Docs 141-171
Washington, January 28, 1962, 2:38 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/1-2862. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Ball.
Tosec 48. For Secretary from Ball. In conversation with President last night he reflected concern way press was playing Punta del Este conference as defeat for United States if anything less than full sanctions approved. He thought you might wish consider backgrounder in Punta del Este for United States correspondents pointing out limited character of results we had originally hoped for and progress you were making in equalling or surpassing initial realistic expectations. He feels that press here is representing our original expectations extravagantly and consequently any result less than sweeping sanctions may be interpreted as defeat. At same time he is fully aware of sensitivity of situation in Punta del Este and need to avoid any suggestion in press stories as to views of United States Delegation which might adversely affect course of negotiations.
I pass these comments on for your consideration, in the light of the situation as you appraise it on the spot. Meanwhile I have spoken to Fulbright who believes that suspension from OAS organizations far more significant than economic sanctions. I feel confident that if you obtain suspension resolution he would be prepared to announce he regards this as triumph. Along same line believe it possible to arrange for other similar expressions of opinion and as soon as probable shape and form of resolution becomes clear we shall take steps here to prepare ground for appropriate statements to be made once resolution finally adopted.
Example of press treatment specifically called to my attention by President is today's New York Times article by Tad Szulc headlined "Split on Cuba is Blow to U.S." Main burden of article is that US did not prepare ground sufficiently and was unrealistically optimistic about results.
Ball
142. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Punta del Este, January 30, 1962, 4 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/1-3062. Secret; Niact. Received at 3 a.m. and passed to the White House.
Secto 41. Eyes only for the President and Acting Secretary. No Other Distribution. Deliver White House for President before 8:00 a.m. Conference has reached point where there is general agreement on every element of a fine result, except matter of expulsion or suspension of Cuba from OAS organs and agencies. Full day and night of most intensive negotiations has failed to produce a formula on which there can be more than 13 votes. What I have been working for is an answer which could get at least 18 if not 20 votes in order not to give Castro the satisfaction of having more important Latin American countries appear to be defending him. Bear in mind that exclusion or suspension from OAS organs is substitute for diplomatic sanctions which can probably get only 13 votes.
Argentina and Chile are more pliable but are unwilling to leave Brazil and Mexico completely in lurch. Latter two are ready to see Cuba expelled from most OAS organs but find it difficult for internal reasons to say so at this meeting. On other side, Colombia is leading Central American and rightist LA group but Colombian Foreign Minister is taking exceedingly stubborn position that this meeting must make executive decision to exclude Cuba from OAS now. Colombian FM is making no effort to find formula to produce unity on this point. Prospect is, therefore, that entire program is jeopardized because failure to agree on exclusion will mean no voting on all other items now agreed. I myself agree we must solve this question in order to make acceptable package meeting general support.
Have not had chance to consult Congressional advisers after tonight's consultations going well past midnight but will see them first thing Tuesday morning. I will emphasize to them importance you and I attach to avoidance of split of OAS on basis bare 14 votes if possible, particularly since we have only 13.
Believe it would be of inestimable value if you could telephone Lleras Camargo immediately to ask him to instruct his Foreign Minister to give me maximum cooperation to find formula which could unite OAS on satisfactory basis rather than suffer fatal breakdown this conference and devastating split OAS. As former Secretary General OAS he should be responsive this appeal. Time is of essence because this tempest in teapot is making US and OAS look ridiculous.
Will meet with Central American and hard-line LA countries early Tuesday morning to attempt moderate their views. But what is needed is a genuine desire particularly by Colombia to find generally acceptable formula.
Regret this situation but it is consequence of bare majority of 14 which called this meeting over serious objections of other important countries and insufficient time for intergovernmental preparations before conference convened. As background your talk with Lleras Camargo, recall that Colombia precipitated December 4 action and this meeting without prior consultation with us. They have special obligation to do everything possible to make it outstanding success it could be if we could solve this particular deadlock.
Request you not instruct me to attempt proceed with remainder agreed program without solution to this problem because resentment would be so high among many delegations that conference would collapse without tangible results. Lleras Camargo should telephone his Foreign Minister to give us maximum time advantage.
Have had diplomatic undercover evidence here of deep jealousies between most small Latin American countries and few larger more important ones, as reflected earlier conference here on Alliance for Progress. Am confident that if we can settle this one remaining question, conference could provide startling demonstration unity of hemisphere and strong movement on communism and Castro during past several weeks and months.
Rusk
143. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Colombia/1/
Washington, January 30, 1962, 10:18 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.8/1-3062. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Cates, cleared by McGeorge Bundy and Brubeck, and approved by Ball. Repeated to Punta del Este.
604. President Kennedy talked briefly with President Lleras Camargo this morning with regard to possibility of Colombia cooperating with US in reaching agreement on Cuban exclusion from OAS. The President felt somewhat constrained in view open telephone circuit and requests you present following message to President Lleras soonest:
"In confirmation and amplification of our telephone conversation this morning I wish to emphasize what we firmly believe to be importance of reaching conference decision which will have broadest possible support.
Current situation at Punta del Este Conference is that we have only thirteen sure votes for exclusion Cuba from OAS and feel that if we do not reach as near unanimity as possible result will be victory for Castro and weakening of inter-American system.
We believe possible develop formula which moves toward exclusion of Cuba by subsequent action of Council and possibly Inter-American Conference and which will meet views Argentina Chile Brazil Mexico.
We recognize and greatly value energy and firmness Colombian stand throughout Conference but realize danger of grave split in OAS system if we insist on full exclusion Cuba now. Your FonMin is key man and we are disturbed by prospect of disagreement with him. That is why I have asked for your help in obtaining his cooperation work closely with Rusk in favor of compromise which can attract widest support. Unless we reach some such agreement I fear inter-American system will suffer serious blow and Alliance for Progress will be set back.
I feel an agreement on incompatibility of Cuba with principles of OAS, exclusion of Cuba from Inter-American Defense Board and establishment special watch dog committee plus agreement in principle appropriate steps to be taken to exclude Cuba from OAS would add up to successful conference.
As I said on the telephone I am most grateful for your willingness to help me in this matter and feel confident that your representative and mine working together can assure a highly successful result. John F. Kennedy"/2/
/2/Telegram 546 from Bogota, January 31, reported that Lleras had telephoned Caicedo, who told him that Uruguay had now accepted the Colombian/Central American resolution with a minor modification, making 14 votes, and that Argentina and Chile had decided to abstain. (Ibid., 721.00/1-3162)
Ball
144. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Punta del Este, January 31, 1962, 5 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/1-3162. Confidential; Eyes Only; Niact. Received at 4:49 a.m. and passed to the White House.
Secto 47. Eyes only for the President and Acting Secretary. No Other Distribution. Six resolutions representing our six-point program were passed by conference early this morning with twenty votes for strong declaration on Communist offensive in hemisphere, Alliance for Progress and expulsion Cuba from Inter-American Defense Board. Establishment of security committee received nineteen votes, one abstention. Economic measures sixteen votes, four abstentions and exclusion Cuba from organs and agencies OAS fourteen votes, six abstentions./2/
/2/The texts of the resolutions are printed in the "Final Act of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving As Organ of Consultation in Application to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Punta del Este, Uruguay, January 22-31, 1962" (OAS doc. OEA/Ser.C/II.8), and in Department of State Bulletin, February 19, 1962, pp. 278-283.
Only disappointment was exclusion vote with Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Bolivia abstaining on resolution as whole although joining with majority to give twenty votes on first two operating paragraphs underlining incompatibility Marxism-Leninism and present Cuban Government with inter-American system. Efforts to find formula to bridge gap continued up to final stage. Uruguay played courageous and key role in providing fourteenth vote. Keenest disappointment was emphasis abstainers on juridical arguments to such an extent as to imply majority was acting illegally. They let us down not so much by their votes as by way they handled it. In each instance severe internal problems were cited privately as determining their attitude and in all countries except Argentina I must confess these factors obviously dangerous and important. Brazil has especially vulnerable internal factors with government which manages to stabilize the left and which is anxious not to provide Quadros liberal and leftist support.
I would suggest general theme your press conference this subject ought to be program as a whole indicating remarkable movement in hemisphere in past several months in recognizing dangers of Communist penetration program in startling contrast to results San Jose conference sixteen months ago and far more than could have been reasonably expected as late as early December. Would try to get specific point of difference into context entire achievement and context of unanimous recognition of incompatibility Cuban regime with inter-American system. You might point out that smaller countries especially in and around Caribbean feel themselves to be under direct Castro-Communist pressures and that US felt it important that OAS give these countries its full support. Countries at greater distance from Cuba feel less directly threatened by Castroism. Would urge caution in discussing questions of diplomatic victory or defeats as between friends in OAS; OAS itself scored a most significant victory looking at program as whole. Most important you not show irritation or annoyance those abstaining expulsion vote since we must proceed on basis closest cooperation with them.
Congressional advisers pleased with results but naturally upset about countries abstaining expulsion vote. But I know they will return with better appreciation realities Latin American scene and with conviction that conference succeeded.
Rusk
145. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, February 6, 1962.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 24, Daily Staff Meetings. Secret. Drafted by Colonel Lawrence J. Legere.
SUBJECT
Daily Staff Meeting, 6 February 1962
1. Mr. Bundy presided. Although the main purpose of the meeting was to listen to Walt Rostow's summary of the Punta del Este conference, Bundy did mention
[Here follow references to two unrelated matters.]
2. Rostow's discussion of Punta del Este was, as are all his presentations, interesting but perhaps a little discursive compared to his usual style. Perhaps the most significant part of his discussion was a small by-play between him and Bundy on the degree of unanimity achieved for the final resolution of the conference. Bundy seemed to think that, given the President's desire for as nearly a unanimous outcome as possible, we might have done better than to squeak by with the minimum fourteen votes for a bare two-thirds majority. Rostow, however, said he felt strongly that Secretary Rusk, who worked like a Trojan night and day, had done the best he could do in conscience. It was true that at one point the Argentine delegation proposed a mealy-mouthed anti-Communist compromise resolution which might have achieved unanimity or close to it, but the Secretary felt that a more meaningful outcome was to secure the fourteen votes he got for a resolution that meant something.
3. Rostow feels that all delegations gained something by the conference outcome. The United States succeeded in deflating the Cuban issue in domestic politics (the Congressional delegates were able to see at first hand how tough the going was to achieve the end result obtained), plus a goodly gain in good will among all the Latin American delegations for having put forth an honest, conscientious, polished try. In a rather contemptible manner, the big conservative powers such as Argentina and Chile could record a gain because they had opposed Uncle Sam and placated the left wing oppositions in their own countries.
4. Rostow noted the potential importance of the five-man security committee/2/ which the Alliance had agreed to establish as a watch dog over the development of insurgency situations or even actual arms shipments. This committee should be under strong political control for obvious reasons. The Pentagon has under consideration the question of who will be the US member, and Rostow personally feels that General Thomas White might be a good bet, given his broad outlook, sophisticated background, and command of at least Spanish and maybe Portuguese.
/2/Resolution II called for the creation of a Special Consultative Committee on Security.
5. DefCons--no change.
LJL
146. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 4, 1962, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-462. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Wilson and approved in S on April 12. The conversation was held in the Secretary's office.
SUBJECT
Cuban Situation
PARTICIPANTS
Brazilian Foreign Minister San Tiago Dantas
The Secretary
Ambassador Lincoln Gordon
Mr. J. W. Wilson, Officer in Charge of Brazilian Affairs
In the course of a conversation on other matters, the Cuban situation was discussed.
