Docs 109-140
109. Editorial Note
On April 23, 1961, in circular telegram 1661, the Department of State instructed all U.S. Embassies in Latin America to discuss with the highest available authorities the problems flowing from the situation in Cuba. The telegram stated that the United States considered that the situation was that of "intrusion of extra-continental power into Hemisphere menacing Hemisphere peace and security and calling for measures of Hemispheric defense, defense of neighboring countries threatened and conceivably of self-defense of US." It stated that although hemispheric defense was a matter for consideration under the Rio Treaty and other inter-American procedures, the defense of threatened countries might be the subject of unilateral or bilateral action or group agreement; if the Organization of American States failed to take multilateral action or authorize action by one or more powers, those governments, which were threatened or prepared to assume responsibility to oppose extra-continental aggression, might act singly or in concert. It drew a distinction between "'intervention' in the internal affairs of another state" and "defense against widening area of domination by extra-hemispheric powers".
The telegram instructed the recipients to "obtain and report views of government to which accredited and get feeling regarding either (1) meetings of Foreign Ministers or (2) special session OAS or (3) organization consultation Rio Treaty under Article 6 on ground capture and use of Castro government by bloc threatens security of American states and peace of Americas." It stated that the Department would carry on parallel conversations with Ambassadors in Washington. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-2361) The complete text of the telegram is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume X, Document 171.
The text of the Rio Treaty, or Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, done at Rio de Janeiro, September 2, 1947, is in 4 Bevans 559.
110. Editorial Note
At the 483d meeting of the National Security Council on May 5, 1961, the Council discussed U.S. policy toward Cuba and, in NSC Action No. 2422, approved by the President on May 16, took several actions relating to Cuba. In NSC Action No. 2422-k, the Council:
"Agreed that the United States should at once initiate negotiation to enlarge the willingness of other American states to join in bilateral, multilateral and OAS arrangements against Castro, such as (1) breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba; (2) controlling subversive activities of Cuban agents; (3) preventing arms shipments to Castro; (4) limiting economic relations with Cuba; (5) creating a Caribbean security force; (6) initiating a naval patrol to prevent Cuban invasion of other states in the Caribbean; and (7) denunciation of Castro as an agent of international communism by all nations of this hemisphere." (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Misc) Files: Lot 66 D 95)
The complete text of NSC Action No. 2422, along with related documents, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume X.
111. Telegram From the Embassy in Colombia to the Department of State/1/
Bogota, May 6, 1961, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5-661. Confidential; Priority.
518. Embtel 506./2/ Foreign Minister visited me last evening to deliver promised memorandum on Cuban situation. Free translation follows:
/2/Telegram 506, April 27, reported that Foreign Minister Julio Cesar Turbay had informed the Ambassador that he would soon receive a memorandum with the Colombian Government's analysis of the Cuban situation and possible OAS action as mentioned in circular telegram 1661; see Document 109. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-2761)
"In present circumstances Colombia considers it indispensable consolidate inter-American system and make it operative rather than permit it weakened or refuse its responsibilities. If system's unity preserved and efficacy stimulated, American States can avert risks Cold War and prevent Communism's advance, penetration and infiltration in rest of hemisphere.
Within criteria making system operative it is indispensable modify impression produced among LA people and governments by abortive Cuban invasion and by publicity giving details its preparation, organization and development. Independently of whatever act Cuba may commit in future, such as attacking American nation or intervening in internal affairs to foment revolts, which would permit rapid collective action within terms Rio Pact, Colombia conceives a procedure which would be as follows:
Convoke soonest IA-ECOSOC with object defining extent new programs and placing them in operation. Perhaps would be convenient for Foreign Ministers as well as Ministers Economy attend this meeting order enhance its political importance, reinforce contacts among themselves and commit their governments even more to execution plans for reform and social welfare. Meeting would be called to create Mistica of revitalization and progress which would permit governments obtain generous response their people for better fulfillment their national and international obligations.
Beginning now careful preparations could be initiated for FM meeting acting as organ consultation so that, soon as very bad impression caused by frustrated invasion dissipated, meeting could be convoked examine evident threats to peace deriving from present situation and to indicate measures which should be taken in face specified foreseeable acts aggression by Cuba or through her intervention against integrity and autonomy American States.
As inter-American system runs risk collapse if it proven inefficient this case or if limits itself to making non-obligatory recommendations it should not choose easy road of FM meeting under act 39 of Charter nor for meeting OAS Council which due limited competence might result in debate on procedure.
Meeting organ consultation should not take measures authorized by Rio Pact as sanctions against Cuba for events that have occurred up to now. Emphasis would be on threat American security rising from possible action of country placed within Soviet orbit. In consequence recognition these threats, organ consultation could specify various types of typical cases aggression against continental security; for example, establishment of Sino-Soviet military bases on American territory; acquisition nuclear arms; sending arms to any American country; intervention to promote subversion in another American state; aid to subversive movements against legitimate governments. In this way acts of legitimate self defense by one or various countries would be authorized in such cases and a vigilance committee could be created to denounce any activity preparatory to any of those acts defined as aggression.
Earlier or simultaneously aforementioned determinations, organ consultation should reaffirm solidarity inter-American system and its essential principles. Should declare that any country which does not submit itself to existing treaty and agreement obligations could not claim rights or prerogatives which system extends to those who live within it in good faith. Cuba should be invited abandon any military or political alliance with Sino-Soviet nations and to submit itself to system's discipline. In improbable case Cuba should accept invitation ad hoc committee created San Jose could function. If rejects invitation its attitude would serve persuade all sectors opinion of undisguised political ties between Cuba and Communist Powers.
Would not be difficult for American states reach agreement re what acts would characterize aggression in future given present conditions in hemisphere. Would be little less than impossible agree on what acts were aggression in past.
Colombia is optimistic on prospects for policy to correct common faults and error. There is no American state that has not committed them. But it is not too late to correct them nor to adopt line of conduct wedded to principles that have made OAS admirable experiment.
Ministry has given precise instructions its Ambassadors to OAS and White House order that they may have complete information re manner which Colombia conceives of how these ideas should be developed. They have authorization to deliver copy of these instructions to State Department if it so desires." End Verbatim Text.
After reading document Turbay urged me to transmit it in toto rather than to attempt summary. He said Salaxar Santos returning Washington Sunday night with copy memo and detailed instructions for Ambassadors Santamaria and Xuleta Angel to carry forward further consultations with Department. He appeared very anxious obtain our reactions but I begged off commenting until I had had time study document and of obtaining Department's reactions except to say I believed no added evidences of Cuban alliance with Soviet Bloc needed for OAS to tackle problem. Turbay emphasized that Santamaria authorized show Department his detailed instructions.
This GOC memo obviously prepared with full concurrence President Lleras. As matter of fact Turbay was on phone with him reading text memo when I entered his office.
Spanish text will reach Department by pouch Tuesday night.
Wells
112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Colombia/1/
Washington, May 18, 1961, 10:39 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5-1861. Confidential. Drafted by Director of the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs Edward A. Jamison, cleared by Chairman of the Task Force on Latin America Adolph A. Berle and Officer in Charge of Colombian Affairs Sam Moskowitz, and approved by Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Wymberley DeR. Coerr.
700. Re Depcirtel 1755./2/ Berle and Department officers met with Colombian White House and OAS Ambassadors May 18. Essential points Deptel 692/3/ conveyed to them. Sanz/4/ expressed special interest following:
/2/Circular telegram 1755, May 8, sent to all U.S. Embassies in Latin America, stated that a decision had been made "to seek as promptly as possible inter-American program to condemn, isolate, and weaken Castro regime and assist other governments to counter its subversive activity." (Ibid., 737.00/5-861) The text is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. X, Document 211.
/3/Telegram 692, May 15, instructed the Ambassador to give U.S. views on the Colombian proposal to the Foreign Minister. It argued that a basis for action already existed, although advance agreement would be essential and might not be immediately obtainable, and urged more specific measures than the Colombians were suggesting, but it stated that the United States did not object to Colombian consultations with other governments about their proposal. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5-661)
/4/Colombian Ambassador Carlos Sanz de Santamaria.
1. Possible presence FonMins at Extraordinary IA ECOSOC Meeting Uruguay as means achieve informal consensus on subsequent OAS action on Cuba. He was informed Department not in position make commitment re presence Secretary; would appear essential effective advance agreement be achieved before FonMins consider Cuban problem jointly either formally or informally, and some feeling exists even peripheral consideration political aspect might prejudice outcome economic meeting.
2. Timing possible OAS action on Cuba. Sanz was informed we do not wish exclude possibility political action prior IA ECOSOC although at this moment it may appear doubtful.
3. Importance Colombians attach to view that OAS actions should be those addressed to possible Cuban aggressive acts in future and not condemnatory of past. Our view that while past cannot be ignored, important thing now is to isolate Cuban-communist danger and prevent its extension.
Sanz inquired whether there are proposals for dealing with Cuban problem other than theirs and was told we knew of none except our own and that of Venezuela/5/ which now appears dormant.
/5/The Venezuelan proposal for a meeting of Foreign Ministers to urge sanctions short of armed intervention against Cuba was reported in telegrams 3072 and 3089 from New York, dated May 9 and 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5-961 and 737.00/5-1161, respectively)
Bowles
113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Venezuela/1/
Washington, May 19, 1961, 8:28 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5-1861. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Venezuelan Affairs John J. Ingersoll, cleared by Jamison and Berle, and approved by Director of the Office of the East Coast Affairs Harvey R. Wellman. Repeated to USUN for Stevenson.
1085. Embtel 1080./2/ Meeting May 19 with Ambassador Mayobre Berle reviewed substance Depcirtel 1755/3/ and indicated problem seems to be narrowing to questions: (1) timing and procedures for MFM and (2) substantive actions to be taken. Said might be disadvantages mixing political question with objectives Montevideo meeting IA-ECOSOC and consensus necessary for meaningful action prior July 15 seems unlikely. Expressed view attitudes LA Governments and public opinion must be allowed jell favor multilateral action respect Castro.
/2/Telegram 1080 from Caracas, dated May 18, reported that President Betancourt had decided that a Foreign Ministers meeting on the Cuban problem should be postponed until after the IA-ECOSOC meeting. (Ibid., 737.00/5-1861)
/3/See footnote 1, Document 112.
Berle mentioned Colombian proposals of which Venezuelans aware and said appears most LA Governments could agree course compatible thinking Betancourt, Lleras Camargo and US. Exceptions Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador and Chile. Suggested Gov might help persuade Brazil and perhaps others adopt more positive viewpoints.
Bowles
114. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts in the American Republics/1/
Washington, June 24, 1961, 6:47 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6-2461. Confidential. Drafted by William G. Bowdler of the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs and approved by Coerr. Repeated to USUN and to CINCARIB for POLAD.
2094. FYI. Colombian President Lleras Camargo in May gave USG note and memorandum containing considered analysis Cuban problem and offering specific course of action for dealing with it. Additional memorandum elaborating proposal given Stevenson on recent trip./2/ Copies being airpouched.
/2/A copy of the memorandum that Lleras Camargo gave Stevenson on June 21 is in the Princeton University, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Stevenson Papers, Previously Embargoed Files, Box 2, Cuba. For Stevenson's report to the President on his June 4-22 trip to South America, including his summary of South American views concerning a possible Foreign Ministers meeting, see Document 14. Information on his visit to Colombia is in telegram 638 from Bogota, June 21, and despatch 806 from Bogota, June 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 721.00/6-2161 and 120.1520/6-2761, respectively)
Essential points Colombian analysis are:
(1) Record which led to Cuba's "formal introduction into Soviet orbit" is paralleled by series US unilateral measures culminating in support invasion attempt.
(2) Internal political situations and public opinion on Cuban problem in LA affected in manner which prevents governmental support effective OAS punitive action.
(3) US should reject unilateral action and "force regional organization to act." OAS action program on Cuba should deal with present and future and not with past.
(4) Essential that OAS action deal with strengthening inter-American system for future by demonstrating its ability deal with problems of underdevelopment as well as security.
