In the few months since the Ambassador's arrival, progress has been made in restoring at least ostensibly good relations. However, during this same period President Duvalier's heavy-handed suppression of a student strike, expulsion of a number of Roman Catholic church officials, and arrest and maltreatment of anyone thought to be opposed to his regime have increased his unpopularity and resulted in an increasing tendency on the part of the general public to blame the Embassy and the United States Government for "support" of a "despised tyrant."

The Ambassador emphasizes that we are faced with two "sorry alternatives." There is no one on the scene now who gives any promise of being able or willing to establish a decent constructive government./2/ Should Duvalier fall, there is a decided danger of chaos and a struggle for power among individuals in whom we would have little ground for confidence. Such a situation might well tempt Castro or Trujillo to intervene in such a way as to jeopardize our national interests, possibly even forcing military intervention. Therefore, unless we are willing to take radical steps (including military intervention, if necessary, after Duvalier's removal), we have little choice but to follow our present course of maintaining friendly and helpful relations with the Duvalier government. This is not an easy task nor one which the Ambassador particularly relishes under present circumstances, but he is perfectly willing to undertake it and believes it to be the less dangerous of two unhappy alternatives./3/

/2/In a February 14 memorandum to Rusk, Berle informed him that it was the conclusion of the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency that "the present Haitian Government may linger along for awhile, but it might dissolve into anarchy almost any time." Berle proposed to make contact with the principal members of the Haitian opposition on a cautious basis, making no commitments. (Ibid., Latin America Task Force Files: Lot 61 D 298, Haiti)

/3/In despatch 420 from Port-au-Prince, April 11, Ambassador Newbegin objected to Berle's meeting with Haitian exiles in early March on the grounds that the exiles would assume that the meetings constituted support for Duvalier's overthrow. Newbegin reiterated that the Haitian opposition to Duvalier was so disorganized, disunited, and ineffective that any coup attempt would fail or lead to anarchy. (Ibid., Central Files, 738.00/4-1161) In telegram 274 to Port-au-Prince, April 24, Berle assured Newbegin that his discussions were meant only to establish good relations and guide exile leaders who might eventually play a role in a democratic Haiti. (Ibid.) No other record of Berle's meeting with the exiles has been found.

366. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Coerr) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, May 23, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 738.00/5-2361. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Coerr, cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, and sent via Bowles.

SUBJECT
Our Policy toward Haiti subsequent to President Duvalier's "Inauguration" May 22

REFERENCE
My draft memorandum of May 22 from Mr. Bowles to Mr. Berle/2/

/2/The attached draft explained to Berle that the decision to send the U.S. Charge to Duvalier's unconstitutional "self-coronation" represented the middle ground between Berle's contention that non-attendance would demonstrate U.S. support for democracy in Haiti and make a favorable impression within the Western Hemisphere, and Coerr's view that the Ambassador should attend in light of U.S.-Haitian relations and the reaction his absence would cause inside Haiti. These conflicting viewpoints are outlined in memoranda from Coerr to Bowles, May 16 and Coerr to U. Alexis Johnson, May 17, and from Berle and Hoover to Achilles, May 16; ibid., 611.38/5-1616, 611.38/5-1761, and 611.38/5-1761, respectively.

Background

The reference memorandum (Tab A) describes the decision we took on May 18 to be represented at Duvalier's "inauguration" on May 22 by our Charge./3/ The New York Times today correctly reported our action as a "snub" to the Duvalier regime. Having thus established our position on the dictatorship, we must now attempt to cut our losses by re-establishing adequate working relations with the Duvalier Government. Ambassador Newbegin is at present in Washington on consultation.

/3/In this memorandum U. Alexis Johnson noted that, as the invitation was addressed to the U.S. Charge, he and ARA believed that this was a good "out," and that Ambassador Newbegin should remain in Washington until after Duvalier's inauguration. (Ibid., 738.11/5-1861)

We took the difficult decision of May 18, to respond to Duvalier's action with a moderated sign of disassociation, as a calculated risk. To reduce the consequent damage to our foreign policy objectives in Haiti, we must amend our relations with the Government of Haiti in a similar moderate manner. We should try to re-establish effective working relations with the Duvalier regime which is headed by an irrational man who has almost totalitarian power over the island.

I list below with comment the following lines of action that Mr. Berle has told me today he is contemplating:

(1) He has proposed to you that we send a Departmental officer, Mr. John Hoover (FSO-2) to Haiti on a fact-finding mission.

Comment: Mr. Berle and I have agreed on our need for increased information about the situation within Haiti but we have further agreed that we should at this time make no attempt to get it which would be conspicuous. For us to send a Departmental officer to Haiti now, and before Ambassador Newbegin returns, would, Mr. Berle and I agree, be conspicuous, and Mr. Berle has withdrawn his suggestion.

(2) Mr. Berle was due to leave at 1 p.m. for New York today where he is making a speech this evening. He told me this morning of the possibility that he might be in touch with Haitian exiles, who have quite a colony in New York, with whom Mr. Berle and other interested individuals have maintained an informal contact for some time. He had a supper meeting with a group of Haitian President Duvalier's opponents in New York on March 4.

Comment: It is possible that, although we have no firm evidence to prove it, news of Mr. Berle's March meeting with President Duvalier's enemies in New York has reached Duvalier. If so, this development could account for a series of subsequent actions of the Government of Haiti such as the Haitian delegate's absenting himself from the Cuban debate at the UN and the Haitian President's decision to consolidate his hold on the Government by transforming himself from President to dictator two years before the expiration of his presidential term. Regardless of whether Duvalier has, in fact, heard of Mr. Berle's past meeting or meetings, since he became Chief of the Latin American Task Force, with his exiled opposition, there is no doubt that his reaction would be most adverse should he now hear of such a meeting subsequent to the snub that the U.S. Government administered to him on the occasion of his "inauguration" of May 22.

I pointed out to Mr. Berle that I had assumed a heavy responsibility in recommending the moderated course of action which resulted in our being represented only by our Chargé, that in so doing we assumed the obvious risks of antagonizing the Duvalier regime, with the consequent risks of goading him into excluding the U.S. presence from and facilitating the Castro-Communist penetration into Haiti. I told Mr. Berle I thought that for him or any other easily identified U.S. official to meet under present conditions with the Haitian exiles in New York would be distinctly dangerous. I also told him that should he do so I could not assume any responsibility for subsequent U.S. policy toward Haiti. Mr. Berle said he thought we had to make our stand on dictatorship clear and that he would "take note" of my position.

Recommendations:

(1) That you instruct Ambassador Newbegin to return to Haiti quietly on or about May 26./4/

/4/Rusk approved this recommendation.

(2) That you telephone, or authorize a ranking officer of the Department, or myself, to telephone Mr. Berle today in New York instructing him not to renew contact with the Haitian exiles./5/

/5/According to a note on the source text, Rusk "decided not to intervene here."

367. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, May 26, 1961, 9 a.m.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Haiti, 1961, 000.1--. Secret. Drafted by Maurice J. Mountain, Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, on May 29. Copies were sent to Bundy, Rowan, and Captain Ryan at the White House.

SUBJECT
White House Conference on Haiti

A meeting under the Chairmanship of Mr. Richard Goodwin of the White House Staff was held in the conference room of the White House at 9 A.M. on May 26, 1961. The following were the participants:

Ambassador Robert Newbegin, U.S. Ambassador to Haiti
Mr. Adolph A. Berle, Department of State
Mr. Theodore C. Achilles, Department of State
Mr. Wymberley Coerr, Department of State
Mr. Daniel M. Braddock, Department of State
Mr Forest E. Abbuhl, Department of State
Mr. John P. Hoover, Department of State
[name not declassified], Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Maurice J. Mountain, Department of Defense

Mr. Newbegin outlined the situation in Haiti saying that the U.S. interest in that country was chiefly because of its strategic geographic location and that commercial interests in the area were not too important. He said it was desirable from the U.S. standpoint that affairs in Haiti remain quiet at this time so as not to make our general Caribbean situation more difficult than it now is. He said the Duvalier government is stable by Haitian standards and that it appears to be in complete control, though it remains so by brutal methods. He said that the Duvalier government at the present time is not doing the United States any harm although it is not doing any good either. There is no democratic replacement for this regime in sight. The population of Haiti is 90% illiterate and while some democracy may be possible among the small literate group, it is probable that their concern would be with the assumption of power and the personal gain to be made by taking over the government.

Ambassador Newbegin said that there was some degree of Communist infiltration. The Minister of Information is undoubtedly a Communist. The Minister of Finance was trained in Rumania and during some time spent in France possibly had Communist associations; he is not now a member of the Party but is an opportunist who would rejoin the Communists if he thought they could win. The Minister of Commerce has leanings toward the Communists. There is believed to be no other serious Communist infiltration. Among the masses Communists are few although one estimate of questionable validity reports it at 4,000.

Mr. Goodwin asked if Castro could cause trouble since Cuba is only 30 miles away. There was general agreement that Castro could cause trouble not through a military invasion but through infiltration of small groups designed to establish a base for subversion. Mr. Goodwin asked about the possibility of patrols of the Haitian coast and whether the United States should try to undertake surveillance against infiltration movements from Cuba. The Department of Defense was asked to look into this matter.

The question of discontent among the Haitian people was discussed. Ambassador Newbegin said that land reform was not an issue. Mr. Berle said that the chief objection the Haitians have to the Duvalier government is its brutality and the point of danger will be reached when the people get sufficiently fed up with being "banged over the head" to take action.

