations to the Sino-Soviet Bloc would jeopardize the entire Inter-American system; and that the establishment of a military foothold in Latin America by Bloc powers would pose a direct threat to the security of the U.S. itself.
The purpose of this paper is to review current U.S. military policies and programs concerned with the security of Latin America and project them in the light of the threat, the resources available to meet it, and the adjustments which may be necessary during the 1960's. The focus will be on the strategic concepts, collective security arrangements, military assistance and other military programs, and arms control policies applicable to the security of the Western Hemisphere during the decade.
Parts II-IV of the paper will discuss three principal security problems: (1) the problem of extra-continental aggression; (2) the problem of aggression by one State against another; and (3) the problem of indirect aggression and subversion. Examined under each will be the nature of the threat; existing strategies and policies; and existing capabilities to cope with the threat. Part V of the paper proposes strategy and policy for the future. The last two sections of the paper set forth conclusions and recommendations in the military field for furthering the goals of our "Alianza para Progreso" and meeting successfully the challenge we face in the decade of the 1960's.
The long-range goals of hemispheric security are dependent not only on military capabilities but also on a carefully phased approach to such complementary needs as political stability, social and economic development, and the encouragement of the people of Latin America toward what the President has called "an historic decade of democratic progress" and a "hemisphere where all men can hope for the same high standard of living". Where directly relevant to the military requirements and resources, other factors--economic, political, and psychological--will be discussed. Basically, however, this paper is limited to an analysis of the military aspects of hemispheric security.
[Here follow Parts II through V.]
Part VI--Conclusions
1. Latin American nations collectively are essential to the security of the U.S., and certain Latin American countries, individually, are important to its security. The fall of individual Latin American countries to the Soviet Bloc will jeopardize the security of the United States.
2. The Western Hemisphere has a sound strategy and sufficient capacity at this time to guard against the least likely threat to its security, an armed external attack, and an ineffective strategy and insufficient capability to guard against the most likely threat--the threat to internal security.
3. Existing military policies and programs for the security of Latin America will have to be modified to meet the shifting nature of the security problem, giving priority to the internal security threat and new emphasis to military programs contributing to economic development and the strengthening of representative government, while at the same time, maintaining an effective strategy to secure the Western Hemisphere against external attack.
4. Modifications in existing programs will have to be brought about gradually, taking into account the sensibilities of the Latin Americans on these matters. The goal should be to give Latin American states a sense of more vital and more dignified partnership with the U.S. in the overall defense of the hemisphere from attacks from without and within.
Part VII--Recommendations
1. Encourage acceptance of the concept that the U.S. has primary responsibility for the defense of Latin America against external attack, that the role of the Latin American nations in this mission is to be de-emphasized, and that the internal security mission of Latin American nations is to be accorded increased emphasis.
2. As further means of coping with indirect communist penetration of the hemisphere, the U.S. should:
a. Seek to create increased awareness on the part of Latin American countries of the danger to hemispheric security posed by Castroism and communism in general and of the need to take prompt multilateral action, when necessary, to eliminate this danger.
b. Negotiate, or renegotiate, as may be required, bilateral agreements designed to provide assistance to countries requesting help in defending themselves against indirect aggression and subversion directed and sustained by communists from within or without the hemisphere.
3. Explore the establishment of an Inter-American Security Force, and, as an initial step, promote the establishment of a Caribbean Security Arrangement, by means of which Caribbean countries would cooperate with the U.S. and one another in maintaining the security of any Caribbean country, at its request, against bona-fide communist-directed aggression or subversion.
4. Make efforts to strengthen the IADB through such means as: (1) closer relationship with the COAS, (2) increased joint defense planning, (3) greater responsibility for planning and advising on internal security matters (including a system of surveillance in the Caribbean to identify and frustrate armed assistance from Cuba to subversive movements in other countries).
5. Promote the establishment of the proposed Inter-American Defense College at an early date.
6. In our military assistance programs, give first priority to meas-ures designed to meet the threat to internal security and seek to eliminate missions which may no longer be valid. In this connection seek the repeal of the Morse Amendment.
7. Increase and strengthen the training of Latin American military personnel in anti-subversion, anti-guerrilla, and riot control techniques.
8. In accordance with the President's Special Message on Foreign Aid, place new emphasis on military assistance programs which contribute to the civic improvement and economic development of the countries of the area, and at the same time to the development of improved social responsibility and better public acceptance of the local military.
9. In order to give additional emphasis to the internal security and civic action missions of Latin American forces, seek a modest increase in the level of U.S. military assistance programs.
10. Encourage and support Latin American initiatives toward regional arms limitation agreements.
77. Memorandum From the Deputy Coordinator for Foreign Assistance (Bell) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, June 26, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 720.5-MSP/6-2661. Secret. Sent through Ball who initialed, indicating his approval. Drafted by Joseph B. Kyle of Bell's office with revisions by Bell.
SUBJECT
Proposed Presidential Determination under Section 105 (b)(4) and 451(a) of the MSA of 1954, as amended, permitting the use of funds to furnish military assistance to Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Haiti
There are attached (Tab A)/2/ a proposed memorandum to the President and a Memorandum of Determination by the President which would permit the use of funds to provide grant military aid to Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Haiti.
/2/None of the attachments is printed.
The military assistance proposed is for the purpose of internal security, which, as you know, requires a decision by the President under the terms of the Mutual Security Act. You are aware of the fact that the proposed Fiscal Year 1962 aid bill seeks the deletion of the requirement that the President make these findings. This has been strongly opposed by those in both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee who have spoken on the subject. This opposition has been based on the conviction of the speakers that aid to non-democratic Latin American regimes to assist the maintenance of internal security will be equivalent to the maintenance in power of harsh and repressive regimes. Senator Morse, in particular, has spoken vigorously to the effect that decisions on such matters should be made only by the President. There is no question but that the reason for this provision of law is to make plain the view of the Congress in opposition to aid to dictatorships and the belief that the President will be less likely to make exceptions if a determination by him was required.
The proposed determination which is attached (Tab A) would provide internal security military assistance to seven countries, two of which, Nicaragua and Haiti, can hardly be said to have democratic regimes. ARA's argument as to the necessity for the determination is set forth in the Memorandum to the President and in the case of Haiti, is elaborated in a memorandum from Mr. Coerr at Tab B. ICA has recorded a dissent which appears at Tab C. You are also aware of the particular opposition voiced by Senator Humphrey to giving any aid to Haiti, even economic, under the present circumstances. I am sure that his reaction to military assistance to Haiti would be even stronger as would be that of Senator Morse and such members of the House of Representatives as Mr. Hays. Thus, my feeling is that Congressional reaction to this determination would be seriously adverse to the legislation which we are trying to obtain. Whether this attitude on the part of the Congressional leaders could be overcome by conversations seems to me doubtful and, in any case, there is very little time since this determination to be effective would have to be approved by the President in the next few days.
Since the issue is one of the political necessity as against the assumed adverse effects on aid legislation, I believe you should personally review this proposal and indicate whether you wish it advanced. If so, the Memorandum to the President should be signed./3/
/3/A June 29 memorandum from Under Secretary Bowles' Special Assistant Samuel W. Lewis to Executive Secretariat Director Battle states that Bowles concurred with the recommendation, provided that no action should be taken on aid to Haiti until it could be incorporated in the overall aid package for Haiti. Coerr had assured Bowles that any decision on Haiti could be kept confidential for the time being. (Department of State, Central Files, 720.5-MSP/6-2961) A June 29 note from Rusk's Special Assistant Emory C. Swank to Rusk, attached to the source text, noted that it might not be possible to keep any decision on Haiti confidential since the Department was required by law to furnish the Speaker of the House and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee copies of all Presidential determinations. Rusk did not sign the memorandum to the President.
78. Telegram From the Embassy in Honduras to the Department of State/1/
Tegucigalpa, July 23, 1961, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 713.20/7-2361. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bogota, Guatemala City, Managua, Panama City for Polad Cincarib, San Jose, San Salvador, and USUN.
54. In informal meeting in advance of Joint Session/2/ this morning at which US observers presented GOUS views, CA and Panamanian Foreign Ministers expressed to US group their undivided and joint support for Colombian plan/3/ in face of Communist-Castro threat to hemisphere. Agreement will be kept confidential in order avoid counter-productive effects of untimely publicity but Foreign Ministers emphasized solidarity their six governments in support this initiative at appropriate moment. (Later, in plenary session, Foreign Ministers approved strongly-worded public resolution deploring Communist penetration and recommending reaffirmation of democratic principles and the adoption of measures to stop the spread of Communism but omitting all reference to Cuba or Castro.)
/2/Reference is to an informal meeting of Foreign and Economic Ministers of Central America and Panama, held July 21-23 in Tegucigalpa.
/3/See Documents 111 and 114.
Foreign Ministers voiced their conviction and deep concern that Central American area was weakest flank, must expect receive brunt of Castro-Communist attack and subversion. Consequently this area should be extended most immediate and meaningful support, economic and otherwise. Deep appreciation was expressed for recognition shown by GOUS to importance of region by attendance high ranking mission at meeting of Ministers.
At least four of six in stressing danger of direct attack by Castro-Communist forces, perhaps on July 26, spoke of arms caches that had been found in their countries and of plans of subversive elements to overthrow governments. Goodwin replied to effect US recognizes treaty obligations and prepared extend aid if required and requested.
Embassy and visiting group assumes US forces in area have been properly alerted for July 26 potentialities.
Burrows
79. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Operations of the International Cooperation Administration (FitzGerald) to the General Counsel of That Agency (Rubin)/1/
Washington, August 21, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 720.5-MSP/8-2961. Secret. Filed with an August 29 memorandum from Rubin to Kyle.
SUBJECT
Provision of Military Assistance to Central American Countries; your memorandum of August 16, 1961/2/
/2/Not found.
I am very skeptical of the proposal to furnish military assistance to Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. There is no demonstration that the provision of this equipment will significantly increase the capabilities of the armed forces to deal with Castro-Communist type of infiltration or subversion. The addition of the equipment contemplated inevitably will raise the operation and maintenance cost of the armed forces and further divert local government resources from constructive economic development. The draft determination contains no estimate of this additional cost nor whether the countries concerned are willing and able to meet it. Finally, even if they are so willing, there is no evaluation of the relative priority of the use of the country's resources for its military establishment as compared to its use for economic or social development.
The same considerations apply also to the proposal to furnish Haiti with almost a million dollars worth of military equipment. In addition, there is the question of our posture in supporting such a repressive regime as that of President Duvalier. Finally, the draft determination states that "the present regime has decimated and humiliated the armed forces by frequent purges . . ." In this situation it hardly seems likely that the armed forces could make any effective use of the proposed equipment but rather it would be used by Duvalier for the purpose of supporting his own regime./3/
/3/Rubin's August 29 memorandum, cited in the source note, states that the ICA position was as stated in FitzGerald's memorandum, but that ICA would concur if the Department of State judged that political considerations required the proposed Determinations, which Kyle had sent to Rubin with an August 15 memorandum. (Department of State, Central Files, 720.5-MSP/8-2961)
80. National Security Action Memorandum No. 88/1/
Washington, September 5, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 88. Secret.
TO
The Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT
Training for Latin American Armed Forces
I would appreciate hearing what steps we are taking to train the Armed Forces of Latin America in controlling mobs, guerrillas, etc. In addition, as the events of the past week have shown in Brazil, the military occupy an extremely important strategic position in Latin America. I would like to know how many officers we are bringing up from Latin America to train here and whether we could increase the number. Also, what other steps we are taking to increase the intimacy between our Armed Forces and the military of Latin America. It has been suggested that we set up a camp in the United States similar to the FBI Academy which brings in police from all over the United States. We would bring up a good many officers from the different countries of Latin America for a period from 1 to 2 months; we would have FBI people there who could talk to them about the techniques they have developed to control communism, subversion and we could have our military coming in to teach them how to control mobs and fight guerrillas. In addition to increase their effectiveness it would also strengthen their ties with the United States. Will you let me know your view of this?
John F. Kennedy/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Kennedy signed the original.
81. Memorandum From the President's Assistant Special Counsel (Goodwin) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, September 6, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Box 31, Cuba 1961. Secret. Another copy of this memorandum, ibid., National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, is dated September 1.
The Cuban Task Force met at the White House on Thursday, August 31. Present were Under Secretary Ball, Assistant Secretary Woodward, two members of the ARA Bureau, Dick Bissell, Tracy Barnes and myself.
The following decisions were made:
1. We would proceed immediately to discuss with other Caribbean governments the possibility of organizing a Caribbean Security Force. This could be organized on the basis of informal understandings within the framework of existing treaty arrangements, as a series of new bilateral treaties, or a formal, multilateral treaty. It was thought that the basis of organization would depend on the judgment of other Caribbean countries as to how they could accomplish the objective of establishing the force without running serious internal political risks. The United States, for its part, would prefer the formal multilateral arrangement. Such a Caribbean Security Force would have at least four major aspects:
(1) Advance commitment to come to the aid of other signatories threatened by Castro revolutions and, perhaps the designation of specific units for participation in necessary multilateral actions.
(2) The establishment of a pool of intelligence information concerning subversive activities with provision for exchange of such information.
(3) The establishment of a Caribbean air and sea patrol to watch for suspected infiltration of Castro arms or agents.
(4) A training program in combatting subversive tactics, police organization and procedure, etc.
It was conceded that the substantive aspects of this arrangement could, if necessary, be achieved informally. However, the decision to seek a more formal arrangement was primarily arrived at on the basis of internal political considerations in the United States.
[Here follows discussion of other aspects of U.S. policy toward Cuba; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume X, Document 258.]
Richard N. Goodwin/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
82. Memorandum From Attorney General Kennedy to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, September 11, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 88. No classification marking. The source text bears the notation in Kennedy's handwriting, "OK JFK".
In furtherance of our conversation on the plane last week, I believe it might be advisable for a team made up of representatives from the FBI plus the military to make a survey of the security situation in the countries of Central and South America.
Shortly after Cuba we made arrangements for an FBI man to accompany a group which was making a tour of Central America. When he returned he wrote a confidential report for me which indicated that security arrangements in a number of the countries were extremely deficient.
I think that if a group of this type went down into these countries they could determine whether all necessary steps are being taken by the internal police to deal with communist infiltration and whether the military or police are prepared to deal with mob riot, or guerrilla bands that may become active. Also, as we learned in the Dominican Republic crisis, that the communications system with the State Department and the CIA was inadequate. Steps should be taken to determine what is needed in this field and this problem remedied. I am sure that reports are coming in from various embassies that touch on this situation but I think it should receive top priority./2/
/2/A September 12 note from White House staff member Mildred Zayac to Goodwin, filed with the source text, states that Bundy had asked her to send it to Goodwin with the message that "the President would like to get it going right away."
83. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Williams) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Woodward)/1/
Washington, September 12, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, 381 Caribbean. Secret.
Dear Mr. Woodward: At a meeting on 5 May 1961, the National Security Council agreed, inter alia, that the United States should at once initiate negotiations to enlarge the willingness of other American states to join in bilateral, multilateral, and OAS arrangements against Castro. Listed among the possible measures were:
a. Creation of a Caribbean Security Force; and
b. Initiation of a naval patrol to prevent Cuban invasion of other states in the Caribbean.
The Department of Defense recognizes that there are desirable political benefits in establishing a Caribbean Naval Patrol (CNP) and a Caribbean Security Force (CSF). However, so that the Department of State is fully informed of all aspects of the matter, I wish to convey the following comments made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which I concur.
Briefly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff hold the opinion that, militarily, the advantages in establishing a CSF and a CNP would not be significant. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in support of the NSC decision, have furnished guidelines for use in creating a CNP and a CSF. Those guidelines are attached herewith./2/
/2/Two memoranda from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara, both dated August 18, are attached to the source text. JCSM-560-61 concerns a possible Caribbean Security Force; JCSM-561-61 concerns a possible Caribbean Naval Patrol. Each has an attached appendix setting forth guidelines.
