Documents 30-58
APRIL-MAY 1962: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
30. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/
Fifth Revision
Washington, April 3, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-462. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but it was attached to an April 4 memorandum from Rusk to the President, which stated that the extensive new language was drawn largely from the texts of the two Soviet documents presented in Geneva or from verbal accounts of Soviet views. A preliminary draft of the paper, which has the same numbered paragraphs but no preamble, is attached to a March 30 memorandum from Klein to Bundy. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Staff Memoranda, Klein) A copy of the fourth revision, also dated April 3, which was drafted that morning at a meeting at the Department of State attended by Klein, Bohlen, Kohler, Thompson, and Hillenbrand, and is the same as this paper except for two paragraphs, is ibid.
DRAFT PRINCIPLES, PROCEDURES, AND INTERIM STEPS
(Amended to Reflect Geneva Discussions. New Language Underlined)
The parties have discussed certain issues related to the reduction of tensions and the strengthening of peace. They have sought to deal with these issues in a way which would accomplish two things:
First, it would create a useful framework for continuing negotiations concerning aspects of these issues on which differences remain to be resolved. To this end, the parties have agreed in regard to each of the issues under discussion: (i) on general principles, which will serve as a basis for continuing negotiations, and (ii) on procedures to govern these continuing negotiations. In this connection, a Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies will be established which France and the UK will be invited to join.
Second, it would permit them to take interim action concerning urgent aspects of these issues on which the parties are already of the same view. To this end, the parties have agreed on certain interim steps to deal with aspects of these issues that pose immediate dangers. These interim steps do not purport to settle the questions for all time but they are needed to meet pressing problems until more comprehensive agreements can be reached in the above-mentioned negotiations.
There follows, therefore, in regard to each of the issues under discussion, a statement of (i) general principles to serve as a basis for future negotiations; (ii) procedures for these future negotiations; (iii) interim steps to be taken in the meantime.
1. Berlin
(a) General Principles: They agree that the Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies should, in its continuing negotiations, take account of the general principles that, pending the reestablishment of German unity:
(i) West Berlin should be free to choose its own way of life;
(ii) the parties should undertake to respect the social order that has taken shape therein;
(iii) its viability--including the stability and prosperity of its economy--should be maintained.
(iv) Unrestricted communication will be assured between West Berlin and West Germany in a manner which respects the functions, activities, and prerogatives of the competent authorities and which permits the competent authorities in West Berlin to determine who may or may not enter West Berlin. Subject to the foregoing, an International Access Authority should be established to perform specified functions in order to ensure this unrestricted communication.
(b) Future Negotiations: They agree to study proposals relating to West Berlin in an effort to reach agreements which would give effect to these principles in a way consistent with the vital interests of all parties in the aforementioned Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies.
(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they declare that access procedures in effect on January 1, 1962, will remain in effect. Rules and regulations of the competent authorities, including sanitary laws and regulations, which the Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies agrees are compatible with the principle of free access between West Berlin and West Germany, will be respected. Included among procedures in effect on January 1, 1962, is the fact that transit will proceed along the same communication routes presently used, and will be subject to compliance with the existing procedures, whereby:
(i) transit vehicles and their passengers are not allowed to deviate from the established transit routes;
(ii) passengers in transit are not allowed to go beyond the limits of the communications routes used for transit;
(iii) passengers in transit are prohibited from giving or receiving any articles; and
(iv) no one may board vehicles in transit to Berlin.
They also declare that they will seek agreement of the authorities in West and East Berlin to establish an all-Berlin technical commission, to be composed of officials appointed by the Governments of West Berlin and of East Berlin, to deal with such matters as the handling of traffic, sewage, and public utilities.
2. Germany
(a) General Principles: They believe that the Germans have the right to determine their own future, and they wish to facilitate the exercise of this right in a way that will enhance the security of all European peoples.
(b) Future Negotiations: They agree that the authorities in West and East Germany should be invited to establish three mixed technical commissions, consisting of officials designated by these authorities, to increase cultural and technical contacts, to promote mutually beneficial economic exchanges, and to consider a draft electoral law or other steps toward German reunification, respectively.
(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime they declare they will insure that in any arrangements into which any of them may enter with any part of Germany account will be taken of the provisions in this paper agreed by the parties in advance, except to the extent that these provisions may be modified by agreement such as may result from the continuing negotiations within the Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies.
3. Nuclear Diffusion
(a) General Principles: They believe that further diffusion of nuclear weapons into the control of national governments not now owning them would make more difficult the problem of maintaining lasting peace.
(b) Future Negotiations: They agree to seek in the above-mentioned Committee (or other appropriate forum) to develop policies regarding non-diffusion of nuclear weapons to which all states owning nuclear weapons might agree and to which states not now owning nuclear weapons might also subscribe.
(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, as states now owning nuclear weapons, they declare they will not themselves relinquish control over any nuclear weapons to any individual state or regime not now owning such weapons; including any state or regime exercising functions within the area referred to in 4. (c) below; they will not transmit to such state or regime information, equipment, or material necessary for their manufacture; and they will urge states or regimes not now owning nuclear weapons to undertake not to try to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states or to seek or receive information, equipment, or material necessary for their manufacture.
4. Non-Aggression
(a) General Principles: They believe that force should not be used to change existing frontiers and demarcation lines in Europe or for any other aggressive purpose.
(b) Future Negotiations: With a view toward strengthening peace and European security, they agree to seek in the above-mentioned Committee (or a Sub-committee thereof):
(i) to develop a suitable declaration which the NATO and Warsaw Pact Organizations might make to register their renunciation of the use of force for the settlement of international questions, and, specifically, the renunciation of the use of force to change existing boundaries and demarcation lines in Europe, and,
(ii) to consider measures to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation.
(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime they declare they will not themselves use or support the use of force to change the external and internal borders of Germany including the existing borders of West Berlin, and they note with approval declarations by German authorities in the same sense.
5. Procedures
(a) The parties note with approval declarations by the competent German authorities, assuring their allies that they will act in conformity with the above provisions regarding access and other matters relevant to their functions and prerogatives.
(b) Once the proposed Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies has been established: (i) the Foreign Ministers of the countries represented on it would meet periodically as seems useful to review its work; (ii) if and as warranted, the Heads of Government could meet to consummate concrete agreements reached by the Foreign Ministers and their Deputies in the proposed Committee.
31. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, April 6, 1962, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-662. Secret; Priority.
1891. Eyes only for Rusk from Clay. While it is much too soon for positive diagnosis and probably for this message, the change in Soviet attitude since the final Rusk-Gromyko talk must be given real significance. At this point, I am inclined to believe that it marks the full end of the wall crisis and that we have won this round which started just after the wall was in place.
I believe that the Soviets and East Germans had to erect a wall to stop refugee flow but that it was hoped also it would panic West Berlin and lead to Allied disagreements, particularly with FRG. Thus, harassments against Allies were stepped up in the belief that Allied failure to react would aid in creating panic in West Berlin.
We met their harassments promptly and while I sometimes thought with less strength than was desirable, I must admit with sufficient strength to nullify any real fears they might have developed in West Berlin and to convince the Soviet representatives that harassments to be effective would truly involve the risk of war. Meanwhile, West Berlin, temporarily stunned by the wall, recovered its morale and maintained a thriving economy. It was evident that harassment alone could not destroy West Berlin.
I do not pretend to know what the next Soviet move will be other than to continue talks in a less oppressive atmosphere. However, I doubt if harassments will remain the order of the day and I would predict a stable and quiet situation here for several months. If there are no negotiations or if negotiations take place and fail, we may expect another Berlin crisis. If it comes again some months from now, I would expect it to be directed against the West Berlin economy rather than against the Allies.
I would urge even now that we increase our effort to sharpen our counter measures, particularly to enable economic sanctions and blockades to be placed in effect promptly. I think we have won a battle but not the campaign and that we now have an interlude in which we can get ready for the next battle.
Once again, I repeat that I think the immediate crisis in Berlin created by the wall is over and that we have won this round. While it is still only a battle and not the campaign, you have my sincere congratulations for bringing it about./2/
Lightner
/2/In telegram 1892 from Berlin, April 6, Clay elaborated further on signs in Berlin that indicated a definite change in the Soviet position. Citing Soviet cessation of harassing flights, their agreement on the status of military missions, overtures to discuss the impasse over visits by the Soviet and U.S. Commandants, and general friendliness of Soviet representatives, Clay stated that the West could agree to cut down the number of convoys using the Autobahn in an effort to meet these Soviet advances. (Ibid.)
32. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, April 7, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-762. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The source text bears no drafting information.
SUBJECT
Further Berlin Negotiations
The President reached the following decisions at the meeting on Berlin in the Cabinet Room on April 7 at 10:30 a.m./2/
/2/According to the President's Appointment Book, Bundy, Ball, Kohler, Bohlen, Hillenbrand, Thompson, Sorensen, the President, and the Vice President attended the meeting. (Kennedy Library) In a memorandum to the Vice President, April 6, Colonel Burris stated that the President called it a negotiating discussion concerned with political policies, and that no military personnel would be present. He concluded that the purpose of the meeting was "to discuss the general policies and courses of action, measures and counter-measures, which should be taken in Berlin, Geneva, and with NATO allies henceforth." (Johnson Library, Vice President Security File, Memos from Burris)
1. The revised draft of April 3/3/ was approved for discussion with our principal allies, preparatory to discussions with Ambassador Dobrynin, which it is hoped that you will be ready to undertake by the beginning of the week of April 16. The President desires that such negotiations be well launched before the resumption of atmospheric testing, which is now scheduled for the beginning of the following week.
/3/Although the source text bears the handwritten notation "(attached)", no draft was attached to it; see, however, Document 30.
2. The President approved the following change in the document: in paragraph 3 a., replace the words "national governments" by the words "any national government."
3. The President desires that every effort be made to minimize the possibility of damaging leaks during and after the process of Allied consultation. In this connection, he specifically approves the proposal that there be no discussion of these papers on a multilateral basis. Instead, there should be separate bilateral discussions with representatives of Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic./4/
/4/The second paper referred to here is the proposal for an international access authority for Berlin that Thompson gave to Gromyko on February 1. (See vol. XIV, Document 278.) Kohler gave copies of both papers to representatives of the British, French, and German Embassies during the afternoon of April 9. Memoranda of his conversations at this time are in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-1262. The meeting with Grewe is also described briefly in Ruckblenden, p. 549.