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of CIA said that intelligence within Haiti was very difficult to obtain since the people were too terrified to talk. A large part of their information comes from Haitian exiles. It is, therefore, uncertain as of now what the Communists have done or are doing within the country. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] pointed to the experience in Venezuela at the time of the fall of Jimenez where a considerable Communist apparatus suddenly appeared though its existence had been discounted prior to the fall of Jimenez. Mr. Goodwin asked that CIA see what could be done to increase our intelligence of Communist or Castro activities within Haiti.

Ambassador Newbegin said that any action taken with regard to Haiti should be very carefully considered since it was clear there would be a reaction forthcoming from Duvalier. He mentioned the fact that Duvalier had been deeply offended by the absence of the U.S. Ambassador at his recent inauguration. This absence was intended to demonstrate U.S. disapproval of the sham through which Duvalier got himself elected to a second six year term. However, none of the Latin American Ambassadors were absent from the inauguration; only the U.S. Ambassador was missing. As a result Mr. Newbegin said he felt the chances were 60 to 40 that Mr. Duvalier would retaliate by declaring Ambassador Newbegin persona non grata. Similar affronts to Duvalier are almost certain to cause reactions which we may not desire. If we become increasingly tough with him, we may drive him toward the Castro-Communist camp. In Mr. Newbegin's judgment we have not identified anyone or any group competent to form a replacement government. Until we do he suggests that we get along with Duvalier as best we can.

Mr. Goodwin said he had learned that the head of the Marine Mission to Haiti was a very able officer and he would like to have him brought to Washington for a few hours of consultation about U.S. relationships with the Haitian military. He suggested Thursday, June 1, or Friday, June 2. Mr. Newbegin said he would like to hold up on this because it too could lead to difficulty with Duvalier if he knew that this officer was being called back. In the discussion which followed it was agreed that Colonel Heinl, USMC, could go to Guantanamo for two or three days of medical check-up during which period he could be flown to Washington. It was agreed that the Department of Defense would arrange this, consulting if necessary [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for appropriate cover arrangements.

The meeting ended on the note that contingency plans for the Duvalier government continuing in power would not be implemented but that plans for all other contingencies would be kept ready./2/ Another meeting will be held next week./3/

/2/At the 483rd meeting of the National Security Council, May 5, the Council requested the preparation of contingency papers on Haiti and the Dominican Republic given the emergencies that seemed to be developing there. (Memorandum from Coerr to Rusk, June 26; Department of State, Central Files, 738.00/6-2661) The Haitian contingency plan, drafted by Hoover and Abbuhl on May 26 and dated May 29, under cover of a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, is attached but not printed. The contingencies contemplated included Duvalier remaining in power, an impasse in U.S.-Haitian relations, Duvalier's replacement by death, incapacity, or overthrow, and finally subversion or invasion from without. The Department of State provided recommendations for each contingency. The Department of State copy is ibid., Latin America Task Force Files: Lot 61 D 298, Berle, Task Force Material, Basic Documents.

/3/No record of this meeting has been found. Mountain wrote this last sentence by hand.

Maurice J. Mountain
Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff

368. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/

Paris, June 2, 1961, 11 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 738.00/6-261. Secret. Rusk accompanied President Kennedy on a State visit to France May 31-June 3.

Secto 5. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. Have studied Haiti contingency paper submitted May 29/2/ by Achilles group and consider it good job within possibilities such papers. As illustrated by many events past and recent history, such papers may have little relevance to unfolding events. Very existence such papers (such as pre-invasion NSP paper on Korea) has narcotic effect through impression we have answered our policy problems and can rest until events fit assumption of paper. I suspect life is more complicated than that.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 367.

Haitian paper means to me that we see no good answer and are preparing to look for bad ones. The ways to find better answers is to look for different questions. Following is one attempt which my colleagues can multiply and assess.

Haiti is the cesspool of the Western Hemisphere, under a dictator whom we abhor. The situation is ripe for Castro-type effort and we ourselves cannot in good conscience say that this could be worse for the Haitians however damaging to US and cause of freedom in the Americas.

Since we are already supporting the Haitian economy why not do a good job? Why not talk out with Duvalier our readiness to help Haiti make a major surge forward in economic and social development on the assumption that he will remain in power and might be ready to write a gleaming chapter in Haitian history? His policies cannot help but be modified if he takes up such a dare and the more he advances down such a trail the more pressures are built up to build a decent regime or be forced to get out.

I can imagine a US military development group centered around engineer, medical and signal components which could work with his own armed forces on development projects. Even if Duvalier is initially disinterested in schools, he might be ready to set up a network of simple aid stations and health centers where people would congregate and be available for extension-type information through visual and sound aids.

Suggest we put together ideas which we would wish to see carried out by a decent Haitian Government and then consider whether Duvalier might get on with them. He just might have moments when he yearns to be a decent man.

This might mean changing Ambassadors, eating a bit of crow and enduring a certain amount of criticism. But waiting for a chance to use force is no answer either, because the problem is neither military nor cloak and dagger. Would like report on this upon my return.

Rusk

369. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/

SNIE 86.1-61

Washington, June 7, 1961.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff contributed to this special estimate. It was submitted to the U.S. Intelligence Board on June 7 by the Director of Central Intelligence. All members of the Board concurred except the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.

SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS IN HAITI/2/

The Problem

The Estimate

1. In contrast to the Dominican Republic, where the 30 May assassination of Generalissimo Trujillo was preceded by months of unrest, uncertainty, and intensified repression, the situation in Haiti has remained essentially static. President Duvalier has now conferred upon himself a new six-year term in office, two years before the old term was due to expire. In the 30 April parliamentary elections, in which the voters were called upon to choose among various hand-picked pro-Duvalier candidates, Duvalier placed his own name at the top of the ballot, thereafter asserting that he had been unanimously re-elected. Despite the palpable fraud of this procedure, Duvalier was reinaugurated on 22 May without protest, in the presence of thousands of peasants brought in from the countryside./3/

/3/Haitian Presidents have invariably sought to perpetuate themselves in office and have as regularly been thrown out at the expiration of their legitimate terms. Although Duvalier has got away with this "re-election" this time, he has laid the basis for a coup attempt at the expiration of his legitimate term in October 1963. [Footnote in the source text.]

2. By the forced retirement of some officers and the reassignment of others, President Duvalier has further ensured his control over the military establishment, the principal instrument of political power in Haiti./4/ Although the officer corps as a whole almost certainly resents his divide-and-rule technique, he has put in the key positions men on whom he relies. General Merceron, the army commander, strongly resents the growing influence of Major Raymond, the commander of the Presidential Guard, but has been unable to curb it.

/4/The army, which includes the small air force (160 men) and the coast guard (300 men), numbers 5,200, but its small ground forces are scattered over the country in small police and constabulary detachments, except for an 800-man battallion at Port-au-Prince and the Port-au-Prince police (730). The Presidential Guard (400), is an independent command responsible directly to Duvalier. In addition, Duvalier directly controls two paramilitary organizations, a civilian militia in Port-au-Prince (275) and a civilian "secret police" numbering 750-1,000 in the country as a whole. [Footnote in the source text.]

3. Underlying opposition to Duvalier will of course continue. The President's arrogation to himself of a new six-year term has almost certainly increased the resentment of churchmen, students, military men, and others of the old mulatto elite, which has lost its power and influence since Duvalier came to power. Small exile groups continue to exist in New York, Caracas, and Havana; inflammatory broadcasts in Creole, directed at students and the peasantry, continue to emanate weekly from Cuba.

4. Nevertheless, the numerous opposition elements, both in and outside Haiti, still appear to lack the strength, vigor, and cohesion to challenge effectively a man of Duvalier's political skill and determination. A four-month strike by students, who had been the most active of Duvalier's critics, collapsed in March 1961. According to the Haitian Government, a small group of Cuban-supported exiles were apprehended when they landed in late April. Although significant pro-Castro sentiment exists among students and other intellectuals, Castroism still appears to have had little impact on the peasantry.

5. An extremely impoverished country, even by Latin American standards, Haiti has had an unusually poor coffee crop this year, and the dead season is approaching. Nevertheless, the population at large will probably continue to eke out an existence. In November 1960 US financial and technical programs, which had been partially suspended earlier in that year, were resumed and expanded. The present level of US economic assistance (totaling about $13.5 million for the present US fiscal year) appears sufficient to stave off a foreign exchange or budgetary crisis. Thus, current economic difficulties do not appear sufficient to cause any significant falling away of Duvalier's support. Preliminary indications with respect to the 1961-1962 coffee crop are promising.

6. In sum, we consider it unlikely that the internal opposition will be able to overthrow the Duvalier government in the short run. However, the 54-year-old Duvalier is a diabetic and has suffered at least one heart attack, although his health appears to have improved in recent months. His departure from the scene--whether by natural causes or assassination--would almost certainly be followed by a struggle for power. There is no one leader who could command the quick and widespread support necessary for strong government. The military would be likely to seize control of the government, but probably would not be able to stabilize the situation. The result would probably be a period of disorder similar to the nine-month hiatus preceding the installation of Duvalier, when six provisional governments rose and fell. In such an unstable situation, pro-Castro elements would certainly strive to gain control of Haiti.

II. Consequences of Trujillo's Assassination

7. The assassination of Generalissimo Trujillo is unlikely to have any important direct effect on the Haitian situation. Despite the psychological encouragement Trujillo's death has almost certainly given to opponents of Duvalier, it has not changed the presently unfavorable situation confronting them in Haiti.

