Docs 412-434
412. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 4, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-461. Secret. Drafted by Poole and approved in S on May 25.
SUBJECT
Cuban Situation; Atomic Irrigation Scheme; Economic Survey; Double Taxation
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Pedro Beltran, Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Peru
Fernando Berckemeyer, Ambassador of Peru
Theodore C. Achilles, Task Force on Latin America
Wymberley DeR. Coerr, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
Richard A. Poole, Officer in Charge of Peruvian Affairs, WST
Cuba and Related Matters
The Secretary welcomed Prime Minister Beltran. He opened the conversation by discussing the grave situation in Laos and then turned to the Cuban problem, which he stated was, of course, a matter of great preoccupation to the United States Government.
Prime Minister Beltran agreed that the situation in Cuba and the ramifications of the Cuban problem throughout Latin America were indeed very serious. It was his feeling that there was no time to be lost, as Castro's hold on Cuba was ever strengthening, with increasing arms from the Soviet bloc, and as Castroist activities throughout Latin America could have grave consequences for the Hemisphere. He felt that the United States would be losing precious time by attempting to get the support of additional Latin American countries for concerted action, as he saw little hope of those countries joining in. He was convinced that action should be taken by the U.S. as soon as possible and that this action should be quick and decisive. He realized that there would be considerable outcry in Latin America against U.S. intervention. However, many of the Latin America leaders who would cry out against us publicly would congratulate us privately. It is an unfortunate fact, he added, that these leaders are so afraid of Castroist, Communist leftist influence on their masses that they feel they have to take such an equivocal position. If our action were quick and decisive, Beltran continued, he felt sure the adverse reaction would not last and that the event would soon be forgotten as a live issue, as in the case of Guatemala and the assassination of Lumumba./2/
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XX, Document 6, for details on the death of Prime Minister Lumumba.
When the Secretary referred to Peru's break with Cuba/3/ and asked what Beltran felt the chances were of other Latin American countries taking similar action, Beltran said Peru had been very disappointed when, prior to the break, it had attempted unsuccessfully to persuade other countries such as Colombia and Argentina to do so concurrently. Here again was an indication of fear of local reactions.
/3/The Government of Peru severed diplomatic ties with Cuba on December 30, 1960.
The Secretary then asked what Beltran felt the reactions in Latin America would be if the OAS were to dissolve. Beltran felt that, despite Latin American reluctance to take concerted action, those countries would view with great concern any signs of dissolution of the OAS and would therefore make every effort to prevent this from happening.
Proposed Atomic Explosion to Divert River for Irrigation
Prime Minister Beltran then turned to a subject he had discussed briefly with the Secretary at the University of California in Berkeley./4/ This concerned a scheme which had just been broached to him (Beltran) by Professor Teller to explore the possibility of diverting the waters of the Huancabamba River to flow westward in order to irrigate the barren Pacific coastal desert of northwestern Peru. In response to the Secretary's questions, Beltran explained that the Huancabamba is a tributary of the Maranon, which in turn is one of the two principal tributaries forming the Amazon. Professor Teller's scheme would involve an atomic explosion to blow off the top of the Andean ridge separating the upper reaches of the Huancabamba from the western watershed of the Andes. Professor Teller had guessed this would be about a thousand feet vertically to be removed, although Beltran guessed it would be more like 3,000 feet. Beltran thought that the width at the base of the portion to be removed would be about 3 miles, but he said this too was a pure guess. Professor Teller had told him that this sort of explosion could be precisely regulated not only in terms of the amount of earth and rock to be removed, but also in the direction in which this material could be blown, thus making it possible to deposit it in such a way as to dam the Huancabamba into a lake from which the waters would then drop westward to the Pacific. Beltran said Professor Teller had proposed that two nuclear technicians go to Peru to study the possibility of this project, but that they go under some other guise in order to preserve appropriate secrecy.
/4/Secretary Rusk and Prime Minister Beltran met on March 20. According to a March 21 memorandum made by the Secretary to the files, "Prime Minister Beltran and I met briefly at Berkeley at a reception where private conversation was difficult. He did say he had something 'classified' to discuss with me in Washington; this turned out to be a proposal on peaceful uses of atomic energy he had raised with Dr. [Edward] Teller." (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)
The Secretary said he would be glad to have his staff look into the matter.
Economic Survey of Southern Peru
Ambassador Berckemeyer took the occasion to express sincere appreciation for the very thorough economic study of southern Peru accomplished under the supervision of the ICA. (NB: The Ambassador was referring to the thirty-odd volume "Regional Plan for the Development of the South of Peru", dated 1959 and published in 1960, prepared by the joint USOM-Peruvian Servicio Cooperativo Interamericano del Plan del Sur, SCIPA.)
Double Taxation Agreement
Ambassador Berckemeyer also took the opportunity to express his Government's concern over the fact that the double taxation agreement negotiated between Peru and the United States was still in suspense in the Treasury Department.
In response to the Secretary's question as to the status of the matter, Mr. Poole explained that an agreement had been negotiated and initialed in November 1960 in Lima by Peruvian and U.S. negotiating teams, for reference to their respective Governments for signature and ratification, and that, while the Peruvian Government was prepared to go ahead with completion of the agreement, further action on our part was in suspense in the Treasury Department pending a policy study of double taxation agreements in general.
413. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Woodward) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, September 20, 1961, 10:05-11:40 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1963. Confidential. The time of the meeting is from the President's Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library)
SUBJECT
Talks between Presidents Prado and Kennedy/2/
/2/President Prado was invited to pay a state visit to the United States in March 1961. Prado visited the United States September 19-22.
We had been prepared to conduct the White House conversations with President Prado along the lines he had requested, i.e., in two parts with separate agenda items, the first part to be between the two Presidents alone and the second with their respective staffs. Even though the discussions were to be in English, it had been planned that an interpreter would be present ostensibly to help out in case of difficulty but actually for the purpose of taking notes. The interpreter was dismissed, however, when President Prado said he needed none, and as it worked out the entire discussion was between the two Presidents alone. At the termination of the discussion, President Kennedy invited the staffs into his office and briefly reviewed for them the matters discussed, along the following lines:
(1) Cuba. President Prado had made three suggestions which President Kennedy thought constructive and worth exploring: (a) He suggested that the COAS recommend that an OAS or Red Cross commission investigate the situation of political prisoners in Cuba. This would probably be refused by the Cubans, but such refusal would doubtless hurt them in Latin America. The initiative for suggesting this COAS action should probably come from a country in the middle of the spectrum (i.e. of attitudes toward Cuba). (b) The Colombian initiative/3/ should not be taken up formally until we have all or most countries aligned, including Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. Otherwise the initiative will fail and we will be worse off than before. (c) Meanwhile, we should concentrate on getting additional countries to break relations with Cuba when they have valid reasons for doing so.
/3/See Document 111.
President Prado had also suggested the possibility of broadening the Miró Cardona council/4/ so that we might recognize it as a government in exile. President Kennedy said we had reservations both because of the difficulty of free Cuban groups and because there are doubts concerning support in Cuba for Miró Cardona and the possible reactions there to recognition; it might even serve to increase support for Castro.
/4/Reference is to the Cuban exile group led by Jose Miró Cardona.
(2) Double Taxation. President Kennedy explained that we had the matter under study and that we hoped to have something ready for Congress in January.
(3) Loans. The Presidents discussed the various loans the Peruvians are interested in, including the emergency loan for the Puno area, housing, airports, etc. President Kennedy thought it would be a good idea for Minister of Development and Public Works Grieve to get in touch with the various lending agencies on these matters.
(4) Peru-Ecuador Boundary. This matter was discussed, but President Kennedy gave no indication of the substance of the discussion.
(5) China. The question of recognition of China was discussed and there appeared to be general agreement. President Prado had submitted a note on the subject from which President Kennedy read a passage/5/ stating that Prado had received the impression from his visit last spring to Formosa that Chiang Kai-shek was prepared to invade the mainland alone if he could be assured of arms and moral support. President Kennedy thought this had a familiar ring reminiscent of last April, when we had learned a hard lesson.
/5/Not found.
President Prado's original agenda was much longer than the above, but as yet we have no further information whether other items were discussed. However, the following additional substantive matters pertaining to the visit may be of interest:
(1) Loans. There have been various conversations during the past week between Peruvian officials (including officials sent up independ-ently of Prado's party) and the Department, Eximbank, DLF and ICA pertaining to the above-mentioned prospective loans--to which we should add the Lima water and sewage project. Applications for this loan (to the Eximbank and DLF) and for the aided self-help housing loan (DLF) appear to be in the best position to move ahead fast. The Eximbank cannot handle the airport loan, so the DLF is now studying it; however, we are now thinking in terms of encouraging the German offer but on better terms. The DLF and ICA are continuing discussions on the Puno emergency projects, and there may be a number of small projects that will qualify, although the Peruvians' project preparation is not too adequate.
(2) Joint Communiqué. We have had considerable discussion back and forth with the Peruvians concerning the joint communiqué wording on the subject of observance of international obligations and agreements. The Peruvians tried hard for wording we considered pointed too obviously at the Rio Protocol between Peru and Ecuador. We have reached agreement, however, on more general language which we trust will not be offensive to the Ecuadoreans. Other than this there has been no problem in agreeing to the language and substance of the communique./6/
/6/For text of the communique, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 611-613.