In response to the Secretary's inquiry as to his opinion on the Cuban situation, the Foreign Minister replied that there is a rapid daily deterioration. Castro is in a fight with the Communists, who have increased the strength of their apparatus, and is in danger of being discarded by them. He has appealed to the esprit de corps of the barbudos. The food situation is bad. He cited as significant the recent action of the Cuban Government in exporting to the USSR appliances, etc. taken from private homes in order to pay for food imports.
The Foreign Minister said Brazil is in a good position to follow and influence the situation. (The Secretary interjected that this may soon be a "unique" position.) For this reason he is interested in what the U.S. views are of this evolution in Cuba--of getting Fidel away from the Communists. The Foreign Minister said there can be no thought of retreating from the Cuban revolution, of return to the Cardonas and the like, the status quo ante. It would be easier to create the conditions for a new form of democratic revolution. In response to a question by Ambassador Gordon, the Foreign Minister indicated that this might be something on the model of Yugoslavia. He asserted that it is clear that Khrushchev despises Fidel.
The Secretary said that, while their conversation was speculation, of course, he wanted to make sure it was understood clearly that from the U.S. viewpoint two things are not negotiable: (1) the direct Cuban ties with Moscow, such as arms and the Communist apparatus; and (2) Cuban subversive actions elsewhere in the hemisphere. If the situation inside Cuba should involve a clear break with Moscow and the concentration of Cuban activities in Cuba, then the possibility would be opened for a change of the policies of other countries. We have known of some top level defections and discontent (among those still in Cuba) over the embracing of the Communist apparatus.
The Secretary emphasized that, as President Kennedy has stated publicly, it is not the expropriations nor the internal changes in Cuba which are our concern; it is the ties with Moscow and the subversion elsewhere in the hemisphere. If Castro had support free from the Communist apparatus and cut the ties to Moscow, this would create a new situation.
The Foreign Minister then inquired whether the Secretary thought the idea of trying to wean Castro away from the Communists had some merit. The Secretary responded by pointing to the fact that we have never asked Brazil to break relations with Cuba, an omission which is not due to accident.
In recapitulating the Secretary's two points of U.S. policy on Cuba, the Foreign Minister said it was his understanding that these were tied to formal Communist participation in the Cuban regime and that, if these were removed, other points would be negotiable. He stated parenthetically that Castro is not weak internally. The Secretary said evidence of cutting the ties with Moscow would be, for example, reconciliation with Castro's early supporters who have left him on the Communist issue and the dropping of the language of Communism. When the Foreign Minister inquired if the U.S. made a distinction between diplomatic relations and ties with the U.S.S.R., the Secretary said that a change such as breaking ties would probably bring on a break in relations.
The Secretary mentioned the problem of asylees in the Ecuadoran Embassy and wondered if the Cubans would let some of them out of Cuba for Brazil. The Foreign Minister said the Brazilian Embassy was taking them in liberally and commented on the numbers in various Embassies. Some had been let out of the country in the past, he said.
In concluding the discussion of Cuba, the Secretary said he wished to make two more points. (1) There will be no military invasion of Cuba except in the event of fighting with the Soviet Union over something elsewhere, such as Berlin. (2) We do not take seriously the threats of Khrushchev to support Cuba. Khrushchev will not sacrifice the Soviet Union for Cuba.
With regard to an appointment to continue their discussion upon the Foreign Minister's return from Mexico, the Secretary said he was free all Thursday afternoon, April 12. He proposed that, should the weather be good, they take a cruise on the Potomac in the President's boat, having lunch on board and talking during the afternoon.
The Foreign Minister said he intended to summon the Brazilian Ambassador in Habana to Mexico City during his visit there. When the Secretary cautioned on the need for holding closely knowledge of their discussion, the Foreign Minister assured him of the Ambassador's discretion.
147. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Mexico City, June 29, 1962, 4:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.12/7-662. Secret. Drafted by Mann on July 3 and approved by the White House on July 10. The source text, marked Part II, is filed with a July 6 covering memorandum from Department of State Executive Secretary William H. Brubeck to Bundy, which also enclosed a memorandum of Part I of the conversation.
SUBJECT
Communism in Latin America
PARTICIPANTS
President Kennedy
President Lopez Mateos
Foreign Minister Tello
Ambassador Mann
Mr. Martin
Ambassador Carrillo Flores
President Kennedy brought up the subject of the danger of the spread of Communism in Latin America, particularly in the Caribbean basin, as a result of Sino/Soviet influence in Cuba and the use of Cuba as a springboard.
President Kennedy first asked whether President Lopez Mateos thought that the Cuban people would be able in the foreseeable future to recover their sovereignty from the Castro regime. President Lopez Mateos expressed the opinion that while the Castro regime had lost ground with the Cuban people because it had perverted the original purposes of the revolution and had come under the influence of the Communist bloc, it seemed doubtful, as a practical matter, that the Cuban people would be able to do very much about it in the foreseeable future because of the nature and military strength of the Castro regime. President Lopez Mateos doubted that the Communist revolution could gradually become a national type of revolution such as the one which took place in Mexico.
There was some discussion about the ability and disposition of the Soviet Union to give meaningful aid to Cuba.
President Kennedy, following up on President Lopez Mateos' appraisal of Castro's chances for survival, then asked what President Lopez Mateos thought could be done to prevent the spread of Soviet power and doctrine via Cuba to other American Republics. President Kennedy mentioned his concern with Soviet activities in countries like Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala and Ecuador. Guerrilla activities in Colombia and the recent revolts in Venezuela were specifically mentioned.
President Lopez Mateos acknowledged that this was a very difficult question. He said that Mexico had the ability to deal with Communist subversion and implied each country should take whatever measures are necessary to defend itself. Mr. Tello suggested at this point that it is important that Latin American countries prevent their territories from being used as a base of operations against other American Republics.
President Lopez Mateos repeated the familiar Mexican thesis: The important thing is to create better economic and social conditions and especially to provide jobs. When the people were better off, he thought it would not be easy for the Communists to lead them astray. He stressed his opinion that the Alliance for Progress is the best way to combat Communism.
President Kennedy replied that he did not underestimate the importance of economic growth and social progress; nor was he suggesting that Communism was an immediate danger in the United States or Mexico. But he pointed out it would take a decade to achieve the objectives of the Alliance for Progress even under the best of conditions. In the meantime, the question was: What did Mexico think should be done to prevent the spread of Communism in other American Republics? President Kennedy pointed out that, as Cuba shows, once a Communist regime has fastened itself on a country, it is most difficult for the people to rid themselves of it.
The Foreign Minister then recalled that Mexico was the first country at Punta del Este to openly espouse the doctrine of incompatibility between Cuba and the inter-American system and argued that this was a very substantial contribution to the success of Punta del Este because this was the thesis that prevailed rather than the Colombian or Peruvian doctrines. He explained again the Mexican juridical doctrine of the necessity for amending the Charter of the OAS so that there would be a sound legal basis for collective action.
The Foreign Minister went on to say that the Castro regime had made many "mistakes" and in his opinion would continue to make mistakes. He said that Chile, for example, had recently been on the verge of breaking relations with Cuba. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
President Kennedy returned again and again to his question of what President Lopez Mateos thought was the best way to deal with the obvious danger of an expansion of Communist influence in Latin America. President Lopez Mateos each time repeated his view that rapid economic development and social progress was the answer. In the end he said he would give the matter more thought.
In the course of the discussion, President Kennedy stated that the United States wished to deal with the problem of Communist penetration in the hemisphere in cooperation with other Latin American states like Mexico. He said he wanted to keep in close touch with Mexico on this point and to reach agreement on practical measures which could be taken by American states to deal with the threat. He said the United States had no plans at the present time for unilateral military action against the Castro regime.
148. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, August 30, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/8-3062. Confidential. Drafted by Director of the Office of Regional Political Affairs Ward P. Allen and Martin.
SUBJECT
Informal Meeting of OAS Foreign Ministers
Discussion
Enthusiasm for the United States resolution on Latin American military coups/2/ is lagging with the general resumption of relations with Peru. After considerable negotiating of text, we can still not be sure of a majority. The Argentine Ambassador has indicated that his government cannot vote for our resolution but would think it useful to have an informal meeting of Foreign Ministers to discuss this subject. This would substitute an informal meeting in the immediate future for the formal meeting in the indefinite future as proposed in the United States resolution. Moreover, such an informal, private meeting, precedent for which was established in 1958,/3/ would have the advantage of demonstrating our continuing concern with the problem of coups but without public debate or voting of resolutions on the subject.
/2/Reference is to a U.S. draft resolution presented to the OAS Council on August 16. The text of the operative portions is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 308. Related documentation is in Department of State, Central Files 371.04 and 371.05.
/3/Reference is to an informal meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics held in Washington September 23-24, 1958. The text of the communique issued at the conclusion of the meeting is printed in Department of State Bulletin, October 13, 1958, pp. 575-576. See also Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. V, p. 37, footnote 2.
In addition, there is widespread concern in Latin America about news accounts of recent arrivals of Soviet arms and men in Cuba. The Guatemalan Government has suggested a meeting of the OAS Foreign Ministers to consider what action should be taken. This could be better handled at an informal meeting.
You could also give them a general briefing. The Berlin crisis is serious. The Geneva disarmament negotiations have been the scene of important new Western proposals. These are both matters in which there is much interest in Latin America and should be more. It is in our interest to give the Latin American Foreign Ministers a greater sense of participation in these developments.
The XI Inter-American Conference scheduled for Quito in 1960, in accordance with the OAS Charter, has been twice postponed. Meanwhile an agenda of over 40 items has accumulated. It would be desirable to decide whether or not this series of Conferences at 5-year intervals should be continued, replaced by something else or abandoned. This, too, could be taken up at the informal meeting and a manageable agenda of five or six items could be worked out for the Quito Conference.
In addition to the above matters, such a meeting could discuss and perhaps resolve the pending problem of the admission of Jamaica and Trinidad to the OAS.
Everything considered, it would appear highly desirable for the United States to issue invitations for an informal two-day meeting of Foreign Ministers in Washington/4/ during the last ten days of September or early October when many of the Foreign Ministers will be in the United States for the UN General Assembly opening.
/4/At this point on the source text, the words "or New York" were handwritten in the margin. Rusk crossed out Washington and wrote "in N.Y.", which he underscored twice.
Recommendations/5/
/5/Rusk initialed his approval of recommendations 1 and 2 on August 31. He wrote in the margin next to recommendation 3, "Not necessary to bother him. DR".
1. That we respond favorably to the Argentine suggestion and informally seek to develop support for such a meeting with the other American Republics.
2. That, assuming generally favorable response, the United States take the initiative in arranging such a meeting.
3. That you secure the approval of the President for taking up these matters in this way.
149. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in the American Republics/1/
Washington, September 16, 1962, 12:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/9-1662. Confidential. Drafted by Allen, cleared in substance by Deputy Director of the Office of International Conferences Richard S. Wheeler, and approved by Martin. Sent to all diplomatic posts in the American Republics except Kingston and repeated to USUN, POLAD/CINCLANT and POLAD/CINCARIB.
468. Please convey following to FonMin soonest:
Response various FonMins to consultation initiated by Secretary September 5/2/ indicates general receptivity to idea informal MFM. Taking into account wishes and convenience largest number, Secy therefore wishes invite his colleagues meet with him in Washington Tuesday and probably Wednesday, Oct 2 and 3. In view informal nature gathering, no formal agenda necessary. Meetings would be closed. Secy would initiate meeting with general review world situation with emphasis on Berlin and other major problems. He would follow with appraisal Cuban situation on which we hope there will be general exchange views. We also expect at least Argentina, Venezuela and US will have comments to make on international aspects general question coups d'etat in American Republics as they may affect political tensions in hemisphere and success Alliance for Progress. There also some indications FonMins may want consider desirability COAS review agenda 11th IA Conference order eliminate all items except those major importance. However this matter, as well as any exchange views on possible date of Conference, may well take place outside meeting.