8. If guerrilla operations develop in the Dominican Republic, they might spill over the Haitian frontier, but probably not to such an extent as to involve major clashes or to have a serious unsettling effect on the position of the Duvalier regime within Haiti. We consider it extremely unlikely that either Castro or the present Dominican regime would undertake military operations in or against Haiti in view of the risks of US or OAS counteraction. Major subversive pressures on Haiti from the Dominican Republic would probably arise only in the event that pro-Castro elements gained power in the Dominican Republic.

9. The unsettled state of affairs in the Dominican Republic to his east, coupled with the presence of a revolutionary Cuba to his west, will probably reinforce Duvalier's sense of dependence on US economic, military, and diplomatic support. At the same time, Duvalier will probably attempt to trade on the notion that the US must support him as the only one capable of providing stable government in Haiti. Castro and his Latin American supporters will almost certainly seek to exploit indications of US support for Duvalier as evidence of US affinity for dictators. At present, with the troubles of the Trujillo dynasty focusing hemisphere attention on the island, such Castro propaganda would probably do some damage to the US position in Latin America.

370. Guidelines Prepared by the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs/1/

Washington, September 18, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.38/9-1861. Secret. Drafted by Abbuhl, cleared by ICA, S/P, B/FAC, INR/RAR. Sent to Acting Secretary Bowles under cover of a September 18 memorandum from Woodward.

GUIDELINES OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD HAITI

Objectives

In order of priority U.S. intermediate or long-range objectives are:

1. A stable government aligned with the United States.

2. Less dishonesty and inefficiency within the Government to permit the U.S. aid program to function more effectively.

3. Improvement in the economic and social life of the Haitian people through a technical and economic assistance program which will ensure a rate of economic growth greater than that of population growth.

4. Development of a more reliable, constructive and respected military establishment to fulfill its constitutional role.

5. An improved climate for foreign private investment.

6. Settlement of pending claims of private U.S. citizens against the Haitian Government.

Lines of Action

1. Continue to live with the Duvalier regime so long as there is no acceptable alternative.

2. Consciously direct U.S. policy toward the development of a better alternative; to this end increase the flow of intelligence information and identify elements and individuals acceptable to the U.S. as the nucleus of a successor government.

3. Evaluate and appraise the potential and likely support for an alternative government which might be received from elements within Haiti, including especially the armed forces.

4. Avoid actions that might precipitate Duvalier's downfall as long as this would create a power vacuum which Castro-Communists could be expected to exploit.

5. Demonstrate resolution and firmness in dealing with Haitian officials and, whenever possible, take the lead in matters affecting U.S.-Haitian relations.

6. Urge Haitian officials to avoid excesses and brutality and respect human rights.

7. Discourage the GOH from its tendency to by-pass the Embassy and USOM and deal directly with Washington agencies.

Economic:

1. Carry forward as much constructive economic and social development as possible.

2. Insist that the GOH help itself and demonstrate its willingness and capability to use U.S. aid effectively, by undertaking badly needed reforms designed to improve public administration, particularly budgetary and fiscal procedures.

3. Undertake, in cooperation with other organizations such as the Pan American Union and ECLA, a comprehensive analysis of the Haitian economy and socio-cultural systems, and the formulation of a national development plan to serve as a basis for Haiti's long-range economic development.

4. Undertake some projects such as low-cost housing, waterworks, highways and airports to provide large-scale employment and demonstrate the tangible results of U.S. aid.

5. Extend aid in the form of grants or long-term, low interest loans for projects which are not self-liquidating.

6. Use the so-called "turnkey contract" procedure for major projects as a means of counteracting the low level of probity and quality of Haiti's administrative machinery and the efforts of many Haitian officials to utilize U.S. aid for purposes not in keeping with our objectives.

7. Regard budgetary support only as a temporary expedient.

8. Insist that the GOH include provisions in its budget to service debts owed U.S. citizens.

Military:

1. Continue, through our present military and materiel assistance programs to develop and maintain a favorable attitude toward the U.S. within the Haitian Army.

2. Develop roles for the Army to play in the economic development of the country, in coordination with other such activities being undertaken in the country.

3. Improve the professional capacity, discipline and stability of the Haitian Armed Forces through U.S. training, and encourage more efficient and economical use of these forces within present manpower and funding ceilings.

4. Continue to provide Haiti with the type and quantities of military assistance believed to be required in order to maintain constitutional law and order, giving consideration to the recommendations developed by the country team in consultation with the special inter-departmental team which was recently sent to Central America to assess the internal security situation of each country.

Contingencies

/2/See footnote 1, Document 367.

[Here follows a section entiled "Rationale," which reported that Haiti had too many people, too little arable land, and scant prospect for economic development since it lacked basic infrastructure. U.S. efforts to aid Haiti had been defeated by corruption of its venal governments. The Rationale section also stated that there were no good prospects for opposition to Duvalier inside or outside Haiti, and that the Duvalier government had little ability to administer joint aid programs, and limited ability to service additional foreign debt. Finally, the section listed five special problems: little capacity for self-government; the legacy of the U.S. Marines' intervention; a tendency to bypass the Embassy and USOM and to try to deal directly with Washington; social and racial tensions; and Duvalier's hypersensitivity to criticism.]

371. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, June 1, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Haiti, 1/61-6/62. Secret.

Attached is a copy of a memorandum which Mr. Goodwin took with him to the meeting between the President and Ambassador Thurston on Saturday, May 26./2/ I understand that the memorandum was discussed at the meeting and that the President gave his general approval to it.

/2/The meeting took place at the White House from 11:02 to 11:20 a.m. Schlesinger also attended. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) No other record of this meeting has been found.

We would appreciate receiving a memorandum confirming the President's approval of the position set forth in the memorandum or some other indication of the President's decision respecting it./3/

/3/Not found.

E.S. Little/4/

/4/Little signed for Brubeck above Brubeck's typed signature.

Attachment

Our present policy is aimed at the identification and support of a viable alternative to Duvalier and the ultimate dislodgement of the Duvalier regime in favor of such alternative. Our present target date for the completion of this operation is next May, at which time Duvalier's first "elected" term of office expires. (We have never recognized the second "election" at which he extended his term.)

Among the reasons we feel it necessary to dislodge Duvalier are the following:

1. Some of the key people around Duvalier are ultranationalist, anti-U.S. and have communist backgrounds. There is every indication that their influence is increasing. We also believe that they are quietly, and under the very severe limitations of Duvalier's ingrained suspicions of everyone, trying to increase their authority within the government, militia, etc.; hoping to take over when Duvalier goes. The longer that he hangs on the more likely they may be to succeed.

2. There is some indication of increasing communist activity in the country. There is no doubt that the longer this repressive regime continues the greater the potential communist strength.

3. Our support of Duvalier inevitably strengthens the hands of those elements of the opposition which are anti-US in orientation.

4. We are convinced that it is hopeless to try to work with Duvalier. He is indifferent to the social and economic welfare of his people, intoxicated with brutality and repressions, unaware or indifferent to the possibility of ultimate communist rule, and hostile to our guidance or advice. All efforts to work with him have met resistance and there seems to be no realistic hope that things will get better in the future.

5. A US role in dislodging Duvalier would, of course, help us with other democratic forces in the Caribbean area and be another significant step in upsetting the old "friendly to dictators" picture which still prevails although lessened by the DR events.

Under no circumstances would we try to dislodge Duvalier without a fairly clear idea who would replace him.

Thus we must use the next year to identify the alternative.

1. The CIA, FBI and INR have completed a dossier of promising Haitian exiles and visible resistance figures/5/ from which we are trying to select those most likely to be capable of heading a successor government.

/5/Reference, at least in part, is to a compilation listing nearly 200 potential oppositionists to Duvalier. The list was attached to a memorandum from Hilsman to Martin, May 7, in which Hilsman noted that Duvalier's repression of dissident elements was so effective that there were no organized opposition groups inside Haiti. Oppositionists were all exiles. Hilsman listed 18 "technicans" who appeared to meet minimum standards of administrative ability, leadership, friendship to the United States or lack of animosity, and absence of Communist sympathies. (Department of State, Central Files, 738.11/5-762)

2. We are trying to substantially increase our intelligence on Haiti. [4 lines of source text not declassified] Hard as it is to believe, we know far less about Haiti under Duvalier than we knew about the Dominican Republic under Trujillo.

3. Identification of an alternative is the primary mission of our Embassy.

While this is going on we will be publicly cool toward Duvalier and conduct normal personal and private contacts. We are most anxious not to do anything which will precipitate his departure before we are ready. On the other hand a cool public posture, with occasional mild acts of hostility, are essential if we are to encourage the tentative emergence of an opposition and make them willing to be in touch with us.

If we are ready next May it is probable that we will be able to get rid of Duvalier. We are studying plans for this now. The most promising approach would be the withdrawal of recognition at the time when his term expires. This would have a juridical base and we could probably get some other countries (e.g., Venezuela and Colombia) to go along with us. This complete severing of relations on the part of the US and others would make his fall almost inevitable.

I want to stress that this is now a probing operation. We do not intend to move decisively unless and until we feel that we have reasonable control over the future course of events.

372. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, August 8, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Haiti, 7/62-8/62. Top Secret. The Department of State copy indicates that the memorandum was drafted by Abbuhl and approved by Martin. (Department of State, Central Files, 738.00/8-862)

SUBJECT
The Situation in Haiti

As background information for the meeting with the President on Haiti, which is scheduled for Thursday, August 9,/2/ the enclosed memorandum on the current situation in that country has been prepared by the Department and concurred in by the Central Intelligence Agency./3/

/2/The meeting with the President took place at the White House from 10 to 10:55 a.m. McGeorge Bundy, Edwin Martin, Crimmins, Goodwin, Graham Martin, J.C. King, Richard Helms, and Frank Sloan attended. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book)

/3/No memorandum of conversation of this August 9 meeting has been found, but it was discussed at the White House Daily Staff meeting of August 10. According to Colonel J.J. Ewell's notes of the staff meeting: "State and the White House are, of course, concerned about the situation in Haiti. Someone in State, I think Martin, is for suspending military assistance but Goodwin is against it. He seems to think we had better play this by ear until the situation develops one way or another. He evidently thinks that Duvalier can probably ride this one out and if we have chopped at him, he would then give the U.S. a very hard time. A small Navy/Marine task force is on the alert in the general area." National Defense University, Taylor Papers, White House Daily Staff meetings, May-Sept, 1962) See also Document 373.

E.S. Little/4/

/4/Little signed for Brubeck above Brubeck's typed signature.

Enclosure

THE SITUATION IN HAITI

Since the regime assumed power five years ago, the political situation has deteriorated steadily and the chronically stagnant economy has been further depressed. A partisan civil militia has been developed from among the poorest, and in some cases, worst elements of the population. This militia, which is highly susceptible to political manipulation, may eventually become powerful enough to neutralize the US-trained and oriented regular armed forces, a circumstance which would open the way to a takeover by unscrupulous activists and extremists, including Communist or pro-Communist elements. A small group of ultra-nationalistic and racist advisers, all opportunistic and some receptive to strong Marxist if not Communist influence and some with Communist backgrounds, has gradually consolidated its position within the regime and is exercising a dangerously increasing influence. This group is believed to be trying to expand its authority within the Government and militia, in the hope of taking over when Duvalier goes.

While it is estimated that the strength of the Communist Party has not yet reached dangerous proportions, there can be no doubt but that the continuance in power of Duvalier's brutal, corrupt regime, which despite its propaganda is indifferent to the social and economic welfare of the people and either unaware of or indifferent to the possibility of ultimate Communist rule, is highly conducive to the growth of Communist strength and potential.

On the basis of our experience to date in dealing with the regime, we are convinced that it is hopeless, so long as Duvalier remains in power, to make any further attempt to establish a practical basis of cooperation with it or to carry out successfully the type of aid programs essential to the development of the country and of more enlightened and responsible government.

Accordingly, our present policy is: (a) to look toward the replacement of Duvalier by a more efficient, enlightened and friendly government, but (b) to avoid a premature showdown which might result in failure, elimination or neutralization of the political opposition or the assumption of power by elements no less, or perhaps more, inimical to United States interests than he. Although Duvalier is attempting through unconstitutional means to perpetuate himself in office at least until May 15, 1967, the term for which he was constitutionally elected expires May 15, 1963. The latter date offers special opportunities for pressure and maneuver on our part and is considered a target date for Duvalier's departure.

Since, in our opinion, Duvalier cannot remain in power for any extended period without United States economic and military assistance, these two levers are being used to bring carefully measured pressure to bear on the regime and to influence internal political developments in furtherance of objectives (a) and (b) above.

The decision has been made to phase out quietly two important United States financed regional development projects, which have not succeeded primarily because of the lack of Haitian cooperation, and to reduce over the next several months the range and cost of all other AID activities to about half their present level. It has also been decided to proceed with one rather than both of two pending loans in order to avoid either strengthening Duvalier unduly or provoking him to intemperate action. We are going ahead with a loan to construct a jet-capable airport which will meet a United States military requirement, but not a highway construction loan, approval of which would make it difficult, if not impossible, for us to continue opposing two pending IBRD loans.

On the military side, our Missions are exercising a useful influence on the United States-oriented regular armed forces, but this influence is being offset by Duvalier's deliberate and successful efforts to undermine the armed forces in favor of the potentially dangerous civil militia. At the moment Duvalier appears still to need our Missions and military assistance program as proof of United States support of his regime, but the continued buildup of the militia as the principal instrument for the support of his regime progressively reduces the possibility of using our military assistance to arrest or preferably reverse this unfavorable trend. Consequently, MAP shipments have been temporarily suspended while we still have this leverage, in an effort to elicit improved cooperation from the regime in implementing the Missions' recommendations which are designed to prevent the power balance from changing in favor of the militia.

There are definite indications that awareness on the part of Haitian officials and the public that Duvalier apparently no longer enjoys unqualified United States support has weakened the regime and has helped to stimulate dissident civilian elements, military officers and even former Duvalierists to plot against Duvalier more actively than heretofore. An increasing volume of reports on plots against Duvalier has been received, but the plotting appears to be based largely on wishful thinking and to be vague and uncoordinated. Approaches have been made to us recently by one dissident civilian element for assistance and by a military group (with perhaps some civilian associates) for assurances that the Untied States would not interpose itself against a military coup directed against Duvalier. A spokesman for a pro-American group of former and current Haitian military and civilian officials told our Ambassador as recently as August 1 that they were plotting to overthrow Duvalier not later than October of this year./5/

/5/As reported in telegram 56 from Port-au-Prince, August 2, Thurston estimated that "this movement of disaffected former Duvalierists represents most cohesive and effective challenge to Duvalier that has yet come to our attention." (Department of State, Central Files, 738.00/8-262)

While the latter group, which apparently includes some reputable individuals such as the Army Chief of Staff, represents possibly a cohesive and potentially effective challenge to Duvalier, the various currents of opposition activity generally have not yet made any efficacious attempt to organize or agree on future programs or a candidate, and are floundering in little groups out of fear, self-interest and uncertainty. On the basis of present evidence, it appears that the mistrust, treachery and opportunism which are chronic in Haiti make the prospects of Duvalier's overthrow in the near future problematical at best. A cool public posture and occasional mild acts of hostility toward Duvalier by the United States will maintain and probably increase current ferment, but effective opposition action will, in our opinion, probably require at a minimum firm assurances of United States support. Opposition elements at all levels invariably stress that only the United States can come to their relief.

373. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin) to the Ambassador to Haiti (Thruston)/1/

Washington, August 11, 1962.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.38/8-1162. Top Secret; Eyes Only; No Distribution.

Dear Ray: I have just read your telegram No. 77/2/ and thought perhaps it would be useful to give you some background on our thinking here and on the instructions of the last day or so which seem to have disturbed you. They were based on an hour's discussion with the President Thursday morning, participated in by Defense, CIA and AID, as well as ourselves./3/ No one challenges the basic policy decision that we cannot hope to achieve our objectives in Haiti so long as Duvalier is in power and that we must seek means to secure a change.

/2/In telegram 77 from Port-au-Prince, August 10, Thurston reported that he had informed key personnel of his instructions as outlined in telegram 54 to Port-au-Prince, August 9. The Department's instructions were that "all official U.S. personnel in contact with opposition elements should not go beyond that of interested listeners. No encouragement should be given plotting elements." If pressed for U.S. assistance by plotters, Thurston and his relevant staff should only say that the United States would follow its stated policy of nonintervention. In telegram 77 Thurston suggested that these instructions were "too restrictive" and that risks had to be taken to obtain a more enlightened and cooperative government in Haiti. (Ibid., 738.00/8-1062 and 738.00/8-962, respectively)

/3/See footnote 1, Document 372.

However, there is an equally important element in our policy which I think has been made clear throughout that, particularly under present cold war circumstances, it would be against United States interests to have an attempt to unseat Duvalier result in a period of chaos and confusion and perhaps violence, and a government even less effective and able to deal with the Haitian problems, or at worst, a government with Castro-Communist leanings.

The Haitian situation has seemed to us sufficiently confused and the Haitian people sufficiently immature politically, and the country sufficiently weak economically that these consequences could readily result from premature and poorly planned activity.

There was also, of course, a desideratum that any movement against Duvalier have a reasonable prospect of success in order to preserve the relatively few assets Haiti has in terms of effective and well-intentioned leaders.

It has also been clear that the United States definitely wanted any action to be taken to be indigenous and not open us to the charge of intervention. In this connection there are fundamental differences between the Haitian situation and the Dominican situation which must be kept in mind. Action in the case of the Dominican Republic was within the framework of OAS attitudes and positions which in turn stemmed largely from Dominican intervention in affairs of other countries, particularly Venezuela. The Haitian Government has taken no such steps and, in fact, there is little interest in Haiti among other Latin American countries with the exception of the Dominican Republic.

In this policy framework we have, as you know, for several months been doing two things. First, both for its effect in Haiti and because it was a correct posture for the United States to take in its own terms and for its position in the Hemisphere, we tried to make clear that we were not friendly to, or supporting in any way, Duvalier and, in particular, his attempts to perpetuate himself in power by the phony election of 1961./4/

/4/Duvalier used the elections of April 30, 1961, for the new unicameral legislature that he created to claim reelection to the presidency. At the top of each ballot for deputy to the legislature was written, "Francois Duvalier, President de la Republic." Duvalier claimed that the over 1.3 million ballots for the legislature (most non-Duvalier estimates of those Haitians voting were about 100,000) also constituted his election to the presidency. As the Embassy stated, efforts to give the election an "appearance of constitutionality should stretch the imagination of even the most credulous of the uneducated among the Haitians." (Despatch 469 from Port-au-Prince, May 9; Department of State, Central Files, 611.38/5-961)

Second, we were stepping up our intelligence activities and contacts in order to appraise the prospects for the organization by the Haitians of a successful coup and the maintenance of a satisfactory government, military or civilian or mixed.

