Documents 1-29
MARCH 1962: DISCUSSION OF BERLIN AT THE EIGHTEEN-NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE MEETINGS AT GENEVA
1. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, March 9, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.
In your discussions with Foreign Minister Gromyko at Geneva,/2/ you should bear in mind our need to draw him out on the main directions of present Soviet policy regarding the West and, specifically, the United States. It would be of considerable importance to us to get a clearer picture of the underlying attitudes which will have a direct bearing on such matters as a nuclear test ban, disarmament, Berlin and Southeast Asia. You will have to judge on the spot how best to explore these matters but, for our own approach, my conversation in Vienna, my interview with Adzhubei/3/ and other communications with Soviet leadership give ample guidance.
/2/Rusk was in Geneva March 10-27 for a meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament March 14-June 14.
/3/Regarding President Kennedy's interview with Adzhubei on January 31, see vol. XIV, Document 277.
With particular regard to Berlin, you should attempt to develop in your discussions with Gromyko the draft proposal of a modus vivendi which has my approval./4/ I should like to add the following for your guidance:
/4/The draft under reference, dated March 6, consisted of four paragraphs (Purpose, Proposal, Advantages, and Soviet Reactions) and a draft proposal with paragraphs on: 1) Berlin, 2) Germany, 3) Nuclear Diffusion, and 4) Non-Aggression. (Attachment to memorandum from Legere to Taylor, March 9; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, 38 Negotiations) In commenting on this draft, Legere wrote that it was "a very dangerous paper," since it assumed that pending a Berlin settlement, the Soviet Union was interested in eliminating tensions. (Ibid.)
1. We anticipate that, at an appropriate stage, such a proposal would be given in written form to Gromyko. This is the only way we can be sure that in its full form it will get top-level study in Moscow.
2. In presenting the proposal, you would indicate to Gromyko that this represents the sort of practical way of moving ahead with due regard to the interests and obligations of both parties that I have had in mind in my various communications with Chairman Khrushchev.
3. While the draft proposal corresponds, in our view, to the essential interests of all concerned, and while in our view it would stand before the world as a document fair to the prestige and power of all, we should of course be glad to hear Soviet suggestions for improvement. We believe that our document points the way to a method of handling the Berlin question which recognizes the realities on all sides.
4. In presenting the draft proposal to Gromyko, we should initially omit the section on Germany. Since Gromyko will almost certainly raise questions which are directly relevant to such a section, you would indicate to him that we must talk with our Allies, including Bonn, before agreeing on any language for such a paragraph with the Soviet Government. Since it is in the common interest of both Moscow and Washington that we reach some basis of stability and mutual security on such questions, Gromyko will appreciate the need for us to be able to act on the basis of agreement with the strong and independent governments with whom we are intimately associated.
5. You should indicate also that if the Soviet Government is interested in discussion of this kind of proposal, and if serious progress can be made with respect to agreement on such a proposal, I would regard the matter as one which might be the basis of a fruitful meeting of Heads of Government.
While our expectation is that you may not get much questioning from Gromyko on this document at this stage, there may easily be an immediate question about the duration of such an understanding. I believe that our answer on this point should be indefinite, but if the point is pressed, we might suggest that the Committee of Deputies might be asked to report after a given interval of time. This would give a date for new negotiations without threatening the life of the modus vivendi itself.
6. If the Soviet Union should press on the matter of occupation status, I assume that we will answer in the usual fashion--that the real presence of our troops and our real access to the city cannot be negotiated away. But it is appropriate to remark that the modus vivendi is so constructed as not to require any open abandonment by the Soviet Union of its own views on this matter.
7. The draft proposal does not go very far, mainly because we must not put on paper things which might shock our Allies if presented without prior consultation. However, you should indicate orally to Gromyko that if the Soviet Government is prepared to discuss an interim arrangement, we would expect to be able to consider a number of additional elements. One of course is a paragraph relating to Germany, and you should indicate informally the possibilities now contained in the bracketed German paragraph of the draft proposal. In addition, we could make it clear that during the life of the modus vivendi both sides could readily lower the temperature of their "inflammatory propaganda" on Berlin and East Germany. Further, we could indicate the possibility of widening the future negotiations on non-aggression so as to examine together proposals which the two sides have made in the past. And finally, you should repeat the private assurance you have given Gromyko in the past that if progress can be made in this direction, we believe that boundary problems can be effectively settled.
8. If discussion should turn toward respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, you should indicate, as I did to Adzhubei, that time may be more effective here than any other instrument, and you should also find occasion to develop the point that if the Soviet Union should ever wish to multiply the responsiveness of the West on this point, we believe it could obtain substantial concessions by the simple expedient of replacing Ulbricht by a more "Polish" leader; this is a statement of objective fact, and not a bargaining proposal.
9. I believe that the privacy of the draft proposal is of very great importance, and yet I recognize the necessity for avoiding a split in the Western alliance by apparent "back door" negotiations. Accordingly, we have agreed that you will give appropriate oral indications of our notion of an indefinite modus vivendi to Home and Schroeder--but it seems to be quite undesirable that the document itself should be mentioned or circulated at this time. We must consider by cable or telephone, prior to your handing over a document to Gromyko, whether we should do so without specific consultation with our Allies. It is my thought that, if real progress has been made consistent with the vital interests of the West, Allied consultation would not be difficult; on the other hand, if Gromyko's reactions are entirely negative, we must consider whether there would be any point in transmitting to him a document which would be both futile in Moscow and irritating to our Allies.
John Kennedy
2. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, March 10, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2058A. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand on March 9 and cleared in draft by Bohlen.
SUBJECT
Berlin
1. Attached at Tab A is the text of our Berlin Modus Vivendi which might be handed to Gromyko at an appropriate point.
2. To supplement the President's communication to you, the following tactical considerations seem pertinent:
a. In a formal sense, your conversations will be a continuation of your meetings with Gromyko in September and of the five Thompson conversations with him./2/ The theory has been that you and Ambassador Thompson were trying to ascertain whether a basis for negotiations existed. This formula was designed largely to accommodate the French and to provide a vehicle for their eventual participation in Four-Power negotiations. It now seems clear that nothing which is likely to emerge from discussions with the Soviets will be enough to obtain de Gaulle's agreement to have the French join with the British and us in a conference. The problem, therefore, becomes one of finding a formula so that the French cannot legally block an arrangement on Berlin rather than trying to maintain an arbitrary and partly fictitious line between exploratory talks and negotiations.
/2/For records of Rusk's three meetings with Gromyko in September and Thompson's five meetings with Gromyko in January, February, and March, see vol. XIV, Documents 156, 160, 164, 251, 264, 278, 284, and 314.
b. It still seems desirable, however, that we should continue to represent the bilateral discussions at Geneva as exploratory talks to the Soviets, making clear that we are not in a position to commit our Allies but that, if a promising avenue towards a modus vivendi appeared to be opening up, we would undertake to obtain their approval.
c. As you are aware, Soviet intentions remain unclear. While Gromyko has made threats to Ambassador Thompson and the Soviets have put pressure on us in the air corridors, they have not shown an unmistakable determination to push ahead with their program of a unilateral peace treaty with the GDR and a turnover of their access responsibilities to GDR officials. This indicates a need for some caution on our part, lest by seeming over-eager we encourage the Soviets to think that harassments in the air corridors and their other pressures have already softened our position. Presentation of a new formulation such as the suggested Modus Vivendi on Berlin must be carefully worked out to avoid creating such an impression.
d. Given these considerations, an initial carrot and stick approach seems appropriate, prior to presentation of the Modus Vivendi. It will probably be desirable to begin by saying something about the air corridors (this to be decided in the light of the situation on March 12 and of the possible discussion of this subject during the tripartite meeting the previous evening). You may then wish to refer to the deadlock reached in the Thompson--Gromyko talks, adding that, as the President pointed out to Adzhubei in their recent discussion in Washington, both sides seem to be repeating static formulas. The President, it may be recalled, suggested to Mr. Adzhubei that, since any final solution of the Berlin problem seemed out of the question, both sides should seek to find an accommodation which would prevent tensions from mounting. You might then wish to continue along the lines of the attached talking points (Tab B)./3/ Talking point papers for subsequent meetings with Gromyko will be prepared as required at Geneva.
/3/Not printed.
Tab A/4/
/4/Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.
DRAFT MODUS VIVENDI
The US and USSR have been discussing a wide range of subjects. They have agreed, in regard to certain of these subjects on (i) certain general principles to which their governments subscribe; (ii) procedures for continuing negotiation on the basis of these principles by a Committee of Foreign Ministers' deputies, which will be established specifically for this purpose, and which France and the UK will be invited to join; and (iii) certain interim steps to meet immediate dangers in the meantime.
1. Berlin
(a) General Principles: They believe that West Berlin should be free to choose its own way of life, that its viability should be maintained, and that its access should remain free and unhindered.
(b) Future Negotiations: They agree to study proposals for improving the situation in Berlin consistent with these principles in the aforementioned committee of Foreign Ministers' deputies.
(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they declare that present access procedures should remain in effect, irrespective of the nationality of the persons performing these procedures at Nowawes and Marienborn checkpoints.
2. Nuclear Diffusion
(a) General Principles: They believe that further diffusion of nuclear weapons into the control of national government not now owning them would make more difficult the problem of maintaining lasting peace.
(b) Future Negotiations: They agree to seek, in the above-mentioned committee (or a sub-committee thereof) to develop policies regarding non-diffusion of nuclear weapons to which all states owning nuclear weapons might agree and to which states not now owning nuclear weapons might also subscribe.
(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they declare that they will not themselves relinquish control over any nuclear weapons to any individual State not now owning such weapons and will refrain from assisting any such State in manufacturing them.
3. Non-Aggression
(a) General Principles: They believe that force should not be used to change existing frontiers and demarcation lines in Europe or for any other aggressive purpose.
(b) Future Negotiations: They agree to seek in the above-mentioned committee (or a sub-committee thereof) (i) to develop declarations which all NATO and Warsaw Pact members might be invited to make in this regard; and (ii) to consider measures which might be taken to enable the governments represented on that Commission to communicate and establish their non-aggressive intent in the event of grave crises and otherwise to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation.
(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they desire that they will not themselves use or support use of force to change the external borders of Germany or the demarcation line inside Germany, and they note with approval past declarations of the Federal Republic that it will not use force to achieve the reunification of Germany or to settle international disputes.
4. Procedures
Once the proposed Committee of Foreign Ministers' deputies has been established, the Foreign Ministers of countries represented on it should meet periodically, as seems useful, to review its work. If and as the Foreign Ministers believe that this is warranted, the Heads of Government could meet from time to time to consummate agreements that these efforts had produced.
3. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy/1/
Moscow, March 10, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. No classification marking. In a memorandum to the President on March 12, Sorensen explained that he had picked up this letter at 3:20 p.m. on March 10 from Georgi Bolshakov, who in a 15-minute conversation, reflected the contents of the letter in a "less dogmatic and more affirmative and friendly tone." Bolshakov stressed that concession on the international access authority was made personally to the President and that the Chairman's best efforts came from his own pen and not from the Foreign Office. (Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Cuba, General, 1962) A copy of the letter was transmitted to Secretary Rusk in Geneva at 9:30 p.m. on March 10 in Tosecs 9 and 10. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163) The full texts of all the Kennedy-Khrushchev messages are printed in volume VI.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your message on the German affairs/2/ and have closely studied the U.S. Government's memorandum handed by your Ambassador to the Soviet Foreign Minister on March 6./3/ I regret that after so many meetings of our representatives and in spite of our confidential communication, the negotiations on the questions relating to the German peaceful settlement, do not make any progress, to put it mildly. I have the impression that the American side has not got rid of the preconception that under the peaceful settlement which we seek somebody takes something, somebody gives--one takes an orchard and gives an apple, or sells the same horse twice. To be frank, I simply do not understand such an approach to the appraisal of the meaning of our negotiations.
/2/For text, see vol. XIV, Document 296.
/3/Regarding this memorandum, see ibid., Document 314.
Perhaps the reason for that is that we look at things from different angles, that we view the situation and the causes that have brought it about in a different way and consequently we have different views on the methods of eliminating the existing tension. If you could distract yourself from the notions so deeply rooted overseas and look at the situation in the way we see if after all we have lived through, you would probably see for yourself that in a German peaceful settlement nobody sells or buys anything, nobody trades unequal values.
No, from the point of view of common sense the situation here is quite clear. A terrible blood-shedding war took place. The peoples of our countries fought shoulder-to-shoulder against the common enemy--aggressive Hitlerite Germany. By a supreme effort and at a cost of countless losses we achieved the goal--defeated the enemy. By right of conquerors the four Allied Powers--the USSR, the USA, Britain and France--occupied temporarily, till the peace treaty is signed, the territory of Germany who had unleashed World War II.
As a heritage from our predecessors we have got a delimitation of our troops, which was not quite reasonable, and the division of Berlin into four parts. I was told that when at the end of the war the plans of occupation of Germany were discussed at the European Advisory Commission the British proposed to seat the Allied Control Council not in Berlin but in a small town at the juncture of the three occupation zones. That proposal motivated by practical considerations was not accepted and it was decided to seat the Control Council for symbolic reasons, in the capital of defeated Hitlerite Germany.
Nobody could then envisage, of course, that there would be two Germanies and the people acted at the time on the basis of the requirements of organization of military occupation. It may serve as a certain excuse for those who adopted decisions at that time.
But history does not always develop as the statesmen foresee. In reality it turned out that there exist two Germanies. Neither you, Mr. President, nor I know for how long the two German states that emerged on the ruins of the Reich will exist, if they ever unite. And our sympathies for these states are not quite the same: you sympathize with social and political system of the FRG, and I naturally sympathize with the German Democratic Republic as a socialist state.
In addition there exists West Berlin. The population of this city lives under old capitalist order while around it--on the territory of the GDR--socialist order has been established. And here we are looking for a solution--how to ensure peaceful coexistence under these circumstances.
You are well aware, Mr. President, that because of the absence of peaceful settlement and the continuation of occupation West Berlin has for many years been causing serious and dangerous frictions between us. I will not conceal that when you insist on keeping your troops in West Berlin, we understand it as an expression of a desire to preserve a NATO beachhead and military base against us inside the GDR. We entered Berlin as allies but we are not allies any longer. Moreover--we are in different military blocs--you are in the North Atlantic bloc, we are in the Warsaw Treaty Organization--organization of socialist countries.
These two groups are antagonistic because the NATO countries have formed their bloc against socialist countries. To protect our interests we had to set up a defensive Warsaw Treaty Organization. What was left to be done?
You note that the present situation in Germany is not satisfactory. This is our point of view too. And what can we do now? Once upon a time, so the story goes, two goats met head to head on a narrow bridge across an abyss. They would not give the way to each other and down they fell. They were stupid and stubborn animals.
But if we fail now to show sober understanding of the situation and do not realize that we have to pass by each other in a friendly way and not to collide at the place where, as you yourself emphasized, our essential interests do not cross--then it will be difficult to take a reasonable decision which would permit both sides to live calmly.
You often call West Berlin a stumbling block and say that until recently everything was allegedly all right there. When we propose to sign a peace treaty and to create a free demilitarized city in West Berlin granting its population guarantees of free and independent life you assert that this is abnormal. It means, that situation can be considered normal only when your troops are stationed in West Berlin as occupants, when the state of war is preserved there, and you do not want to participate in concluding a peace treaty. But could it really be considered normal? This is against common sense.
The Soviet Union proceeds from the necessity to find such a solution which would not cause damage to either side; we must solve this whole problem amicably and, having solved it, not collide with each other in the future. In short, it is necessary to untie knots which create frictions between our states.
I do not know, Mr. President, what else you could suggest as a solution of this problem. My colleagues and I could not find anything better for the improvement of post-war relations other than the conclusion of a German peace treaty and the normalization of the situation in West Berlin on this basis. To use the language of your representatives, we do not sell or buy this city as a horse. We do not want to own this horse and it is not your horse after all. It belongs to none of us.
West Berlin has turned out to be a capitalist island in the midst of socialist countries. So, what! Let it remain such--we do not want to seize this island or to liquidate the capitalist order which exists on it. Let it be fixed what has been given by history.
You write in your message that two principles must be taken as a starting point: (1) to avoid any shift favorable to one side and detrimental to the other, and (2) to ensure a greater degree of stability and tranquility in the entire German situation. If one adds to this that it is also necessary to take into consideration the real situation in Germany, i.e. the existence of the two German States--then one can say that these very principles form the basis of the Soviet proposals on the conclusion of a German peace treaty. The peace treaty should fix the situation which really exists, should not allow to upset the established balance and should secure stable peace and tranquility in Europe and not only in Europe.
One of the important aspects of such solution is the respect for the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic. No one demands from the Western powers to do more than observe generally adopted norms of the international law and international practice with regard to the GDR. One cannot ignore the dignity and sovereign rights of a state, especially if one wants to use the routes of communications crossing its territory as well as its services, if a display of good will is expected from it. And it is impossible to achieve a peaceful solution by pushing aggressive circles of the FRG to still new aggravations of the situation in the centre of Europe.
You write that both sides should refrain from actions which would burden the proceeding negotiations. This is a right idea. Unfortunately, the Western powers are still trying in everything--both in major and in minor matters--to ignore and tread on the rights of the GDR. The NATO Council--not without the US participation, one can assume--has even adopted a special decision recommending the members of this bloc to deprive the citizens of the GDR of the possibility to have normal contacts with many countries of the world. But what if the GDR in response to such a defiant decision forbade the citizens of the NATO countries to go and to fly to the GDR or anywhere through its territory? The Western powers, evidently, would not like it, but that would be the exercise by the German Democratic Republic of its sovereign right. Why, then, do the USA and its allies consider it possible to hold such a position towards the German Democratic Republic?
Or, perhaps, one should regard as a contribution to the solution of the questions discussed by us the endless--and let us call a spade a spade--provocative visits by politicians of the FRG and other NATO countries to West Berlin? I do not wish to go into polemics now and therefore I will not refer to many well known facts.
You, Mr. President, in your message, and also the US Ambassador when he called on the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR touched upon the question of the flights of Soviet aircraft in the air routes leading to West Berlin over the territory of the GDR. In so doing the American side tries to create an impression as if the Soviet aircraft make "aggressive harassment" to the flights of the aircraft of the USA, Britain and France to West Berlin. I see no necessity to dwell on this question: the actual situation and our position are undoubtedly well known to the US Government. This position is based entirely on the corresponding international agreements and on the practice of use of these air routes.
There seems to be somebody's hand in this artificial heating up of the atmosphere around the Berlin air routes. To our mind, the best thing to do would be not to encourage certain hot-heads in the NATO, especially among the military, but to cool them off so that they realize at last that no instigating actions can change the situation and deprive the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic of what they possess. Abandoning by the Western powers of their attempts to violate the lawful interests of the GDR and the USSR would constitute that very abstention from unilateral actions, creating the danger of outbreak of serious incidents, which the US Government calls for.
Generally speaking, it is very difficult to find in the document handed by Ambassador Thompson on March 6 a desire to facilitate an agreement. There is, however, a statement in it to the effect that the US stands for the achievement of a just and peaceful settlement of disputed questions dividing our countries. This statement is correct, but, unfortunately, it is not substantiated in the negotiations in order to achieve the necessary agreement.
I would not like to leave anything unclear--one way or another we will sign a German peace treaty. I have already said in Vienna and repeat it now that if there is no other choice we will make use of the US example and the lesson which was taught us by it in case with Japan. Some hot-heads occupying official positions in the USA are threatening us with various misfortunes, but I think they are more clever in their doings than in their words because only suicides can now threaten with war but suicides are always insane people. I, for myself, consider that our counterparts with whom we conduct conversation are mentally normal people and can realistically evaluate and understand what it would mean to attack the Soviet Union or another country.
Some people allege that we are attacking someone, demanding a peaceful German settlement. But no sane person can consider as an attack the talks on the conclusion of a peace treaty. And the conclusion of a peace treaty means putting an end not only to the state of war but also to the state of hostility which results from an unaccomplished peaceful settlement.
I believe that we, the men vested with great trust and responsibility by our peoples, should understand all this correctly and should oppose opinions which sometimes push us to the wrong way. To say it straight: let us not frighten each other with words. We have seen enough of frightening. You, Mr. President, participated in the World War II, I participated not only in that war. Both of us are aware what war means and as the leaders of states we know what military means are now at the disposal of the USSR and the USA. Let us not count by pieces who has more or who has fewer modern means of mass destruction. Each of our countries has already stock-piled more than enough means to inflict an irreparable devastating blow.
The Soviet Union intends to conclude a German peace treaty. If we do not find common language with you and you yourself do not want to take part in the peaceful settlement then the Soviet Union and other states will sign the peace treaty with the GDR.
My colleagues and I have much pondered how to bring closer our positions on the questions under discussion including the problem of ensuring a free access to West Berlin. Your recent letter, in which certain ideas on this point are expressed, strengthened my intention to share with you the considerations that we have arrived at on the creation of an international organ on the access to West Berlin. I hope that the ideas that I am expressing here will be received with good will, without prejudice.
Specifically I have in mind the following:
We are prepared to meet halfway the desire expressed by you and to agree to the creation of a special international organ on the access to West Berlin for the period of time that will be defined by the agreement between us. The organ that I have in mind would act as an arbiter if difficulties appeared during the practical implementation of the agreements on free access to and from West Berlin. It would not be empowered with any administrative functions which would give it authority to directly regulate traffic or set its own regulations on the traffic routes connecting West Berlin with the outside world because this is a prerogative of the German Democratic Republic. In brief, any talk of an organ of the kind proposed by the American side at the negotiations in Moscow, which would be a kind of state within state is out of question. Such situation would be in basic contradiction with the most elementary concepts of respect for the sovereignty of states. From the remarks made by the American side you also, it seems to me, see the necessity to take this aspect of the matter into consideration.
Naturally, the creation of the international organ on the access to West Berlin that I have in mind is possible only under the condition that the troops which are now stationed there by virtue of occupation are withdrawn from West Berlin as a result of the conclusion of a peace treaty. We consider that for West Berlin itself it would be calmer and better if there were no foreign troops stationed there at all. However, you say, you have some doubts--would not some harm be done to the population of West Berlin on the part of the GDR. Although we have repeatedly explained that the GDR does not and cannot have such aims, we are nevertheless ready to agree to stationing in West Berlin for some period of time, let us say for 3-5 years, symbolic contingents of troops of the UN or neutral countries.