(5) Alliance for Progress and Rio Treaty collective measures offer means for accomplishing these objectives. For present priority must be given to social and economic progress, unless Cubans commit major provocative acts such as attack or intervention which would call for immediate OAS action.
Colombian proposals contemplate specific program which includes following:
(1) Successful IA ECOSOC Ministerial Meeting as indispensable to creation propitious atmosphere for subsequent MFM under Rio Treaty on Cuba. Position that USG adopts to assist LAs accelerate economic development and radically improve social conditions will be "absolutely decisive." Amount assistance required and clarification criteria under which it will be granted important. Equally or more important is action improve and stabilize prices of LA basic commodities because any new weakening of prices will "completely" annul USG monetary aid.
(2) Shortly after IA ECOSOC meeting there would be convoked Meeting of Foreign Ministers (MFM) under Rio Treaty with these objectives:
a. Examine political and juridical obligations inter-American system and reaffirm intention of American States strictly adhere to them.
b. Examine incompatibility inter-American system with policy of neutralism toward threats posed to system or individual member by direct or indirect aggressive action international communism.
c. Declare that in event any such aggressive actions or threats of aggression are substantiated by OAS vigilance committee would justify automatic intervention by inter-American system.
3. Pursuant these objectives, MFM would adopt three basic resolutions:
a. First would contain synthesis meaning inter-American system and obligations and rights its members; reaffirm intention states respect all obligations; imply that state which failed respect obligations would voluntarily place itself outside system; affirm "that any irrevocable attachment of American State to Communist orbit would be incompatible with OAS obligations". Accompanying resolution would invite Cuba abandon ties with Sino-Soviet bloc (manner not specified).
b. Second would make clear that inter-American system does not permit neutralist position in face of threats to system or one of its members and that intervention international communism constitutes permanent threat to hemisphere peace and security.
c. Third would specify certain acts which would constitute aggression or threats aggression within terms of Articles 6 and 9 or Rio Treaty including: establishment of Sino-Soviet military bases on American territory, acquisition of nuclear weapons from Communist bloc, sending Communist bloc arms to any American state to promote subversion in other American states (sic), support to subversive movements which seek to overthrow legitimate governments and establish communist regimes. OAS vigilance committee would be set up to watch situation and convoke Organ of Consultation on perceiving threats to peace and security of hemisphere.
Colombian analysis and proposals being given immediate careful study. GOC has already discussed initiative with various LA governments. Foreign Minister Turbay currently on trip to Panama, Brazil and Chile to enlist support. Action requested: Treat this material on Colombian initiative as background. Report any local reaction. Instructions will follow. End FYI.
Rusk
115. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SecDel/MC/43
New York, September 25, 1961, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1957. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. Approved by the White House on October 3. The conversation took place before a luncheon at the Waldorf Astoria. The time and place are taken from Kennedy's Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library)
SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE SIXTEENTH SESSION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September 19-24, 1961
PARTICIPANTS
US
President Kennedy
Colombia
Ambassador Turbay/2/
/2/Former Foreign Minister Turbay.
SUBJECT
Lleras Plan
Before the Secretary's lunch today for the Latin Americans, there was a short exchange of views between President Kennedy and Ambassador Turbay (Colombia). The President was interested in the progress of the Lleras Plan. Ambassador Turbay said it consisted of three resolutions, designed to test Cuba's willingness to conform to and remain within the Inter-American System. His exposition of this substance was as he gave it to Secretary Rusk on September 22./3/ The texts had not yet come from Bogota.
/3/Turbay met with Rusk on September 21 and 22. Memoranda of the conversations are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1957.
Ambassador Turbay then said he hoped the President would speak of the Plan to President Frondizi, since Turbay had the impression the Argentine position was not as clear as it had seemed to be. President Kennedy asked whether in Ambassador Turbay's opinion a conference of Foreign Ministers could or should be called. The reply was that unless Argentina, Brazil, and Ecuador were in line (it was useless to hope Mexico would be), the bulk of the OAS members would abstain. It was true that if fourteen members were in agreement on a subject, the rest had to go along, but in this case, without these key members' approval, there would not be fourteen votes. President Kennedy inquired whether Argentina was the key to this problem. Turbay replied in the affirmative, saying good support by Argentina would surely bring Brazil and probably Ecuador along./4/
/4/Kennedy raised the subject on September 26 with Frondizi, who was noncommittal but indicated that a meeting of consultation might be possible in early 1962. (Ibid., Central Files, 720.5-MSP/9-2761) A memorandum of the conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. X, Document 264.
President Kennedy expressed the U.S. appreciation for Colombia's and Ambassador Turbay's initiative in the Cuban matter.
116. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SecDel/MC/45
New York, September 25, 1961, 5:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1957. Confidential. Drafted by Braddock, cleared in draft with Achilles, and approved in S on September 27. The conversation was held at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.
SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE SIXTEENTH SESSION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September 1961
PARTICIPANTS
US
The Secretary
Mr. Achilles
Mr. Woodward
Mr. Braddock
Brazil
Amb. Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco
Minister Geraldo de Carvalho Silos
SUBJECT
Situation in Brazil and Brazilian Attitude toward Cuban Problem
The Secretary opened the conversation by asking how Brazil was adjusting to the change in its Constitution and its Government. Ambassador Arinos launched into a lengthy discussion of Brazil's constitutional form. He said that Brazil followed more the Greek concept of the state than the Anglo-Saxon and that whereas in the latter the idea was to defend the citizen against the government, in the former it was to integrate him with the state. He said that in Brazil the President is not elected by political parties or institutions (there being twelve political parties) but rather by a plebescite of the people. The President, therefore, feels responsibility to the mass rather than to any institutional groups. Congress, on the other hand, is made up of representatives chosen by parties or other specific organizations. Congress, therefore, tends to be more moderate in its views than does the President.
With this as a background, Ambassador Arinos said that Brazil was experiencing little difficulty in adapting itself to the sudden constitutional and governmental change. He mentioned that Goulart drew much of his strength from his home state of Rio Grande do Sul and from the labor unions, of which he was a national official.
The Secretary asked whether in Brazil, which had great problems and great potentialities, the government did not concentrate more on internal matters than on external. The Ambassador thought this was generally true and stated that the President, and now also the Prime Minister, were so involved with domestic problems and administration that they left the conduct of foreign affairs largely to the Foreign Minister. He said that Brazil did work closely with some of its smaller, weaker neighbors, particularly Paraguay and Bolivia, to help them toward greater economic and political stability. Brazil exercised with them a role, he said, not too unlike that which the United States exercised toward Latin American countries, including Brazil.
The Secretary asked whether it was not difficult to conduct foreign affairs from Rio with the President located in Brasilia. Ambassador Arinos answered in the affirmative. He said that the Foreign Office had forty members of its staff in Brasilia and five hundred in Rio, and that all of the archives and files were in Rio. He thought that coordination with the President's office might be improved by the recent creation of a new position of Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs in Brasilia, which is filled by a member of Congress.
The Secretary brought the conversation gradually around to the subject of Cuba and sought to find out how Brazil viewed the Cuban problem. Ambassador Arinos said that Cuba under Castro was pro-Communist and against the Church, whereas Brazil was anti-Communist and very Catholic. He said that Brazil had some Communists but that thus far they had not gained any ascendancy in the drive to relieve human misery in Brazil, notwithstanding the influence of Castro and the Cuban revolution. The Secretary observed that the modern history of the United States was proof that democratic institutions could meet the need for social and economic change and that we did not concede any superiority to the Communists on this point.
Ambassador Arinos stated that Brazil was opposed to intervention and felt that the attitude that should be taken toward Cuba was to try to bring it back as a full member of the American system rather than to put it outside. Asked by the Secretary whether he thought Cuba could be brought back, the Ambassador said that there was a remote chance that it could, provided Cuba were permitted to retain the positive accomplishments of its revolution and were given assurances of assistance with its economic and social problems. The deterioration of the Cuban economy would work in favor of this course, he said.
The Secretary asked what the Ambassador thought of the proposals made by President Lleras with regard to Cuba. The Ambassador said that inasmuch as these proposals were aimed at trying to bring Cuba back into the family, they were fairly close to the thinking of the Brazilian government. He gave no other indication as to whether the Brazilian government would endorse or support the Colombian initiative, or whether he believed that this course was worth pursuing. When asked by the Secretary what he thought about the possible convocation of a meeting of Foreign Ministers, he seemed surprised and asked for what purpose the meeting would be called. The Secretary answered that a meeting if called would be in connection with the Colombian initiative. The Ambassador appeared somewhat relieved but not entirely reassured.
The Secretary said that Cuba represented not just one problem for us but several. There was the problem of Cuba itself. There was the problem of Cuban-U.S. relations. There was the problem of Cuba's efforts to undermine other governments. There was the problem of Cuba as a member of the Organization of American States. And there was the effect of the Cuban problem on American public opinion. Unless the Organization of American States could find a way to deal with the problem, it was to be feared that the American public would lose faith in the Organization. The Secretary explained that in saying this he was thinking not of particular sanctions by the OAS but of recognition by the OAS of the existence and seriousness of the Cuban problem and of a serious effort to deal with it.
117. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts in the American Republics/1/
Washington, October 17, 1961, 8:41 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.05/10-1761. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Bowdler and Jamison; cleared by William Barnes, John H. Crimmins, Alton W. Hemba, and Samuel O. Lane, Deputy Directors of the Offices of Central American and Panamanian Affairs, Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, East Coast Affairs, and West Coast Affairs, respectively; and approved by Coerr. Repeated to Ciudad Trujillo, POLAD CINCLANT, POLAD SACLANT, and USUN.
721. Request by Peru for application Rio Treaty to Cuban situation/2/ has precipitated showdown this issue in OAS at time and under circumstances not of Department's choosing. Issue having been planted, however, particularly in such well-reasoned challenging terms as contained Peruvian OAS Representative's statement (Depcirtel 718),/3/ Department believes best strategy is endeavor combine surprise Peruvian initiative with Colombian initiative and rally maximum support, including most of large LA states.
/2/Circular telegram 712, October 14, reported that Peru had requested a special meeting of the OAS Council relating to the Cuban situation; the Department had had no advance notice of the move and was considering how it might affect the Colombian initiative. (Ibid., 371.05/10-1461)
/3/Dated October 16. (Ibid., 371.05/10-1661)
In theory easy combine two initiatives. Both contemplate action under Rio Treaty. Peruvian seeks appointment by COAS, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation, of Investigating Committee to go to Cuba to investigate series of acts falling under categories violation human rights, subversive activities abroad and rejection inter-American commitments by association Sino-Soviet bloc, and submit report. Peruvian initiative does not specifically contemplate further action beyond this, but logical next step would be for meeting Organ of Consultation (i.e. Meeting of Foreign Ministers) to adopt resolutions, based on findings of Committee, along lines of those proposed by Colombia.
In practice may not be so easy combine two proposals and achieve same degree support which Colombian alone might have obtained. Indications are however that President Lleras looking upon situation created by Peruvian initiative realistically and desirous work out combination to move ahead rapidly. Department consulting Colombians and Peruvians on feasibility and best manner coordinate their initiatives.
If queried re US position you may state:
1. USG believes Peruvian proposal and its sound well-reasoned supporting statement warrant most careful consideration.
2. Of utmost importance any move in COAS on Cuban issue clearly constitutes forward step and not be subject to interpretation OAS inactive or negative on Cuban problem.
3. We are developing views on best means for insuring coordinated OAS steps to contribute to steady progression in OAS action./4/
/4/On October 25 the OAS Council voted 19-1, with 1 abstention, to refer the Peruvian initiative to Council's General Committee. The decision was a compromise, worked out after it became clear that the Council was divided. Documentation on this subject is ibid., 371.05 and 737.00.
Rusk
118. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Coerr) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball)/1/
Washington, November 4, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-461. Confidential. Drafted by Coerr, Bowdler, and Jamison and cleared in the Legal Adviser's Office.
Problem
To determine U.S. action on the Colombian Proposal regarding Cuba in the OAS.
Discussion
The Peruvian initiative calling for Rio Treaty action on the Cuban situation has, in combination with its resultant publicity and Colombian activities on behalf of its own initiative, put the OAS under strong pressure to decide whether or not it will face up to the Cuban issue. There is an increasing belief that the OAS cannot sidestep the problem much longer without grave loss of confidence and prestige.