I have had some feeling that the step up of unrest in Haiti was due as much to the increased awareness of the military that time was against them in their competition with the militia as to any actions we have taken to show disapproval of Duvalier.

As I assume you are aware from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], the Agency reached last week a tentative conclusion, based on such information as was available to them, that there were a number of small plotting groups not in touch with each other and in fact on the whole distrustful of each other and that insofar as they had plans of action, these were on the whole fairly childish in concept. This analysis seems to me consistent with the reports you have been sending in.

It is within the framework of this policy approach and on the basis of this appraisal of the current situation that the President reached the decisions that he did on Thursday. From a timing or tactical standpoint it is perhaps a somewhat more cautions approach than we had had in mind but Crimmins and I agree that it is no change in direction. It was made clear, and, I think, accepted that the continuation of Duvalier in office beyond May 1963 would be a major event in Haitian politics and this date a significant one for Haitian opposition groups.

As you may have heard, or certainly will hear shortly, it was agreed to step up [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] activity by adding one or two people to your post in order to keep in touch more closely with various groups and individuals and know more about their plans, to serve as a better basis for United States policy and action decisions here. There have been no decisions which preclude us from playing an active covert role. There have been no decisions which would prevent us from giving active overt assistance if called upon to do so by a provisional government which was to our liking or, if the situation would develop in a way which would permit OAS sponsorship of action. If this type of situation should develop, we would prefer that United States military activity be associated with military activity of other Latin American countries.

Within the framework of this policy, we shall continue to stress that aid actions have been taken on technical grounds. This reflects our concern about premature action either by Duvalier against us or the opposition or by the opposition against Duvalier. Steps by either side at this time would on the basis of our present information seriously interfere with achieving our fundamental objectives as described above.

The first thing John and I discussed after returning from the White House was the technical problem we, and particularly you, would have in carrying out this policy in the face of the current unrest about which we knew relatively little at the time of the meeting with the President. It is exceedingly difficult for people to keep their courage up to the breaking point over a long period of time, to be uncertain about the future prospects and about the nature or even existence of outside support. On the other hand, and far outweighing these real considerations, is the great damage that could be done to the prospects of success by premature, ill-planned action with a loss of leadership and of prestige that this would involve. Moreover, we must consider as overriding, as I am sure from your reports you have been doing in your contacts, the giving of any basis to any of the opposition groups for thinking that the United States was taking an active role and that they had a claim on us which could be cashed at a time of their choosing. The United States is, and must continue to be, firmly committed to a policy of nonintervention in internal affairs of other countries, even in Latin America, in situations where the security and future of the hemisphere as a whole is not directly involved and where we cannot count on the public support and endorsement of the great majority of other countries in the hemisphere.

While it would be inappropriate to move at this particular time, I am more convinced than ever of the necessity to the carrying out of difficult policy line of an early change in the chief of your military mission. I spoke to Lansing Collins about this on Thursday.

Perhaps I should have written this letter or something like it considerably earlier, but I did not realize that there might be some difference in our concept of the timing factors and the application of what I think has been an agreed basic policy. Nor was I aware until this week exactly how the President looked upon the problem, although I did know from previous conversations of his desire for caution and careful planning.

Sincerely,

Edwin M. Martin/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature and typed initials.

P.S. In reviewing this letter there are two points I may not have made clear. In our understanding we had never, in considering implementation of the basic objective, gone beyond authority to collect intelligence. We still have not done so. Any action by us, covert or overt, can thus only take place as a result of a new decision at the highest level.

I want to stress also that we recognize that we may be faced with very difficult decisions if the evidences of our unfavorable attitude toward the Duvalier Government are taken by Haitians as guarantees of support and they take overt action accordingly. This may be a fairly immediate problem. I cannot, of course, predict what our decisions would be if violence should break out but you should certainly not count on measures beyond those necessary to protect the lives and property of Americans.

EMM

374. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State/1/

Washington, January 21, 1963.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Haiti, 9/62-2/63. Secret. Sent to Bundy under cover of a January 21 memorandum from Brubeck, which noted that this memorandum was prepared as background information for a Presidential meeting on Haiti on January 22. The meeting with the President took place at the White House from 4:15 to 5 p.m.; Martin, Crimmins, Collins, and Dungan attended. Guatemala was discussed in addition to Haiti. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) No other record of the January 22 meeting has been found.

HAITI SITUATION AND UNITED STATES POLICY

1. In his Independence Day address on January 1, 1963, President Duvalier eliminated any remaining doubt that he might hold Presidential elections before February 10 and step down from the Presidency on May 15, 1963 as he is obligated to do under Haitian law. He stated clearly that he plans to continue in power through 1963 and beyond.

2. The Duvalier regime has not received any substantial assistance from the United States or international lending institutions since July 1, 1962. United States military materiel shipments have been suspended since that time, as has been the greater part of our economic aid. We have also blocked approval of pending AID, IDB and IDA loans totalling some $17 million, because their approval would strengthen Duvalier's position greatly and seriously undermine opposition efforts and morale. We recently approved an AID loan of $2.8 million for a jet airport in order to reduce the risk that our negative attitude toward Duvalier might provoke him to intemperate action before we were prepared to deal with it, and because the airport meets an important United States military requirement for a jet-capable field in Haiti.

3. The fact that the Duvalier regime is now receiving only very limited economic assistance from the United States Government and international lending institutions has served to identify the United States with more enlightened political forces whose cooperation will be required if we are to attain our long-term objectives in Haiti, that is, to keep Haiti aligned with the United States and the free world, and to help overcome its critical economic and social problems in order to establish a broader base for the development of more enlightened, orderly and responsible government. It has also resulted in increased activity on the part of these forces. We estimate, however that the measures taken thus far which are essentially passive in nature, are not likely to provide sufficient stimulus to acceptable opposition elements who are seeking some means of preventing Duvalier from unconstitutionally perpetuating himself in office.

4. In recent weeks, we have been receiving improved intelligence reporting on the organization, internal conflicts, attitudes and activities of Haiti's principal Communist elements. While they now appear to be better organized and therefore potentially more of a threat than we had previously estimated, we do not believe that their strength has reached dangerous proportions. We are, of course, assessing on a continuing basis the relative strength of the Communists and other opposition elements who hope to topple Duvalier.

The most recent comprehensive review of our Haitian policy was made in October when the Latin American Policy Committee approved a Plan of Action (enclosed),/2/ the principal conclusions of which were the following:

/2/Dated October 23; not printed.

1. The kind of measures, both overt and covert, which would assure Duvalier's departure in favor of an acceptable alternative, were not acceptable to us at that time.

2. We should take advantage of the possible development of circumstances in which the application of further overt measures would tip the balance and result in Duvalier's probable replacement by a more acceptable government. At the same time, we should avoid pin-pricking measures which only serve to make it more difficult to maintain a working relationship with his regime without assuring the desired result.

3. A further review of our policies and programs in Haiti should be undertaken in early 1963 in the light of developments and prospects then existing.

This further policy review is scheduled to be completed the week of February 10 when Ambassador Thurston will arrive here on consultation. The Country Team at Port-au-Prince is forwarding a paper for consideration that is to include, inter alia: (a) a summary of the current situation, (b) Duvalier's prospects of remaining in power beyond May 15, (c) the various courses of action open to us for achieving his departure and the risks involved, and (d) our posture towards the Duvalier regime should it remain in power after May 15.

375. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/

Washington, February 20, 1963.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HAI. Secret. This paper, which was drafted by Abbuhl, was transmitted to Bundy under a February 21 memorandum from Brubeck. Bundy requested the plan to show President Kennedy en route to Palm Beach, Florida, the night of February 23.

HAITI PLAN OF ACTION FROM FEBRUARY 15
TO SEPTEMBER 15, 1963/2/

[Here follow a discussion of the objectives of the plan (the orderly departure of Duvalier, a working but cool relationship until that time, and preservation and strengthening of the U.S. position with the political forces that the United States wanted to see replace Duvalier), a description of the current situation, and an assessment that a change of government in Haiti was likely within the next year.]

Plan of Action

/3/In the "Current Situation" portion, not printed, it was explained that the $2.8 million loan from AID for a jet airport was approved "in order to reduce the risk that our negative attitude toward Duvalier might provoke him to intemperate action before we were prepared to deal with him." See also paragraph 2 of Document 374.

2. At every opportunity in conversations with President Duvalier and other high Haitian officials, exert pressure directed against anti-American, crypto-Communist or Communist elements both in and out of the Government.

3. React with toughness and vigor to any Government excesses involving the violation of the rights of American citizens.

4. Public Law 480, Title III/4/ programs should be maintained, with vigorous Embassy support in fighting obstructionism. Appropriate instances of obstructionism should be protested by formal note. If the programs cannot be maintained because of obstructionism, they should be suspended and the reasons for the suspension should be made known publicly.

/4/The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, July 10, 1954, 68 Stat. 454.

5. Maintain maximum pressure on the Government to pay its debts both to official American lending institutions and to private American creditors. Particular attention should be given to the satisfactory settlement of private American claims which have been pending for almost a year before the Haitian Claims Commission.