(3) So far President Prado and his party seem happy with the visit.
414. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Woodward) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, September 21, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1963. Official Use Only. Drafted by Poole and Belcher on October 4.
SUBJECT
Farewell Meeting between Presidents Prado and Kennedy, September 21
Upon your return from New York,/2/ I thought you might wish a brief note on the subject meeting. As in the case of the first meeting (covered in my memorandum of September 20 to you),/2/ the two Presidents met alone, after which they met briefly with the accompanying officers on both sides. At this brief meeting President Kennedy mentioned only the following:
/2/The Secretary attended the opening of the U.N. General Assembly in New York September 18-31.
/3/Document 413.
(1) Joint Communiqué. President Kennedy stated that he had agreed to change the wording in the second paragraph of the joint communiqué in order to indicate U.S. willingness to cooperate in emergency projects in Peru. Our commitment reads as follows:
"With this in mind the Presidents considered various projects of importance to Peru's economic and social development. The United States will participate in emergency projects being initiated by the Peruvian Government in the critical Puno area."
(A copy of the final joint communiqué is attached.)/4/
/4/Not printed; see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 611-613.
(2) Loan Discussions. President Kennedy said he understood there would be further discussions here concerning the prospective emergency loan. Minister of Development and Public Works Jorge Grieve stated that, with assurance of U.S. participation, the Peruvian Government would start immediately on the emergency program, using funds it has earmarked for this purpose.
Note: Relative to the emergency loan in the Puno area, active consideration is now being given in the DLF, ICA and Department as to method of approach, source of funds, types of projects to be financed and the amount of U.S. financing.
415. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Peru/1/
Washington, March 24, 1962, 6:01 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 723.00/3-2462. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Goodwin; cleared by Belcher, Poole, Bromley Smith, and S/S; and approved by E.M. Martin.
723. Following is summary of conversation with President concerning political situation in Peru:
Ambassador Loeb outlined the political situation in Peru. He said that an APRA victory was possible/2/ and that the Peruvian military had indicated that they would not accept such a victory and might attempt to prevent an ARPA assumption of power through military force.
/2/Presidential elections were scheduled in Peru for June 10.
It was agreed that it was not in the United States interest to have a military takeover in Peru if APRA won and that we should try and prevent military intervention in case of an APRA victory.
The President agreed the Ambassador should inform key members of the Peruvian military that we appreciated the traditional friendship of the armed forces with the United States and respected their vigorous and effective anti-communism. However, they had to realize that the United States was committed in the hemisphere, and in the eyes of its own people and Congress, to the support of non-communist constitutional governments throughout the hemisphere. Therefore, if APRA won and the Peruvian military threw them out it would be extremely difficult for us to recognize a government installed by the military or to continue our aid program with such a government.
The President said that the extent to which the US position was pressed would depend upon the discretion of the Ambassador as to the point at which implied threats would become counterproductive of the goal of halting a military takeover in the event of an APRA victory. In line with this the Ambassador was authorized to go as far as stating that it would be "impossible" to recognize a government installed by the military or to continue our aid program with such a government. Furthermore, the Ambassador was also authorized to refer to the fact that he had discussed these matters with the President and other high government officials. If the Ambassador felt it necessary to quote the President directly or to have a Presidential instruction which he could read to Peruvian officials he was to request this from the Department.
Ball
416. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Peru/1/
Washington, May 29, 1962, 9:14 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 723.00/5-2962. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Belcher and Poole; cleared by Curtis of INR/DDC, Wellman of ARA/EST, and by S/S; and approved by Goodwin.
860. For Ambassador. Department has held further consultations [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] USIA concerning additional steps to be taken in effort prevent military intervention in Peruvian elections using as discussion points informal memorandum prepared during your visit here and your comments by official-informal letter.
1. Agreement reached to proceed immediately with following steps, which we consider to be in consonance your views:
a. APRA should be encouraged again to urge Prado request OAS observer team (request should be made to SYG rather than Chairman COAS). Have you made or do you plan make further approach to APRA, or would you consider it preferable handle through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] (which latter prepared undertake) in order avoid possible leak of your involvement?
b. Department and USIA will encourage US press, radio and TV coverage, including dispatch of correspondents, and off the record will alert key journalists to issues involved in intervention.
c. CAS alerting stations in various LA countries to encourage widespread LA press coverage, including dispatch of correspondents, and will arrange FBIS coverage and playback.
d. USIA will assist in playback but avoid using attributable media.
e. Department will request advance approval of message of congratulations from President to winning candidate to be dispatched immediately if situation warrants.
2. Agreed not to inspire press query to President on US attitude toward possible military intervention.
3. Following suggestions being considered and we would appreciate your views urgently by priority cable:
a. Dispatch of general officer to Peru under suitable pretense (such as inspection trip to include other countries) to serve as additional point of contact and communication with Peruvian military during election period./2/ (View Doig's attitude as revealed Deptel 850,/3/ we doubt utility your suggestion in Embdes 622/4/ that Gens White and Doig visit Peru ostensibly on SCCS business.)
/2/Retired U.S. Army Colonel Clyde R. McBride was sent to Peru for this purpose. A memorandum of conversation between Colonel McBride and Peruvian General Alfredo Rodriguez of May 22 is ibid., 723.00/5-2262.
/3/Dated May 24. (Ibid., 723.00/5-2462)
/4/Dated April 23. (Ibid., 723.00/4-2362)
b. An approach to third countries (i.e. Colombia and Brazil in addition to Venezuela which you report has already taken some action this regard) to suggest they inform Peruvian military that they could not recognize a military takeover while at same time suggesting all three be prepared align selves with US, should coup take place, on policy of at least temporary nonrecognition. (We will discuss with you separately possible courses of action in event elections postponed or nullified because of alleged fraud, actual military coup, etc.)
c. Dispatch of economic mission following elections and prior to inauguration to discuss assistance programs etc. with winning candidate.
3. Are there any other steps you believe you or Washington agencies should take aside from above and steps you have already taken under existing authority? We must bear in mind of course widespread belief in Peruvian military and political circles that you, Embassy and Department favor APRA and resultant fact that, despite our protestations to contrary, overt efforts to prevent coup will be interpreted by many as effort assist APRA and hence be discredited. We must also bear in mind strong possibility of Belaúnde victory and desirability erasing his impression we favor APRA and oppose him as pro-Communist.
Rusk
417. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Peru/1/
Washington, June 7, 1962, 8:16 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 723.00/6-762. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Thompson of ARA/WST, cleared by Jamison of ARA/RPA and Robinson of AID/LA-WC, and approved by E.M. Martin.
883. Embtel 951./2/ Request cable summary action suggestions in despatch reftel.
/2/Dated June 6. (Ibid., 723.00/6-662)
Department now considering proposals for US response to most likely contingencies as follows:
1. Military nullification or postponement elections leaving Prado government in office for remainder term: Continue present recognition GOP; seek convince military of need schedule new election; foster compromise between APRA and military.
2. APRA victory followed by military imposition of new government: Publicly announce we withholding recognition of imposed government; publicly announce suspension aid programs; recall Ambassador for consultation; withdraw at least top aid officials; seek take these steps in concert with LA states; attempt persuade APRA to make deal with military offering military face-saving formula; attempt persuade Belaúnde maintain united front with APRA against military intervention.
3. APRA victory followed by disqualification APRA on charges fraud: Urge Prado to request OAS electoral commission investigation; consider all measures under (2) above recognizing that in confused situation we probably best advised work for Belaúnde-APRA coalition government to avoid civil strife.
4. APRA victory without immediate military intervention: Immediately offer APRA expert assistance in developing its economic program; encourage APRA and Belaúnde to cooperate for social reform; suggest Haya request military support and offer appropriate guarantees security, etc.
5. Belaúnde victory: Increase contact with Belaúnde and make clear we consider his objectives consistent with Alliance for Progress and glad work with him on development of Peru; offer Belaúnde expert assistance in developing his economic program; encourage alliance between APRA and Belaúnde based on trading APRA Congressional support for few key ministries.
We recognize proposals for action would have to be implemented or rejected in light appraisal their effect at time given contingency becomes reality. Interpretation of constitutionality of various procedures for solution which Peruvians might adopt likely be important factor our response to various developments under contingencies 1, 2 and 3. We shall be relying heavily on Embassy for these interpretations.
Re contingency 2 above we believe it unrealistic to expect we can bring sufficient pressure to bear to force military to abdicate once they have taken such blatant action. Accordingly object of actions proposed is attempt to influence military acceptance some compromise leading to return to constitutional government.
Request comments./3/
/3/The Embassy commented in telegrams 956 and 958 from Lima, June 7 and 8, respectively. (Ibid., 723.00/6-762 and 6-862)
Rusk
418. Editorial Note
On June 10, 1962, Peru held national elections for President, two Vice Presidents, and the entire Senate and Chamber of Deputies--all for 6-year terms. None of the three major candidates for the Presidency, Victor Raul Haya de la Torre (APRA), Fernando Belaunde Terry (Accion Popular), or Manuel Odria (Union Nacional Odrista), received the one-third of the valid popular vote needed to win the office. The Peruvian constitution stipulated that the new Congress, meeting in joint session, choose the new President when it convened formally on July 28. Charges of electoral graft were immediately exchanged by the candidates.
419. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Peru/1/
Washington, July 12, 1962, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 723.00/7-1262. Secret; Niact. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Goodwin.
22. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. Unless you see strong objections in light of local factors of which I may be unaware, please indicate privately to President Prado that US has great understanding for present difficulties of Peru and his own gallant effort to insure continuity of constitutional government in his great country. If he has any suggestions about any way in which we might be of any assistance in this situation we would be glad to give it the most urgent and sympathetic consideration./2/
Rusk
/2/In Embassy telegram 74, July 16, Ambassador Loeb reported to Secretary Rusk that he relayed this message to President Prado ealier in the day. The President thanked the Secretary for his concern and stated that "at the present time he thinks of no specific action USG could take, either privately or publicly, to assist." (Ibid., 723.00/7-1662)
420. Editorial Note
The result of the Presidential vote remained disputed for weeks after election day. Haya de la Torre, believing the Peruvian military would not allow him to be elected President, gave his support to Odria's candidacy. Belaúnde demanded on July 12 that the government establish a tribunal to investigate electoral fraud or face violent insurrection (Airgram A-4 from Lima, July 13; Department of State, Central Files, 723.00/7-1362) On July 16 the military demanded that the government annul the results of the elections prompting President Prado's cabinet to resign. On July 18 the military arrested the President and established a 12-man junta under the direction of Army General Ricardo Perez Godoy. The junta declared the results of the elections null and void, announced that free and fair elections would be held in Peru as soon as possible, and asked the world community for official recognition. (Airgram A-49 from Lima, July 20; ibid., 723.00/7-2062)
President Kennedy was informed of the coup at his July 18 staff meeting. (Memorandum for the Record, July 18; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings, May-September 1962) The Department of State announced that day that the United States was suspending diplomatic relations with Peru and was ceasing all but humanitarian assistance to the country. (Department of State Bulletin, August 6, 1962, pages 213-214) Ambassador Loeb was recalled to Washington for consultation on July 26.
421. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, July 27, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.23/7-2762. Confidential.
SUBJECT
Relations with Peru
Problem:
1. What actions should we propose to representatives of the junta as necessary to permit us to resume relations and to recommend such resumption to other countries and what should be our timing in conducting such discussions?
2. What should be our response to the Venezuelan proposal--supported by several of the Latin American countries--that there be an OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers to condemn the military takeover in Peru?/2/
/2/On July 18 the Venezuelan Charge in Washington presented an aide-memoire to the Department of State expressing the intent of his government to call a special meeting of Foreign Ministers of the OAS to condemn the coup in Peru. Venezuela's Foreign Minister, Dr. Marcos Falcon Bricenos, arrived in Washington on July 24 to ask for U.S. support in this endeavor. He met with Assistant Secretary of State Martin the same day. (Memorandum of conversation, July 24; ibid., 723.00/7-2462) On July 27 he met with Secretary Rusk. (Memorandum of conversation, July 27; ibid., 723.00/7-2762)
Background:
As of today several Latin American countries have broken diplomatic relations with Peru and all the others, except Haiti, have suspended relations, as the United States has. Most of the other western world countries, including Canada, France, Germany and Japan, are also in a state of suspended relations. The Argentines have indicated they may resume relations next week. Haiti has recognized the junta.
The press commentary in all the important Latin American countries has been overwhelmingly critical of the junta action in Peru. Press reaction in the United States is beginning to be more mixed, with most United States business interests, particularly the mining interests, pressing for prompt reversal of the United States stand. The Congressional reaction has thus far been entirely favorable to the United States action.
While there is clearly widespread criticism and opposition to the junta action, within Peru, including some public criticism, efforts to create an organized opposition have failed. There has been no significant violence. The attempted general strike was a failure and the major political parties have abandoned attempts to create a common front from which to negotiate with the junta. Parties and leading personalities seem to be rapidly moving toward concentration on jockeying for position in the elections promised for next June.
It seems clear that the sharp reaction of the United States and other Latin American countries has led the junta to take a position with respect to new elections, with respect to current civil rights, with respect to leaders of the previous government and of APRA, and with respect to the private business community and the Alliance for Progress more liberal and more in accordance with United States views than would otherwise have been the case.
While there is also the probability that this prompt and strong reaction has been a warning sign to potential military plotters in other Latin American countries--such as Venezuela and the Dominican Republic--of the difficulties they may face if they act, the Governments of these countries remain deeply concerned about the impact on their situation of premature recognition of the junta and resumption of United States aid. They undoubtedly have some cause for concern.
With respect to the proposal for a Meeting of Foreign Ministers on the Peruvian situation, which is being pressed by Betancourt with varying degrees of support from the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Colombia, Panama and Honduras, it seems open to some question whether the necessary eleven votes could be secured to call such a meeting. Even if they could, there would undoubtedly be a major public debate over the desirability of a resolution condemning the junta action, reflecting in part special situations, but largely the nonintervention philosophy of such leading countries as Mexico, Brazil and Chile which was so much in evidence during the recent Punta del Este discussions on Cuba. It seems wholly unlikely that, in the absence of any real resistance to the junta in Peru, OAS action could affect the position of the junta, though it might be a mild warning to future plotters.
On the other hand, the junta and its friends would certainly interpret any difficulty in securing the eleven votes for calling such a meeting and, even more emphatically, a noisy public dispute about a condemnatory resolution, as indication of sympathy and support for their position, support which has heretofore been wholly lacking in the hemisphere. It would therefore be counterproductive.
Without OAS Council action, it would be within the terms of reference of the Inter-American Peace Committee (IAPC) to meet quietly to consider the Peruvian situation in the context of the general Latin American situation and to discuss effective measures which might be taken, including the question of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers. Such a group might be a useful forum to consider on an inter-American basis, rather than on a strictly United States basis, what measures it would be useful to get the junta to take in order to permit resumption of relations with it during the hiatus before new elections take place. It would also enable Venezuela and others concerned to say that their initiative had resulted in some OAS action. The present membership of the IAPC is good for this purpose, inasmuch as it consists of United States, Venezuela, Colombia, Uruguay, and El Salvador, with El Salvador to be replaced by the Dominican Republic on August 6.
Conclusions:
It would seem quite possible that the junta might be persuaded to move up the date of elections from June to February or March. They have stated that timing was dictated by the need to complete a reregistration of all voters to avoid possible fraud. There is no reason why this should not be accelerated.
It is of great importance to have the junta reaffirm, publicly and with emphasis, its intention to hold free elections so that any temptation to continue to enjoy the fruits of power may be discouraged.
It would also be desirable to secure privately a clear indication that the junta will not take actions which would assist the Communists in Peru to extend their influence, particularly over the APRA unions.
Since this is a temporary government and since it is not desirable to make their position too attractive and easy for them, it would seem desirable to resume most economic aid programs, but not to undertake new commitments or to participate in long term planning activities or new project development. It would seem quite incompatible with our condemnation of the action of the Peruvian military, an action which was taken without any serious dissent within the military to resume military assistance until civilian authority has been reestablished.
It would be highly desirable if the present military cabinet could be replaced by a civilian cabinet either representing all parties or of a technical character. It may be quite difficult to persuade the junta to accept this government and it should be sought without becoming a sine qua non of resumption of relations.
In order to conduct an effective negotiation, it is desirable that the junta continue to feel uncertain about its position in international circles, that resumption of relations be kept to a minimum, and that current stories in some segments of the United States press about a reversal of United States position be refuted insofar as possible, perhaps by some small action such as withdrawing the deputy chief of the AID mission and, perhaps, the heads of the military mission.
In opening discussions with the junta, we should not give evidence that we are under pressure for a hasty action. During the course of next week our Charge should be authorized to initiate discussions with Peruvian civilians who are known to be friendly to the junta, indicating our willingness to consider suggestions of what the junta proposes to do in the direction of restoring civilian control, our policy being guided in these exploratory conversations by the principles outlined above.
In order to persuade the Venezuelans to accept the Inter-American Peace Committee proposal it would be desirable that the President see the Venezuelan Foreign Minister, Marcos Falcón Briceno, who is here with a letter from President Betancourt, and discuss the situation with him. We think all other Latin American countries would accept our view on this if the Venezuelans can be persuaded to do so.
Recommendations:/3/
/3/Presumably the President approved all these recommendations although no indication of approval or disapproval appears on the source text.
1. That you authorize an instruction to the United States Embassy to Peru along the lines described above.
2. That you authorize the taking of minor measures of the sort mentioned above to indicate our continued desire to see further moves toward civilian constitutional government in Peru.
3. That you agree to see Marcos Falcón Briceno, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister, on Monday, July 30, and that, subject to the results of that conversation, you approve our arranging the calling of the Inter-American Peace Committee for the purposes described above.