All this, of course, is connected with the transformation of West Berlin into a free demilitarized city and with the simultaneous achievement of an agreement on a final legalization and consolidation of the existing German borders and also on other questions which are well known to you and which you mention in your message.
Such an arrangement could then be fixed in a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic (or in an annex to it), which will be concluded by the Soviet Union and a number of other states, if the Western powers have definitively decided that at the present time they will not take part in a German peaceful settlement.
Under an agreed solution of all these problems a part of which would be an agreement on the creation of an international organ on the access to West Berlin, such access through the territory of the GDR would be exercised on the basis of agreements, that is with the observance of usual regulations and formalities which are applied to the transit through the territory of sovereign states. We know that the GDR is ready to assume in an appropriate form the obligations providing for an unimpeded access to and from West Berlin. Should any complications or frictions in the exercise of a free access to West Berlin arise, the last word would be with the international organ--arbiter of which we have said above.
The international organ would include, first of all, the four powers--the USSR, the US, Britain and France. Thus the Soviet Union would act in capacity of a guarantor of a free and uninterrupted access to West Berlin to which, judging by everything, the Western powers attach particular importance. As to other possible participants of the international organ, this question could be solved later by the agreement of the parties.
What is the advantage of a decision that I have just outlined? In a sense this is an alloy of the two positions--American and Soviet. On one hand, the Soviet Government, though it is not so simple for us, agrees to the creation of an international organ on access. On the other hand, an agreement will be reached--if the US is not ready yet to conclude a peace treaty with both German states--that with the conclusion by the Soviet Union and by a number of other states of a peace treaty with the GDR the situation in West Berlin is normalized on this basis by transforming it into a free demilitarized city in accordance with our mutual agreement, and other questions which you know are being solved. That would be a great victory for the cause of consolidating peace and easing tension.
This is a reasonable proposal and if we could reach an agreement on its basis it would help us to take off the existing heat in international relations. Our proposal is a concession to you. We do not want to create difficulties for you, Mr. President, and your country because in your country there are hot-heads; maybe there are some among your allies too. These questions are correctly understood in our country and by our allies. Let us leave the troops of the UN or neutral countries in a free city of West Berlin for 3-5 years to allow the nerves to cool down during this period of time and then the whole situation will look in a quite different light.
I hope that the thoughts, expressed by me, will allow us to concentrate our attention in the course of the talks on the main questions and to achieve a necessary progress in the nearest future.
It was my intention to dwell upon in this message only on the German peace treaty. But in the meantime I was informed about the confidential conversation with your brother, Robert Kennedy. /4/
/4/Not further identified.
He said that since we had not achieved any progress on Berlin question, you, Mr. President, consider it necessary to make an effort to find the areas wherein the soonest achievement of an agreement with the Soviet Union is possible. And you, according to Mr. Robert Kennedy, think that such area is the disarmament problem and, first of all, the question of the nuclear test ban.
I would have understood such a position of yours, let us say, a few days ago. But, how, may I ask you, should we understand it now, when you have made a decision to resume nuclear weapon tests/5/ and especially on the eve of the conference where we are to deal with the disarmament questions. I have expressed my attitude towards your decision with full frankness in my message of March 3./6/ What was said there may seem harsh to you, but had I given another evaluation of such a step by the US Government I would have been simply insincere.
/5/On March 2 President Kennedy had authorized the resumption of nuclear testing.
/6/For text of this letter, see Department of State Bulletin, March 26, 1962, pp. 494-497.
Your brother expressed the thought that our Ministers should discuss at Geneva the possibilities of an accommodation on the question of the nuclear test ban. As you already know from my recent message we have agreed that our Minister will participate in the work of 18 nation conference though I do not conceal that if you start series of nuclear explosions, it will certainly not increase chances for success in the Committee's work. We, you and I, must look at the course of events realistically.
Your brother said that you, Mr. President, would like to have a summit meeting, which could be prepared in advance by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs or through diplomatic channels. I also would believe that such a meeting with you would be useful if an accommodation on a number of questions is reached before it by our Ministers, that is if the questions are prepared for their final discussion, approval and formalizing at the meeting of the Heads of State. I am always ready for such a meeting in order to ensure a necessary accommodation. When I am speaking about such a meeting at the highest level I believe that both our peoples are equally interested in it. After all, when the fate of the mankind is at stake we as statesmen, must use all the opportunities to justify the great trust placed upon us. It certainly happens sometimes that efforts of ministers alone are not enough and then for the sake of success and in the interests of peace the Heads of state and government have to join the effort.
Our new Ambassador, A.F. Dobrynin will soon arrive in Washington. I recommend him to you and I am confident that he will represent the Soviet Union in your country well. He enjoys the full confidence of the Soviet Government and my full confidence. Whenever you need to convey something to me in a confidential way he will be able to transmit this to me personally.
I would like to thank you for your kind and warm words passed to me through A.I. Adzhubei and in my turn to wish you and your family success and good health.
Sincerely
N. Khrushchev/7/
/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
4. Telegram From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk, at Geneva/1/
Washington, March 11, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Secret; Eyes Only.
CAP 5114-52. For Mr. Rusk from the President. You have the latest Khrushchev letter,/2/ and you also have the problem of harassment in the corridors. In this situation I cannot give you binding instructions from here. But I do want you to know once again of my own strong belief that we must not spare any effort to find a modus vivendi. Khrushchev's proposal of an international organ on access, though at present attached to a quite unacceptable condition, does offer a real chance of progress, and I think you should add the idea of such an organ to your presentation on a modus vivendi. We should certainly register our opinion of chaff and of Soviet flight plans for Monday./3/ Still, I myself am most concerned not to miss the chance of starting a serious discussion of a modus vivendi, and I depend on you to press strongly in this direction. With all my confidence and best wishes.
/2/Document 3.
/3/On March 10 the Soviets announced that they would operate inbound and outbound flights in the southern corridor to Berlin at altitudes that were normally reserved for Western flights to Berlin.
John F. Kennedy
5. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, March 11, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/3-1062. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN
John C. Ausland (State Department) and Martin J. Hillenbrand (Geneva)
Mr. Hillenbrand said that he had talked to the Secretary about General Norstad's request for authority to fly over 10,000 feet in the Berlin air corridors [1 line of source text not declassified]./2/ The Secretary asked that we request the approval of the President to grant General Norstad the authority he had requested. The Secretary had spoken with Lord Home and recommended that the British Government grant the authority requested by General Norstad also. As soon as the Secretary has received the British reply Mr. Hillenbrand will inform the Department and will request that the Department approach the French with a request that they grant the authority requested by General Norstad also. If neither the British or French or both have not granted General Norstad the requested authority by 1800 Z, March 12, the Secretary believes that General Norstad should be granted authority to proceed unilaterally.
/2/In a message dated March 11, Norstad described the flights that the Soviets planned to operate in the southern Berlin air corridor and stressed that these flights raised the corridor problem to new heights of seriousness and complexity. He outlined the countermeasures he had ordered and requested authority to fly above 10,000 feet when Soviet flights prevented Western use of the normal flying altitudes. (Ibid., 962.72/3-1162) Later on March 11 President Kennedy approved this authority. (Tosec 12 to Geneva, March 11; ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2058)
The Secretary will be discussing the air corridor question with Gromyko this evening and if this conversation affects the views expressed above he will communicate immediately with the President.
6. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SecDel MC/4 Geneva,
March 11, 1962, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/3-1162. Secret. Drafted by Kohler and approved in S on March 13. The meeting was held at the U.S. Mission. A detailed summary of the conversation was transmitted in Secto 10 from Geneva, March 12. (Ibid., 762.00/3-1262)
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary of State
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Kohler
Ambassador Thompson
United Kingdom
Lord Home
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Sir Frank Roberts
SUBJECT
British-American Bilateral Talks
Negotiations with the Soviets
The Secretary opened the conversation by reviewing briefly his talk with German Foreign Minister Schroeder./2/ Following this he set forth our estimate that while there had been absolutely no give in the Soviet position during the bilateral talks we have had with them, still there is no evidence they are preparing for a showdown. However, it seems likely that they consider that they are stuck with public positions. We had considered whether we could develop a sort of generalized formula under which it would be possible to set up a continuing negotiating forum such as Deputy Foreign Ministers. Lord Home wondered whether this would fill the Soviet requirements since he felt that a summit conference was an immediate goal of Khrushchev. The Secretary replied that it might even be possible to have a Summit Conference which would serve to launch the continuing Deputy Foreign Ministers forum. In response to a further question from Lord Home as to the content of the formula, the Secretary said this might provide for a continuance of existing access procedures (that is, at a suitable date, not as now under harassment) to which could be added items regarding non-transfer of nuclear weapons, no use of force to effect boundary changes and a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression arrangement. At least this would enable us to put forward an agenda broad enough to be of some interest to the Russians. This idea was based on an assumption that the Russians were not out really to take over access and that such a formula would give them a chance to draw away. If this assumption proved to be wrong then we were faced with a crisis and showdown in any event. Lord Home observed the Secretary's formula did not touch on the status of the city of West Berlin which seemed a prime Soviet point or the question of the presence of Allied troops in Berlin. He suggested that we might also be able to add something about practical dealings with the GDR. If we did not add such elements Lord Home feared we would simply face a Soviet charge this was another Western delaying tactic.
/2/During a working luncheon with Rusk at the Hotel Lausanne at noon, Schroeder stated that he had no doubts about U.S. intentions with regard to Berlin. Rusk outlined the U.S. appreciation of the discussions with Gromyko. (SecDel MC/1, 6, 9, and 10; ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2074) During the conversation the Germans presented the U.S. Delegation with a 3-page paper on how the talks with the Soviets might be continued. (Attachment to SecDel MC/10)
Turning to Sir Frank Roberts, the Secretary asked his opinion as to whether the Soviets would be more receptive to his formula if it were launched at a Summit meeting in May. Sir Frank thought that this would enhance the attractiveness of the proposal. Ambassador Thompson agreed but went on to point out with reference to Lord Home's remarks that our position was that the matter of our staying in West Berlin was not negotiable and that this would have to be made clear. The Secretary resumed, saying that it might be possible to add to the formula some reference to the ultimate reunification of Germany and the setting up meanwhile of technical communications between the FRG and the GDR. Ambassador Thompson commented that two recent developments might be interpreted as a good sign. Khrushchev's speech to the Central Committee Plenum had made clear that the conflict with the Chinese would continue. Furthermore it seemed possible that the big Soviet loan to Ulbricht might be a sort of sop to him in lieu of positive action with respect to the peace treaty and status of West Berlin. Lord Home, who had been reflecting on the conversation, then agreed it would be useful to try out a formula along these lines. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh asked whether we would envisage the result of this as parallel declarations or what? The Secretary replied that he thought it was possible that a quadripartite paper could be developed to which all four powers would adhere. However he felt that there was no use to consult in any detail with the Germans and French unless there was some indication of Soviet interest.
Air Corridors
The Secretary then turned to the subject of the air corridors and reviewed briefly the very serious Soviet maneuvers and harassments of our access. He felt that the use of chaff to jam radars was particularly outrageous and little short of the actual use of firearms. Ambassador Bohlen commented on the surprising nature of this Soviet action contrary to their usual practice of trying to cover their acts with some semblance of legality and expressed the opinion that it would be important to hit Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on this promptly tonight. As evidence of the seriousness with which the US regarded this the Secretary then pointed out to Lord Home that if the dropping of chaff in the air corridors had happened two days earlier it was quite possible he would not be here today. However the news had been received too late to enable him to touch base with the British and others. After some further discussion of the details of the Soviet actions in the air corridors and particularly the filing of flight plans between the altitudes of 7500 and 10,000 feet, the Secretary suggested that the time had come when we should perhaps authorize Norstad to put flights through over 10,000 feet. Mr. Kohler explained that the US had already given such authority to Norstad but that it was for the time being contingent on British and French agreement. The Secretary then gave Lord Home a copy of the talking points prepared for his meeting with Gromyko tonight. (Attachment) After they had been looked over by the British Delegation it was agreed that these talking points were very suitable for use with Gromyko tonight except for the last sentence of numbered paragraph (1). It was noted that the British could add specific incidents involving British aircraft. The Secretary then suggested a number of possible courses of action that might be taken as follows:
A. In the corridors:
1) schedule Allied flights in the same altitudes as Soviet flights, with ten minute time lags;
2) schedule Allied flights exactly to coincide in time and altitude with Soviet flights;
3) delay schedules and inconvenience LOT flights in the same measure as the Soviets have affected our flights; and
4) orbit fighters at the entrance to the corridors at normal operational flight elevations.
B. Outside the corridors:
Harass Soviet flights over Western Europe, and over the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and North Sea with:
1) regular fighter escorts;
2) fighter harassment, close buzzing to match Soviet actions with our aircraft; and
3) delay of airport clearances.
We would also harass Soviet bloc flights over Western Europe.
These were discussed at some length. It was suggested during this discussion that many of these measures could be taken within Norstad's present authority if they were suggested to him by governments; also that the original British condition to authorize flights over 10,000 feet, i. e. that the Soviets attempt to preclude flights in the normal commercial channels of 7500 to 10,000 feet had now been met. While no definite decision was made on these proposed countermeasures it was agreed that the Secretary would serve notice on Gromyko before the dinner tonight of his intent to bring up this serious matter and that the Secretary and Lord Home sometime following the dinner take Gromyko aside and take this question up with him. Meanwhile the Secretary had been attempting to place a phone call to General Norstad. He finally reached the General though with a rather bad connection. General Norstad informed the Secretary that he had sent his recommendations with regard to the Soviet maneuvers which should reach us within the hour and that as of tonight he needed no new authority./3/
/3/See footnote 1, Document 5.
Attachment/4/
/4/Secret.
BERLIN AIR CORRIDORS
Talking Points
1. I have observed with increasing concern the activities of Soviet aircraft in the Berlin air corridors. We had hoped that it would be possible, in the course of the next week or ten days, to have some fruitful discussions with you regarding Berlin. We cannot and will not hold such discussions, however, when the Soviet Union is carrying on a policy of deliberate harassment of Allied flights through the Berlin air corridors.
2. I would like to leave you under no illusion as to the risk you are running in seeking to interfere with Allied exercise of their rights in the Berlin air corridors. This was brought to the attention of the Soviet Government as recently as February 15 following harassment of United States aircraft by Soviet fighters on February 14.
3. On February 14, 1962, Soviet aircraft on three occasions seriously threatened by close approach United States aircraft flying in the North corridor to Berlin in accordance with quadripartitely agreed flight rules under flight plans on which customary flight information had been made available to the Soviet element of the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC). Soviet MIG's performed acrobatics around the nose of two United States Air Force C/124's, approaching at times as close as twenty feet. A Soviet MIG also approached to within one plane length of a Pan American World Airways aircraft loaded with passengers.
4. On February 19, the Soviet controller in BASC began to file individual flight plans for Soviet military transports. Although the Soviet Government has, in the past, flown occasional individual aircraft along the air corridors, this was the first time it was done on a systematic basis. The Soviet controller sought to portray these flights as "normal", but they were a patent attempt to preempt space in the corridors by flying unnecessary flights. This intention was clearly demonstrated on March 7 when the Soviet controller filed a flight plan for a Soviet LI-2 at the same altitude and time that a scheduled Pan American World Airways plane was due in the corridor under a flight plan filed in BASC. When the United States controller asked the Soviet controller to refile his flight plan for another altitude, the Soviet controller refused. Although the Pan American plane reached Berlin safely, the Soviet flight was an obvious attempt to interfere with use by United States aircraft of the air corridors.
5. On March 9 on two occasions, Soviet aircraft made runs across the three air corridors some four miles West of Berlin, employing measures, including the dropping of chaff, designed to interfere with radar. This was a direct and deliberate effort to threaten the safety of flight. There can be no justification whatsoever of such practice in or near the corridors.
6. On March 10, the Soviet controller filed flight plans for Soviet aircraft for March 12, in the South corridor at altitudes between 7,000 and 10,000 feet which are those normally used by aircraft flying to and from Berlin. The Soviet Government knows that these flights will conflict with scheduled flights by Pan American World Airways and Air France aircraft. This tactic represents a further obvious attempt to inhibit legitimate air access to Berlin provided for under the quadripartite agreements.
7. The Soviet Government should not overlook the fact that up to this point the Allies have shown great restraint in the face of severe provocation. The Soviet Government should understand that the Allies have the means to respond with vigor and effectiveness and that they are not prepared to tolerate persistent Soviet actions directed toward restricting exercise of their rights of air access to Berlin. We expect the Soviet Government to cease its interference in the air corridors. Allied aircraft will continue to fly in the corridors at times and altitudes deemed necessary. We will take the necessary steps to ensure the safety of such flights and will hold the Soviet Government responsible for the consequences of any incidents that might occur.
8. We note that these activities are being intensified on the eve of the Disarmament Conference. This Conference is being held pursuant to a statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations signed by both the US and the USSR and unanimously approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations. In this statement of principles it was agreed that, in order to facilitate the attainment of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, all states should refrain from any actions that might aggravate international tensions. Actions of the Soviet Union which deliberately interfere with well established rights of air access will make the achievement of this goal much more difficult. They will jeopardize the Conference, and threaten most seriously the prospects for discussions on Berlin and other important items.
9. I should add that the Soviet assertion of alleged "GDR" sovereignty over Berlin and over the air corridors overlooks the basic fact that the arrangements for both Berlin and the air corridors antedate by some years the setting up of the "GDR".
7. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SecDel/MC/56
Geneva, March 11, 1962, 7:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-362. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on July 9. The meeting was held at the Hotel Richmond. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Secto 11 from Geneva, March 12. (Ibid., 700.5611/3-1262)
SUBJECT
Berlin and Germany
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Kohler
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Foster
Ambassador Dean
Mr. Akalovsky
USSR
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Zorin
Mr. Semenov
Mr. Tsarapkin
Mr. Grizlov
Mr. Usachev
Mr. Soukhodrev
UK
Lord Home
Mr. Godber
Sir Michael Wright
Sir Frank Roberts
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Mr. Samuel
The Secretary, Lord Home, and Mr. Gromyko had a conversation among themselves after dinner.
The Secretary raised the question of the very serious harassments by the USSR during the past several weeks of air and ground access to Berlin. He recalled the USSR's attempts to reserve time in the air corridors for its own flights, which attempts had been rejected by the West. He noted that since then the USSR had employed other methods of harassment, such as saturation of corridors contrary to past practice and to the need revealed to the Western Powers, filing of flight plans in direct opposition to Western flight plans, jamming of air frequencies used by the West to ensure air safety and, finally, three days ago, the dropping by Soviet bombers, which had come from the Soviet Union, of chaff in the corridors to jam Western radar installations. He also noted that the Soviets had now filed plans for flights on March 12th at altitudes from 7,500 to 10,000 feet at the exact times when Western civil airlines flew to Berlin. The Secretary stressed that such harassments were not tolerable and could lead to serious consequences. He emphasized that the U.S. would take all the steps necessary to ensure safety for air access to Berlin. He expressed the hope that Mr. Gromyko would get in touch with his Government so that danger may be avoided, but stressed that the US would not shrink from such danger.
Lord Home pointed out that the Soviet bombers which had dropped metal filings in the corridors had come from a long distance. He strongly emphasized that the Soviet chaffing activity was totally inappropriate since it was something that one would not do to a friend but only to an enemy. If a Western plane had crashed it would have been the same as if it had been shot down, and up to 100 lives would have been lost. He said that he had nearly turned his aircraft back to London after having heard of this action by the Soviet Union, noting that he was not sure that he would not do it even now. He observed that these actions by the Soviet Union were in contradiction to the USSR's claim that it wishes to relieve tensions. He recalled his warning to Mr. Gromyko in New York that harassment of access may lead to war and urged that it be stopped so as to avoid catastrophic consequences. He pointed out that the chances for agreement in Geneva on much bigger things would be jeopardized should the Soviet harassment activity continue.
The Secretary observed that we knew the identity, the origin, and the destination of the bombers involved, as well as their flight patterns, and said that chaff had been dropped precisely in the corridor. He pointed out that this activity could not have been the result of maneuvers outside the corridor.
Mr. Gromyko said that as far the question of corridors was concerned the Soviet Union had replied to the West in its note./2/ The Soviet Union disagreed with the Western statements that Soviet planes were flying through the air lanes (he avoided the term "corridor") in violation of the existing agreements and past practice. The Soviet Union could not recognize the West as arbiter in interpreting the existing situation. He claimed that the US assessment of the situation was apparently based on incorrect conclusions by some of its experts. In preparing its note, the USSR had studied the situation, including the existing agreements and past practices, and had based its reply on that study. If the United States intended to take steps to ensure its interests, that was its own business, but the USSR would also take steps to ensure its own interests, as well as those of the GDR, and would not yield them. Therefore, one must appraise the situation more calmly, taking into account the best interests of all concerned. Mr. Gromyko asserted that the USSR did not wish to heighten tensions in connection with Berlin and Germany, as well as Europe in general. He professed that the USSR desired an international detente, as he had stated to the Secretary in New York and to the President in Washington. It would be best if an agreed solution to all these problems could be reached. He alleged that the Secretary and Lord Home were attempting to dramatize the situation by referring to some unidentified bombers which had dropped chaff, and said that the reports about these activities, which he had read in the Western press, were a strictly Western responsibility. Mr. Gromyko rejected Lord Home's warning, saying the latter should weigh his words and keep such language to himself. He asserted that what should be done here was to find a way of easing the situation and to promote the solution of questions of interest to all concerned, rather than to give warnings.
/2/For texts of the February 15 Western note and the February 17 Soviet reply, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 687-689.
The Secretary suggested that Mr. Gromyko inquire with his Defense Ministry so as to see that the bombers involved had indeed come from the USSR, dropped chaff, and returned back to the Soviet Union. The Secretary then referred to Mr. Khrushchev's assertions that the USSR wished to ease tensions. He said that this was one voice of the USSR. The other voice of the USSR was what was happening in Berlin. The problem was to find out which was the authentic voice of the USSR, since the two did not speak the same language.