6. American officials should talk fiscal and administrative reform at all levels of contact with Haitians, both in and out of the Government, so that it will be clearly understood that such reforms are a sine qua non for United States aid to Haiti. Mention of such reforms should specifically include the incorporation of all Government revenues into the regular budget, since there is no accountability for the substantial proportion of revenues that are now outside the budget.

7. While limiting its activities to support of the malaria eradication campaign and execution of the jet airport construction loan, the USAID Mission should continue its searching evaluation of United States aid to Haiti in the light of experience, and an attractive and realistic contingency aid program for an acceptable successor government should be prepared.

8. To offset our retrenchment in other fields, USIS should continue a high level of activities, and the Haitian-American Institute should step up the quantity and quality of United States cultural programs in Haiti in order to raise American cultural prestige. On carefully selected matters where local media for political reasons dare not publish news about U.S. positions regarding Haiti, USIS should be utilized as a channel for distributing this news, bearing in mind, however, the need to protect USIS' relations with local information media and the Haitian Government.

9. United States Military Missions in Haiti should: (a) continue, where possible, to maintain or increase effective contact, private and official, with the Haitian Armed Forces and its leadership, with a view to preventing loss of existing latent assets, and to developing a solid basis for future cooperation; (b) pursue intelligence collection efforts as directed and required; (c) maintain current plans for short-notice resumption of MAP material and training support for the Armed Forces which could be offered to a new and more responsive regime; (d) develop contingency plans for a broader civic action program for the Armed Forces under a successor regime so they may play a more constructive role in the development of the country.

10. Increase the number of visits by units of the United States Navy to the outlying ports of Haiti in order to demonstrate an American presence and sympathetic interest in those areas.

11. The Immigration and Naturalization Service should be requested to issue re-entry (I-512) permits to exile leaders residing in the United States who are attempting to organize a unified movement of all Haitian exiles, both here and in other countries, and need to travel outside the United States to do so. Because of their indefinite residence status as exiles, they are unable without such a permit to re-enter the United States once they leave, except by applying for and obtaining a resident visa from a United States Consul abroad.

12. Consider means of reducing the size of United States military missions in Haiti in such a way as not to violate agreements, hamper United States interests, or provoke Duvalier to demand their complete withdrawal. Planned increases in Military Attache coverage should be implemented.

13. Continue to block pending AID, IDB, and IDA loans to Haiti which, if approved, would be exploited politically by Duvalier and would support his current effort to portray his regime as progressive, and respected and accepted internationally.

14. Follow closely the financial position of the Haitian Government in order to take advantage of any circumstances in which the United States can exercise any influence thereon in ways furthering our principal objective, i.e., the departure of Duvalier in favor of an acceptable alternative.

15. Assess, on a continuing basis and against the evolving situation, the potential for achieving our objective through a direct approach to Duvalier calculated to encourage him to leave office. Such an approach could be made either through a special emissary or through the American Ambassador, who would point out that there will be no resumption of US aid to Haiti so long as he remains in power, and that it would be in the interests of the Haitian people, U.S.-Haitian relations, and peace and progress in the Caribbean area for him to step down and make way for an orderly succession. In 1956 the then American Ambassador, accompanied by the Papal Nuncio, made such appeal to President Magloire just before he left office.

16. Encourage the international press to publish the facts about Haiti, when this can be done without risk of detection, so that the repressive and illegal nature of the Duvalier regime will continue to be spotlighted on the international scene and so the Haitian opposition will take encouragement from this sympathetic interest in their plight.

17. Publicize by means of background press briefings, statements by appropriate members of Congress, Government officials, etc. that U.S. economic aid has been drastically reduced and military materiel shipments suspended for some time because of the inadequacies of the Duvalier government, its failure to adhere to agreements, and attempts to subvert U.S. aid to political ends. Such briefings and statements should also: (a) deplore the oppressive nature of the Duvalier regime and Duvalier's failure to step down from office at the expiration of his elected term of office, (b) reiterate the desire of the United States to help the Haitian people in accordance with the principles and democratic spirit implicit in the Alliance for Progress, and (c) intimate that substantial U.S. assistance would be forthcoming to a cooperative, responsible government.

18. As the end of Duvalier's constitutionally elected term approaches, consideration should be given to consulting with the representatives in Washington of those Latin American and NATO governments that maintain diplomatic missions in Port-au-Prince, with a view to encouraging them to recall their representatives from Haiti over the period May 15-22, 1963, in order publicly to disassociate their countries from Duvalier's flouting of Haiti's constitution and electoral laws.

19. If Duvalier is still in office on May 15, no actions should be taken to underline the passage of that date or prejudice the continued presence of our Ambassador, except to follow the procedure of the past two years, i.e., call the Ambassador back on consultation before May 15 and have him remain away from Haiti until after May 22, the second anniversary of Duvalier's "reinauguration."

376. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic/1/

Washington, March 7, 1963, 6:27 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 HAI. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Crockett; cleared in draft with Wellman, Deputy Director of the Office of West Coast Affairs Herbert Thompson, Fisher, Allen, Cottrell, and Dungan; cleared in substance with General Enemark of DOD/ISA; and approved by Martin. Also sent to Bogotá, Caracas, Panama, San Jose, and Tegucigalpa, and repeated to Port-au-Prince, POLAD CINCLANT and POLAD CINCARIB.

788. While Duvalier still maintains firm and effective control of Haiti, opposition to his oppressive regime is widespread and plotting against him has increased substantially since it became evident that he has no intention of voluntarily relinquishing power at the end of his constitutional term of office, May 15, 1963. A sudden coup or act of violence against Duvalier could occur at any time, a possible consequence of which might be an internal armed conflict or a complete breakdown in public authority. Given the degree to which racism has been made an issue by Duvalier, the safety of foreigners would be particularly endangered in such a situation. There could also be danger of a Communist-inspired attempt to move in under cover of a confused or anarchical situation. There could be a request for assistance from a respectable provisional government fighting Duvalier forces.

US contingency planning for Haiti incorporates provision for use of US forces in varying forms as may be required by conditions within Haiti following an outbreak of violence. These possible courses of action range from the bringing of fleet units into Haitian waters to serve as a calming and restraining influence, to the actual landing of troops should the situation degenerate to such an extent that the threat to our interests outweighed the disadvantages of taking such drastic measures./2/

/2/The draft contingency plan is in JCS telegram 9018, March 9, sent for information to the Department of State. In telegram 231, March 9, the Department of State sent the JCS plan to the Embassy in Haiti for its comments. In telegram 393 from Port-au-Prince, March 12, Thurston responded that he agreed with the plan, but wanted to be able to assure opposition forces of U.S. assistance in advance of their acting. (All ibid.)

While some kind of OAS umbrella would be urgently sought for the direct involvement of US forces in any of the contingencies envisioned, it must be recognized that a variety of developments within Haiti could make it encumbent on us to move our forces much more rapidly than it would be possible to obtain any sort of OAS action. Should this prove to be necessary, it would be distinctly advantageous if our actions enjoyed the sanction (and possible participation) of as many as possible of the Hemisphere governments that share our interest in preventing a disaster in Haiti.

Without approaching host governments, addressee posts are requested to comment on the prospects for obtaining advance commitment of support by the governments to which accredited for utilization of US forces in the manner and degree required by emergency situations that might be expected to arise in Haiti./3/ Such support would consist of public statements calling for or approving US action as well as support in seeking OAS approval.

/3/The recipient posts estimated that their government's responses to unilateral U.S. intervention in Haiti would be negative. The responses are ibid., POL HAI and POL 26 HAI.

While the range of such emergency situations is all but limitless, Department has particularly in mind situations resulting from or complicated by Haiti's proximity to Cuba and/or a complete breakdown of law and order, riots and violence such as have attended some previous changes of political power in Haiti.

Rusk

377. Summary Record of the 509th National Security Council Meeting/1/

Washington, March 13, 1963, 4:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, No. 509. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.

SUBJECT
Latin American Policy

Present: President, Vice President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Dillon, Attorney General, General Taylor, Director McCone, Secretary Vance, Under Secretary Ball, Ambassador Stevenson, Administrator Bell, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Director Murrow, Director McDermott, U. Alexis Johnson, Assistant Secretary Martin, Assistant Secretary Tyler, Paul Nitze, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Sorensen, Mr. Dungan, Mr. Kaysen, General Clifton, Mr. Bromley Smith

[Here follows discussion of Cuba, for text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1063, volume XI.]

Secretary Rusk indicated that we must be prepared to move promptly in trouble areas such as Haiti./2/ General Taylor indicated that we could put U.S. Marines ashore in Haiti within 51 hours.

/2/At the request of the White House, INR prepared an assessment of short-term prospects for Haiti and of possible U.S. actions. It concluded that Duvalier was precariously threatened by opposition groups inside and outside Haiti. These groups were nonetheless ill-equipped to gain effective control of the government should Duvalier be eliminated. Anarchy was the most likely result; and Castro and Haitian Communists would profit most. There were few options open to the United States: direct U.S. intervention would be strongly protested in Latin America, and the Dominican Republic's intervention would raise as many problems as it would solve. OAS intervention would be difficult to sell to the other members, but it was the best option. An OAS mission would have to take responsibility for a remedial economic program and establishing law and order conducive to formation of a successor regime. (Memorandum from Hughes to Rusk, May 8; ibid., 5/7/63-8/63)

The President reacted sharply to the estimate of 51 hours by saying that this was too long. General Taylor said there was a unit which could be airdropped much sooner if an airfield were available. If we wished, we could keep the Marines aboard ships just over the horizon.