George W. Ball
422. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Peru/1/
Washington, July 28, 1962, 5:23 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 723.00/7-2862. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Poole, cleared by Loeb, and approved by Belcher.
106. From Loeb. Following is translation of memorandum from Haya, handed me at Lima Airport:
"1. Political line followed by President Kennedy with respect military coup in Peru has produced extraordinarily favorable reaction among people. I think tremendous amount good will has been won among great masses, especially students.
2. Naturally, it is not same among businessmen or among Americans who wish live comfortably and without annoyances. But President must select what is most suitable for United States and democracy: Either have on his side majority of people or have the groups of people who engage in business and live apart from politics. I think we have won battle against Communism through President's firm policy.
3. Solution, it seems to me, may be found in sending OAS committee for purposes 'friendly mediation.' This way out would be very important and constructive. I believe Junta would have opportunity 'save face' and we would have good occasion for rapprochement.
4. Composition of Junta could be changed through 'friendly mediation' of OAS. At present Junta does not offer any guarantee that will follow democratic line. General Bossio/2/ is the most reasonable and certainly the most impartial and "constructive" of its members. Bossio has influence with Torres Matos/3/ and Verastegui,/4/ but there are dangerous elements such as Llosa,/5/ Lindley/6/ himself (an extremist in social matters) and another. Perez Godoy is man of limited intellectual resources and prejudiced.
/2/Brigadier General Juan Bossio Colla, Minister of Government and Police.
/3/Admiral Juan Francisco Torres Matos, Minister of Marine.
/4/Brigadier General Maximo Verastegui Izurrietta, Minister of Development and Public Works.
/5/Admiral Luis Edgardo Llosa, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
/6/Nicolas Lindley Lopez, Minister of War.
5. Junta should be reorganized and made subject to a statute, at least. If it is to remain in existence, should have some member of the Supreme Court added to it and perhaps direct or indirect representatives of chief democratic parties. I think this is least that can be demanded of Junta, as guarantee of restoration democracy and elections in not distant future (in shorter period than one year), and with assurances human and civil rights will be respected and army will not intervene in next election.
6. Pretext for coup, that is, "fraud," has been greatly discredited even among army, navy, air force and police themselves. I believe members of Junta themselves do not believe in "the fraud" very much. This circumstance favors possibility of demanding of Junta that it be made more democratic.
7. General Bossio has reiterated his promises of respect for rights of individuals and compensation for damage done to Casa del Pueblo and the headquarters of La Tribuna. He (who is perhaps brains of Junta) appears well disposed and desirous of 'saving face.' At same time he is very fearful of trend of international public opinion. He is convinced that military coup is extremely unpopular.
8. I believe United States is using its prestige in Latin America as 'high card.' This, in my opinion, is fundamental. President Kennedy has gained much in behalf of cause of hemispheric solidarity and anti-Communism. And in my opinion, his policy should be maintained with integrity but without ceasing to consider solutions. But I am sure that President's conduct has met with warm approval on part of great majority of the Peruvian people. For Peru, for cause of Cuba and for sake of hemispheric solidarity, this favorable situation must not be lost. I am sure Peru will accept without protest whatever pressures may be necessary in defense of democracy. Maintaining principle of defense of democracy, I believe Peruvians will accept all that United States may do in clear, energetic way in order not to yield in face of danger of disruption of the American system and of Communist advance.
Lima, July 24, 1962"
Rusk
423. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Peru/1/
Washington, July 30, 1962, 9:17 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 723.00/7-3062. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Loeb and Martin; cleared by Belcher, Dungan, S, and S/S; and approved by E.M. Martin.
113. Eyes only for Henderson. Deptel 108./2/ As result meeting this morning with President and SecState, following clarification provided for your guidance./3/
/2/Not printed. (Ibid., 723.00/7-2762)
/3/No memorandum of conversation for this meeting was found.
We are seriously concerned possible loss US prestige and influence hemisphere affairs as result any outward appearance of failure our efforts. We therefore wish expedite solution in such way as not to leave US isolated or to give appearance US capitulation.
With respect OAS, efforts now being made to put off decision on Venezuelan initiative for MFM at COAS meeting this afternoon for week or ten days without substantive debate, but US definitely opposed MFM. We seeking method handle issue of OAS role without letting down Betancourt too hard.
On recognition issue, appears several European states may resume relations almost immediately but, except for Haiti and possibly Paraguay, Department hopeful no other LA nations will recognize this week.
With view US resumption relations at appropriate time (we waited three weeks in Argentine case) we anxious you intensify negotiations with Junta through appropriate intermediaries looking toward specific restatement, in package to which we could point, of certain concessions of which first two not new but, in our view, not sufficiently understood by world opinion:
1. Guarantee of continued civil liberties.
2. Guarantee of free and fair elections, preferably before June 9 but at no later date, with full rights to all parties under Constitution, and with guarantee that Armed Forces will respect results those elections.
3. Offer by Junta, as indication of good faith, to invite OAS observers during electoral processes. This concession would particularly strengthen Junta's position with respect continental opinion and would also facilitate US recognition. Important that above elements be incorporated in some sort of restatement.
Some civilianizing of Cabinet, provided civilian members were known for dedication to constitutional processes, would make our recognition easier, but our view is not to insist on this as sine qua non of recognition.
Finally, we still consider it important receive private assurances from Junta that communists will not be permitted to use present situation to strengthen their position in Peruvian labor.
Junta should understand that while other countries and US might be willing resume normal relations, this would not imply resumption of aid automatically.
Please communicate soonest any results negotiations.
Rusk
424. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
New York, August 1, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 723.00/8-1662. Confidential. Drafted by E.M. Martin. The meeting took place at Idlewild Airport, New York City.
SUBJECT
Peruvian Situation
PARTICIPANTS
Former President Prado, Peru
Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
In order to avoid the press, President Prado chose to remain on his plane. Our conversation of 20 minutes or so was thus entirely private, except for 15 or 20 cleaning people sweeping and dusting around us.
President Prado seemed in excellent health and reasonably good spirits. He condemned the junta takeover and the charges of fraud as equally without justification. He praised the role that Ambassador Loeb had played and thought there was no good reason why he should not go back to Peru. He felt the United States position and the President's statement/2/ had been enormously valuable in Peru and to future developments in the hemisphere.
/2/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, August 6, 1962. p. 214.
I outlined briefly the conditions we were seeking from the junta as a basis for resumption of relations. He felt they were very sound, though he would have stressed somewhat more than we did the inclusion of civilians in the Cabinet. In response to my question he thought that all one could hope for at this time was technicians rather than politicians.
I outlined our argument against the Venezuelan MFM proposal, and he agreed that we were right.
I indicated our concern about a move by the Communists to take over the APRA Unions. He thought this was one of the most important dangers and deserved all the attention we could give it. He felt the junta was anti-Communist but naive.
I asked him how he felt about General Bossio who had shown himself rather favorably disposed toward APRA. He expressed the view that the General was not to be trusted at all.
He was most effusive in his appreciation for the President's greetings which I had conveyed to him. They obviously touched him very deeply in his present situation. I said it was a personal message which the President did not propose to release and thought best he not give to press, though he could of course say, if he wished, that President had sent him a message of good wishes.
425. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, August 2, 1962, 10:33-11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Confidential. Drafted by Department of State interpreter Anthony J. Hervas and approved by the White House on August 15. The meeting took place at the White House. The time and place of the meeting are from the President's Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library)
SUBJECT
Venezuelan Initiative for Meeting of Foreign Ministers on Peruvian Situation
PARTICIPANTS
The President
His Excellency Marcos Falcón Briceno, Foreign Minister of Venezuela
Dr. Carlos Perez de la Cova, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Venezuela
Mr. Martin--ARA
Anthony J. Hervas, State Department Interpreter
After the exchange of greetings the Foreign Minister handed to the President a letter from President Betancourt. After reading the letter the President said that he had discussed the matter of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers with Assistant Secretary Martin and that there was agreement that the influence of the nations of the hemisphere should be brought to bear upon the situation in Peru. However, such a meeting might not be successful and he was concerned about the discouragement that might result. He therefore considered that it would be better to wait until August 8/2/ and see what measures the Junta adopted in Peru towards the re-establishment of Constitutional Government. In any case there would always be an option to convene the meeting.
/2/The Council of the OAS was scheduled to meet August 8; see Document 426.
The Foreign Minister replied that there were two main problems to consider. Peru had created a very difficult situation and he considered that the United States was doing a wonderful thing by exerting pressure on the Junta so that they would adopt a decent form of Government and call for free elections. However, the Peruvian situation was one that affected the stability of other countries. He had talked with the President-Elect of Colombia, Guillermo León Valencia, in New York recently and the latter had expressed his entire agreement with President Betancourt. He then quoted President León Valencia as having said that "if we do not do something about such a Meeting, how many more days can I remain President of Colombia?"