4. The President thinks it most important that the discussions take place, in so far as possible, in an atmosphere of reduced tension such as now exists. He believes that this point should be made with emphasis at each stage of your discussions with Ambassador Dobrynin.
McGeorge Bundy
33. Editorial Note
On April 12 General Clay, who had returned to Washington for consultations, met just before noon with Secretary of State Rusk, and later in the afternoon with President Kennedy. No record of either of these meetings has been found other than notations in Rusk's Appointment Book (Johnson Library) and the President's Appointment Book (Kennedy Library). Following the meeting with the President, the White House released a statement that said that although there was as yet no settlement of the Berlin question, General Clay had reported that the morale and economy of the city no longer required a full-time representative. With this in mind Clay would return to Berlin for a few weeks and then visit the city at frequent intervals in the future. For full text of the statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pages 325-326.
34. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
I-25394/62
Bonn, April 13, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/4-1362. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. The source text bears no drafting information, but the memorandum was drafted in Washington on April 16 presumably in the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The source text is attached to a memorandum from Kohler to Rusk, April 16, in which the Assistant Secretary stated that the Secretary would find the account "both interesting and disturbing." Kohler added that he was "a little upset that there was not more response by Nitze and Dowling to some of the rather farfetched statements of the Chancellor." Dowling transmitted a 2-paragraph summary of the conversation in telegram 2477 from Bonn, April 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/4-1362)
PARTICIPANTS
FRG
Chancellor Adenauer
Dr. Globke
Mr. Osterheld
Mr. Kucherer
US
Mr. Nitze, ASD (ISA)/2/
Ambassador Dowling
Mr. McQuade, DOD
/2/Nitze was in Germany to address the Amerika-Gesellschaft in Hamburg on April 11. For his account of the meeting, see From Hiroshima to Glasnost, pp. 206-207. Memoranda of Nitze's conversations with Carstens, Schroeder, and von Haase in Bonn on April 13, and with Brandt in Berlin on April 14, are in the National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 36, 16A Germany.
[Here follow two pages of discussion of defense matters and Soviet missile strategy.]
Turning to the second subject, he [Adenauer] said that quite frankly it seemed to him that the Defense Department normally depends upon the State Department and State upon Defense. He realized that what he was about to say concerned primarily the State Department but he would say it to me because I was there and it did have Defense implications. The Chancellor said he was shocked by the latest messages from State about negotiations with the Soviets on Berlin. These proposals envisage insuring access to Berlin, but include recognition of the Soviet zone regime. Furthermore, the security of access would depend on Sweden, Switzerland and Austria. He outlined the 5-5-3 "Board of Directors" of an International Access Authority in which a majority vote would be determinative. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The whole idea is impossible. The DDR would be one of the five Communist States and the FRG one of the five Western States. This constitutes de facto recognition of the DDR. The latest proposal includes elements of a solution of the Berlin problem, as such, and also elements of an arrangement against the diffusion of nuclear weapons. The Chancellor said he does not know what the UK and France might think about these issues, but he is absolutely sure that De Gaulle would say no. The FRG got these proposals two days ago with the request that its position be sent to Washington yesterday. These views have now been sent and they are negative. Furthermore, the Chancellor said, he feels that such a procedure for working out positions on the Berlin issue is poor. There have been many months of talks in New York, Moscow and Geneva in which we have made a series of concessions, and now we want to continue talks in Washington. The Soviets pocket our concessions and take it for granted that they can talk without making any concessions. Perhaps De Gaulle is right; the negative outcome at every stage makes the US role as negotiator for the three powers unsatisfactory.
The Chancellor then said that he regrets General Clay's departure. (This remark was in a friendly vein and did not appear to be a complaint.) Nitze and Dowling responded with recognition of Clay's important role in Berlin, and Nitze said he hoped to go to Berlin tomorrow. The Chancellor said that it was a good idea at the time to send Clay for it helped to diminish unrest in Berlin arising from erection of the wall. He understood that Clay was discontented because he had no real position now and was sometimes opposed to the views of the US Commander and even, at times, of the Ambassador himself (general laughter).
The Chancellor commented that the latest US messages containing the 5-5-3 proposition for negotiations with the Soviets contributed to the unrest arising from Clay's departure. He reiterated his conviction that this message, if known to the public, would create terrible unrest. Yesterday, he called in the Chairmen of the three major parties in the Bundestag, including the Socialists, and informed them about these messages. The unanimous judgment was against the step envisaged by Rusk.
The Chancellor said that his remarks to us were meant only for those concerned in Washington and not for the press. He is going to send President Kennedy a message today to ask that there be a pause in the negotiations with the Soviets so that the FRG will have time to re-examine the Berlin problem and try to think of better ways to find a solution. From our present knowledge of the Soviet position, it is quite useless to keep coming back at them time and time again as we are now doing. The Soviets pocket any concessions which we offer without giving anything in return.
This morning, he said, a small group of people in his Government had looked at the development of the Berlin situation and decided that the prospects for resolution of the Berlin question in 1958 had been considerably greater than they are now. The German position on the Berlin question in this period may have contributed to this decline in the prospects for a Berlin settlement, as it may have been too rigid. The Chancellor now wants to re-examine the problem to see if it is not possible to make some sort of offer to the Soviets which would be of genuine interest to them. However, we must get some concessions from the Soviets in order to make a deal. The Chancellor asked that nobody on the US side say that Germany is undertaking such a re-examination until the Germans see if any change in their position is possible.
Nitze said that he would be back in Washington Sunday night and that he would see Rusk on Monday and give him a personal report of this conversation.
The Chancellor said he would be glad to have this done. He requested Nitze to emphasize that Germany is anxious to examine all the developments since 1958 to see if any new proposition that might be meaningful to the Soviets can be developed. He does not want to give more details about the German views until he can clarify his own thinking.
Nitze assured the Chancellor that Washington would do nothing on Berlin without his agreement. The US wants to work with Germany and with Britain and France. Nitze expressed the belief that the US has conducted all of the talks with the Soviets about Berlin along the lines of papers mutually agreed upon among the four powers, without any concessions which deviate from these agreed papers, subject to certain reservations contained in them. The US wants a joint position with the FRG and the UK and, as far as possible, with France. Therefore, if the Chancellor wants a delay in the talks at this time, Nitze said he felt sure that this would be seriously considered.
Dowling observed that the 5-5-3 proposal is, of course, only for consideration of the four Western Governments. The views of the UK, France and the FRG are necessary before the US would think of presenting these proposals to the Soviets. The purpose of the messages from Grewe is to cause exploration of this possible course of action among the four powers to determine whether it would be wise to make such a proposal to the Soviets.
The Chancellor pointed out that if Germany should make proposals, France might be more ready to agree to them than if the US did so. If specific proposals were to be advanced and France should say no, the US would be in a difficult position.
The Chancellor then said that we will continue to have trouble in Berlin but that he was aware some time ago that it is impossible to predict what difficulties the Soviets might make. He handed Ambassador Dowling a newspaper containing an article ("Neue Zurcher Zeitung", Friday, April 13, 1962, page 2, column 1) about the unrest caused by General Clay's departure. He said that we must do nothing to increase such unrest.
Dowling pointed out that part of the unrest arose because the story of Clay's departure leaked before Clay himself could explain his purpose in leaving: that Clay is leaving at his own request pursuant to a decision that he could do more to help Berlin by returning to the US at this time. The premature leak from Washington put his departure in the wrong light. Dowling said he talked with Clay ten days ago in Berlin and Clay's ideas had changed a bit; he was leaving with a sense of accomplishment. The Ambassador hoped that Clay would have a chance to talk with the Chancellor before finally leaving Berlin.
The Chancellor observed that he knew that Clay had wanted to leave as long ago as last November. The Chancellor said that he himself knows that Clay's departure cannot be imputed to the Administration but the public merely observes that he came at the moment of crisis and is now leaving. This causes unrest. Another official the other day had complained that the Ambassador himself might soon be leaving.
The Ambassador laughed and said that he was misquoted by the press. At a press interview he had said that someday he would have to leave, but not now; right now he was staying, not leaving. The Chancellor said he wondered where the Ambassador would be going. To the State Department? Dowling said the press had said so, but that George Ball told him the other day that he had not even heard of the story. The Chancellor said that if and when the Ambassador was to leave, he should come and tell the Chancellor about it.
The Chancellor said he was deeply impressed by McNamara. Nitze said McNamara has tremendous energy and insight into how one gets things done. The Chancellor said he is a very clear thinker.
The Chancellor then referred to the President's troubles with the steel industry. There were references to the President's press conferences, Nitze's speech in Hamburg and visits with various officials of the German Government and the conversation came to a close on a friendly note.
35. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 13, 1962, 3:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-1362. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cash and initialed by Kohler. The meeting was held in Kohler's office at the Department of State. It is described briefly in Ruckblenden, p. 550.
SUBJECT
Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
German Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe
Mr. Horst Blomeyer-Bartenstein, First Secretary, German Embassy
Assistant Secretary Foy D. Kohler
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, GER
Mr. Frank E. Cash, Jr., GER
Ambassador Grewe began by saying that he had received a lengthy telegram with preliminary comments on the principles paper, and he might receive more. The Germans feel the need of consultation on the paper. They note the concentration on West Berlin and the recognition of vital interests of the Soviets in West Berlin. Paragraph 1 (b) restricts the responsibilities to West Berlin but acknowledges vital Soviet interests therein. The concept of the access authority changes the legal position and makes it necessary to have a common view among the US, the UK, and France. The Germans would like to know how the British and French feel.
Mr. Kohler said that the British are in accord, and the French don't have instructions on the International Access Authority paper./2/
/2/During the morning of April 13 Kohler had met with British Minister Hood. While accepting the two papers, subject to minor revisions, Hood wondered if there were any "desperate urgency" about resuming discussions with the Soviet Union. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-1362) Ambassador Ormsby Gore held a similar conversation with Rusk at 12:30 p.m. (Memorandum of conversation, ibid.) Kohler then met with French Minister Counselor Lebel at 3 p.m., who stated that the French had had reservations about the approach to the Soviets from the beginning and that these reservations remained. Lebel handed Kohler an aide-memoire incorporating a number of French desiderata on parts of the papers that the French regarded as "dangerous." They too wondered if it were necessary to give Dobrynin the revised principles paper. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid.; aide-memoire; ibid., Presidential Correspond-ence: Lot 66 D 204)
Ambassador Grewe said the two documents have a character different from the Geneva paper. They seem to represent an exchange, and the principles paper is drafted in treaty language from which it would be difficult to retreat.