Mr. Martin said our Ambassador in Haiti did not recommend that Marine forces be kept aboard ship just over the horizon. This matter is to be followed closely because of the uncertain situation in Haiti.

[Here follows discussion of other Latin American topics (see Document 56) and further discussion on Cuba (see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XI).]

378. Telegram From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State/1/

Port-au-Prince, May 2, 1963.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HAI. Top Secret; Operational Immediate. Repeated to Caracas and Santo Domingo. No time of transmission appears on the source text. Relayed to the White House.

521. Through situation reports and cables on specific incidents we have attempted to convey accurate picture abnormal situation prevailing here in recent days./2/ I believe it now essential for US Govt consider urgently what it can do together with other interested govts to get this powder keg under control and turn the crisis to advantage in terms our objectives and interests in Haiti and Latin American generally.

/2/After the April 26 abortive kidnapping attempt on his family by Haitian dissidents, Duvalier's agents began to arrest oppositionists, many of whom fled to the sanctuary of foreign embassies. The government cordoned off the Dominican and other Latin American Embassies in Port-au-Prince to prevent potential political refugees from obtaining asylum. On April 26 Haitian police forcibly entered the Dominican Embassy. The Dominican Republic called for a special meeting of the Council of the OAS, which in turn created an investigative committee that visited both countries. As a result of the visit and in anticipation of the report, Haiti removed its forces from the Dominican Embassy and allowed some Haitian asylees safe conduct to the Dominican Republic. Documentation on this conflict is primarily ibid., POL DOM REP-HAI. See also John Bartlow Martin, Overtaken by Events, pp. 416-447.

It is difficult to exaggerate the fear, both justified and unreasoning, which now dominates Port-au-Prince. It permeates all elements of the population, Haitians and foreigners, officials and non-officials, rich and poor. Many ordinary Haitians are drifting back to their villages in the hinterland. No curfew has been declared but there is little nocturnal activity because of the fear of being inadvertently shot by army and militia patrols posted around city. Except for violent action by Barbot group (which now believed be ones who killed guardians Duvalier children and to whom is also attributed last night's reportedly successful raid on weapons depot at Martissant area) Duvalier's security forces appear to have everything under control. Yet apprehension persists as crowds of simple people are harangued in inflammatory creole speeches by Duvalier and his henchmen. Duvalier himself in "apres moi le deluge" mood as he continues to crack down on all elements suspected of opposing him.

Both because of personal indignities suffered at hands police authorities and accounts of atrocities reaching them from increasing number asylees in Latin American Embassies foreign diplomats are deeply troubled about situation. To what extent this has as yet had impact on their governments cannot be determined from here, but I would judge that our own general position re Duvalier regime now more widely supported than before recent events.

Arrival OAS commission welcomed here by all except GOH itself which wants it out of town as soon as possible. Our only contact with commission has been through Dean Diplomatic Corps, those Latin American Embassies whose countries are on commission and American journalists. I understand that there are differences in the commission about how broadly they should interpret terms of reference (Emb would appreciate official info from Department on this subject) and how long they should stay in Haiti. Dept should, I believe, use its full influence to keep OAS in this country as long as possible. Appreciate that problem of intervention in internal affairs presents difficulties, but GODR charges do in themselves afford bridge for OAS to delve into the real factors underlying the fundamentally unsatisfactory situation here and to make recommendations equal to challenge. This is also virtually unanimous view my diplomatic colleagues.

Unless Duvalier removed soon from scene (he shows no signs of voluntary departure) I find it difficult to envisage any solution other than intervention. Under certain circumstances (shooting of US Embassy officials or storming any local embassy to kill asylees) I would recommend unilateral use of US forces. Far preferable however would be collective OAS intervention. Economic sanctions as in Dominican case hardly seem appropriate in country like Haiti so close subsistence level already and might only have adverse propaganda impact. What is required is collective "police" action which would result in effective physical control local situation including if necessary pacification opposing groups. Recognizing that old-fashioned marine type occupation no longer feasible would it not be possible to work on emergency basis towards Venezuelan and Dominican participation, perhaps only symbolic, along with our own forces in OAS sanctioned collective police effort here? I submit that dangers inherent in continued laissez faire policy re Haiti are sufficiently grave to warrant this kind of extraordinary action by our inter-American system./3/

Thurston

/3/In telegram 323 to Port-au-Prince, May 2, the Department reminded Thurston that there was little enthusiasm in Latin America for intervention in Haiti, and that the United States had yet to convince the OAS that a "police action" was needed. Nonetheless, the Department assured Thurston that its policy was "far from one of laissez faire." (Department of State, Central Files, POL HAI)

379. Haitian Situation Report/1/

Washington, May 8, 1963.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HAI. Secret. Sent to the White House under cover of a memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy, May 8. The report of the situation was as of 2 p.m., May 8. It was in response to a request from Dungan.

1. Reinforced Dominican forces deployed along Haitian-Dominican border during past 48 hours to a total of perhaps 1,200 men./2/

/2/On May 6 Bosch told U.S. correspondents that he would invade Haiti at 4:30 a.m. on May 7. Ambassador Martin was not convinced that Bosch would invade, neither was he sure that he would not. Martin recommended giving Bosch a firm commitment to help him subvert Duvalier, a flat "no" from the United States implying that the U.S. was withdrawing its support, or some combination of the two alternatives. (Telegram 1364 from Santo Domingo, May 6; ibid., POL DOM REP-HAI)

2. Bosch has assured Ambassador Martin and Ambassador Facio of OAS that he will not take any unprovoked aggressive action outside OAS context.

3. Bosch has informed Ambassador Martin privately of his recognition that Dominican armed forces lack capability to invade Haiti and stated that he is maintaining them along border principally to pressure rapid OAS action.

4. Haiti has been noticeably quieter during the past 48 hours, with a strict 8:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. curfew still in effect.

5. The only organized opposition activity is under direction of Clement Barbot, organizer of the TTMs, who has since broken with Duvalier and who claims credit for killing three Palace escorts in recent unsuccessful attempt to kidnap President Duvalier's children. His force is quite small but we have information it probably inflicted around 30 casualties in a clash with TTMs on April 30.

6. 100 U.S. dependents departed for Miami by plane at 11:00 a.m. Another group of about the same size will be evacuated tomorrow, May 9, and a third planeload of private citizens is expected to leave on Saturday, May 11.

7. Haiti agreed to our evacuation and have assured Ambassador Thurston that the Haitian Government has every intention of continuing to guarantee protection of foreigners.

8. This morning the OAS adopted a resolution returning its special investigation committee to Haiti and broadening considerably the terms of reference governing its operation./3/

/3/OAS doc. OEA/Ser.G/V/C-d-1062. The committee made several trips to Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The OAS Council adopted various resolutions in an attempt too facilitate the situation without much success during the remainder of 1963.

9. The UN Security Council will meet at 3:00 p.m. to hear the Haitian protest Dominican aggression./4/ We will try to avoid formal UN action on the basis OAS is currently seized of the problem and dealing with it adequately.

/4/That effort was successful. At the end of the discussion of the crisis by the Security Council, May 8-10, the Secretary General ruled that it was a consensus of the majority of the members that the OAS should be given the chance to bring about an amicable solution. (Memorandum from Cleveland to Ball, May 10; Department of State, Central Files, POL DOM REP-HAI)

10. The prospective flight of an official Haitian aircraft to Curacao was cancelled at Haitian initiative after authorization for it to land had been given by Dutch authorities. We do not know what the intended purpose of this unusual flight might have been nor the reasons why it was cancelled.

380. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Haiti/1/

Washington, May 14, 1963, 11:19 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 HAI. Top Secret; Emergency; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Martin; cleared by Rusk, Dungan, Sloan of ISA, and King of CIA; and approved by Martin. Repeated Emergency to Santo Domingo; Priority to USUN; and Operational Immediate to POLAD CINCLANT and POLAD CINCARIB.

414. Port-au-Prince and Santo Domingo for Ambassadors, USUN for Amb. Stevenson.

1. In light possibility Duvalier departure/2/ a carrier is being instructed move as close to Port-au-Prince as possible while staying in international waters by early Wednesday morning./3/ Whether or not these forces needed appearance may be helpful in calming situation.

/2/According to telegram 413 to Haiti, May, 14, Duvalier's aide made four reservations for Duvalier and others to fly from Curacao to New York to Paris to Algiers via Pan Am Airlines on May 15. (Ibid., POL 15-1 HAI)

/3/May 15.

2. As soon as you have firm information Duvalier has left from US or other sources you should with such assistance as you consider appropriate from your Latin American colleagues facilitate organization of temporary governmental council composed friendly Haitians now in Port-au-Prince. You should do this regardless efforts by Duvalier to bestow mantle or of unacceptable elements to seize it and claim governmental authority. You should draw upon list available to you. We have in mind particularly [General] Constant, [George] Latortue, and if possible Madhere. Would like at least 5 but 3 would do. Insofar as possible this group should understand that their role is provisional until exiles return and some semblance of order permits organization of wider based governmental council which could be in control pending elections. Would want to get several key exiles like Fouchet, Boucicaut and [Leon] Cantave back and on Council as soon as feasible. Will wait your recommendations as to when.