Mr. Gromyko interjected that there was no point in using such enigmatic language and asserted that the USSR spoke with only one voice.
The Secretary said that then we must weigh the voice we always considered to be authentic, but that we must also weigh the events in the corridors.
Mr. Gromyko reiterated that the USSR did not believe that it was violating the existing agreements with regard to the air lanes. Thus there was no such contradiction as the Secretary was referring to. He also reiterated that the USSR would not yield and would continue to protect its interests in the air lanes, as well as the interests of the GDR, which was an ally of the Soviet Union. He asserted again that the USSR was still seeking agreement on these questions and that it had not changed its view that these problems should be resolved on the basis of an understanding with the West. Otherwise, there would have been no talks with Ambassador Thompson in Moscow and no meeting here in Geneva. The USSR was prepared to talk here in Geneva about these matters but it did not see any contradiction between its statements regarding its desire for a detente and its activities in the air lanes or, to use Western language, air corridors. He then wondered where the true voice of the United States was.
The Secretary noted the lateness of the hour but said he wished to make only two comments. First, it was a simple and fundamental principle that any rights the USSR had in East Germany or Berlin rested only on one basis, which was also the basis of Western presence in West Berlin and of access to that city, namely, the surrender of Nazi Germany; therefore, the Soviet Union was in no position to infringe upon the rights of the Western Powers in Berlin or East Germany. All this was so simple and fundamental that sometimes it was even difficult to understand. Secondly, Mr. Gromyko would be well advised to get in touch with his Government and stop such actions as would necessarily interfere with the settlement of the problems to be discussed here in Geneva. The Secretary then observed that in the following days he would inevitably listen with two ears; one to Mr. Gromyko, and one to what happened in Berlin.
Mr. Gromyko replied that he would be listening with both ears to the Secretary as well as to what the West did in Berlin. If the US intended to complicate the situation in the air lanes, then the United States, and perhaps other governments, would have to bear full responsibility for that.
The Secretary inquired, in a jocular manner, whether Mr. Gromyko was going to telephone the Soviet Commandant in Berlin and have him change the Soviet flight plans.
Mr. Gromyko responded that the Secretary should not prompt him as to how he should conduct his affairs.
Lord Home remarked that if Mr. Gromyko telephoned his Defense Minister he would find out about the chaffing operation.
The conversation ended with Mr. Gromyko again denying any knowledge of such operation.
8. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SecDel/MC/58
Geneva, March 12, 1962, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-1262. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on July 9. A detailed summary of the conversation was transmitted in Secto 18 from Geneva, March 12. (Ibid., 611.61/3-1262)
SUBJECT
Germany and Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Kohler
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Akalovsky
USSR
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Semenov
Mr. Kovalev
Mr. Bondarenko
Mr. Sukhodrev
Mr. Gromyko hosted a luncheon at the Soviet Mission.
Mr. Gromyko opened the conversation by raising the question of Berlin. He referred to the US view that this question should be discussed here in Geneva, and said that since both sides had this desire, perhaps it would be worthwhile to do so.
The Secretary agreed that this would be useful to discuss this problem. He stated that the United States had reviewed the exchanges of views that had taken place on this subject since last June, some of them at the highest level and some at the diplomatic level, and had attempted to assess the current situation. He said he wished to comment on the more important elements of that situation.
The Secretary expressed regret that it had not been possible to find a way of resolving this problem so as to stabilize the situation and to remove the dangers involved. He expressed the view that it was important to place Berlin in the context of the broader positions of the US and USSR and of their responsibility as great powers. He said he knew that the President and Mr. Khrushchev understood the historical role they were to play and pointed out that the shape of history over the next decade may depend on how they resolve that problem. He recalled the President's conversation with Mr. Khrushchev/2/ about the ideological difference between them and their recognition that neither could change the views of the other. He expressed the belief that the differences relating to the internal organization of the two states were not important to their relations. In this connection the Secretary observed that the leader of the USSR of the 1920's would not recognize the USSR of today; nor would the leaders of the US of that period recognize the US of today. Changes had occurred and would occur in both countries and they were not important to their mutual relation. The Secretary observed that the differences in the US and USSR outlook on the development of the international community, referred to by the President in his interview with Adzhubei, were perhaps more troublesome. The United States believed in the development of independent states under the Charter of the United Nations, whereas the USSR seemed to have commitments with regard to revolutionary movements. Even so, this was not fundamental in our problems.
/2/For a memorandum of the President's conversation with Khrushchev on June 4, 1961, see vol. XIV, Document 33.
The Secretary expressed the belief that the firmest basis on which the two sides should consider their problems was that of their common interests. Both sides had interests in their security, their future, and the development of the well-being of their peoples. They also had a great deal of unfinished business at home. For its part, the US would be only too glad to turn to those internal tasks. The USSR should turn to the resolution of the problems standing between them, that would bring important change in the international scene. Also, if progress were made in the disarmament field both sides could devote greater resources to their internal economic development. The Secretary stressed that the US had come to Geneva to engage in serious and careful negotiations to make steps in the disarmament field in spite of its disappointing experience over the past 15 years. He expressed the view that unless the US and the USSR succeeded in resolving this problem there would be competition in armaments and an increase in the dangers on the international scene. Although there were some people who apparently did not believe that peaceful coexistence was possible, the Secretary said he held the opposite view. In this connection, he cited the fact that the US and the USSR had lived in peace during a period of over 40 years.
The Secretary recalled Mr. Khrushchev's remark that the Berlin situation had been inherited from the previous governments of the two countries. However, the Secretary said, he did not wish to go into the details of history. What he wished to stress was that both sides should proceed on the basis of their state interests in Central Europe. On that basis, the problem boiled down to the simple proposition that the USSR had been taking a one-sided approach: when the West wished to take up its rights on land, in the air, and in Berlin on a juridical basis, the USSR said that we should proceed on the basis of facts; on the other hand, when the West cited facts, the USSR stated that facts should be changed. The United States did not believe that relations between Great Powers were possible on the basis of such an approach. In fact, if the USSR should press this approach it would not be to its advantage either, because that might lead to a massive rearmament of the West and also give rise to extremist elements in the various countries which might be difficult to handle. Such a situation would require diversion of resources from the peaceful development of our two peoples.
The Secretary went on to say that the United States was aware that the situation in East Germany was not satisfactory from the standpoint of the USSR and the East German authorities. The fact that many people had left East Germany was probably a source of concern both to the USSR and the East German authorities. Thus the USSR appeared to believe that this unstable situation required solution. However, the US did not believe that the USSR had a right to transfer the burden of that situation to the West.
Referring to the US-USSR exchanges of views over the past months, the Secretary wondered whether both sides should not approach the problem on the basis of their total interests and on the basis of the points of agreement and disagreement between them. While the US could not speak for the USSR, it was convinced that both sides had a common interest in peace. If this was not the case, the Secretary observed, then the further remarks he was going to make would be irrelevant.
Noting that he was not suggesting any Western allied positions on any points, although the US was of course aware of the views of its allies, the Secretary stated that, speaking on behalf of the President, he wished to put forward certain thoughts designed to place the situation under control and to put the problem in proper perspective in the context of the broader interests of both sides. He suggested that perhaps an attempt could be made to find certain principles to which both sides could subscribe and a procedure for negotiations on the basis of those principles, and to undertake certain steps while negotiations were proceeding so that there would be no danger of crises.
Citing Berlin as an example, the Secretary said that both Governments had stated, although in different terms, that West Berlin should be free to choose its own way of life, that its viability should be maintained, and that access to it should be free and unhindered. Perhaps that is a general proposition to which both sides could give their accord. If such a general proposition were agreed, ways could be found of improving the situation in Berlin on the basis of these principles. In the meantime, both sides would also state that existing access procedures would remain in effect.
The Secretary then referred to the problem of the diffusion of nuclear weapons and noted that the USSR had apparently expressed an interest in and concern about the US policy with regard to it. The United States, for its part, was also interested in and concerned about the Soviet policy in this respect. The Secretary expressed the belief that both sides had a common interest in not having nuclear weapons pass into the hands of others. He suggested that both sides could perhaps agree that further diffusion of nuclear weapons into the hands of national governments now not owning such weapons would not further the cause of peace. Then, in negotiations, a system providing for non-diffusion of nuclear weapons might be developed to which all states owning nuclear weapons, as well as those now not owning such weapons might subscribe. In the meantime, both sides would declare that they would not themselves relinquish control over any nuclear weapons to any individual state now not owning such weapons and would refrain from assisting any such state in manufacturing such weapons.
As a third example of the suggested approach, the Secretary referred to the problem of non-aggression. He noted that the US and USSR with their respective allies were not in a major confrontation in Central Europe and that it would be tragic if force were used and if uncontrollable events were set in motion. There would be few survivors to conduct a post mortem on our mistakes in dealing with this problem. Therefore, both sides could undertake the commitment not to use force to bring about a change in the status quo. In further negotiations, a declaration by all NATO and Warsaw Pact members might be developed and specific measures by all governments might be considered to establish their non-aggressive intent and to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation. In the meantime, both sides could undertake not to use force to change the existing borders or demarcation lines in Germany and would note with approval West Germany's declaration that it would not use force for those purposes.
Noting that Mr. Gromyko might have some additional points to suggest along the above-mentioned lines, the Secretary said that perhaps he and Mr. Gromyko could find a procedure for reaching agreement on a set of such principles and then heads of government might meet to conclude the agreement. Throughout this process, both sides would of course wish to remain in touch with their respective allies. As to the forum for future negotiations on the basis of those principles, the Secretary suggested that it could perhaps consist of the Deputy Foreign Ministers of the US, the USSR, the UK and France. However, that would be contingent upon substantial agreement in advance and on the absence of actions aggravating the international situation.
By way of a post script, the Secretary stressed that the United States wished to make very serious progress in the disarmament field and hoped to find ways of managing those serious problems which stood in the way to such progress.
Mr. Gromyko responded by stating that the Soviet Government deeply regretted that no agreement on a German peace treaty had been possible so far. In spite of Soviet efforts to reach agreement with the United States and its allies, the period elapsed had shown that agreement was still far away. He claimed that the reason for this situation lay in the US unwillingness to take into account the existing facts resulting from World War II, and in particular the existence of two sovereign German states. Whether the West liked it or not, the GDR existed, just as the FRG existed. He asserted that the authors of post war agreements could not foresee the situation existing now, since they had proceeded on the premise that there would be one, united, demilitarized, sovereign, and peaceful Germany. The situation was now different, and the world could see that there were two sovereign German states in existence. Mr. Khrushchev had pointed out this fact to the President in Vienna and had stressed that 16 years had passed since World War II and that the situation, which in the absence of a peace treaty had become bad and wrong, could not be left unchanged. This was why the USSR had proposed a two-fold formula for a German peace treaty; either two peace treaties--one with each of the two Germanies, or a single treaty with both Germanies. Thus, when the USSR referred to a German peace treaty it had in mind these two formulae. Mr. Gromyko contended that the USSR still believed that the best solution would be if agreement were reached with the West to conclude a German peace treaty. However, since the US and its allies had stated that they would not participate in a peace treaty with the GDR, the Soviet Government was prepared to resolve the question on the basis of the USSR's, along with other states that might wish to do so, signing a peace treaty, accompanied by the settlement of a number of other problems, including West Berlin, on the basis of negotiations between the US and the USSR and their respective allies. He recalled his conversation with Ambassador Thompson on this subject in Moscow.
Referring to the general principles mentioned by the Secretary, Mr. Gromyko said they failed to include such an important principle as due respect for the sovereignty of the GDR. He stressed that the Soviet Union would not accept any arrangements infringing upon the sovereignty of the GDR. He said that this meant that the question of communications to West Berlin could be agreed only on the basis of respect for the sovereign rights of the GDR, i.e., on the basis of the established international practice with regard to transit by land, air, and water. The question of communications was insolubly linked to the question of the status of West Berlin, a point which the Secretary had failed to mention. The status of West Berlin must be resolved on the basis of a peace treaty, although the US may not take part in such treaty. To the USSR West Berlin was only a part of the German problem, whereas the Secretary's general principles were limited to West Berlin alone. Mr. Gromyko then recalled the Soviet draft on the status of a free city of West Berlin/3/ and contended that the USSR did not seek to affect the social order in West Berlin established by the population of that city. He reiterated that two points were missing from the Secretary's list of general principles: (1) respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, and (2) status of West Berlin. He then recalled Mr. Khrushchev's statement that the USSR did not need West Berlin--not a single acre, or street, or house in West Berlin was needed by the Soviet Union. Nor did the GDR have any need for West Berlin. At the same time, the GDR was making a great concession, even a sacrifice, in agreeing to West Berlin's becoming a free city.
/3/A copy of the draft statute for West Berlin, handed to Thompson by Gromyko at their second meeting on January 12, is in Department of State, Hillenbrand Files: Lot 84 F 53, Box 1, Folder 8.
Mr. Gromyko then said that the Soviet Union was prepared to approach the question of a German peace treaty from any end, although it was not prepared to have that question approached in a one-sided manner. The Secretary had mentioned only questions of interest to the US and had failed to mention matters of interest to the USSR and its allies.
As to the substance of the status of a free city in West Berlin, Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet proposals on this subject were well known and therefore there was no need for repeating them. The Secretary was familiar with the Soviet proposals with regard to the stationing of token contingents of troops in West Berlin and with the different variants of that proposal. The Secretary was also familiar with the Soviet position with regard to the question of access. As to the latter question, the USSR was convinced that the requirements of unrestricted access and of genuine respect for the sovereignty of GDR, a respect that should not be only on paper, could both be satisfied. Mr. Gromyko said that if the West were interested in unrestricted access and if it agreed to respect the sovereignty of the GDR, then the way to agreement was open. Otherwise, if the West were interested in unrestricted access but wished to ignore the sovereignty of the GDR, the way to agreement was closed.
Referring to the Secretary's suggestion with regard to general principles, Mr. Gromyko observed that this was something new, at least in form, and that he did not exclude the possibility of first reaching agreement on a set of general principles, then gradually developing those principles, and ultimately reaching agreement on a detailed basis. However, the interests of all parties concerned must be taken into account in that process, and therefore both sides should jointly consider the situation to develop a mutually acceptable set of principles.
With reference to the Secretary's general remarks, Mr. Gromyko stated that agreement between the US and the USSR would undoubtedly be of tremendous importance to the world situation. The Secretary had mentioned the US allies, but that, of course, was a matter for the United States itself to handle. As for the USSR, it wished to reach agreement. As Mr. Khrushchev had mentioned to the President in Vienna, US and Soviet interests were in direct confrontation only in one place on the international scene. That confrontation was due to the abnormal situation in Germany, which in turn had resulted from the fact that no peace treaty had been concluded so many years after World War II. Therefore, if that question were resolved on a mutually accepted basis, the international situation would be radically improved and the source of friction would disappear. Of course, there remained the disarmament problem. Mr. Gromyko asserted that as far as the USSR was concerned, it had come to Geneva to attempt to resolve that problem. But agreement on the question of a German peace treaty and the settlement of the West Berlin problem on the basis of such a treaty would certainly be of no detriment to the cause of disarmament. However, there must be a desire on the part of all parties concerned to reach agreement. Speeches such as those made by Mr. McNamara and other, even civilian, personalities in the United States brandishing nuclear arms were not conducive to positive results. Methods of threat were now outmoded and could not lead to any results. What both sides must do was seek to bring their respective positions closer together.
Finally, Mr. Gromyko said that the Secretary had correctly interpreted the spirit of the Vienna meeting as regards the lack of desire on either side to convert the other side to its views and ideology. Both sides could live in peace and their desire for peace must unite them in their work, including here in Geneva.
The Secretary said that all of us could remember that the former Germany had made the US and USSR allies, and noted that it would be a pity if the present Germany were to make them enemies. Referring to the fact that both sides had used the term "one-sided", the Secretary wondered whether the gap could be bridged if certain simple ideas were established. Mr. Gromyko had mentioned the existence of two Germanies. The United States would certainly not deny that fact, but there were other facts, such as West Berlin, Western presence in West Berlin, and Western access to it. All these were facts as well. As to the question of a peace treaty, the Secretary said that the US was not deeply concerned about the Soviet intention to sign such a treaty, but we were deeply disturbed by what the USSR had stated it intended to do in that connection. The USSR had never disposed of our rights with regard to access and, therefore, it could not transfer them to East Germany. In fact, the Zorin-Bolz letters recognized that in 1955;/4/ that exchange of letters also recognized that there were international commitments with respect to Germany. However, since that time Soviet demands appeared to have risen, although there had been no change in the situation. This was what we called one-sided approach. Referring to Mr. Gromyko's contention that the Secretary had failed to take into account Soviet interests, the Secretary stated that we were prepared to talk about all of Germany, all of Berlin, or any aspect of the problem. As to the question of the so-called respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, the Secretary said that he did not believe there was great difficulty on this point, because no one in the West intended to have things happening in the corridors that would interfere with the affairs of East German authorities. On the other hand, the 1955 exchange of letters had not placed access under the GDR sovereignty and it was impossible to see how the USSR could do it now. The Secretary concluded the conversation by reiterating that our problem was not the Soviet intention to sign a peace treaty, but only what such a treaty would do to us./5/
/4/For text of the letter from Bolz to Zorin, September 20, 1955, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 460-461. Zorin addressed an analogous letter to Bolz.
/5/At 6 p.m. on March 12 Rusk cabled President Kennedy to report on the discussion with Gromyko:
"In my bilateral with Gromyko today I began unfolding modus vivendi, using portions on Berlin, nuclear diffusion and non-aggression as examples of techniques of solution we had in mind. At the same time I noted other subjects could be included. Gromyko noted absence of 'sovereignty of GDR' and 'status of West Berlin'. He did not close door on proposed technique and atmosphere entirely calm despite effort made previous evening by Home and me to press him on Berlin incidents. Am seeing Gromyko again at Tuesday lunch and will continue with modus vivendi along lines of instruction. Since Gromyko clearly acknowledged I would have to consult allies, believe I can go somewhat further without allied consultation on details. However do not believe I should give him a piece of paper just yet? Also am trying to combine serious attitude on Berlin incidents with recognition of importance leaving avenues open for adjustment Berlin crisis." (Secto 16; Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-1262)
9. Memorandum From the Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (Dean) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Geneva, March 13, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/3-1362. Secret. Drafted by Dean and also sent to Bohlen, Kohler, Hillenbrand, Manning, Spiers, and Martin.
Pursuant to your instructions I called upon Lord Home at his house in Geneva (10 rue Jean-Senebier). There was also present J.B. Godber, Minister of State, Sir Frank Roberts, British Ambassador to Moscow, and Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office.
1. I gave Lord Home a copy of the telegram we received this morning./2/ After some discussion he recommended the following procedure:
/2/Presumably reference is to telegram 1726 from Berlin, March 13, which reported that Soviet planes had dropped chaff in the southern and central air corridors to Berlin early that day. (Ibid., 862.72/3-1362)
(a) Finesse the lunch today with Gromyko and do not mention either the receipt of the telegram or the proposed afternoon meeting. Make the lunch short and crisp.
(b) U.S. Secretary of State and British Foreign Minister should ask Gromyko to come to see them this afternoon. At that meeting they should say, in no uncertain terms, that this nonsense must stop immediately and apart from other things it is definitely not refraining from actions which might aggravate international tensions as was agreed in the Joint US-USSR Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations dated September 20, 1961./3/
/3/For text of this statement (U.N. doc. A/4879), September 20, 1961, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 1091-1094.
2. The Secretary of State and British Foreign Minister should ask the Foreign Ministers of Canada and Italy to call on Gromyko to protest this action on the eve of the disarmament conference.
3. The Secretary of State and British Foreign Minister should not leave as this would place both Foreign Ministers of friendly powers and Foreign Ministers of non-aligned powers, who came here at our invitation, in a very difficult position. It would leave Gromyko, in effect, in control of the situation. The Secretary should insert a very strong passage in his proposed speech/4/ denouncing these actions of the Soviet Union in no uncertain terms, state that he had come to propose the broad general and complete disarmament plan, then ask how he could be expected to put forward such a plan in all seriousness in view of these known provocative actions of the USSR. In fact, the Secretary of State and the British Foreign Minister should leave immediately after the opening of the conference unless events would make it seem advisable for them to stay. Certainly they should leave if there is no forthcoming response from the USSR. Lord Home observed that if you and he left before making your proposed speech at the opening of the conference it would give some of the non-aligned Foreign Ministers an opportunity of saying that the US and UK had turned and converted a disarmament conference, to which they had come in good faith, into a Donnybrook over West Berlin. He felt that not only would countries of these Foreign Ministers be hurt and grieved but he did not think we would be in as good a position at the Security Council.
/4/For text of Rusk's opening statement to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, March 15 (U.N. doc. ENDC/PV.2), see ibid., 1962, pp. 1146-1150.
Under-Secretary Shuckburgh wanted to know if we had actual confirmation that the chaff had been dropped in the Berlin Corridor and I advised that we would let him know as soon as we received information on this score.
I have asked Mr. Kohler to advise.
AHD
10. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SecDel/MC/57
Geneva, March 13, 1962, noon.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-1362. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on July 9. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's suite at the Hotel Richmond. A detailed summary of the conversation was transmitted in Secto 29 from Geneva, March 13. (Ibid., 611.61/3-1362)
SUBJECT
Germany and Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary
Mr. Akalovsky
USSR
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Soukhodrev
The Secretary and Mr. Gromyko met for one hour prior to the luncheon hosted by the Secretary.
The Secretary opened the conversation by expressing his appreciation of Mr. Gromyko's coming before lunch to talk very privately on one or two points.
The Secretary stated that he thought it might be useful to explore whether communications could be established across the gulf which appeared to separate the two sides. He observed that it was not clear what each side had precisely in mind when it made statements. Recalling the President's meeting with Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna and the subsequent exchanges of views, the Secretary stated the US had supposed that when Mr. Khrushchev raised the question of Berlin and Germany his problem was to stabilize the situation from the standpoint of Soviet interest, particularly with regard to those parts of Germany which were under Soviet control and responsibility. The United States has refrained from protesting or interfering unduly because it had recognized that the situation perhaps warranted attention from the Soviet viewpoint. However, the Secretary noted, the present situation no longer warranted this kind of assessment of what Mr. Khrushchev had meant. What was now being done and said indicated an intention to do what the President had said in Vienna the US could not accept, i.e., diminish the Western position in Berlin and Germany while strengthening the Soviet and Bloc position in that situation. The Secretary observed that if there were no intention to move against the vital interests of the West in Germany and Berlin, other things might fall in place and could be adjusted. He stressed, however, that if there were an intention to drive the West out of Berlin, then there was a serious problem at hand both in Washington and Moscow.