/2/Circular telegram 388, September 5, summarized a meeting that day between Rusk and Latin American Ambassadors, in which Rusk discussed the Cuban situation and suggested an informal meeting of Foreign Ministers in New York, where many would be attending the U.N. General Assembly. (Ibid., 737.00/9-562) A record of the meeting was transmitted in Document 153.
There would be no voting or any resolution emerging from meeting, but if a consensus develops on any subject this might be expressed in public communique to be issued close of meeting.
Secretary hopes all his colleagues will be able attend and dates have been arranged in order facilitate maximum attendance. However Secretary understands of course that in few cases attendance FonMin may prove impossible, in which event it hoped FonMin could deputize special high-level representative attend in his place.
Secretary desires invite those attending to informal dinner October 2.
Following points for your background and use your discretion:
(1) Consultations indicate probable attendance all FonMins above dates except Mexican (who agreeable to meeting but committed accompany President Far East tour), Peruvian, Uruguayan and Chilean, whose attendance uncertain.
(2) While Secretary does not plan stress problem coups, we believe it desirable not overlook question, in view position taken by US in its pending COAS resolution that discussion by FonMins appropriate, in view fact original Argentine initiative proposed informal meeting for this explicit purpose/3/ and in view strong feelings Venezuelan FonMin and others that problem must be raised. Any discussion will not refer to Peruvian situation. Moreover, informal discussion this matter would make it unnecessary for US to press its resolution in Council.
/3/The Argentine suggestion was made in an August 21 aide-memoire, the text of which was transmitted in telegram 553 from Buenos Aires, August 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/8-2162)
(3) On balance we think it undesirable meeting take up question Bolivian withdrawal which inextricably mixed with Rio Lauca dispute which might well make Chilean attendance impossible.
(4) In view Ecuadorean desire that question postponement Quito Conference not be discussed because of domestic political repercussions, we do not wish press this issue but believe corridor talks re streamlining agenda should not embarass Ecuadoreans. Quito may assure FonMin communique if any will not contain any reference this matter without their approval.
(5) In view fact question admission new members now in process consideration COAS and in deference Guatemala's desire it not be discussed at meeting, US does not propose raise it.
(6) SYG Mora will be invited attend.
(7) Meetings will be held in Department conference rooms and not in PAU, but this does not preclude possibility some ceremonial session after meeting at PAU with FonMins acting as Council members if this desired.
Rusk
150. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, September 18, 1962, 11:49 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 612.37/9-1862. Secret. Drafted by Sayre and approved in S October 12. The conversation was held at the Department of State. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)
SUBJECT
Mexican policy towards Cuba
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Antonio Carrillo Flores--Ambassador of Mexico
Mr. Martin--Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
Mr. Sayre--Officer in Charge, Mexican Affairs
The Ambassador called at the Secretary's request. The Secretary inquired about the projected trip of President Lopez Mateos to the Far East. He said that the United States wanted to do whatever it could to assist the President while he was in the country. The Ambassador expressed appreciation for this offer. He thought the President would make a technical stop at Los Angeles on October 4, would stay over night at Honolulu on October 5, and make another technical stop at Guam on October 6.
The Secretary then turned to a discussion of the Cuban situation.
The Secretary said that he had little to add to the facts which he had described earlier to the Latin American Ambassadors. In response to the Ambassador's question, he said that the weapons received by Cuba were normally used in a defensive system. He noted, however, that they had offensive capability if targets came within range, e.g., if a U.S. aircraft flying outside Cuban territorial waters came within the 17-mile range of ground-to-air missiles it could be shot down. He acknowledged that the weapons did not constitute a direct military threat to the U.S. and that they would require minimum attention if the U.S. had to move into Cuba. He said that the United States of course had no intention of permitting Cuba to export any of these to other Latin American countries.
The Secretary said that the American republics had to recognize that the Castro regime could not be permitted to continue in the Hemisphere for an extended period because it was incompatible as the Foreign Ministers had said at Punta del Este. He said that the United States is concerned about Cuban subversive activities, the large number of Latins receiving training in Cuba, and the amount of money being provided from Cuba for activities in other countries. He said that the people of the United States are seriously concerned about Cuba, as are the other republics. He said that some might consider these feelings irrational, but that these feelings are a fact and the United States Government had to deal with the situation with them in mind. The Ambassador said that he could confirm from his own experience that the people of the United States viewed the Cuban issue with considerable emotion. He said he is unable to make a speech anywhere without the question arising. The Secretary said that in explaining this situation to the NATO parliamentarians he had told them that all the money their countries are spending on publicity campaigns in the United States would be to no avail so long as ships carrying their flags participated in the Cuban trade.
The Secretary said that the U.S. considers that extra-continental intervention in the Hemisphere is a fact. We believe that Cuba intends to export its system to other countries. We view Castro-Communist activities as deeply antagonistic not only to the OAS Charter but to the values and systems of each of the republics. He urged that Mexico review its position on Cuba, giving the most solemn consideration to Mexico's own interest, to the views of Mexico's neighbors who look to her for leadership, to Mexico's commitment in the Hemisphere, and to what Cuba really means to Mexico and to the Hemisphere.
The Secretary said that he did not want to make any specific proposals to Mexico. These would occur to Mexico as it studied the problem. He did want to mention that Mexico's neighbors are preoccupied by the large number of their citizens who are passing through Mexico enroute to Cuba. The use of Mexico in this manner is disturbing to them and they are frustrated in dealing with the problem. He noted that a Mexican airline provides part of the service. He said that the U.S. feels that a strict watch should be kept on activities in the Caribbean. The American republics could not afford secrecy in this area. He said he knew Mexico maintained some surveillance against possible movements to and from Cuba. He expressed the hope that this could be increased and Mexico could announce publicly its action. The Secretary mentioned the subversive activities of the Cuban Embassy and consular personnel in Mexico. The Ambassador referred to the strict controls which his Government maintains at the Mexico City airport as an example of surveillance over Cuban diplomatic and consular personnel. The Secretary said he referred to Cuban diplomatic activities only as a point which Mexico might want to consider. Maybe such activities could be controlled by limiting the number of Cuban personnel in Mexico.
The Secretary emphasized again that he was not proposing or asking for any specific action but did want to suggest that Mexico earnestly explore what was in its own best interest and that of the Hemisphere. The Ambassador inquired whether he could say that the sense of the Secretary's remarks was that Mexico should show it is preoccupied and not indifferent to the problem. The Secretary hoped that Mexico could go further, and show that it is deeply concerned. He said Hemisphere leaders had to look forward, and see where continuance of the present situation would lead. He noted that this is the first time that people now living have had to deal with the problems of a vicious form of intervention in the Hemisphere. The Secretary said he thought everything should be done to isolate Cuba and was afraid Mexico was not conveying an impression of solidarity.
The Ambassador said that he had not previously been confronted with so difficult and complex a problem in US-Mexican relations. He thought it was a political and not a military problem. He understood the Secretary to be urging that Mexico consider how it could best establish that it had a sense of solidarity with other republics on the Cuban issue. He recalled that President L#pez Mateos had said in meeting with President Kennedy that Castro was no longer a popular figure and was now a tool of the Soviets. Mexico also recognized Cuba might be a greater problem for Mexico than the U.S. The problem was to find a solution that would not boomerang. Mexico was limited by its own political situation and upcoming presidential election. President Lopez Mateos is seeking to avoid an open fight between the extreme left and right. Steps by Mexico on the Castro regime therefore would have serious political consequence. Thus President Lopez Mateos had to make concessions first to the right and then to the left in order to maintain harmony. He noted Mexico's relations with Spain were a concession to the left. Assistant Secretary Martin suggested the Mexican President might consider making concessions to the right on Cuba.
The Secretary said that the problem for the U.S. is not just political or one of public opinion in the U.S. or Congress. In a real sense, it involved the future of Cuba and of the Hemisphere. Cuba is the first point of confrontation with the Soviets in the Hemisphere. He noted that the U.S. has a million men on duty outside the U.S., with casualties a weekly occurrence.
The Secretary said that the Soviets are investing substantial sums in Cuba. He noted that the Soviets are not investing this for Cuba alone, but with the thought that Cuba is a bridgehead to the rest of Latin America. If the American republics could demonstrate that the investment will not pay off, the Soviets might reconsider the value of Cuba because the Soviets cannot afford such an investment on Cuba alone.
The Ambassador inquired as to the possibility of a meeting between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev and whether Cuba would be discussed. The Secretary indicated that he thought not, because the Soviets would link Cuba to Turkey or some other spot. Assistant Secretary Martin noted that agreement by the U.S. to discuss Cuba with the Soviets would be in keeping with Khrushchev's view that the Monroe Doctrine is dead.
151. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in the American Republics/1/
Washington, September 21, 1962, 8:23 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/9-2162. Confidential. Drafted by Bowdler, cleared by Martin, and approved by Allen. Sent to all diplomatic posts in the American Republics except Kingston and Port-of-Spain and to USUN, and repeated to POLAD CINCARIB and POLAD CINCLANT.
508. Depcirtel 468./2/ Department believes that informal MFM at conclusion its deliberations should issue public communique containing meaningful statements regarding increased danger Cuban subversion and aggression and specifying defensive measures which American community should take meet it.
/2/Document 149.
We believe communique might include following elements:
1. Recognition recent Cuban arms build-up with Soviet military personnel and equipment intensifies dangers hemispheric peace and security. FonMins view with increasing seriousness Soviet intervention in building up Cuba as vanguard for assault on institutions of American Republics. This requires governments keep situation under constant review and renew efforts, individually and collectively, guard against further communist penetration this hemisphere.
2. Agreement work through appropriate OAS organs as necessary in pursuing following courses of action:
a. Reexamine trade relations with Cuba to see what additional steps affecting trade in items other than food and medicines could be taken limit capacity Castro regime subvert institutions OARs or threaten peace and security individual country or hemisphere.
b. Act to prevent vessels under their control from carrying to Cuba arms, implements of war, other items strategic importance.
c. Appeal all other independent nations take similar action with respect trade with Cuba and use vessels under their control.
d. Intensify efforts prevent Castro-communist agents and groups within their respective countries from subverting their established institutions.
e. Recognize Caribbean is area most immediately vulnerable to subversion from Cuba and consequently governments of area, pursuant paragraph 3 Resolution II of 8th MFM, have special interest take defensive measures prevent clandestine shipment men and material from Cuba to their countries for subversive purposes.
f. Agree that in this hemisphere cloak of secrecy should not be used cover up military buildups supported by extracontinental powers threatening peace and security of Americas and consequently intensify their individual and collective surveillance of delivery of arms and implements of war and all other items strategic importance to Cuba from any source and exchange information on such deliveries.
g. Request COAS undertake, pursuant Resolution II of 8th MFM and using SCCS as necessary, urgent and thorough investigation of: (1) transfer of funds from Cuban sources to OARs for purpose subverting peoples and governments in interest of international communism, (2) flow of Cuban subversive propaganda to OARs, (3) utilization Cuba as base for training and indoctrination of persons from OARs in techniques communist subversion and as staging area of movement of persons from OARs to Sino-Soviet bloc countries for further training. Investigation should include recommendations to governments on how combat these dangers, bearing in mind laws and constitutional provisions of respective countries.
3. Reaffirmation by FonMins their determination invoke Rio Treaty to counter immediately and effectively by whatever means may be necessary, including use of force, any threat from Castro regime or Sino-Soviet bloc powers to safety of American Republics and peace and security of hemisphere.