Mr. Kohler said it was quite true that the longer one talked the closer one got to negotiation.
Ambassador Grewe said the Geneva version of the principles paper was indicative of general tendencies, but the new version gave the appearance of covering the field of negotiations. There was no mention of the things that remained valid.
Mr. Kohler said this was not the concept. This paper was intended to register disagreement rather than agreement. What is not in the paper remains as it is.
Ambassador Grewe said that Bonn realized this was the concept, but the Soviets will not understand the text in the same way. Bonn would not be happy if the principles paper were transmitted to the Soviets at the present stage. It offers far-reaching concessions to the Soviets without receiving anything in return. The Germans understand that the US is not as optimistic as the press has been, and they think that in such a situation it would not be wise to offer such a paper. Negotiations would not come about, but the positions that were offered would be consumed and could not be offered again.
Ambassador Grewe said the Germans feel Western rights are not really secured by the present text. A method must be found to make clear that continued existence of Western rights form the basis of the paper.
With regard to the status of Berlin, there is a strong tendency toward considering West Berlin as an independent entity. No mention is made of the ties with the Federal Republic.
The German question as such is dealt with in a manner tending to equalize the two parts of Germany. Much of the language comes too close to the "two Germanies" theory of the Soviets.
Bonn cannot accept the concept of the mixed commission charged with strengthening cultural ties. They also think that having the commission which is to frame the electoral law consider other steps comes close to the Soviet stand.
Mr. Kohler said that this wording was precisely that of the Geneva paper, and therefore, he was astonished at the German stand. Only three non-substantive words have been changed. This had already been cleared with Foreign Minister Schroeder.
Ambassador Grewe said with reference to nondiffusion in point 3, the Germans are not happy concerning the reference to Germany, however ingenious it might be. They feel the formula will fade, but the special reference to Germany will remain. As to the substance, the present text goes considerably further than the German statement of 1954,/3/ beyond which they are not prepared to go.
/3/Presumably Grewe is referring to Protocol III (Control of Armaments) to the Brussels Treaty, October 23, 1954, by which the Federal Republic undertook not to manufacture atomic weapons. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. V, Part 2, pp. 1446-1451.
Concerning European security in point 4 it is really not European security, but general security that is at stake. The mention in 4 b) could be very misleading indeed and could lead to a concentration on Europe.
The Germans do not see a link between points 3 and 4 on the one hand and points 1 and 2 on the other. This they consider very important inasmuch as there is no reason to talk about 3 and 4 if there is no give on 1 and 2.
Mr. Kohler said the link exists in our minds, and the points are not divisible. However, point 3 might come out and get into the disarmament context. We have no intention of getting into a nonaggression pact without a modus vivendi on Berlin.
Ambassador Grewe said he wished to turn to the access paper where the crucial point concerned composition of the Board. The Germans have very strong objections because they feel that this would not provide for real freedom of access. The neutrals would be under heavy Soviet pressure. Such an arrangement would not keep the Berliners calm because it would fail to assure them that the air routes remained free.
Ambassador Grewe said he noted as a smaller point that the formula concerning the reestablishment of German unity had been deleted.
The Germans were asking what really is the purpose of presenting the papers at this stage where there seemed to be no serious readiness to negotiate on the Soviet side. They wondered whether under such circumstances it was really wise to present such a paper moving the position in such a far-reaching way. We must also consider the fact that the position would be further weakened in actual discussions.
Mr. Kohler said he had a couple of preliminary comments. First of all, he said, we regard the occupation rights as guaranteed by the presence of our troops and our military posture in general. These rights are clearly nonnegotiable. It is not necessary to confirm them. This was a deliberate omission. Much has been omitted on both sides. This paper is not intended to cover many points. We have included language concerning the "vital interests", in which we include the presence of our troops, access, and viability. It is not a contribution to say that our rights must be put in.
Ambassador Grewe said that it was not the German idea that there be an explicit reference to occupation rights. The purpose was to avoid having such a paper used to deny Western rights. This might be accomplished by accompanying unilateral statements.
Mr. Kohler said such statements are inevitable. Furthermore, the "legislative history" is quite clear.
Mr. Kohler said the US feels the current lull over Berlin may be connected with our decision on testing. If, however, the Soviets are restrained in their reaction to our nuclear tests this may be an indication of a tendency toward a modus vivendi. We have gone to great pains to say we are just discussing, but we are actually getting quite close to negotiations.
Ambassador Grewe said the Germans do not oppose negotiation as such but feel we should be very cautious with texts.
Mr. Kohler commented that it would be hard to carry on the discussions orally with Dobrynin without a paper to focus on. He said the German view would be brought to the attention of the Secretary and the President, and we would be in touch with the Germans further. We must try to find some solution to the problem of the composition of the Board of Directors of the Access Authority. We feel we would be in pretty good hands with the Swiss, Swedes, and the Austrians.
Ambassador Grewe asked how Mr. Kohler saw events developing.
Mr. Kohler said he was not sure. He would have to think about what the Germans had said and get in touch with them.
Ambassador Grewe said the Germans really would hope that no paper would be given to the Soviet Ambassador on Monday.
Mr. Kohler said this would be passed on.
Mr. Kohler said he would like to add one more point concerning Berlin. We have made it clear that we are not accepting a free, demilitarized, independent status. We thought the language was harmonious with the existing status, but this is tricky language.
Ambassador Grewe wondered why it was necessary to give away this position at this stage. The Soviets would surely come with their maximum position and we would have nowhere to fall back.
Mr. Kohler said the Soviets had tried this in Geneva, and had been told that no agreement was possible on the kind of paper they were putting forward. It had been explained to them that we were trying to go beyond this leaving out the disagreed positions. We had tried to impress them with the fact that the basic positions are nonnegotiable. We must see if a modus vivendi is possible or if we must continue on a collision course.
36. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 14, 1962, 11:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-1462. Secret. Drafted by Cash and initialed by Kohler. The meeting was held in Kohler's office at the Department of State.
SUBJECT
Leak of Documents
PARTICIPANTS
German
Ambassador Grewe
US
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Cash
Mr. Kohler began the meeting by commenting that a pretty full briefing was behind the stories out of Bonn./2/
/2/In the evening of April 13, Kohler had telephoned Grewe to say that all the main newspapers carried stories that included the principal points of the two U.S. papers. Kohler added that the top levels of the U.S. Government were "distressed" and wondered if "purposeful consultation is possible." (Memorandum of telephone conversation; ibid., 762.00/4-1362) Grewe discussed the leak, telephone conversation with Kohler, and the Chancellor's meeting referred to in this memorandum in Ruckblenden, pp. 549 ff. During this meeting Grewe also transmitted the Chancellor's letter (Document 37) to the President.
Ambassador Grewe said yes that was true. He said he had been in touch with Bonn, and that Professor Carstens had assured him firmly that there had been no briefing by any official German source and that everything possible had been done to prevent a leak. The spokesman of the Foreign Ministry had stated that the Bonn meeting was merely an exchange of views. He had expressly denied any connection with further talks on Berlin. He had said the Federal Government was fully informed, but further details could not be given. In answer to a question he had said the project of an international access authority had been under discussion since the President's interview with Adzhubei. This was all that was said officially. The text of the documents was known only to the small number of people who attended the Chancellor's meeting including the three floor leaders of the three parties. Thus, the Ambassador said, he was really not in a position to agree that these stories were the result of a German leak. The first information concerning the exist-ence of a document was in an AP story in the Washington Post yesterday. Just because a story has a Bonn dateline, he continued, does not mean that it comes from a German source. The New York Times, for example, frequently plants in Bonn stories acquired elsewhere. In addition, there are a number of foreign missions in Bonn.
Mr. Kohler said in this case it was pretty obvious that the story had not originated with the New York Times.
Ambassador Grewe said he could not say what the three floor leaders had done, but he and Professor Carstens had done everything possible to keep the documents secret. There had, of course, been much speculation around the meeting in Bonn.
Mr. Kohler said it was pretty obvious that this story came from an authoritative briefing.
Ambassador Grewe said he failed to see what the Germans could have hoped to gain from a leak. It would not, after all, improve the Ambassador's position, and that is well-known in Bonn.
[2 paragraphs (3-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
Mr. Kohler said this was a serious problem, and the President and the Secretary had both been shocked.
Ambassador Grewe said he could understand this
Mr. Kohler said that in Geneva everything had been given to the Germans, including the draft principles paper, and nothing had leaked. Thus, he had thought the Ambassador's telegrams might be the source. He said we would just have to review the situation and see if there were not a more secure means that could be used.
Ambassador Grewe commented that the US method of handling this consultation had been overly dramatic. For two weeks the Germans had heard nothing, and then they were given 48 hours in which to respond.
Mr. Kohler said there had really been nothing new in the revised documents.
Ambassador Grewe demurred.
Mr. Kohler said he did not agree that there was anything basically new. Furthermore, he did not see how the Germans could disown the technical commissions, which they had previously approved.
Ambassador Grewe said this was unfortunate, and he didn't know how it had happened. In any event this was not a crucial point.
Mr. Kohler said there was some inclination in the US Government just to turn the whole problem over to the Federal Government and let it handle the matter.
Ambassador Grewe repeated he could not agree that the leak came from a German source.
Mr. Kohler said that the only communication he knew of that had gone to Bonn on this subject was the German message. None had gone to the US Embassy. Therefore, the source had to be German.
[1 paragraph (2-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
Mr. Kohler said he doubted that this was the kind of message that would be broadcast by the Embassies here. (Subsequent checks with the French and British Embassies indicated that the French did not repeat their message to Bonn, but the British did. The latter do not, however, regard themselves as primary suspects.) Mr. Kohler continued by saying that he thought the Secretary was going to send a personal message to Foreign Minister Schroeder saying how shocked we were about this and asking if he had any suggestions as to how this could be prevented in the future. It is, after all, pretty fantastic to read such an accurate account in the newspapers.
Ambassador Grewe said the Germans feel that it would be a better method to be in permanent contact and not to ask for a response on such short notice.
Mr. Kohler said he would report this.