Referring to the question of the so-called respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, the Secretary stated that this raised no problem if it meant that access should not interfere with the internal affairs of East Germany. On the other hand, there was a grave problem if this meant that East Germany could interfere with access. The Secretary stressed the view that both Mr. Gromyko and himself should be able to clarify the language they used with each other. If there was no problem, both sides could see what political action could be taken; conversely, if there was a problem, then one would have to proceed on that basis.
The Secretary went on to say that the same point could be illustrated in other ways. For example, Moscow had talked a great deal about a peace treaty. The Secretary said that a peace treaty between Moscow and Pankow was of no particular concern to the US if it was clear that such a treaty would not attempt to do what it could not do, namely, dispose of Western rights and access. He recalled in this connection that this had been recognized in the formula of the 1955 Zorin-Bolz understanding. A treaty with such a formula would not create crisis or tensions. Turning to the question of recognition of the GDR, the Secretary recalled Mr. Gromyko's statement to Ambassador Thompson that the West already recognized the GDR. He said that it was true that the US acted on the basis that there was a place called GDR and that there were authorities which were in control there. From that standpoint, there should be no problem. However, both sides should explore what lay behind their statements, so that they could see what each side had in mind and that they could communicate efficiently and see how to deal with the situation, rather than stay apart through lack of understanding.
Mr. Gromyko said he had listened attentively to the Secretary's remarks and that his impression was that the Secretary had essentially repeated what he had said before. Mr. Gromyko claimed that he had tried to detect new points in the Secretary's remarks but had failed to see such points. With reference to the meaning of the phrase "respect for the sovereignty of the GDR", Mr. Gromyko stated that both sides should agree that, in matters relating to communications and access to West Berlin, specific questions should be decided in accordance with the accepted international practice, i.e., all questions pertaining to transit by land, air, and water should be resolved in accordance with that practice. While that practice was a long established one and had concrete content, it might find different expression in different documents. In brief, it meant that states across whose territory transit took place must be respected and be allowed to live and develop as sovereign and independent states. Mr. Gromyko reiterated his view expressed previously that it was possible to reconcile such respect with the requirement of free access. Thus, if the United States Government and the other Western Powers were prepared to agree that in reaching an understanding on unrestricted access, an understanding must also be reached with regard to respect for the sovereignty of the GDR in accordance with International Law, then the way to agreement was open. Conversely, if the US sought agreement on free access which would ignore the sovereign rights of the GDR, then the way to agreement was closed. Mr. Gromyko said he did not know whether his remarks would dispell the Secretary's doubts, but said the Soviet Union did believe it possible to reconcile these two requirements. He said that when both sides got down to elaborating specific agreements, this would be formulated in specific language. In this connection, he noted that Ambassador Thompson had received the Soviet draft of a possible formula./2/
/2/Gromyko had given Thompson the draft declaration at their meeting on January 12; see vol. XIV, Document 264.
Referring to the Secretary's remarks regarding diminution of Western rights, Mr. Gromyko contended that they were unfounded and that it was wrong to pose the question in this manner. He claimed that assertions that the Soviet Union intended to drive the West out of West Berlin, to detract from the vital interests of the West, or even to take hold of West Berlin either for itself or East Germany were completely unfounded. The USSR was convinced that a German peace treaty and the settlement of the West Berlin question on the basis of such a treaty would not entail any loss for any of the Western powers. The USSR did not believe that a peace treaty and the creation of a free city of West Berlin would lead to the weakening of the Western position, or of the US position in particular. On the contrary, the USSR believed that such a settlement would strengthen the positions of all concerned since it would remove forever the source of tension and the fever now shaking all of Western Europe. He reiterated that it was incorrect to put the question in a way that implied that somebody was to take something and somebody was to give. He expressed the view that a settlement of this problem would lead to a settlement of relations between the US and USSR.
Mr. Gromyko then referred to the principle of respect for the existing way of life in West Berlin, which had been mentioned by the Secretary the day before. He claimed that this principle was part of the Soviet position, which was based on the premise that West Berlin should enjoy the social order desired by its population and that there should be no interference from the outside. He professed bewilderment as to why the US had such "Mont Blancs" of doubts with regard to Soviet intentions and said he assumed the US had mountains of files with papers ascribing to the USSR the intention to dupe the other side and all sorts of other cunning motives. He recalled Mr. Khrushchev's efforts in Vienna to persuade the President that a settlement of this problem was in the interest of both sides.
The Secretary stated there was a big difference between the two types of approach. One thing was to propose a solution and say that it was good for the other side; it was another thing to recognize that each side had vital interests and to see how the problem could be resolved in what both sides believed to be in accord with their interests. He stressed that the US could not accept the Soviet proposition that the Soviet proposal was in the US interest. He expressed the view that both sides could accept that each of them had vital interests in Central Europe and that they should see how those interests could be adjusted.
Reverting to the question of the so-called respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, the Secretary noted the fact that the West had had over many years agreement with the USSR with regard to access rights. He stated that it was not incompatible with the sovereignty or rights of any authority to accept such an agreement. The understanding between Moscow and Pankow fully protected this point. As to access by air, the Secretary noted that it was proper practice today to have transit across territories take place without the slightest interference from those on the ground. Therefore, there should be no incompatibility in this matter, unless there was an intention to impose restrictions and control over such rights.
The Secretary said that we had no difficulty with the known fact that East Germans administered certain parts of access and coordinated traffic on water, rail, and the Autobahn. He noted that there was already a considerable amount of direct East German participation in this matter. Therefore, there should be no practical problem.
Finally, the Secretary stated that he could accept Mr. Gromyko's statement that there was no ground to suppose that the USSR was trying to diminish the position of the Western Powers. He expressed readiness to sit down and to discuss the problem on that basis. He recalled that he had mentioned several points the day before,/3/ although there might be some others, which needed to be discussed along these lines.
/3/See Document 8.
Mr. Gromyko said he wished the Secretary to understand correctly his statement that adoption of the Soviet proposals for a peace treaty, even if such a treaty were to be signed only by the Soviet Union with the GDR, for the creation of a free city of West Berlin, and for free access to that city under conditions of respect for the sovereignty of the GDR would be in the interest of all concerned. The Soviet Union believed that such a settlement would not undermine or diminish the position of any state because it would ease tensions rather than worsen the prospects for peace and security. Furthermore, the Soviet Union strongly believed that such a settlement would even strengthen the positions of all concerned since it was in the interest of peace.
Finally, Mr. Gromyko stated that he had noted that the Secretary, in referring to the sovereignty of the GDR, had used formulations which raised quite a few questions in his mind. The Secretary had mentioned that access had been operating so far and that there had been no problem. However, there were many things in the past which no longer existed. At one time, the Germans could not even cross the street without first obtaining permission from either American or Soviet soldiers. Those things were due to Germany's unconditional surrender. Yet the situation had changed, both in East and West Germany; therefore, we must proceed on the basis of the existing situation, although some may not like it, a situation which was highlighted primarily by the existence of two German states.
The Secretary interjected that there was also Berlin.
Mr. Gromyko continued that the Soviet Union did not wish to pocket anything as a result of a settlement. He observed that he liked the Secretary's statement of yesterday that the US and USSR had been allies against Germany and that Germany should not make them enemies. He concluded by saying that both sides had fought against Germany and must draw certain conclusions from that fact./4/
/4/At 11 p.m. on March 13 Rusk cabled the President a summary of the day's events. The Secretary said that he had pressed Gromyko to state whether the Soviets intended to diminish the Western position in Berlin, but Gromyko had been evasive. Rusk indicated that he intended to develop the modus vivendi further since Gromyko had shown some interest in it. (Secto 26 from Geneva; Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-1362)
11. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, March 13, 1962, midnight.
/1/Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Chron. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Rusk and concurred in by Kohler. Repeated to Berlin.
Secto 27. Eyes only President and Acting Secretary. USBER--Eyes only Clay. General Clay called me KY-9/2/ this evening (confirmed Berlin Tel 36)/3/ to express concern about effect air corridor situation on morale West Berliners. I urged him send telegram/4/ topside Washington in order to get his views clearly before you. Unfortunately, I cannot establish effective KY-9 communication with Norstad from here.
/2/This conversation had taken place at 7:40 p.m., but the record in the Rusk Files indicates that it was not monitored. (Ibid., Telephone Conversations)
/3/Telegram 36 from Berlin to Geneva, March 13, reported that Clay was "seriously disturbed" by General Norstad's proposal to regulate civilian transport schedules in the face of Soviet harassment. (Ibid., Central Files, 962.72/3-1362)
/4/At this point in the source text Rusk wrote: "Clay's telegram is attached," but it was not, nor has it been further identified.
Key question is effect on West Berlin morale both of present level Soviet actions and countermeasures we may take. I see Clay's dilemma as to attitude he should take in Berlin. If he says there is no physical danger to air access (which he believes is true) he might invite increased Soviet action. If he says there is danger he could start panic. I have some sympathy his suggestion that we send armed aircraft through corridors but have some concern that this might create panic regarding air travel we are trying to avoid. In this connection believe it would be important obtain estimate Bonn as to whether introduction fighters would affect willingness Panam and other civil airlines continue operations under these circumstances. My own first reaction, however, is that we should not refrain from sending occasional armed aircraft through fear of escalation corridor situation because (a) indefinite prolongation present Soviet practices cannot be accepted and (b) strong line taken by Home and me to Gromyko ought to be backed up with some sort of reaction.
Suggest State, Defense with full access contingency planning Joint Chiefs and ambassadorial group consider urgently what we should recommend to you on suitable steps. Concerted administrative harassments communist bloc airlines at free world terminals, as already planned for somewhat different circumstances, might be one such measure. Extending Norstad's tripartite authority to use air space above ten thousand might be another. Fighter escort military transport scheduled during period Soviet activity might be another.
I am reluctant to make exact suggestions from here since Geneva cannot be headquarters this problem. But I feel we should devise steps to be used in immediate future if our warning to Gromyko produces no tangible result in air corridors.
Rusk
12. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Weiss) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kitchen)/1/
Washington, March 14, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-1462. Top Secret. Drafted and initialed by Weiss.
SUBJECT
Berlin
1. Following the Berlin Task Force meeting this morning, a smaller group was convened in Mr. Davis' office to discuss current happenings in the Berlin air corridors.
2. The sequence of events is about as follows:
a. Norstad requested and was granted authority to schedule civil, as well as military, air transport flights./2/
/2/Norstad asked for the authority in SHLO 5-00207; a copy of the JCS telegram granting the authority was transmitted to Paris in telegram 4889, March 13. (Ibid., 762.72/3-1362)
b. General Clay raised a major objection to this authority (Berlin 1729, TS)/3/ on the grounds that adjustment of civil schedules would have a highly adverse effect on the Berlin population and would be looked upon as a major inroad on access.
/3/Dated March 13. (Ibid.)
c. This problem seemed fairly well under control by virtue of (i) Norstad's previous conservative attitude toward attempting to adjust flights of even military transports and (ii) caution expressed in the cable giving him the authority to adjust civilian flights, to the effect that such adjustments should be kept to a minimum.
d. In Berlin's 1733/4/ concern is expressed over the continued Soviet harassment, with the proposal that fighters be put in the corridors and that a transport be flown above 10,000 feet.
/4/Telegram 1333 is the same as telegram 36 to Geneva; see footnote 2, Document 11.
e. The Secretary cabled (Secto 27)/5/ that he talked to Clay. He stated that he was sympathetic to the idea of fighters and that he believed that we could not indefinitely delay responding to Soviet actions. However, he also stated that he did not want the authority for calling the shots on Berlin to be transferred to Geneva, but rather wanted Washington to be aware of his views.
/5/Document 11.
f. Subsequently a call from Geneva (Hillenbrand to Ausland)/6/ disclosed that the Secretary was forwarding a second message which amplified, and perhaps modified, some of his previous views. Also, Hillenbrand indicated that discussion with Stoessel revealed that Norstad was sending a message to McNamara. Exact content uncertain.
/6/No record of this conversation has been found.
g. Mac Bundy called requesting State's views indicating he was going to be talking to the President. In brief, Ausland indicated that in connection with use of fighters in the corridors there were three points to be assessed (i) the effect of such action on Berlin morale, (ii) possible effect on the Geneva Conference and (iii) consequences for escalation. He also indicated that it might be more logical to first fly above 10,000 feet and then resort to fighters if this seemed necessary./7/
/7/No record of Bundy's conversation with Ausland has been found, but at 5 p.m. Ball called Bundy to review the latest discussion within the U.S. Government, including his own conversations with Secretary Rusk. Their conversation followed the lines described in numbered paragraph 3 of this memorandum. (Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations)
3. The purpose of our meeting was to discuss all of the foregoing events. In the course of our discussions these points were brought out:
a. With regard to use of fighters, Norstad had been very reluctant to resort to this in the past for two very good reasons (i) once used we have played what amounts to almost our last trump before actual fighting and, (ii) militarily, Norstad is not sanguine about the outcome. Also the question was raised as to the various alternative ways that fighters could be employed. Although armed escort is possible, it is difficult and would probably not be a first choice. On the other hand, simply flying armed escorts occasionally through the corridors, though it might sound a warning, would have no direct effect whatsoever on Soviet tactics of scheduling specific transport flights in the corridors, which is what has given rise to our annoyance.
b. With regard to flying over 10,000 feet, the question was raised as to whether this should be first done with a military or civilian aircraft, and if the latter, whether empty or with passengers.
4. I raised the question of necessity to distinguish carefully the basis for our taking a further action. Clearly the Soviet harassment has had no significant effect upon our access. In fact, in this regard, up to this point in time, one might say that the Soviets are failing in their activity. On the other hand, the need to respond to the Soviets might nevertheless justify an action. In this event, I raised the question of a possible ultimatum of breaking up the Geneva Conference within a specified period if the Soviets did not cease and desist.
5. Our meeting has been temporarily adjourned pending receipt of the second message from the Secretary and Norstad's message to McNamara./8/ The White House has asked for an interim reply by 2:00 p.m., as to where matters stand. It is then likely that we will attempt to reach a more definitive position before the end of the day.
/8/One of these two messages (probably the second) is ALO BW 247, March 14, received in the Department of State at 6:29 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/3-1162) The second message has not been further identified.
p.s. Norstad's cable has just been received. He strongly recommends against either going above 10,000 feet or using fighters. He feels that the Soviet attempts have been ineffectual and that accordingly a response beyond that heretofore utilized is not required. (We have also received a telephonic message from Geneva indicating that the Secretary supports Norstad's view.) Accordingly, I do not believe anything will go out on this matter tonight. However, I have suggested to EUR that we send a cable to the Secretary in Geneva pointing out that in light of the Norstad position, the question really boils down to whether we feel it is necessary, as a matter of principle, to respond to the arrogant Soviet actions which result in our negotiating in Geneva under duress. If we do, then rather than take action in the corridors we might better give the Soviets a direct warning to the effect that unless the harassment in the corridors ends we will end the discussions at Geneva. This course of action would only be logical if one assumes that the Soviets do not desire a break-off in the Geneva talks. This is a point which must be weighed in the balance, and we have obviously not had time to do so.
13. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, March 14, 1962, 11 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-1462. Secret.
Secto 34. Eyes only for Acting Secretary from Secretary. Ref Tosec 25./2/ In putting forward elements of possible modus vivendi to Gromyko, I have taken into consideration Ambassador Thompson's view that it would be tactically unwise at this stage to disclose categorically to Soviets that we would be prepared to accept GDR personnel at checkpoints. While I agree it may be useful to indicate that our approach is consistent with "respect for local rules and regulations," I consider it important that Soviets not be aware of our full position on GDR personnel at checkpoints until we have more evidence of likelihood of Soviet willingness to reach agreement. Otherwise, effect might well be to cause them to abandon effort reach agreement and proceed with their separate peace treaty.
/2/Tosec 25, March 13, is summarized in this telegram. (Ibid., 611.61/3-1362)
I have, however, as indicated para 12 Secto 29,/3/ made points that we have no difficulty with known fact that East Germans administer certain parts of access and coordinate traffic by water, rail and Autobahn, that there thus already was considerable amount of direct East German participation in this matter, and that therefore there should be no particular problem.
/3/See the source note, Document 10.
Rusk
14. Editorial Note
On March 15 Assistant Secretary of State Kohler hosted a working luncheon for Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov. Kohler opened their conversation by stating that since he and Semenov were primarily responsible for Germany at the working level, it might be useful to talk about it informally. Following a brief exchange on the need to clarify whatever points could be clarified, Kohler turned to the Soviet harassments in the air corridors to Berlin, and stated that the Soviet Union seemed to be making a deliberate attempt to interfere with Western access. Semenov stressed that everything the Soviet Union was doing was perfectly legal, but after being confronted with all the details, he came close to admitting the charge.
Kohler and Semenov spent a considerable amount of time discussing the meaning of "respect for the sovereignty of the GDR" and how this might be reconciled with free access to Berlin. Then Kohler presented in broad outline the U.S. concept of a modus vivendi. At the end of the conversation Semenov thanked Kohler for his views, but concluded that the United States still was not taking into account the Soviet position on West Berlin.
A 17-page memorandum of this conversation (SecDel MC/24), March 17, is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-1562.
15. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, March 17, 1962, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-1762. Top Secret; Niact. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Rusk. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2060)
Secto 53. Eyes only for President and Acting Secretary. Have had brief additional talks/2/ with Gromyko alone in connection normal activities conference and will be having bilateral dinner with him on Tuesday. Meanwhile, members of his delegation have shown interest in exploring further with Kohler and Bohlen/3/ implications my presentation "modus vivendi" approach last Tuesday. I am not taking initiative for full exploration with Gromyko over this week end in order to give him chance to get Moscow reaction to what has been said already. However, I expect to step up pace of private talks during coming week. Senior member Soviet delegation expressed some concern to Thompson that I might be leaving next week end because he said "Moscow moves very slowly"./4/ I should like to leave open exact date of my return because if we seem to be making any headway on Berlin, that should be overriding claim on my time.
/2/The additional talks have not been further identified.
/3/Regarding Kohler's conversation with Semenov, see Document 14. A memorandum of Bohlen's conversation with Semenov on March 16 (SecDel MC/29) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2074.
/4/This conversation has not been further identified.
[Here follow two paragraphs on disarmament.]
Rusk
16. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SecDel MC/33
Geneva, March 18, 1962, 12:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-1862. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Bohlen on March 19. The meeting was held at the Hotel du Lac.
PARTICIPANTS
United States
Mr. Kohler
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Bohlen
U.S.S.R.
Mr. Semenov
Mr. Kovalev
Mr. Suslov (Gromyko's personal assistant)
SUBJECT
Berlin
The following points of some interest in regard to the Soviet position emerged. I shall not set down the repetition of past positions which Semenov, who did all the talking for the Soviets, covered. The chief points stressed by Mr. Semenov in reply to our questions seemed to be the following:
1. The real reason why the Soviets desire to change the existing situation in Berlin is to do away with the Allied control represented by the occupation regime in order to eliminate certain types of activity in the city, i.e., RIAS, intelligence operations and comparable matters. In discussing RIAS, for example, Mr. Semenov mentioned that they "knew" that this was used as a source of operational instructions to agents in the GDR. He mentioned that Berlin, in its present state, created a constant source of friction with the Soviet Union and implied that this was one of the major reasons why they desired a change in its status.
2. The free city concept seemed to be a means of bringing about an end to what he referred to as "organic links" with the FRG. He mentioned that in the Soviet concept all private as against state ties could be maintained, citing as an example the case of Austria. He emphasized the fact that despite the Allied veto of the incorporation of West Berlin into the Federal Republic this was merely a paper veto and the relationship in fact is as though West Berlin were a Land of the Federal Republic. He referred again to the fact that this had not always been the case and mentioned specifically the B-mark question of the late 40's. He admitted on this point that one of the main purposes of the Soviet Union was to prevent the extension of what he termed German revanchist and militaristic activities in West Berlin. He compared these activities in West Berlin as the end of a cable whose source was West Germany. Semenov laid great stress on the danger that the German militarist sentiment and activity would succeed in bringing the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. into conflict and that it was to avoid this possibility that the Soviet proposals were directed.
3. Semenov laid considerable stress on the allegation that Western Berlin as now constituted is, in effect, a "NATO base", largely, it appeared, because of the NATO declaration to the effect that an attack on the forces in Western Berlin would bring NATO into action./2/ He said that this NATO connection was incompatible with the solution of the Berlin situation that they envisaged.
/2/For text of this declaration, December 16, 1958, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, p. 560, or Department of State Bulletin, January 5, 1959, p. 4.
4. Originally, Mr. Semenov stated that the question of the presence of Allied forces in the city was one that should be left for the ministers to discuss, but later on in discussing our objections to the concept of a free and neutral city, he said that this might be reconciled with the presence of Western forces.
5. On the subject of access he was evasive and did not answer a number of questions which we put to him as to what the Soviets really meant by this reiterated statement; i.e., whether this would involve GDR control over the traffic of persons and goods to and from West Berlin.
Mr. Semenov throughout stressed the dangers of German militarism as a source of U.S./U.S.S.R. conflict and asserted several times that the Soviets had no intention of harming U.S. interest. He was, however, impressed by our statement that whatever might be the Soviet intentions, the objective results of the course of action which they proposed would inevitably result in a loss of Western influence and position in regard to Berlin. He had no particular answer to our statements that the East Berlin leaders have frequently made specific what their intentions in this regard were, and said we should not pay too much attention to statements of others, mentioning alleged statements of some of our military in Berlin. He stressed throughout the importance of reaching some understanding while admitting the great difficulties which stood in the way of its achievement, and his outline of Soviet objectives in regard to Berlin was somewhat more precise than in previous discussions with the Soviets although containing nothing exceptionally new.