4. Declaration that FonMins look forward to time when freedom-loving Cuban people will establish government compatible with principles and purposes inter-American system which will be quickly recognized, assisted and welcomed back into family American nations.
Foregoing is exclusively for information of addressees. No mention should be made to local officials until specifically authorized by Department. We recognize this is ambitious program and may not be possible to secure agreement of FM's at informal meeting this character to commit themselves this far. Will be exploring very informally with them individually in NY next week. Meanwhile would appreciate your comments./3/
/3/Printed from an unsigned copy.
152. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in the American Republics/1/
Washington, September 25, 1962, 3:55 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2171. Confidential. Drafted by Bowdler, cleared by Martin and Chayes, and approved by Allen. Sent to Bogot#, Caracas, Guatemala City, Managua, Mexico City, Panama, Port-au-Prince, San Salvador, San Jose, Santo Domingo, and Tegucigalpa, and repeated to USUN, POLAD CINCARIB, POLAD CINCLANT, Asuncion, Buenos Aires, La Paz, Lima, Montevideo, Quito, Rio de Janeiro, and Santiago.
517. Based on paragraph 2e. of Depcirtel 508/2/ Department has been considering courses action which countries bordering Caribbean can take demonstrate their determination work collectively resist attempts direct or indirect aggression by Castro regime. Current planning runs along following lines:
/2/Document 151.
A. Courses of Action
1. Establishment system air-sea surveillance around Cuba and along coast Caribbean countries. Surveillance would serve inhibit Castro regime from sending clandestine shipments of arms and men to other countries of area and would strengthen capabilities those countries intercept such shipments. We would assume primary responsibility for Cuban patrol while other countries would cover own coasts with such assistance from us as may be necessary. Our conducting Cuban patrol would not rule out contributions by other Caribbean countries (e.g. naval units or support facilities for such units).
2. Intensification efforts counter Castro-communist subversion including control of travel to and from Cuba, shipment subversive propaganda from Cuba and transfer funds from Cuban sources for subversive purposes. Governments could also agree on system for exchanging information on Castro-communist subversive activities.
3. Issuance by governments of Caribbean area, including United States, of joint declaration that extension by Castro regime of its Marxist-Leninist system by force or threat of force to any part of Caribbean area or creation or use of a Soviet supported offensive military capability endangering security of any country in area, will call for taking of any necessary measures to protect security of countries concerned. This declaration would be accompanied by announcement that discussions will be held at military level to plan for defensive measures for meeting these contingencies.
B. Timing and Forum
1. Paragraph 2e. of Depcirtel 508 if approved at informal MFM would constitute additional hemispheric acknowledgment that Caribbean countries are particularly vulnerable Castro-communist subversion and consequently justified taking special defensive measures. This would serve minimize criticism Rio Treaty being bypassed or that inter-American system being fractionized.
2. Based this paragraph we would seek have President Caribbean country (e.g. President Betancourt) invite Ministers Defense and Interior Caribbean countries meet during second or third week of October to consider special measures which should be taken. Courses action outlined A. could constitute program to be approved. Inclusion Interior Ministers would emphasize that problem of dealing with Castro-communist threat is not purely external but one in which internal measures are equally important.
Comment:
Department aware foregoing plan presents certain problems, particularly (1) whether Haiti and Mexico would want to join in action contemplated and (2) probability agreement patrol activities will give rise to requests for further military assistance. Would appreciate your evaluation receptivity of local government to plan and additional problems you can foresee in its execution. Foregoing is exclusively for information of addressees and should not be discussed with local officials until specifically authorized by Department.
Ball
153. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
New York, September 26, 1962, midnight.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9-2662. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Repeated to all posts in Latin America except Trinidad and Jamaica, and to POLAD CINCLANT, and POLAD CINCARIB. Received at 1:19 a.m. on September 27.
Secto 21. Informal MFM. Following based on uncleared memcon:/2/
/2/A memorandum of the conversation is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2152.
Secy met Sept 25 informally with FonMins Bolivia, CR, DomRep, Guat, Nic and Panama for discussion Cuban problem in preparation informal MFM next week. He briefly reviewed situation, pointing out while recent Sov shipments supplied at Castro's urging have neither increased power of Cuba as offensive military threat nor increased Castro's ability control own people, do represent increased Sov involvement. Secy repeated unequivocal assurances US will under no circumstances permit any raids or attacks of any kind by Cuba on LA countries and stated so far Castro acting cautiously in this area. Recent Sov bluster still gives no indication Soviets contemplating actions of type President warned against in press statement.
Secy made clear US not prepared accept Cuban situation as permanent. Although military action remains eventual possibility, we must think of ways solve problem without recourse to arms. Objective should be actions which increasingly isolate Cuba so as make abundantly clear to Soviets Cuba is unprofitable enterprise for them, either in itself or as basis Communist penetration other ARs.
Such steps, which worthy discussion informal MFM, would include review of minimal trade relationships with and shipping to Cuba (this matter we also discussing with our NATO allies); measures to control flow of small arms, propaganda, money, agents from Cuba and movement of groups of Latin nationals to Cuba for training in subversion; measures of increased surveillance Carib area; and measures control Commies in each country.
In making clear our determination isolate Cuba, we naturally hope for complete hemisphere solidarity, at least on general approach. In addition we prepared move on more intensive steps tightened surveillance and controls with those ARs willing do so, particularly Caribbean nations whose special right take extra measures was recognized at Punta del Este (para 3 res 11).
In ensuing discussion (Bolivia and El Salvador silent) Central Americans expressed agreement Secy's approach; showed real interest in moving forward in Carib concert, but did not suggest any radical or belligerent action. They showed general concern (to which Secy agreed) that one serious impact in their countries of recent Cuban buildup has been to increase confidence and insolence local Commie groups who intensifying their subversive nibbling tactics. Guatemalan suggested all should urge those ARs still maintaining relations with Cuba to break them. Considerable emphasis placed by Latins on importance of intensive combined efforts educate peoples OARs on actual conditions Cuban people to counteract heavy Castro propaganda.
Separate meeting of Central American and Caribbean FonMins (excluding Mexico) held 3 pm September 26 with Martin/3/ for more concrete exploration possible steps. Secy met 5 pm same day with FonMins South American Reps present for similar initial review of situation.
/3/The meeting was summarized in Secto 41 from New York, dated September 28. (Ibid.)
Rusk
154. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
New York, September 27, 1962, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2171. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to all posts in Latin America except Trinidad and Jamaica, and to POLAD CINCLANT, and POLAD CINCARIB.
Secto 28. I. Secretary met September 26 with Foreign Ministers Chile, Haiti, Peru, Venezuela and ex-Foreign Minister Arinos of Brazil./2/ Reviewed Cuban situation along lines reported Secto 21,/3/ amplifying following points:
/2/A memorandum of the conversation is ibid.
/3/Document 153.
1. Re Soviet military build-up. If it should be necessary US take military action, only 3-4 hours preparation would be required reduce effectiveness of material so far received since July. If should be necessary use force, US would employ maximum, non-nuclear violence order minimize time and casualties, but we most anxious avoid this course since would leave long lasting wounds in Cuba and elsewhere.
2. This is why we pursuing objective of making Soviet involvement in Cuba as expensive and unprofitable as possible for USSR by measures which will further isolate Cuba and exert maximum pressure on USSR.
3. Made clear US not objecting to whatever type social or economic system Cuban people may freely choose, but only to Soviet intervention there and Soviet-Cuban intervention OARS. Stressed US unwilling negotiate Cuban problem with USSR. Due special IA relationships and agreement, Cuban situation no way comparable to or linkable with situations elsewhere, i.e., Berlin or US MAP relations with other free world countries such as Turkey. Stressed US not seeking import cold war into hemisphere or drag OARS into problems not their responsibilities. Cold war direct result Soviet efforts subvert true independence national states. It they who have now brought cold war to hemisphere through Cuba.
4. Also pointed out intense preoccupation American people with Cuban problem is political fact that must be taken into account--as must public opinion situation OARS as well.
II. Venezuelan Foreign Minister, agreeing Secretary's approach, pointed out fight against Castro-Communist gangsterism OARS closely relation promotion democracy./4/ In Venezuelan own experience Communists gained strength under dictatorships. Peruvian Foreign Minister, though agreeing desirability meeting on Cuban problem, opposed distracting attention by reference other issues and stated if any their problems (i.e., coups d'etat) discussed, Peru would not attend.
/4/A note on the source text indicates that this sentence reads as received and was confirmed by the originator.
Secretary responded by stressing informal nature meeting outside institutional framework OAS. US thought has been take advantage presence Foreign Ministers in US (originally preferring New York as locus) to talk about problems hemisphere interest, foremost among which, in US view, is Cuba. All realize are various problems within family, such as US-Panama differences re Canal to which Panamanian Foreign Minister referred in GA, and US-Mexican border problem. One country not participating OAS meetings due differences with another. Upcoming Brazilian elections may complicate Brazilian discussion certain matters. However, view our common interests, obligations and objectives, US strongly hopes will be possible Foreign Ministers can gather to talk without regard for various problems within hemisphere and without raising the difficult and divisive question of what we must formally discuss.
While in situation of complete informality it not possible impose conditions on what any Foreign Minister might mention or call any one to order, this should not pose real problem if we all relatively relaxed and not try give institutional effect to an agenda when there is no agenda.
Chilean and Brazilian made mildly helpful statements re general desirability of meeting. Arinos stated Brazilian information confirms Secretary's description Soviet build-up, but little evidence indicate Castro-directed efforts infiltrate Brazil. Indicated some concern re how reach and express conclusions of meeting, referring to possible press communique. Secretary gave impression probably will be communique but stated at moment US has no flat suggestions re content.
III. We intend follow up this and previous meeting with further talks New York and Washington, exploring more concretely ideas contained Department Circular telegram 508./5/
/5/Document 151.
View absence or late arrival in US Foreign Ministers of Ecuador, Honduras, Paraguay and Uruguay Embassies those countries requested consult Foreign Ministers soonest, drawing on background presentation of problem by Secretary reported above and in Secto 21 and stressing US desire discuss at meeting steps indicated paragraph three Secto 21. Unless Department perceives objection recommend Department author-ize other addressees utilize information both telegrams for discussion Foreign Offices as appropriate.
Rusk
155. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, September 30, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/9-3062. Confidential. Drafted by Allen. The source text bears Rusk's initials indicating that he read it.
SUBJECT
Latin American Attitudes re Informal MFM
As a result of your meetings with the Latin American Foreign Ministers and additional conversations with them during the last few days, the following is our appraisal of their positions at present:
1. The Central American and Caribbean countries (except Mexico and Haiti whose views are unknown) are interested in taking some joint action among themselves to strengthen their defenses. Some of them are toying with a separate declaration, but due to their dispersion and lack of leadership, this has not jelled. All are receptive to the idea of a later Caribbean meeting of the Ministers of Defense and Interior to establish joint air and sea patrols for coastal surveillance and to set up some system for exchanging information. The major points in our proposed communique are all acceptable to them.
In addition, one or more have suggested the following steps, none of which is generally acceptable to all (nor to us):
a. Creation of a government in exile. (Guatemala will push this.)
b. Convocation of a formal MFM under the Rio Treaty to take binding decisions on severance of diplomatic and economic relations.
c. In addition, there have been press reports that some countries favor the creation of a Caribbean NATO-type military alliance. However, they have not proposed this in discussions with us.
2. Venezuela likes the points contained in our proposed communique but insists on adding a reference to the importance of strengthening representative democracy. Colombia is sympathetic and cooperative, but somewhat concerned that any separate action by the Caribbean group would appear as a division within the OAS.