37. Letter From Chancellor Adenauer to President Kennedy/1/
Bonn, April 14, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany. No classification marking. The source text is labeled "Unofficial Translation." The letter was delivered to Kohler by Grewe at 11:45 a.m. on April 14, who stated that it had been prepared before the press leak, but it had not been outdated because of the leak. (Memorandum of conversation, April 14; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-1462)
MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Up to now the repeated attempts to open negotiations with the Soviet Union on Berlin have failed. The latest proposals of the Department of State comprise decisive elements concerning not only Berlin but also the German question, which exceed all previous offers made to the Soviet Union. I have considerable objections against some of these proposals and I would urgently request you, my dear Mr. President, to consider interrupting, for the time being, the negotiations and using this time to reexamine all problems concerning Berlin in common with the three powers./2/
/2/On April 14 Kohler drafted a reply to the Chancellor's letter. In the 4-page draft he reiterated the U.S. concern about the press leak, expressed surprise that the Chancellor regarded the latest paper as "something startingly new," stated that Rusk did not plan to give Dobrynin a further paper at the meeting on April 16, and tried to clarify the German misconception about the nature of the paper. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204) On April 15 Rusk discussed the draft letter with the President, and they decided that no reply would be sent at that time, but that Hillenbrand would telephone Dowling to inform him that no paper would be given to the Soviet Ambassador. (Note attached to Kohler's draft letter; ibid.)
With kind regards,
Yours very sincerely,
Adenauer/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that indicates that Adenauer signed the original.
38. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, April 14, 1962, 1:26 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/4-1462. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Kohler and Hillenbrand and approved by Rusk. The source text indicates that Rusk discussed it in substance with the President.
2848. Eyes only for the Ambassador. Verbatim text. Please deliver following personal message from me to Foreign Minister Schroeder at earliest opportunity:
Begin text: The President and I have been shocked at what we can only consider a serious/2/ breach of confidence in the disclosure to the press in Bonn of certain details of the secret working papers which we have been discussing with your government since our meeting in Lausanne early in March. In giving the revised versions of these papers to Ambassador Grewe on April 9, we impressed on him the need for utmost discretion in our consultations regarding these matters and he informed us that this had been stressed in his report to the Foreign Office.
/2/At this point in the source text the word "serious" replaces the word "flagrant," which is crossed out.
As you are aware, these are subjects of considerable delicacy which can only be discussed between governments on a basis of mutual confidence that premature public disclosure and comment will not give a distorted impression in a way which can only result in weakening our position as against the Soviets. It is difficult to see how useful consultations can be conducted without the assurance on each side that confidences will be respected.
I know you will personally share my concern and will agree that we must both, in the future, make every effort to insure that subjects of highest importance which are under current discussion between us are not permitted to become public in a way which can only be detrimental to our common interests. We are considering what changes we might make in present consultative procedures, and I should appreciate any suggestions you may be able to make in this connection.
We fully recognize that this is not a problem limited to Bonn and that all of us are subject to the human frailty which expresses itself in unauthorized leaks. But I am quite sure that it is important for us to devise procedures which will make it possible for us to continue in close touch on such an important and dangerous matter as Berlin.
I am looking forward to seeing you in Athens. End verbatim text.
Rusk
39. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 16, 1962, 2:34 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-1662. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Rusk. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Moscow in telegram 2363, April 17. (Ibid., 375/4-1662)
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Dobrynin expressed a preference for a conversation with me alone, hence I did not invite even an interpreter to join us. The background of this particular conversation was that I had said to Mr. Dobrynin, during his call prior to the presentation of his credentials,/2/ that I hoped to have a talk with him to bring both of us fully up to date on the conversations at Geneva.
/2/Dobrynin presented his credentials on March 30.
I first told Dobrynin that I was glad to be able to review with him the present status of our discussions of the Berlin and German questions and that lively press attention to our interview might have thrown this first talk somewhat out of proportion. I told him that we had not, for example, taken for granted that our two Governments had agreed that there would be a "new round of talks" in Washington between him and myself. My clear understanding of the way Mr. Gromyko and I left it was that we would be in touch with each other about how further discussions might best go forward. I told him that we had no overriding preferences about whether these matters should be pursued in Washington or in Moscow; as he knew, Mr. Khrushchev had indicated to President Kennedy/3/ that Mr. Dobrynin had the Chairman's full confidence and was available for any exchanges we wished to undertake;/4/ similarly, Ambassador Thompson had our full confidence and could be in touch with Soviet authorities in Moscow on the same basis. Mr. Dobrynin indicated that he had had no instructions from Moscow on this point but that he would ascertain whether Moscow had any preferences and would be in touch with me again.
/3/See Document 37.
/4/Presumably Rusk and Dobrynin are talking about the exchange of U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers and Frederic L. Pryor, an American student, for Colonel Rudolf Abel on February 10.
I then proceeded to outline briefly where I thought we were in our talks. I said that, in the interest of clarification, it might be useful to think of our exchanges at three different levels.
The first had to do with what the Soviets have called "drawing a line under World War II". The Soviets had made proposals in 1958, and again in June of last year in Vienna, about how the Soviet Government would like to proceed with a permanent settlement on the German and Berlin questions. I told him that the West, too, had ideas about how this ought to be done. I mentioned proposals for reunification on the basis of free elections and related elements of previous Western positions with which he was familiar. I said that we had not pressed these proposals during this past year because we did not see, realistically, any prospect of agreement and that we did not think that it would improve the situation for the two sides simply to engage in a propaganda contest over irreconcilable positions.
The second "level" of exchanges had to do with the factual situation in Germany. When we on our side have mentioned such matters as reunification or all-Berlin arrangements, the Soviet side had spoken of existing facts. Usually, these facts were stated by Soviet representatives as meaning two Germanies. We, on the other hand, had insisted that there was another fact--our position in West Berlin and our free access to that city. I was glad that at Geneva the Soviet side seemed to recognize that the facts in the situation include both the two Germanies and West Berlin. One difficulty in our conversations thus far had arisen from the confusion between these two levels of discussion. When we talked about elements of a permanent solution, the Soviet side said, "But look at the facts". But when we turned to talking about facts, the Soviet side said, "But these must be changed".
A third level of discussion would concern itself with how we should manage the fact of disagreement if it became apparent that we could not come together either on a permanent solution or an agreement based upon existing facts. The working paper on general principles which I handed to Mr. Gromyko in Geneva was our suggestion as to how we might deal with the existence of underlying disagreement in such a way as not to move toward a dangerous crisis.
I then turned to the question of access and commented on the fact that we had not gone into considerable detail with each other on our respective proposals for an international access authority. Our difficulty with the working paper on this subject which Mr. Gromyko handed me at Geneva was that it was tied organically to the withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin. We did not wish to leave any wrong impression through a detailed examination of a paper which seemed to be rooted in an underlying demand which we could not accept, namely, the removal of Western forces from West Berlin. I repeated to Mr. Dobrynin what I had said to Gromyko in Geneva, namely, that I did not see any fundamental difficulty in working out access arrangements which were consistent with what they called "the sovereignty of the GDR" and what we might call the responsibilities of local authorities. Our international access proposals were aimed at arrangements which would guarantee free access which would not interfere with activities in East Germany. We still were of the opinion that this was not an insoluble problem unless the Soviet side had in mind a type of East German control over access which could be used to throttle West Berlin.
I told Mr. Dobrynin that we were not entirely clear from our talks at Geneva about the connection between access arrangements and Soviet proposals for the withdrawal of Western troops. Mr. Khrushchev had seemed to make this connection quite specific. At Geneva, Mr. Semenov had indicated to Mr. Kohler that this was something "for the Ministers". When I questioned Mr. Gromyko on this matter he used a diagram to show that access was linked to the status of West Berlin and that the question of status was, in turn, linked to the presence of Western troops.
At this point Mr. Dobrynin said that "as of now" he would have to say that the "present position" of the Soviet Government was that agreement on access is linked to the presence of Western forces in West Berlin. "What the future attitude of my Government might be, I would not be in a position to say", he added.
I told him that I thought there might be some point in our exploring further the question of access provided it was understood by the Soviet side that we were not thereby changing in any way our attitude on Western troops. The latter was not a negotiable problem from our point of view. But it might be worth finding out whether the question of access could move toward more agreement even though the major issue remained in the background.
He asked where I thought we stood on some of the other "broader questions" which had been mentioned both at Geneva and in recent press accounts. I repeated the point that I had made to Gromyko in Geneva, namely, that if we could find a way of dealing with the central issues of vital concern to the West, I felt that a number of these other matters would fall into place. As he knew from reading the press of the last few days, we were in the process of consulting our allies. He laughed and said, "That is very evident".
It became clear from Dobrynin's conversation that he had had no instructions to continue further from where Gromyko and I had left off in Geneva, or, if so, had been instructed not to pursue the matter in this particular conversation. We agreed therefore, not just to reiterate to each other what Gromyko and I had said to each other at Geneva. In the course of general conversation, however, the following additional points came up:
Dobrynin said that West Berlin was an outpost of the West capable of causing real trouble between us. He was not thinking of it as a strong military base but as a situation which could cause accidents or incidents of a dangerous sort. Therefore, it was in the interest of both sides to eliminate this source of trouble. He said that he was not clear just why we attach so much importance to our position in West Berlin--whether it was a question of prestige or just what it was.
I said that President Kennedy had covered this point in considerable detail with Chairman Khrushchev in Vienna. The President had pointed out the nature of our commitment to West Berlin and the effect upon our entire position if we were to permit that position to be eliminated or diminished. It would be wrong for the Soviet side to build its hopes upon the results which President Kennedy had clearly indicated we could not accept. I said that we felt that there might be some wishful thinking in some quarters of Moscow derived from the geographic location of Berlin. I had earlier told Mr. Gromyko that they could think about the political problems of Berlin more accurately if they imagined Berlin to be located on the demarcation line between the Federal Republic and East Germany. The geographical isolation of West Berlin was irrelevant because the Western allies were there and would remain there. I said that it would not surprise me to know, for example, that some Soviet military advice might be that this should be an easy problem; but it was an easy problem, from that point of view, because the United States is in West Berlin.