The Colombians are actively consulting other governments to determine potential support for their plan to convene a Meeting of Foreign Ministers (see Tab A for brief summary)./2/ They believe they have at least fourteen votes--the two-thirds majority required for substantive action--and are hoping to add one or two of the larger countries. The Colombians probably will not move from the stage of consultations to action in the OAS in the face of the united opposition of the large Latin American countries. We have encouraged them at a high level and consistently in the last few months to pursue their plan, and have informed the other Latin Americans of our basic agreement with its objectives. They consider they have our backing and may be expected to ask for our active support at any time.
/2/The tabs are not printed.
We have two courses of action:
1. Limit ourselves to action now being taken on the Peruvian proposal, pressing for investigation by the Inter-American Peace Committee and similar action by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and withhold at this time the strong U.S. support for the Colombian proposal.
2. Combine with the above action on the Peruvian proposal close cooperation with the Colombians and, should they request it, strongly support the Colombian proposal in talks with all Latin American governments and especially Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.
The first course would avoid a formal showdown on Cuba and would offer some faint appearance of anti-Cuban activity in the OAS. In ARA's opinion, however, this course of action would be so weak as to constitute a clear victory for Cuba.
The second course would run the risk of committing the U.S. to a line of action that might be thwarted by the opposition of several of the larger Latin American countries. This could resolve in a psychological victory for Castro but we believe such a victory would be, although more dramatic, no greater than the one he would gain through continued OAS failure to act affirmatively on the Cuban issue in the face of Peruvian and Colombian initiatives. ARA believes that the issue has been joined in the OAS and that we should take advantage of the momentum started by the impulse of the Peruvian and Colombian proposals by giving our full support to the Colombian effort to gain maximum Latin American backing for the Colombian Plan. We believe that the vigor, tact and timing of our effort will have a substantial effect on the vote, especially if nations now doubtful or opposed are given to understand that the United States is determined to bring the issue to a vote.
The various considerations discussed above are described in greater detail in Tab B.
Recommendation
That you approve the second course of action./3/
/3/Ball approved this recommendation on November 6.
119. Memorandum From the Representative to the Council of the Organization of American States (Morrison) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Woodward)/1/
Washington, November 15, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-1561. Confidential. Drafted by Morrison. A note attached to the source text indicates that the memorandum was sent to Ball. Copies were also sent to Coerr, Jamison, Hartwick, and Crimmins.
Following extensive personal conversations with a large number of OAS Ambassadors in Kansas City during Friday and Saturday of last week, I have come to the conclusion that we have an excellent chance of getting a vote ranging from 13 to 16--first in favor of calling the meeting of Foreign Ministers and next getting some type of effective action regarding the Cuban issue. In my opinion, this is the most important success that the Kennedy Administration can achieve in foreign policy. By the same token, if we fail, it could be a definite loss for the Administration and, of course, for the U.S. people.
I know that Brazil has gone to work energetically doing missionary work to achieve a negative vote. Although the Mexican Ambassador has stated to me that they will not make a campaign and will be "fatalistic" about having this meeting that they do not want, still we have to realize that these two nations are going to press hard to defeat the Colombian proposal,/2/ delay it or "pigeon-hole" it.
/2/At the OAS Council meeting on November 14, the Colombian representative presented a request to convoke a meeting of Foreign Ministers under the Rio Treaty. The Council was scheduled to meet on December 4 to consider and act upon the Colombian request.
My point is we have to act quickly with all resources at our command. I say "quickly" because I am sure that already the Brazilian Foreign Minister is working energetically on Uruguay, Argentina and Chile. These are three countries that with extensive, timely action on our part will support the Colombian proposal. But all concerned must be impressed with the necessity for needed and timely effort to be put forth now in reaching not only the Foreign Ministers but also the Chiefs of State. OAS Ambassador Rivarola (Argentina) stated that he had personally recommended to his government support of the Colombian proposal. OAS Ambassador Clulow (Uruguay) feels the same way. My fear is that before we get our missionary work underway, we may find that as a result of Brazilian urging these three countries may be induced to "play the delaying game" or take a neutral position. In my opinion, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile (the difference between 13 assured and 16 votes) are the key to our diplomatic success and likewise if the situation is ultimately unfavorable, the reason for diplomatic defeat.
I would recommend that you show this memo to Mr. Ball and also to Mr. Goodwin.
120. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State/1/
Buenos Aires, November 22, 1961, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-2261. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bogota, Rio de Janeiro, and Santiago.
905. At lunch today Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Camilion said GOA not in accord use Article VI Rio Treaty and believes action on Cuba should be under OAS Charter (Article 39). Reaffirmed other points made in Embtel 898./2/ GOA talking to both Brazil and Cuba [Chile]. Says latter two will both vote against calling MFM under present Colombian initiative and GOA would probably do so also. GOA impressed and agrees with Mexican arguments against Colombian initiative on juridical grounds.
/2/Telegram 898, November 21, reported on a meeting between Senator Hubert Humphrey and Foreign Minister Carcano, in which the latter stressed that Frondizi wanted to talk to a high-level U.S. emissary during his forthcoming visit to Trinidad. (Ibid., 737.00/11-2161)
Camilion said December 4 date too early and that it might be possible convene December 4 and then declare recess until full consultations can be held. He did not answer categorically my question as to whether GOA prepared take action at this time on Cuba if consultations could be held but instead referred back to need for consultations. Camilion stressed GOA not interested whether its name appears in connection with new proposals but very obvious to me this question of thou dost protest too much and the GOA very much interested in being in the forefront of any proposals.
Hoyt
121. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts in the American Republics/1/
Washington, November 30, 1961, 2:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.05/11-3061. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Jamison and Bowdler; cleared by Bracken, Crimmins, Wellman, and Director of the Office of West Coast Affairs Taylor G. Belcher; approved by Woodward. Repeated to USUN, Ciudad Trujillo, POLAD CINCARIB, and POLAD SACLANT.
1028. Secretary and Woodward today informed Argentine Foreign Minister in Canada of acceptability to President Lleras of compromise formula suggested by Argentines to Stevenson at Trinidad November 26-27./2/ Argentine formula calls for COAS decision December 4:
/2/A memorandum of Stevenson's meeting with Frondizi is filed ibid., 737.00/11-2761. Telegram 346 from Bogota, dated November 28, reported that Ambassador Freeman had presented the compromise formula to Lleras and that the latter had agreed to the formula with some modifications. (Ibid., 737.00/11-2861)
1. Agree that MFM be held;
2. That COAS decide before December 31 (a) whether meeting to be held under Article 6 Rio Treaty or Article 39 OAS Charter; (b) date and place of MFM.
Following was clearly understood as part of formula: (a) Argentina would vote favorably this resolution and obtain support other LA governments. FYI. Argentina would concentrate Chile Uruguay Brazil and if feasible Mexico. End FYI. If support for Argentine formula should prove to be limited, US would have to weigh carefully possible advisability of return to full support Colombian initiative under Rio Treaty; (b) period between December 4 and 31 would be used to reach agreement on whether MFM would be convoked pursuant Rio Treaty or OAS Charter and to seek maximum possible advance agreement on substantive action to be taken at MFM in hopes this would be sufficient to obtain support of practically all member governments. Should there be apprehension lest US abandoning view that Rio Treaty applicable you should make it clear that we continue to believe nature of threat such that it clearly falls within terms Rio Treaty Article 6.
Argentine Foreign Minister told Secretary he would immediately have Argentine embassies take up formula with OARS, particularly Brazil Chile Uruguay, while Argentine Ambassadors to White House and OAS would discuss formula with LA Ambassadors Washington. Secretary agreed we would support Argentine formula with countries that already have indicated support Colombian proposal or favor stronger action but effective outcome will depend primarily on Argentine initiative this matter. Woodward urged Foreign Minister come Washington work on this matter with Colombian Foreign Minister due arrive here November 30 or December 1. Foreign Minister said he would consult immediately with Argentine Ambassadors to White House and OAS as well as President Frondizi on this point.
FYI. We have acquiesced in Argentine move in expectation achieving equally good substance of OAS action on Cuba with more support than that contemplated Colombian proposal, including possibly even Brazil and Mexico. Other factors are real or dissembled disgruntlement indicated by several governments, with Argentina in lead, over precipitate formal presentation Colombian proposal to COAS (Depcirtel 997)/3/ and alleged lack prior consultation on exact texts Colombian draft resolutions. Views other governments so far received on substance resolutions, except for Mexico and on one or two important points Brazil (both of which obviously would prefer no MFM) do not reveal major differences on type of anticipated MFM substantive action and some of these views appear essentially constructive. End FYI.
/3/Dated November 24. (Ibid., 371.05/11-2461)
Request you seek earliest opportunity convey foregoing orally to President or Foreign Minister. Report reaction soonest.
Rusk
122. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts in the American Republics/1/
Washington, December 3, 1961, 5:11 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.05/12-361. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Bowdler and Jamison; cleared by Crimmins and in draft by Woodward; approved by Jamison. Repeated to USUN, Ciudad Juarez, POLAD CINCARIB, and POLAD SACLANT.
1047. Depcirtels 1028/2/ and 1041./3/ Consultations here clearly show Argentine formula has failed to add support deemed essential and in particular has not proved acceptable Brazil, Chile and Mexico. Under these circumstances GUS returning full support Colombian proposal convoke MFM under Rio Treaty on which vote will be taken COAS meeting afternoon December 4.
/2/Document 121.
/3/Circular telegram 1041, December 1, sent to 13 Embassies in Latin America, instructed them to make it clear that unless the Argentine formula could obtain a "substantial majority" in the OAS Council on December 4, the United States would support the Colombian proposal. (Department of State, Central Files, 371.05/12-161)
Request you inform President or FonMin of foregoing if you deem it appropriate and useful, stressing importance we attach to favorable vote, particularly in light Castro's recent public admission he confirmed Marxist-Leninist who deliberately deceived and used non-communists to gain his ends, as well as because of regime's alignment Sino-Soviet bloc; also if necessary expressing our hope COAS Delegations will be given instructions support Colombian request convocation MFM under Rio Treaty./4/
/4/On December 4 the OAS Council approved a resolution convoking a meeting of consultation of Foreign Ministers under Articles 6 and 11 of the Rio Treaty. The vote was 14-2 with 5 abstentions. The text of the resolution is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 323-324.
Rusk
123. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts in the American Republics/1/
Washington, December 11, 1961, 7:41 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.05/12-1161. Confidential. Drafted by Jamison; cleared by Whiteman, Bracken, Hemba, Lane, and Crimmins; and approved by Woodward. Repeated to USUN, POLAD CINCARIB, and POLAD SACLANT.
1104. Colombian FonMin while in Washington recently (Depcirtel 1079)/2/ stated Colombian Embassies would be instructed take up soonest with respective governments substance Colombian draft resolutions, copies of which he said had been handed to Foreign Ministries in all countries with which Colombia has diplomatic relations. (Mentioned possibility special mission to Guatemala.) Requested our support Colombian-USUN [New York] efforts achieve maximum possible agreement these drafts.
/2/Circular telegram 1079, December 7, summarized a meeting between Woodward and Colombian Foreign Minister Caicedo Castilla. (Ibid., 371.04/12-761)
USG has proposed certain changes Colombian projects, circulated in English (CW-4207)/3/ and summarized Depcirtel 952./4/ Furthermore events since drafts prepared, particularly Castro December 1 identification himself and regime as Marxist-Leninist, strongly suggest drafts require strengthening or change in certain respects as outlined second paragraph Depcirtel 1079./5/ Specific suggestions this effect being made to Colombians.
/3/Not found.
/4/Circular telegram 952, November 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 371.05/11-1661)
/5/Woodward told Caicedo that in the U.S. view Castro's speech made it advisable to consider. "(1) ways make more specific exact nature Castro-communist danger; (2) advisability changing 'invitation' to Cuba to break Sino-Soviet ties to firmer call or demand; and (3) definition specific steps which would be required for Cuba demonstrate conclusively compliance with that call." He also suggested that the MFM might authorize the OAS Council to observe and report on Cuban compliance with the above-mentioned call and to recommend possible action in case of compliance or non-compliance.