3. Brazil's position is encouraging. They agree to the desirability of firmer action to control the flow of funds, propaganda, agents and trainees; agree to the right of the Caribbean countries to take special measures; agree that some public declaration is desirable and Arinos did not object to any of the basic points contained in our proposed draft.
4. Bolivia will probably follow Brazil. The Bolivian and Chilean Foreign Ministers have engaged in informal conversations regarding the Lauca controversy. They will keep this subject out of the MFM.
5. Argentina's position is uncertain due to the lack of a Foreign Minister, but we believe they will be generally helpful. Mexico's views are unknown.
6. Chile poses a serious problem. The Foreign Minister feels strongly there should be no communique at all. His position is based on the Chilean domestic situation and on his alleged promise to the legislature in return for permission to participate in the meeting, that there would be no agreement or declaration emerging from the meeting. If, however, we have the support of Brazil and Argentina, the Chileans can be isolated and perhaps brought along.
156. Editorial Note
An informal meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics was held October 2-3, 1962, in Washington. In addition to Secretary Rusk, the participants included 17 Foreign Ministers or Acting Foreign Ministers, Special Representatives from Argentina and Brazil, and the Chairman of the Council of the Organization of American States. No formal, agreed records of the meetings were made. U.S. memoranda of conversation recording the four sessions are in Department of State, Central Files 371.04/10-262 and 371.04/10-362. The texts are scheduled for inclusion in the microfiche supplement to Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XI. See also Document 157. Related material is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2168-2171.
157. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in the American Republics/1/
Washington, October 4, 1962, 8:21 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/10-462. Confidential. Drafted by Bowdler and Allen, cleared by Martin, and approved by Allen. Sent to all diplomatic posts in the American republics except Kingston and Port-of-Spain and to USUN and repeated to POLAD CINCARIB, POLAD CINCLANT, Kingston, Port-of-Spain, London, and Paris.
596. Department regards informal MFM as highly successful. Communique/2/ is strongest unanimous statement on Cuban problem yet to emerge from gathering of all American governments. Both by itself and as impetus for follow-up action on 8th MFM decisions it should have helpful political and psychological, and to limited extent economic, impact in promoting our twin objectives of (1) making it as expensive as possible for USSR to maintain Cuba and (2) isolating Cuba and thereby reducing subversive, political and psychological usefulness of Cuba to Soviets. Re US opinion communique helpful in meeting criticism of OARs and OAS for disinterest and inaction.
/2/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, October 22, 1962, pp. 598-600.
Discussions characterized by friendly and cooperative spirit and high degree of frankness which reflected in communique. Strength of communique lies not only in content but also fact it reflects unanimous agreement with no abstentions or reservations. Document contains all essential points we desired. If phraseology not as strong or specific as we would have preferred on some aspects, particularly in condemning Castro regime, this due stand taken by countries maintaining relations with Cuba. They agreed oppressive nature Castro regime and suffering Cuban people but feared adverse effect their relations if meeting too outspoken this matter.
Features of communique which further USG objectives re Cuba are:
1. Recognition of Soviet effort convert Cuba into armed base for penetration of Hemisphere and subversion its democratic institutions.
2. Agreement OAS bodies should intensify efforts to carry out assignments regarding Cuban situation and be ready move quickly if situation calls for additional action. (This refers particularly to action under Rio Treaty.)
3. Consensus that studies on subversive travel, funds and propaganda should be done pursuant Resolution II of 8th MFM without delay.
4. Consensus that recent events in Cuba warrant action under Resolution VIII of 8th MFM including use of American Republic ships in Cuban trade, accompanied by appeal to other independent countries to review their Cuban trade and use of ships.
5. Recognition that Soviet intervention in Cuba is not analogous to, and cannot be justified by, defensive measures which other Free World countries have taken against Soviet imperialism (e.g. bases in Turkey).
6. Recognition that threat of Cuban subversion manifests itself differently in different areas of Hemisphere calling for special measures to deal with it pursuant paragraph 3 of Resolution II of 8th MFM. (Caribbean generally recognized as area of greater danger although this not specifically stated.)
7. Voicing of deep sympathy with the Cuban people over their plight. Views expressed in communique provide us with basis for pressing for action in COAS, joining with Caribbean countries in special measures along lines Depcirtel 517,/3/ and urging NATO and other Free World countries support American Republics in their efforts isolate Cuba.
/3/Document 152.
Text of communique carried in wireless file.
Ball
158. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, November 30, 1962, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.15/11-3062. Confidential. Drafted by Edward M. Rowell of the Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs and approved by the White House December 28. The source text is marked "Part 1 (of 7)." The meeting was held at the White House.
SUBJECT
Communism, Cuba and Caribbean Security
PARTICIPANTS
President Kennedy
Ambassador Charles R. Burrows
Assistant Secretary of State Martin
Assistant Administrator of AID Moscoso
Mr. Ralph Dungan, The White House
President Villeda Morales of Honduras
Honduran Ambassador to the United States and the OAS Celeo Davila
Honduran Foreign Minister Alvarado Puerto
Honduran Finance Minister Bueso Arias
The conversation was long and involved.
President Villeda Morales made the following points:
United States efforts leading to withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba were magnificent, but there is no way to be sure whether or not underground bases still threaten hemispheric security and peace. In the Cuban crisis Honduras offered facilities in accordance with its obligations under the Rio Treaty and the decision of the Council of the OAS./2/ The United States can always rely on unlimited Honduran cooperation.
/2/Reference is to a resolution approved by the OAS Council on October 23 calling for the withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other offensive weapons and recommending that member states take all necessary measures to ensure that Cuba could not continue to receive Soviet military supplies and to prevent the missiles from becoming an active threat. (OAS doc. OEA/Ser.G/III/C-sa-463 (1); also printed in Department of State Bulletin, November 12, 1962, pp. 722-723)
The problem of Cuba and security transcends nuclear arms and purely military operations. Every Communist is dangerous. Cuba directly affects all the small nearby countries. These countries must develop socially and economically to offset Marxist propaganda. Communism will be no menace if countries are ruled democratically, and if assistance under the Alliance for Progress is forthcoming.
It would be suicidal for the Communists to take over a Central American Government, because they could not isolate a mainland country as they did Cuba. The Communists recognize this. Also, it is easier to generate instability from outside a Government than from within. Hence, the Communists are not interested in taking over any Central American Government, and the menace of communism is not imminent in the region. It is a mistake to ascribe to the Communists disturbances such as the recent one in Guatemala, since this exaggerates their truly limited power.
In Honduras communism is in a state of lethargy and communism is weaker than in any other Central American country. This is because the Government profoundly believes in human dignity and the elimination of repressive measures.
The constitution forbids participation by non-democratic parties in elections. Eighty per cent of the electorate supports the present administration. Communists are kept under close control. Five years ago they generated street fights, but since then their activities have dwindled. They are no danger in Honduras.
The situation may be different in other Central American countries, and what affects one affects all.
Villeda introduced the possibility of a Caribbean force, and likened "Operacion Fraternidad" to a group of firemen ready to answer an alarm. However, an alliance of armies (which would be used against guerrilla or insurgent groups) should be preceded by creation of a civilian force. This two-stage establishment of forces should not be revealed to the Communists. Villeda noted that three years ago he met Presidents Lemus of El Salvador, Yd#goras of Guatemala and Somoza of Nicaragua, and suggested the creation of a civilian security system to fight communism.
The question of an army to defend the democracies can be raised in Honduras, preferably after the elections. In this connection, it was suggested that an air base be built near San Pedro Sula.
Relations between the Central American Governments are propitious for the discussion of a joint military force. The situation should remain good after the Nicaraguan election in February, 1963. Villeda believes he can coordinate such an effort. He said the other Central American Governments had "indicated their confidence in his ability to reflect the common hopes and ideals of them all".
President Kennedy made the following points:
Castro is still an aggressive element. President Kennedy has been considering creation of a Caribbean force which could be used against guerrilla or insurgent groups. President Villeda's reference to such a force mentioned in connection with "Operacion Fraternidad", is interesting. President Kennedy hoped Villeda would continue to think of a joint force or army. Care must be taken to see that it would not support dictatorships (e.g., Haiti), and that it would not appear to interfere in elections. Possible Communist gains in turbulent Guatemalan elections would tempt such interference. The force would have to be established within the framework of the OAS to avoid the stigma of "U.S. imperialism". An example of successful joint action is that taken by the United States, Colombia and Venezuela to prevent a Communist take-over in the Dominican Republic following Trujillo's death.
The United States will study the matter of common military action with the Central American Republics, and will keep in touch with Villeda.
President Kennedy cautioned Villeda, saying experiences with Jagan, the Chinese and Castro demonstrate that Communists frequently take over a Government in the guise of enlightened, democratic, revolutionary leaders, and not as Communists per se.
It is essential to recognize that present Hemisphere problems pit the Hemisphere and the United States against communism, and are not just reflections of bilateral conflict between the United States and Castro. Should Castro convince people that the matter is purely bilateral, he will draw greater sympathy, and the eradication of the Communist menace will be more difficult.
159. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, March 12, 1963, 12:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, CSM 10 LAT AMER. Confidential. Drafted by A.J. DeSeabra of the Division of Language Services.
SUBJECT
Cuba and Communist Activities in Latin America
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The Secretary of State
Asst. Secretary Martin
Ambassador GordonA.J. DeSeabra (Interpreter)
Brazil
Finance Minister Dantas
Ambassador Campos
Ambassador Bernardes
The Secretary, referring back to the conversations on Cuba held last year,/2/ recalled that there were two points that were not negotiable:
/2/See Document 146.
(1) the military and political connection between Cuba and Moscow;
(2) the attempts by Cuba to foment subversion in other Hemisphere countries.
The first point was brought to a dramatic climax last October. Since then the missiles and bombers have gone, some troops have left. Since it is not exactly known how many troops will remain in Cuba, the problem is still very much with us. The U.S. was gratified at the unanimity shown in the O.A.S. on the quarantine, the Brazilian position being particularly significant. It was such unanimity that made possible a peaceful solution of the missile problem. Had there not been unity in the O.A.S. or in N.A.T.O., Khrushchev might have made a different judgment on the missile situation.
The second point was still troublesome. While Cuba was not the sole channel used by the communists for subversive activities in Latin America, Cuba was extensively used for the supply of funds, the movements of persons, propaganda broadcasts, etc. The U.S. was concerned with measures to reduce or eliminate that subversive pressure from Cuba, which has been felt especially in Venezuela, as in other parts of the Hemisphere. The Secretary went on to say that there appeared to be no serious interest in Havana in a reconciliation with the rest of the Hemisphere. During the Mikoyan visit, several points of view were apparently expressed within the Cuba regime, one favoring continued ties with Moscow, another advocating a closer tie to Peking, and a third which might be termed a Titoist approach. The fact remained that there was no thought being given to a reconciliation with the rest of the Hemisphere. The Secretary asked Minister Dantas to comment on the two points raised, as well as to give his impressions, on the basis of information obtained from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana, on the present state of affairs in Cuba and on the present attitudes of the leadership in that nation.
Minister Dantas said he had had no recent contact with sources of information on Cuba, and asked Ambassador Bernardes to make some comments.