Mr. Dobrynin and I exchanged a few words about President Kennedy's remark to Adzhubei that time might make some of these problems easier to solve. Dobrynin recalled Gromyko's remark to me at Geneva that time could work the other way. I said that I recalled that remark and that I had passed it by because Mr. Gromyko had referred to Hitler and I was quite sure that he did not intend to equate us with Hitler. Mr. Dobrynin said he was quite sure that was not Mr. Gromyko's intention. He asked how I saw time working to improve this principal point of confrontation between the two Governments. I said that time might ease their own pressures in East Germany; that time might make practical relationships in Germany more feasible and more conducive to a normal atmosphere; that time might make it possible to make some significant advances in disarmament, about which we were very serious. He asked me whether Berlin and disarmament are linked. I said they were not organically linked but obviously progress in one would help in progress on the other. He commented that the reverse could also be true.
Again, on the effect of time I pointed out that President Kennedy had moved early in his Administration to try to create an atmosphere of calm in the relationships between our two Governments and, particularly, to restore effective contact between us. Even though we might not be able to agree on important issues, we had felt that responsible contact at all times was important. Dobrynin agreed and said that this had been much appreciated in Moscow and we mentioned the release of flyers, the cultural agreement/5/ and the variety of exchanges we have had as evidence of more effective communications. I told him that we thought that his own assignment in Washington as Ambassador was a step in improving communications, which he accepted with obvious pleasure.
/5/For text of the U.S.-Soviet cultural agreement, signed on March 8, see 13 UST 1496.
I told Mr. Dobrynin that we were not unaware of the fact that shortly after Geneva the situation in West Berlin itself had significantly improved. I had said to Mr. Gromyko that we should be listening with both ears--with one to what is said, and with the other to what is done in Berlin; I was glad to see that matters had moved to a much more normal position there since Geneva and that we felt this was a wholesome contribution. He nodded acquiescence.
I told him that we were prepared to go ahead with conversations as anticipated by Mr. Gromyko and me at Geneva and that we were not on our side wishing to procrastinate--and reminded him of my exchange with Gromyko on that subject in Geneva.
My net impressions of this one hour's talk with Dobrynin were (a) he was not under instructions to pursue these questions on their substance; (b) he did not attempt to leave any impression that the Soviets were in any hurry; (c) he clearly did not attempt to leave any impression that they wished to move the matter to a crisis or showdown; (d) he was amused but entirely relaxed about the press flap out of Bonn; (e) he would report our conversation and be in touch with me again about any suggestions Moscow had about how the conversations might continue and (f) he thought my outline of the three levels of discussion was a useful clarification and had thought so when I first presented it to Gromyko in Geneva.
He seemed equally relaxed about Laos, which he mentioned on his initiative just before leaving. I told him that it must be obvious to them that we were making serious efforts to support the idea of a negotiated coalition government, that we were having some difficulties with the RLG leadership and that we thought that it might take a little more time to bring the matter to a satisfactory conclusion.
I told him that I had told the press for background that they should not expect too much from this meeting this afternoon, that this was our first contact since Geneva, that one of the matters we would be discussing was in what way we might continue the discussions between our two Governments on these problems./6/
Dean Rusk/7/
/6/On April 23 Dobrynin met with Rusk again and, in reply to the two points raised by the Secretary, said that the Soviet Union was ready to continue the discussions at whatever site the President of the United States desired. He also confirmed that the Soviet Government could not accept an agreement that furthered the stay of occupation forces in West Berlin. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-2362) Later that day Kohler telephoned Dobrynin to say that the President preferred Washington for continuing the talks. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; ibid.)
/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
40. Letter From Foreign Minister Schroeder to Secretary of State Rusk
Bonn, April 16, 1962.
[Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
41. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, April 25, 1962, 1:16 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375/4-2462. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved and initialed by Kohler.
2936. Eyes only Ambassador. It seems clear from Carstens' "general" points of objection reported your 2545/2/ that Germans still do not fully understand nature of approach in US "principles paper". When you see Schroeder you should accordingly point out that, as indicated by Secretary at Lausanne and in briefings given Germans at Geneva, what we are trying to do is deal with existence of underlying disagreement on elements of permanent solution and even on formulations of existing facts in such a way as to avoid dangerous crisis. Our paper attempted to set forth certain principles which might be agreed by both sides, omitting those points on which no verbal agreement could be reached, in an effort to create basis for possible modus vivendi. In addition it would provide forum for continuing discussion of questions which could not be agreed now but which involve points of possible future conflict. Inevitably then, paper would have conspicuous omissions. To insist on inclusion of every Western point would merely result in Soviet insistence on inclusion every Soviet point unacceptable to West, and effort to put Berlin problem on back-burner by tactic indicated would inevitably collapse, as it may in any event in face of possible Soviet intransigence.
/2/In telegram 2545, April 24, Dowling reported that in a meeting that day Carstens raised general objections to the lack of reference in the U.S. paper to reunification, Western forces in Berlin, and FRG-Berlin ties, and specific objections to the composition of the access authority, respect for local authority, mixed commissions, the pledge on use of force, and the mention of Germany in the nuclear diffusion ban. (Ibid.)
As to Western unilateral declarations, we assume that unilateral public explanations regarding omissions would be inevitable in case modus vivendi on this basis ever reached which does not seem early likelihood. However, we had not anticipated that these would have to be formally drawn up in advance, or in any case at such an early stage as present.
On specific point of mixed commissions, other than change of a few non-substantive words, language in 2 (b) is identical with that contained in paper given Gromyko at Geneva to which Germans did not object. New language in paragraph at end of Section 1 intended take care of Berlin Senat point re movement of persons in Berlin.
Other specific points made by Carstens are practically all covered by changes included in text of revised paper transmitted Deptel 2930,/3/ and would seem to leave no substantial points of difference between us.
/3/Dated April 24. (Ibid., 762.00/4-2462) This draft, which attempted to take into account specific objections by the West Germans, had substantive changes only in sections I and V.
We had understood from your 2542/4/ that Schroeder would be available Thursday instead of Friday. However, since Secretary would not expect to see Dobrynin until Friday afternoon, in view of time difference you could perhaps still give us quick prior rundown on results your Friday discussion with Schroeder by KY-9 telephone./5/
/4/Dated April 24. (Ibid.)
/5/In his conversation with Dowling on April 27, Schroeder reiterated his regret over the press leak, stated that he was aware of the difficulties it caused the United States, and said he would like to start by approving the revised principles paper (see footnote 2 above), subject to the Chancellor's approval. He then repeated the objections made by Carstens (see footnote 1 above), but accepted Dowling's comment that these questions could be dealt with by unilateral declarations at the appropriate time. He next made a few specific comments on the paper. Dowling concluded that Schroeder needed to overcome Brentano's objections and convince the Chancellor of the merits of the U.S. paper. (Telegram 2578 from Bonn, April 27; Department of State, Central Files, 375/4-2762; and memorandum from Klein to Bundy, April 27, summarizing Dowling's telephone conversation; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany)
Rusk
42. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, April 28, 1962, 4:55 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375/4-2862. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Holloway; cleared by R/PM, SOV, S, S/S, and Hillenbrand; and approved and initialed by Kohler. Also sent to Paris and repeated to Moscow and Berlin.
2964. Paris for Ambassador and Finletter. Eyes only Ambassadors and Hulick. Secretary met with Dobrynin for ninety minutes Friday./2/ Briefing procedures set forth Deptel 2922/3/ should be followed by Ambassadors Dowling and Finletter in using following summary:
/2/A 7-page memorandum of this conversation is ibid., 762.00/4-2762.
/3/Telegram 2922, April 24, instructed Finletter to brief the NATO Permanent Representatives on a restricted basis after Dowling had completed his briefing of German officials. (Ibid., 375/4-2462)
Meeting's purpose was to give Dobrynin opportunity make known any further Moscow information prior to Secretary's departure for various alliance meetings. Dobrynin said Khrushchev interview with Cowles and Gromyko speech to Supreme Soviet/4/ had given Sov position but he willing attempt clarification. Secretary picked up Gromyko reference to alleged American statement on lack of obstacle to "combining free access West Berlin with demand respect GDR sovereignty". Secretary had commented on this at Thursday's press conference./5/ Dobrynin said word "demand" means proposal, which Secretary accepted as adequate explanation for present.
/4/For texts of Gardner Cowles' April 20 interview with Khrushchev and Gromyko's April 24 speech to the Supreme Soviet, see Pravda, April 27 and 25, 1962.
/5/For a transcript of Rusk's press conference, April 26, see Department of State Bulletin, May 14, 1962, pp. 795-802.
Secretary then reviewed US vital interests in West Berlin as immediate questions and matters such as disarmament, non-aggression pacts, diffusion nuclear weapons, etc., as broader questions. Repeated US belief that if West Berlin vital interests agreed on, then others might fall more easily into place. However, if Gromyko demand for end of Occupation is essential element Sov position, then obstacles to agreement indeed formidable. Secretary referred to Geneva principles paper and International Access Authority proposal as possible sources progress, if these could be discussed on basis essential needs both sides. Principles paper deliberately omitted certain points of interest both sides but does provide means for continuing discussion on disagreed matters. In general, broader questions seemed susceptible movement and improvement, which thus brought us back to essential elements. For Berlin, this was our presence there. Secretary added that for disarmament, this was verification question.
Dobrynin said he had nothing new on German question. His instructions were clear that Sov position on end of Occupation and Western troop presence remained as stated by Gromyko.
Secretary then examined Berlin problem against background developments in European integration, pointing out that possibility intra-European wars now gone after 500 years of intrigue, conflicts, etc. This was important for USSR security, particularly when taken with close link US to Western Europe. We believe presence US troops Berlin is actually a stabilizing factor as long as Germany is divided. We do not agree with Gromyko that absence peace treaty in Central Europe creates dangers. Unless Sovs intend push us out of West Berlin, lack of permanent German settlement not dangerous. Obviously, if Sovs do want to push us out, then situation indeed dangerous.
Dobrynin agreed that possibility European wars now remote. He disagreed that situation in Europe was not most important problem. Speaking "with deep conviction as Russian" he said Sovs could not accept Western troops in Berlin. Possibility that either German side could involve Sov and US troops in clashes was a danger. This was really only US-USSR point of confrontation.
Secretary said direct contact of troops of responsible powers not necessarily dangerous. No Man's Land such as Korea had proved more dangerous.
Discussion then turned to reunification prospects and recognition GDR with no change in either side's position. Secretary stressed we do not think division of Germany is good for anyone. It is the Sovs who wished make division permanent. Therefore, although practical situation obviously must continue as it is for time being, we believe it important not to foreclose question of reunification.