Request you approach FonOff soonest, coordinating your approach with Colombian colleague where appropriate, and report our firm support for essentials Colombian proposals, as well as our feeling that in certain respects they now require strengthening. If question raised, you should make it clear that we do not in present circumstance plan raise question application specific Art 8 measures (i.e. sanctions). Request you inquire as to acceptability Colombian drafts to FonOff and elicit any suggestions they propose to make for amendment. Make clear we not necessarily seeking definitive views but interested at least in preliminary reaction as means initiating consultations on Colombian drafts.
Ball
124. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Caracas, December 16, 1961, 5:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12-1661. Secret. Drafted by Stewart, van Reigersberg, and Moskowitz. Approved in the White House on February 6. President Kennedy traveled to Venezuela December 16 and 17.
SUBJECT
Conference Between President Kennedy and Venezuelan President Betancourt--Cuban Problem--OAS Foreign Ministers Meeting
PARTICIPANTS
The President
Ambassador Chester Bowles
Mr. C. Allan Stewart, Charge d'Affaires ad interim
Mr. Robert F. Woodward, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, Assistant Administrator for Latin America of the Agency for International Development
Mr. Richard Goodwin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs
Mr. Harold Linder, President of Export-Import Bank of Washington
Mr. Fernando van Reigersberg, LS staff interpreter
President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela
Dr. Marcos Falc#n Briceno, Foreign Minister of Venezuela
Dr. Andres German Otero, Minister of Finance of Venezuela
General Antonio Briceno Linares, Minister of Defense of Venezuela
Dr. Jose Antonio Mayobre, Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States
Dr. Alejandro Oropeza Castillo, Governor of the Federal District of Venezuela
Dr. Manuel Perez Guerrero, Chief, Office of Coordination and Planning, Venezuelan Government
The meeting convened at 5:15 p.m. on December 16, 1961, at Los Nunez, President Betancourt's residence in Caracas, Venezuela. Several unrelated matters were discussed at this conference, including the subject covered in this memorandum./2/
/2/See Document 334. Other memoranda of conversation are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2016.
Cuban Problem--OAS Foreign Ministers Meeting
President Kennedy brought into the conversation the OAS Foreign Ministers' Meeting (MFM) scheduled on January 10 to deal with the Cuban problem. He said the Panamanian Government had offered Panama City as site for the Meeting but had indicated that circumstances made it necessary to hold the meeting in February. President Kennedy asked President Betancourt whether a delay would be advisable or whether the meeting should be held as scheduled in the Pan American Union headquarters in Washington.
President Betancourt replied that he had discussed this point with Foreign Minister Falc#n Briceno and Ambassador Mayobre and had concluded that the important point was not the site but whether the necessary two-thirds votes could be obtained to vote sanctions against the Castro regime. He said the Governments of Colombia and Venezuela were working a "pincers" movement against Ecuador. He had written a letter to the Ecuadorean President and might send an emissary to converse with President Arosemena about changing his country's policy in favor of voting sanctions. He is also considering a possible trip to Venezuela by the Ecuadorean President.
President Betancourt added that when President Frondizi of Argentina stopped briefly in Venezuela he was of the opinion that Argentina planned to vote favorably for the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, but actually had abstained.
President Betancourt also said that as a result of a trip of President L#pez Mateos of Mexico to Caracas, personal contact was established between the two Presidents. The Government of Venezuela was considering the possibility of sending a special envoy to Mexico in order to try to convince that country to modify its stand vis-a-vis Cuba. Of course, there were internal political factors and a traditional attitude on the part of the Mexican Foreign Ministry that would make such a change extremely difficult to achieve.
When President Kennedy asked again whether the timing of the MFM was vital President Betancourt responded that time was not as important as having the necessary 14 votes.
President Kennedy expressed the view, which was corroborated by Assistant Secretary Woodward, that it would be difficult to obtain a resolution imposing sanctions on Cuba but thought that one would pass asking the Castro regime to sever its ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc and return to the inter-American family. He felt that the strongest possible resolution should be passed.
President Betancourt agreed with this. He added that Venezuela would vote for sanctions or for any other resolution such as the one that had just been indicated by the President. President Betancourt observed that the resolution against the Dominican Republic, voted at San Jose, did not go very far but it was of great moral assistance in paving the way for downfall of the Trujillo regime.
President Kennedy asked for Mr. Woodward's comments on the MFM meeting and the latter stated that it was not likely Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and possibly Bolivia and Ecuador would vote for strong sanctions. Mr. Woodward thought that we should support the Colombian resolution strongly and attempt to pin down Castro to break with the Sino-Soviet bloc or face sanctions.
At this point President Betancourt observed that any unilateral action against Cuba would destroy the inter-American system and President Kennedy assured him the United States did not intend to take unilateral action against the Castro government.
President Kennedy added that the United States hoped to get as strong a resolution against Cuba as it was possible to get; but even if one calling only for a break with the Sino-Soviets were obtained, it is certain Castro would refuse to do so and thus place Cuba in a most difficult position. He said if we lower our aim from the outset the final result might well be a watered-down resolution that would not be very effective. Perhaps we would not be able to agree on sanctions at this meeting but we could lay the groundwork for them in the future. Castro will obviously reject the OAS request and his refusal could be the basis for another Meeting of Foreign Ministers later on. Because it will take some time to line up the necessary votes and the Christmas holidays are near, President Kennedy expressed the view that the February meeting was most logical.
Mr. Woodward added that President Kennedy would have an opportunity on December 17 to obtain President Lleras Camargo's judgment on the timing of the meeting and the type of resolution which could be obtained. President Kennedy said Mr. Woodward would stay an extra day in Bogota to go over the proposed resolutions which are to be pre-sented at the MFM meeting. He thought the revised drafts would be ready for consideration in 10 days.
President Betancourt stated that Venezuela would support strong action against Cuba but cautioned that it might be necessary to go by easy stages, as was done with the Dominican Republic. He expressed the conviction that Castro's days were numbered and he based this on his residence in that country for two years. Castro has insulted everyone and brought about rupture of relations with most of the OAS members. He said that the resistance movement in Cuba must be strongly supported and Venezuela is so doing within its resources. President Betancourt indicated that the situation in Cuba is different from that in the Soviet Union because the Cuban people had known freedom and the Russians never have. He hoped that the Cuban people will eventually be able to get rid of Communism. Any unilateral action on the part of the United States would be extremely harmful.
President Kennedy replied that the police system in Cuba was very powerful and that it would make it difficult for the Cubans to revolt. On the other hand, the United States would not act unilaterally but only on a hemisphere-wide basis. In view of Castro's recent speeches and of the economic and social structure he was trying to impose on Cuba it would seem that it would be difficult for the Latin American governments to oppose a resolution that urged Castro to return to the inter-American family of nations. Castro has shown himself to be a Communist rather than a great American revolutionary leader. President Kennedy thought it would not be likely that Castro would return to the inter-American family and therefore action against his regime would be easier once he had refused to break his ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc.
President Betancourt expressed his total agreement with the President's views.
125. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Bogota, December 17, 1961, 5:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2016. Confidential. Drafted by Dearborn on December 20 and approved by the White House on January 8, 1962.
SUBJECT
Developments in the Dominican Republic Planning for Foreign Ministers' Meeting on Cuban Problem
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
President Kennedy
Mr. Chester Bowles, President's Special Assistant
Ambassador Moscoso
Assistant Secretary Woodward
Deputy Assistant Secretary Goodwin
Ambassador Freeman
Mr. Henry Dearborn, Counselor of American Embassy, Bogota
Colombia
President Lleras Camargo
Foreign Minister Caicedo Castilla
Minister of Finance Mejia
Director of National Planning Dept. Gutierrez
President Kennedy called at President Lleras's office at 5:30 p.m. on December 17. Each President was accompanied by advisers as recorded above. Press photographers were invited in and pictures taken. President Kennedy then suggested that the group sit down for conversations and the Presidents, together with their advisers, held a discussion for over an hour.
[Here follows discussion concerning the Dominican Republic; see Document 335.]
Planning for Foreign Ministers' Meeting on Cuban Problem
The Presidents devoted most of their conversation to the pending Foreign Ministers' Meeting to consider the Cuban problem. The points discussed were: 1) the timing of the Meeting; 2) the place where it should be held; 3) the need for additional support; and, to some extent, 4) the substance of the resolutions to be presented.
President Kennedy raised the question of timing. President Lleras stated that before President Kennedy went to Venezuela and Colombia he favored holding the Meeting on January 10, as proposed earlier. Since the visits, and owing to their extraordinary success, he was even more firmly opposed to postponement. He thought the momentum derived from the visits should not be lost. President Kennedy agreed and said that preparations should be aimed at an early holding of the conference. He said that Ambassador Woodward and Mr. Goodwin would remain in Bogota for another day to join Ambassador Freeman in an effort to reach an agreement with Foreign Minister Caicedo and President Lleras on the texts of the resolutions to be presented.
In considering where the Meeting might be held, President Lleras stated that he was not one of those who was worried about adverse reactions if Washington should be chosen as the site. He remarked that no one could reasonably say that because the Meeting was held there, its action would be dictated by the U.S. Government. Washington was, after all, the seat of the OAS and what could be more logical than for important questions to be considered there. He doubted, for example, that many really believed the UN was under the domination of the United States because its headquarters was in New York. If the Meeting could be held elsewhere, President Lleras suggested that Bariloche in Argentina would be a good place. He added that Montevideo, Santiago, or "even Brasilia" would also be acceptable. He did not think El Salvador would be satisfactory, but he was in favor of Costa Rica if that Government were amenable. It was agreed that a site must be chosen before the end of the week, and it was the consensus that if no other place were available Washington should be the place.
President Lleras expressed the opinion that at least one other country should be brought into the group of those favoring action since Uruguay was doubtful. He believed that of the countries which abstained on the vote of December 4, Chile would be the most easily won over. He said he knew that President Alessandri was 100 per cent in agreement with him and that the reason why Chile had abstained was that Alessandri had lost the last elections and had bowed to political pressure. Argentina, Dr. Lleras thought, might be brought around, especially if it could be made to appear that the Argentine Government was playing a leading role. He asserted that he would be glad to have Argentina think it invented "the whole thing" if only it would adopt a constructive attitude. Dr. Lleras urged that President Kennedy work on President Frondizi, President Alessandri and also on the Bolivian Government. Mr. Woodward noted confidentially that Mexico had let the United States know that it would break relations with Cuba if all the other American States did so. President Kennedy replied that the United States would work especially on Presidents Frondizi and Alessandri and would do what it could to influence Brazil, Bolivia and Ecuador. He also urged President Lleras to concentrate consultive efforts on these Governments.
Regarding the substance of the resolutions, President Lleras emphasized that he thought the word "sanctions" should not be used as this would draw all manner of objections from various countries. He favored simply noting at the chosen time that the Cuban Government had identified its interests with the Sino-Soviet bloc and had reneged on its inter-American commitments, and therefore the nations of the inter-American system were breaking off relations with it. President Kennedy stated that he would prefer not to give Cuban relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc as a reason for the break, but rather that the Cuban Government was engaged in subverting the democratic governments of the western hemisphere in implementation of the policies of Moscow. President Lleras enthusiastically supported this suggestion.
President Lleras explained that Colombian strategy would be to hold firmly at first to an insistence that a special vigilance committee be set up to follow Cuban performance and to report to the COAS. He wished to assure President Kennedy, however, that Colombia would ultimately agree to having the COAS itself to perform this function. He said Colombia was adopting this strategy in order to sidetrack the numerous changes in the resolutions which other countries might propose. He hoped they would devote their efforts to convincing Colombia to give up its vigilance committee, thereby diverting them from seeking changes in more vital parts of the resolutions. Dr. Lleras suggested that the United States might inform other Governments that it was working on Colombia to dissuade it from insisting on a vigilance committee. He urged President Kennedy to meet with President Frondizi on the latter's way home from the Far East, but also urged that Colombia's strategy on the vigilance committee not be divulged. President Kennedy suggested that the U.S. might suggest that Argentina too attempt to convince Colombia to give up this committee idea.