Military opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff follow:
Comment on a proposed Caribbean Naval Patrol (CNP): The U.S. Atlantic Fleet is fully capable of conducting necessary naval patrols in the Caribbean. In the past, the U.S. Navy has operated with combined Latin American Naval forces in the Caribbean for other purposes. From a U.S. military point of view, there are no apparent military problems incapable of solution which would be generated by the establishment of a multi-national naval patrol to prevent a Cuban-sponsored invasion of other Caribbean states. The stopping of clandestine shipment of arms and men is complicated by the restrictions of international law against boarding and searching ships on the high seas. The CNP could stop, board and search suspicious ships in the territorial and/or customs waters of those Caribbean countries which are willing to grant such authority to CNP forces. With such authority the CNP could intercept some clandestine shipments of areas and men destined for Caribbean countries.
Comment on a proposed Caribbean Security Force (CSF): Latin American military contributions to such a force, would, of necessity, be small. Hence the U.S. contribution should be sufficiently great to ensure successful military action. However, from a U.S. military point of view there would be no apparent military problems incapable of solution which would be generated by the establishment of a multi-national CSF.
Castro Threat: Cuban military forces lack the capability to launch a meaningful military invasion against any Latin American country with the possible exception of Haiti. In the case of Haiti, the capability is limited to a lightly armed invasion using a few aircraft and/or small boats.
Castro possesses the capability to export the Cuban revolution through support and provision of "volunteers" and/or arms to indigenous revolutionary groups in other countries and is more likely to choose this alternative than military ventures which could be identified as being instigated by the government of Cuba.
General Comment: Before a political decision is reached for the establishment of a CNP and CSF, consideration should be given to the possible legal effects on the treaty with Cuba for use of the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo/3/ lest Castro gain grounds for legal termination of the treaty. Following a political decision to create a Caribbean Security Arrangement and prior to initiation of operations thereunder, international agreements providing for combined operations, rights of entry of forces, and overflight authority will be required.
/3/Signed at Havana February 16, 1903, and at Washington February 23, 1903; for text, see 6 Bevans 1113.
If arrangements go forward for a CSF and a CNP then supplemental funding arrangements will have to be provided in appropriate programs.
Sincerely,
Haydn Williams/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Williams signed the original.
84. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Hansen) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles)/1/
Washington, September 28, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 710.5-MSP/9-2861. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
SUBJECT
Presidential determinations for Caribbean Countries
As you requested, I have made a hurried appraisal of the proposed MAP determinations and have discussed this with Dick Goodwin in the White House. We came out on the matter as follows.
1. From a review of the WAT report/2/ we are concerned as to whether the team did the type of thorough review of the problem with regard to each country which appears required for such a determination by the President. Our main concern stems from whether or not the right questions have been asked with regard to the nature of the internal security threat in each country (i.e., there appears to be a standard finding that such a threat exists), and as to whether this particular addition of military hardware represents the optimum use of our resources to meet such actual or potential threat (i.e., if the country team had their "druthers" would they choose this particular means of meeting the threat?). The process of evaluation and the rather hasty manner in which the evaluations appear to have been made do not inspire our confidence. On the other hand, we do not know the team members and might have a quite different reaction had we reason to believe that the exercise was conducted in a hard-headed, objective manner by personnel who were required to make a judgment as to whether this form of assistance was of the essential nature which would require a Presidential determination of this type, at this time.
/2/Reference is to a Washington Assessment Team, with State, ICA, and Defense representatives, that visited Central America in April and May. No report has been found. Related documentation is ibid., primarily under 620.37 but also under 611.20, 710.5, and various country numbers.
Frankly, the impression left by the report is that this was a rather narrow inquiry to establish deficiencies in military armed strength against stereotyped or presumptive findings of threats to internal security.
2. A second aspect of these proposals is the very real question of what we are buying with the arms, not only in terms of the immediate security problem but also the pattern of supplying assistance to these countries in this unilateral manner. From the viewpoint of the Presidential determination, it would appear preferable that such arms aid, if granted, be given in the context of some Caribbean security force or in attribution to a framework of cooperation by the Caribbean countries to meet the Castro threat. This does not mean that the arms aid would be granted to a collective organization, but that presumably it would be done in response to a collective agreement that the internal security of member nations should be strengthened in the face of their joint determination to resist Castro subversion.
3. It is not clear from the information available to us that the provision of these arms is in satisfaction of commitments already made by the United States, but presumably the general political noises we have been making in that area following the Cuban crisis would lead these countries to believe that we were going to be forthcoming in assisting them to meet internal security problems. It is not clear that our various program actions to create and train more efficient police forces are far enough along to indicate that more than those efforts are currently required, although in sifting through these proposals some of the items appear to be of obvious utility related to these efforts.
4. Finally, we have seen no indication that the request for approximately $7 million assistance for these areas has been reviewed against the global total of MAP assistance provided for all of Latin America, i.e., $57 million. We are not sure that present MAP planning for Latin America is far enough advanced to indicate a clear priority for the use of this $7 million requiring Presidential determination. (In this connection there is no legal need for urgency on this matter, since the passage of the new Act requires that the funds be paid out of the total $57 million allowance, under Sec. 511 of the new Act,/3/ and determination now would not count these grants against the earlier authorized ceiling.)
/3/The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, approved on September 4; for text, see 75 Stat. 424.
In summary, and based on brief study, we are extremely uneasy as to the adequacy of the process by which these determinations have been proposed to you. But at the same time, we cannot document that the conclusions of these earlier studies are not valid. This puts the issue to whether or not you have confidence that the judgments you are being asked to endorse have been made in a responsible, accountable manner. If you do not feel that this is the case, we would suggest that you place a review of the matter in the hands of Assistant Secretary Woodward, with the requirement that he review this with the assistance of staff in whom you both repose high confidence as to the results. This is not to say that we like to recommend that the answer to one study is another study, but we clearly cannot judge the competence and comprehensiveness of the original review of this problem by the WAT.
If you determine to your satisfaction that these determinations (except the one for Haiti, which is subject to much more substantive political argument) should go forward to the President, we suggest that the determinations be posed in the context of regional action rather than dealt with as purely bilateral actions addressed to the internal security problems of each individual recipient.
I hope these considerations will prove helpful, although I must confess they represent "second guessing" of a nature that I do not ordinarily indulge. Dick Goodwin or I will be glad to discuss this further with you if you so wish.
Kenneth R. Hansen
85. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Bowles to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, September 29, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Presidential Determinations. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
SUBJECT
Determinations under sections 511(b) and 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, permitting the use of funds in order to furnish military assistance to Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala
The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that you make the requisite determinations under sections 511(b) and 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), to permit the use of funds in order to furnish military assistance up to $6,500,000 to Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala.
The proposed military assistance is needed for purposes of internal security to increase the capability of these countries to defend themselves against Castro-communist subversion. The considerations relevant to this recommendation are as follows:
1. Washington agencies which have primary interest in the maintenance of effective internal security forces by the Latin American nations are aware of the serious threat to the security of the area generated by growing social unrest and the intent of the Castro movement, in alignment with the Sino-Soviet bloc, either to promote or use this unrest to overthrow governments by internal subversion. In May, 1961, these agencies determined that the most effective way to assess the internal security requirements of the area and to develop specific United States programs aimed at assisting American Republics to develop a capability to counter subversion was to appoint an interagency Internal Security Assessment and Programming Team to hold on-the-spot discussions with each United States Government country team. It was determined that the Internal Security Assessment and Programming Team should visit initially only Panama, the five countries of Central America, and Haiti. All of these countries are considered prime targets for Castro-communist subversion. Near to Cuba geographically, they do not have the capability to prevent the clandestine entry of men or arms into their national territories. Because of unstable political institutions, enormous social differences, and retarded economic growth, many groups in their societies feel isolated from the main currents of national development, and are easy prey to Castro-communist propaganda and organizers. Forces responsible for maintaining law and order have neither the equipment nor the trained personnel to counter well-conceived and well-executed plans to subvert the state, either by mob action, guerrilla warfare, terrorism and sabotage or by armed invasion.
2. The Internal Security Assessment and Programming Team held discussions with the United States Government country teams in Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala from April 27 to May 12, 1961. It was determined that serious threats to internal security exist in these countries; that these threats are likely to take the form of direct and/or indirect Castroist action, either unilaterally or in conjunction with local communists, exiles, or dissident opposition groups. It was further determined that the action might take the forms of actual invasion, strikes, guerrilla action, sabotage, terrorism, or mob action.
3. The Internal Security Assessment and Programming Team and the country teams are of the opinion that the six countries do not possess the effective capability to resist invasion or protracted internal subversion. They do agree, however, that with the provision of grant assistance, to include equipment and training, a considerably improved degree of capability can be developed to cope with isolated, spontaneous attempts at internal subversion, to determine the existence and nature of border incursions, and to prevent the small-scale clandestine movement of men and arms across frontiers.
4. The Internal Security Assessment and Programming Team and the country teams reached the conclusion that the major deficiencies within Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala for coping with the internal security threat were in the fields of transportation, communications, and maintenance; in leadership and intelligence techniques; and, to a somewhat lesser degree, in serviceable and appropriate arms, and in certain types of consumable goods. Recommendations, in consequence, follow the general lines of, for mobility, such items as jeeps and trucks, transport aircraft, and Coast Guard-type patrol vessels. Similarly, for communications, there were endorsed essentially a certain amount of fixed, or automobile transported, and of "walkie-talkie" types of radio apparatus. In terms of arms, there were endorsed riot control type equipment or light weapons such as the M-1 series. As respects leadership and intelligence techniques, recommendations concerned training and military and civil police advisory assistance. The recommendations took into account the ability of the countries to absorb the equipment and training.
5. If the recommendations of the Internal Security Assessment and Programming Team and the country teams as to the equipment and other requirements referred to above were accepted for funding, it would require the obligation of approximately $6,500,000. In addition to the requirements to be funded from military assistance availabilities, there are equipment and training requirements, for which $726,000 was obligated in fiscal year 1961, to be administered by the International Cooperation Administration through its Public Safety program in Panama, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.
6. In addition to enhancing the capabilities of local security forces to counter threats to internal security, the provision of grant military assistance will serve an additional purpose. Part of the assistance will consist of tools and/or construction machinery which will enhance the capability of the security forces to participate more fully in social and economic development, thereby contributing to narrowing the gulf that historically has divided the security forces in these nations from the rest of society.
[Here follow paragraphs 7-12, with discussion of the internal security situation in the six countries in question.]
Under these circumstances, it is considered to be important to the security of the United States to promote stability in Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala by furnishing these nations with military assistance for their internal security upon a determination under the third sentence of section 511(b) of the Act that internal security requirements may be the basis of this program. It is also considered important to the security of the United States to furnish military equipment and materials to Panama, Costa Rica, and El Salvador (which are not parties to general military assistance agreements with the United States) and to Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua (which are parties to general military assistance agreements with the United States, such agreements being applicable, however, only to assistance furnished for Western Hemisphere defense missions), for the purposes described above without regard to the requirements of section 506(a) of the Act requiring agreement to four specific undertakings. It is planned to seek special agreements with the six countries providing all or some of the undertakings in section 506(a) of the Act; however, since the negotiation of these agreements may be protracted in duration or may not be successful, it is considered necessary to waive the requirement for such undertakings in the event that negotiation of these agreements is protracted in duration or not successful.
Enclosed is a detailed statement of the background and justification of this program, the implementation of which is estimated to require the expenditure of up to $6,500,000 of funds available for military assistance.
It is considered that the furnishing of the assistance described above and the use of funds made available for military assistance programs are in furtherance of the purposes of the Act and are important to the security of the United States.
It is accordingly, recommended that you sign the enclosed memorandum, thereby making the determinations required by the Act for the above-mentioned purposes./2/
/2/The President signed Presidential Determination No. 62-3 on October 26. (Ibid.)
The Department of Defense concurs in this recommendation.
Chester Bowles
86. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Bowles to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Kitchen)/1/
Washington, September 29, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 710.5-MSP/9-2861. Secret. Drafted by Bowles' Special Assistant Andrew E. Rice. Filed with Document 84.
SUBJECT
Military Aid to Central American Countries
I have today signed the memorandum to the President recommending that a determination be made authorizing up to $6.5 million in grant military assistance to five Central American republics and Panama to preserve internal security.
If the President makes this determination, a grave responsibility lies on us to insure that the assistance is responsibly administered. I call to your attention the following considerations which appear pertinent:
1) We must make perfectly clear that this aid is not to be used to deter legitimate popular expressions of aspirations for greater social justice and political freedom. This is particularly important since this assistance is not designed to provide the capability to put down any major uprisings but rather is aimed at the control of "spontaneous outbursts". If weaponry identified as coming from the United States shoots down non-violent demonstrators, we would obviously be in grave danger of strengthening the popular appeal of forces unsympathetic to the United States.
2) In Nicaragua--and perhaps in other countries as well--we should be alert to the possibility of conditioning specific elements of our aid upon the accomplishment of specific reforms in police, judicial or other governmental procedures.
3) We should indicate to all the countries that the problem of internal security in Central America should be a matter of joint rather than unilateral concern. Our goal, I think, should be the development of a coordinated plan for defense against clandestine border crossing and coastal landings so that our aid supports the common determination of these countries to resist Castro subversion, rather than treating each country separately.
4) We should emphasize again the high importance we attach to "civic action" by the security forces of each country. The recommendation to the President points out that part of the assistance will consist of tools or construction machinery which will enhance the capability of these forces to participate in economic and social development. We should not fail in this respect.
I should like to be kept informed of the major steps which are taken to implement the Presidential determination, keeping in mind the above considerations, and to this end should appreciate your staff keeping Andrew Rice of my office advised.
87. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, October 7, 1961.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 17, T636-71. Secret.
The Secretary of Defense has responded (Tab 2)/2/ to your memorandum of early September (Tab 1)/3/ requesting information on the steps being taken to train the armed forces of Latin America in controlling mobs, guerrillas, etc., as well as your suggestion that a camp be set up in the United States similar to the FBI Academy.
/2/The tabs were not attached to the source text. Reference is to a September 11 memorandum from Acting Secretary Gilpatric to Kennedy. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 88)
/3/Document 80.
We have also received memoranda from the Secretary of State (Tab 3)/4/ and the Director of Central Intelligence (Tab 4)/5/ who have submitted information on their programs for attacking this overall problem.
/4/Reference is to a memorandum of September 30 from Acting Secretary Bowles to Kennedy. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 88) A second memorandum of that date from Bowles to Kennedy urged that more should be done in U.S. training programs for foreign military personnel to foster an appreciation of democratic values and that U.S. aid programs should place more emphasis on rural reform. (Ibid.)
/5/Reference is to a memorandum of September 12 from Acting Director General Charles P. Cabell to Kennedy. (Ibid.)
A brief summary follows:
a. Mr. Gilpatric informs you that the military schools in the United States and in the Canal Zone are giving considerable emphasis to courses in internal security for Latin American officers. For example, 600 officers attended such courses in FY-61. In addition, the U.S. military school system is training just about as many Latin Americans in these and general military courses as the countries concerned are able or willing to make available for this purpose. As you know, many Latin American countries utilize their armed forces for performing the basic internal security mission as well as to officer their police forces. Thus our military schools afford a direct way of reaching this influential element of the governments in Latin America. The officers concerned gain an appreciation and understanding of the U.S. more or less by absorption while attending these courses. The extent of direct political indoctrination in these courses is probably very small, if not non-existent. Mr. Gilpatric is favorably disposed to the idea of setting up an FBI-type academy.
b. The memorandum from the Central Intelligence Agency indicates that they have a modest program for training selected, high-level security officers from Latin America in the U.S. They have resident advisory officers in a few Latin American countries, [5 lines of source text not declassified].
c. The State Department memorandum describes the AID/ICA program for police training. This program is rather comprehensive, and involves in-country assistance and advice as well as training programs in the U.S. itself. It will be noted that the budgetary support for this worldwide program has been reduced from $10 million in 1961 to about $9 million in 1962, with a corresponding amount of counterpart funds being used in the host countries. About 20% of this is used for Latin America. AID is currently considering a proposal to establish a U.S. police academy, preferably in a Caribbean location such as the Canal Zone. This would allow them to train greater numbers of Latin American police officials at a reduced cost.