It seems clear that Soviet objectives are: (i) to eliminate Berlin as an Allied control center, (ii) to bring to an end what he claimed to be the organic links to the FRG which, in their version makes it a hot bed of "revanchist and militaristic" propaganda and activities incompatible with the establishment of "normal" relationships between our two countries and the general purpose of stabilization of the German situation on the basis of two Germanies. The Soviet insistence that Eastern Berlin and what went on there was "not a question" but a situation in fact which was definitely set forth. The only time he reacted sharply was when reference was made to our right, in view of the Soviet actions in East Berlin, to the incorporation of West Berlin into the Federal Republic, and he remarked "You just try that!"
The general impression of the conversation was that the Soviets are anxious to explore possibilities of a mutually acceptable solution. Semenov gave a somewhat clearer outline of Soviet reasons in the various suggestions they had put forward. There was no give, however, nor clarification of the phrase "respect for the sovereignty of the GDR in respect to access rights." He referred on a number of occasions to unrestricted access but declined to be specific as to how this would relate to East German sovereignty.
17. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, March 19, 1962, midnight.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-1962. Secret; Priority. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Hillenbrand and concurred in by Bohlen and Kohler. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2060)
Secto 65. Eyes only for President and Acting Secretary from Secretary. After informal meeting of heads of disarmament delegations this afternoon,/2/ Gromyko asked me to stop by his office. He handed me paper,/3/ saying he had been thinking about our discussion of general principles applicable to Berlin situation, and he had tried to put down what they might look like. He proposed we try to agree on general principles and implementing agreements here in Geneva, so that if agreement reached it could be referred to Heads of Government.
/2/The U.S. Delegation reported on this meeting in Disto 54 from Geneva, March 19. (Ibid., CF 2061)
/3/A copy of this paper, which had nine numbered paragraphs and was entitled "General Principles," was transmitted in Secto 66 from Geneva, March 19. (Ibid., Central Files, 762.00/3-2062)
After examining paper briefly, I commented that there were obviously a number of points on which we were very far apart and which would have to be discussed further. We would have paper containing our own position and two papers would then have to be considered together.
I am inclined not to treat this as formal document requiring transmission to Allies at present stage, since Gromyko and I will be discussing at dinner tomorrow evening. Though the outlook is dim, I shall do my best to make some progress.
Our preliminary estimate of Soviet paper (text of which being transmitted in separate telegram) is:
1) Although some formulations are new and relate to our previous discussions, paper as whole is essentially restatement in guise of principles of basic Soviet position on Germany and Berlin as it has developed over past three and one-half years. With Berlin portion cribbed liberally from proposed statute of a free demilitarized city of West Berlin handed Ambassador Thompson by Gromyko on January 12, 1962/4/ language completely disregards very flat negative positions we have communicated Soviets during series of conversations here on following points:
/4/See footnote 2, Document 8.
a) Presence of Allied forces
b) Rejection of free city concept
c) Attempt to associate Western Powers overtly with peace treaty approach, and
d) Banning of certain activities in West Berlin on discriminatory basis which might provide justification for subsequent intervention.
2) Concept of viability of West Berlin is borrowed, but in context which implies this essentially an economic matter.
3) Soviet "principles" no longer allow, as one of possible alternatives, retention of token forces of three Western Powers along with Soviet units. This may be response to our insistence that we could not consider reintroduction of Soviet forces into West Berlin.
4) Apparent concession in allowing West Berlin free city authorities to determine who may or may not visit city is offset by need for agreement with GDR as well as by entire context. Soviet language does not resolve ambiguity between alleged willingness to allow free access and insistence on respect for GDR sovereignty. Moreover, reference to internal legislation and provisions of free city statute presumably intended to exclude categories forbidden in final paragraph of section 2.
5) Language of procedures to be followed by "military traffic" is vague but would not necessarily be incompatible with observance of present procedures by GDR officials at Land check points if Soviets intend as fallback formulation also to apply to Allied military units. However, limitation of volume of military traffic to actual needs of these contingents seems directed towards removing possibility civilian air traffic under military aegis and under existing basic procedures.
6) Soviets have taken our term "international access authority" and attached it to completely different concept involving no administrative functions and presumably Soviet veto in event cases arise when authority is to have last word.
7) Language on non-transfer of nuclear weapons, although lacking precision, seems designed to prevent any development of NATO nuclear deterrent.
8) Language on NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression treaty raises GDR recognition problem. Moreover, Federal Republic and GDR are linked in such a way as to make procedure suggested certainly unacceptable to Federal Republic.
As to giving Soviets US principles paper, our present thought is not to hand it over during session tomorrow evening but to devote this to pointing out that Soviet statement of principles is unacceptable along lines suggested above. In light of this conversation, will then make recommendations as to whether advisable give our paper to Soviets./5/
/5/In his next telegram to the President, Secretary Rusk offered the following additional analysis:
"Seems obvious this merely restatement their standard position in guise of our suggestion about modus vivendi. Deeply regret unable report any appreciable progress Berlin thus far. Unless you have other views, I intend to have further talk with Gromyko alone tomorrow night and make it quite clear we cannot accept any such far-reaching diminution Western position. Will then return to our modus vivendi as only way out of situation where we find ourselves unable to agree. I see no possibility peaceful settlement this problem unless Soviets really understand our complete determination to stand behind your clear statements to Khrushchev and Gromyko that we cannot accept significant reduction Western position. Only if this is accepted by them can many questions rapidly fall into place." (Secto 67, March 19; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-1962)
Rusk
18. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SecDel/MC/61
Geneva, March 20, 1962, 7:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-2062. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on July 9. A detailed summary of the conversation was transmitted in Secto 73 from Geneva, March 21. (Ibid., 611.61/3-2162)
SUBJECT
Germany and Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Kohler
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Akalovsky
USSR
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Semenov
Mr. Kovalev
Mr. Bondarenko
Mr. Sukhodrev
Mr. Gromyko hosted a dinner at the Soviet Mission.
Following a brief conversation on how the disarmament conference should proceed, in the course of which the Secretary had pointed out the relationship between the Crisis around Berlin and the possibility of achieving disarmament, Mr. Gromyko suggested that no crises should be created and claimed that the Soviet proposals were designed to knock the ground from under crises. He compared the present situation to the walking on a tight rope, which was fraught with all sorts of possible surprises. A situation where there was no peace treaty, where troops were stationed in West Berlin, where the occupation regime prevailed in that city, and where the sovereign rights of the GDR were encroached upon, may generate situations neither of the two sides wanted.
The Secretary responded by saying that, in his view, the situation we were facing today was as follows: The Soviet Union had made some proposals since 1958 which were unacceptable to the West in the literal sense of the word. The fact that the Soviet Union had pursued those proposals for three years might be an indication of the importance the Soviet Union attached to them, but this did not make them more acceptable. The Secretary expressed the view that the exchanges between the US and the USSR which had taken place since the Kennedy administration had taken office indicated that there was no movement toward agreement. What the United States had said at Vienna and in the subsequent exchanges, apparently had made little impression in Moscow. However, the Secretary emphasized, everything that had been stated by the US was really meant and meant seriously. The Secretary said that when we had come to Geneva it was quite apparent that the two sides were not in agreement and that there was very little prospect of finding agreement. Therefore, the question now was how to deal with the fact of disagreement. He suggested that one way would be to start from the existing situation. The Soviet Union had also suggested this approach but without taking into account the complete set of facts. The Soviet Union had said that there were two Germanies, but there was also the fact that Berlin, and particularly West Berlin, also existed. The Secretary emphasized that unless there was a radical change in the Soviet attitude expressed since 1958 with respect to the vital interests of the West, it was difficult to see how an understanding could be reached, and thus our problem was to find ways of handling disagreement without conflict which would have disastrous consequences for both of our countries and the whole Northern Hemisphere as well.
Mr. Gromyko responded that if the United States expected a radical change in the Soviet position, i.e., abandonment by the USSR of its proposals for a change in the West Berlin situation, for a German peace treaty, and for respect of the sovereignty of the GDR, then this was in vain since the USSR would never agree to such a proposition. Both sides could and must seek a solution that would meet the interests of both sides. Such a solution would provide for: (1) a German peace treaty--perhaps without Western participation, which would be regrettable; (2) a change in the abnormal situation in West Berlin, a situation which had ensued from Germany's surrender; and (3) a change in the situation with regard to respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, which was now quite intolerable. He asserted that if both sides desired to reach agreement, agreement could be reached. On the other hand, if there was no such desire, the situation was quite different and the USSR would have to take alone such steps as it had mentioned previously on numerous occasions.
The Secretary observed that the conversation was moving towards clarification. The Soviet Union had said that the West should withdraw. We had said that we had a position in West Berlin which we would maintain. These positions were in contradiction and the problem was what we should do. We were prepared to deal with the factual situation, and we were also prepared to deal with the theoretical situation by advancing proposals on how the German situation should be resolved permanently. What we could not accept was when the USSR said one thing should be taken on the basis of facts and another on the basis of theory. Neither side must act like a mother giving a spoonful of bitter medicine to her child and saying "Take it, it's good for you". Each side knew what its vital interests were and they must prevent a clash neither of them wanted. The Secretary recalled the President's remarks to Adzhubei that some problems may be affected by time. Berlin may become more manageable with time. However, the Secretary pointed out, this should not be interpreted as a desire to procrastinate. He stressed that the USSR had denied Western vital interests for more than 3 years and the US did not like that delay. If we were to hurry, hurry toward agreement was one thing; but if the hurry was not toward agreement then Moscow and Washington must think what they were hurrying to.
Mr. Gromyko observed that bitter medicine sometimes helped the patient. Remarking that taste was a subjective matter, he professed bewilderment why the Soviet proposals were considered bitter. The USSR held the opposite view, since its proposal for a free city of West Berlin in connection with a German peace treaty was designed to eliminate a source of friction, and there was nothing bitter involved here. He asserted that the West always ascribed sinister motives to the USSR.
Referring to the Secretary's remarks that the Soviet Union had been refusing over three years to recognize the Western rights in Berlin, he claimed that this was not so and that the USSR was merely trying to eliminate the abnormal situation which had resulted from Germany's unconditional surrender. As to the Secretary's remark about facts and theory, he contended that this was a somewhat arbitrary way of interpreting the situation. The USSR believed that there were main facts as well as subsidiary or secondary facts. The decisive fact was that two Germanies existed as independent states. 17 years had passed since World War II without a peace treaty and the USSR had concluded that a change was necessary. As to the Secretary's query how the USSR claimed to proceed on the basis of facts but sought change, he asserted that there was no contradiction here. All the USSR wanted was to normalize the situation in Germany and Berlin and draw a line under World War II through the conclusion of a peace treaty and by solving the West Berlin problem on that basis. The Soviet Union had been repeating this phrase because it wanted to convince the West. After all the Soviet Union was negotiating and there was nothing else it could do in that situation other than write and talk.
Mr. Gromyko contended that the USSR was negotiating with the US in the hope that agreement could be reached. The United States had also said that it wanted agreement. The Secretary had said today that perhaps an understanding could be reached on the basis of the existing factual situation. But such an understanding would also represent agreement. The Secretary had said in New York that both sides should agree on the factual situation, but it was quite clear that agreement must somehow be recorded and formalized. A peace treaty, even without Western participation, would do that, while agreement on other matters could be formalized with Western participation. If the US were not to say that it wished agreement, the USSR would proceed differently. But since the US stated that it wanted agreement, the USSR was negotiating with it.
The group then moved to the adjoining room for coffee.
The Secretary resumed the conversation by stating that he wished to draw a distinction between negotiation and action. We had no doubt that any government was free to raise any proposals as a matter of negotiations, even though the other side might regard those proposals to be outrageous. However, we were most concerned when suggestions were raised which contemplated action without the consent of the other side. If Moscow desired to stabilize the situation on the basis of the existing facts, we had considerable understanding for this. This would be a reflection of events which had taken place during and since the war. However, it was our view that the heart of the existing situation was our presence in West Berlin and the freedom of access to West Berlin. It would be one thing to stabilize the situation and record it in a treaty on the basis of the existing situation in West Berlin and the existing access, as had been done in the Zorin-Bolz understanding, whereas it was quite a different thing to propose a treaty providing for change in the situation and contemplating action. This was so elementary to us that we could not understand why the other side did not regard it as elementary as well.
Referring to the Soviet paper received yesterday,/2/ the Secretary stated it was disappointing since it provided no basis for discussion. The paper took no account of what the President had said in Vienna or of US statements through the various channels. It merely reflected the Soviet position advanced three years ago and no solution was possible for that basis. Reiterating that both sides could either reach agreement on the basis of the existing situation or make proposals on how the situation should be changed and then negotiated, the Secretary stated that the US had not done the latter because it believed that the prospects of understanding were better on the basis of the situation existing now and in the near future.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 17.
The Secretary then strongly emphasized that it was important to be clear as to what was the heart of the matter here. He stated that the United States was in no sense prisoner of the FRG; in other words, it was not merely following with reluctance the lead from someone it was not responsible for. What we were concerned with here were the vital interests of the United States. The Secretary said he assumed that Mr. Gromyko acted on the same basis in his relations with East Germany, and stressed again that what we were talking about was US national interests.
The Secretary then referred to some points discussed over the past weeks. He expressed the belief that reconciliation of the freedom of access and of what the USSR called the sovereignty of the GDR, should not present a problem, since similar arrangements were made throughout the world almost every day. With regard to the status of West Berlin, he said that we preferred to refer to Berlin as a whole, but the USSR said that this was not a subject for discussion. As to West Berlin, the United States view was that West Berlin was not part of West Germany. It was a separate territory under our responsibility but free to choose its way of life and establish relations with the outside world. With reference to Mr. Gromyko's interest in the question of frontiers, the Secretary stated that this should not present a great problem either. He reiterated most emphatically that the US was in Berlin and that it will stay there, and stated that it will be well if this was clearly understood. The United States would stay in Berlin until there was a broad change, such as an all-German settlement, a general settlement of East-West relations or a general settlement in the disarmament field. However, under present circumstances, the US would stay in West Berlin. As to the Soviet Union suggestion that UN troops be stationed in West Berlin, the Secretary said that if Mr. Gromyko meant US, UK and French troops, we might go so far as to think about it. Otherwise, such an arrangement would not be possible.
Mr. Gromyko said that the heart of the matter was whether the two sides wished to negotiate seriously or to procrastinate. The USSR proceeded on the premise that both sides desired to reach real understanding. The US had referred to difficulties with some of its allies. This was something for the United States to judge, but the USSR was negotiating with the US as the representative of the West, since it knew that the US had influence with its allies. The USSR had been negotiating with the US most seriously; otherwise it would not have displayed such scrupulous and tolerant attitude throughout all the exchanges since Vienna. As Mr. Khrushchev has stated to the President, Germany was the only source of friction between the United States and the USSR, and if that source were eliminated everybody would sigh with relief.
Mr. Gromyko continued that he was gratified that the Secretary believed it possible to reconcile the two requirements related to access. Since the USSR also believed in that possibility, a mutually acceptable solution should be feasible. On the other hand, the question was to what kind of West Berlin access should lead. [sic] The USSR categorically refused to accept the United States proposition that the Western presence should be continued and that no change should be introduced. He contended that while earlier the US had stated that access was the main problem, now that a possibility of resolving that problem had emerged the US stated that there should be no change in West Berlin.
The Secretary interjected that this was nothing new. As the President had stated to Mr. Khrushchev, we could not accept any diminution of the Western position in Berlin.
Mr. Gromyko went on to say that US statements to the effect that the West was present in West Berlin to protect the interests, and what it called the way of life of West Berlin, ignored Soviet statements that the USSR was also in favor of such protection. He contended that the Secretary was now circumventing this element of the Soviet position completely, whereas in New York he had asked questions on how West Berlin's freedom would be ensured. He said that judging from the Secretary's statements, the US did not appreciate the steps the Soviet Union had made to narrow the gap between the respective positions of the two sides and toward reaching an understanding. He cited the Soviet paper of March 19 as one of such steps, and asserted that it took into account some of the considerations expressed by the US and general principles mentioned by the Secretary. He said that it was good to hear that the Secretary believed that there was no problem with regards to frontiers and some other matters, and this was a positive factor. The Soviet paper of March 19 had been advanced in order to narrow the gap between the position of the two sides; however, the Secretary had now said that this proposal was almost a step backward. He expressed the hope that the United States would study the paper most carefully and give a reply to it.
Referring to the question of access, Mr. Gromyko noted that the US had repeatedly stated that it was not clear how access would be organized in practice, and how respect for the sovereignty of GDR should be understood in connection with the transit of persons and goods. He contended that the Soviet position on this score had been explained in Vienna, New York and Washington, as well as to Spaak, Fanfani, and some American journalists who must have informed the US Government. Nevertheless, the US appeared still not to have a completely clear picture of how this problem would be handled in practice. Taking into account all this, and in particular the private talks the Secretary and he, Gromyko, had last week and the day before, the Soviet delegation had considered the matter and had decided that it would be useful to provide the United States with additional clarification with regard to access and transit so that nothing would remain unclear. Mr. Gromyko then produced a paper saying it was a working paper which he hoped the US would study./3/
/3/A copy of this paper, which comprised 10 numbered paragraphs on various types of access to Berlin, was transmitted in Secto 71 from Geneva, March 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/3-2062)
The Secretary responded that he first wished to comment on the paper received the day before. He stated that he was quite sure that if that paper were referred to the United States and allied governments they would have a negative impression of the paper. Therefore, he did not believe it useful to treat the paper as a formal expression of Soviet views. He said that in terms of the discussion in Geneva, he was inclined to suggest to Mr. Gromyko to take the paper back, but was not doing so because that would have a connotation in diplomatic practice which he did not intend. The Secretary expressed the view that flexibility should be maintained in these contacts until both moved toward agreement.
The Secretary then raised the question of how both sides should proceed further. He reiterated emphatically that when the President had stated that our vital interests included: (1) our presence in West Berlin; (2) freedom of access as it had been understood for many years; and (3) freedom of West Berlin to choose its own way of life, he used the word "vital" in its literal sense. The Secretary then suggested that the time had come when exchange of unilateral papers was not nearly as important as discussion of vital interests as seen by each of the two sides and represented by them here and as the search for reconciliation of those interests if possible. He observed that this was the real task of foreign ministers. He then suggested that perhaps starting Thursday as much time as possible be devoted to that purpose, leaving Wednesday for whatever communications either side might need with its government. He stated that the President was anxious for him to come back from Geneva with an idea of how the world would proceed from here, and remarked that he was not sure that the situation had been considered in all of its ramifications. Referring to the Soviet paper of today, the Secretary stated that he was inclined not to receive it unless he had some indication as to its contents, because he did not see any value in exchanging papers which could not serve as a basis for agreement.
The Secretary continued that he wished to emphasize one point. Over 200 million people live in the USSR and about 180 million in the US. The question was how we should relate these interests to the broad interests of our people. In the framework of the broad interests of our peoples, these problems were peripheral. However, some of these marginal problems may become central overnight. This was not a matter of logic of one side because the other side may not follow the same logic. Both sides must reconcile their interests and prevent a clash which would create danger. The Secretary observed that, in terms of history, the problem discussed here was not such as it was now being built up. Nevertheless, both sides must see how to reconcile their respective interests involved.
Mr. Gromyko wondered whether he had understood the Secretary correctly that he was not interested in the Soviet views on access. He noted that if the Secretary was concerned about the form of the document, he should take note of the fact that it was only a working paper.
The Secretary expressed the view that both sides while in Geneva had an opportunity of finding out their respective views. If papers were exchanged a procedure would be instituted which would be more formal than it was wise under the circumstances. He stated that we were of course interested in Soviet views, but suggested that caution with regard to papers was in order. If the latest Soviet paper was of a personal nature, he might perhaps read it and return it with annotations; however, he did not wish to receive at this point more formal papers involving his and other governments. In other words, the Secretary said he was concerned about the procedure leading toward a solution and not a procedure that would inflame the situation further. Over the past three years, too much literature had been exchanged and too little agreement had been reached.
Mr. Gromyko replied that if the Secretary had difficulties from the standpoint of formal procedure, he could give the paper to the Secretary on a personal basis or read it to him.
The Secretary inquired about the length of the paper. Mr. Gromyko replied it was 3-1/2 pages long.
The Secretary then suggested that perhaps Mr. Gromyko and himself might designate their associates to look at the paper. Mr. Gromyko declined the suggestion, saying that Mr. Rusk was the Secretary of State and he the Foreign Minister and that it was they who should handle this matter.
The Secretary then agreed to receive the paper as a working paper given to him by Mr. Gromyko on a personal basis. He noted that if the paper contained no basis for discussion, Mr. Gromyko might consider it as not having been given.
Mr. Gromyko reiterated that the paper was merely a working paper and was not an aide-memoire or a formal note.
Referring to the Secretary's remark on the number of people living in the USSR and the United States and their interests, Mr. Gromyko professed surprise at the trend of that remark, which he claimed implied that the USSR wanted to pocket West Berlin. He asserted that the USSR had no need for West Berlin, which was populated by only 2,200,000 people. The USSR only wished a peace treaty and a solution of the West Berlin problem on the basis of such a treaty. The USSR sincerely wished an understanding with the United States in this respect.
The Secretary interjected that he had not meant to imply what Mr. Gromyko had just referred to, but had merely wished to state that the two governments had a responsibility for their peoples and must consider their interests in the world. He also noted that he did not wish to imply anything with regard to the balance of power.
Mr. Gromyko continued by asserting that a solution of the question of a German peace treaty would be in the interest of both sides and in the interest of peace in Europe. The Soviet Union had told the US its ideas with regard to a possible solution of that problem. It had also stated its preference for a solution on the basis of agreement with US. Likewise, the Soviet Union had expressed readiness to sign a peace treaty without Western participation but with an understanding with the West with regard to such matters as frontiers, etc. Mr. Gromyko reiterated that he categorically rejected attempts to portray the situation as if the Soviet Union or the GDR wished to get hold of West Berlin. With regard to the Secretary's suggestion for further discussion on Thursday, Mr. Gromyko wondered what significance should be attached to that date, asserted that he was prepared to negotiate Wednesday, Thursday or any other day. He said that he might be mistaken but he was under the impression that the Secretary wished to communicate with his Government and that thereupon he would be prepared to engage in more detailed negotiations.