President Kennedy asserted that it was now urgent to reach an agreement on the draft resolutions with Colombia and that he hoped this could be done the following day. Then consultations with the other Governments could begin promptly. He stressed again that a definite time and place for the Meeting should be set before the end of this week. Dr. Lleras was entirely in agreement and an appointment was set up for Mr. Woodward, Ambassador Freeman and Mr. Goodwin to meet with Foreign Minister Caicedo and President Lleras on December 18./2/ Mr. Jamison, who had just arrived in Bogota for these conversations, would be present. President Kennedy stressed that the strategy should be to draft fairly strong resolutions and then modify them if necessary.
/2/Telegram 422 from Bogota, December 18, reported on the meeting. (Ibid., Central Files, 737.00/12-1861)
126. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts in the American Republics/1/
Washington, December 20, 1961, 7:27 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12-2961. Confidential. Drafted by Jamison; cleared by Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs Marjorie M. Whiteman, Director of the Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs Katherine W. Bracken, Hemba, Belcher, and Crimmins; and approved by Woodward.
1141. Depcirtel 1104./2/ During conversations with Department officials Bogota, President Lleras said Colombian Fonmin Caicedo arriving Washington December 21 to confer and negotiate with representatives other governments, particularly those which abstained on December 4 convocation re substantive action to be taken at 8th MFM. Rather than conducting consultations on basis existing Colombian drafts, Caicedo would point out new circumstances created by Castro's open identification himself and Cuba with communist ideology and policies Sino-Soviet bloc, and in effect seek suggestions for action which might go beyond that contemplated in present Colombian drafts, including possibility agreement on specific measures (sanctions) under Article 8. As result such consultations Colombia would prepare new draft or drafts upon which widest possible area of agreement to be sought prior to opening MFM.
/2/Document 123.
FYI. We prepared and left with Colombians draft single combined resolution/3/ representing changes which in our view would substantially strengthen and clarify steps contemplated in present Colombian drafts and would also respond to certain comments made to our Missions on Colombian texts. Copies this draft being forwarded airmail for possible use in event it or similar draft becomes basis pre-MFM negotiations. End FYI.
/3/Reference is apparently to a "hypothetical draft" transmitted in circular airgram CA-715, December 22. It called on Cuba to renounce Marxism-Leninism, break with the Sino-Soviet bloc, and cease all attempts to subvert or overthrow the governments of other American Republics, and called on the governments of the American Republics to break diplomatic relations with Cuba unless it complied within 30 days. (Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/12-2261)
Ball
127. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina/1/
Washington, December 26, 1961, 1:14 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12-2661. Confidential. Drafted by Woodward, cleared by the President, and approved by Woodward.
1151. In December 24 conversation, President Kennedy explained to President Frondizi/2/ that conversations between Colombian Government and several other governments have revealed a general view that Castro's recent frank admission of Marxist-Leninist convictions and intention to make Cuba into a communist state now require action beyond that originally contemplated by Colombian draft resolutions. President Frondizi was given a copy of a new Colombian draft (substituting for the former third resolution) providing forthrightly for obligatory breaking of diplomatic and economic relations, and also a Colombian-US preliminary draft of a single combined resolution which also incorporates this provision./3/
/2/Frondizi and Kennedy met at Palm Beach.
/3/A Colombian draft of a combined single resolution, given to the Department on December 22 by the Colombian Foreign Minister, was transmitted in circular airgram CA-735, December 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/12-2961)
President Frondizi indicated no receptivity to applying sanctions; he emphasized that political difficulties in Brazil and Chile and to a lesser extent in Argentina make it impracticable to consider such sanctions; he asserted that it is much more important to preserve a high degree of unanimity of action and solidarity in the inter-American system than it is to try to enforce such sanctions against Cuba; he thought that the inter-American system might become seriously divided and weakened by possible refusal of Brazil and other countries to comply with a two-thirds vote that did not include Brazil and Mexico which have over half of the population of Latin America (plus presumably Argentina and Chile); he emphasized the great importance he attributes to the U.S. and Argentina working and consulting together on this and all other important Hemisphere matters; he and particularly Minister Carcano thought that a strong resolution condemning Cuba for becoming an accomplice of the Soviet Bloc might provoke Cuba into separating itself from the inter-American system without obligatory sanctions; and he offered to send President Kennedy a draft of such a resolution.
President Kennedy told President Frondizi we would be glad to receive and consider such a draft resolution; he agreed that the US should work as closely as possible with Argentina; he agreed that it is important to maintain the solidarity of the inter-American system; he stated that the US of course wishes to weigh carefully the danger of causing a division in the inter-American system and internal political problems to Argentina, Brazil and other countries against the need for the most effective action possible to isolate Cuba and set up safeguards against Soviet bloc subversive influences from Cuba; but that he suspected that there would be less unfavorable reaction in Brazil and other countries if sanctions were applied against Cuba than President Frondizi considers likely.
(On the airplane to and from Palm Beach, Woodward emphasized to the Argentine delegation that the countries favoring obligatory breaking of diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba are beginning a concerted effort to obtain maximum support for these measures and believe they have at least 14 votes. After the conversation with President Kennedy, Woodward therefore urged that the Argentines formulate a suggested resolution as soon as possible. Minister Carcano and Ortiz de Rosas said January 2 was the earliest they could submit a draft to President Kennedy and that they would do so through the US Embassy in Buenos Aires.)
President Frondizi expressed concern regarding pressures from Argentine armed forces on GOA for more emphatic action against Cuba which he said he suspects is accentuated by stimulation US intelligence sources.
Please hold information this telegram in confidence and take advantage of opportunities to urge expeditious preparation suggested resolution by GOA and express US hope that GOA will exert leadership in conversations other governments.
Rusk
128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil/1/
Washington, December 26, 1961, 8:37 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/12-2461. Confidential. Drafted by Jamison, cleared by Pezzullo, and approved by Woodward.
1776. Embtels 1499/2/ and 1500./3/
/2/Telegram 1499, December 24, reported a conversation with Foreign Minister Dantas and stated that his position had "progressed substantially." (Ibid.)
/3/Telegram 1500, December 24, expressed concern at the latest draft resolution on Cuba. Ambassador Gordon stated that he had been making progress in his efforts to bring Brazil to a course in line with U.S. views, but "without previous warning, I find that our own position has apparently moved forward a good deal without giving Brazil or other southern South American Governments a chance to catch up." (Ibid.)
1. While approach outlined point 7 reftel/4/ which you propose taking with Brazilians appears satisfactory, we believe you should make it clear to them that there is considerable pressure from governments which are urging positive action on Cuban problem for obligatory rupture of diplomatic and economic relations under Article 8 Rio Treaty. Inclusion reference to diplomatic break in draft forwarded WIROM 1733/5/ was in fact made after preliminary consultation Bogota with FonMin Caicedo and President Lleras during which they suggested this as a logical reaction to recent frank Castro declarations. At later meeting on December 18 they read to us and handed us a resolution prescribing rupture both diplomatic and economic relations. Caicedo subsequently informed us in Washington that several governments favor these more drastic sanctions.
/4/Paragraph 7 of telegram 1500 urged that the draft resolution should not be circulated in any way until Gordon and Deputy Assistant Secretary Goodwin, who had just arrived in Rio de Janeiro, could fully explore the Brazilian position.
/5/Not found. A draft resolution calling on Cuba to renounce Marxism-Leninism, break with the Sino-Soviet bloc, and cease all attempts to subvert or overthrow the governments of other American republics, and calling on the governments of the American republics to break diplomatic relations with Cuba unless it complied within 30 days was circulated to U.S. Embassies in Latin America in circular airgram 715, December 22, which stated that it was a "hypothetical draft" intended for "possible use" by the Colombian Government. (Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/12-2261)
2. USG desires promote widest possible agreement in advance of MFM on actions which will achieve moral isolation Castro regime and contribute to defensive capacity independent OAS governments protect themselves against Castro communist subversive design and activities. While we anxious consult to maximum with reluctant governments, USG obviously does not wish to put itself in forefront in opposing desire for strong action of governments deeply concerned and perhaps more immediately affected by Castro communist threat than those which abstained December 4 vote. Since Brazil and others of these governments apparently now recognize need for OAS action, we would hope they will themselves make genuine effort convince governments desiring strong action that less drastic OAS steps necessary and likely in long run to have greater effect in counteracting danger.
3. We would be most grateful opportunity review carefully draft, which as mentioned item 5 of reftel, Dantas indicated he would prepare, and hope also Brazilians will consult on such draft with other governments particularly Colombia. From what we know here of Brazilian viewpoint as previously outlined, it appears Brazilian draft, as Embtel suggests, likely include much of substantive material now contained in US combined draft (WIROM 1733).
4. Consultation with FonMin Dantas should be highly useful in achieving better understanding respective viewpoints and hope he will be able visit Washington during week beginning December 31.
5. FYI only. Both Colombian revision US draft forwarded WIROM 1733 and more drastic Colombian draft providing merely for break in diplomatic and economic relations discussed with and handed to Argentine President and FonMin on strictly confidential basis December 24. Argentines promised give President Kennedy by January 2 draft resolution containing their views on appropriate action. End FYI.
Rusk
129. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Colombia/1/
Washington, January 3, 1962, 8:56 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/1-362. Official Use Only. Drafted by Jamison, cleared by Belcher and Morrison, and approved by Woodward.
535. FonMin Caicedo stopped briefly Washington on return Paris to Bogota, where scheduled arrive January 4. Woodward saw him twice review prospects 8th MFM and handed him copies comparative revision Colombian draft he left with us in December (text revision circulated CA-715/2/ as amended Depcirtel 1200)./3/ This most recent draft contains provision for obligatory break diplomatic and economic relations Cuba after 30-day waiting period observe compliance.
/2/Reference is apparently to CA-735; see footnote 3, Document 127.
/3/Dated January 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/1-362)
Caicedo indicated this revision seemed generally satisfactory but needed consult President Lleras before giving final view.
Principal additional questions discussed were: (1) whether necessary 14 votes obtainable for resolution containing obligatory measures and (2) whether even if attainable such action would be preferable approval by larger majority of resolution like that contained Depcirtel 1200 but with obligatory feature amended to make it recommendation. Caicedo appears personally favor all-out effort obtain 14 or more votes for obligatory measures.
Unfortunately Argentine draft which is presumably aimed at strongest feasible action short of obligatory measures (BA tel 1133 rpt Bogota 39)/4/ not available prior Caicedo's departure. We plan keep Colombians informed of any developments that respect.
Rusk
/4/Dated January 3. (Ibid., 737.00/1-362)
130. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State/1/
Rio de Janeiro, January 4, 1962, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/1-462. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to Buenos Aires and Montevideo.
1551. Woodward from Goodwin. Upon arrival in Buenos Aires I had an hour talk with Camilion, I was then taken to meet with Frigerio and Musich. Afterwards to an hour meeting with Carcano and later to talk with Frondizi in the Casa Rosada.
During the entire trip I was followed by a car full of military intelligence agents. The visit received press coverage. My talks left no doubt in my mind that Frigerio is at least the second most powerful man in Argentina, with enormous influence on Frondizi. In foreign policy his voice is the only one that counts while Carcano is an intelligent sincere fellow with very little meaningful influence or authority.
The essence of the Argentine position is: 1. Sanctions are impossible because they are unacceptable to Brazil, Chile etc., and to force them would be to disrupt the inter-American system. 2. It is vital to have a united front of the American nations on this question, because a serious division between the large nations and the small nations plus US would be a serious defeat for American policy and a victory for Castro. 3. Argentina's position is based on these two factors since its own internal situation is strong enough to permit Argentina to do anything it wishes, including the imposition of sanctions. 4. It is vital to reaffirm the Alliance for Progress and restate the basic principles of the inter-American system in order to give the MFM a wider scope than a mere effort to condemn Castro.
They then showed me their resolutions/2/ which consisted of: A. A long resolution stating the principles of inter-Americanism and saying that all must adhere to those principles if they were to be members in good standing of the system. Cuba is not mentioned by name but would clearly be excluded under the criteria. (I assume you now have the resolutions and so will not discuss in detail); B. Two other resolutions adopted from Colombia (1) and (2) but with much of the anti-Cuba language watered down.