The Foreign Minister added that the situation in Venezuela was not one of great danger at this moment. A few days ago the Chief of the Navy had publicly stated that he considered that his first duty was to back the Constitutional Government of President Betancourt, and that he was therefore confident that Betancourt would remain in the Presidency through 1964. However, in his opinion the problem at hand was not one to be considered on a two, three or four year basis, because its consequences would affect the solidarity of the Americas. He added that some years ago military coups were a customary and habitual event in the national life of many countries. However, this was no longer true because now the communist parties are backing these movements, as was the case in Venezuela, in both Carúpano and Puerto Cabello, where known communists were found in uniform during the revolts.
The Foreign Minister further noted that when he was visiting Peru last April he was told that since the beginning of the year there were rumors that if APRA were to win the elections, the Government would be overthrown. The military were aware of the fact that if they did overthrow the Government, the United States would not cooperate, through the Alliance for Progress and other programs, with the new Government of Peru. In spite of this they carried out their coup. This coup was not aimed against APRA or Belaúnde or any political party. Nor was its purpose to correct a fraudulent election, based on the charge that many persons had voted twice. The coup was carried out only to satisfy the Army's appetite for power. If the Organization of American States would do nothing about this situation it would greatly affect public opinion in this hemisphere.
The President noted that there was great concern about the situation because of two main reasons: the confusion that had surrounded the vote (the results did not imply a clear mandate, and it had taken a long time to count the votes); and there had been a very small public reaction to the military takeover. According to information received through the press and through the business community there seemed to be a certain acquiescence, which made it difficult for the United States to adopt an attitude of outrage. In view of these events, it became very difficult for the United States to discourage other countries from recognizing the military Junta, especially in the cases of countries such as Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Bolivia.
In response to the President's question about Bolivia's position, Mr. Martin said that the Government of Bolivia was rather nervous about the whole situation but that it had not, as yet, recognized the Peruvian Junta.
The President then indicated that, considering the prevailing circumstances in Peru, it would not be a very appropriate moment to hold a Foreign Ministers' Conference, especially if other Latin American countries move to recognize the Peruvian Junta. Furthermore if the Meeting were unsuccessful, this would greatly strengthen the military. For these reasons the United States prefers to approach the problem through bilateral means, rather than through the OAS.
The Foreign Minister indicated that for years the principles of solidarity and democracy had been expounded in the Americas. That an organization had been created on the basis of member countries with a democratic form of government. If the Organization's Foreign Ministers could meet, the purpose would be different from the one that was pursued at the Punta del Este meeting. In this case the purpose would not be to seek a direct action, because it would not be possible. In the present circumstances the Foreign Ministers could meet to discuss the situation. No specific mention of Peru need be made in convening the meeting. This would allow other countries to attend, such as Colombia, who have indicated that Peru should not be dealt with pointedly. The holding of the meeting would have a moral and practical effect on the Government of Peru. He added that 11 Governments would vote for the meeting and that recommendations had been presented to prepare an instrument that would consider the adoption of necessary measures in the event of any future military coups in the Americas. Also a study or working group could be formed to consider the situation. He then noted that four countries had requested the meeting and that Venezuela also expected the support of Colombia as had been indicated to him by Foreign Minister Caicedo. Should the meeting take place, the Ministers need not openly condemn the situation in Peru, but could make a general statement of principle condemning military coups as opposed to the principles of the Charter of the OAS.
The Minister further noted, if the U.S. supported the meeting, even in the case of defeat, the United States would lose nothing and on the contrary would have gained a great deal in the eyes of Latin American public opinion.
The President at this point asked the Foreign Minister what were the specific points that he would propose for the agenda of the meeting. Would it be that the OAS would go on record as being against military coups because they constituted a denial of the constitutional practices? Was it a matter of stating a general policy?
The Foreign Minister replied that the United States was the only international power in the Hemisphere and that he understood the world wide implications of any move made by the United States. However, in the case of Latin America this was an action that was expected from the United States.
The President asked the Foreign Minister for his opinion about the situation in Brazil where there was not a direct threat from the military but rather from the radical left as the government is disintegrating. There seemed to be a race between the influence of the military and that of the communists and the mobs in the streets.
The Foreign Minister noted that there are coups from the right and coups from the left. In Venezuela the left had enlisted army support for a coup.
President Kennedy then noted that in Ecuador there seemed to be a conflict between the Army and the Air Force on the one hand and the man in the street on the other, and inquired about the Minister's opinion as to the situation there.
The Foreign Minister stated that there might be some danger in Ecuador. However, it should always be borne in mind that nothing pleases the communist forces more than a military coup from the right especially if it is carried out with the support of the United States.
The President replied that he understood this to mean that the result could be a superficial feeling of stability but that in the end it actually served the purposes of the communist forces. He added that the United States would have to study the final language of the Venezuelan proposal. He clearly understood that it would not be a question of non-recognition.
In response to the President's question regarding the position of the various Latin American countries on recognition of the Peruvian Junta, Mr. Martin replied that Argentina and Chile would probably recognize the Junta early next week. On the other hand Venezuela, the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica would never recognize the Junta.
The Foreign Minister then noted that in matters of politics it is very difficult to use the word never, but that the present position of his country was that recognition would not be extended as long as the Junta remained in power. He further believed that the United States could exert substantial pressure at a Meeting of Foreign Ministers, especially through the lever of the Alliance for Progress and military aid programs.
The President stated that the United States does not wish to appear isolated in its efforts and must be supported by other countries. The United States wants to avoid the labels of intervention and aggression. It would not like to hear the Junta charge that the United States was attempting to dominate the Hemisphere through intervention.
The Foreign Minister indicated that, as was mentioned to him by the Ambassador of Nicaragua, it is important to the success of the Venezuelan proposal that it be supported by the resonant voice of the United States. He added that President Betancourt was deeply concerned not only by his own internal situation but also about the future role of the OAS. He considered it important to go on record against the type of situation the Peruvian coup represents.
The President then requested the Foreign Minister to prepare a written statement of the specific measures that the Venezuelan Government proposes for the Meeting of Foreign Ministers so that the United States Government might study it./3/ He reiterated his understanding that it would not deal with non-recognition but with general principles.
/3/Projected draft statement not found.
426. Editorial Note
At the August 6, 1962, White House staff meeting, Carl Kaysen, Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs related the President's opinion that the United States should grant official recognition to the Peruvian junta. Assistant Secretary of State Martin and Presidential Special Assistant Arthur Schlesinger favored waiting, at least until the August 8 OAS Council meeting. (Memorandum for the record, August 6; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings, May-September 1962)
At the COAS meeting, the representatives of the Peruvian junta reaffirmed their commitment to respect individual and civil liberties and to conduct free and fair elections as soon as possible. The United States was able to forestall the Venezuelan initiative to call a special OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers on Peru. On August 17 the Department of State issued a press release announcing the resumption of U.S. diplomatic relations with Peru. (Department of State Bulletin, September 3, 1962, pages 348-349)
427. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin) to Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/
Washington, October 3, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 723.5-MSP/10-362. Secret. Drafted by Poole and Thompson of ARA/WST.
SUBJECT
Military Assistance to Peru
Our policy determination to limit the level of military assistance to Peru at this time is based on a number of factors:
1. Last March, in accordance with authorization given him by the President, Ambassador Loeb told top Peruvian military leaders that we would find it very difficult to recognize a government installed by military coup and next to impossible to continue assistance programs, and in doing so he referred to his conversation with the President. The position we took is now public knowledge.
2. When we announced suspension of diplomatic relations and assistance programs we declared publicly that the coup d'etat represented a grave setback to the principles agreed to under the Alliance for Progress.
3. In taking this public position we hoped to demonstrate to the hemisphere our firm support of democratic, constitutional process and to provide a deterrent to potential military coups against democratic, constitutional regimes elsewhere in the hemisphere.
4. In Peru itself it was hoped that witholding full resumption of assistance might serve as an additional inducement toward a rapid return to constitutional government.
We have carefully explained to the Junta our position on limited resumption of military assistance to commence this month, our assurance that, in any case, full assistance would be resumed when the situation returns to "normal" next year, and our disposition to review the situation at some intermediate time, perhaps early next year. (We were prepared to commence limited assistance a month ago, but the White House requested this be deferred until the Congress acts on the 1963 program.) As you know, the Junta has been exercising heavy pressure to induce us to resume full assistance now, accusing us publicly of violating our agreements, threatening to dispense with our military missions, threatening to withdraw from Peru's hemispheric defense mission and generally choosing to confront this issue headlong as a matter of political prestige rather than agree to a gradual approach./2/
/2/See, for example, the memorandum of conversation between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Llosa at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations on September 28. (Ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)
In actuality the grant assistance we have contemplated resuming this month (certain maintenance, spares and training) is not inconsiderable: $6.1 million out of $9 million undelivered in FY '62 and previous programs (i.e. 67%) and $1.5 million out of the $13.8 million FY '63 program, if approved (i.e. 12%), totaling $7.6 million.
I believe the following factors militate against reverting to full military assistance at this time:
1. The deterrent factor in our position against military coups elsewhere in the hemisphere would be impaired, including our credibility should we wish to convey a similar warning.
2. Our posture in the hemisphere and in Peru itself in favor of constitutional process would be weakened by a speedy return to business as usual in military assistance. (The position we took at the time of the coup was generally applauded in the press of the hemisphere and our present position is not out of step in the hemisphere as a whole, where several countries--Colombia, Venezuela, Uruguay, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Honduras--have not yet even recognized the Junta.)