Ambassador Bernardes said that the impression of the Brazilian Embassy in Cuba was that there had been some training in subversion of individuals from Latin America. There was no knowledge of any Brazilians having been trained, leaving the possibility that the number had been so small that the Embassy had no knowledge of it. Such training was aimed particularly at Venezuela and the Caribbean area, but did not seem to present a serious problem with regard to Brazil, Argentina or Uruguay for instance. The economic situation was deteriorating daily in Cuba, with severe shortages and strict rationing. Just the same Castro was still getting a hard core support, and there was no prospect of a popular uprising at this time. There were divergencies inside the Cuban Government between the followers of Moscow and those of Peking. But Cuba was so economically dependent on Moscow that it could not afford to go over to the Chinese.
Ambassador Gordon asked whether there had been any change in the Brazilian attitude in the O.A.S. toward possible collective action against Cuba-subversion.
Ambassador Bernardes mentioned that the proposed resolution on that matter might be made acceptable, although there should be a reference to respecting constitutional procedures, since there are in Brazil constitutional limitations on interference with the movement of people in and out of Brazil. He also said that Brazilian support would be much easier if there were some known cases; so far there had been no known case of Brazilians who had actually been trained in Cuba in subversive techniques.
Ambassador Gordon mentioned the Lima documents that contained some evidence.
Ambassador Bernardes indicated that the individuals in question had not been trained in Cuba.
The Secretary asked whether communists in Brazil made their contacts with Moscow through Cuba.
Minister Dantas explained that communist contacts with Moscow were made mainly through Czechoslovakia, although the pro-Peking faction had a closer contact with Cuba. In Brazil the orthodox communists were now denouncing those who had close ties with Cuba, such as Francisco Juliao. As for Carlos Prestes, his actual status within the communist party of Brazil is not very well known. He still enjoys some prestige, but he no longer appears to be the effective leader. The activities of communist groups in Brazil are not very important in the domestic scene. Communists concentrate their efforts mainly on endeavoring to maintain positions of leadership in the labor unions, where they are being challenged by non-communist labor leaders.
Turning to the initial remarks made by the Secretary, Minister Dantas recalled that ever since the first talks about Cuba, the major concerns of the Brazilian Government were identical to those of the U.S. Government; to wit, to eliminate Cuba's military ties with the Soviet Bloc and to eliminate the promotion from Cuba of subversive activities in the Hemisphere. The only significant difference between the U.S. and Brazil was in the methods to be used to obtain the ends mentioned above. Early in 1962, it had been thought in Brazil that it would be possible to arrive at an agreement with Cuba to eliminate these two dangers while respecting the evolution of the Socialist regime in Cuba, by securing a commitment on the part of Cuba to abstain from military ties with the Soviets as well as refraining from further subversive activities in the Hemisphere. Those are the objectives to which the Brazilian Government had remained, and still remains, faithful. Since then there have occurred two events, one more important than the other, which show the consistency of the continued Brazilian position. The first important event was that at the time of the quarantine, Brazil gave its support to the blockade so as to avoid any military danger from Cuba, military ties with the Soviets, and the introduction of nuclear weapons in other countries of the Hemisphere. The other more recent event had to do with subversive activities. For some time, pro-Cuba groups in Brazil had been organizing and publicizing a Congress for Solidarity with Cuba, to be held in Rio with participants from all over the world. In the last few weeks, the Brazilian Government had voiced its disapproval of the Congress, its untimeliness, and had instructed its Consular offices to refuse visas to anyone desiring to attend the Congress.
The Secretary asked whether there had ever been any information or complaints from neighboring countries regarding any subversive activities based in Brazil.
Ambassador Bernardes mentioned that he did not know of any such complaints. He added that at the time the documents had been found in Peru, there had been comments in the Peruvian press about possible international ramifications. But there had been no official complaint on the part of the Peruvian Government.
Ambassador Gordon mentioned that there had been rumors of subversive activities in Bolivia and Paraguay, but Ambassador Bernardes said nothing more had transpired.
160. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in the American Republics/1/
Washington, March 13, 1963, 8:23 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 36 CUBA. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Sterling J. Cottrell and Deputy Director of the Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs John W. Fisher; cleared by Martin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Frank K. Sloan, Special Assistant to the Joint Staff Director for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities Major General Victor H. Krulak, and in substance by Special Assistant to the President Ralph Dungan; and approved by Director of the Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs Lansing Collins. Sent to Bogota, Caracas, Santo Domingo, Kingston, and Port of Spain, and repeated to Guatemala City, Managua, Panama City, San Jose, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, CINCARIB POLAD, and CINCLANT POLAD.
1564. In meeting March 18-20 with six Presidents Central America and Panama, there will be discussion of measures which should be taken to reduce travel between Cuba and Isthmian countries and flow of funds, propaganda and arms to them from Cuba.
We expect in course of discussion to offer consult with Central American and Panamanian Governments on additional U.S. training and other assistance which may be required to develop or improve border and coastal patrol capabilities of their respective security forces.
Action addressees should inform Govt of foregoing and state that we desire make this offer also to addressee govts. Advise soonest if govt to which you are accredited is interested in principle.
Consultations will be arranged later.
Necessary there be no publicity on this exchange until further word.
Separate message on Jamaican request for patrol boats being sent.
FYI. U.S. desires establishment of a coordinated Caribbean surveillance system involving:
a. Continued close-in surveillance of Cuba by U.S. forces.
b. A U.S. military alerting system, by which intelligence of subversive movement will be rapidly transmitted to the American Ambassadors to countries concerned through intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters of the Atlantic Command.
c. A unilateral surveillance and interception effort by each country in its own territorial waters.
d. U.S. assistance in final interception in territorial waters upon request of the country concerned. End FYI.
Rusk
161. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in the American Republics/1/
Washington, March 14, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2229. Confidential. Drafted by Allen and approved by John M. Cates. Sent to Bogot#, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Kingston, La Paz, Montevideo, Port-au-Prince, Port of Spain, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, and Santo Domingo.
1572. President plans make following points re Cuban problem CA and Panamanian Presidents Meeting March 19. Although only restatement present policy in view likelihood leaks you requested convey orally and confidentially to FonOff no earlier than March 18.
1. Cuba not merely Caribbean or hemispheric problem: Soviet involvement makes it complex and delicate East-West problem;
2. We do not favor initiating military action at present; however we fully support our hemispheric treaties and obligations and no commitments have been made inhibiting our ability do so including taking military action against Cuba if necessary;
3. Cuban economy in poor condition, economic measures by free world nations having their effect;
4. Cuba's political isolation increasingly uncomfortable for Castro regime;
5. US has told USSR we not satisfied with rate of withdrawal troops; we will not countenance military action by Soviet troops in Cuba against Cubans.
6. Our best courses action at present are:
a. Assure offensive weapons not reintroduced into Cuba;
b. Bring about removal remaining Soviet military personnel;
c. Prevent Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
d. Reduce its capabilities to direct and support subversion and insurrection within other hemisphere states;
e. Intensify resistance to and counter attacks of Castro propaganda throughout LA;
f. Increase IA cooperation within OAS, continuing to work through collective action;
g. Increase isolation of Castro regime from political life of hemisphere;
h. Maximize cost to Soviet Bloc and ChiComs of supporting Castro regime;
i. Reduction in movement of nationals LA countries to Cuba for training in subversion, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and control those returned from Cuba.
7. Isthmian countries and US can accomplish something together on these courses, especially last one.
8. (We support in discussion program for reducing movement of Communist subversives between Cuba and CA Isthmus along general lines SCCS report.)/2/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 162.
Rusk
162. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in the American Republics/1/
Washington, March 14, 1963, 9:22 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 36 CUBA. Confidential; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Fisher; cleared by Allen and Cottrell; and approved by Collins. Sent to Guatemala City, Managua, Panama, San Jose, San Salvador, and Tegucigalpa.
1573. Presidents' Meeting. We hope that, in discussion of Cuba and subversion problems at San Jose, there will be useful exchange of views on measures which Isthmian Governments themselves can take to restrict movement of people between their countries and Cuba which serve subversive purpose.
We will be prepared to endorse and offer support to suitable program this end. Program should come up in discussions at San Jose as much as possible under Isthmian auspices, rather than come as U.S. proposal.
You should convey following outline of program to Government to which accredited, and without undertaking to "negotiate" program with Government, you should express strong hope that latter will take opportunities to propose and support points contained in it at Presidents' Meeting. Specific proposals are drawn largely from SCCS report to COAS/2/ and we now urgently seeking have them embodied in action program to be recommended to all AmReps. However, will be impossible complete COAS action prior meeting.
/2/Reference is to a report by the Special Consultative Committee on Security to the Committee to Study Resolutions II.1 and VIII of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of OAS Foreign Ministers, February 8, 1963. For text, see OAS doc. OEA/Ser.L/X/II.3; its conclusions are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 254-255.
You may express our gratification at quick negative response on rumor of Isthmian announcement on Cuba just before San Jose.
Collins/3/ will be prepared discuss further with Foreign Ministers in San Jose March 16-17.
/3/Lansing Collins.
Proposed program follows:
1. Appropriate Ministers countries Central America, Panama, and U.S. meet periodically to review measures adopted and progress made to control Castro-communist subversive movements between Cuba and Central American Isthmus.
2. Institute full and effective cooperation our countries with appropriate bodies of OAS, and bilaterally among our several states, in interchange of information concerning travel of person to Cuba and other Castro-communist subversive activities.
3. Initiate bilateral talks with other countries to enlist their cooperation in adopting specific measures prevent movement through their countries of persons to and from Cuba.
4. Agree to support action by COAS to recommend program of controls of travel along lines of proposals presented by COAS Committee, and meanwhile so far as possible, to implement such program, principal elements of which are:
a. Adopt appropriate legal restrictions on travel to Cuba and provide severe penalties for evasion. Through bilateral talks we should urge other countries to do the same.
b. Stamp passports or other travel documents issued to own nationals "not valid for travel to Cuba."
c. Refuse exit permits for Cuba to any national of third country who cannot produce valid permit issued by his own country for travel to Cuba.
d. Refuse to honor any visa for Cuba which is not integral, non-detachable part of travel document issued by country of which traveler is citizen.
e. Require accurate manifests of all carriers departing for or arriving from Cuba, and furnish copies of these manifests to diplomatic missions of other Western Hemisphere countries which are affected.
f. Intensify intelligence efforts in each country to identify persons who have traveled or intend to travel to Cuba and report selected information promptly to own government.
g. Pursue campaign expose scope and purpose of Cuban training of nationals of our countries for subversive purposes, in order discourage prospective trainees and highlight urgent need halt subversive travel of our nationals to Cuba.
h. Utilize our intelligence capabilities to determine nature and extent of clandestine aircraft and small boat traffic between Cuba and other countries in area.
i. Institute unilateral surveillance and interception efforts by each country in its own territorial waters to stop this traffic. U.S. prepared upon request to assist in final interception in these territorial waters.
Rusk
163. Editorial Note
President Kennedy met with the Presidents of Central America and Panama in San Jose, Costa Rica, March 18-20, 1963. The Declaration of Central America, which they issued on March 19, stated their agreement that ministers of the seven countries should meet as soon as possible to develop and put into effect "common measures to restrict the movement of their nationals to and from Cuba, and the flow of materiel, propaganda and funds from that country." The text is printed in Department of State Bulletin, April 8, 1963, pages 515-517. Documentation concerning the meeting is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2228-2233. See also Documents 58, 59, 61, and 62.
164. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, April 1, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 COAS-IA. Secret. Drafted by Allen.
SUBJECT
My Memorandum of March 12, 1963 Regarding Next Steps in OAS on Cuban Problem/2/
/2/Copies of the March 12 memorandum from Rusk to Kennedy and its enclosure, an undated memorandum by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, are attached to the source text. A March 30 note from David Rowe of the Executive Secretariat to Rusk's Special Assistant Emory C. Swank, attached to the source text, states that the White House had lost the March 12 memorandum and had requested a copy with an update of its recommendation concerning OAS action.