3. Leave to your discretion whether it would facilitate maintenance of order to attempt include in such group representatives existing government like President, Supreme Court, who has best title and successor to head of state, or others about whom we inquired [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] earlier this week. We see considerable advantages to including one or more of these persons. Would see considerable advantages in Chief Supreme Court serving as very temporary Chairman to add to notion of legitimacy.

4. Suggest safety of group might be increased if it could operate from a Latin American Embassy, though political reactions of Haitians to such locale would require consideration.

5. First action this group should be request recognition as provisional government from all countries which have maintained relations with Haiti in past and to invite assistance OAS and its member states individually and collectively in maintenance law and order until Haitians' military and police functions can be returned to normal. Not so immediately necessary but desirable would be indication of their wish for OAS and member state technical assistance on substantial scale in operating Haitian Government pending elections. They should, of course, make public their intention invite participation by other Haitian leaders not presently available in Port-au-Prince in governing committee in very near future. You should on receipt this request telephone it to Washington for conveyance to OAS and use our facilities to repeat to other Latin American governments. We also think it important that they immediately authorize Auguste and Baguidy to act for them at UN and OAS, respectively. Whom we believe may be disposed cooperate.

6. It is of course desirable that group be able make radio contact with Haitian population at earliest possible moment. If this not feasible from Port-au-Prince facilities, we would like their authority to have Boucicaut broadcast in their name to Haitian people as co-member of group. He is now in Kingston and being held ready for immediate use of this sort. We are working on arrangements to provide him broadcasting facilities either from carrier or aircraft which would appear come from Haitian soil as early as possible tomorrow. Will confirm details later.

7. We would much prefer not to have US forces enter Haiti until request from group for military help received and preferably not until there has been opportunity OAS agree respond favorably which may take 12-24 hours or may never be possible. We would also press for others to join with us on at least token basis as rapidly as possible. However, with or without formation such a group and with or without such an appeal, we are ready at any time, if necessary to protect lives of US and other foreign nationals and asylees, to authorize landing from nearby carrier. It would be of greatest importance if request for such assistance could be made publicly in name not only US Embassy but other Latin American and European Embassies. We will be informing principal European and Latin American capitals early tomorrow of this possibility.

8. Meanwhile, we have been having discussions here today with Cantave, who has plan for entering Haiti from outside which might be made feasible within relatively short period of time if organization provisional government in Port-au-Prince proves impossible. We do feel it necessary to have call for help from such group from within Haiti before we can take anything but most temporary action to maintain law and order or to assist in managing Haitian government. We are holding up action with this group however until we see what happens tomorrow. It seems clear that without such request no sort of OAS action is possible and perhaps not even with it.

9. Telephone on Inter-American phone on receipt this message. You may comment or ask questions by reference paragraph numbers./4/

/4/In telegram 663 from Port-au-Prince, May 15, noon, Thurston reported that he had telephoned Martin to inform him that Duvalier was not leaving Haiti. Thurston made comments on the plan outlined above for transition to a temporary government, on the grounds that his views might be useful in the future. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 HAI)

Rusk

381. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B1285A, Memos for the Record, 4/15/63-6/4/63. Secret. A handwritten note at the end of this paper indicates that copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy and Ball on an eyes only/personal basis, at the request of McCone on May 20.

HAITI

I. Duvalier

1. Apparently Duvalier, in the absence of assassination, will survive the efforts of internal opposition elements (now not organized) will be inaugurated and will continue in control of Haiti. His statements (whether sincere or not) that he will not proclaim a Socialist or Communist state place the United States in the position where we cannot oppose him on political grounds except for the following reasons:

a. Violation of Haitian constitutional processes, thus extending his tenure of office;

b. His administration has not been in the best interests of the Haitian people; and

c. We don't like him and it appears he does not like us.

2. Assuming (a) above to be correct, Duvalier can only be removed by some form of military action by either the OAS, the United States, or an exile group. An alternative would be an uprising by a group from within which might be catalyzed but would require almost immediate external assistance in order to survive.

3. Duvalier has a small Naval force (two sub-chasers and a few small boats, personnel of questionable loyalty) a small Air Force (four P-51s probably inoperable, and a few transports and trainers, and personnel of questionable loyalty). His Armed Forces total 5280 officers and men (including Army, Coast Guard, Air Corps and Police), equipped with light arms, six antiquated tanks and a few field pieces. These forces have been weakened by recent purges of the officer ranks and morale is believed to be low. Although the Army is reinforced by a poorly equipped and badly organized civilian militia, the extent to which these forces would support Duvalier is not known.

4. There appear a large number of refugee or exile groups intent on disposing of Duvalier and taking over the government. Many are former Haitian political figures, who seek restoration of their power or financial positions. Some may be motivated by high principle, others by personal ambition, and there is evidence that some of them are both motivated by and supported by private capital who seek special consideration such as hotels, casinos, etc., in Haiti. There is evidence that some of this support might come from undesirable circles within official endorsement of one or several of these exile groups.

[1 paragraph (13 lines of source text) not declassified]

5. The assumption that large segments of Duvalier's military establishment and the Haitian population would immediately defect to the expeditionary force, while a strong possibility, must not be accepted as a certainty in planning such an operation. It is possible that Duvalier might release irresponsible groups throughout Haiti who would unleash acts of terror.

6. [6 lines of source text not declassified]

Throughout the history of Haiti's independence there has been a racial problem--95% of the population are negroes and 5% are mulattoes (a combination of negro, French and marines). The mulattoes have been the elite, the successful commercial interests, and the influential forces in government, though seldom the Head of State. They have traditionally had their "hand in the till." When a mulatto has actually headed the government, trouble has resulted. The traditional principle has been to have a negro in the top position in the government. These factors must be taken into account in considering U.S. policy.

7. Whatever is done will be attributed to the United States. It cannot be otherwise. It will be looked upon as United States interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state (irrespective of how bad that state is). There will be high "noise level" which will be particularly true in many Latin American and African states. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

8. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Duvalier, despite his statements, is bitter toward the United States. He has disposed of interests traditionally friendly to the United States who have been in Haiti. This has been done by forced exile or assassination. Hence, it can be expected that he probably will turn either to Cuba or to the Bloc for military and economic aid, and this very probably will be forthcoming.

9. We must not overlook the French influence in Haiti and its continued interest in Haiti. Despite difficulties with policy discussions with France at the moment, it might be constructive to explore this entire problem in depth with France because of France's special interest in Haiti and the distinct possibility that they may have an influence in Haiti which we do not have.

Attachment

STRENGTH ESTIMATES

382. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin) to Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/

Washington, May 21, 1963.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HAI-US. Top Secret. Drafted by Martin.

SUBJECT
Haiti Course of Action

While the understanding of the meeting which we had in Mr. Dungan's office last night/2/ was to prepare alternatives for presentation to the President, rather than recommendations, I should like on the basis of that paper to make the following recommendations to you:

/2/No other record of the meeting has been found. For the policy paper as approved by the President, see Document 384.

1. Basically I think we should follow courses (b) and (c), maintaining the Embassy under a Charge but with formal relations suspended and seeking to test the attitude of the Haitian people toward Duvalier through Haitian intermediaries. This is a course which I think we might follow for several months before considering an alternative. Such a course involves certain other steps which follow.

2. As of the 24th or 25th of May the Ambassador should be recalled for consultation with no immediate attempt to return him there or officially assign him elsewhere. We would put him to work in ARA.

3. As of about June 1 special alerts would all be stepped down and the major military units withdrawn but patrols in the Windward Passage should be increased somewhat beyond precrisis levels with particular attention to traffic from Cuba.

4. There should be a slowing routine appearing phase down of the staffs of our military missions.

5. We should continue the malaria eradication program and proceed on a normal but very strict basis with the airport loan.

6. We should not have formal relations but the Charge should be free to talk informally with the Foreign Minister and to use informal channels for routine communication between himself or other members of the country team and Haitian Government.

7. While one cannot predict OAS potentialities until the Committee files its report, which should be by the end of this week, I think we may assume that with the quieting down of the Dominican-Haitian conflict OAS interest will become rather secondary. The best we can hope for is to stimulate interest in the human right aspects of the Haitian problem and a recognition that glaring violations of human rights can become a threat to peace and security and therefore a matter of international concern.

I do not think this program is one which should be finally adopted for at least 48 hours, namely until we see what develops in the course of the celebrations scheduled for tomorrow and in their immediate aftermath.

A principal problem about this arrangement is the nature of the diplomatic relations we have or don't have with the Duvalier regime. The longer we keep relations in a state of suspension, the more difficult it may be to stay there and to conduct necessary business. On the other hand reestablishing formal relations with the Duvalier regime could create embarrassing difficulties for us in recognizing and assisting a competing regime. Perhaps we might wait a week or so longer before crossing this particular bridge to see what the prospects look like for having such a competing regime problem.

383. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, May 21, 1963.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01258A, Meetings with the President, 4/1/63-6/30/63. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on May 27.

SUBJECT
Meeting re Haiti--4:30 p.m., 21 May 1963-- Cabinet Room

PRESENT
The President and most of the Principals

1. State presented a paper/2/ on the situation advocating the return of our Ambassador, leaving the Embassy with the Charge, and play the relations with the Duvalier Government on a very low key and await developments.

/2/Document 382.

2. McCone suggested that this looked like the Cuban policy in July 1959 which gave the Soviets an opening into Cuba. I/3/ therefore advocated that we conduct a complete diplomatic relationship but that it be on an informal basis. The President agreed, ordered Ambassador Thurston recalled, and rese