/2/Three Argentine draft resolutions were enclosed with a letter of January 2 from Frondizi to Kennedy. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Argentina, General) Telegram 1218 to Buenos Aires, January 5, reported that the letter had been delivered to the White House on January 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1-362)
I informed the Argentines that, as a strictly personal reaction, I found nothing wrong with the ideas of restating the principles of inter-Americanism, although I would want to suggest much modification in the detailed wording of their draft. I went on to say that there was a great deal of feeling in favor of imposing mandatory sanctions. I said we agreed that it was important to achieve agreement between the big nations, and that not to do so would be a serious blow to the system. However, I said, if it was a choice between (A) lack of agreement and the passage of a strong resolution or (B) agreement on a weak and meaningless resolution, then the US would have to choose the former. The ideal solution, of course, would be agreement on a strong and meaningful resolution. I said I realized the problems raised by sanctions and, if we could get agreement among the big nations, perhaps other nations could also agree on a resolution which fell just short of sanctions. If this was not possible then I was afraid the US would be in the same position it found itself before the convocation vote. We would be compelled to vote with the more militant nations; since the only justification for not voting sanctions now would be the agreement of the large nations. I said that a strong resolution would have to have at least three elements: 1. A strong condemnation of Cuba for subordination of sovereignty and attempts to overthrow other governments; 2. Calling upon Cuba, in the strongest possible terms, to renounce these practices etc. (Both these would be along lines contained in the resolutions Woodward and I left with Lleras Camargo.); 3. A strong reporting provision calling for a report, within a specified period of time, as to whether Cuba had complied with the resolution.
They said the elements of all these were in their resolutions. I agreed, but said they had not stated them forcefully enough or with enough specifics. They said that they thought there was no real difference in principle, but a difference in language only and that they would be willing to accept our stronger language since they realized our public opinion problem etc. I actually showed Carcano the language of condemnation and the call for renunciation contained in the combined draft we left in Colombia. He thought it was a little strong but thought they could accept it, and perhaps sell it to the Brazilians. I did not show him the reporting provisions contained in your latest telegram instructing me to go to Argentina./3/ But I continually referred to the necessity of provisions along those lines. (Please have that section of the resolution translated into English.)
/3/Reference is to telegram 1806 to Rio de Janeiro, December 30. (Ibid., 371.04/12-2961)
In sum, I believe there is a substantial chance that the Argentines will accept a strongly worded resolution which should be acceptable to us. This means a considerably strengthened version of the resolutions they sent to you, very much along the lines we had been considering. I foresee some difficulty with the thirty-day provision. In turn, I believe we should be able to accept their resolution restating the provisions of inter-Americanism. Of course, their version requires considerable editing; especially to avoid the implication that we are buying political support. This resolution is central to their position, does no harm to the other resolutions which are our real interest, and, in fact, will give the conference a broader political base. As to whether there should be one resolution, which we prefer, or three, as they prefer, I do not have a strong view.
Today we are talking with the Brazilians. In the next two days I also expect to have another talk with Dantas and, probably, with Goulart. I urge not precipitous rejection to the Argentine resolution until we have had a chance to strengthen it, and try it on them. I believe they will send Camilion to Washington some time next week. It looks probable that Dantas also will come to Washington about January 9 or 10; although his health situation is still precarious.
Gordon and I are preparing a general commentary on the US position which we will send before the end of the week.
I also spent three hours in Montevideo talking with Sparks. Of course, the Uruguayans have no clearly defined position. However, after talking with Sparks and the Argentines (who are in constant contact with the Uruguayans) I believe it is probable that they will follow Argentina and Brazil.
Gordon
131. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State/1/
Rio de Janeiro, January 7, 1962, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/1-762. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Santiago, and Bogota.
1570. 1. Goodwin and I met Thursday with Bernardes and Valle, and Saturday with Foreign Minister Dantas, Bernardes, and Renato Archer to discuss GOB views forthcoming MFM. (Deputy Archer is new Undersecretary in Foreign Office under terms Parliamentary amendment.)
2. Dantas states as basic premises (A) need to secure maximum unity and strengthening inter-American system in face Cuban problem and (B) need to avoid sharp conflict and division with Brazilian public opinion. Immediate or slightly deferred but automatic diplomatic or economic sanctions continue to be outside framework Brazilian thinking, although we made clear these possibilities under increasingly active discussion in Washington and warmly supported by smaller countries closer to Cuba.
3. With respect condemnation Cuban past and present, Dantas continues prefer idea of resolution confronting Cuban official statements and actions with restatement of principles of inter-American system, drawing conclusion that such statements and acts are clearly incompatible with system. Against this background, Brazilians would introduce new idea that declared Marxist-Leninist state can coexist peacefully with rest of hemisphere only if it accepts a form of "neutralization", which would include arms limitation, avoidance types military actions set forth Colombian drafts, foreswearing of subversive radio broadcasts to other LA countries, and refraining from subversive infiltration by other means. MFM would appoint a special committee to define terms of neutralization in detail and discuss with Cubans, and to report results to COAS within definite time period. If no positive results, Cuba then would clearly be engaged in acts under Article 6 Rio Treaty and could be subjected to sanctions under Article 8. To our surprise Dantas said such sanctions might include if necessary even armed force.
4. This idea appears to have a double origin (A) Bernardes belief after long talks with Olivares that if assured that US will not invade, Cuba would in fact accept rigorous limitation, and (B) Dantas conviction that no juridical definition is feasible of "breaking ties with Soviet bloc", whereas neutralization is an accepted juridical status which could be defined unequivocally.
5. Dantas also considering some means coupling above plan with MFM declaration that Cuban actions and statements warrant determination by rest of OAS that Cuba has taken itself out of system and is no longer entitled to its rights and privileges. This might be immediate or automatic within fixed time period unless Cuba radically altered her posture and policy. Further discussion tentatively arranged for Sunday, although not firm date.
6. We regard Bernardes idea paragraph four (A) above as pipedream, but see some real merit in idea reading Cuba out of system, possibly losing OAS membership thereby, as MFM action result, immediate or deferred, rather than formal sanctions which we do not believe Brazil can accept at this time. Neutralization concept, if defined with enough rigor, may come to much same thing as breaking military ties Soviet bloc and refraining any form subversion other LA countries. Discussions are making Dantas aware that US also faces major problem public opinion which he and other southern country Foreign Ministers must weigh. We believe position should be kept sufficiently flexible to accommodate at least part Brazilian approach if it develops in concrete manner.
7. Dantas still troubled recent chest operation but believes may be able to come Washington by mid-week, e.g. January 10 or 11.
8. Goodwin will be back Monday and will discuss further.
9. Goodwin concurred in draft.
Gordon
132. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts in the American Republics/1/
Washington, January 9, 1962, 9:16 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1-962. Confidential. Drafted by Woodward and Jamison; cleared by Belcher, Whitman, Bowden (SOV), Bracken, and Charles K. Johnson; and approved by Rusk.
1230. Department's current analysis positions OAS governments re possible action 8th MFM indicates:
Group of governments constituting most if not all thirteen which clearly supported Rio Treaty convocation appear favor obligatory rupture diplomatic and economic relations perhaps with 30 to 60 day waiting period demonstrate Cuban noncompliance. Certain these governments such as Guatemala and Peru would support measures having appearance even stronger action including some type air-sea surveillance Caribbean area or denial Cuba's right participate OAS. On other hand Argentina, as reflected in consultations possible actions resulting Kennedy-Frondizi December 24 meeting, emerging as leader in group which opposes or unreceptive obligatory rupture diplomatic and economic relations, but willing support or favorably consider non-mandatory action, including insistence Cuba clearly define its position within OAS system or suffer at least moral consequences. Argentina also desires inclusion exhortation drastic emphasis on and acceleration Alliance for Progress program. This group would probably also support continuing COAS responsibility maintain vigilance and recommend means strengthening capacity defense against Cuban-communist intervention. Although positions all governments not clear, Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador might follow Argentine lead. Uruguay uncertain, Mexico will probably oppose on "juridical" grounds.
Principal immediate questions are:
(1) Whether necessary majority fourteen votes obtainable for obligatory measures; and
(2) Whether, even if such bare majority obtainable, it is not preferable seek agreement additional governments on action not involving obligatory measures but clearly achieving moral isolation Castro regime and agreement on strengthening defense against its penetration.
In these circumstances our position should be described as follows:
(1) US favors MFM action which will accomplish most conclusive possible definition OAS position against Castro regime's making itself accomplice Sino-Soviet bloc.
(2) Resolution or resolutions containing principal points draft forwarded CA-735,/2/ and that developed on basis Depcirtel 1200/3/ including obligatory diplomatic and economic break (after waiting period), would accomplish this purpose particularly if substantial majority for it achieved.
/2/See footnote 3, Document 127.
/3/See footnote 3, Document 129.
(3) We continue prepared consult on ways in which basic objective effective OAS isolation Cuba can be achieved, but we consider it extremely important that countries favoring obligatory measures be urged consult with countries not favoring such measures and vice versa since most imminent danger from Marxism-Leninism-Castroism is to Latin countries and USG judgment cannot substitute for their judgment in deciding on MFM actions in relation their individual country situations and danger from Cuba.
FYI. While maintaining obligatory measures as "basic position" we do not wish preclude outcome which would clearly accomplish isolation Castro without forcing reluctant countries into obligatory break at this time. End FYI.
Please discuss US position with FonMin (except Brazil, Argentina and Colombia) and report his views. Mention that US does not have a specific proposal but has drafted tentative articles to be of assistance in recording consensus when substantial majority views are known.
Rusk
133. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina/1/
Washington, January 11, 1962, 12:55 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1-1162. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Woodward and Jamison, cleared in draft by Rusk and with the White House, and approved by Woodward.
1246. Verbatim Text. Transmit following message from President Kennedy to President Frondizi:
"Dear Mr. President:
I am grateful for your letter of January 2, 1962/2/ and for the frank expression of your viewpoint regarding the prospective actions to be taken at the forthcoming Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Punta del Este. You may be certain, Mr. President, that I share your preoccupation regarding the urgent necessity that both the solidarity of the hemisphere and the internal unity of the Member States be strengthened rather than weakened as a result of that Meeting. Naturally, I welcome your emphasis upon the program of the Alliance for Progress, and I share your view that the spirit of that program--the fulfillment in peace and freedom of the aspirations of the peoples for economic and social progress should characterize the Meeting.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 130.
I am confident that all of our Governments are deeply concerned over not only the need for rapid and effective demonstration of the achievements which can be made in economic and social development, but also the need for finding means to prevent the inroads in this hemisphere of the power bloc and system of which the Cuban Government has become an accomplice. A substantial number of our Governments, including those which are threatened most closely by the principal source of the present infection, are so greatly concerned over the existing danger that they would strongly support OAS action for the application of some, at least, of the mandatory measures which are available under the Rio Treaty. Some of these Governments indeed seek mandatory action of an even stronger nature. To ignore the concern of these immediately threatened Governments--which compose the majority of the inter-American community--incurs the grave risk that our system would be confronted with a division at least as wide and as deep as that which might result from the adoption of steps which they deem important and urgent.
I must emphasize in all frankness that the Government of the United States shares their view concerning the importance and urgency of applying effective measures under the Rio Treaty against the existing and potential threat posed by the alignment of Cuba with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, dedicated as it is to eventual subversion of the Governments of this hemisphere and to the denial of every value for which the Alliance for Progress stands. It appears that a majority of the American States are in agreement that it would be desirable that these measures take the form of the obligatory imposition of sanctions. I recognize, however, the advisability of seeking to avoid a probable rift in solidarity if this can be accomplished by achieving unanimity, or virtual unanimity, on a program which would include the concepts of great importance contained in your proposals. There are, however, certain modifications in those proposals which my Government wishes to suggest./3/ The suggested modifications are largely changes in the third proposed resolution. However, my Government would also wish to suggest modifications in the first resolution to place greater emphasis on the mutual nature of the pledge taken in the Charter of Punta del Este. I should like to emphasize that these modifications--which are primarily changes of language and not changes of principle--represent the minimum position which we could expect that a substantial number of American Governments, including my own, would be able to accept.