I enclose a copy of the referenced memorandum which was transmitted to the White House March 12.
With respect to the COAS report on subversive activities referred to in paragraph 1, the Committee has now completed preliminary approval of its program of recommendations, and although these have not yet been submitted to the full Council, they will be available for use at the April 3 meeting in Managua.
Paragraph 2 of the March 12 memorandum recommends that we seek further action in the OAS on economic measures against the Castro regime. I am informed that no action has yet been taken on this recommendation. In the light of our overall Cuban policy, this problem remains important and the recommendation is not affected by the San Jose meeting. Indeed, the recommendation that further economic measures be taken against the Castro regime would be quite consistent with the general attitude of the other Presidents as expressed in that meeting. I renew my recommendation, therefore, that you authorize the Department of State to seek action by the COAS along the lines of paragraph 2 of my memorandum of March 12./3/
/3/An April 5 memorandum from Dungan to Rusk, attached to the source text, states that the President concurred in Rusk's recommendations and left the question of timing of implementation to the Department.
Dean Rusk/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
Enclosure/5/
Memorandum by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs (Cottrell)
/5/Originally enclosed with Rusk's March 12 memorandum to Kennedy, cited in footnote 2. Both were enclosed with Rusk's April 1 memorandum to Kennedy.
SUBJECT
Next Steps in OAS on Cuban Problem
1. Subversive Activities (Movement of Persons, Propaganda and Funds).
The COAS Committee charged with maintaining vigilance against subversive activities has been working for the last several weeks on a practical program of recommendations to the governments for the control of travel, propaganda and funds, basing its work in part on the recent SCCS report which had been prepared at its request. (The United States member is also drawing upon material prepared by Subcommittee chaired by Major General Victor Krulak, USMC.)/6/
/6/Reference is to the Counter-Subversion Subcommittee of the Interagency Cuban Coordinating Committee.
We are accelerating this work so that, if possible, the Committee's report may be sent to all members of the Council by March 15. Then the consideration of this hemisphere-wide problem by the seven Presidents at San Jose may be within the hemisphere-wide framework of the OAS.
2. Further Economic Measures against the Castro Regime.
The following three considerations militate against strong immediate OAS punitive measures against Castro:
a. Dissipation through time and circumstance of the crisis-stimulated willingness to take strong action;
b. United States concern lest the impending partial withdrawal of Soviet troops be prejudiced; and
c. The importance attached to preserving unanimity in the OAS.
Nevertheless, it is important that some forward movement be made in the OAS toward our ultimate objective (other than the above defensive action against that part of the problem represented by subversive activities).
Recommendations:
1. I therefore recommend that, prefaced by consultations with members of the COAS Committee and others, we seek to have the COAS adopt by the last week in March a resolution which would:
a. Extend the arms embargo imposed by Resolution VIII of Punta del Este to include "all items of trade except foodstuffs, medicines and medical supplies";
b. Recommend that Member States prohibit the use of their vessels to carry to Cuba any embargoed items;
c. Recommend that Member States deny overflight and landing rights to Soviet aircraft on bloc-Cuban runs; and
d. Call upon the rest of the free world to take similar measures.
Such a resolution is consistent with United States objectives and practice, should be welcomed domestically, would have slight economic, but appreciable psychological advantages, stands a good chance of obtaining unanimous or near unanimous support, and seems unlikely to affect Soviet willingness (if any) to remove its troops.
2. After the recovery of the United States prisoners, and after observing further withdrawals of Soviet troops, we can consider additional measures for adoption by the OAS.
165. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 COSTA RICA. Confidential. Drafted by Collins and O.L. Sause of AID. Filed as an attachment to an April 22 memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy, which stated that it was a further response to the President's March 22 written inquiry to Martin. Kennedy's March 22 memorandum to Martin asked Martin to let him know that steps he was taking to implement "the testament of San Jose." A copy is filed with a March 25 memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy enclosing an initial report. (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
Implementation of Agreements Reached at San Jose
The initial report of March 25 indicated that a meeting of Ministers of Government would take place at Managua, Nicaragua, on April 3 to draw up security measures against subversion in the Isthmian countries. Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach headed the United States Delegation to this meeting and results were considered most successful.
The most significant of the resolutions promulgated at the end of the meeting April 4/2/ were the following:
/2/The resolutions are printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 6, 1963, pp. 719-721.
1. To recommend to their governments that they adopt, within the limitations of their respective constitutional provisions, measures to be put into effect immediately to prohibit, restrict and discourage the movement of their nationals to and from Cuba. To this end, the Meeting proposes the adoption of the following measures:
a. Provide, as a general rule, that every passport or other travel document which may be issued carry a stamp which indicates that said passport is not valid for travel to Cuba.
b. Declare officially that nationals who are permitted to travel to Cuba should have the permission duly inscribed in their official travel document.
c. Promulgate regulations restricting the granting of visas to foreigners who have travelled to Cuba within a stipulated period of time.
2. To recommend that their governments take action to impede the clandestine movement of arms into the Isthmian countries, including specific instructions to border control forces to intensify port, airfield and border inspection of incoming and outgoing cargo in order to prevent contraband shipment of arms; establish strict security and accountability with respect to arms and ammunition issued to their armed forces and law enforcement agencies.
3. To recommend to their governments the adoption as soon as possible and to go into effect immediately, of effective measures to prevent activities for subversive purposes that may be instigated by Castro-Communist propaganda or agents in each of the Central American countries.
4. To recommend to the Governments of Central America and Panama the establishment, as soon as possible, of an organization in each state, with the sole purpose of counteracting Communist subversion in the Central America-Panama area. These organizations will be primarily responsible for:
a. Detecting, controlling and counteracting actions and objectives of the members, organizations, sympathizers and collaborators of the Communist Party.
b. Lending mutual support to each other and continually exchanging information regarding movements of persons or groups, propaganda, funds and arms for Communist subversive purposes.
These resolutions do not represent commitments on the part of governments but only recommendations to governments. In order to assist the Central American Governments to put these recommendations into effect and in order to find out what technical or material assistance the United States should offer, a team with Immigration Service, AID, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCARIB, USIS, CIA and State representation will visit each of the Central American countries starting from Panama around
April 23 and ending in Guatemala. The report of this team/3/ will be used to persuade the Central American Governments to put more recommendations into effect and also as a basic paper for the United States Delegation to the next regular meeting of Ministers of Government of Central America which, at Managua, was set for 90 days hence, i.e., July 5.
/3/The report of the Interdepartmental Team on Counter Subversive Measures in Central America and Panama, which visited Central America and Panama April 23-May 11, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Latin America.
[Here follows discussion of the implementation of decisions on economic matters.]
166. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, May 24, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Cuba, Security. Secret. The source text bears no indication of the drafter.
SUBJECT
Mexican Position on Imposing Economic Sanctions Against Cuba
In a memorandum of May 17/2/ you asked for comments on the report that Mexico has agreed with Brazil to oppose any OAS effort to tighten Hemisphere restrictions on trade with Cuba, particularly in light of the many ways we have recently been trying to be helpful to Mexico.
/2/A copy is filed as an attachment to a copy of Ball's memorandum, ibid., National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General.
The Mexican position is not unexpected. In a long conversation with Assistant Secretary Martin at the end of January on a variety of possible measures with respect to Cuba, President Lopez Mateos made quite clear that Mexico would give its public support to any action against Cuba necessary to prevent a serious and direct threat to the security of the United States or the Hemisphere, as it did in the missile crisis. It was also prepared to support measures which would clearly contribute to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a significant diminution of his power in Cuba or in the Hemisphere, though it would strongly prefer to do so quietly rather than publicly. It was not prepared to collaborate in actions whose value was largely symbolic or psychological and particularly where a public position was required. He felt the domestic difficulties that such measures would cause him would far outweigh any possible contribution they might make to achieving agreed Hemisphere policy objectives.
He is particularly concerned at the present time about domestic impacts of public actions vis-a-vis Cuba because of the current necessity to secure and maintain the support of all elements of his party in the difficult task which he must complete by the fall of choosing the next Presidential candidate. This responsibility traditionally belongs to the outgoing President, and he is most anxious to perform it. He is also equally anxious to maintain the solidarity of the party behind the candidate selected. With the tensions increasing each year between the left and right wings of the party, these objectives can only be secured by avoiding public positions which would tend to alienate either group or by balancing gestures to one by gestures to the other. He is personally closer to the left and will be particularly careful not to alienate unnecessarily this source of his greatest strength. In these circumstances Lopez Mateos can be expected for the next year to be extremely cautious about taking public positions on the question of Cuba unless really major security issues are involved.
It will be exceedingly difficult for us to demonstrate that further controls on Latin American trade with Cuba will have any but a psychological effect on the viability of the Castro regime. Exports are currently limited pretty much to foods and medicine. A recent analysis is enclosed./3/
/3/The enclosure, a May 6 memorandum prepared in the Department of State, is not printed.
It may be noted that, pending consideration by the OAS Council of the report of the Vigilance Committee on measures to limit Cuban subversive activities in Latin America, the United States has not made any proposal with respect to trade limitations, and therefore the Mexican position is not formally in opposition to any existing United States proposal. The Vigilance Committee report is expected to be submitted to the Committee this week but action may not come for several weeks.
George W. Ball
167. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, May 25, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Latin America, Kennedy Doctrine. No classification marking.
SUBJECT
A possible declaration against further Soviet penetration of the Western Hemisphere
At your direction, I have had a small group of people working on this problem outside the normal channels in the last three weeks. We have now produced two papers which we think are worth your attention. One is a draft Declaration (Tab A)./2/ The other is a set of possible situations in which a prior Declaration of this sort might prove helpful (Tab B)./3/
/2/Tab A, May 24, is entitled "Draft Declaration Against Further Soviet Penetration of Latin America." After discussion of the Monroe Doctrine and the inter-American system, it stated that "extension, by any means, of the political domination or military presence of the Communist powers within this hemisphere is hostile to the basic principles of the life of the Americas." It further stated, "Such intrusion cannot be accepted, and we will take the steps to prevent it that may be required in the interest of freedom. This is the obligation of all free nations of the hemisphere under the Rio Treaty, as we understand it, and it is the policy of the United States."
/3/Tab B, entitled "Draft Scenario for Statement Embodying Kennedy Doctrine," dated May 23, did not describe possible situations; it was a scenario of actions to be taken, such as consultations with other American governments and advance notice to Congressional leaders, before the President made such a statement. It began with an ARA note stating that it was assumed that the proposed statement meant that the United States would take unilateral military action if necessary to prevent a Communist takeover of a Latin American government, but that such a step would raise grave problems in U.S.-Latin American relations.
We are still working on a third problem, which is to analyze the alternative ways and means of getting such a Declaration on the record with a minimum amount of opposition within the hemisphere. While the Declaration, as this preliminary draft will show, can be surrounded with a good deal of hemispheric mood music, it would nevertheless be a major unilateral U.S. move, and we could count on a lot of Latin American twittering--especially from Brazil and Mexico; it would be important to reduce this if possible.
The easy way to get this Declaration on the record would be to have it issued in the context of some crisis in which in fact our decision to act would be generally approved. The hypothetical British Guiana case in the scenario is an example./4/ There is, however, little point in solving such easy and relatively unlikely cases now. We can meet them readily as they come. The hard problem is to lay a groundwork against a repetition of something like the Cuban case as it actually developed, so that we would have had support and not general opposition to drastic action as early as 1960.
/4/The attached scenario does not mention British Guiana, nor does it describe any background events leading to the scenario it sets forth.