It is not apparent in the memoranda, which are quite straightforward, but there is a certain amount of friction between the various Departments in the implementation of these programs. This is particularly true in areas where civil disturbance is such a major problem that normal police measures are not adequate to cope with it. It is also found in areas where the Army or some para-military agency discharges or controls the basic police function. I would suggest the advisability of sending all of these memoranda to the Secretary of State and ask that he have the relationship of these programs studied and redefine the responsibilities for such programs in countries where it may be a matter of contention.
If this suggestion meets with your approval, I will inform the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Director of CIA that you have noted their memoranda and are asking the Secretary of State to study this overall problem and clarify responsibilities for such programs in countries where it is in dispute.
Maxwell D. Taylor/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
88. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/
Washington, November 2, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 710.5/11-261. Confidential. Drafted by Woodward, Jamison, and Bowdler; cleared by Charles Maechling, Jr., Director for Internal Defense in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, Captain Paul B. Ryan, USN, of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and Goodwin; and approved by Woodward. Sent for action to Mexico City, Guatemala City, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, Managua, San Jose, Panama City, Bogota and Caracas.
CA-388. Depcirtels 1761, May 10;/2/ 196, August 1, 1961./3/
/2/Document 75.
/3/Circular telegram 196, August 3, instructed recipient Embassies to give the President and Foreign Minister assurances of U.S. support and to indicate that the United States was prepared to establish a system of air-sea surveillance in case of need upon request. The telegram is missing from Department of State, Central Files, 713.00/8-361. The information here is from a copy of the first page on a microfilm index and from follow-up telegrams to and from Guatemala City, San Jose, San Salvador, and Tegucigalpa, all ibid., under 713.00 and 713.5.
The Department, after careful consideration of the Caribbean Security Arrangements Plan in the light of your replies to the reference Depcirtels and developments throughout the Latin American area, has concluded it is more desirable at present to pursue the objective of strengthening the defenses of the Central American and Caribbean countries against the Castro-communist threat of indirect aggression through a less formal approach than previously envisaged.
Benefits to be derived from formalization of the Plan through a series of bilateral agreements do not at present appear to be great enough to offset possible consequences of the fact that several governments would deem it necessary to seek congressional approval. This would give Castro-communist elements greatly increased opportunity to exploit nationalist sentiments, anti-Americanism, and other Castro-communist themes with a resulting possibility of failure of the governments to join in the Plan which would seriously detract from its psychological impact and effectiveness.
As you are aware, the most obvious methods by which the United States Government can contribute to the strengthening of security in the Caribbean and Central American area against indirect aggression--that is, incitement to revolt, and infiltration of men, materiel, funds and propaganda for creating disturbances, terrorism and sabotage--are the following:
1. Helping to equip and train local forces;
2. Offering to provide immediately, upon request, air-sea surveillance;
3. Attempting to promote more useful exchange of information among all the countries, and particularly between neighboring countries, on movements of subversive agents, arms and substantial amounts of propaganda material, known misuse of travel documents, methods of sabotage, espionage, terrorism or agitation and any other pertinent information which government officials consider useful to their colleagues in other governments for the purpose of detecting and preventing subversion.
The Department expects to be able soon to inform the Ambassadors in the Central American capitals and Panama, and in Bogota, that Presidential determinations have been given for the provision of materiel for the internal security of the Governments to which those Ambassadors are accredited./4/ (It is considered that the Government of Venezuela does not require this type of assistance at this time. Serious question has been raised as to whether materiel and other kinds of assistance against indirect aggression in addition to that already being made available to the Haitian Government should be given in present circumstances, particularly because of the apparent aspiration of President Duvalier to perpetuate himself in office indefinitely.)
/4/The President so authorized in Presidential Determination No. 62-9 on December 14. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Presidential Determinations)
In those countries in which the Governments have not already been given assurances that the U.S. Government would provide air-sea surveillance upon request--when there appears to be good reason to believe that this might help to prevent landings of armed forces, agents or supplies by Castro-communist elements--the Department believes that the Ambassador should take occasion to give this assurance at the time when he personally informs the Chief of State to whom he is accredited concerning the fact of the availability of the additional materiel for security against indirect aggression. In those countries where assurances have already been given pursuant to Depcirtel 196, the Ambassador should repeat the assurances, alluding to the previous offer of air-sea surveillance in time of emergency. If any of the Ambassador addressees in such countries which have not previously been given these assurances wish to suggest some alternative procedure, it would be appreciated if they would inform the Department. At the same time, the Department would appreciate the comments of the Ambassadors at Caracas and at Port-au-Prince, in their separate and different circumstances, concerning the appropriate timing of such assurances to the Chiefs of State to whom they are accredited. You should mention to the Chiefs of State, when discussing this subject, that as beneficial effects of the Alliance for Progress appear and as there develops a more widespread conviction that economic and social progress can really be brought about more rapidly by democratic methods, it can be expected that subversive activities will be stepped up by Castro-communist elements.
At the same time that discussions are initiated on the above subjects in the respective countries, it would be appreciated if the Ambassadors would consult with the Chiefs of State to whom they are accredited concerning the problem of improving exchange of information. The object is, of course, to promote the rapid flow of practical information between the particular officials most directly able to use it for the purpose of revealing plans or preparations for indirect aggression and therefore of preventing it should it occur. We believe that the exchange of information can better be handled if the GUS and the Government to which you are accredited were to designate an official (or officials) in their respective countries who would be primarily responsible for sending and receiving such information. Similar arrangements could be made by each government with the other governments of the area. The transmission of information between the designated officials could then be carried out through diplomatic channels. We believe that this type of system is preferable to establishing a new centralized organization for this purpose which would probably only slow down the transmission, although we would not want to give the impression of impeding the establishment of a Central Intelligence Service as envisaged by the recent meeting of Chiefs of Staff of the Central American countries and Panama if these states want to set up such a body.
Department recognizes possibility that security of individual countries can be enhanced by collective measures whereby countries work out joint defense plans and establish procedures for dealing with subversive activities, and Depcirtel 707/5/ authorized Ambassadors emphasize this line. While hoping that CADC may perform actively in this role, Department aware some divisive tendencies within CADC, such as : Col. Lopez' (Honduras) statement he doubted advisability of central intelligence exchange, particularly with Nicaragua; Minister of Government Robles' (Panama) statement in the National Assembly that Panama has no obligation toward CADC; President Echandi's (Costa Rica) as yet uncertain attitude toward the participation of the Costa Rican Guardia Civil officers in the meetings so far. Ambassadors accredited countries which participated recent meeting Guatemala of Chiefs of Staff/6/ may at their discretion again refer to Depcirtel 707 provided they believe such repetition would be helpful in achieving reftel objective and would not be a meaningless or harmful gesture. Advise if you believe renewed approach 707 would be helpful.
/5/Dated October 14; sent to six Embassies in Central America and Panama. (Department of State, Central Files, 713.5/10-1461)
/6/The meeting of Central American Armed Forces Chiefs of Staff, held September 19-23, called for coordinated defense efforts, including the creation of a Central American Defense Council. (Despatch 147 from Guatemala, September 26; ibid., 713.5/9-2661)
Your comments and suggestions would be appreciated.
For Embassy Mexico City: Given the Mexican attitude toward the defensive measures contemplated in this instruction, the decision on how to approach the GOM and how much of the foregoing to use in the approach is left to the Embassy's discretion.
For Embassy London: Further instructions re UK Caribbean territories will follow.
Bowles
89. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to President Kennedy/1/
JCSM 832-61
Washington, November 30, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vol. I, Military Actions for Latin America. Secret.
SUBJECT
Military Actions for Latin America (U)
1. On 12 October 1961, in your conversation with General Decker at Fort Bragg, you asked what additional contribution the US Armed Forces could make in conjunction with indigenous military forces toward the attainment of US national objectives in Latin America. As a result of consultations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted an interim report on 9 November,/2/ in which you were advised that a comprehensive program was being prepared for later submission to you. This program is submitted herewith in three parts./3/ It is intended for use in conjunction with and in support of existing US political, economic and social measures and in implementation of the concept of the Alliance for Progress. It is designed to maximize the contribution of the US military in the achievement of over-all objectives for Latin America.
/2/JCSM-768-61; not printed. (Ibid.)
/3/Parts II and III are not printed.
2. Part I summarizes recommendations for increasing the effectiveness of the military program and the contribution of the US Armed Forces for the achievement of US national objectives in Latin America. Implementation of some of these recommendations will require additional funding and personnel.
3. Part II is a detailed presentation of the recommendations with supporting data. Included therein are some military actions that will require coordination by other US agencies and acceptance by allied governments. Part III is factual data, including US and Latin American military capabilities in the Southern Hemisphere.
4. It is recommended that you approve the suggested programs as a matter of policy guidance governing the future role to be played by the US Armed Forces in Latin America.
5. It is further recommended that detailed Diplomatic Mission plans reflecting this guidance be developed and implemented as a matter of priority.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L. L. Lemnitzer/4/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.
Appendix A
MILITARY ACTIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA
Part I
1. Recommendations
The following recommendations are submitted for consideration as means for increasing the effectiveness of the US military program in Latin America and the contribution of the US Armed Forces for the achievement of US national objectives in Latin America and in support of the Alliance for Progress.
Of paramount importance is the necessity to convince the Latin American Governments of the significance of this program and encourage and prevail upon them to accept it in good faith and assist in its implementation and success. These governments should be made to understand the importance of the educational phase in particular, and persuaded to accept it and fill all available quotas in US schools. Latin Americans must also discard the philosophy that a corps of US trained country personnel are dangerous to the indigenous governments because of the radical changes they could impose as a result of their exposure to the US and the US way of life.
a. For Increased Internal Security
(1) Seek congressional action to make less restrictive those provisions of the Military Assistance Act which limit military support in the internal security area.
(2) Orient the Latin American armed forces to accept the apolitical role of the military. All US Government representatives in Latin America should continue to stress to their counterparts that the military is an instrument responsive to democratic government and should act in support of the constitutional principles of that government.
(3) Expand the provision of US military technical assistance to develop more efficient Latin American military establishments.
(4) Broaden and expand the capability of indigenous forces to conduct counter-insurgency, anti-subversion and psychological warfare operations.
(5) As the emphasis on our military assistance to Latin America shifts from hemispheric defense only to internal security, anti-submarine warfare, counter-insurgency, and civic action programs insure that means are available and methods are developed to guarantee the rapid provision of the necessary training, equipment and material.
(6) Improve the US/LA combined intelligence capability.
b. For Hemisphere Defense
(7) United States act to increase the effectiveness of the Inter-American Defense Board.
(8) The United States lend full support to the early establishment and subsequent contribution to the operation of the Inter-American Defense College.
(9) United States encourage frequent US/LA Defense Conferences.
c. For Economic Development
(10) Encourage and assist the indigenous armed forces to devote more effort and influence toward internal development.
(11) Increase the number of US military advisors and mobile training teams in Latin America to provide a broader scope and an accelerated advisory effort in civic action programs.
(12) Establish Latin American Civilian Conservation Corps Programs.
(13) Strengthen the Latin American Military Air Transport Capability.
(14) Increase the activities of the Inter-American Geodetic Survey (IAGS) to accelerate the production of critically needed maps of Latin America.
(15) Encourage and support a Latin American military contribution to indigenous communications improvement programs.
(16) Encourage Latin American services to convert more strictly combat units to dual purpose units which will contribute to the countries' military capabilities, and also to their economic development.
(17) Expansion of Latin American shipyard capabilities.
d. For Information and Education
(18) Encourage and assist Latin American armed forces to establish their own Military Information and Education Programs.
(19) Establish and support a Western Hemisphere Military Speakers Program.
(20) Expand the US/LA officer exchange program.
(21) Increase the language training and proficiency both for US personnel going to Latin America and for Latin Americans undergoing training in the United States.
(22) Increase US interest in the more junior-ranking Latin American military personnel who will later emerge as their countries' leaders. Increase the number of US orientation tours for those young officers.
e. Miscellaneous
(23) Encourage the revision of archaic Latin American per-diem laws which provide excessive allowances and serve to restrict the numbers of Latin American military personnel able to come to the United States for training.
(24) Appoint retired US career military personnel to positions in the US diplomatic missions in Latin America.
(25) Establish and support alumni associations for Latin American officers who have attended US service schools and academies.
(26) Encourage Latin American military sponsorship of youth programs such as Boy Scouts, Girl Guides, YMCA, church groups, and sports activities.
(27) Provide training and indoctrination for the Latin American services in disaster relief.
2. The Problem and Need for Action
a. The US military capability in furthering US national objectives in Latin America is greater than the actual utilization made of the US Armed Forces in this respect. Efforts of the US military within Latin America have done much to strengthen the US position. However, because of existing circumstances, opportunities are being missed in which the US Armed Forces could do much more to foster Latin American resistance to Communist penetration of the hemisphere and, at the same time, enhance the US image.
b. The importance of encouraging the Latin American services to organize and train for internal security and antisubmarine warfare as their most effective contributions to Western Hemisphere defense is recognized and appreciated.
c. Of almost equal importance is the requirement to demonstrate to the Latin American governments the potential of their own military services to support their own economic and social development. An analysis of the situation now existing in each of the Latin American countries, and an attempt to establish what could be done by the military to assist these countries in furthering their own economic development programs reveals certain over-all similarities. In most of the countries, a large majority of the population leads only a marginal existence. The reasons are primarily institutional and technical. Current programs of the Agency for International Development, aimed at overcoming these conditions, are broad in scope and catalytic in nature. However, in every country there are problem areas susceptible to attack by indigenous military forces in a civic action role.
d. Illiteracy encompassing the majority of Latin American populations is perhaps the greatest obstacle to development. In many countries, entire areas are without educational facilities. Construction of village schoolhouses and other buildings of public assembly is within the capabilities of indigenous troops. These same forces could provide teachers, as well as the physical facilities for an expanded program of public education.
e. As stated in the 9 November memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an increased US military program in support of US objectives in Latin America should be established on a broad base of information and education for the Latin American military man. Annex D to Part II of the present report amplifies this.
f. Departure from the previously purely military roles by US and Latin American armed forces in implementing these recommendations will result in some resentment and criticism from certain power groups in Latin America. However, integrated policy direction at the US national level plus continued close coordination of approved programs by the US Ambassadors in their country programs will minimize this risk.
g. The US Armed Forces have done much in their combined operations, and in other contacts with the Latin American services, to reduce the traditional distrust and animosity between the Southern Hemisphere countries. Continued effort in this respect will contribute heavily to the establishment of the cooperation required between the Latin nations (as well as between them and the US) in the battle against communism.
h. Funding and additional personnel for the program presented cannot be determined until specific recommendations are approved, at which time the services will submit estimated requirements. Resources required will be justified by the value of the results achieved. Parts of this program will require no more than a change of attitude and direction.
i. The US military in Latin America are doing a good job in strengthening internal security in the Southern Hemisphere. With positive direction from the top and with coordination and cooperation between the military and the other executive agencies of the Government, from the top down, the US Armed Forces can do much more to help accomplish US objectives and help the Latin Americans derive greater benefit from the Alliance for Progress and country resources.
90. Report and Recommendations of the Washington Assessment Team on the Internal Security Situation in South America/1/
Washington, January 10, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.20/8-461. Secret.
[Here follows a table of contents.]