Secretary concluded that we had gone far to indicate agreement possible on some points, but Sovs must first come to grips with problems of access and presence. He suggested that conversation turn to these when he comes back./6/ Suggested also possible consider Geneva principles paper, which unlike Sov paper, did not touch on controversial points. For example, our paper omitted any confirmation of Occupation.
/6/Rusk left Washington on April 29 to attend Alliance meetings in London, Athens, and Canberra. He returned on May 11.
Dobrynin agreed resume talks upon Secretary's return, but pointed out he foresaw no change in Sov positions in next ten days. Secretary said he foresaw no change in ours either.
Conversation was cordial.
Rusk
43. Summary of Discussion/1/
Washington, April 28, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-2862. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but possibly Secretary Rusk, who was also present, drafted it. The meeting was held at the White House.
SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN/2/
/2/Macmillan visited Washington April 27-29 for talks on questions of mutual concern.
The President remarked that the Prime Minister and he had discussed privately the course of the conversations on Berlin with the Russians./3/ The fact, which they had no particular explanation for, that the Russians had relaxed pressure, made it appropriate to move ahead; after his return from Athens the Secretary would see Dobrynin again. The President noted that he and the Prime Minister were in agreement on these talks.
/3/No record of the private conversation has been found.
SUBJECT
Berlin and Germany
The Secretary, pointing out that we were in Berlin and were going to stay there, stressed that both we and the British should point out to Bonn and Paris that we had made no concession to the Russians. The course of future discussions is another question. We had no apologies for the stand we have taken, and the nervousness displayed by some of our allies is out of place. In answer to the Prime Minister's question, the Secretary said that in yesterday's talk with Dobrynin he had pointed out that we had gone some way to meet the Soviets on points of interest to them. However, there were no signs that they were prepared to give us any satisfaction; we were nose to nose on the key issues. Dobrynin's attitude, which showed no obligation or interest in accelerating things, was puzzling. There were some signs of interest in a modus vivendi paper.
The Prime Minister commented that he had remarked to the President that it was difficult to negotiate when we were under pressure, as we were then accused of appeasement; we should press forward when we are not under the disadvantage of pressure. As an agreement would involve too much loss of face for the Soviets, we might end up with some sort of modus vivendi, an agreement to disagree. The results, the Secretary remarked, would depend on whether the Soviets have decided they cannot make progress on their proposals. Our concern is their commitment to a peace treaty; if our rights are not respected when such a treaty is signed, there will be a dangerous situation. The Secretary suggested that the danger, which would arise when pressure was resumed, could be lessened by remaining in contact. In the meantime we should try to alleviate the nervousness of our allies.
In response to the President's question, the Prime Minister said he had no plans to see Adenauer. Depending on his talks with Schroeder, the Secretary indicated he might see Adenauer on his way home from Athens. The President, indicating his concern that the Germans might at some future time wish to put the blame on us, said that it was most important that Adenauer show his approval. The French had disassociated themselves from what we were doing; it was important not to let the Germans do the same thing. The Secretary said he thought Adenauer was not receiving accurate reports, adding that we had one point of disagreement with the Germans. Even without reunification in the near future, we thought it was in our interest for the West Germans to multiply contacts with East Germany, but the Chancellor seemed nervous over doing so. Ulbricht's personality was, apparently, a real stumbling block.
The Prime Minister mentioned his concern over the myth growing up and about what the younger generation of Germans would think about our policy. The President commented that such a myth, that we had let the Germans down, had already grown up in connection with the Berlin wall. In response to the President's question, the Prime Minister said that he was already planning to see de Gaulle in June, and he would go to see Adenauer if it would help, even though it was becoming somewhat more difficult to talk to him. The Prime Minister thought it important to get the younger Germans with us, as Schroeder, a good man, was. The Secretary remarked that we hoped to make some prog-ress with von Brentano, who would be here shortly.
The Prime Minister, expressing great concern, said now was the time to get an agreement, or a modus vivendi as the Soviets would not make a formal agreement. Such a result might not be too far from what we had considered and almost agreed on just before the new American administration assumed office. These talks, he recalled, broke down on the point of what would happen after five years. The Secretary said we were trying to return to something similar, but using Deputy Foreign Ministers. The Secretary, in answer to the Prime Minister's question, said we had given a paper to Gromyko in Geneva, but nothing since. After the meeting of the four Foreign Ministers, we might amplify the Geneva paper. We had to be precise enough to cover ourselves after the Soviets signed their peace treaty. The Prime Minister thought a summit meeting might produce a modus vivendi.
At another point in the day's discussions the Prime Minister raised Berlin again. He favored the idea of working toward something which could be put to the heads of government. He was willing to do everything he could with Adenauer and de Gaulle. He expressed concern about the possibility of a crisis in East Germany, of a Hungarian-type uprising, which would be very embarrassing. The Prime Minister was sure that we should take advantage of the period of calm; the storms were just below the horizon. If a storm were to come, many of those now criticizing us would not be of much help. We could not wait because of de Gaulle.
44. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 30, 1962, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Brandin and approved in the White House on May 7. On April 29, in preparation for this meeting, Bundy sent a memorandum to the President stating that Brentano needed to take away from the conversation the following four points: 1) the United States was determined to defend Berlin, and the President, not the German press, was in charge of this defense; 2) the United States found Schroeder both reliable and able; 3) German critics of the U.S. position were generally ill-informed; and 4) the Kennedy administration was not likely to be swayed by politically inspired leaks, and those responsible for them would lose influence with the United States. (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
Dr. von Brentano's Meeting with The President
PARTICIPANTS
Dr. Heinrich von Brentano, Majority Leader in the German Bundestag (CDU)
Professor Wilhelm G. Grewe, German Ambassador
Mr. Weber, German Interpreter
The President
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Robert M. Brandin, Office of German Affairs, EUR
The President expressed his sympathy to Dr. von Brentano regarding his automobile accident and said he was glad to see him in the United States.
Dr. von Brentano said he was happy to be able to make the trip despite the accident and grateful for the opportunity to talk to the President. He said he wanted to point out at the beginning in order to avoid misunderstanding that he was not in the United States in an official capacity, but rather as a member of the German Parliament and Head of the CDU Parliamentary Group. He stressed, however, that there were no differences between himself and the Federal Government, the Chancellor or Foreign Minister Schroeder. He acknowledged that in the last days before Easter certain misunderstandings had been reported in the German press. He had left for France and did not hear about them until later. In connection with the US-Soviet talks, there had been a meeting in Bonn, but he assured the President that no one who participated in that meeting wanted indiscretions. He said anyone who knew him would know that he would not commit such an indiscretion. He said he realized that one could not have a common policy with a major ally if there were such indiscretions. He could not be sure, however, that someone else was not responsible.
The President said he knew Dr. von Brentano was not responsible for the indiscretions because we had worked with him in the past. The President then went on to say that the problems we have with the Soviets are extremely difficult. They are unsolvable in a real sense and may be unsolvable even as far as lesser matters are concerned. We could not even begin to deal with them, however, if our proposals came out in the press and become part of a political controversy.
The President referred to the difficulty of getting together proposals and noted that it was easy to criticize from the outside. He cited the criticism that had been made since the erection of the wall in Berlin--i.e., that it should have been taken down brick by brick--but said we had adopted the course we considered most responsible. The President said there might be some things in the documents we had prepared which should be changed. No one wanted to dictate to the Germans, who were most involved geographically and personally, what they should do. This is why we had submitted documents for their comments.
The President remarked that if the present situation were satisfactory, we would not need a modus vivendi. It was not satisfactory, however, and that is why we wanted to try to change it. He referred to Khrushchev's rude remark about being able to squeeze the West in Berlin any time he wanted to. Perhaps we could not change this situation, but we should try to do so.
The President said he had the feeling the press in Bonn was carrying on a war against the United States, accusing the United States of being weak and lacking determination. He pointed out that since his Vienna meeting with Khrushchev, he had increased the United States defense budget by $3-1/2 billion, had called up two divisions of reservists with all the difficulties involved, would soon have seven more combat divisions in readiness than were available when he took office and had sent General Clay to Berlin. In addition, we were taking the risk of war, were getting ready for a possible blockade, and had passed national emergency legislation. We were also taking on the burden of trying to reach a solution with the USSR on these problems. At the same time, the United States was under constant attack while the French were held up as a good example. Yet the French had only two divisions in Germany and the two divisions recently recalled to France from Algeria were not even fully armed. The President said that if someone else wanted to carry on negotiations with the USSR, it was all right with him. For the past seven months, the United States had had only headaches.
Dr. von Brentano said that neither he nor his friends had ever reproached the United States for weakness or lack of determination. In fact he could cite additional illustrations to the contrary. He said the United States and Germany have common policy objectives, but there were some misunderstandings. Perhaps the fact that the Federal Government had been asked to comment on the United States proposals had stirred up unrest in Bonn because it was felt that there were far-reaching implications involved. Dr. von Brentano said the Germans had welcomed talks with the USSR, being fully aware of their importance and the importance of mitigating present tensions. He added that all Germans were aware of the great responsibility for the United States and the Free World which rested on the President's shoulders.
The President expressed his appreciation and said that in any negotiations it was easy to sit outside and say what should or should not be done--e.g., in labor-management negotiations. He went on to say that there were basic disagreements with the USSR on Western presence in Berlin, on the Soviet free city proposal, and on the Soviet desire for presence in West Berlin. He emphasized that the United States would not recognize East Germany de facto or de jure. It was necessary, however, to see if there was any possibility of reaching an accord which would prevent increased tensions every few months and would end the situation whereby West Berlin could be saved only by the threat of war. He pointed out there might be greater trouble after the USSR had signed a peace treaty with the East Germans.
The President said he realized that the United States objection to the diffusion of nuclear weapons created difficulties for Germany, but indicated that we had a problem with the French on this matter and that our policy was a general one not directed against Germany. As far as the non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw pact was concerned, the President thought it should be possible to word it differently to meet German objections. He suggested that Dr. von Brentano discuss the question of technical commissions with Mr. Kohler./2/ The President made the general point, however, that the United States wanted to move in association with the Federal Government. If parts of the United States proposals were not acceptable, the United States wanted to hear the German comments. The President hoped Germans realized, however, that we could not get everything we wanted. Otherwise, there would be no possibility of trying to reach an agreement.
/2/A memorandum of Kohler's conversation with Brentano, which took place at Kohler's office at noon and covered the international access authority, press leaks, the general principles paper, the technical commissions, U.S.-German relations, future consultations, and the visit of Fritz Erler, is ibid.