One possibility is to precede the Declaration by a meeting of OAS Foreign Ministers in which the Secretary of State, without tabling a resolution that could not pass, would make very clear the concern of the United States and its own determination to leave no doubt of its own position. Quite possibly a new and somewhat stronger resolution of concern could be passed which might help as a cover for a new U.S. Declaration. But what is more important is that such a meeting would be a highly visible form of consultation which might ease the problem of a unilateral statement shortly afterward.
It is also possible to express U.S. concern in a preliminary way through press conferences and Executive Branch testimony on the Hill. And our concern can also be orchestrated in different ways before the UN and in NATO, although these are less important centers for this particular problem.
The consensus of this small working party is, first, that some declaration or affirmation of this sort is desirable and possible, and second, that it would be well to take plenty of time to get it done right, with all appropriate preparation. Our inclination is to believe that it is something that can be done more effectively when Congress is not in session, and our tentative recommendation is that we plan toward a major statement which might be made in October or November. We believe that the Declaration should be made on some important hemispheric occasion, and that plans should be made now to make sure that such an occasion is on the calendar well ahead of time.
Members of the working party will value your guidance for further staff work.
McG. B.
168. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, June 6, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Latin America, Kennedy Doctrine. Secret.
SUBJECT
Kennedy Doctrine
1. You wanted to be reminded about the possibility of setting up a meeting on the Kennedy Doctrine.
2. Bob Hurwitch/2/ tells me that State has dropped its plans to stir up an OAS resolution focussing on the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba. Ed Martin and others feel it is a non-starter--there is no sense in passing a resolution unless the OAS is prepared to act on it. If the OAS is not prepared to act, the resolution will simply highlight the impotency of the OAS.
/2/Deputy Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Robert Hurwitch.
3. I talked to Bill Bowdler about the OAS tactics involved in taking a first jump towards a possible Kennedy Doctrine. (In the past, Bill had been in touch with Walt Rostow on the Doctrine.) Bill's feelings are generally as follows:
(a) The OAS will be a difficult forum, especially at this time. For one thing, we have let Cuba cool down substantially; at this point, many Latin Americans feel that the U.S. is really not interested in doing much about Cuba. For another thing, elections in Latin America in the near future (Peru, Argentina, Mexico, and Chile) do not help matters. Mexico's key primary in September, which determines the next president, will make Mexico especially tough to deal with; Chile is presently ginning up for next year's election and will be similarly difficult to handle.
(b) It would not be easy to call a meeting of Foreign Ministers under the prevailing tepid atmosphere. A call for a meeting, as a reaction against the recent Castro visit and Khrushchev speech about national liberation movements, would not be credible. The OAS countries are really not concerned with subversion and "another Cuba." About the only credible issue you could conceivably use now to gin up a Foreign Ministers meeting is the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba.
(c) Bill doubts that we could get an OAS resolution on intervention which is any stronger than the Punta del Este resolution. The OAS countries probably would not even buy a resolution stating that we don't want another Cuba. They would immediately think in terms of the next step, which they are not willing to face--actions to prevent another Cuba.
(d) Bill said that, in about a month, the COAS will meet to consider the Lavalle Committee's report on subversion./3/ This context might provide a useful forum for a small jump towards the Doctrine.
/3/Reference is to the report of the Special Committee to Study Resolutions II.1 and VIII of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, submitted to the OAS Council on June 4. (OAS doc. OEA/Ser.G/IV/c-i-605 Rev. 3, July 3, 1963; printed in part in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 271-276) The OAS Council voted on July 3 to transmit the report to member governments urging them to implement its recommendations to the extent that they had not already done so within the limits of their constitutions. (Circular telegram 23 to ARA diplomatic posts, dated July 3; Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 COAS-IA)
4. Assuming we want to condition the OAS for the Kennedy Doctrine (maybe we don't) there seems to me to be 2 ways we can do it--dramatically (e.g. a Foreign Ministers meeting without much softening up) or subtlety. The subtle method would seem to involve the use of a series of statements to create an atmosphere which reflects our concern about another Cuba in the hemisphere. If we decide to take the subtle road, we should probably use every chance we get to take a jump, no matter how small, towards the Kennedy Doctrine. In this regard, a reaction to the Castro visit and the Khrushchev speech seems to me to be in order--perhaps a speech in the COAS by the Secretary or one of the Under Secretaries. Also, it would seem appropriate to say something in the COAS at the time when the Lavalle Committee submits its report on subversion. It should be noted that the small steps would not preclude a Foreign Ministers meeting; in fact, they might create a more credible atmosphere for one.
5. In view of the fact that we are getting close to the operational stage of the Kennedy Doctrine, you might want to consider inviting an ARA type or two to the next meeting of the Kennedy Doctrine group./4/
/4/A memorandum of February 21, 1964, from Bundy to Robert Kennedy and others, states that Bundy's May 25 memorandum to the President (Document 167) and its attachments were developed outside regular channels at President Kennedy's direction. It states, "The actual policy result of all this was a few sentences in the President's November 18 speech, which was blanketed almost immediately by his death." The text of Kennedy's speech is printed in Department of State Bulletin, December 9, 1963, pp. 900-904.
GC
169. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/
Washington, November 27, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 CUBA. Confidential. Drafted by Bowdler. President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas, on November 22.
SUBJECT
Venezuelan Announcement of Cuban Origin of Discovered Arms Cache
On November 3 the Venezuelan Government discovered a large arms cache buried on a beach of the Paraguana Peninsula in northwestern Venezuela. A careful examination of the weapons revealed them to be of Cuban origin. The Venezuelan Government has advised us that it plans to make the evidence public on November 28.
When we learned the Venezuelans had conclusive evidence that the arms cache was Cuban and planned to announce it, we urged President Betancourt to do two things: (1) as a minimum to present the evidence to the OAS and (2) as a highly desirable maximum to combine the disclosure with an appeal to other governments of the Caribbean area for cooperation in multilateral surveillance under Resolution II of the 8th Meeting of Foreign Ministers (Punta del Este) to detect and thwart further attempts by the Castro regime to export arms and men for subversive purposes. President Betancourt agreed to report the incident to the OAS but he was decidedly cool to the suggestion of an appeal for surveillance cooperation. His coolness is attributable to domestic political considerations, particularly the December 1 national elections and the implications of having publicly to request foreign assistance.
The Venezuelan intention to publicize the Cuban origin of the arms cache, read in conjunction with previous statements made by President Kennedy and me (compilation enclosed)/2/ about insuring that the Castro regime does not export arms and men in this hemisphere, makes it important that we comment promptly and publicly on the announcement. Even though the public statements which President Kennedy and I made were quite clearly referring to Cuban military action against other American Republics, they are susceptible of being interpreted as applicable to this type of incident.
/2/The enclosures are not printed.
A contingency press statement is enclosed. Depending on the terms of the Venezuelan announcement, it may need some adjustment, although I anticipate that the changes will be minimal. It is designed to emphasize Castro's growing interventionist activities in the hemisphere and to call for greater cooperation in watching for and thwarting these activities, without generating a sense of alarm. The statement makes clear our willingness to cooperate in surveillance but leaves the initiative to the Latin Americans from where it must come if we are to obtain their participation.
In keeping with the objective of calling attention to Cuban subversion without causing alarm, I plan to have the Department Press Officer volunteer the statement at the regular noon press briefing following the Venezuelan announcement./3/
/3/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, December 16, 1963, pp. 913-914.
Dean Rusk/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
170. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Posts in the American Republics/1/
Washington, December 4, 1963, 7:59 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 COAS-IA. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Bowdler; cleared by Allen, Belcher, Collins, Director of the Office of East Coast Affairs Daniel F. Margolies, and Acting Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs Kennedy M. Crockett; approved by Martin. Sent to all Embassies in the American Republics except Kingston and Port-of-Spain and repeated to Kingston, Port-of-Spain, USUN, and POLADs CINCLANT and CINCSO.
1016. Depcirtels 983,/2/ 986,/3/ 1004./4/ Department now making careful assessment of options for COAS/OC action in Venezuelan complaint on Cuban arms cache case. Options being weighed in terms practical effects of measures in further isolating Cuba and degree of support which can be achieved, particularly from those countries maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba.
/2/Circular telegram 983, November 29, outlined a Venezuelan proposal to invoke the Rio Treaty, call a meeting of Foreign Ministers, and appoint a commission to investigate the Cuban arms cache. (Ibid.)
/3/Circular telegram 986, November 30, instructed recipient Embassies to consult the Foreign Ministries in their respective countries and urge support of the Venezuelan proposal in the OAS Council. (Ibid.)
/4/Circular telegram 1004, December 3, reported that the OAS Council, acting provisionally as the Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty, had authorized a committee to investigate the arms cache. (Ibid.) For text of the resolution, see OAS doc. OEA/Ser.G/III/C-sa-526; also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p. 286.
Initiative on proposed action rests primarily with Venezuela and to some extent with Investigating Committee which in addition to determining facts may also include recommendations in its report. At present moment we have no clear picture what Venezuelan intentions are. President Betancourt in press conference Nov 29 reportedly said it has become "necessary to have joint definitive action to finish with this bridgehead of communism in America." He apparently did not specify what action he had in mind. On Dec 3 he reportedly told press Venezuela would seek partial air and naval blockade of Cuba to prevent export of arms and rupture diplomatic relations with Cuba by OAR's still maintaining them. Venezuelan COAS Representative at COAS/OC session confined himself to asking for investigation after which "Venezuela will demand a clear and heavy judgment."
We view range of options of COAS/OC in this situation as including following:
1. air and naval blockade to prevent shipment of arms to Latin America from Cuba;
2. break in diplomatic and consular relations;
3. break in economic relations (embargo already authorized by Eighth MFM);
4. complete or partial interruption of communications;
5. endorsement of system of cooperative surveillance by interested Caribbean countries against clandestine shipment of arms and men from Cuba.
6. condemnation of Castro regime for interventionist activities;
7. call for increased vigilance by OARs and implementation Lavalle Committee recommendations on control of travel, propaganda and funds.
Assuming Venezuela case is airtight (which we believe it is) and Venezuela makes determined bid for effective action as it did in case against Trujillo, request urgently your own assessment (without going beyond Embassy staff) of degree of acceptability of each of these options to government to which you accredited.
Rusk
171. Record of Actions by the National Security Council Standing Group/1/
Washington, December 10, 1963.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency Files, NSC Standing Group, Vol. I. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
Meeting No. 16/63, December 10, 1963--5:00 PM
Deputy Under Secretary of State Johnson summarized a draft State Department paper dealing with possible measures which might be taken in the OAS to prevent Cuban arms exports to Latin America./1/ Following a discussion, the group asked the State Department to prepare a memorandum for the President's decision covering the two preferred alternatives./2/
/2/Not printed. (Ibid.)
/3/A memorandum of December 13 from Ball to Johnson set forth the alternatives. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA)
a. Requiring OAS authorization for the use of force in connection with visit-and-search in international waters against selected Cuban vessels and selected vessels of OAS countries.
b. Not requiring OAS authorization for the use of force because visit-and-search would take place only within the territorial waters of an OAS country agreeing to cooperative interception.
Because the attitude of Mexico and Brazil toward the use of force is critical in any effort to obtain OAS approval for such action, the State memorandum will recommend that our Ambassadors in Mexico City and Rio de Janeiro be authorized to find out informally the probable view of these two governments toward an OAS resolution authorizing the use of force if a visit-and-search in international waters were challenged by a Cuban vessel or selected vessels of any OAS country./4/
/4/The instructions were sent in telegram 1071 to Mexico City, also sent to Rio de Janeiro and Caracas, December 17. (Ibid., POL 3 COAS-IA)
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