The Secretary replied that there was no magic about Thursday but noted that the conference schedule and other engagements would not make it possible to meet the following day. He stressed, however, that he was prepared to continue the discussion even tonight. The Secretary then observed that he had planned to stay in Geneva about 10 days. Although he had some important appointments in Washington, if profitable discussions should develop he would be prepared to stay as long as necessary because this was the most important point on the agenda and also one of the most important aspects of disarmament among other things. He wondered whether Thursday afternoon would be a convenient time for a further meeting.
Mr. Gromyko replied that he was available for further discussions at any time while in Geneva. He observed that the Secretary's departure date was something for the Secretary to decide. Referring to the Secretary's previous remarks, he contended that the Secretary had implied that he did not regard the question of a peace treaty and of West Berlin as very important. The USSR could not agree with such a view. He said he wished to reiterate what Mr. Khrushchev had said to the President in Vienna, namely, that the USSR regarded this problem as the most acute and extremely crucial one. He contended that in speaking of the German problem the Secretary and other US officials sometimes seem to use words and formulations lightly. Conversely, the USSR had been displaying a more serious attitude and weighed its words.
The Secretary stressed that he did not wish that there be any misunderstanding on Mr. Gromyko's part. He reiterated that Western presence in West Berlin, the freedom of access to West Berlin, and West Berlin's freedom to choose its own way of life were vital interests of the United States and of the West, and emphasized that the word "vital" meant life or death. He said that he did not wish to minimize the importance of this problem but only to place it in the context of the broader interests of our peoples and to point out the necessity of resolving the problem without conflict. He stated that the two governments should not engage in a dangerous game on top of the roof of a house in which millions of people were going about their daily work. There must be no such dangerous game because this was the matter of our vital interest which we intended to treat as such.
Mr. Gromyko contended that if there was anybody engaged in such a game, it was not the USSR. The USSR approached the problem with all seriousness and responsibility. However, it believed that this was the area where the interests of the two sides collided most acutely and that therefore, the situation required solution. Although there were some other areas, such as Laos, where settlement was still outstanding, those were areas where the interests of the two sides did not actually collide. He reiterated his assertion that the USSR approached this problem most seriously; it could be noticed that the other side approached it lightly and indulged in strong words.
The Secretary stated that he did not quite understand the meaning of the word "lightly". He observed that perhaps there was a misunderstanding in Moscow. For three years the USSR had been making proposals to which the United States and the West had said "NO". This was not light and neither was the President's July 25 speech light./4/ The Secretary emphasized that it would be a serious mistake if anyone in Moscow believed that the US was joking in this matter.
/4/For text of President Kennedy's address to the Nation, July 25, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 533-540.
Mr. Gromyko responded that this was exactly what he had in mind. It was a mistake to believe that the use of strong words by US military or civilians sufficed to change the position of the USSR. It was this that he called approaching the problem lightly.
Mr. Gromyko then reiterated that the USSR's choice number 1 was to resolve the problem on the basis of agreement with the West and that the Soviet Union would act without the West only if no such agreement were reached. He asserted that the USSR had come to Geneva in the hope that something could be done to bring the positions of the two sides closer together. The US had said that it was prepared to continue the discussions; the USSR was also prepared and therefore we should see what results could be achieved.
The Secretary said that with regard to Mr. Gromyko's remark he wished to point out that in a real sense it was quite impossible to act alone.
It was agreed that the next meeting would take place at 3:00 p.m. on March 22.
19. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SecDel/MC/60
Geneva, March 22, 1962, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-2262. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on July 9. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's suite at the Hotel Richmond. A detailed summary of the conversation was transmitted in Secto 92 from Geneva, March 23. (Ibid., 611.61/3-2362)
SUBJECT
Germany and Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary
Mr. Akalovsky
USSR
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Sukhodrev
The Secretary opened the conversation by saying that so much had been said by the two governments on Germany and Berlin at Vienna and since then that it was not easy to know where to turn now. He recalled Mr. Khrushchev's and Mr. Gromyko's statement that the Soviet proposals were not directed against the United States and were not designed to reduce the Western position in Berlin. While not wishing to talk about the intentions of the other party, the Secretary stated the US believed that the objective results of the Soviet proposals at Vienna and since then would indeed greatly reduce or at least limit the Western position in Berlin. He emphasized that it was the objective results we were most concerned about. The Secretary referred to the President's statement at Vienna that the effect of the Soviet proposals would be very far-reaching and negative not only in Berlin and Germany but also throughout the world. He stressed that we had commitments and responsibilities in Berlin and Germany and that they were fundamental to us. In the light of what we believed the direct and immediate effect of the Soviet proposals would be if we agreed to them, the US could not agree that those proposals would be beneficial to it, as Mr. Gromyko had contended. The United States had to look at its position and its interests. It had defined its vital interests and believed that the effect of the Soviet proposals, including some elaboration thereof in Geneva, would injure them deeply. For example, the presence of the West and its forces in West Berlin was of vital interest to us, but the Soviet Union had stated that they must be withdrawn or share their responsibility with Soviet troops.
Turning to the question of access, the Secretary recalled his earlier statement that if our vital interests were recognized there would be no problem making access arrangements compatible with what the Soviet Union called respect for the sovereignty of the GDR. However, the Soviet paper on access/2/ indicated that there was apparently some misunderstanding on the Soviet part. The Secretary stated he had not meant that access should be subject to East Germans but that it could be compatible with the complete management of East German affairs by local authorities.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 18.
Referring to the question of the viability of West Berlin and the maintenance of its way of life, the Secretary stated that it was clear to us that the objective of the Soviet proposals was to undermine and destroy the freedom of West Berlin. This was implied not only in Soviet statements with regard to access, but also in those regarding the freedom of persons to travel to and from Berlin, as well as regarding West Berlin's relations with the outside world, particularly West Germany. Thus the Soviet proposals did not provide for the maintenance of the freedom of West Berlin for any period of time.
The Secretary continued by emphasizing that we of necessity must think very hard of the objective effect of the various proposals. The suggestion that a line be drawn under World War II sounded very good. However, when it turned out to be a reduction or even elimination of the Western position in West Berlin it was another matter. Some other phrases in Soviet proposals implied that they also would have a similar effect on the Western position. In the light of all this, the Secretary suggested that perhaps possible alternatives should be examined. The first alternative would be to do nothing. The second alternative would be to allow a dangerous crisis to develop. The third alternative would be to continue efforts along the lines of the efforts conducted so far and to see whether agreement was possible. Finally, the fourth alternative would be to look at the wide gap between the positions of the two sides, recognize that it was very difficult to reach agreement, and see how disagreement should be handled. Commenting on these alternatives, the Secretary stated that, although he believed that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States would shirk a crisis, he was confident that both recognized that a crisis was not in their interests. On the other hand, efforts to find agreement had not been productive thus far and it was difficult to say now whether they would be productive in the future. As to the question of how to handle disagreement, the problem was to find a method not involving the interests of the West or requiring a formal withdrawal of Soviet proposals.
Mr. Gromyko contended he regretted very much that negotiations had so far been unsuccessful. He claimed that in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union had made certain proposals designed to facilitate agreement, the United States Government appeared not to be serious in its intention to strive for an understanding. Referring to the Secretary's statement that the Soviet proposals were objectively aimed at undermining the Western and, in particular, the United States position in Berlin, Mr. Gromyko asserted that the Soviet Government had believed and continued to believe that the solution of the problem of a German peace treaty and the settlement of the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a treaty would not lead to the undermining of the Western or US position, if that position was correctly understood. He recalled his statement that the United States should not fear anything from the implementation of the Soviet proposals if the United States was genuinely desirous of achieving a detente and of strengthening peace. Thus, he contended, if the interests of the big powers were understood correctly, the Soviet proposals would not lead to the undermining of the positions of any power, including the US. Moreover, the Soviet Union believed that a settlement on the basis of the Soviet proposals would be beneficial to all concerned and would be in the interest of peace. The Soviet Union did not believe that withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin and a settlement of the question of a free city of West Berlin on the basis of a peace treaty would in any way diminish the position of the Western powers; on the contrary, their position in Europe and throughout the world would be strengthened because that would be a major act by the Western powers to contribute to a relaxation of tensions and to the strengthening of peace. On the other hand, if the US proceeded from the premise that the situation should remain unchanged, i.e., that the occupation regime in West Berlin should remain as if nothing had happened since World War II, that the situation with regard to communications where the sovereignty of the GDR was being ignored should continue, and that there should be no peace treaty, then it must be stated categorically that the USSR would never agree to that. The USSR believed that changes were needed and it would be very good if an understanding were reached on those changes and if the changes were implemented on an agreed basis.
Mr. Gromyko then recalled the Secretary's remarks that it was possible to make freedom of access compatible with what the USSR called respect for the GDR sovereignty. He asserted that the USSR also believed this to be possible, but wondered what content the Secretary injected in his remarks. When the USSR said that there should be respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, it meant that such respect should be in deeds and not words. However, the Secretary appeared to inject a different content because he qualified his statement by saying there would be no interference in East German internal affairs, thus implying that questions of access were not related to the sovereignty of the GDR. If this interpretation of the Secretary's position was correct, then the US conception differed completely from the Soviet conception. In any event, the US position was not quite clear.
Mr. Gromyko continued by asserting that the USSR had given the US, both in Moscow and Geneva, clarification as to its understanding of all these problems, starting with the crucial problem of a German peace treaty and down to the problem of transit through the territory of the GDR. The USSR had given the US detailed views on these matters, including two papers/3/ here in Geneva. The USSR had done so in the hope that the US would duly appreciate it and believing that clarification would facilitate understanding. However, the Secretary's remarks seemed to indicate that the US failed to see the main point in the Soviet proposals, because the Secretary had implied that something like a blockade would be established around West Berlin as a result of Soviet proposals. Mr. Gromyko contended that the USSR had no such intention either with respect to the movement of freight or to the movement of persons. All the USSR called for was such respect for the sovereignty of the GDR as was accorded to all states through the territory and air space of which transit took place. Therefore the US should not look in the Soviet proposals for what was not there and what the USSR did not intend to include.
/3/Regarding these Soviet papers, see footnote 2, Document 17, and footnote 2, Document 18.
Commenting on the Secretary's alternatives, Mr. Gromyko asserted that he did not know why the Secretary had mentioned the first alternative. He said that there was no question of leaving the situation without change. The United States knew full well that the USSR, together with some other states, would sign a peace treaty with the GDR and any attempt by the US to convince the USSR to leave the situation unchanged, i.e., to put the matter of a peace treaty aside, would be futile. Referring to the Secretary's second alternative, Mr. Gromyko stated that if the US and its allies moved toward crisis, evidently a crisis would be precipitated, but it would be the responsibility of the Western Powers. With regard to the Secretary's third and fourth alternatives, Mr. Gromyko claimed that the distinction between the two was artificial and that they were practically the same. He said that both sides should see where they were close and what separated them. For its part, the USSR was prepared to seek a possibility of understanding and this was attested to by its patience in negotiations. If such readiness also existed on the other side, mutual efforts should be continued. Mr. Gromyko then said that, if he had understood the Secretary correctly, the Secretary appeared to have mentioned at the end of his remarks the possibility of the Soviet Union's withdrawing its proposals. He said that if the Secretary was joking, then of course he could understand that remark; on the other hand, if the Secretary was serious, he could not possibly understand it. In any event, the correct assumption was that the Soviet would not withdraw its proposals.
Mr. Gromyko then asserted that the USSR was concerned about whether the United States Government believed, as the Soviet Government did, that it was best to seek an understanding on an agreed basis. If the United States did not wish to proceed on the basis of agreement, then the situation was quite different. However, Mr. Gromyko said, he accepted the Secretary's statement that it would be good to agree and to avoid complications between our two states. He said that he agreed with the Secretary's remarks that both countries had a great deal of work to do at home, and that Germany should not make them enemies. He wondered why then the United States took a position which was not facilitating agreement and why it was looking for devious schemes and motives in Soviet proposals. He reiterated his previous contention that neither the USSR nor the GDR needed West Berlin and that the GDR was making a sacrifice by agreeing to the creation of a free city of West Berlin on its territory. He called upon the United States to adopt a more sober position with regard to the Soviet proposals and the Soviet steps to meet the US half way. He observed that it was not useful to stay in place and that this was not the purpose of the USSR in Geneva. Of course, to stay put was better than to go backwards, but it was worse than to move toward understanding.
The Secretary emphasized that the President desired a solution of this and other problems on the basis of agreement. However, this was not possible by simply accepting Soviet proposals, particularly such proposals as cut at the heart of the interests of the West and of the US.
The Secretary expressed the hope that agreement could be reached on the basis of understanding and that the Soviet Union also desired understanding. This had been discussed in Vienna and there was no doubt as to the US position on this point. The Secretary also emphasized that he had no inclination to delve into Soviet motives; what we were concerned about were the objective effects of Soviet proposals, and those effects we must consider very seriously.
Referring to the so-called respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, the Secretary stated that he wished to remind Mr. Gromyko of the US view that, under the circumstances prevailing at the end of World War II and since then, no one was in a position to create sovereignty in East Germany which would have priority over our position in West Berlin and our rights of access. He emphasized strongly that this was not in the hands of the Soviet Union, whose position and interests in Germany stemmed from the same fact and stood on the same basis as our position and interests did, namely, the surrender of Nazi Germany.
The Secretary then recalled the US suggestion for an international access authority and stated that it had been made because we believed this was one way of reconciling freedom of access with East Germany's concern for its internal affairs. Noting that the international access authority would involve territories under three jurisdictions--the FRG, East Germany, and West Berlin--the Secretary stated there would be very simple arrangements with regard to jurisdiction to be accepted by the three government authorities. He observed that the very acceptance of such arrangements would be compatible with the notion of sovereignty and that there would be no interference with the day-by-day activities in the FRG, West Berlin, or East Germany. The Secretary then stressed that an international authority such as conceived by the US would be quite different from an authority under the administrative arrangements by East Germans and subject to a four-power commission which would probably operate under the rule of unanimity, although the Soviet proposal contained no specific reference to such rule. Such an arrangement would expose access to all the hazards to which Ulbricht might wish to subject it. There was no assurance that the four-power commission could resolve any problems that might arise. Although we were prepared to work on this and see whether it perhaps provided some possibility, we did not see in this arrangement adequate guarantees for West Berlin's future. Furthermore, the Soviet paper indicated that the establishment of an access authority was related to the withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin, and this was of course a major obstacle from our standpoint. The Secretary then noted that the United States had never held the view that East Germany would not have a normal and active part in the provision of access facilities, such as rail, Autobahn, canals, and in the air. The latter would involve only the question of overflights. The Secretary said that exclusion of the East Germans in these matters would be impractical and unnecessary.
Turning to Mr. Gromyko's comments on the alternatives he had indicated, the Secretary stated that he wished to stress most emphatically what the President had told Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna, namely, that it was not the US who was pressing this problem to a crisis. It was not the United States who had brought up the problem in its present form and therefore we could not accept the responsibility. As to Mr. Gromyko's comment that the distinction between the third and fourth alternatives rested on weak ground, the Secretary said that he wished to illustrate his point. Thus far we had apparently been working on the third alternative. There was no need to assume that the alternative was necessarily at a close, although it had not yielded much result. However, there was no agreement in sight today; nor was there a basis for agreement. Nevertheless, both sides must seek to resolve the problem. It was in the light of this that the possibility had been suggested to Mr. Gromyko of reaching agreement on certain simple and short principles, some of which our two governments had already agreed to quite recently, in any case more recently than at the end of World War II. If the heads of governments of our countries could agree on those principles, each principle would open the way for additional negotiations. There would also be stipulation as to what would happen in the meantime. The Secretary said that since Mr. Gromyko might not have obtained a clear picture of this idea when it was first mentioned to him, he had prepared a paper/4/ which would clarify what was meant. The paper covered several subjects of interest to both the US and the USSR. The Secretary then handed the paper to Mr. Gromyko, noting that it was being given as a working paper within the framework of personal conversation. He pointed out that the contents of the paper did not require confirmation by the USSR of Western occupation rights in West Berlin, rights which we believed needed no confirmation. The contents of the paper did not stand in the way of a peace treaty but provided for a framework where a peace treaty with East Germany would not inflame the situation.
/4/Document 20.
Mr. Gromyko said he wished to make a few observations. Reverting to the question of access authority, he wondered why the Secretary had mentioned three jurisdictions. He professed that he could not understand the reason for mentioning the West German jurisdiction. He asserted that the question was that of the sovereignty of the GDR, but the US was trying to involve the jurisdiction of West Germany despite the fact that the Secretary himself had correctly stated that West Berlin was not related to West Germany.
As to the question of a peace treaty with the GDR, Mr. Gromyko recalled US statements to the effect that it was up to the USSR whether to sign such a treaty or not. However, he wished it to be clearly understood that the USSR did not regard the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR merely as a formal act, but rather as a major political act which must be accompanied by certain changes, by certain measures, and by the solution of certain questions the USSR had repeatedly mentioned to the Western Powers. It would be one thing if the USSR signed a peace treaty with the GDR with prior understanding regarding the solution of other questions with the US and apparently its allies as well. Then everything would go smoothly. On the other hand, as the USSR had repeatedly stated, if there were no such understanding, the situation would be quite different. The US had stated on many occasions that when the Soviet Union signed a peace treaty with the GDR, there should be a prior understanding as to what the situation would be and what measures should accompany such a treaty. The USSR agreed with this and this is why it was negotiating. It would be well if agreement could be found.
Referring to the Secretary's remark that it was not quite clear how decisions would be taken in the four-power commission of the access authority, Mr. Gromyko stated that there were of course certain aspects which would have to be resolved through additional consideration and discussion. However, he thought that in principle it was quite clear that the objective of that proposal was to facilitate agreement with regard to access and the status of West Berlin.
As to the paper given to him by the Secretary, Mr. Gromyko said that he was prepared to consider it as a working paper, just as the two Soviet documents were working papers, but wished to inquire whether the paper had been prepared with due account being taken of the two Soviet documents. He asserted that this was of substantial importance because the Soviet papers had been drafted with the objective of facilitating agreement. He said that he would have comments on the US paper at a later date and facetiously asked what he should tell to his allies now that he had received a US paper.
The Secretary replied that this was up to Mr. Gromyko himself. He said that his paper was not in direct response to the two Soviet papers. It was an illustration of the approach he had mentioned at his first meeting with Mr. Gromyko. The Secretary also observed that we could of course discuss access, perhaps within the context of the Soviet papers, but stressed that the linkage to the withdrawal of Western troops created a formidable problem.
Mr. Gromyko observed that there was not much point in exchanging papers unless account was being taken of their respective contents.
The Secretary reiterated that his paper was not in response to the Soviet papers but was rather in the context of earlier discussions. Noting that he had already made some observations on the two Soviet papers, the Secretary wondered whether it might perhaps be profitable if some of his and Mr. Gromyko's associates discussed them further, although he would be prepared to do that personally with Mr. Gromyko. He said that a number of points required clarification, such as, for instance, the question of the unanimity rule in the access authority, if we were fully to understand the Soviet papers.
Mr. Gromyko replied that either procedure was acceptable. Reverting to the question of access authority, he emphasized that the Soviet proposal was linked to the withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin and their replacement with neutral or UN troops. The Soviet proposal for access authority could be considered only in that context, because it was not a separate proposal.
The Secretary replied that this was how we understood the Soviet proposal and that in that sense it did not advance us very far. He strongly emphasized that the presence of Western forces in West Berlin was fundamental to us.
Mr. Gromyko responded that if this was fundamental to the US, the USSR also believed that it was one of several fundamental questions, such as the question of a peace treaty, which was primary and decisive, the question of respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, the question of the status of a free city of West Berlin, etc.
The Secretary concluded the conversation by recalling his statement that many problems would fall into place if the central questions were resolved.
20. Paper Prepared in the U.S. Delegation/1/
Geneva, undated.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-2062. Confidential. The source text bears no drafting information, but is attached to a March 21 memorandum from Kohler to Rusk, which states that it had been worked out after communications with Washington. The source text bears the handwritten notation: "As handed Gromyko."
DRAFT PRINCIPLES
The US and USSR have been discussing a wide range of subjects. They have agreed, in regard to certain of these subjects on (i) certain general principles to which their governments subscribe; (ii) procedures for continuing negotiation on the basis of these principles by a Committee of Foreign Ministers' deputies, which will be established specifically for this purpose, and which France and the UK will be invited to join; and (iii) certain interim steps to meet immediate dangers in the meantime.
1. Berlin
(a) General Principles: They believe that West Berlin should be free to choose its own way of life, that its viability should be maintained, and that its access should remain free and unhindered.
(b) Future Negotiations: They agree to study proposals for improving the situation in Berlin consistent with these principles and the vital interests of both sides in the aforementioned Committee of Foreign Ministers' deputies.
(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they declare that long established access procedures should remain in effect.
2. Germany
(a) General Principles: They believe that the German people have the right to determine their own future and to reestablish the unity of Germany if they so desire, and they wish to facilitate the exercise of this right in a way that will enhance the security of all European peoples.
(b) Future Negotiations: They agree that the authorities in West and East Germany should be invited to establish mixed technical commissions, consisting of officials designated by these authorities, to increase cultural and technical contacts, promote mutually beneficial economic exchanges, and consider a draft electoral law and other steps toward German reunification.
(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they declare that they will ensure that any arrangements into which any of them may enter with any part of Germany will be consistent with the declarations recorded in this announcement, and that any peace treaty which they may conclude with a united Germany will be consistent with the declarations noted under 3 and 4, below.
3. Nuclear Diffusion
(a) General Principles: They believe that further diffusion of nuclear weapons into the control of national governments not now owning them would make more difficult the problem of maintaining lasting peace.
(b) Future Negotiations: They agree to seek, in the above-mentioned committee (or other appropriate forum) to develop policies regarding non-diffusion of nuclear weapons to which all states owning nuclear weapons might agree and to which states not now owning nuclear weapons might also subscribe.
(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they declare that they will not themselves relinquish control over nuclear weapons to any individual state not now owning such weapons and will refrain from assisting any such state in manufacturing them.
4. Non-Aggression
(a) General Principles: They believe that force should not be used to change existing frontiers and demarcation lines in Europe or for any other aggressive purpose.