/3/The modifications were transmitted in telegram 1247 to Buenos Aires, January 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1-1162)
The penetration of this hemisphere by international communism has endangered the security of the American nations and evoked the strongest possible feelings of the people of the United States, as well as of the people of other American States. I believe that this Meeting offers the OAS an unparalleled opportunity to demonstrate that collective action, through the inter-American system, can deal with this threat. The future unity and vitality of the Organization of American States depends upon taking the strongest possible action with respect to Cuba which commands the support of a substantial consensus of the hemisphere. We consider it still possible that such a consensus might be achieved in favor of the imposition of sanctions. If so, we would hope to pursue this course together with your Government.
In view of the limited time remaining before the opening of the Meeting in Punta del Este, I am requesting the Secretary of State to transmit the suggested modifications to you through our Embassy at Buenos Aires. I shall be very much interested to know your opinion of these suggested modifications, as well as your latest views as to the possibilities of imposing diplomatic and economic sanctions. I would also be pleased to learn the responses which you may receive from the proposal of these modified resolutions to the Governments that are not now supporting the idea of a collective break in diplomatic and commercial relations.
In the meanwhile, my Government is informing the other Governments that the United States is prepared to support the firmest effective action for which there is a substantial majority, and we are discussing with those Governments illustrative phraseology for action which might receive the support of such a majority.
In conclusion, I should like to express my appreciation for the leadership which you and your Government are displaying in this most important effort. If we achieve a satisfactory decision at Punta del Este and, at the same time, maintain the essential unity of the hemisphere, you will have made a highly significant contribution to that result. This fruitful collaboration between our two countries will, I am confident, be extended and strengthened in all fields of hemispheric political and economic activity. The important role which Argentina is playing in Latin America will be one of the most important forces in bringing us closer to our mutual goals for the freedom and prosperity of the Americas.
With pleasant recollections of your visit to Palm Beach and with cordial best wishes,
Sincerely yours,
John F. Kennedy"
Rusk
134. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil/1/
Washington, January 14, 1962, 5:09 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1-1462. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Jamison, cleared by Woodward and Rogers, and approved by U. Alexis Johnson.
1922. Brazilian proposals 8th MFM action as set forth in memorandum Valle brought/2/ and Foreign Minister's January 12 statement discussed by Secretary, Woodward and Goodwin with Valle and Campos morning January 13./3/ Our discussion largely aimed at clarification their ideas. No commitment was made for other than further study, but it was suggested that they might wish discuss with Argentines. We also emphasized strong feeling of many other OAS members in favor vigorous action and strength of feeling within US on Cuban problem.
/2/Not found, but summarized in telegram 1593 from Rio de Janeiro, January 9. (Ibid., 737.00/1-962)
/3/A more detailed record of the conversation is ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
Seems clear that Brazilian program, while fostering notion that Cuba can or should have its right to "neutral" status recognized by OAS, contemplates no action by MFM beyond some kind of preliminary indication of incompatibility between declarations (not acts) of Castro regime and OAS principles and that all other aspects working out "statute of relations" between Cuba and hemisphere would be left to Foreign Ministers group or other "special organ" which would hear all parties and report to COAS. Valle vague on precise terms reference for such group.
Principal questions raised with them were: 1) Whether their formula does not contemplate possibility permanent acceptance neutral status for Cuba, i.e. permanent acceptance accomplice of Soviet bloc; Valle's reply was that things couldn't go on there indefinitely as they are (he conceded that a "communist state" is "by definition interventionist"). 2) Effect within Brazil of MFM decision on obligatory measures; Valle said result would be [to] greatly accentuate existing tensions. 3) Whether neutralization not the same as isolation other programs contemplate; Valle said isolation would inevitably widen gap between Cuba and other American states, while their program could lead to its being narrowed (even to consideration of resumption of US-Cuban trade).
Valle produced copy of the illustrative draft (Depcirtel 1236)/4/ which we are making available other COAS representatives here (but not by us to Brazilian pending your reaction Deptel 1903)./5/ We explained carefully to him the basis on which it was prepared and is being used for consultative purposes.
/4/Circular telegram 1236, January 11, instructed recipient Embassies to give the Foreign Minister in confidence a draft prepared on the basis of circular telegram 1200 (see footnote 2, Document 129) emphasizing that it was not a U.S. proposal but an example of a position that might have substantial support. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1-1162)
/5/Telegram 1903, January 11, instructed the Embassy to give the Brazilians the draft resolution on the basis set forth in circular telegram 1236, unless it perceived objections to doing so. (Ibid., 371.04/1-1162)
Valle queried whether Secretary would be able stop off in Brasilia on January 19 en route to Punta (when he will be receiving four other FonMins including Roa) and he explained that unavailability aircraft before evening January 20 would make that impossible.
Rusk
135. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, January 18, 1962, 4:13 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/1-1862. Confidential. Drafted by Bowdler and approved in S on January 20. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)
SUBJECT
Redrafts of Argentine Resolutions for 8th MFM/2/
/2/The Argentine redrafts are filed with a memorandum prepared in the Department of State summarizing the Argentine position as presented at the January 18 meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1-1862)
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
ARA--Mr. Goodwin
RPA--Mr. Jamison
RPA--Mr. Bowdler
Ambassador del Carril of Argentine Republic
Dr. Oscar H. Camilion, Argentine Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Ortiz de Rozas, Director General, Political Division, Argentine Foreign Office
After an exchange of amenities during which the Secretary expressed appreciation to the Argentine emissaries for having come all the way to Washington, Under Secretary Camilion explained the purpose of their visit. He indicated that at President Frondizi's request the Foreign Office had reviewed very carefully the observations made by President Kennedy in his letter and the suggested modifications to their resolutions. They had found these very useful and had reworked their earlier drafts in the light of them. However, there were certain aspects of the changes recommended by the United States, particularly with respect to sanctions, that in their opinion would not command the support desired and hence would threaten the unity of the hemisphere to which President Frondizi attached the greatest importance. He emphasized the need to maintain a united front in the Americas not only against Castro but as a demonstration of purpose within the Free World.
The Secretary stated that there were several ways in which unity could be disrupted. He said we should not lose sight of the fact that the countries geographically close to Cuba are very concerned about the danger to them from Cuba and because of this feel very strongly about the need to take effective measures. Another aspect of unity is that if President Kennedy does not give the American people and the Congress an adequate formula for dealing with the Cuban problem, this could have an erosive effect on our capacity to work with the OAS. Still another consideration is the implications which go beyond the Continent. For example, it is difficult for the United States public to understand our concern over communist penetration in other distant areas of the world and the need to act against it if nothing is done about penetration within our own hemisphere. Also, other countries on the periphery of the Soviet bloc are watching to see how resolutely we handle a problem, such as Cuba, in our own back yard as an indication of how determined we would be to assist them in a difficult situation.
Under Secretary Camilion recognized the validity of these considerations but questioned whether the solution we advanced based on sanctions would really achieve what is being sought. He said that the problem was not one of definition--we are all agreed that Cuba is communist and that this is incompatible with Cuba's continuation in the OAS--but of the efficacy of the action contemplated. Argentine thought that the more effective measure would be to find a way to suspend Cuba's participation within the inter-American system.
The Secretary interrupted to say that he wanted to mention another consideration making it very important that decisive action be taken at Punta del Este. He said he had not mentioned this matter to any other Latin American government and did not want to be misinterpreted for bringing it up in this context. He explained that the latest reports from Ambassador Thompson in Moscow on his conversations with Premier Khrushchev show that if the Soviets persist in their current policy on the Berlin problem we are on a collision course which will lead to war. Given this circumstance, it is of the utmost importance that no weakness be shown in Punta del Este lest the Soviets interpret this as a lack of determination on our part. The Secretary went on to say that if suspension of Cuba from the OAS can be worked out, then it might be a substitute for sanctions. He added that if it could not be put into effect quickly, however, we would find it difficult to accept as an alternative.
In an exchange of comments on the effectiveness of sanctions, the Secretary expressed the view that such measures would have a profound impression on the Cuban people and would help us in getting other members of the Free World to align their policies with those of the hemisphere on Cuba and Dr. Camilion again expressed his doubts as to their efficacy. The Secretary then asked Department officers present to try to work out with the Argentine emissaries a formula which might accomplish an effective provision leading rapidly toward exclusion of the Cuban Government from the inter-American system, and to check back with him.
136. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Punta del Este, January 23, 1962, 1 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/1-2362. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, Mexico City, Port-au-Prince, and USUN. Received at 1:20 p.m.
Secto 6. Daily Summary Cable. Secretary saw Foreign Ministers Argentina, Chile and Mexico morning of January 22. Argentine Foreign Minister Carcano maintained view it would be inadvisable press for sanctions and favored Charter amendment permit expulsion Cuba. He said most Argentina could do is abstain on sanctions and comply if approved. He stressed OAS unity theme and argued Central Americans should not force other countries accept sanctions. He said Argentina not committed to sticking with Brazil, but showed no indication shift in direction of strong resolution based on sanctions or explicit statement endorsing suspension.
Chilean Foreign Minister Martinez, while making no new comment on substance although opposing sanctions, appeared eager to take lead in bringing positions of reluctant and negative countries more nearly into line with that of US and others. He said he was holding a meeting this group immediately following the Secretary's call and would inform Secretary its outcome. He emphasized that since Chile had not taken public stand it is in good position to assume leadership in such conciliation efforts. Furthermore, he claimed Chile not subject to same internal pressures as other countries, mentioning specifically Brazil. Hoped to achieve, if not unanimous, at least nearly unanimous support for resolution which would strengthen rather than weaken OAS system.
Secretary emphasized (1) importance that as part of responsibilities under system, Governments not believing themselves to be so directly affected support Rio Treaty action requested by other Governments directly in line of Castro's Communist fire; (2) intense interest US public opinion Cuban problem and its inability understand why OAS should be reluctant take definite stand on issues as well as possible effect this would have on ability US support OAS; and (3) that in view of current trend Soviet policy on Berlin essential that free world in no way indicate to Khrushchev any weakening of determination to resist, and that therefore what occurs at eighth MFM in relation Communist threat has impact on that situation.
Most notable development in conversation with Mexican Foreign Minister Tello was latter's unequivocal assertion that Mexico prepared support clear pronouncement incompatibility between Communist Government which Cuba has become and Inter-American principles and agreements. Otherwise, repeated several of now familiar Mexican juridical arguments against Rio Treaty action. Suggested nevertheless that US advisers and Ambassador Sanchez Gavito join forces to endeavor to work out general resolution containing specific points for some of which Mexico might be able to vote favorably.
Haitian delegation issued statement which, as explained in backgrounder to French press representative, was interpreted to mean that Haiti intends give no support to even moral sanctions on Cuba and that its attitude at this meeting will conform strictly to that of the Mexican delegation. Foreign Minister later made completely ambiguous statement to informal meeting of 14 described below.
In informal meeting called at US instance of 14 countries which voted for holding MFM all except Uruguay and Haiti either pressed for or expressed willingness endorse immediate application diplomatic and economic sanctions. Uruguay urged need to work out action commanding wide support. Haiti took equivocal position it would study proposals in light of principles non-intervention and self-determination. Repeating basic US position in support strong action, Secretary said there were indications other six countries seeking work out formulas which would bring two groups closer together, beginning with what now appears clear consensus that Communist character and alignment Cuban Government incompatible with OAS principles and agreements.
Brazilian Foreign Minister in intimate conversation late January 22 shows deep concern re difficulty attaining common agreement and gives indications willingness take more direct approach. For example, he broached idea possible call on Cuba at this MFM to state whether Cuba will confirm standards such as those listed in Brazilian/2/ (unsatisfactory) providing now for application sanctions after 60 or 90 day waiting period. He also indicated acceptance possible removal Cuba from IADB by this MFM; prohibition movement arms from Cuba to OARS; and possible creation special committee IADB or subordinate directly to COAS intensify protection against Castro-Communist infiltration particularly in Caribbean area.