SUBJECT
Report of Assessment Team on Internal Security Situation in South America
Between November 15 and December 21, 1961, a special inter-agency survey team visited the ten South American countries to assess the internal security situations in these countries, and to report their views for transmittal to appropriate officers of the United States Government. The team consisted of the following members:
C. A. Boonstra (Chairman), Department of State
E. C. Townsend, Colonel, USA, Department of Defense
H. L. Downing, Colonel, USAF, Caribbean Command
H. O. Hardin, Agency for International Development
S. J. Papich, Federal Bureau of Investigation
N. L. Ferris, Federal Bureau of Investigation
[name not declassified] Central Intelligence Agency
[name not declassified] Central Intelligence Agency
Background
The capabilities of nations in Latin America to maintain law and order in situations where violence is instigated, or supported, by Communist and Castro agents or sympathizers is vitally important to hemisphere defense. In late 1960 the American Embassies in these countries were instructed by a joint State-Defense-ICA directive to prepare detailed reports assessing the internal security situations. A follow-up in Central American and Caribbean countries was made by a traveling inter-agency assessment team in April-May 1961.
Scope of Survey
The South American Assessment Team (SAAT) was instructed to report on (1) the nature and extent of the Communist threat in each country; (2) the capacity of the police and armed forces of each country to maintain internal security, and the will of government and society to back them up; (3) any organizational changes needed in each country to improve the maintenance of internal security; (4) the capabilities of the U.S. agencies within the country to assist the local government in internal security, and to keep Washington informed; (5) prospects for exchange of intelligence information; and (6) requirements for U.S. advice, equipment and training.
Latin American problems are such that almost all actions by the local governments, and by the U.S. exert influence on the internal security situations. Particularly important are courses of action relating to economic and social development, now embodied in the Alliance for Progress, and those affecting education, health, and information. The survey team considered its specific assignment, however, as being the complex of police, military, and intelligence activities which bear directly on the suppression and control of subversion and politically-motivated violence.
Visits were made by the team to each of the South American countries, beginning in Venezuela and proceeding thereafter to Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador and Colombia. In each country the team consulted with U.S. personnel and reviewed pertinent documents.
General findings and recommendations are summarized in the first part of the report. The second part presents the individual country assessments. The review of intelligence activities, for which Mr. S.J. Papich of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had primary responsibility, comprises the third part of the report and is being forwarded separately through appropriate channels./2/
/2/Part II is not printed. Part III was not found with the source text.
Summary of Findings
In general the internal security forces of the South American countries have the capability, when there is a will to do so, for maintaining order and for suppressing outbreaks of violence in those principal urban centers where, so far, the strength of subversive forces has been concentrated. In none of the countries are the Communist parties capable at this time of seizing power, or of sustaining a large-scale campaign of organized armed struggle, through efforts involving only their own members and sympathizers.
The primary threats to internal security come from the capabilities of Communists and Communist sympathizers to utilize the forces of other political groups in advancing their programs. Unrest and disorder stemming from these diverse other sources provide opportunities for the use of violence, not in the previous pattern of palace coups, but in broadly based political and social movements. The Communists are able to cooperate with and to supply leadership to the extremists of the left, and to provoke violence on the part of the extremists of the right. Emphasis is placed on discrediting, outflanking, and outmaneuvering those internal security forces which the Communists cannot successfully combat. Their courses of action include the now-familiar techniques of pressure, infiltration, and division in weakening the will of governments for taking effective action, and of initiating violence principally in rural areas and on issues where the internal security forces are vulnerable.
Countries having already critical problems in internal security accompanied by violence that requires urgent attention are Colombia and Bolivia. Political and class divisions are developing in Peru and Ecuador which soon could place these countries in a similar category. Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina are maintaining internal security through a delicate balancing of political forces which involve risk of sudden deterioration. In Chile, where internal security is supported by relatively good police forces, Communist capabilities are being strengthened through constitutional processes and accelerated by a deteriorating economic situation. Uruguay, which is a relatively stable country in spite of being the base for much Soviet bloc activity, will find its problems serious if situations in Brazil and Argentina grow worse. Finally, Paraguay is unique among the South American countries in that its primary internal security threat is not aggression from within, but from exiles outside its borders who are motivated by highly diverse political objectives.
Even in those countries where internal security problems are the most serious, there is time still for the construction of forces adequate to deal with them. Recognition of the urgency to do something now is the principal problem.
Past military and intelligence programs of South American countries, and those for providing U.S. assistance, have been relatively small and slow-moving and have dealt principally with unrealistic requirements for defense against external aggression. Under previously prevailing priorities and attitudes, lags and obstacles were not considered of serious import. Such approaches are now incompatible with the urgent need to improve internal security capabilities.
Since much of the Communist threat is based on the exploitation of disorders developing from economic and social pressures, the foundation of the internal security programs must be the effort to remedy these underlying causes. To be successful, however, such programs must in themselves disturb the existing structures of nations and their societies, and they increase accordingly the need for internal security forces capable of assuring the stability essential to their implementation.
The fact that military strength has long been a principal supporting factor in South American governments is misleading with respect to the capability of these forces, during this period of rapid changes, to assure internal security. In most countries the armies are little more than professional officer corps controlling masses of poorly trained conscripts. Such forces have been effective frequently as a political factor, and when used on a mass basis, have been able to control principal cities and to repel attacks on garrisons. The value of such forces for internal security action against subversive forces, however, is highly questionable. Officers and enlisted men share few common objectives. The forces can be easily divided on political issues; they lack the training, light arms, communications, transport and small tactical units which would be necessary to control widely scattered disorder or guerrilla attacks. What is needed today is the shift of South American military effort away from the principal cities and from the traditional political role, to the establishment of small tactical forces stationed strategically where internal security is threatened.
This would require concurrently an increase in police capabilities within these principal cities. The South American countries best equipped today to use their Armed Forces effectively for internal security purposes are those with relatively strong police forces. Deficiency in day-to-day maintenance of public order in the populated areas provides an ideal climate for subversive action throughout the entire country. Those countries relying on strong armed forces with little emphasis on police thereby reduce their capabilities to move where needed against wide-spread subversive effort and indirect aggression.
Equally vital to internal security are adequate facilities for investigation and for intelligence collection. The internal security efforts of South American countries are deficient in these respects.
To a large extent these situations exist because the will of government and society is such that the necessary improvements are not considered urgent or demanded. The U.S. is endeavoring now to stimulate will toward remedying basic causes of social unrest and civil disorder. There is required equally the stimulation of will to erect internal security structures capable of dealing with subversive activity and violence. This will require drastic modifications in the structure, equipment, and training of South American armed forces, in the strengthening of police forces, and in intelligence collection.
The first systematic United States effort toward development of internal security capabilities in the South American armed forces was made in the 1962 military assistance program, but because top-level approval still is lacking, the program is not yet fully in operation. In the interim there have been grants of several special "packages" of internal security equipment and training. Aside from this, any increase in internal security capabilities derived by the South American armed forces from past programs has been a fringe benefit.
Another benefit, often considered to be the principal U.S. asset derived from the past programs, is the existence of a generally pro-U.S., well-oriented, and reasonably well-educated officer corps. Influential officers are to be found within each country today who recognize the need for reconstruction of the armed forces to meet subversive threats of the type which in the future may appear. Although each of the countries for its own reasons will endeavor to support some conventional, prestige type forces, there exists today a far better opportunity than ever before to exert U.S. influence toward orienting these forces to the internal security concept.
Along with military aspects of internal security programs, most of the South American countries are studying the advisability of utilizing their armed forces on construction projects and other programs characterized as civic action. Such effort is commendable provided it does not detract from the internal security capability. The first, and most important, task is the transition from conventional forces to those trained and equipped primarily for internal security. The South American armed forces at present do not have the trained manpower to do this and simultaneously to divert their resources into widespread civic action. Initial emphasis should be given to those functions which serve areas where they provide simultaneously an internal security and construction force.
U.S. efforts to cope with internal security problems are hampered by lack of unity in working out programs at the country level and in Washington. This is strongly evident in the South American military assistance programs. U.S. military training missions to the South American countries are individually and independently established on service lines. At present, although one U.S. officer in each country has responsibility for coordination and for implementation of the military assistance program, he does not have command authority except over officers of his own service. Communications with the Canal Zone headquarters of the unified command, and with other agencies, and with Washington are limited by inadequate procedures and facilities. The result is a cumbersome, slowly moving effort lacking the unified command and influence needed for adequately coordinated assistance to the armed forces of the host country.
If U.S. military influence is to be used more effectively toward improving the internal security capabilities, what is most needed today is an adequate revision of the entire U.S. military program in South America including the basic bilateral treaties and the force structures agreed to therein, the command and support organization of the U.S. MAAGs and military training missions, the intelligence effort of the armed forces attaches, the legislation which hampers systematic planning of internal security assistance and a clear cut assignment of responsibility and authority as compared to the present diffused system.
To assist in strengthening police capabilities, the AID at present has police assistance and training programs in four of the South American countries. These programs are making a notable contribution toward internal security in proportion to the relatively small resources being utilized. The emphasis has been on organization, administration, records, investigations, and non-lethal tactics of riot control, all based on the public service concept.
Questions have been raised in the past as to whether police assistance and training is properly an AID function. The survey in South America indicated clearly that AID should continue to have responsibility for administering the police assistance programs. This, along with financial support for modest civic action programs of the military forces, provides to AID an important role in the overall internal security effort.
Intelligence capability is the third principal area of deficiency which can benefit by U.S. assistance. This by its nature is delicate and sensitive. Attachment of intelligence advisors to U.S. military missions, already underway, is a useful contribution. Training and assistance for the investigative branches of the police forces is another. Encouragement and assistance should be given to those countries which are trying to organize national intelligence systems.
The adequacy of U.S. intelligence collection, mainly to keep the U.S. informed, but also to support where desirable the internal security capabilities of the South American countries, is assessed in the separately distributed annex to this report./3/
/3/Reference is to Part III.
Finally, the several U.S. agencies administering internal security programs within South American countries require better coordination. The country team as presently constituted in the larger Embassies imposes too broad a span for the Ambassador to coordinate and control effectively the multitude of U.S. programs. For internal security programs there is need to fix responsibility in a small working group headed by a senior officer with responsibility and adequate authority. The size of working groups from that now required could be drastically reduced by the previously suggested simplification of the command structure for U.S. military personnel within the country.
An urgent need exists for coordinated inter-agency guidance to the Country Teams on internal security programs. At present there is no directive authorizing the Country Teams to carry on joint military planning with the host countries for such purposes. Restrictions continue to exist on the use for internal security of equipment delivered within the hemisphere defense programs of past years. Guidance is inadequate respecting sources of supply, types of equipment and policies to be followed in responding to requests for riot control equipment.
Recommendations for U.S. Action
1. All aspects of the U.S. military assistance programs including authorizing legislation, bilateral agreements, MAAG and Mission organization, and U.S. policy objectives should be revised to conform with the concept that maintenance of their own internal security is the primary contribution that South American armed forces can make to Western Hemisphere defense.
2. Responsibility and authority should be consolidated and specifically assigned in Washington to provide for the continuing direction, control and coordination of the internal security program for Latin America. Within the Country Team of each Embassy, responsibility and authority similarly should be consolidated and assigned.
3. AID, the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency should agree on a joint program for each country defining the weapons, tactics, and forces to be encouraged for use in control of mobs and violence and the means for assuring adequate stocks of riot-control equipment and appropriate police weapons.
4. Effectiveness and flexibility of military assistance should be improved by combining the Training Missions and Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's) in each country into one unified command directly subordinate to Commander-in-Chief Caribbean Command (CINCARIB), by providing adequate communications systems, by systematic planning of internal security assistance, and by prompt and orderly implementation of agreed programs.
5. AID should give much higher priority in South America to the support of police assistance and training, both in country and regional projects.
6. The Department of Defense, CIA, and AID should increase and coordinate their efforts to improve intelligence capabilities of South American countries, particularly in the areas of intelligence advisors, intelligence exchange, police investigative personnel, technical equipment and training.
7. The USIS, the Department of Defense and AID should make a coordinated effort to foster a constructive information and indoctrination program for personnel of the South American armed forces and police forces.
8. Participation of South American military forces in civic action, and in economic and social development programs, should be encouraged only to the extent that such efforts contribute to, or do not interfere with, the reorganization and urgently needed training of forces for internal security.
9. AID, in addition to police assistance, should coordinate with the Department of Defense on civic action programs contributing to internal security, including in some cases the recognition of improved living standards for the armed forces as an economic and social need.
[Here follows Part II of the report.]
91. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/
SNIE 80-62
Washington, January 17, 1962.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, American Republics, 1962. Secret. A note on the title page indicates that the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and that the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on January 17. The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Air Force, the Joint Staff, and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of the estimate. All members of the board concurred except the AEC representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
THE THREAT TO US SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA
The Problem
To estimate the threat to US security interests in the Caribbean area over the next two decades.
The Estimate
1. US security interests in the Caribbean relate principally to the maintenance of independent and friendly states in the Western Hemisphere. The Caribbean is not only the basin around which are located a large number of American republics, but it is the link between the US and the larger American republics in the southern continent. In addition, the US is concerned with keeping its southern flank free of hostile military power, and with maintaining the unrestricted operation of the Panama Canal and of other US installations.
2. Threats to US interests could arise from a variety of sources: the vulnerability of the area to attack from outside the hemisphere; the establishment of a military presence within the area by hostile powers; attempts by the Communist powers, with the help of the present Cuban Government, to spread Communist revolution to other parts of the area by military action or subversion; the growth of indigenous radical nationalism; and instability rising from attempts by governments in the area to interfere in the affairs of their neighbors or to impose their will upon them. A discussion of each of these threats follows in the paragraphs below.
3. Vulnerability to outside attack. The area of the Caribbean is within range of Soviet ICBMs and long-range bombers, and cities, canals, and military installations could also be attacked by missile-carrying submarines. In the event of general war, some US installations, such as the canal and air and naval bases, probably would be subjected to Soviet attack.
4. Establishment of a hostile military presence. Cuba and any other Caribbean state which fell under Communist control could be used by the USSR as areas in which to establish missile, submarine, or air bases, designed to bring North America under attack or to add to the deterrents to any conceivable US military action in the Caribbean or elsewhere. On the whole, we believe the establishment of such Soviet bases is unlikely for some time to come. Their military and psychological value, in Soviet eyes, would probably not be great enough to override the risks involved.
5. The Soviet leaders would be concerned lest steps toward the establishment of such bases would provoke the US to overthrow the Castro regime before bases could become operational and would generally heighten the risk of war. Moreover, Soviet bases in Cuba could involve the USSR in difficult political and control problems with the Cuban Government; the Soviets have been very careful to retain control over situations which involve them in any serious degree of risk, and they would be mindful of the danger that Cuban initiatives could expose the USSR to serious risks of general war. Finally, the Soviet leaders, for the present at least, appear to prefer not to make their presence too obvious or apparent, lest they discourage rather than encourage the spread of communism to other Latin American countries. Since their essential aim in Latin America is not military conquest but Communist revolution, we believe they will prefer to use Cuba as a symbol of spontaneous popular revolution and as a base for subversive operations.
6. Nevertheless, the USSR can and probably will augment its naval, air, and communications capabilities in the area by the development of arrangements or facilities not openly identifiable as Soviet military bases. For example, the improvement of Cuban naval and air installations would provide facilities suitable for Soviet use, and special installations and arrangements could be set up for intelligence collection or subversive purposes.
7. This reluctance to establish military bases might not extend over the entire period under review. If communism spread to other countries in the area, and if the US appeared to be weakening in world power and national will, the Soviet leaders might be emboldened to buttress their gains by openly establishing Soviet military bases in the area, with the object of further weakening US prestige and further strengthening and protecting their local satraps. If such bases were established, the first step might be the establishment of jointly-operated submarine or air bases, on the theory that the establishment of such bases would be less likely to incur risk of US reaction than would the establishment of missile bases, while at the same time constituting a demonstration of Soviet presence and protection.