3. We would permit the Junta to have the satisfaction of seeing us capitulate before threats and pressure from a position carefully arrived at and approved at the highest level. In all probability this would strengthen the extremists in the Junta who have been advocating a hard line and further weaken our already limited influence. (See Lima telegrams 416 and 418 at Tabs A and B.)/3/ Disquieting questions have been raised as to the real intentions of the extremists.
/3/Not printed; dated September 30 and October 1, respectively. (Ibid., Central Files, 723.5811/9-3062 and 10-162)
4. Congress might well question our tactics in holding the line until adjournment and then suddenly returning to full assistance.
5. Full assistance would be illegal in the absence of a Presidential determination on internal security and the negotiation of an amendment to our mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Peru. The proposed FY '63 program contains a large internal security component which can be delivered only after those actions. I believe it would be inadvisable to seek to negotiate an amendment of our agreement at this time.
Recommendation/4/
/4/Ball approved all four recommendations.
For these reasons I recommend that you speak to the President again in order to secure his agreement that, rather than resuming full military assistance immediately,/5/ we modify our position in the following manner, the first three steps to be effective after congressional action (expected shortly) and pending step four:
/5/A handwritten notation here reads: "This refers to President's decision, made during conversation with Secretary, that full mil. assistance should be resumed immediately."
1. That we permit military purchases on a normal basis rather than the present basis (maintenance and spares only, with certain other items on a "case by case" basis), as sales do not constitute assistance and therefore should not affect our public posture in this regard.
2. That we expand the categories of grant assistance to be provided (now restricted to certain maintenance, spares and training) to include additional training and certain types of non-sensitive end items, e.g. certain civic action items, support items, uniform material, etc. not involving internal security.
3. That we consider other grant assistance only on a case by case basis, using the criterion of urgent necessity.
4. That we plan full resumption in mid-November--four months after the military coup--and inform the Junta this month that we shall make our promised review at that time instead of early next year./6/
/6/A limited resumption of military assistance to Peru began on October 8 according to a joint State-Defense message transmitted in telegram 281 to Lima, October 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 723.5-MSP/10-862) Telegram 313 to Lima, October 23, reads: "In view need solidarity in face Cuban-Soviet threat to hemisphere security, remaining special restrictions on MAP for Peru (Deptel 281) are removed effective immediately." (Ibid., 723.5/10-2362)
428. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, January 25, 1963, 12:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 123 Jones, J. Wesley. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Belcher and approved in the White House on February 18. The meeting took place at the White House.
SUBJECT
Farewell Call of Ambassador Jones Before Departing for Peru/2/
/2/Jones was appointed Ambassador on November 29, 1962.
PARTICIPANTS
The President
Ambassador J. Wesley Jones
Mr. Ralph Dungan, The White House
Mr. Taylor G. Belcher, Director, Office of West Coast Affairs
The President opened the conversation by referring to the many problems which the Ambassador would face in his new post--the forthcoming elections and change of power, the dangers inherent in Leftist agitation, the dispute over territorial waters and the question of submarines for the Peruvian Navy. The President asked whether the Peruvians were claiming the 200-mile limit on territorial waters only with respect to U.S. vessels and it was explained that they were not. Upon learning that the reaction in Lima to our recent approach on behalf of two fishing vessels/3/ had evoked a rather negative response based on the alleged tone of our note, the President asked whether in fact the note had been offensive and he was assured that it had not been. The Ambassador spoke of his regret that there were these problems such as the fisheries and the question of submarines to plague him at a time when he felt it was so important to establish a quick sense of mutual confidence and rapport.
/3/On October 28 the tuna fishing vessels Western Ace and Chicken of the Sea were seized by Peruvian authorities for fishing within the 200-mile territorial limit claimed by Peru.
With regard to the submarines, the President inquired as to why the Peruvian Navy required any submarines, much less new ones. It was explained that the Peruvian Navy had a replacement program set up which provided for two new submarines to replace the two oldest of the four now in commission. A U.S. firm was interested in bidding and we had been informed that the Germans and the British had also been invited to bid. The President said that while it would be better if they did not spend their resources on submarines, if they were determined to purchase them somewhere it would be better if U.S. suppliers had the opportunity than to have the business go to Britain or Germany. It was pointed out to the President that the contrast between the $20 million apparently available for new submarines and the $1.3 million set aside in the budget for the cost of land reform was scandalous and would be likely to evoke embarrassing questions in connection with our aid program for Peru.
The President wished the Ambassador well and asked him to be certain to make it clear to the Peruvians that the U.S. Government was doing all in its power to cooperate with the other governments who were participating in the Alliance for Progress but that they would have to appreciate that our resources were limited and that we did have a balance of payments problem. He added that today Latin America occupies a primary place in our policy considerations. Europe was relatively secure and prosperous while the situation in Latin America required our best efforts and attention.
429. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
NIE 97-63
Washington, May 1, 1963.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry. Secret. According to a covering sheet, this estimate was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Joint Staff. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted the estimate to the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 1, and all members of the Board concurred except the representatives of the AEC and FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
POLITICAL PROSPECTS IN PERU
The Problem
To estimate the prospect for the establishment of an elected civil government and the basic problems which would confront such a government.
Conclusions
A. Peru's present political difficulties are the result of pressures for political and social change generated in a long static society undergoing industrialization and urbanization. These pressures have been building up for a generation. A resolution of the consequent political tensions is not likely to be accomplished for many years. (Paras. 1-6)
B. The present Military Junta seized power in July 1962 in order to prevent direct or indirect accession to power by APRA/2/ as the result of the 1962 presidential and congressional election. It has failed in its efforts to develop a political coalition which would ensure the defeat of APRA in the new election which it is committed to hold in June 1963. An election with the candidates now running could be as close and inconclusive as that of 1962. (Paras. 7-11, 20-24)
/2/Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, a radical leftist but anti-Communist party established in 1924. In its earlier days, APRA was violently revolutionary and was repeatedly suppressed by the conservative military. However, in more recent times its program has been considerably moderated and it has sought to achieve power by political action. [Footnote in the source text.]
C. Inasmuch as the military are in a position to control the outcome of the election, they will probably carry out the Junta's commitment to hold it. If, contrary to expectation, Haya should win a undeniable victory, they could still intervene to prevent his inauguration and to establish a military government which would retain power for an unspecified period. There is no doubt that the military have this capability or that they would exercise it if convinced that it was necessary to do so in order to prevent APRA from coming to power. (Paras. 25, 28-29)
D. The Peruvian Communist and pro-Castro groups have little prospect of achieving power in the near future. The Peruvian armed forces and security services are capable of controlling subversive activities short of a well-organized guerrilla movement or a revolutionary uprising on a national scale. (Paras. 16-19)
E. In the past, Peruvian Governments have been unwilling to make the sacrifices or to risk the political liabilities of programs aimed at bringing about fundamental social and economic change. Now, however, Peru faces a situation in which political stability is becoming more and more dependent on the ability and disposition of governments to respond effectively to popular demands for economic well-being and security. This situation augurs a breakup of the existing structure of the Peruvian society and economy. Unless the forces of moderation are able to bring about orderly change, radical leadership will probably get the chance to try its methods. (Para. 34)
[Here follow 9 pages of the "Discussion" section of this estimate.]
430. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, May 10, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 14 PERU. Confidential. Drafted by Poole and approved in S on May 15.
SUBJECT
Peruvian Elections
PARTICIPANTS
Fernando Berckemeyer, Ambassador of Peru
The Secretary
Richard A. Poole, Officer in Charge of Peruvian Affairs, WST/ARA
Ambassador Berckemeyer said he was calling in response to the Secretary's suggestion in a conversation at a social event earlier in the week, in which the Secretary had expressed his concern over the outlook for the Peruvian elections and had asked the Ambassador to call on him before leaving for Lima. The Ambassador said he would be leaving that same afternoon, accompanying an IFC Mission in his capacity as a Governor of the IFC and that this gave him an opportunity to talk to government leaders and others about the political situation. The Ambassador wished to respond to the Secretary's earlier remarks by stating that the Junta had made a solemn promise to hold free elections and to respect the results, as he himself had had occasion to confirm in Washington. He saw no other course but to live up to this promise and, while he was aware of disturbing rumors to the contrary, he was confident the Junta would do so. He referred to the communiqué issued by the Junta on May 2, in which the Junta stated that there would be no change in the electoral statute and that the elections would be held without fail on June 9.
When the Secretary asked what the outlook for the electoral race seemed to be and whether there was any danger of extremist elements making a strong show, Ambassador Berckemeyer replied that he felt there was no such danger, as the 1962 elections had proven the country to be politically moderate. He said the vote had been very closely divided between the three principal parties, none of which was extremist; and that the three small extreme left parties had shown very little strength; and this year there are the same three principal presidential candidates and only one small party contender. Of the three principal candidates, the Ambassador thought that Odría had gained the most in the interim, having last year won a surprisingly clear victory in the very important Lima-Calloa area where the "quality vote" is cast, i.e., the intellectuals, business, government servants, industrial labor, etc. He mentioned that Mrs. Odría was a strong asset in the campaign. He thought that there were too many unknowns as far as Belaúnde was concerned and that APRA leadership was now too old.