Dr. von Brentano agreed with the President on non-diffusion of nuclear weapons, saying it was not a problem and not necessary to discuss since he understood the United States legal situation. The important thing was whether or not we had a functioning Atlantic Alliance ready to react to any threat. Dr. von Brentano said it was not necessary to talk about non-aggression pacts either because he was also sure some acceptable formulation or language could be found. He noted, however, that guarantees from the other side were of problematic value and cited Khrushchev's definition of wars of liberation. Dr. von Brentano said it was necessary to discuss some things, privately not publicly, because of our responsibilities to the German and American people.
Turning to the question of recognizing the GDR, Dr. von Brentano indicated this was not a prestige factor, but a political question of overriding importance. The participation of the GDR on equal terms with the great powers in an international access authority would tend to place it on the same footing with such powers. The establishment of joint commissions was also potentially dangerous because it could set in motion a train of events leading to the establishment of an all-German commission. He did not think this would happen under the present government, but he was afraid that a first step in this direction could lead to a second step which would be disastrous--i.e., taking Germany out of the Western Alliance. Dr. von Brentano stressed the necessity of avoiding any developments which would open up such vistas. This concern was the basis of his reserve and warning.
Dr. von Brentano pointed out that the Federal Government had agreed in 1959 to the establishment of joint technical commissions as part of the over-all Herter Plan./3/ If those commissions were established apart from such an over-all plan, however, it could lead to all-German conversations. He was not worried about the threat of the GDR, but about the possibility of weakening the Western Alliance. If Germany left the Western Alliance or if such a possibility were implied in any proposals, the consequences would be very serious.
/3/For text of the Western Peace Plan ("Herter Plan"), May 14, 1959, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 624-629, or American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 655-663.
The President asked Dr. von Brentano what it was in the United States proposals that worried him. We were talking about West Berlin and East Berlin and others participating in an international access authority on a basis giving the West and the others a clear majority over the Communists. He pointed out that West Berlin and East Berlin and the other members each had a different status. Recognition of the GDR was not involved. The President noted that the United States had been dealing with Communist China at Geneva without recognizing it. He said he would have the same problem if he tried to change United States policy toward Communist China and, therefore, he understood German sensitivity in this matter, but he emphasized that dealing with the GDR did not mean recognition, as demonstrated by the fact that the Federal Republic dealt with the East Germans on 90 per cent of Berlin access at the present time.
Mr. Kohler said it was a question of technical functions not political institutions.
Dr. von Brentano replied that the proposed commissions were really political institutions. He said he was fully aware that German reunification could not be brought about now by the United States or Germany, but he thought the common goal of reunification should not be given up. If there were all-German talks or an all-German commission, the impression would be created that the Western Alliance was not interested in the peaceful reunification of Germany and had shifted the problem to the Germans. In those circumstances, people in Germany would say it was up to the Germans to settle this problem. This development could be dangerous.
The President suggested that Dr. von Brentano discuss with Mr. Kohler the language establishing technical commissions to see if a way could be found of meeting the problem without lessening the commitment to reunification. He emphasized again, however, that it would not be possible to reach an agreement with the USSR that would fully satisfy everyone. He thought it would be useful to distinguish between what was unsatisfactory and what was verboten. Unless some agreement could be reached on possible proposals, we would have to stop the conversations with the USSR.
The President said we envisaged a technical access authority which would actually govern traffic to Berlin. This traffic was being controlled now. The question was how we could set up a system assuring continued traffic for the next few years at least. With this objective in mind, we had put forth proposals to see if it was possible to create a basis for seeking such a solution. The President expressed the view that the present situation with respect to Berlin access was unsatisfactory since it gave the USSR great opportunities for interference. For example, the Soviets could insist on certain visas. As a result, no Germans would travel. He wondered where this would lead to.
The President said the French did not want to be associated with our efforts because they wanted to avoid criticism in the future that Germany had been sold out by the West. In the President's opinion, this was taking the easy way out.
Dr. von Brentano said he knew that if the situation was serious, it was necessary to try to find an accommodation. He was aware that concessions on both sides would be necessary, but as the President himself had said, one could not negotiate on the basis of "what's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable".
The President said that it was necessary to see if some middle ground could be found. For this reason, we had given our proposals to the Federal Government for comment. The President said he did not mind accepting responsibility and abuse since he thought it was in ev-eryone's interest to try to reach an understanding. He thought the present relative calm should be used to pursue conversations with the USSR. It was better to talk now than under pressure. He added he had observed that when those most opposed to conversations were asked to face up to the possibility of war or to the necessity of economic, naval or air blockade, they always wanted to do something else. Therefore, these problems should be discussed now.
Dr. von Brentano said he had been involved in many negotiations and he knew the difficulty of getting answers to difficult questions. He emphasized he was not entitled to reproach the United States nor interested in doing so. He wanted to express some apprehensions because he thought a frank exchange of views and expression of feelings were essential. He added that after reading the press in recent days, he frankly did not know where we stood. He emphasized, however, that it was silly to say anyone in Germany wanted worsened relations with the United States because all Germans knew how dependent they were on United States friendship and support.
The President said there seemed to be stories in the press every day criticizing the United States. He referred to the Gruson article in the New York Times of April 28 carrying the headline "Brentano Uneasy Over Bonn-US Tie". He said it was easy to cast blame from the outside. He noted that the Federal Government had not yet established the 18-months conscription period, nor had it passed emergency legislation. Despite this, there was antagonism against the United States. The President pointed out the United States probably would have a deficit of $4 billion this year and that if it had not been for the Berlin problem, he could have had a balanced budget and could have reduced taxes.
The President repeated that if the United States and the Federal Republic could not reach an understanding, it would not be possible to go on with the talks with the USSR. He said he wanted a private exchange of views about mutual interests and in the spirit of mutual confidence. He indicated he was aware that United States relations with the Federal Republic in the last fifteen years were the best we had had with any country, with the exception of the United Kingdom where we had a special relationship. He added that he was also aware of German assistance to the United States balance of payments. He expressed the view that the poison in the newspapers was bad for both sides as Ambassador Grewe well knew.
The President noted that by not sharing nuclear information with France, we were avoiding creating difficulties for Germany. We were also supporting the Common Market which created difficulties for the United States, but helped Germany. The President thought that perhaps there was a breakdown in communications between the United States and Germany and that both sides should work harder and more quietly. He said the United States was totally stunned by the heat of the reaction in Bonn to the United States proposals for discussion with the USSR. When he had approved these proposals, the President added, he had assumed they were in accord with the understanding reached by our two governments.
Dr. von Brentano agreed that things had not taken the best course in Bonn. Turning to the Gruson interview, he said he had known the correspondent for years and that he had had a long talk with him at which no notes were taken. He did not evade questions which were in the air because that would have been foolish. On the other hand, he could not accept responsibility for what the New York Times or the German press wrote afterwards. It was silly to say that he was in the United States to propose alternatives. He was not here on behalf of the Federal Government and he could not accept an official task in his present position.
The President again suggested that Dr. von Brentano go over the United States proposals with Mr. Kohler and give his opinions. The President said he knew we shared the same objectives, but that he would welcome Dr. von Brentano's thoughts, particularly as to what would cause difficulties in the long range and what might be unpleasant but could be lived with.
In conclusion, the President suggested it would be best in handling the press after this interview to say that there had been a general discussion and exchange of views which had been good and useful. He advised against suggesting that there had been any discussion of details and thought nothing should be said about any protest. Dr. von Brentano fully agreed.
As they were leaving the room, the President asked Dr. von Brentano what he thought would happen to the price of Volkswagens. Dr. von Brentano expressed the hope they would go the way United States steel prices had.
45. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
US/MC/30
Athens, May 3, 1962, 1-3:35 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5-362. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Kohler and approved in S on May 6. The meeting was held at the Ambassador's residence. A summary of this conversation was transmitted in Sectos 24 and 31 from Geneva, May 4. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2104)
UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-NINTH MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL Athens, Greece, May 4-6, 1962
PARTICIPANTS
United States
Secretary Rusk
Mr. Kohler
Germany
Foreign Minister Schroeder
Mr. Carstens
SUBJECT
Berlin and Germany
The pre-lunch conversation opened with a thorough discussion of the leaks of the US proposals to the Soviets in Bonn. Views were exchanged along well-known lines and it was agreed that while there were possible theories as to the source and motivation of the leaks, nothing could be definitely established and the question should be regarded as closed. Foreign Minister Schroeder pointed out the political difficulties of his situation in which he was under attack within his own party as "soft." Mr. Schroeder then went on to the question of communications and consultation between the two Governments and put in a plea that this should resume through the channel of Ambassador Grewe in Washington. He pointed out that since Grewe was so thoroughly familiar with all the details, the reports which he submitted were fuller and more useful to him than those received from Ambassador Dowling, who had no means of supplementing his instructions in reply to questions as happened when Ambassador Grewe saw, for example, Mr. Kohler in the State Department. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
The conversation then continued at the luncheon table. Mr. Schroeder talked at some length about the desirability of an early visit to Bonn by the Secretary. In reply the Secretary indicated that he had considered this. Unfortunately it would not be possible in connection with the present visit since he was committed to proceed on to Australia. There seemed some possibility that if the NATO meeting should end on Saturday he might be able to go briefly to Bonn on Sunday, however this appeared to be rather remote. Otherwise he was under some fire from Congress with respect to his travels. It was for this reason that he had made arrangements to bring together the CENTO, NATO and ANZUS meetings within a period of ten days. This might also mean that it would be preferable for him to visit Bonn after the adjournment of the Congress, that is, in July, though he did not rule out that arrangements could be made before that date.