8. Possibilities of the spread of communism in the area. The area of the Caribbean presents a picture of great variety, in terms of social structure, economic organization, and political direction. A few states have had or are passing through full-fledged social revolutions; in others the pressures for revolution are building up. Some states have very backward economies, while others are moving toward modern industrial societies. Many are single crop or commodity exporters; others are moving toward more balanced economies. In each country there are groups seeking to overthrow the existing order; even Mexico, which can be considered to have completed its revolution, harbors groups who believe that the revolution has been arrested and that a new leftward movement should be set in train. Some of these revolutionary groups are Communist led; some are not.
9. It appears to us very likely that during the next decade or two the Communist element among the revolutionary forces will grow in size, although its growth in influence would not necessarily be proportionate to the growth in size. The important question is not whether communism grows, but whether the non-Communist revolutionary forces can grow more rapidly, can control the revolutionary movement, and can achieve an acceptable level of momentum and progress in social, economic, and political change. This question cannot be answered at this stage of Latin American history; much depends upon such factors as the degree of success of the Alliance for Progress in achieving real social change, the skill and determination of local non-Communist leaders, and the activities and achievements of Castro's Cuba and of the local Communists in exploiting and subverting revolutionary unrest.
10. We believe that Castro's Cuba will continue to do what it can to export its revolution. It has to some degree handicapped itself by openly espousing Marxism-Leninism, but to the extent that it can capitalize on the failure of non-Communists to achieve real reform, it may yet succeed in bringing sympathetic forces to power elsewhere. For some of these countries, Venezuela for example, the critical choice between communism and non-communism may come within the years immediately ahead. For some of the others it may come later. During the next two decades, all could escape communism, but some may fall under Communist control. Local factors of an unforeseeable character, such as the quality of emerging leadership, may prove more decisive than existing political trends or degree of backwardness. In addition, factors external to the area, such as Communist successes or reverses in other underdeveloped countries, developments within the Communist Bloc itself, or changes in the appreciation of the general power balance between the Communist Bloc and the Free World will play a part.
11. Growth of indigenous, non-Communist, radical nationalism. Those states which experience a profound social, economic, and political transformation without coming under Communist control will almost certainly develop a greater sense of national identity and a stronger impulse to assert political independence. As broad-based political movements replace military or personal rule, there will develop a much stronger feeling that the Latin American states can be masters of their own destinies, and the new political leaders will be obliged to stress their devotion to national sovereignty and especially their independence of US policy. In some instances national sovereignty may come to mean that anything can be attempted with little concern for US reaction.
12. This is not to say that the growth of nationalism will necessarily be accompanied by a rise of anti-US attitudes. To the extent nationalism succeeds, it will tend to reduce the antagonism toward the US among the broad mass of the people, but at the same time it will win the enmity of established elites. In any event, the very emergence of new forces, and the identification--rightly or wrongly--of the old order with the US will tend to promote suspicion of US motives and policies and will encourage the new leaders at least to strike a pose of independence and self-determination. As a consequence, the US role in the control and operation of canals or other US installations will almost certainly come under heavy attack, and the US freedom of action will probably become increasingly restricted. In the event of open differences with the US, an opportunity might be presented for hostile extra-hemispheric powers to gain a meas-ure of influence.
13. Such a trend toward radical nationalism appears to us to be unavoidable, although it will probably move at a variable and indeterminable pace. In some countries it probably will gather force more slowly than in others. In Panama today, where the Canal Zone offers a visible target for agitation, it appears to be particularly strong; in some of the more isolated countries of the area it may mature only after major reforms have occurred and a new sense of self-confidence develops.
14. Rivalries and tensions within the area. Historically, the Caribbean area has been rife with personal feuds and petty tensions between states. Conspiracies and revolts against some leaders or countries have been organized, armed, and initiated on the soil of others. Combinations and alignments have been developed among groups of countries or leaders against others. We believe this kind of activity will continue in the years ahead, although it may take a somewhat different form than in the past. The pace of social, economic, and political change will not be uniform. Oligarchs cut off from power in one state may move to others and may receive aid and comfort in their plots to reassume control at home. Similarly, frustrated revolutionists will, as in the past few years, use asylum in sympathetic countries to organize and plan revolutions in their home countries. While the form may be the same as in the past, the ultimate stakes will not be personal power so much as the social and economic structure of the nation itself.
92. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, February 5, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316. Secret. Drafted by Maechling and Brigadier General W.A. Enemark, USA, Regional Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, with concurrences by Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs William Bundy, and in the Agency for International Development.
SUBJECT
National Security Action Memorandum No. 118--Participation of U.S. and Latin American Armed Forces in the Attainment of Common Objectives in Latin America/2/
/2/NSAM 118, from McGeorge Bundy to Rusk and McNamara, dated December 5, stated that the President was "favorably impressed" with the general approach and content of the proposals in JCSM 832-61 (Document 89) and desired their further refinement and development into specific programs for action. It further stated that the President had assigned primary responsibility for formulating a policy guidance paper on this subject to the Department of State and responsibility for developing general and specific programs for implementation to the Department of Defense and that he requested a brief consolidated report on February 1 outlining actions that were underway. (Department of State, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316)
This report is in response to NSAM 118. It was prepared in collaboration with the Department of Defense and has the concurrence of that department.
I. Policy
The implementation of our Latin American policy is taking place within a framework of rapid evolutionary change. Throughout Latin America social tensions are mounting. The reforms generated by the Alliance for Progress are likely to weaken, rather than strengthen, the fabric of society in most Latin American countries by increasing these tensions during the period before the long term programs of the Alliance become effective. We must expect the Communists and other extreme left-wing political factions to try to exploit this situation to their own advantage.
A key element in preserving the internal stability of Latin American countries during this critical period will be the position and attitudes of the Latin American military. Historically, the military in Latin America has played a major role in local political life. In only a few countries is there any tradition of civilian control. Frequently, the armed forces have exercised degrees of open control varying from outright military dictatorship to situations where they influence the political balance of power, either by dictating the limits within which a civilian government is permitted to operate or by swinging their support from one faction to another.
In the past there was a strong tendency on the part of Latin American military establishments to support conservative political institutions. Even though the officer corps in Latin America is predominately of middle and even lower-class origin, it has usually identified its interests with those of the upper-class landowning and commercial oligarchy that has dominated the political scene in Latin America since the wars of independence. Today, however, the same factors which are revolutionizing the civilian environment are affecting the military establishments of Latin America. In nearly every country the rising generation of younger officers is sympathetic to social and economic reform. In a few cases, their social and economic tendencies are beginning to introduce a new and unpredictable element into already unstable local political situations.
From the standpoint of military policy, our current strategy calls for the United States to assume primary responsibility for defense of the Western Hemisphere against external attack. Our policy objectives, therefore, require military establishments in Latin America which are capable of contributing to the defense of the hemisphere by maintaining internal security against the threat of Castro or communist-inspired insurgency. We also want military establishments that will evolve in a way that contributes to the political stability and economic development of their respective countries. In this connection, it should be noted that most Latin American armed forces are capable of maintaining internal security in urban areas only; they are not generally capable of coping with uprisings or guerrilla actions in rural areas.
In order to align Latin American military establishments with United States military policy, and to train and equip them for their contribution to the defense of the hemisphere, the United States must be the paramount foreign military influence in Latin America. A favorable political orientation on the part of the Latin American officer corps is vital to our interests. This calls for continuous effort in solidifying the bonds between our military forces and those of Latin America.
In achieving the foregoing objectives, we must recognize, however, that some kinds of action to strengthen Latin American military forces are fraught with hazardous political consequences. In nearly every Latin American country the political balance is a delicate one, with the armed forces capable of tipping the scales. Most governments are carefully nurturing the principle of civilian control. We cannot afford to be identified with any step backward either to repressive dictatorship or military intervention in political life.
Accordingly, every move we make to strengthen our ties with the Latin American military must be done on a selective basis with careful attention to the sensitivities of the country concerned and their effect on the political balance in that county. With this qualification, we are implementing the proposals made in JCSM 832-61, along the following lines.
II. Implementation
Nearly all the proposals in JCSM 832-61 have been under way for some time. Nevertheless, we have reviewed the entire list carefully to determine which proposals should be continued at their present level, which should receive increased emphasis, and which should be rejected as not feasible or undesirable.
Our review disclosed that of the twenty-four specific proposals that the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted to cover their original twenty-seven recommendations, nineteen are already in operation. We believe that eleven of these should continue at present levels and nine should receive increased emphasis. The report being prepared in connection with NSAM 119 (on civic action)/3/ will include recommendations on the degree of emphasis for these nine. Four of the twenty-four proposals (Nos. 1, 9, 12 and 24) have been carefully reviewed and found to be either unfeasible or of such questionable value that they are being returned for further study. The Enclosure/4/ lists the twenty-four proposals with the current status and degree of emphasis recommended for each.
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VIII, Document 65.
/4/Not printed and titled "Specific Projects Submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Cover the Recommendations Contained in Their Paper No. JCSM-832-61, with Comment on the Current Status, Desirability, and Degree of Emphasis Required for Each"; undated.
The civic action recommendations of JCSM 832-61 deserve special mention. Action is now being taken pursuant to NSAM 119 to expand civic action programs in underdeveloped countries throughout the world, including Latin America. The Department of Defense has reviewed the FY 1962 military assistance equipment program with a view to expediting certain projects for selected military forces in Latin America which can contribute substantially to economic and social development, and to determine whether other purely military projects can be deferred without significantly lowering the military effectiveness of Latin American forces. $2.9 million in the FY 1962 Military Assistance Program is being authorized for these projects, and another $5.0 million may also be allotted for the same purpose.
To determine what funds can be obligated for civic action type projects in FY 1962, and to program other such projects in FY 1963, a DOD-AID team will soon visit selected Latin American countries. The specific programs resulting from this visit will be listed in the report on NSAM 119, due on March 31./5/ We therefore recommend that with this memorandum action on NSAM 118 be considered completed.
/5/Dated March 30.
William H. Brubeck/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that indicates Brubeck signed the original above Battle's typed signature.
93. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, February 20, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 134. Secret.
SUBJECT
Report and Recommendations of Washington Assessment Team on Internal Security Situation in South America
I am enclosing a copy of the Report and Recommendations of the Washington Assessment Team (SAAT)/2/ which visited South American countries, during the period November 15-December 21, 1961, to assess the communist threat, the local Government's capability to meet and overcome it and U.S. Country Team capabilities for rendering internal security assistance. Also enclosed is a copy of a Staff Study of the Report prepared by this Department.
/2/Document 90.
The following steps in implementation of the Report are being taken: (1) each concerned agency is being requested to review the nine recommendations in Part I and to state its views concerning them; (2) the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) is being provided a copy for such action as it may deem appropriate; (3) each concerned Ambassador is being provided a copy for his use and comment.
In the meantime, the following actions consistent with the recommendations in the Report already have been initiated:
1. The Defense Department has taken steps to unify the Service Missions in each South American country into a single MAAG under the command of the Commander-in-Chief Caribbean Command;
2. AID is engaged in reviewing the current Public Safety Program for Latin America to insure that it is responsive to the critical needs of Latin American countries for police assistance;
3. Pursuant to NSAM 119, AID and the Defense Department are acting jointly in the development of civic action projects, additional to those now underway, that might usefully be undertaken in Latin America;
4. Pursuant to NSAM 118, an expanded program of collaboration between the U.S. and Latin American military is underway.
Dean Rusk/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
Enclosure
Department of State Staff Study
SUBJECT
Report and Recommendations of Washington Assessment Team (SAAT) on the Internal Security Situation in South America
The Report is the product of an inter-agency team, which visited each of the ten South American countries during the period November 15-December 21, 1961, to assess the communist threat, the local Government's capability to meet and overcome it and U.S. Country Team capabilities for rendering internal security assistance. The Report is based on interviews and briefings by Country Team and other U.S. personnel only; there were no contacts with local nationals.
The first seven pages (Part I) summarize the Team's general findings and recommendations. These are followed by detailed country reports (Part II). Part III, the sensitive intelligence annex which reviews local government and U.S. intelligence capabilities, is in the custody of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
I. Team's Basic Findings
(a) The Threat. The primary threat is posed by the growing capacity of a communist minority in each country to exploit others, particularly extremist factions of the right and left, for the promotion of communist programs and goals. In order to reduce the deterrent capability of security forces, communists are placing emphasis on the discrediting, outflanking and outmaneuvering of such forces. These tactics include the policy of fomenting violence in rural areas, where security forces are weak, and of promoting disorders over issues on which security forces are vulnerable.
(b) Security Force Capabilities. Although each country maintains substantial military and police forces supposedly capable of maintaining internal security, these are deficient in the quality, orientation, organization, training and equipment they require to meet and overcome the threats that reasonably may be anticipated. Police forces, in particular, require strengthening.
(c) Country Team Capabilities. U.S. efforts to furnish governments the guidance and assistance they require to maintain effective security are hampered by inadequate coordination of the total U.S. internal security effort at the Country Team, CINCARIB and Washington levels. In particular, the entire U.S. program and overseas representation require review and revision. Reorientation of the program is necessary if it is to become a fully effective instrumentality for improving the internal security capabilities of South American countries.
II. Team's Recommendations and Analysis of Security Situation
(a) Part I of the Report contains nine recommendations, which are set forth in enclosure 1 of this memorandum./4/ These should be endorsed, in principle, except recommendations numbered 1 and 8.
/4/Not printed.
(1) The revisions of U.S. programs proposed in recommendation 1 should be limited to those determined, in consultation with concerned Ambassadors, to be politically practicable. For example, bilateral military assistance (MAAG) and military training mission agreements are not now wholly in conformity with the concept that the primary role we envisage for Latin American armed forces in hemisphere defense is the maintenance of internal security. In some cases, it may not be possible to persuade the local government to adopt this concept and to agree to the revisions necessary to bring existing bilateral agreements into conformity. Moreover, in some cases it may be juridically necessary for revised agreements to obtain local Congressional ratification or approval. Extreme leftists and nationalist opposition elements might prevent, and would delay, such approval in certain countries. This would place in jeopardy not only the revised or new agreements, but also our existing military agreements and defense arrangements.
(2) In recommendation 8, the Team has too severely restricted conditions under which South American military forces should be encouraged to participate in civic action. The participation of South American military forces in civic action and in economic and social development programs should be encouraged, whenever such participation does not detract from, or interfere with, the reorganization and urgently needed training of internal security forces.
(b) Additional recommendations appear in each country report (Part II). These represent, for the most part, the Team's judgment on how the nine recommendations in Part I should be translated into specific U.S. actions at the country level. While most have some merit, they should not be endorsed prior to the receipt and review of each concerned Ambassador's comment.
(c) The Team's analysis in each country report (Part II) of the internal security situation is as comprehensive and accurate as might reasonably be expected, in view of the limited time spent by the Team in each country. On the basis of information available to the Department, the country analyses are not wholly accurate, nor are the conclusions in the country reports entirely valid. However, these discrepancies do not, by themselves, necessarily nullify the recommendations included in the country reports, the majority of which are consistent with the Department's appraisal of the local security situation.
III. Implementation
(a) Each concerned agency (Defense, AID, CIA, USIS) should be requested to review the nine recommendations in Part I which affect its policies, programs and activities, and to state its views concerning them.
(b) The Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) should be provided a copy of the Report for such action as it may deem appropriate.
(c) Each concerned Ambassador, in consultation with other members of the Country Team, is in the best position to assess the merit of the Team's recommendations set forth in Part II, inasmuch as they relate to matters largely in his jurisdiction. Accordingly, each Ambassador should be sent a copy of the Report for his own use and requested, in consultation with other members of the Country Team, to transmit his comments.