(b) Future Negotiations: They agree to seek in the above-mentioned committee (or a sub-committee thereof) (i) to develop a suitable declaration regarding non-aggression between the NATO and Warsaw Pact Powers; and (ii) to consider measures which might be taken to enable the governments represented on that Commission to communicate and establish their non-aggressive intent in the event of grave crises and otherwise to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation.
(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they declare that they will not themselves use or support use of force to change the external borders of Germany or the demarcation line inside Germany, and they note with approval past declarations of the Federal Republic that it will not use force to achieve the reunification of Germany or to settle international disputes.
5. Procedures
Once the proposed Committee of Foreign Ministers' deputies has been established, the Foreign Ministers of countries represented on it should meet periodically, as seems useful, to review its work.
21. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, March 22, 1962, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0021/3-2262. Secret; Priority. Received at 3:17 p.m. Also sent to Geneva and USAREUR and repeated to Berlin, London, Paris, and Moscow.
2285. Geneva for Sec Del. USAREUR for Gen Clarke. I regard Vopo shooting US Military Liaison vehicle/2/ as an extremely serious development following as it does the wounding under similar circumstances of a member of the British Armed Forces/3/ and believe that serious counter-measures should be taken against Soviet Military Mission in West Germany. I recognize that any measures we may take may produce comparable steps by Russians against our Mission in Potsdam thus severely restricting their normal intelligence activity. Nevertheless I recommend that Gen Clarke's protest to Marshal Konev be followed immediately by serious counter-measures against Sov Military Missions in West Germany including restriction of Sov Missions to their compounds until a satisfactory reply has been received from the Sov authorities./4/
/2/On March 20 and 21 a U.S. Military Liaison Mission vehicle was detained and shot at by Vopos in the Gotha area. A summary of the incident was transmitted in telegram 1795 from Berlin, March 22. (Ibid., 762.0221/3-2262)
/3/On March 10 the driver of a British Military Mission vehicle had been wounded by Vopos, and Soviet officials' cooperation had been deemed "inadequate" in helping the victim. (Telegram 1764 from Berlin, March 17; ibid., 762.0221/3-1762)
/4/On March 22 General Clarke sent a letter of protest about the incident with the USMLM vehicle to Marshal Koniev, and on the following day outlined specific measures he would take if no reply were received by March 27 or if the reply were unsatisfactory. (Telegram 2300 from Bonn, March 24; ibid., 762.0221/3-2462) Clarke reported on March 27 that the Soviet reply, received that day, was unacceptable. (SX 2552 from Heidelberg; ibid., 762.0221/3-2262) Two days later the Chief of Staff, USAREUR, informed the Soviet MLM at Frankfurt that its personnel were restricted to the Mission except for official duties and that U.S. escorts would accompany any Soviet traffic. (SX 2601 from Heidelberg, March 29; ibid., 762.0221/3-2962)
Although I understand British have not instituted any counter-measures I have not discussed this with British and French Embs in Bonn except to protest to Sov authorities.
Dowling
22. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, March 23, 1962, 2 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-2262. Secret; Niact. Received on March 22 at 11:18 p.m. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Rusk and concurred in by Bohlen, Thompson, and Kohler. (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 193, Chron)
Secto 91. Eyes only for the President and Acting Secretary. No Other Distribution. Separate telegram will give details my conversation with Gromyko alone today./2 / Two points seem clear. First, Gromyko shows no inclination to break off talks and register an impasse. Despite several firm and possibly provocative statements by me with respect to nature of possible crisis, he did not respond with belligerence or threats. Second, there seems to be no movement in Soviet position toward Western vital interests. He made it perfectly clear that minor variations in access proposals he had submitted were organically dependent upon removal Western forces from West Berlin.
/2/See Document 19.
At reception following our conversation Gromyko indicated some interest in "modus vivendi" paper I had handed to him./3 / He commented that certain subjects such as status of West Berlin had been omitted. I told him that we could discuss such questions. We agreed our respective colleagues might have preliminary discussion at technical level of his two recent papers and our paper before our next conversation. (This being arranged.)
/3/Document 20.
There is no doubt that Gromyko understands conditions under which, from our point of view, they could sign peace treaty with GDR without precipitating crisis. He again stated clearly, however, that they are not interested in a peace treaty as pure formality but one which would either be based upon a prior agreement with West or one which would carry with it full implications of GDR sovereignty with respect to access and other questions.
I am aware that you hoped that conversations with Gromyko would clarify whether we are moving toward a crisis or toward a possible agreement. Nothing has been said at Geneva which indicates that we are moving toward an agreement. Whether this means we are moving toward a crisis is still obscure. Fact that Gromyko seems interested in continuation talks is at least relevant. Suggest intelligence community be specially alerted for other evidence of Soviet intentions./4/
/4/At 5:37 p.m. on March 23 the Department of State cabled Secretary Rusk at Geneva that the intelligence community was reviewing Soviet intentions on Berlin, but the evidence available did not appear to indicate a Soviet intention to precipitate a crisis, although air and ground access to the city would continue to be harassed. (Tosec 128; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-2362)
As to what happens next after this round of talks, judgment should be deferred pending Gromyko's response to "modus vivendi" approach. Will report further in next day or so.
Unless there is some significant movement in their position in next two days, I plan to leave Geneva Monday afternoon./5/ In my final talk with Gromyko I would not register impasse but would merely say that I would report in full to you on our conversations.
/5/March 26.
Rusk
23. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, March 23, 1962, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/3-2362. Secret; Priority. Received at 2:40 p.m. Also sent to Geneva and Bonn.
1799. Geneva eyes only for Sec Rusk. Bonn eyes only for Dowling. From Clay. While the tightening of the rope around our neck in West Berlin has never stopped, the rate was accelerated with the air corridor harassments which began in early February prior to Geneva. The shooting of member of British Military Mission and shooting at car of member of our Mission which could have resulted in wounding or murder of occupant cannot be considered as separate isolated events but as a part of a pattern. Delays in clearing convoys, demands to search trucks, continued tailings in East Berlin all fit into this pattern. Also, visa charge tried out as test marks the initial inclusion of West German traffic in the pattern. With Geneva further evidence of Soviet intransigence its failure is almost certain to bring the rope still tighter. Notes may be fine for the record, but to stop this pattern we must be much more determined and stronger on the ground and in the air than we have been to date. I am convinced that retaliatory action against Soviet Mission is far more effective than a note and if we are not prepared to protect our own Mission to this degree we should withdraw it.
I think too we must be ready if harassment increases to show our strength in the air; to refuse to accept delays on the Autobahn; and to meet each restriction in German traffic with countermeasures of blockade and harassment elsewhere.
I hope that I am proved wrong and that we do not have to face increasing pressures. We are not going to stop Khrushchev and Ulbricht by wailing at the wall. Today, after thirteen years of pressure, we have no immediate course of action to meet any challenge. We must get our house in order so that we can move instantly, even if unilaterally, as hesitation and delay can quickly force us into a position where our only choice is war.
Lightner
24. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, March 25, 1962, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-2562. Secret; Niact. Passed to the White House. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Rusk and concurred in by Thompson, Kohler, and Bohlen. (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 193, Chron)
Secto 104. Eyes only President and Acting Secretary. No Other Distribution. On Soviet initiative Semenov and colleagues saw Kohler and Bohlen Saturday afternoon for further discussion modus vivendi paper./2/ Further talks same group taking place Sunday morning. While there is no specific indication of any Soviet change on points of substance they showed considerable interest in our present approach. There is still some apparent confusion in their minds between (a) reaching agreement on points of substance and (b) determining how to deal with the fact of disagreement without moving toward crisis. Presumption is I will see Gromyko perhaps Monday for further talk on basis preliminary exploration by experts. While we could be proved wrong within hours, our present impression is that they do seem to wish to keep things open at Geneva to avoid a break here, possibly with summit in mind. While Gromyko has not mentioned summit on his initiative, I did remark to him that our modus vivendi paper was an effort to envisage what Chiefs of Government could come out with if they should discuss Berlin.
/2/A 17-page memorandum of this conversation (SecDel MC/52) is ibid., Central Files, 762.00/3-2462.
On Saturday Semenov was seeking clarification number of points probably at Moscow's request. There is no doubt but that Gromyko is in contact with Moscow and is not merely handling question on basis instructions with which he departed for Geneva. Will report promptly on Sunday's conversation./3/
/3/At 8 p.m. on March 25 Rusk reported that the Sunday morning session had produced no appreciable change in the Soviet position except that the Soviet paper on access was not necessarily conditioned on withdrawal of Western forces from Berlin. (Secto 106 from Geneva; ibid., 110.11-RU/3-2562) A 14-page memorandum of this second conversation (SecDel MC/51) is ibid., 762.00/3-2562.
Still tentatively planning leave here late Monday or more probably Tuesday. However, I would not wish to leave if there is possibility of moving Berlin matter by another two or three days. Will communicate with you prior to any announcement my departure.
Rusk
25. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SecDel/MC/59
Geneva, March 26, 1962, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-2662. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on July 9. The meeting was held at the Soviet Mission. A detailed summary of this conversation was transmitted in Secto 114 from Geneva, March 27. (Ibid., 611.61/3-2762)
SUBJECT
Germany and Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Akalovsky
USSR
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Semenov
Mr. Sukhodrev
Mr. Gromyko invited the Secretary to speak first, saying that it was an unwritten tradition in the Soviet Union to have the guest speak first.
The Secretary said he wished to make one or two preliminary comments. He said that we had not responded initially and immediately to the Soviet paper on access because it was our view that it contained a fatal defect, i.e., the link between access and withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin. That link was also apparent in what Mr. Gromyko had said orally. The Secretary emphasized that any proposal contingent on the withdrawal of Western forces was impossible and misleading because of the importance we attached to the presence of Western forces in West Berlin. Referring to the US suggestion for an international access authority and to the Soviet suggestion for such an authority, the Secretary believed that it might be possible to explore this in order to see whether some solution could be found, but emphasized again the greatness of the problem created by the linkage.
The Secretary observed that this was an illustration of the fundamental problem in communications between our two governments. The Soviet proposals were obviously in conflict with the vital interests of the West. A series of communications and conversations both sides had had so far on these problems had made it obvious that there was no movement toward agreement. However, it was not in the interests of the two sides merely to say that no agreement was possible and let things develop toward a crisis. Therefore, the US had tried to list the points on which it believed agreement was possible, at least in general terms. If both sides agreed on general principles, they could proceed to discuss other problems.
The Secretary said that personally he did not believe that there were many points of difference; however, they were points involving vital interests and if they could be handled and managed, other problems would fall into place. In spite of the differences of emphasis and detail, the Secretary thought agreement should be possible on the questions of the status of West Berlin, boundaries, non-aggression, practical arrangements to reconcile access and what Mr. Gromyko called the sovereignty of GDR, and non-diffusion of nuclear weapons. He stressed, however, that the stumbling block was what we considered our vital interests.
Referring to the US paper on general principles,/2/ the Secretary said that it was not in direct response to the Soviet papers on principles and access, but was designed for a different purpose. While the Soviet paper on general principles restated Soviet proposals, we believed that account must be taken of the differences existing on the various problems and that we must see how to handle them. Thus our paper did not require withdrawal of Soviet proposals or acknowledgement by the USSR of our vital interests in any new form. On the other hand, our paper contained points on which both sides should be able to agree and which could serve as a basis for further discussions.
/2/Document 20.
Mr. Gromyko then launched into a lengthy statement frequently referring to what appeared to be a talking paper. He started out be restating the Soviet Government's belief that the Soviet proposals for a German peace treaty and the creation of a free city of West Berlin on the basis of such a treaty were aimed at a detente and at an improvement in international relations, particularly those between the great powers. He asserted that the Soviet Government wished good relations with the United States, including friendship, and that the peoples of our two countries would be grateful to their leaders if they were to bring about such relations. He stated that the Soviet Union had rejected and still rejected any attempts to depict the Soviet insistence on a peace treaty and on the creation of a free city of West Berlin as pursuit by the USSR of some narrow aims. The Soviet Government also flatly rejected assertions that the USSR or the GDR wish to take hold of West Berlin. Mr. Gromyko observed that such aims were alien to Soviet policy. He then said that the Soviet Union was proceeding on the basis of the fact that there was an absolutely abnormal situation in Germany and West Berlin, due to the fact that seventeen years after World War II there was still no peace treaty and the occupation regime continued to exist in West Berlin as if nothing had happened since the war. The Soviet Government believed that this abnormal situation was in conflict with the best interests of peace in Europe and throughout the world and was in conflict with the interests of improving relations among states, including those between the US and the USSR. He contended that the Soviet Government had never signed and could not sign a commitment providing for a perpetuation of the occupation of Germany or West Berlin, whereas what the Western Powers now sought in West Berlin was tantamount to the occupation of that city for an indefinite period. He reiterated that the Soviet Government could not agree to any such thing. Seventeen years had passed since World War II and a line should be drawn under that war; the drawing of such a line should not be a mere formal act but should involve changes stemming from a peace treaty.
Mr. Gromyko asserted that the Soviet Government proceeded from the facts of the existing situation, where two sovereign and independent German states existed, and suggested that all states must take account of those basic facts in shaping their policy with regard to Germany and, to a large extent, with regard to Europe in general. The Soviet Union proceeded from this basic fact and the purpose of a peace treaty was to bring the situation in Germany and Berlin into accord with the present as distinct from the past.
Mr. Gromyko continued that it was most important now to have a German peace treaty and to resolve the status of West Berlin on the basis of such a treaty by agreement of all states concerned. As to the contents of such status, the Soviet Government had made proposals on the subject and they were well known. He said that he wished to emphasize the Soviet Government's preference for an agreed solution of the problem of a German peace treaty and of the status of West Berlin on the basis of such a treaty. He stressed that the USSR would sign a peace treaty unilaterally and take appropriate steps without agreement on the part of the Western Powers only if the latter refused to reach agreement. However, the USSR preferred an agreed solution and the search for such a solution was the purpose of the present negotiations.
Mr. Gromyko then stated that the questions of a German peace treaty and of a free city of West Berlin were closely related to the question of respect for the sovereignty of the GDR. He said that the USSR could not accept any agreement not providing for such respect. The Soviet Union could not agree to any arrangements which would be based on a situation where certain states would completely disregard the sovereignty of the GDR because of their feeling of animosity toward that state. He said that while many countries had a social order and policies which the USSR did not like, the Soviet Government respected their sovereignty in dealing with them, and whenever the Soviet Union had to resolve certain problems with those countries it did so on the basis of respect for their sovereignty. The GDR should not be an exception from that rule. The Secretary's statement that unrestricted access and transit of persons and goods could be reconciled with respect for the GDR's sovereignty represented a correct thesis. The Soviet Government held the same view and had said so in New York and to Ambassador Thompson in Moscow. However, the main problem was the content and the interpretation of this formula. He asserted that the Soviet Government feared there was an intention merely to pay lip service to the sovereignty of the GDR and to flout it in practice. If this was the case, it would be regrettable and it would not facilitate agreement.
Referring to the Soviet paper on transit, Mr. Gromyko claimed that it had been prepared in order to meet repeated US requests that the Soviet Union spell out its views with regard to the question of respect for the sovereignty of the GDR in connection with the transit of persons and goods. He contended that the paper set forth the detailed views of the Soviet Government on the subject of civilian transport, but the US pretended not to have noticed the paper and merely said that its main defect was the link to the Soviet proposals on the status of West Berlin. Although it was true that there was a Soviet proposal on the status, the US now had an opportunity of considering the problem of transit thoroughly and of replying to the Soviet views on transit as such. Of course, transit would be to such a West Berlin the status of which would have to be agreed. However, the Soviet Union had now stated its views on transit and on the question of how sovereignty and transit could be reconciled, as both sides had said that they could.
With reference to the question of the presence of Western forces in West Berlin, Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet Government had proposed several variants of the solution of this problem, which were well known. He claimed that the Secretary's remarks indicated that the West regarded West Berlin only as a military springboard and a military base. The USSR was compelled to draw appropriate conclusions from this.
Mr. Gromyko then said that the Soviet Government had repeatedly stated its position with regard to the questions to be resolved in connection with a peace treaty, such as borders, non-transfer of nuclear weapons to and non-production of such weapons in the two Germanies, and non-aggression. That position was well known and there was no need to repeat it. The Soviet Union had tried to present its views on these matters in compressed form in the USSR working paper on general principles. Of course, the paper contained certain points which were not regarded favorably by the United States. However, the US paper also included certain points representing US unilateral positions and took no account of Soviet positions. Furthermore, the US paper even represented a backward step in certain areas.
Mr. Gromyko then reviewed the US paper paragraph by paragraph. With regard to paragraph 1, he said that the title "Berlin" appeared to reflect a desire to slip in the idea of one Berlin, something which was not negotiable. He said the United States itself had admitted that West Berlin was a separate entity and he contended that East Berlin was an organic part of the GDR. Referring to the phrase "for improving the situation" in subparagraph (b), he wondered what it meant. He suggested that it might mean an increase in the number of occupation troops or agreement on a perpetuation of the occupation. He asserted that the real question was that of eliminating the occupation and of removing the situation fraught with dangers and risks; the present situation yielded no good to anyone, including the United States, from the political, military, economic, or any other standpoint. With reference to subparagraph (c), he said it emphasized preservation of the present access procedures whereas the USSR proceeded on the basis of the need for respect for the sovereignty of the GDR and of reconciling the concept of the GDR sovereignty with free access. He said it would be intolerable if the sovereignty of the GDR was not respected. Mr. Gromyko asserted that there was no justification for the US apprehensions with regard to possible actions by the GDR in the event that the Soviet proposal was adopted, because if the USSR reached agreement with the US and its allies, it would consult its own allies, including the GDR, and the GDR would undertake appropriate obligations. Therefore, there was no ground for fears. He expressed the hope that the US would study the Soviet proposals on access, including access authority, and duly evaluate them. He reiterated the Soviet desire to reach agreement and said he wished to stress again that only if there were no agreement between the two sides would the West have to deal with the GDR. He reiterated that the US should now carefully study the consideration expressed by the USSR.
Referring to paragraph 2 of the US Draft Principles, Mr. Gromyko noted that subparagraphs (a) and (b) referred to German unification. He said the Soviet Government's view was that this was an internal matter for the Germans themselves to resolve by agreement between the GDR and the FRG and asserted that conclusion of a single peace treaty or of two separate peace treaties would facilitate a rapprochement between the two German states. He claimed that this paragraph was an illustration of the incorrectness of the US assertion that the paper set forth agreed views. The Soviet views on the question of German unification were known to the US, but the paper set forth the US' own views. With reference to subparagraph (c), Mr. Gromyko said that it was the Soviet view that any agreement with any part of Germany must be consistent with the understanding, including the results of the present negotiations between the two sides on the questions relating to a German peace settlement, if such an understanding was reached. On the other hand, if there were no such understanding, then the USSR would have no alternative other than to act on the basis of a peace treaty with the GDR. However, that would be the case only in the event that there was no agreement between East and West.
Commenting on paragraph 3, Mr. Gromyko contended that it substituted the question of non-armament of the two German states with nuclear weapons and of non-production of such weapons in those states with the question of a much broader, international scope. Yet conversations both here in Geneva and in New York had dealt with this problem with specific reference to the two Germanies. Mr. Gromyko said that the USSR was not opposed to the idea of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons on a global scale and noted that the Soviet vote for the respective UN General Assembly resolution, as well as the Soviet Government's communication on this question to the acting Secretary General of the United Nations, reflected that attitude. However, for reasons that were well known, it was important that one problem not be replaced with the other or made contingent upon its solution. Moreover, the formula in the US paper was unsatisfactory because it did not preclude such interpretation as would allow armament with nuclear weapons of such Bundeswehr and other non-nuclear nation forces as were formally not under the control of "national governments" but were considered as part of NATO forces. He stated that the language of this paragraph should not allow such interpretation. He noted, however, that the USSR would not object to the inclusion of such a broad formula in the principles, if they were agreed, provided that it contained the phrase "including the two German states." Furthermore, it must also be understood that the solution of the broad problem must not hold up the application of this principle to the two German states. Of course, if there were no delay with regard to the broad problem, there would be no difficulty. Mr. Gromyko then stated that the Soviet position was that nuclear weapons should not be transferred either directly, through third parties, or through military organizations; this should apply to both the universal formula and the formula restricted only to the two German states.
Turning to paragraph 4 of the US paper, Mr. Gromyko said that reference to non-use of force in sub-paragraph (a) was a minimum minimorum. On the other hand, the USSR believed that borders must be legally formalized. The positions of the two sides were also different with regard to the question of demarcation lines, because the USSR did not make any distinction between external borders of and the line between the two Germanies. He contended that it would be in the interest of peace if the internal line were formalized as a border. Noting that so far neither side had proposed either orally or in writing any modus for such formalization, Mr. Gromyko thought that both sides would have to work out such a modus at a later date. As to sub-paragraph 4 (b), Mr. Gromyko said that a declaration on non-aggression was an acceptable form of obligation from the Soviet standpoint. However, he professed puzzlement in regard to the provision under (ii) and wondered why language causing puzzlement and even apprehension should be included. A non-aggression agreement was a clear commitment involving politico-moral obligations to which nothing should be added that complicated the matter. With respect to sub-paragraph (c), Mr. Gromyko said that the USSR could not accept reference to past statements by the FRG. He noted that this point related to paragraph 8 in the Soviet draft principles. It was quite evident that the two German states must make some kind of statements. Furthermore, in the spirit of fairness, if reference was made to past statements by the FRG, then past statements by the GDR should also be referred to.
Observing that those were the Soviet views on the US working paper, Mr. Gromyko said that he wished to point out that, in developing its own proposals, the USSR had attempted to narrow the gap between the US and the Soviet positions. He regretted that the Soviet action had not met with due response on the part of the US and expressed the hope that the US would pay greater attention to the study of Soviet proposals and would find in them what it had not yet been able to discern. Of course, it was possible that the US had already discerned certain points in the Soviet proposals but was unwilling to speak about them. Mr. Gromyko then claimed that the Soviet basic proposals for a German peace treaty and the solution of the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a treaty, as well as the additional Soviet proposals made here in Geneva in both written and oral form, were designed to facilitate an understanding between the two sides. He said that the main goal was to eliminate the differences between the two sides and to remove the obstacles to agreement between them in Europe, where their interests collided and where dangers existed.