/2/The source text here indicates an omission and states that a correction will follow. No corrected copy has been found, but on the transmission copy, the relevant passage is "Brazilian formula and then (if action unsatisfactory)". (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2038)
US inscribed at eighth place in order of speaking.
Cuba (inscribed at fifteenth place) requested meeting Secretariat use one of meeting rooms to mount "exhibit" which will be open to press and other delegations immediately after "FonMin" Dorticos speaks.
Substance above may be used in general terms for Congressional briefings as appropriate.
Rusk
137. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Punta del Este, January 23, 1962, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/1-2362. Secret; Niact. Received at 7:15 p.m.
Secto 8. Eyes only for the President and Acting Secretary. No Other Distribution./2/ Have concentrated during first day of Conference on intensive consultation with other Foreign Ministers singly and in groups to get direct sense of situation and to discuss with them US political and other problems related to the Conference results.
/2/An unnumbered telegram of the same date from Punta del Este, filed with the source text, instructed that this should be interpreted to mean distribution to "top echelon Department and ARA."
On issue of obligatory diplomatic and economic sanctions there is strong support among 14 who voted December 4 to call this meeting, except for Uruguay and Haiti who, for different reasons, are wobbling. Situation which Haedo would readily resolve on cash basis of aid. Haiti is holding aloof possibly because of Duvalier's disgruntlement over recent aid discussions as well as from nervousness that Haiti may be next in terms of outside intervention against dictatorship.
It seems clear that Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Bolivia have been moving significantly in recent weeks but still too early to determine exact basis on which broad consensus might be reached.
Have used in private talks fact that President Kennedy is now calling upon US people and Congress for greater support of OAS than has any President. This includes massive Alliance for Progress program, trade authority to negotiate common market external tariffs downward on most favored nation basis and commodity arrangements. This means President needs OAS support to demonstrate to American opinion that such support is both needed and deserved. Have also spoken frankly with Foreign Ministers key larger countries about necessity OAS deciding whether such problem as Cuba can be handled multilaterally or whether we revert to unilateral action and law of jungle in hemisphere. Have also discreetly indicated what action taken this Conference could have significant bearing on Khrushchev's estimate determination of free world in decisions he must be making about such matters as Berlin and Southeast Asia.
Believe there are many points on which there could be near unanimity, including basic proposition that communist country is incompatible with membership in and obligations of hemisphere system. Even Mexico seems prepared join in some such declaration. There will also be strong support for certain detailed steps such as exclusion Cuba from Inter-American Defense Board, embargo of arms traffic between Cuba and rest of hemisphere and strengthening of Peace Committee to give it vigilance functions regarding security questions posed by Cuban activity.
As result these consultations, my present thought is that we might substitute for obligatory breach of diplomatic relations, the exclusion of present government of Cuba from participation in organs of OAS. This would, in fact, be more drastic action than breach of relations remaining countries having Ambassadors Havana. On economic side, I would be prepared to use exactly the formula used with Dominican Republic, namely, to start now with arms trade and ask COAS to recommend additional steps.
Congressional advisers naturally want strongest possible line although they recognize complications, including fact that there may not be 14 votes for simplest form of obligatory diplomatic and economic sanctions applied at this meeting.
Will have specific recommendations for President's consideration after Tuesday's consultations during which we will be getting results discussions among Argentina, Brazil and Chile as to how far they think they can go to meet our position. One important element is passionate determination Central Americans and Panama to get immediate and drastic sanctions to which they consider themselves entitled because they are countries under most direct attack.
Will advise later.
Rusk
138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador/1/
Washington, January 24, 1962, 8:10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-KE/1-2462. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Deputy Director of the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs John M. Cates, Jr., cleared by Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Carl Kaysen, and approved by Walter Collopy.
389. Please deliver soonest following message/2/ from President Kennedy to President Arosemena:
/2/The message was drafted in Punta del Este and transmitted in Secto 19, January 24, from Rusk to Kennedy, recommending that he send a message along these lines to Arosemena. (Ibid., 371.04/1-2462) Telegram 375 from Quito, January 25, reported that the message had been delivered. (Ibid., 711.11-KE/1-2562)
"Dear Mr. President:
My latest information from Punta del Este is that the governments of the hemisphere are moving rapidly toward agreement on what the Conference of Foreign Ministers should do with regard to the Cuban question. Among the elements of such an agreement are (a) procedures to suspend the present Government of Cuba from participation in the various organs of the inter-American system, and (b) the application of economic sanctions using the same formula that was applied in the case of the Dominican Republic, that is, immediate suspension of trade in arms with other items to be added only by further decision of the Council of the OAS.
I am sure that you are well aware of the intense preoccupation of the people and Congress of the United States with the Cuban problem and that we are most concerned not to leave other and smaller countries in the Caribbean area under the impression that we are indifferent to what they consider to be a genuine threat to their national security. I am confident that you would not wish Ecuador to be isolated from the large majority of the OAS who are concerned to deal with this threat to the hemisphere in order that they might release their attention and energy to the great promise of the Alliance for Progress and other efforts which all of us are making to advance the welfare of the people of the hemisphere.
I do hope you will find it possible to give your distinguished Foreign Minister broad authority to join with the very substantial majority which is rapidly forming at Punta del Este. Solidarity with the United States at this critical time in world affairs would be especially appreciated.
Please accept my very best wishes for your personal well-being and for the prosperity and progress of the Ecuadorean people.
Sincerely, John F. Kennedy."
FYI. Department hopes publicity can be avoided. End FYI.
Ball
139. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Punta del Este, January 25, 1962, 1 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/1-2562. Confidential. Repeated to Bogota, Mexico City, Guatemala City, Santiago, La Paz, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Caracas, and USUN.
Secto 23. Daily Summary Telegram. At first meeting General Committee Venezuelan Foreign Minister Falcon Briceno and Costa Rican Foreign Minister Vargas Fernandez elected chairman and rapporteur respectively.
Colombia, Mexico and Guatemala spoke during morning session and Chile, Bolivia and Brazil in afternoon.
Colombian Foreign Minister gave carefully reasoned speech explaining juridical basis Colombian initiative for MFM under Article 6 Rio Treaty. He traced development inter-American collective system indicating application this system is not intervention and failure could lead to unilateral action. He called for break diplomatic, economic and consular relations with Cuba, COAS maintaining vigilance over situation and prompt handling of problem incompatibility Cuba's continued participation OAS.
Mexican Foreign Minister Tello repeated familiar juridical arguments Rio Treaty not applicable this type situation but closed with strong statement asserting incompatibility between a government's adopting Marxism-Leninism and continued participation in OAS. He said membership in OAS irreconcilable with adoption governmental system characteristics of which not those representative democracy.
Guatemalan Foreign Minister Unda Murillo made sharp and at times telling attack on Castro regime for its association with Sino-Soviet bloc, promotion subversive activities and violation human rights. Effectiveness of speech blunted by length and repetitiveness.
Chilean Foreign Minister Martinez Sotomayor concentrated on general review inter-American principles and need for strengthening inter-American system by overcoming threat of misery and under- development in Latin American countries; said we should focus on preserving unity and strengthening of inter-American system; recognized that Cuba by adopting Marxism-Leninism has separated itself from inter-American system but thought sanctions were not answer to making Castro regime change policies; said political sanctions should not be applied this problem and economic sanctions not effective in view Cuban trade pattern with Sino-Soviet bloc aid certain western nations.
Bolivian Foreign Minister Fellman traced history Bolivian Revolution and described internal matters of interest to Bolivia, such as commodity prices, economic development assistance and access to sea. He stressed principles self-determination and non-intervention arguing meeting should not take punitive action, but urge governments organize themselves on basis free elections and representative democracy.
Burden long speech by Brazilian Foreign Minister Dantas was that door should be left open for Cuba return to American family of nations instead of adopting measures which would only serve to push it irrevo-cably into Sino-Soviet bloc. He described Brazil's formula for "neutralization" of Cuba through set of negative conditions that would govern future relations between Cuba and inter-American system.
Secretary met at midday with Argentine and Chilean Foreign Ministers who brought memorandum said to represent views themselves and five others (Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Haiti and Mexico). Memorandum contemplates resolution which after restatement certain principles focuses on incompatibility between present Cuban regime and inter-American system and prescribes means for regulating resulting relationship, with implication this might require amendment OAS Charter. Additional items on inter-American defense board and traffic in arms not spelled out. Memorandum asserts above would offer "adequate" basis MFM action, and insisted no sanctions should be approved either now or after fixed period.
In response Foreign Minister Carcano's question whether US would support resolution on above basis, Secretary stated while he felt it offers certain possibilities, it did not meet minimum requirements in at least two important respects: (a) absence obligatory diplomatic and economic break or an alternative such as expulsion Cuba from system, and (b) a formula on suspension economic relations in manner this done Dominican Republic. Secretary said that he believed time had come endeavor bring together governments favoring firmest action and those supporting above formula in order start building bridge of agreement instead of walls between two groups OAS members. Carcano and Martinez agreed this would be good idea and said that after checking with other members their group steps would be taken create informal working group with representatives Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Colombia, Venezuela, US and one from Central American and Panama group. By arrangement with Uruguayan chairman of meeting, such group being formed and US delegation planning provide it with draft forwarded Department (Secto 18)./2/
/2/Secto 18, January 24, called for excluding Cuba from participation in the bodies of the Inter-American system, excluding it from the Inter-American Defense Board, and partial interruption of economic relations of all member states with Cuba, beginning with the immediate suspension of trade in arms and implements of war. (Ibid., 371.04/1-2462)
Above may be used in Congressional briefings as required and appropriate.
Rusk
140. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/1-2862. Secret; Niact. Received at 4:49 a.m. and passed to the White House.
Punta del Este, January 28, 1962, 2 a.m.
Secto 36. Eyes only for President and Acting Secretary. No Other Distribution./2/ General speeches were concluded last evening and Foreign Ministers have spent today in intensive consultations to try to draw conference to prompt and satisfactory conclusion. One striking aspect here is to see how much hemisphere has moved, including such countries as Brazil and Mexico, since similar conference at San Jose sixteen months ago.
/2/An unnumbered telegram of the same date from Punta del Este, filed with the source text, instructed that if necessary this should be interpreted to mean distribution to "top echelon Department and ARA."
There is practically unanimous agreement on (1) a general declaration about communism in relation to principles and purposes of hemispheric system; (2) a short but strong reaffirmation of Alliance for Progress to make point that Castro-Communism is not the answer to economic and social development; (3) a clear declaration that the present Marxist-Leninist Government of Cuba is incompatible with the obligations and privileges of hemispheric system; (4) the immediate expulsion of Cuba from the Inter-American Defense Board; (5) the immediate interruption of trade and traffic in arms and strategic items to and from Cuba and the hemisphere; (6) the establishment of a special security committee to the COAS to recommend measures for protection against subversion, espionage, etc., etc.
Remaining points of difference turn on exact solution to (a) expulsion or suspension of present Government of Cuba from organs and agencies of the OAS; (b) authorization to COAS to recommend, in terms of Dominican precedent, suspension of trade in other items.
Differences by end of day have become narrow but deep since it is an underlying juridical difference about whether we can or should invoke the Rio Treaty against Cuba.
I wish to emphasize that the problem now is not the US position but that of reconciling sharply divergent views between the two principal wings of this conference. If we move slightly in one direction we lose support from the other. We are searching for a solution in the practical realm which will leave delegations to weave their own juridical theories. We are not overlooking possibilities of getting near complete unanimity on a satisfactory basis but we shall be during Sunday in the somewhat tense final phase which is normal to such multilateral negotiations.
I have been surprised by the distance which Brazil and Mexico have moved since early December. My sharpest difficulty might be to get certain intransigents such as Ydigoras and Prado to take a firm but reasonable rather than an extremely belligerent view.
Congressional advisers have given us understanding and loyal support. I have not departed from position authorized by President in discussions with them but I am not unmindful of fact that if they come back reasonably satisfied our Alliance for Progress and other programs affecting Latin America will have strong and crucial support.
We are very close to a good result but not yet out of danger of a bad one. At end of day I am moderately optimistic.
Rusk
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