The Secretary reiterated our interest in the elections and expressed the hope that Peru would get back on the track to progress. He hoped that moderate leadership would emerge to represent the "quality vote" the Ambassador had referred to. He asked the Ambassador to call when he returned from his trip.
(Footnote: In an earlier conversation with a Department officer, the Ambassador had expressed himself in strong terms as being very concerned over the outlook for the elections in the face of rumors that they might be cancelled or that there might be some other form of military intervention. He felt that the Junta must live up to its solemn promise or Peru was "finished." He said he had "swallowed the pill" last time, but that there would be no excuse this time. While he found Haya and APRA distasteful and would probably not remain as Ambassador were they to come to power, he nevertheless believed that if they won they should be permitted to take office. He mentioned that, at a recent function for the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, the President had spoken to him briefly and expressed concern over the outlook in Peru. In the earlier conversation with the Department officer and immediately following his conversation with the Secretary, the Ambassador stated that it was very useful to have these expressions of concern from the President and the Secretary, as he would be able to speak with greater weight in Lima in urging that elections be held and their results respected.)
431. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, May 31, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 14 PERU. Confidential. Drafted by Poole and approved in S on June 5.
SUBJECT
Peruvian Elections
PARTICIPANTS
Fernando Berckemeyer, Ambassador of Peru
The Secretary
Richard A. Poole, Officer in Charge of Peruvian Affairs, WST/ARA
Ambassador Berckemeyer called on the Secretary pursuant to the latter's suggestion, during their conversation of May 10, that he call after returning from his visit to Peru. (See memorandum of conversation of May 10.)/2/
/2/See Document 430.
Ambassador Berckemeyer explained that he had returned from Peru on May 27, following a visit of a little more than two weeks, having gone to Peru with an International Finance Corporation mission in his capacity as a Governor of the IFC. He said he had found the economic situation in Peru to be very healthy, attributable in considerable measure to the marked upswing in sugar prices, the continuing increase in fish meal production and export, and a strengthening in prices of lead, zinc and other metals.
Turning to the political situation, the Ambassador said he had had the opportunity of talking to many people, both in and out of government, about the outlook for the elections. One obvious thing that struck him was the complete freedom of political activity, campaigning and press. He was also impressed by the fact that the candidates showed a general respect for the rights of their rivals to campaign freely and that the candidates and their audiences showed a maturity that had resulted in a relative absence of political incidents and clashes, only a few minor incidents of violence having occurred.
The Ambassador stated that he personally was confident that elections would be held and the results respected regardless of the winner. He had conversations with General Lindley (senior co-President of the Junta), whom he hadn't seen in many years, and developed a high opinion of him, of his integrity and of his determination to hold and respect the elections. He felt certain most of the Junta was equally determined to do so, mentioning the Ministers of Agriculture, Development and Health as particular examples, but he could not say this of all of the members of the Junta, particularly two members whom he did not name. (In a later conversation with Department officers, the Ambassador mentioned specifically Foreign Minister (Admiral) Llosa, who avoids stating his position forthrightly, but who does not convey an impression of confidence as to his feelings about respecting the elections regardless of the results.) The Ambassador added that the overwhelming sentiment he got from talking to a wide cross section of private citizens, business leaders, etc., including staunch anti-Apristas, was that the Junta must live up to its promise even if Haya wins in order that the country might return to constitutional, civilian government.
The Ambassador thought that the elections would be very close, but his impression was that Odría was in the lead, due to several factors: Odría/3/ had made a very good impression with his offer to form a national union with the other parties, even though the offer had not been accepted; the relative prosperity in the country was working in his favor, as it diminished his rivals' appeal to discontented elements; whereas last year Odría had made very few appearances outside of Lima, he this year had been stumping the country with surprisingly good crowds; his wife continues to be a major asset, Belaúnde being divorced and Haya and Samame being bachelors; while ex-President Prado's party had last year joined forces with the Apristas, most Pradistas this year, who while not numerous were in many cases persons of considerable influence, had joined forces with Odría. APRA, Berckemeyer said, is a strong party and well organized, but there had been some discord among its leaders that had weakened it somewhat. Belaúnde, he felt, was falling behind. The Ambassador was convinced that Belaúnde was not pro-communist although he was not rejecting communist support.
/3/Reference is to Presidential candidate Manuel Odria.
The Ambassador said that some Americans--and he mentioned a priest whose name he could not recall--were claiming that the U.S. Embassy favored APRA. He himself was convinced that this was not so. He had been delighted to find that Ambassador Jones was very well thought of by all the Peruvians he had seen and that he had done a great deal to create an atmosphere of confidence between the Embassy and the Peruvians.
When the Secretary asked how the Castro-communist problem was affecting Peru, Ambassador Berckemeyer mentioned the fact that a group of young Peruvians, mostly university students, had been apprehended entering Peru from Bolivia with arms and subversive plans. The group had proceeded from Cuba, where they had received guerrilla and subversive training. Mr. Poole mentioned that the Department was very interested in this clear-cut case of Castro-communist training, infiltration and subversion and had asked our Embassy to talk to the Peruvian Government about the possibility of greater public use being made of the incident through the Lavalle Committee/4/ of the OAS, perhaps with the cooperation of the SCCS,/5/ of which General Doig of Peru is a member.
/4/See footnote 2, Document 168.
/5/Reference is to the Special Consultative Committee on Security of the OAS.
The Secretary expressed his appreciation to the Ambassador for giving his observations on his trip. He said he was glad to hear the Ambassador's expression of confidence.
Footnote: In an immediately subsequent conversation with Department officers Ambassador Berckemeyer mentioned that, at a private social function in the evening of May 28,/6/ he had had occasion to talk to the President at some length about the Peruvian situation and had expressed his confidence that the elections would be held and respected. He said he did not know how the press learned of the fact that he had talked to the President, but that when he was asked by the press whether the political situation in Peru had been discussed, he had replied that this would be only natural and that he had expressed his feeling of confidence. It had then been reported in the press that the Junta was said to have assured the United States and other friendly governments that elections would be held and respected and that these assurances had been given in person to President Kennedy by him (Berckemeyer). (The UPI correspondent who wrote the story on May 29 had already told a Department officer of this, adding that Berckemeyer had authorized him to use the story without attribution as to source. Comment: In stating this assurance came from the Junta, he must have been trying to interpret the Ambassador's remarks.) The Ambassador mentioned to the Department officers that Foreign Minister Llosa had then issued a statement to the effect that the Junta had given him (Berckemeyer) no message to give to the President and that the Junta's promises had been made to the Peruvian people and not to any foreign government. The Ambassador stated to the Department officers that he felt it perfectly proper for him as Ambassador, after talking to General Lindley, to express his personal confidence to the President and the Secretary.
/6/Reference is presumably to a reception at the house of Hugh Auchincloss in Washington described in the President's Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library)
The Ambassador was confronted by the press when he emerged from his meeting with the Secretary, and in answer to a direct question said he had conveyed no message from the Junta but had reiterated his confidence that the elections would be held and respected; he was careful to add that the Junta had given its promise to the Peruvian people./7/
/7/Fernando Belaúnde Terry was elected President on June 9 and was inaugurated on July 28.
432. Editorial Note
In his inaugural speech of July 28, 1963, President Belaúnde promised to resolve the long-standing controversy between Peruvian interests and the International Petroleum Company (a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey) over rights to the La Brea y Parinas oil fields. IPC owned the surface and sub-surface drilling concessions to the fields under the terms of a 1922 arbitral agreement. Peru wished to gain control of the fields in the interest of national sovereignty.
Belaúnde discussed the issue with Ambassador Jones and Teodoro Moscoso on August 28 in Lima. Both sides expressed the desire to keep negotiations on the issue private and amicable and to conclude them before October 28. (Airgram A-172 from Lima August 29; Department of State, Central Files, PET 6 PERU)
Negotiations were unsuccessful. On October 28 Belaúnde introduced to the Peruvian Congress a draft law declaring the 1922 agreement null and void. The Congress passed the law on November 1.
On November 8 Ambassador Jones met with Belaúnde to discuss the matter but was rebuffed by the President. The Ambassador made clear that the continued provision of U.S. economic assistance to Peru was contingent on the satisfactory resolution of the issue. (Telegram 572, November 9; ibid.)
Peruvian envoy Manuel Ulloa met with Presidential Special Assist-ant Ralph Dungan at the White House on November 14 in an effort to reach a compromise solution to the problem. They arranged for renewed negotiations between the Peruvian Government and IPC officials to be held in New York. (Telegram 376 to Lima, November 14; ibid.) The sides held preliminary talks on December 4 and decided to hold more formal negotiations following the December 15 municipal elections in Peru. (Telegram 451 to Lima, December 6; ibid.)
433. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SecDel/MC/1
New York, September 23, 1963, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL PERU-US. Confidential. Drafted by Neal of USUN and approved in S on September 24. The meeting was held at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York.
SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE EIGHTEENTH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September 1963
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
Secretary Rusk
Jack D. Neal
Foreign
Foreign Minister Dr. Fernando Schwalb Lopez Aldana (Peru)
Dr. Victor Andres Belaunde, Chairman of Peruvian Delegation
SUBJECT
Peruvian FonMin and Peruvian Chairman of Del Visit with Secretary Rusk
Foreign Minister Schwalb, accompanied by Dr. Belaunde, called on Secretary Rusk this morning.
The Foreign Minister stated the new Government of Peru was attempting to institute agrarian, corporation and tax reforms. To accomplish these will necessitate the cooperation of the United States. Dr. Schwalb pointed out that the present Peruvian system is obsolete and that it must be changed. He recognizes any alteration will require a fight against the forces of the oligarchy but that President Belaunde Terry, who is an honest, young and strong leader, is determined that the changes must be made--and in juridical and peaceful ways. The Foreign Minister stated his Government will need help from the Alliance for Progress and other United States institutions, particularly in the form of credit and technical assistance.
Secretary Rusk stated we are serious about our faith in the Alliance for Progress and that we can be counted on for assistance. He informed the Foreign Minister we are aware that it is difficult to bring about reforms and changes, but that we are encouraged by Peru's beginning and determination. In reply to the Secretary's question, Dr. Schwalb stated the Government is trying to educate the people to this necessary change by popular appeal and through the Catholic Church which has shown support for the Government's program.
The Foreign Minister told Secretary Rusk that President Belaunde's party has no majority in Congress, and he admitted to the Secretary that the other political parties of Peru have refused to accept cabinet posts in the Belaunde Government. The Secretary reminded him that the development of Peru is for the benefit of all and that possibly the President could get other party help and cooperation in the Alliance for Progress Program.
The Secretary inquired about the activities of private enterprise--not necessarily foreign capital--but particularly what Peruvian private enterprise was doing.
The Foreign Minister stated his Government is attempting to stimulate the investment of private Peruvian capital and had invited it to participate. However, he added, the money of Peru is in the hands of a few--the oligarchy--and they are the most difficult opponents of the Government to bring around.
As regards the Peruvian agrarian program, the Secretary sounded a note of caution when he called the Foreign Minister's attention to the failure of the Mexican agrarian reform, when large producing farms were divided into such small units they were not economically productive to the Mexican economy and as a result Mexico became an importing country instead of an exporting nation in several basic food crops.
The Minister stated it was not the intention of the Belaunde program to reduce farm production.
Secretary Rusk told the Foreign Minister Peru had successfully passed through a difficult and important eighteen months. It should capitalize on this opportunity to become one of the leaders in the Hemisphere. He pointed out that investments (both AID and private) are attracted to a given country when it is known these investments will produce results. Peru now has an opportunity to establish a favorable climate and emerge as an example in the Hemisphere.
Both the Foreign Minister and Dr. Belaunde agreed and stated Peru had received favorable comments from other Latin American nations regarding its handling of the recent election.
The Secretary pointed out the favorable public accord which Peru enjoys in the United States. This good will has weathered the past eighteen months without a reduction in popular acclaim. He feels the present Government should do everything possible to maintain this positive position.
The Secretary suggested the Peruvian Government might consider establishing fellowships--at least six--which would encourage college students from the United States to attend some of the better known universities in Peru. He stated the fellowships necessarily would not call for heavy payments to the students, but should cover tuition and modest per diem. Too, he stated the Peruvian Government might consider furnishing some of its literature and publications to institutions in the United States. He feels these steps would have a psychological impact upon certain important segments of this country.
Both the Foreign Minister and Dr. Belaunde were impressed with the idea.
In summing up his thoughts on Peru, the Secretary informed the gentlemen that Peru has a fine opportunity to establish a strong international reputation by mobilizing its own domestic capital in its program of development. He stated it is not necessary to wait 100 years to complete the essential reforms; it can and should be done sooner.
Secretary Rusk turned to the Cuban situation and informed the Foreign Minister of the Russian "move out," but warned him that many were still there. He pinpointed the United States position by informing the Peruvians we cannot accept the present Cuban-USSR relationship and cannot accept the interference of Castro in the Hemisphere.
434. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Peru/1/
Washington, October 2, 1963, 7:46 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 PERU. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Poole; cleared by Belcher, Allen of ARA/RPA, Moscoso, Lucas of AID/LA, Withereld of AID/LA/WC, and the Export-Import Bank; and approved by Belcher.
243. Ref: Embtel 377./2/ Joint State-AID message. During course of two-and-a-half-day visit here September 25-27, Foreign Minister Schwalb accompanied by Ambassador Berckemeyer and Embassy officers, had informal discussions with Moscoso of AID, Linder of Eximbank and Martin of Department and respective staffs, and with heads of IDB, IBRD, IFC and IMF.
/2/Dated September 30. (Ibid.)
In conversations with US officials Schwalb gave general outline Belaunde Government's reform and development program, budgetary problems and legislative problems. Expressed desire for cordial and fruitful cooperation with US and international assistance agencies. Told Moscoso and Linder that due need for increased revenues to meet present budget deficit and reluctance incur additional opposition by general tax increase, Government relying primarily on foreign lending to finance new development programs.
Moscoso and Linder described loans approved since Belaúnde inauguration and status of those pending, and Schwalb was duly impressed with cooperative attitude he encountered and rapid progress. See Deptel 227/3/ re Linder's discussion Eximbank loans.
/3/Dated September 27. (Ibid., FN 11-1 PERU/XMB)
Moscoso suggested, in interests avoiding providing ammunition to US critics of foreign assistance, that Schwalb attempt in scheduled press conference to correct impression New York Times article highlighting his criticism of Alliance red tape in UN speech./4/ (This Schwalb did try to do by pointing out in press conference that his speech as whole was very friendly to Alliance and that criticism was intended as constructive.)
/4/Reference is to an article of September 25, which described Schwalb's speech at the United Nations General Assembly the previous day in which he criticized the "excessive red tape" he felt hindered the work of the Alliance for Progress.
When Schwalb described problems of financing Agrarian Reform, Moscoso suggested GOP look into method adopted in Colombia, where in certain cases land owners pay for improvements provided them by Govt (roads, irrigation, etc., which can be financed by foreign lending institutions) by giving up a part of land holdings to Government for redistribution.
Schwalb discussed with Moscoso and staff at some length prospective investment guaranty agreement. Agreed wholeheartedly in principle on value of such agreement in attracting foreign capital investment but emphasized public relations, congressional and juridical problem for GOP in provisions pertaining to international arbitration and USG assumption of investors' rights, which he recognized were clauses not likely to come up in practice but nevertheless likely to arouse opposition, especially in view public and congressional sentiment on La Brea y Parinas Arbitral Award. Moscoso and staff explained that 80 countries including 10 LA's had signed agreements with such clauses. In answer Schwalb inquiry about more limited agreements with Colombia and Venezuela, Moscoso explained that former was simply interim agreement pending final action on complete agreement and that latter was due special circumstances. Schwalb was given suggested text contained AIDTO 137,/5/ with indication we felt Pastor draft fell short of our requirements largely due omission forementioned controversial clauses. Schwalb promised to study matter further, including possibility resubmission to Consultative Commission on Foreign Relations.
/5/Not found.
Conversations with Martin and staff followed general lines memorandum of September 27 airpouched to you same date,/6/ i.e. with Martin raising following topics: (1) Communism in labor and related political problems as well as Communism among students; (2) International Petroleum Company; (3) IT& T; (4) Discriminatory shipping measures; (5) Agrarian Reform and land invasions, but without discussion specific case of Cerro Crop; (6) COAS chairmanship; (7) Puerto Maldonaldo incident; as well as (8) advisability of further consultations re possible MFM. Fisheries problem and Dominican situation did not arise.
Schwalb gave assurances Government did not favor Communism in organized labor, nor did it favor Aprista-dominated CTP, but rather took position that organized labor and student organizations should be non-political; criticized general strike called by CTP; believed Apristas would support Government reform measures in Congress.
Schwalb was optimistic satisfactory solution to IPC problem could be found, although was not up to date on latest developments. Nor did he have latest information on IT&T and shipping problems. Understood US position on all three questions and stated he would look into them upon his return.
Schwalb was also confident that differences over Agrarian Reform Bill would be ironed out in Congress and that, while doubtless would be dissatisfaction among Odriistas and many landowners, he felt Apristas were in general agreement. Stated problem of land invasions created dilemma for Government, which naturally opposed to illegal invasions but wished to avoid violence, which might then be used by opponents of Government's program to defeat it. Government therefore relying on suasion pending passage Agrarian Reform Law.
Schwalb grateful our desire to back Lavalle/6/ for COAS chairmanship, but stated question of Lavalle's retention had not yet been decided by Belaunde. Schwalb had not yet succeeded in getting to Belaunde on this subject, but would do so on his return. He reiterated interest in making information of Puerto Maldonaldo incident available to COAS. He agreed with Martin that question of holding MFM required further informal consultation among OAS members.
/6/Juan Bautista de Lavalle, Peruvian Ambassador to the OAS.
Ball
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