In the meantime, the following actions consistent with the recommendations in the Report are already in process of implementation:
(1) The Defense Department has taken steps to unify the Service Missions in each South American country into a single MAAG under the command of the Commander-in-Chief Caribbean Command (recommendation 4);
(2) AID is engaged in reviewing the current Public Safety Program for Latin America to insure that it is responsive to the critical requirements of Latin American countries for police assistance (recommendation 5);
(3) Pursuant to NSAM 119, AID and the Defense Department are acting jointly in the development of civic action projects, additional to those now underway, that might usefully be undertaken in Latin America (recommendation 9);
(4) Pursuant to NSAM 118, on which a report was forwarded to the President on February 5, an expanded program of collaboration between the U.S. and Latin American military is underway./5/
/5/NSAM 134, from Bundy to Rusk, dated March 12, stated that the President had noted his "interim report" enclosing a copy of the SAAT report and requested that the Department of State coordinate the report with the departments and agencies concerned and recommend a governmental position based on its recommendations in a paper to be forwarded no later than May 1. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 134) A July 16 memorandum from Taylor to U. Alexis Johnson indicates that no paper was sent. (Ibid.)
94. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, February 28, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 118. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but the Department of State record copy indicates that it was drafted by Officer in Charge of Inter-American Security and Military Affairs George O. Spencer and cleared by U. Alexis Johnson and Haydn Williams and in the Agency for International Development.
SUBJECT
National Security Action Memorandum No. 118--Participation of U.S. and Latin American Armed Forces in the Attainment of Common Objectives in Latin America
This constitutes a revised report in response to the State Department's responsibility under NSAM 118 to provide policy guidance on collaboration between U.S. and Latin American military forces./2/
/2/The text of the undated memorandum omitting the introductory paragraph, and entitled "United States Policy for Participation of U.S. and Latin American Armed Forces in the Attainment of Common Objectives in Latin America," was circulated with NSAM 140, from Bundy to Rusk and McNamara, March 26, which states that the President had approved it. (Ibid., NSAM 140)
The fundamental objective of U.S. military activities and programs in Latin America is the establishment of a Latin American military leadership dedicated to the tasks of: (1) preserving democratic constitutional order; (2) maintaining internal security; (3) contributing to collective defense on a scale commensurate with Latin American military and economic capabilities; and (4) promoting social and economic development. Pursuant to this objective, it is our policy to encourage the Latin American military to reorient their military establishments in the following manner:
1. Encourage acceptance and fulfillment of the concept that each of the Latin American countries is responsible for contributing to the defense of the hemisphere by:
a. Maintaining security against the communist-Castro threat of violence and subversion, including guerrilla warfare, and the movement of armaments and men clandestinely across land, sea and air borders for subversive purposes.
b. Maintaining security, against overt external aggression, of their ports and coastal waters, bases and strategic areas within their territories, but placing maximum reliance on effective application of the Rio Treaty with full U.S. military cooperation to deter or counter such aggression.
c. Contributing to overall hemispheric defense capabilities in adjacent areas of the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, e.g. anti-submarine warfare, patrol harbor defense, and related functions.
d. Contributing patrol or combat forces, or other feasible assist-ance, for any Caribbean Security arrangements that may be negotiated and for implementing any OAS decision that collective military action be taken to maintain the peace and security of the hemisphere.
2. Encourage, to the maximum extent consistent with needs and capabilities of each Latin American nation, standardization along U.S. lines of military doctrine, unit organization and training.
U.S. military programs developed in implementation of the foregoing policy objectives should be so designed as to win the support of non-communist civilian elements, both for the programs and for the local military. To this end, U.S. programs should:
1. Consist of types of assistance that can be justified to non-communist elements of the population as a bona fide security requirement for them and for their constitutional governments.
2. Whenever possible without losing primary military capability, include assistance having some visible economic utility, e.g. assistance for dual-purpose units which contribute to economic development as well as security.
3. Acquaint the Latin American military with the complete portfolio of communist techniques, including the communist tactic of alienating the military from the support of the civilian population by depicting it as a repressive, extravagant and irresponsible element in public life.
It is particularly desirable that the foregoing policy objectives and guidelines be used in the development and conduct of military training and exchange programs, military conferences and other forms of military collaboration which bring U.S. and Latin American military personnel into close professional and personal association. Inasmuch as such programs and activities provide particularly effective channels for promoting U.S. interests, U.S. military personnel engaging in them should be made fully cognizant of U.S. policy objectives.
Finally, it is essential that U.S. military programs be carefully tailored to the individual requirements of Latin American countries. Neither Latin American military nor civilian authorities should be stimulated to request a particular program prior to a careful determination by our Ambassador, confirmed by the State Department, that the program would serve U.S. foreign policy interests in that country.
ML Manfull/3/
/3/Manfull signed for Battle above Battle's typed signature.
95. Editorial Note
On February 19, 1962, AID Administrator Fowler Hamilton recommended in a memorandum to President Kennedy that he make a determination required by section 511(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that internal security requirements might be the basis for the furnishing of grant assistance of defense articles to Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Haiti, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. On February 28 President Kennedy signed Presidential Determination No. 62-17, which permitted furnishing defense articles on a grant basis up to approximately $20.2 million to those countries. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Presidential Determinations)
96. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 11, 1962, 5:40 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.7553/4-1162. Confidential. Drafted by Martin and approved by the White House on April 19. The meeting was held at the White House.
SUBJECT
Inter-American Defense College/2/
/2/The Inter-American Defense Board agreed on December 19, 1961, to establish an Inter-American Defense College at Fort McNair in Washington. On April 11 the OAS Council approved a resolution finding no impediment to the establishment of the Defense College, thus overruling the position put forward by Mexico and Venezuela that the Board lacked authority to create it and that the OAS Council thus had no responsibility to fund its operating expenses. Documentation on this subject is ibid., 371.7553.
PARTICIPANTS
The President
Mr. Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State, ARA
His Excellency Dr. Jose Antonio Mayobre, Ambassador of Venezuela
Ambassador Mayobre indicated that all he wanted to talk about was the Inter-American Defense College. He expressed previously known views that to bring senior officers to Washington for nontechnical, political training would, in the Latin American climate, inevitably stimulate their interest in taking political power. He also thought that bringing just a group of Latin Americans together might establish a mutually supported network of Latin American military interested in taking power. Apart from these objections of principle he thought this was a particularly bad time to set up such an institution in view of the Argentine crisis and that leftist elements would attack it most vociferously.
He went on to say that, while in the recent discussions and in the vote this morning, only Brazil and Mexico had stood with Venezuela, he knew for a fact that many other governments were strongly opposed to the proposition but had only voted for it because of strong outside pressures, and in view of their unwillingness to stand up to their own military, which very much wanted the College. In response to a request from the President he listed at least half the countries of Latin America as being in reality opposed.
Assistant Secretary Martin pointed out that this was not what the governments had told the United States and there might be some difference of view between delegations and governments. He also pointed out that while we had a real appreciation of the problem with which the Ambassador was concerned, we felt that the curriculum could be so handled as to have the opposite effect and that he knew the people involved and was sure they would be quite happy to work in this direction.
The President felt it of great importance to get the American military and the Latin American military better acquainted with each other so they could work together better on the common hemispheric problems in the military field. The President said he could not help but believe that close association with American military, who understood so well the need to subordinate the military power to the civilian, would be helpful in dealing with the problem with which the Ambassador was concerned.
On the other hand, we would not want to push through a project which was in reality opposed by a substantial number of Latin American governments. He knew that many of them had soldiers up here for training at Bragg and many other places and this seemed to be helpful. He felt that some way should be found to review the organization and curriculum of the new College in a way to avoid the difficulties which the Ambassador's Government feared. He felt the institution had a role to perform and it would be very unfortunate to abandon the project at this stage by confessing that we could not reach agreement. He asked the Ambassador to consult some of the other governments which were concerned and then talk to Assistant Secretary Martin and see if some solution could not be worked out which would meet the problems which had been raised.
[After he had left the President's office, the Ambassador indicated to Mr. Martin that one helpful move might be a carefully worded statement at the time the OAS announces that the College is to be established, which would emphasize the democratic and civilian objectives of the training to be provided. He told Assistant Secretary Martin that he would consult his colleagues and be in touch with him in about a week.]/3/
/3/Brackets in the source text.
97. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts in the American Republics/1/
Washington, April 18, 1962, 8:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 720.5/4-1862. Secret. Drafted by Spencer, cleared in draft by Maechling and with the Agency for International Development and the Department of Defense, and approved by Martin. Repeated to CINCARIB and CINCLANT.
1781. Following is guidance to assist Ambassador carry out internal security program responsibilities cited President's letter last May./2/ Following applicable particularly to counter-insurgency, civic action, military indoctrination and other programs bearing US military "cold war" label.
/2/Reference is to a letter of May 29 from Kennedy to all U.S. Ambassadors. For text, see the Department of State Bulletin, December 11, 1961, pp. 993-994.
As general rule US should encourage and whenever in US interest assist LA military and/or police to: (1) improve their capability to maintain internal security against communist inspired or exploited subversion and violence; (2) engage in those high-impact civic action projects which are necessary primarily for security reasons, i.e. projects required to improve image of local military and thereby improve military's ability to maintain public support, particularly at village and campesino level, for necessary security measures; (3) engage in larger-scale, longer-term civic action projects which serve broad nation-building goals more than narrow security objectives, provided such projects consistent with and make practical contribution toward Alliance for Progress, are within local government's economic capabilities to finance and/or US budgetary limitations to support, and do not substantially detract from required reorganization, training and equipping of necessary internal security forces.
However, each US movement into these relatively new fields of collaboration must have Ambassador's prior assessment of its political-economic-military impact on country. To insure such assessments, Amb requested keep informed, in consultation Country Team members and CINCARIB, all current and proposed internal security activities of US departments. Whenever necessary, Amb should consult Dept for additional information or advice he requires for their adequate evaluation.
In particular, local civilian, police and military authorities should be stimulated by members Country Team, or US personnel visiting country, to request or accept only those US programs or activities which Washington has approved after full consideration Ambassador's views. Dept desires that timing and channeling of such stimulation be subject Ambassador's approval in every case.
In developing his recommendations to Dept re any internal security program, Amb should, unless he considers inadvisable or is otherwise instructed, obtain views pro-US, anti-communist civilians who Amb believes are in position make sound judgments re possible adverse impact of program on genuinely democratic developments and who he believes can be relied on to provide frank advice on pitfalls to avoid.
In developing recommendations re assistance to local police and/or paramilitary forces, particularly counter-insurgency training and equipment, Amb should evaluate risk of pro-communist municipal, provincial or other authorities using such forces against efforts of national military to maintain security against communist subversion and violence. In assessing this risk, Amb should, unless he considers inadvisable or is otherwise instructed, consult pro-US, anti-communist civilians or military authorities who can be relied on for objective and disinterested judgment on likelihood of any such misuse.
Rusk
98. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in the American Republics/1/
Washington, August 10, 1962, 8:51 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 720.5/8-1062. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Spencer, cleared in the Department of Defense, and approved by Martin. Sent to all diplomatic posts in the American Republics except Lima and repeated to CINCARIB and CINCLANT.
230. Influential members Congress, wide segment press and some LA civilians severely criticizing MAP program, alleging: (1) close association of U.S. with LA military promoted by MAP and other joint activities contributes little or nothing to developing LA military respect for constitutional principles, e.g. Peru, Argentina; (2) U.S. equipment utilized largely to increase military prestige and capability to suppress non-communist democratic elements; (3) military establishments, budgets and arms acquisitions already too large; (4) MAP should include only minimum equipment and training critically required for internal defense defined in narrowest terms (e.g. police-type assistance) and civic action.
Following assumptions believed to underlie this criticism: (a) LA military have no legitimate hemisphere combat mission and U.S. armament only stimulates arms race; (b) long history military coups and caudillos likely to continue; (c) military largely oriented toward right and generally oppose social and economic reform; (d) military not significantly engaging their resources in economic and social development; (e) because military's right-wing orientation militates against danger it will affiliate with local communists or Sino-Soviet Bloc, U.S. can, without jeopardizing its security interests, severely limit assistance it grants or sells to that which U.S. determines unilaterally to be critical LA requirement; (f) restrictive U.S. arms policy would promote reduction military expenditures and divert savings to economic development, but if not, would benefit U.S. public image by disassociating U.S. from LA military extravagance and irresponsibility.
Embassy requested cable soonest thoughtful comment re validity criticism and assumption. Include judgment whether adoption of more restrictive grant and sales policy would result in net U.S. gain or loss in terms our across-board foreign policy objectives in country.
Rusk
99. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/
Washington, September 10, 1962, 7:38 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9-1062. Confidential. Drafted by Director of the Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs Katherine W. Bracken, cleared in draft by Assistant Legal Adviser for American Republics Affairs Marjorie M. Whiteman and with the Office of International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense, and approved by Martin. Sent to Guatemala City, Managua, Panama City, San Jose, San Salvador, and Tegucigalpa; repeated to POLAD/CINCLANT and POLAD/ CINCARIB.
442. In discussing Cuban situation several Central American Governments have again expressed fears of Castro aggression as result of current buildup in Cuba. General line of action we are proposing has been indicated in circular telegrams 377 and 378./2/
/2/Both dated September 2. (Both ibid., 737.56/9-262)
However, you should, as appropriate remind CA Govts of special US concern in past over threat of such aggression, direct and indirect, and our efforts to strengthen CA countries' defenses against Castro attempts in this connection. Point particularly to ninth paragraph of President Kennedy's statement of September 4./3/ ("It continues to be the policy of the United States that the Castro regime will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever means may be necessary from taking action against any part of the Western Hemisphere.") Reiterate assurances given in circular 196 (August 3 1961)/4/ that we are prepared to assist, upon request, in identification, interdiction or frustration of armed assistance to Castro-Communist elements.
/3/For text of the statement, see Department of State Bulletin, September 24, 1962, p. 450.
/4/See footnote 2, Document 88.
Complementary to this potential assistance is strengthening of their own internal defense capability in which we are cooperating through MAP programs, particularly in efforts during past year to shore up weaknesses in current internal security capability of these countries.
Although inflammatory broadcasts from Cuba are continuing we have no reliable indication that Castro-Communists at this time are capable of, or intend, armed raiding parties in Central America. It appears to us they depend, instead, on ability of local Communist parties to exploit local issues, particularly sabotaging of the Alliance for Progress. We thus hope that governments will respond to our expression of special concern and special efforts we have been making to deter action toward Central America by Castro-Communists, with realistic estimates of areas in which Communists are most active locally and measures to control their attempted subversion of legitimate progress by Communist groups responding to Castro's radio calls.
You may add that we would, if your host government desires, be glad to consult on practical problems involved in arms smuggling on Atlantic Coast in an attempt to develop a better control with resources now available to our two countries.
Rusk
100. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Chairman of the Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Morse)/1/
Washington, September 15, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 720.5/8-362. No classification marking. Drafted by Director of the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs Ward P. Allen and Spencer.
Dear Mr. Chairman: This is in response to your letter of August 3, 1962,/2/ in which you requested that we examine in depth the policies underlying our military assistance program for Latin America and provide you answers, with supporting data, to several questions which you raised regarding this program. As I indicated our intention to do in my initial response of August 10,1 Secretary McNamara and myself, the members of our staffs and our Ambassadors in the field have been engaged in a careful and serious re-examination of these policies and programs. Your thoughtful letter, together with recent political developments in Latin America, have been helpful in stimulating a fresh look at this important area of policy. This explains the delay in responding to your request.
/2/Not printed. (Ibid.)
In historical perspective, our program of military collaboration with Latin American Governments has not developed haphazardly. It has constituted, since the beginning of World War II, a calculated United States response to three major historical military developments bearing in their wake direct and serious challenges to the security of the United States: (1) the threat of Axis domination, represented by World War II; (2) the threat of global war, brought into sharp focus by the Korean conflict; and (3) the threat represented by the appearance in Cuba of a Marxist-Communist regime committed to promote subversive, Castro-communist movements throughout Latin America. Our military programs have developed and altered in response to these threats. Our current programs have a three-fold objective: (1) improving hemispheric defense, principally through continuing to develop Latin American ASW capabilities; (2) internal defense, where necessary; and (3) a growing civic action program of direct civilian benefit.