Mr. Gromyko said that he wished to conclude by recalling Mr. Khrushchev's statement in Vienna that Central Europe, West Berlin, and the question of a German peace treaty and of the status of West Berlin on the basis of such a treaty were the only areas in the world where the US and the USSR interests were in direct collision. If this problem were settled, that would lead to a radical improvement in the relations between our two states and in the situation in Europe generally. In this connection, he also recalled the Secretary's statement in New York that an improvement in the relations between our two states would be of historic significance.
The Secretary responded by saying that he wished to reciprocate the comments Mr. Gromyko had made at the beginning and at the end of his remarks. He stated that the two Governments should try to reach agreement on these problems. Berlin and Germany were undoubtedly the most critical problems and if they were resolved prospects would open for an improvement in the relations between our two states with regard to many other matters. The Secretary felt that it was important that both countries reach agreement on these problems and not let them affect adversely their relations in other areas, including disarmament, where the US was determined to make every effort to reach positive results.
Noting that Mr. Gromyko had touched upon a great number of points, the Secretary said that he would not deal with all of them in detail, but wished to make certain observations on some of them. The Secretary appreciated Mr. Gromyko's detailed comments on the US paper on general principles. However, he wished to emphasize that Mr. Gromyko was not right in saying that our principles took no account of Soviet positions and even represented a backward step as compared to earlier discussions. In fact, discussions between our two sides over the period of the past months had been taking place in a somewhat one-sided manner which was disadvantageous to the US. The USSR had put forward proposals with regard to what it believed to be the right way of drawing a line under World War II. The United States had also had proposals as to how a line under World War II should be drawn, i.e., by unification through free elections, and with Berlin as the capital of a unified Germany. However, we were not putting those proposals forward because that would mean a mere exchange of proposals without agreement. Rather, we had based ourselves on the factual situation. On the other hand, when under these circumstances the Soviet Union said that a line should be drawn under World War II, it clearly had in mind changes which were to a serious disadvantage to the West. The Secretary observed that this brought him to the key point, i.e., the presence of Western forces in West Berlin. He stressed strongly that the US could not accept the view that there was an anomaly in the presence of Western forces in West Berlin; that was no more abnormal than any other aspect of the situation in Germany. Neither could the US accept the view that lines of influence had been drawn in Germany and that Western presence east of those lines was abnormal. Arrangements had been made at the end of World War II, and they provided for Western presence where it existed today. The Secretary recalled the clear and forceful statement by the President in Vienna with regard to the great effect on the Western position that would take place if we permitted ourselves to be driven out of that area. He observed that he did not say that the USSR intended to drive us out, but noted that the objective effect of the Soviet proposals would be just that. This had also been made clear by the President in Vienna.
The Secretary went on to say that he could not agree that there was ground for fears that West Berlin was a military base. The Western forces in West Berlin were minute in the present military situation. They had minor arms, no nuclear weapons, and insecure communications. No military leader in the East or West would regard West Berlin as a military base. The troops in West Berlin were there exclusively for political purposes, namely, to stabilize the situation in Germany, and such stabilization worked to the advantage of both the USSR and the US. Mr. Gromyko and his colleagues had stated from time to time that the Soviet proposals concerning Berlin were good for the West. The Secretary said that he wished to tell Mr. Gromyko sincerely that the presence of Western forces in West Berlin was good for both the United States and the USSR. However, neither side should tell the other what was good for it; each of them should decide this for itself and then both should talk to each other on that basis.
Turning to the question of transit, the Secretary noted that Mr. Gromyko had used the phrases "transit as such" and "transit to such a Berlin the status of which was to be agreed upon". He also observed that any proposals on transit must not necessarily be linked to the withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin. As to the compatibility of free access with the so-called sovereignty of the GDR, the Secretary said this was something both sides had said should be possible, but he was not sure that a common formula had been found for working this problem out. He stated that the expressions "free access" and "exercise of sovereignty" contained the seeds of basic contradiction, unless agreement with respect to free access did not involve the exercise of sovereignty in any manner that would frustrate the agreement. In this connection, the Secretary referred to the first two sentences in paragraph 2 of the Soviet paper on transit and wondered how they could be reconciled. He supposed that both sides would work out a new understanding with regard to access, which would then be subject to agreement by East Germany. The Secretary recalled his remarks that East Germans would of necessity participate in access procedures; however, in a broader sense, the exercise of sovereignty, as far as East Germany was concerned, would consist in agreeing to access. On the other hand, if "sovereignty" meant assumption of control over access in any geographic area, then access would be vulnerable. The United States had proposed an international access authority which it believed could overcome this problem. Mr. Gromyko had made a different proposal with regard to such an authority, which would not necessarily overcome that problem. The Soviet proposal assumed disputes and provided for a four-power commission to arbitrate. This, the Secretary noted, also involved the question of whether that commission would act under the unanimity rule. However, the Secretary stated, if transit was not dependent on the withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin, then he thought that there were some points here which brought the two sides closer together and we could see how to move toward agreement, because he did not believe there was an inherent problem in the matter of reconciling access with the activities of the authorities in East Germany.
Referring to the US paper on principles, the Secretary said he supposed that the general principle under the heading "Berlin" was something both sides had said over the past several months. As to the word "improvement" in sub-paragraph (b), he said there was no basis for suspicion here, because if satisfactory arrangements were found, that would represent improvement; he could not imagine that arrangements agreed upon by both sides would not constitute improvement. As to paragraph 2, the Secretary recalled Mr. Gromyko's comment that it contained a one-sided formulation. However, the Secretary observed, Mr. Gromyko would surely recognize that this was basically what both sides had been saying, and had said more formally in 1955,/3/ although the paragraph omitted reference to free elections. The United States agreed that reunification was something for the German people to accomplish; however, we believed that the victorious powers had a residual responsibility for the solution of the German problem. In any event, the language of paragraph 2 was formulated in such a way as to reflect what we believed to be the Soviet position as well.
/3/Presumably Rusk is referring to the Directive of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers to the Foreign Ministers, July 23, 1955; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. V, pp. 527-528.
As to Mr. Gromyko's comments on the question of nuclear diffusion, the Secretary recalled Mr. Gromyko's statement in New York that the two Germanies should not have nuclear weapons and his own statement that this presented no problem because it was our national policy to oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons to any national government, including the two Germanies. He expressed the view that this problem was something that could be worked out promptly. If there should be any delay because of some difficulties, we could see what could be done, but we preferred the general formula rather than to point at this or that individual state. As to indirect transfer, the Secretary stated we had no intention of giving nuclear weapons to the Bundeswehr or any other national forces, directly or through third parties. He reiterated that the US was opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and said that we had gone to considerable length to safeguard that policy.
The Secretary then recalled the President's remark to Mr. Adzhubei to the effect that some questions might be easier to resolve with the passing of time. He said that he wished to note that this did not mean procrastination, because when two sides were in disagreement it was difficult to tell which side was procrastinating in not agreeing with the other. However, many things could happen with time and create a situation where problems would be easier to resolve. For instance, the situation in East Germany had been stabilized in many respects and the flow of refugees had been stopped. Steps could be made in the disarmament field which would create a situation where solution of various problems might be easier. Also, the confrontation in Berlin could be reduced. The Secretary noted that our main problem was that we were dealing here with a dangerous confrontation of interests and particularly with proposals which we believed seriously affected our interests. Both sides should avoid affecting their mutual interests and develop the situation with regard to Berlin on that basis.
The Secretary then observed that Mr. Gromyko had made some twenty-five points and that he had not responded to all of them. He said that he wished to study Mr. Gromyko's remarks against the background of the previous conversations and then report to the President. He expressed the hope that Mr. Gromyko would do the same and said that both sides should see how to move toward agreement on this critical question. Reverting to paragraph 1 of the US draft principles, the Secretary added that reference to "improving the situation in Berlin" related to possible arrangements with regard to traffic, family ties, and other possible improvements affecting both parts of Berlin. He noted that the first part of paragraph 1 referred to West Berlin. The Secretary observed that this wording was not an attempt to conceal an all-Berlin proposal, although the US was prepared to make such a proposal at any moment.
Mr. Gromyko said he wished to comment on some points made by the Secretary. Referring to the Secretary's remark with regard to the link between access and the status of West Berlin, Mr. Gromyko said that there was indeed such a link in the Soviet proposals. He said that transit arrangements would be superimposed on an agreed status of West Berlin and noted that the Soviet proposals with regard to transit did not exist outside such an agreement.
Mr. Gromyko then expressed satisfaction at the Secretary's remark that there were some points of a positive nature in the Soviet paper on access. As to the question of the voting procedure in the proposed four-power commission, Mr. Gromyko stated that this was a subject for later discussion and that he did not wish to commit himself now. However, he believed that the voting procedure should be such as to satisfy all parties and at the same time not be in conflict with the sovereignty of the GDR. As to the purpose of the international authority, he viewed that authority as arbiter acting in situations such as those discussed in Geneva in 1959./4/
/4/For documentation on the Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting May 11-August 6, 1959, see ibid., 1958-1960, volume VIII.
Referring to the Secretary's comment on the first two sentences in paragraph 2 of the Soviet paper on transit, Mr. Gromyko said that if there were no contradictions there would be no problem. He contended that such contradictions exited whenever international obligations were assumed: while one party must abide by its obligations the other party must respect its sovereignty. This was nothing new and was not an insoluble problem. In fact, the US itself, through Ambassador Thompson, had referred to international agreements, in particular the Chicago Convention./5/ Mr. Gromyko said he was happy to hear the Secretary say that such arrangements were made on a daily basis. He went on to say that it was inconceivable to imagine a situation where the GDR would take control over access in the face of such obligations as it would have assumed with regard to access arrangements, including international authority. Thus the Secretary's fears were not justified.
/5/For text of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed at Chicago on December 7, 1944, see 61 Stat. 1180.
As to the duration of an agreement on transit, Mr. Gromyko said that the USSR proceeded on the basis that if there was agreement on the status of West Berlin, civilian transit arrangements would remain in force for the duration of the status.
Turning to the question of nuclear diffusion, Mr. Gromyko said he thought the Secretary apparently understood the difference between the two variants and the Soviet apprehensions in this matter. He reiterated that the Soviet Union did not wish any delay in the development of global arrangements to cause delay in the arrangements with regard to the two German states. He said that every effort should be made to develop global arrangements, but these two questions should not be linked.
As to the President's remark to Mr. Adzhubei, Mr. Gromyko said it was true that time could be an ally, but observed that sometimes it could also be an enemy and could work against the improvement of relations between our two states. The Soviet Government believed that time was ripe for removing the dangers inherent in the West Berlin situation. Therefore, both sides should seek methods of reaching a speedy agreement. However, the USSR was opposed to negotiations for the sake of negotiations; it was in favor of serious negotiations. The USSR had agreed to bilateral exchanges of views and continued to favor such exchanges. It hoped that such exchanges would lead to positive results which would provide a basis for agreement on the question of a German peace treaty.
The Secretary inquired what dangers Mr. Gromyko saw in the West Berlin situation and suggested surely it was not the presence of Western forces.
Mr. Gromyko responded by reiterating that the situation in West Berlin was an abnormal one, since it was frozen as it had emerged in the first days after the war. The US might like that situation, but the USSR did not. There were many unsatisfactory aspects to this situation, such as the presence of Western forces in West Berlin, the continuation of the occupation status in West Berlin, disregard for the sovereignty of the GDR, and many other questions still remaining unresolved--such as frontiers, nuclear weapons, etc.
Perpetuation of this situation was not in the interests of the US either, as least as the USSR saw those interests; nor was it in the interests of peace in Europe. The Soviet Union proceeded on the basis of facts and wanted the present situation to be in line with the actual situation in Germany. Mr. Gromyko asserted that there were few examples in history where for seventeen years after the war there had been no peace treaty and where the situation, such as that in West Berlin, had been preserved in the same form as it had existed three days after the war. He contended that the acuteness of the abnormal situation was compounded by such factors as the existence of nuclear weapons, rockets, etc., which might give rise to accidents. He wondered why one should play with this kind of a situation and why one should not remove these time bombs left over from World War II, so that all nations could breathe freely and live in peace and tranquillity.
The Secretary referred to Mr. Gromyko's remark with regard to the link and said that he had understood from Mr. Gromyko's statements in earlier conversations that the Soviet proposal for access was specifically related to the withdrawal of Western forces. He observed that the presence of Western forces was considerably different from status and that it was conceivable to reach agreement on a status that would be different from removal of Western forces from West Berlin.
In response to the Secretary's question, Mr. Gromyko drew a diagram indicating three elements: access, status, and troops. He drew lines between access and status and between status and troops, but observed one could also draw a line directly from access to troops. He said that the USSR had given the US its views as to how it understood access in relation to status. Thus access would lead to such West Berlin the status of which had been agreed. [sic] As to the Soviet proposal on status, it was well known and it included substitution of Western forces with neutral or UN troops.
The Secretary observed that Mr. Gromyko's clarification was not very helpful, because it still very much linked access to withdrawal of forces, which was not negotiable. Referring to Mr. Gromyko's remark about tensions, the Secretary said that tensions arise from the fact that the USSR had been asking for something we could not give it. This was the heart of the matter. Furthermore, both sides had commitments concerning Germany and in that respect both of them were interested in the factual situation.
The Secretary reiterated that both sides would like to think about what had been said in Geneva and said he wished to report to the President upon his return to Washington. Referring to Mr. Gromyko's remark with respect to bilateral exchanges, the Secretary said both sides should get in touch after they had carefully reviewed what had been said, because it was in the interest of both sides to do everything they could in order to settle these problems. The Secretary noted that he was not suggesting any particular channel and invited Mr. Gromyko to make suggestions.
Mr. Gromyko said that the channel for bilateral contacts could perhaps be worked out later. He remarked in passing that if the US preferred to use Moscow there would be no objection. In any event, the USSR would wish to know what prospects there were and therefore the question of the form of contact should be considered by both sides in the near future. He said that this stemmed from the USSR's desire to have serious negotiations to seek possibilities for agreement rather than negotiations for the sake of negotiations.
The Secretary replied that the US was also against negotiations for the sake of negotiations and stressed the necessity of seeking solutions. He expressed the hope that he could come to Moscow some time, but said he was not sure if that fitted this situation.
Mr. Gromyko concluded the conversation by saying that the Secretary would be welcome if he found it possible to visit Moscow, including in connection with this problem. However, this was of course something for the Secretary himself to decide. He remarked that the Soviet Foreign Minister had been to Washington whereas the US Secretary of State had not been to Moscow.
26. Telegram From the President's Special Representative in Berlin (Clay) to the Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe (Clarke)/1/
Berlin, March 26, 1962, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/3-2662. Top Secret; Priority. Also sent to Bonn, Geneva, and to the Department of State as telegram 1817, which is the source text.
1076. POLAD USAREUR for Clarke. Bonn for Ambassador. Geneva for SecDel. From Clay. Reference: Bonn 785 Berlin, 2300 Dept./2/ I do not want to belabor the shooting incident. However I must say that sending a letter of protest while doing nothing is the surest way to make it meaningless.
/2/See footnote 3, Document 21.
That the GDR police would shoot up an occupied American military vehicle is shocking to the thinking German and I might add to me, also, when we do nothing but write a letter of protest while we wait for a reply. That this was done by GDR police was much more damaging to our prestige than had it been done by Soviet personnel.
I appreciate the importance of the intelligence you obtain from our Mission, but you must also appreciate the loss of American prestige which is involved and its effect on the confidence of the German people.
We seem to think that unless there is public hue and cry there is no threat to morale. Thus, we argue that air harassments have not damaged morale as air traffic has increased. This is far from the real truth as the Germans who influence public thinking are watching every move in the air to see what we will do. These same Germans are equally concerned to find out how we will react to this most flagrant GDR attack. Secret harassment of Soviet Missions will be no answer as an effective response must be evident to the public, nor will reactions so long delayed as not to be instantly identified with the cause.
I must admit that as I am queried by responsible Germans and Americans, I do not find them particularly impressed by our firmness and determination when I tell them that we have reacted by writing another note.
27. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, March 26, 1962, midnight.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-2662. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Passed to the White House. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Rusk. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2060)
Secto 113. President and Acting Secretary from the Secretary. No Other Distribution. As I wind up this round of talks with Gromyko on Berlin, I have the following summary reactions prior to full report on my return:
1. Soviets have not changed their proposals in any significant way since Vienna summit.
2. Gromyko has carefully avoided threat and bluster on the one side and any temptation to declare an impasse on the other. Bearing in mind your conversation with me just before my departure,/2/ I presented Gromyko with several opportunities to clarify completely their real intentions, specifically to discover whether they are determined to move to a crisis. He consistently backed away.
/2/According to Kennedy's and Rusk's Appointment Books, the President, Secretary of State, and their principal advisers had met at the White House from 11 a.m. to noon of March 9, to discuss, inter alia, disarmament and Berlin. No other record of this meeting has been found.
3. Although they can change their minds overnight, they clearly left the impression that they wished to continue talks on a bilateral basis and are flexible as to exact means. Gromyko underlined that we could consider Dobrynin as a fully reliable channel with full confidence Khru-shchev. In doing so, however, he did not rule out any other channel and renewed this most informal invitation to me, for example, to visit Moscow if it should prove convenient.
4. My associates and I believe that in our talks here, including expert level consultations, we accumulated a great deal of "raw data" which we must carefully review to determine what the most promising line of our next approach might be.
5. Although Gromyko did not accept our modus vivendi approach in these discussions, his criticisms of our so-called principles were not fundamental and I think some revision of this approach might be a good next step whatever the channel.
6. Despite preceding paragraph, Soviets are still pressing for major agreement on essence of their proposals and are reluctant to abandon them even tacitly for a modus vivendi. I am more than ever convinced that what we have described as our vital interests in Berlin are just that and that Soviets look upon our attitude as a formidable obstacle and are reluctant to challenge these interests frontally.
7. Gromyko and I did not reach formal agreement on any point but it is obvious that there are a number of points on which we could agree. Similarly, we did not reach a degree of disagreement on any point which precludes further discussion.
Upon my arrival at airport I plan to make most minimum statement pending full report to you.
Rusk
28. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Mission at Berlin/1/
Geneva, March 27, 1962, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-2762. Secret. Also sent to the Department of State as Secto 116, which is the source text.
21. Eyes only Acting Secretary. Eyes only for Clay from Secretary. Before leaving Geneva, I wanted you to know that, although our talks with Soviets will continue, we made no real headway towards any substantive agreement on Berlin which we could accept. As indicated in the joint American-Soviet statement issued this morning,/2/ it is fair to say that some progress was made in clarifying points of agreement and points of difference, but points of difference remain fundamental.
/2/For text of this statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 691.
I did obtain impression, however, that Soviets do not wish to have confrontation now and desire to maintain contact with us on Berlin. Whether this is consistent with continuing harassments in air corridors and on ground access routes is an obviously related question. I have this morning emphasized to Gromyko that increased Soviet air corridor activity today is inconsistent with spirit of our joint statement and that we cannot help but draw judgments not only from what Soviets say about desiring peaceful solution but also from what they do./3/
/3/No other record of this conversation with Gromyko has been found.
I have not tried to comment specifically from Geneva on your recent messages making recommendations to Dept and USAREUR. However, in a related matter, I have today urged strongly on Lord Home desirability of our instituting certain naval counter measures in response to Soviet harassments of Berlin access. I shall now be reporting to President and, after consultation with our Allies, we shall then have to give thought to next diplomatic round. I am glad that, in meantime, from all evidence Berlin morale and elan remain good though subjected to strains and doubts of which you have made us aware.
Rusk
29. Minutes of the Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, March 28, 1962, 10:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.
[Here follow three pages of discussion of nuclear testing and disarmament.]
The Secretary then turned to Berlin. Here we are no nearer the substance of an agreement but there is a change in tone. At the beginning of the meeting the Soviets had been willing to talk, but the initiative for conversations had come from us. At the end of the meeting the initiative had come from them, and Gromyko had made it plain in his closing statements that they are committed to further bilateral conversations. Yet they are still trying to convert us to their basic view and have not yet really considered our arguments in favor of a modus vivendi which recognizes the fact of basic disagreement.
But the Soviet Union has made proposals on access which, if they could be separated from their unacceptable position on Western troops in West Berlin, would be helpful and worth considering carefully. They also showed some interest in our actions of a modus vivendi.
On the other hand, we did not get much help from Gromyko on harassments in Berlin. He professed ignorance of these harassments both at the beginning and the end of the meeting. The Secretary recalled his firm dealings with Gromyko on the chaff issue and remarked that he had been troubled to discover only later that chaff had been dropped in these areas many times before, although perhaps in not so dangerous or calculated a fashion. The President remarked that he also was troubled, and in response to the President's question the Secretary said that Lord Home seemed also not to have known the history of chaff when he made a still stronger statement to Gromyko. The Secretary remarked that he had made it plain to Gromyko at the end that we would listen both to what the Soviets said and to what happened in Berlin.
In summary, the Secretary indicated his belief that we must match the Soviets in patience and in persistence in these discussions. They were quite willing to play their long-playing record over and over again, and we should be ready to do the same thing. We should keep at it, clearly and continuously. These discussions had not moved very far because Gromyko had been bound closely by his instructions, but we had kept right on showing our views of the way of moving the problems forward. The conversations had been courteous and sober. Gromyko had personally been affable and friendly. The meeting took place with no indication of an impasse. The Secretary reported that the Germans and the French had been kept informed--although he later asked all concerned to protect the fact of contact with the French (because General de Gaulle is not informed of it).
Mr. Kohler added that the German attitude had been excellent. The Secretary concluded by saying that there was a lot of raw material from these conversations and that he and his associates hoped to study it closely in the next few days and see if we could formulate new proposals which might remove some suspicions. But progress would be slow. The Secretary believed he had brought back a thin piece of bacon, but we could go on from here./2/
/2/At 4 p.m. Rusk also reported to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on his discussions at Geneva. For text of his statement and related questions, see Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), 1962, vol. XIV, pp. 335-357.
[Here follow four paragraphs of discussion of unrelated subjects.]
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