Thus, broadly speaking, our programs are designed to contribute to hemispheric stability, to the maintenance of political democracy and to the principles of the Alliance for Progress. Notwithstanding occasional, deplorable military actions which have temporarily set back the progress of democracy, I am convinced that our programs are making a substantial contribution to all of these objectives.
The basic causes of the problem of violence in Latin America are to be found not in the military, but in basic weaknesses in the political, economic and social fabric of Latin American societies. Clearly the ultimate solution requires nothing less than the establishment of political, economic and social stability, under democratic institutions, throughout Latin America. In this process, an examination of history since World War II shows that the Latin American military have in general been a force for good and have played a leading and often decisive role in unseating dictators and helping to maintain political stability against revolutionary efforts to impose totalitarian regimes. Moreover, as we work toward the ultimate, evolutionary solution to the violence problem, we dare not disregard the current, most serious challenge I have mentioned above--the threat posed by the intention of the Castro-communist movement to utilize subversion and military force, whenever necessary, to retard or prevent democratic development. Thus a primary purpose of our military program must necessarily be to provide Latin American countries with the training and military equipment they require to frustrate such efforts.
In connection with our re-examination of our policy and programs, we asked each of our Ambassadors in Latin America to appraise the local impact of our military assistance policies and programs and to inform us whether, in his best judgment, a more restrictive policy with respect to the furnishing of military assistance would result in a net gain or loss in terms of United States foreign policy objectives in the country./3/ Their replies, without a single exception, take the view that a more restrictive United States arms policy would not be in our national interest./4/
/3/See Document 98.
/4/Detailed replies are in Department of State, Central File 720.5.
It is to be borne in mind that these programs of which we speak, although important to our national objectives, are not large. Our total military assistance effort for Latin America is less than five percent of our world-wide program. It represents less than six percent of the military budgets of the Latin American nations themselves and thus is not responsible for the size of Latin American armed forces, which, in their turn, are not distorted in size compared with those of most other developing countries, accounting for only about ten to fifteen percent of total Latin American budgets.
In short, our re-examination of our current three-pronged program in the perspective of our over-all policies and objectives, leads us to conclude that the program is basically sound.
The foregoing comments and conclusions emerge from a detailed Staff Study which we have prepared in response to your request and which I enclose.
Your letter also requested information covering five specific points which I am happy to provide. This information is set forth in Part II of the enclosed Staff Study and the supporting material appended thereto./5/
/5/The September 2 staff study and its enclosures are not printed.
Sincerely yours,
Dean Rusk/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
101. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/
Washington, September 25, 1962, 3:55 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 710.5/9-2562. Confidential. Drafted by Bowdler, cleared by Martin and Legal Adviser Abram Chayes, and approved by Allen. Sent to Bogot#, Caracas, Guatemala City, Managua, Mexico City, Panama City, Port-au-Prince, San Salvador, San Jose, Santo Domingo, and Tegucigalpa and repeated to USUN, POLAD CINCARIB, POLAD CINCLANT, Asuncion, Buenos Aires, La Paz, Lima, Montevideo, Quito, Rio de Janeiro, and Santiago.
517. Based on paragraph 2e. of Depcirtel 508/2/ Department has been considering courses action which countries bordering Caribbean can take demonstrate their determination work collectively resist attempts direct or indirect aggression by Castro regime. Current planning runs along following lines:
/2/Document 151.
A. Courses of Action
1. Establishment system air-sea surveillance around Cuba and along coast Caribbean countries. Surveillance would serve inhibit Castro regime from sending clandestine shipments of arms and men to other countries of area and would strengthen capabilities those countries intercept such shipments. We would assume primary responsibility for Cuban patrol while other countries would cover own coasts with such assistance from us as may be necessary. Our conducting Cuban patrol would not rule out contributions by other Caribbean countries (e.g. naval units or support facilities for such units).
2. Intensification efforts counter Castro-communist subversion including control of travel to and from Cuba, shipment subversive propaganda from Cuba and transfer funds from Cuban sources for subversive purposes. Governments could also agree on system for exchanging information on Castro-communist subversive activities.
3. Issuance by governments of Caribbean area, including United States, of joint declaration that extension by Castro regime of its Marxist-Leninist system by force or threat of force to any part of Caribbean area or creation or use of a Soviet supported offensive military capability endangering security of any country in area, will call for taking of any necessary measures to protect security of countries concerned. This declaration would be accompanied by announcement that discussions will be held at military level to plan for defensive measures for meeting these contingencies.
B. Timing and Forum
1. Paragraph 2e. of Depcirtel 508 if approved at informal MFM would constitute additional hemispheric acknowledgment that Caribbean countries are particularly vulnerable Castro-communist subversion and consequently justified taking special defensive measures. This would serve minimize criticism Rio Treaty being bypassed or that inter-American system being fractionized.
2. Based this paragraph we would seek have President Caribbean country (e.g. President Betancourt) invite Ministers Defense and Interior Caribbean countries meet during second or third week of October to consider special measures which should be taken. Courses action outlined A. could constitute program to be approved. Inclusion Interior Ministers would emphasize that problem of dealing with Castro-communist threat is not purely external but one in which internal measures are equally important.
Comment:
Department aware foregoing plan presents certain problems, particularly (1) whether Haiti and Mexico would want to join in action contemplated and (2) probability agreement patrol activities will give rise to requests for further military assistance. Would appreciate your evaluation receptivity of local government to plan and additional problems you can foresee in its execution. Foregoing is exclusively for information of addressees and should not be discussed with local officials until specifically authorized by Department.
Ball
102. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/
SNIE 85-4-62
Washington, November 9, 1962.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Cuba, November-December 1962. Secret. A note on the title page indicates that the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and prepared by the CIA, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the National Security Agency. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on November 9 except the AEC representative, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES IN LATIN AMERICA
The Problem
To describe and evaluate Castro's capabilities, with Soviet help, for carrying out subversion and sabotage in Latin America after satisfaction of all US conditions relative to the withdrawal of strategic weapons systems from Cuba and a consequent US commitment not to invade.
Note: In this estimate we have considered Castro's raw capabilities, taking note of, but not working out in detail, US and Latin American capabilities for counteraction.
Summary
A. The dangerously unstable situation that prevails throughout much of Latin America is the product of fundamental inequities and historic circumstances; it is not the creation of Castro and the Soviets. Castro's efforts, with Soviet help, to exploit this situation by means of subversion and sabotage have not produced significant results. Propaganda exploitation of Castro and Cuba as symbols of revolution has probably been more effective to date than other subversive activities. Castro's influence in Latin America had waned by the time of the missile base crisis and was further reduced by the revelation that he had accepted Soviet strategic missile bases on Cuban soil and by the manner of the Soviet decision to withdraw them.
B. Implementation of an agreement between the US and the USSR whereby the strategic weapons systems would be withdrawn and the US committed not to intervene in Cuba with force will leave Castro with a new immunity and a greater freedom for subversive actions throughout Latin America. The extent to which this potential is realized will depend upon the situation in Cuba, Soviet policy toward Cuba, and the policies and performance of the other Latin American governments and of the US with respect to the Castro threat. There are many targets in the hemisphere vulnerable to Castro-Communist subversion and sabotage, and the Soviets are likely to assist Castro in reaching them by contributing both to his security at home and to his capability for action overseas. As in the period before the missile base crisis, the effect of Castro's subversive activities will depend not only upon his capabilities but upon the attractiveness of the Cuban example and the willingness of the American governments to take determined counteraction. This willingness will probably be weakened by fulfillment of the US commitment not to invade Cuba.
C. We have examined how Castro's subversive potential would be affected by alternative courses of Soviet policy regarding Cuba: (1) virtual withdrawal of support; (2) continuation of economic and military support ranging from present up to substantially increased levels. We believe that course (1) would considerably reduce Castro's subversive potential, and that the Soviets are unlikely to elect it. We conclude that Soviet course (2) would maintain Castro's potential for subversive action at least at present levels or actually raise it to the point where he could undertake amphibious and/or airborne subversive operations against close-in targets.
[Here follow the remainder of the estimate; Annex A, "Highlights of Cuban Subversive Activities in other Latin American Countries to Date"; and Annex B, "Estimated Military Equipment in Cuba After Withdrawal of Strategic Missiles."]
103. National Security Action Memorandum No. 206/1/
Washington, December 4, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 206. Secret. Copies were sent to the Attorney General and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, AID
SUBJECT
Military Assistance for Internal Security in Latin America
The President has signed a determination authorizing the grant of up to $34.9 million of military materiel for internal security purposes in Latin America./2/ In this connection, the President underscored his concern with the need for the most challenging scrutiny of the justifications advanced for providing items under this determination.
/2/Presidential Determination 63-7, December 1. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Presidential Determinations)
In the complex and rapidly shifting circumstances in Latin America, it is essential that our military aid program be a carefully tailored and constantly updated part of our overall strategy aimed at development and security in the hemisphere. The program development and review process must assure that the specific items furnished under MAP are appropriate to solving the key internal security problems to which our overall country planning is addressed; and that this program in fact strengthens and supports the other objectives of the U.S. effort in each country, including the development of popularly supported civilian governments and effective civil police authorities.
The President recognizes that considerable effort has already been made to reorient military assistance in Latin America. But because this program is so sensitive in relation to the whole gamut of Latin American problems, he wishes to be assured that you continually stress the need to screen MAP items against the full range of intelligence, political analysis, policy evaluation, and other U.S. programs on a current basis.
Specifically:
Are jet aircraft really justifiable items for the internal security mission, or are they included essentially for political reasons? If so, do we have a clear idea of the full political ramifications, and are they clearly to our advantage?
Does the design of the MAP internal security program reflect our current efforts to strengthen the roles and capabilities of civil police in the same countries?
Is there explicit division of missions between the military and police units we support in each country?
Does the projected level of MAP in Latin America reflect a consciously measured balance between our military and police efforts in the internal security field?
Is an adequate contribution made by the intelligence community in the review of internal security programs?
In this connection, the President desires that careful consideration be given to intensifying civil police programs in lieu of military assist-ance where such action will yield more fruitful results in terms of our primary internal security objective. Should AID funds be insufficient to meet total requirements, a transfer from military assistance should be seriously considered.
Will you please take whatever steps are necessary to assure that the FY 1963 MAP program for Latin America is appropriate in terms of these criteria. The President wishes to have the Administrator of AID, in his role as coordinator of foreign assistance, submit a report, in cooperation with the Secretary of Defense, on the steps being taken to assure that MAP has the desired effects on our total efforts in Latin America. He also desires a report later in this fiscal year on the scope and character of the program which is finally implemented under the determination which has just been made.
McGeorge Bundy
104. Editorial Note
At the daily White House staff meeting on January 18, 1963, there was some discussion pertaining to Latin America. The relevant portion of a January 18 memorandum of the meeting by Colonel Lawrence J. Legere of the NSC Staff reads:
"Chuck Johnson had recently sent Bundy a paper recommending that consideration be given to the creation of some kind of multilateral military force for the Latin America nations, or perhaps only for those Latin America nations in the Caribbean area. Of course, by this he did not mean a multilateral MRBM force or even necessarily a multilateral seaborne force, but was merely trying to underline the advantages of getting the Latin Americans to associate themselves in some kind of common military enterprise. The discussion on the Johnson memorandum per se got no place, but it did prompt a side discussion of the military forces of the Latin America nations, with emphasis on the military assistance which the US furnishes them. Komer delivered himself of a few brief but sarcastic outbursts alleging that the US military was all too prone to listen sympathetically to Latin American requests for 'submarines, aircraft carriers, jet fighters, etc.,' (a bit of Komer hyperbole). At this point, Ralph Dungan, a Latin America expert and, because of his closeness to the President, a big gun at these staff meetings, cut Komer off very sharply. Dungan said that he had found the US military very much aware of the nonsense involved in over-sophisticated weaponry for these countries, and that they had 'really put the clobber' on such requests for FY 63. In short, as Dungan put it, the whole direction of MAP for Latin America has 'turned around very well.' In another context later in the meeting, Bundy indicated that he had been absolutely unaware of how military assistance programs to Latin America had 'turned around'; it was apparent, however, that he approved of what Dungan had said." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 25, Daily Staff Meetings)
105. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, February 18, 1963.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, OASD/(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information except that it was drafted on February 22.
SUBJECT
Meeting with The President on 18 February 1963
Present at the meeting were: Ambassador Raymond L. Thurston, Sterling J. Cottrell, Robert Hurwitch, J.C. King, Ralph Dungan, Cyrus R. Vance, Major General Victor H. Krulak, USMC, and the undersigned./2/
/2/Those not yet identified include Deputy Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Hurwitch, Secretary of the Army Vance, and Major General Krulak, Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities to the Director of the Joint Staff.
In the meeting, the President discussed the attached summary of proposed actions with respect to Cuban-based communist subversion in Latin America./3/
/3/The attachment, unsigned and undated, titled "Elements of an Expanded U.S. Program to Combat Cuban-Based Communist Subversion in Latin America," is not printed.
In connection with Section V of the attached summary,/4/ the President stated that we should go to Congress for a larger military assistance program keyed to subversion in Latin America and the Cuban situation.
/4/Section V is titled "Military Measures."
With respect to Section VI. B.,/5/ the President approved in general terms a selected exchange of intelligence with Latin American governments.
/5/Section VI is titled "Expanded Intelligence Effort."
With respect to Section VIII,/6/ the President said that he was not yet ready to carry out such activities, but that they should be thought out and plans should be developed.
/6/Section VIII is titled "Special Measures to Obtain Greater Support for the Anti-Subversion Campaign."
With respect to Section IX.A.2.,/7/ the President approved in general terms the establishment of a clearing house for information about communist activities based in Cuba. However, it was left open whether such a clearing house would be within or without the OAS and whether it would be the SCCS.
/7/Section IX is titled "Increased Multilateral Effort."
In addition, the President asked Secretary Vance to review our counterinsurgency contingency plans for Latin American countries, particularly with respect to the reaction time of the U.S. military and with respect to the extent of non-U.S. participation contemplated in such plans.
The President read the attached memorandum which presented the DoD position on the basic paper submitted by Ambassador Thurston/8/ and then left the room to attend another meeting. Subsequent to his departure, the persons present discussed the question whether a single point of contact should be designated for supervising the execution of the total counter-subversion program in Latin America./9/
/8/The memorandum by Vance, February 18, on the subject "Cuban Based Communist Subversion in Latin America," is not printed. The basic paper was apparently the paper cited in footnote 2 above.
/9/Cottrell stated in a February 27 memorandum to Vance and others that he was establishing a subcommittee of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs, to be called the Sub-Committee on Cuban Subversion; it was to be chaired by Krulak. (Filed as an attachment to a March 4 memorandum from Califano to Colonel Francis J. Roberts; ibid.)
Joseph A. Califano, Jr./10/
Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
/10/Printed from a copy that indicates Califano signed the original.
106. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/
Washington, February 27, 1963, 6:01 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-LAT AM. Secret. Drafted by Deputy Assistant Administrator for Politico-Military Affairs in the Agency for International Development Joseph J. Wolf; cleared by AID Administrator David E. Bell, Martin, Maechling, Enemark, and Dungan; approved by Wolf. Sent to 19 Embassies in the American Republics and CINCARIB.
1491. Joint State/AID/Defense message. Subject: Military Assistance for Internal Security in Latin America.
In connection with Presidential approval of the use of military assistance funds for internal security purposes in Latin America for FY 63, the Executive Branch has been directed to apply the most challenging scrutiny to the justification of items proposed to be provided to Latin American countries under the Military Assistance Program. In this connection, the following guidance shall control the development of Military Assistance Programs hereafter. All such programs shall be carefully tailored and constantly updated so that they are interrelated parts of our overall strategy aimed at development and security in the Hemisphere. They should be related to the concepts of approved Country Internal Defense Plans where such are in effect. The MAP program and the Alliance for Progress programs are mutually supporting elements of U.S. foreign policy. Internal security and civic action are the primary purposes of our Military Assistance Programs in Latin America. At all levels, both in the field and in Washington, the program development and review process must assure that the specific items furnished under MAP are appropriate to solving the key internal security problems to which our overall country planning is addressed. In this connection, it is clear that the internal security question is composed of political, military, and economic factors, which are closely interrelated. Specific evaluation of these factors is an integral part of the justification of any proposed Military Assistance Program, even when programs are politically motivated. The program justification must also, in addition to major item justification, set forth the interrelationship of the proposed program with other objectives of the U.S. in the country, so that program justification makes it apparent that the proposed program would strengthen and support the overall objectives of the U.S. in the country concerned, including the development of popularly-supported civilian governments and effective civil police authorities. In those cases wherein the communist threat or other local circumstances make it impossible to justify a full compatibility between the Military Assistance Program and the longer-range goal of encouraging the development of popularly supported civilian governments, the relevant and controlling facts should be expressly set forth.
Military elements as a political force in the country concerned may, in the U.S. national interest, require support because of this political consideration. To the extent that this is a factor in the formulation of Military Assistance Programs, it should be expressly analyzed and recognized in program submissions. In this connection, the current and desired role of each of the military services should be expressly analyzed, and the proposed levels of MAP support for each service should be specifically justified.
It is U.S. policy that the thrust of MAP programs to Latin America should be to cope with the internal rather than the external threat. This determination is based upon the evaluation of the immediacy of the respective threats, the necessity of the most careful marshalling of the resources of the United States and its Latin American allies, and in light of the role of the United States in Hemisphere defense. Internal security, as a justification for Military Assistance Programs in Latin America should not be used as a catchall justification for the continuation of military assistance which cannot be soundly justified as being related to the actual or potential internal security threat. Pressures for the continuation of programs at previously existing levels and composition cannot be accepted as automatic justification for the inclusion of items as internal security items. There is a continuing requirement to screen all MAP items against the full range of intelligence, political analysis, policy evaluation and other U.S. programs on a current basis. Thus, deviations from previously submitted programs could at any point in the programming cycle be directed in order to insure consonance of program composition with policy objectives.
Some specific points which require express justification are the following:
1. The inclusion of jet aircraft in Military Assistance Programs as items justified for internal security missions and training should be supported by express evaluation of both political and military considerations involved. The external as well as the internal implications of providing jet aircraft should be specifically discussed. In this connection, the regional interrelationship of country programs requires special comment by all levels above the Country Team level, in order to avoid the inclusion of items in country programs simply because they have been included in other country programs.
2. The interrelationship between MAP internal security programs and the current efforts of the U.S. to strengthen the roles and capabilities of civil police should be the subject of express consideration. There should be a notation of the correlation of missions between the military and police units of a country, and particularly those supported by the U.S., and the degree to which the internal security problem requires the support of complementary strength. The possibility of political elements in the country using military or police forces in struggle, one against the other, should be discussed. The projected level of MAP should expressly reflect a consciously measured balance between our military and police efforts in the internal security field, related to the concepts of approved Country Internal Defense Plans when such are in effect. On these issues, as well as on the whole subject of civic action programs, both the AID element and the political element of the Country Team will have important contributions to make.
3. It is U.S. policy that careful consideration be given to intensifying civil police programs wherever such action will yield more fruitful results in terms of our internal security objectives. While Military Assistance Programs and Police Assistance Programs should not be treated as being necessarily substitutional, Country Team evaluation in depth and judgment of the respective requirements is an essential part of the programming justification process.
4. It is the responsibility of all elements involved in the programming process to insure, by careful consideration and express evaluation of the factors concerned, that each Military Assistance Program submitted promotes internal security and stability. The Chief of the Diplomatic Mission should insure that all related aspects of the internal security problem are evaluated and coordinated at all stages in the development of proposed programs, including not only submissions made in the annual programming cycle, but spot recommendations made from time to time.
In light of the foregoing, programs for FY 1965 and subsequent years should be accompanied by justifying statements clearly covering the foregoing points.
With respect to MAP programs for FY 1963, Missions are directed to review approved programs and promptly submit by March 25 any comment as to whether the delivery of any of the items included therein should be questioned. Specific comment is requested on the inclusion of jet aircraft in these programs.
With respect to FY 1964 programs, all Missions are requested to prepare and submit statements dealing with the points covered by this instruction, to reach Washington by March 25.
It shall be the continuing responsibility of Missions to be guided by the foregoing with respect to ongoing as well as future programs, bearing in mind the situation as it may develop in the country concerned and the continuing nature of military assistance programming.
Rusk
107. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Army (Vance) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, March 15, 1963.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, OASD/(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Also sent to the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).
SUBJECT
Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Movement of Subversives and Subversive Trainees
REFERENCES
(a) NSAM No. 213 dated January 8, 1963/2/
(b) Memo for McGeorge Bundy from DepSecDef dated January 10, 1963, subj: Interdepartmental Organization for Cuban Affairs/3/
/2/The text of NSAM 213, entitled "Interdepartmental Organization for Cuban Affairs," is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1964, vol. XI, Document 264.
/3/Not printed.
The attached Program on the Movement of Subversives and Subversive Trainees to and from Cuba was approved by the President on March 8, 1963.
For implementation in the Department of Defense, the Program has been divided under two major headings:
A. Actions Within the Primary Responsibility of the Department of Defense, and
B. Actions Within the Primary Responsibility of a Department or Agency Other Than the Department of Defense.
[Here follow assignments of actions within the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense.]
Attachment
PROGRAM ON THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES AND SUBVERSIVE
TRAINEES APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT ONMARCH 8, 1963
A. Actions Within the Primary Responsibility of the Department of Defense
1. Continue current U.S. sea and air surveillance of the Caribbean area contiguous to Cuba.
2. Continue the development, at high priority, of U.S. communications in Latin America, in order to improve alerting, reporting and control capabilities.
3. Study, on a priority basis, the feasibility and desirability of establishing intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters for rapid processing and dissemination to countries concerned, via the American Ambassadors, of intelligence on the movement of subversives.
4. Establish a coordinated Caribbean surveillance system involving:
a. Continued close-in surveillance of Cuba by U.S. forces.
b. A U.S. military alerting system, by which intelligence of subversive movement will be rapidly transmitted to the American Ambassadors to countries concerned (contingent upon the decisions made as a result of the study under A. 3, through intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters of the Atlantic Command).
c. A unilateral surveillance and interception effort by each country in its own territorial waters.
d. U.S. assistance in final interception in territorial waters, upon request by the country concerned.
5. Establish Military Assistance objectives and planning guidance to provide selected countries, especially in the Caribbean and Central American area, with the necessary small patrol craft, and training and logistical support, to enable these countries to establish an effective patrol of their own coasts. Provide necessary funds in addition to present programs.
6. Provide U.S. Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard training assist-ance, as required, to develop or improve coastal patrol capabilities of Latin American military forces. This may take the form of a Canal Zone training activity, employment of mobile training teams, or a combination of both.
7. Urge the accelerated improvement of internal security forces and police forces in Latin American countries and the intensification of patrol and intelligence activities aimed at preventing clandestine departures and apprehending returned trainees. Provide equipment, training and advice as required.
B. Actions Within the Primary Responsibility of a Department or Agency Other Than the Department of Defense
1. Intensify U.S. intelligence efforts in each country to identify persons who have travelled, or intend to travel, to Cuba, and report selected information promptly to the host government, as consistent with our own intelligence program, and the requirement to protect our sources.
2. Intensify our action in making available to each country selected intelligence concerning the extent, nature and implications of Cuban subversive activities, as consistent with the requirement to protect our own intelligence program.
3. Utilize U.S. intelligence capabilities to determine the nature and extent of clandestine aircraft and small boat traffic between Cuba and other countries in the Caribbean area, with special attention to Mexico, Honduras, Jamaica, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Use evidence obtained to persuade governments concerned to institute surveillance and other control measures.
4. Increase greatly our penetration and other intelligence efforts to identify persons engaging in illegal travel to Cuba, and determine routes and methods employed. Report selected information, consistent with the requirement for protecting our own intelligence program to host government.
5. Intensify current efforts to introduce [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] from each country into the Cuban training program.
6. Both through the OAS and bilaterally, induce each Western Hemisphere country to:
a. Stamp passports or other travel documents issued to own nationals "not valid for travel to Cuba."
b. Refuse exit permits for Cuba to any national of a third country who cannot produce a valid permit issued by his own country for travel to Cuba.
c. Refuse to honor any visa for Cuba which is not an integral, non-detachable part of the travel document issued by the country of which the traveller is a citizen.
d. Require accurate manifests of all carriers departing for or arriving from Cuba, and furnish copies of these manifests to diplomatic missions of other Western Hemisphere countries which are affected.
7. Persuade Mexico to fingerprint, in addition to photographing, all persons leaving for or arriving from Cuba, and to provide data to the parent country of the nationals involved.
8. Make [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] arrangements [2 lines of source text not declassified] to impose administrative impediments and harassment on suspicious Cuba-bound travellers, in order to increase the difficulty of travel and thus discourage prospective travellers.
9. Both through the OAS and bilaterally, request Latin American countries to deny their ports to ships of Cuban registry.
10. Pursue a campaign to expose the scope and purpose of Cuban training of the nationals of other countries for subversive purposes, in order to discourage prospective trainees and impress the governments and the peoples concerned with the urgent need to halt the travel of Latin American nationals to Cuba.
11. Through bilateral negotiations press countries with inadequate legal restrictions on travel to Cuba to adopt laws enabling the prohibition of such travel and providing severe penalties for evasion. Recommend that rewards be offered for identification of evaders.
12. In separate diplomatic approaches to each country, reiterate the need for full and effective cooperation with appropriate OAS bodies, and bilaterally among the several states, in the interchange of information concerning travel of persons to Cuba and other Castro-Communist subversive activities.
13. Propose periodic regional or sub-regional meetings of ministers of Government of the American Republics to review the implementation of steps taken by them to combat movement of subversives in the Caribbean.
14. Urge other Latin American nations to negotiate separately and/or collectively with Mexico, Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia and Chile in order to enlist cooperation in adopting specific measures to prevent the movement through their countries of third country personnel to and from Cuba.
15. Encourage Latin American governments to institute administrative procedures, such as exhaustive examination of manifests, air-worthiness checks of aircraft, baggage inspection and inspection of health and other documents, all designed deliberately to delay and otherwise make difficult the carrying of passengers to Cuba.
16. Request governments of Latin American countries which persist in maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba to expose the falsification of travel documents by Cuban embassies or consulates, and take punitive measures, such as the expulsion of Cuban diplomatic personnel, to bring such illegal activity to a halt. Provide U.S. technical assistance as requested.
17. Intensify technical assistance to Latin American countries in improving immigration and customs controls.
18. Persuade Mexico to halt Cubana Airlines service. If unable to do so, seek to persuade Mexico to refuse the introduction of Soviet-made aircraft in the Havana-Mexico City route on technical grounds. This will create an obstacle to Cubana, since the Britannia aircraft now used are falling into disrepair.
19. Request again of Great Britain, Canada and any other potential supplier that they cut off the supply of spare parts for Cuba's Britannia aircraft.
20. Conduct negotiations with the Netherlands, Mexico, Canada and Spain to persuade those countries to stop, or refrain from reestablishing, commercial air flights to Cuba. Enlist the cooperation of other Western Hemisphere countries normally providing terminal service for any of the airlines involved, such as Venezuela and Trinidad, in applying pressure.
21. Intensify [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] input of propaganda in Latin American public information media discrediting the Cuban training effort, exposing the hazard which it holds for Latin American tranquility, and discrediting persons who have undergone subversive training, in order to discourage possible volunteers and develop popular opposition to such activities.
22. Identify returned trainees who are dissatisfied with their Cuban training experience and exploit their capabilities for provision of intelligence and propaganda material for exposing and discrediting Castro-Communist subversive activities.
23. Initiate a publicity campaign throughout Latin America, not attributable to the United States, which focuses unfavorably on the use of Mexican, Uruguayan, Brazilian and Chilean transit facilities for movement of persons of other countries to and from Cuba for subversive purposes.
24. Propose recommendations by the OAS to member governments of a program of steps, on both the national and international levels, to control travel by their nationals to Cuba, utilizing the proposals in the report by the Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS) as well as the specific recommendations set forth herein.
25. Once the initial comprehensive program in 24 above is undertaken, utilize the appropriate OAS bodies to follow up on implementation through such means as multilateral exchange of information, meeting of experts, and utilization by individual countries of the services of the Special Consultative Committee on Security.
108. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, August 17, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-LAT AM. Secret. Drafted by Spencer; cleared by Martin and U. Alexis Johnson.
SUBJECT
Review of U.S. Military Policy Toward Latin America
In response to Mr. Dungan's memorandum of May 1 (Tab A),/2/ we have reviewed our policy covering our military relations with Latin American countries. The most recent statement of this policy is contained in the Military Assistance Manual of May 5, 1963 (Tab B)./3/ Considering that this policy has been developed for regional application, as well as for countries with military establishments of varying degrees of sophistication, we consider the policy to be essentially sound and realistic--sound because it contains reasonable flexibility, and realistic because the goals established therein appear to be achievable.
/2/Not printed; it expressed concern that the United States did not have a consistent military assistance policy in Latin America and recommended discussion of the subject by the Latin American Policy Committee.
/3/Tabs B through F were not attached to the source text.
During this Administration we have devoted our efforts in the military field primarily to the task of leading Latin American countries away from the concept of hemispheric defense and to developing an effective stance of deterrence and capability against internal threats of communist subversion and insurgency. Our grant military assistance program (Tab C) provides us our principal and perhaps most effective leverage in promoting this objective. Due to the modifications of supportable missions, present policy guidance now limits our grant assistance to internal defense, including Civic Action (65% of the program), naval defense (20%), miscellaneous training (10%), and packaging, crating, and handling costs (5%). Our efforts to provide guidance to the Ambassador and Country Team on the formulation of grant programs have included our Circular Telegram of February 27 (Tab D),/4/ letters to each of our Ambassadors (Tab E) and a proposed follow-on instruction which it is planned to discuss in the LAPC in the light of comments by AID and Defense.
/4/Document 106.
It is not clear how successful we shall be, especially as present equipment becomes more and more obsolete from the standpoint of professional combat standards, in selling this program to the Latin American military. A discussion in the LAPC of the longer-term prospects would seem to be in order.
While our efforts to encourage Latin American countries to concentrate their military programs on internal defense also extend to our military sales program, our influence in the latter sector for obvious reasons is somewhat less controlling. We are convinced, however, that our present sales policy strikes a reasonable balance between our interest of promoting a reduction of unnecessary Latin American arms acquisitions on the one hand and on the other of realizing the dollar benefits of U.S. sales when we are unable to discourage unnecessary purchases from non-U.S. sources. A letter to this effect has been sent to Defense (Tab F).
In addition to those aspects of our policy discussed above, we have in preparation a policy guidance instruction to all of our Ambassadors on the problem presented by the increasing interest of Third Countries (both European and Latin American) in expanding their military relations with particular Latin American countries. While this matter has received considerable study and attention both Departmentally and inter-Departmentally, interagency agreement on this matter has proved difficult.
Finally, we recently sent to our Ambassadors proposals for the reorganization of our MAAG-military missions structure in Latin America, which we believe will serve to improve the capabilities of the military components of our Country Teams to achieve U.S. policy objectives. Our Ambassadors' reaction to these proposals when received will be reviewed by the LAPC as soon as all Ambassadors have submitted their comments.
In summary, while we believe our current U.S. arms policy toward Latin America is essentially sound, there are several pending issues on which there is not complete agreement within the government. In order that these may again be reviewed looking toward their resolution, they will shortly be presented in a memorandum to the Latin American Policy Committee./5/
/5/Not found.
Robert Kent/6/
/6/Kent signed for Read above Read's typed signature.
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