The Secretary then reviewed in broad terms his discussions with Gromyko and Dobrynin. He said he thought that there was some misunderstanding with respect to the broad questions included in the US Draft Principles paper. He pointed out that there had been no real discussion of these broader questions with the Russians. The Secretary had rather emphasized the question of vital interests and indicated that if agreement could be reached on these, then these broader questions could easily fall into place. The idea of setting up a continuing forum of Deputy Foreign Ministers was really calculated to give the Soviets a way out--a cover under which they could if they wished drop their proposals or at least allow them to fade away. It was questionable whether the French would agree to participate. The Secretary commented that the French had suggested a tripartite meeting prior to the quadripartite dinner tonight but had been informed that this would not be possible to arrange. The Secretary thought it might serve a useful purpose, from Mr. Schroeder's point of view, to have this bilateral lunch followed without an interim meeting by the quadripartite dinner. Messrs. Schroeder and Carstens indicated agreement that this would be useful in terms of German fears of French ambitions for a tripartite directorate. Carstens added that the French had said that if the Germans asked them to go ahead at some point and participate in a more formal negotiation with the Russians they would agree to do so. The Secretary commented that the French game at the moment seemed to be to avoid any commitment to any kind of Berlin arrangement which some Germans, some day, might criticize. He thought the French looked even beyond the present German government. Messrs. Schroeder and Carstens agreed with the Secretary's analysis. The Secretary then continued to say that it was absolutely fundamental to the US position that there would be no Berlin or German arrangement without the Federal Government's concurrence. It was conceivable that the European countries could reach some kind of settlement without the United States but it was not conceivable that the United States could reach a settlement without the Europeans.
The discussion then turned to the question of the Technical Commissions which the Secretary said we must discuss and work out together. He did not understand why the Federal Government had such a lack of self-confidence about dealing with East Germans. Carstens replied that if the Federal Government dealt with the East German regime it would strengthen the GDR and make life even more difficult for the East German population. Schroeder then commented at some length on the nature of the Ulbricht regime. He expressed the opinion that a change there to a more liberal regime would be a very important development in the situation. If there were a more "middle-way" regime tensions would relax greatly in Central Europe. Mr. Kohler raised the question, making it clear that he was not challenging that such a change would be a desirable development, whether, however, it would not in fact result in a strengthening of the East German regime, as feared by Carstens, by giving it a greater acceptability to the East Germans. Mr. Schroeder and Mr. Carstens agreed that this was an important question. However, on balance the Federal Republic had to consider that the situation would be greatly eased if there were a regime in East Germany which made some kind of "comparative" approach to self-determination so that the population would be content to live there and not persist in attempts to escape.
The Foreign Minister then turned to his political problems as a result of the leaks. He pointed out that most of his own party, the CDU, as well as the Free Democrats and the SPD, entirely supported his position. Only elements of the CDU were accusing him of having agreed to "concessions." In reply to the Secretary's observation that over the past year we had in fact reached no agreement of any kind with the Russians and made no concessions, Mr. Schroeder said that the opponents referred to such things as willingness to engage in commitments of nonaggression as "concessions." Returning to the previous theme, he added that if there were a less oppressive regime in East Germany and a resulting tendency toward easier conditions, he then believed it would be very useful to move toward closer relations between West and East Germany and even toward some rapprochement with Eastern European countries, notably Poland. After citing his conversation with Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki in Geneva,/2/ the Secretary went on to say that he thought it would be useful to bring West and East Germans together more. Schroeder observed that the Technical Commissions would not really be the way to do this since there would only be a handful of disciplined Communists on these Commissions from the other side. In this connection he cited German experience under Nazi totalitarianism. He said that even at the time he had concluded there was no way to bring the Nazis down from the inside and that only outside intervention could do this. The Secretary said that from the point of view of long range strategy the more we could develop the contacts of Eastern European countries with the West, the more difficult it would be for the Soviets in case of war to fight their divisions through these territories. In fact it might take a certain amount of Soviet strength just to maintain order in the Eastern European countries. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] He added that he thought it would be useful if the Secretary could find some way to suggest to the Russians that it would be in their interest to establish a better regime in Eastern Germany. The Secretary said he had in fact already suggested to Gromyko in Geneva that things were made more difficult by the nature of the Ulbricht regime.
/2/A memorandum of Rusk's conversation with Rapacki on March 15 (SecDel MC/19) is ibid., Central Files, 762.00/3-1562.
The Secretary then turned again to the question of the attitude of Paris. The French had said they would not object to the explorations to see whether negotiations might be possible. Now, however, they were saying that we were getting very near to negotiations but still were not committing themselves. Mr. Schroeder commented that he thought at tonight's meeting the Secretary could not expect to get any comment from Couve on this question until after he, Schroeder, had spoken. He had observed that this was the case in the recent EEC Foreign Ministers Meeting./3/
/3/Held April 17 at Paris.
The meeting then adjourned to the salon. At the Secretary's request Mr. Kohler gave the Foreign Minister a rundown on Dr. Brentano's talks with the President and with himself./4/ Some discussion then ensued as to the press treatment of German attitudes. During this Mr. Schroeder observed that the President should not consider the New York Times a German newspaper. On balance he thought that the treatment of this matter by most of the German press, for example the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, had supported the Federal Government's position. Mende's trip to the United States,/5/ he added, had been very successful. In the famous meeting of the political leaders Mende had observed that it was better to have a modus vivendi than a casus belli. He said that for his political position the question of timing was very important as respects some elements of a possible modus vivendi package.
/4/See Document 44.
/5/A memorandum of President Kennedy's conversation with Vice Chancellor Mende, March 19, during the latter's 12-day trip to the United States is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany.
Mr. Schroeder then returned to the question of communications between the two governments. He again requested that Ambassador Grewe be restored as the channel for communications. He assured the Secretary that these communications would be handled on a very limited distribution basis, precisely the same as those obtaining for the Geneva briefings and insisted that the German Embassy in Washington had in no way been responsible for the leak. He then hoped that Ambassador Grewe would be dealt with exactly like the French and UK Ambassadors. He referred in this connection to the quadripartite Ambassadorial group and the Secretary observed that it was the French who had disrupted this operation by abstaining from active participation. Mr. Schroeder then said that having made this appeal for restoration of normal communications, he wanted to inform the Secretary that a general reshuffling of German diplomats was in the offing which would include positions in Washington, Moscow and the UN as well as several other posts. Referring to Mr. Schroeder's remark about the President's sensitivity to the press, the Secretary observed that the President was a great competitive player and liked to score 100 per cent. He therefore did tend to notice the critical articles more than those which supported him. Moreover he would say frankly that there was some sensitivity in Washington to constant remarks out of Bonn about the good old days of the relationship with his predecessor, Foster Dulles. He had known Mr. Dulles very well himself and knew something of his troubles with the Chancellor.
At the close of the discussion it was agreed that both sides would say to the press something along the following lines: The Secretary of State and the German Foreign Minister had met for a full review of the discussions with the Russians and would continue their discussions with the British and French Foreign Ministers this evening. These discussions would of course be reported to NATO. There was no doubt that further discussions between the US and the USSR would be on a basis of agreed positions which started from the well known and vital interests of the West in West Berlin./6/
/6/At 8:30 p.m. Rusk and Schroeder joined Couve de Murville and Home for further talks on Berlin. Rusk began the meeting by reviewing his conversations with Gromyko at Geneva and then asked his colleagues whether he should give Dobrynin a revised draft of the principles paper. Home favored this, but Schroeder and Couve de Murville demurred. (Memorandum of conversation (US/MC/21); Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5-362) In subsequent conversations, May 4 and 5, Kohler and Carstens reviewed the principles paper in detail, and Carstens agreed that Grewe would receive specific instructions after the Chancellor had considered the text further. (Sectos 34 and 55 from Geneva, May 5; ibid., 762.0221/5-562)
46. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, May 5, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany. Secret. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy.
SUBJECT
Conversation with Heinrich von Brentano, Saturday, May 5, 1962, 10 to 11 a.m.
I called on von Brentano this morning at his request, relayed through Minister von Lilienfeld. At first the meeting was to be at Lilienfeld's house, but later Ambassador Grewe called and said that he would like to have me come to the Embassy and meet with him. On the way to the Eglin Field air demonstration on May 4, I talked with him about it and explained that I would prefer to meet Brentano privately in order to speak very frankly with him about our confidence in Schroeder and in regular channels. Grewe agreed, and in turn I agreed to have a private talk with him after talking with Brentano.
Brentano began our talk by making three general statements. First, he hoped that his visit in Washington had been useful, and he wished to express his thanks for the understanding with which he had been received in all parts of Washington, including the White House. He fully recognized that the unhappy leak in Bonn had been damaging, and he agreed with his American friends that such indiscretions could be helpful only to the Soviet Union.
Second, he entirely agreed that it was important that there should be negotiations with the Soviet Union. Tensions were so great that none of us could neglect any possibility of lowering them. He further recognized that the U.S. must have and exercise the responsibilities of leadership in such negotiations.
Third, he spoke briefly to explain his reservations about the International Access Authority and the mixed commissions. The International Access authority might seem to lessen the ultimate responsibility of the Four Great Powers, and the mixed commissions might be misunderstood in Germany as meaning that the United States had lost its interest in the problem of reunification. Moreover, he thought that serious discussion between West Germans and Communist functionaries was as impossible as serious discussion between the condemned man and the hangman.
I replied to these three headings as follows. First, I agreed that Brentano's visit had been useful and that the indiscretions in Bonn had been damaging. I pointed out the difficulty of catching up with the damage of such indiscretions, and took the occasion to remark that von Brentano's private briefing on Tuesday (May 1) showed this difficulty./2/ We were convinced that his intention had been to emphasize Allied harmony, but in fact correspondents, alerted to probe for differences, had found some and had been guided accordingly. A still more notable instance of this trouble was Brentano's excellent speech to the Press Club which I had heard praised by our own State Department experts and which nevertheless was reported in rather waspish fashion by Murray Marder./3/ All this trouble could be traced to the original indiscretions in Bonn.
/2/According to Tosec 48 to Athens, May 3, Lilienfeld had hosted a dinner on May 1 for 12 U.S. correspondents and broadcasters at which Brentano, with support from Grewe, had reiterated German concerns about the general U.S. approach and the proposals on access and technical commissions. The telegram concluded that the correspondents were left with the definite impression that there were serious differences between the United States and the Federal Republic. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5-362)
/3/For text of Marder's article, which included brief quotations from Brentano's speech, see The Washington Post, May 5, 1962.
Second, I agreed that the United States had the responsibility of leadership and was prepared to exercise it. We also believed in the importance of negotiation, although we had no clear evidence that our current efforts would be successful. We were trying to offer the Soviet Union a quiet way out of the crisis if the Soviet Union was in fact seeking such a result. We thought that perhaps some of the misunderstanding in Bonn derived from a failure to grasp just what our draft papers aimed at. There were many things which we believed that we could not put in a paper designed to attract a Soviet signature. The draft paper therefore described only the small sector in which our position and that of the Soviet Union might overlap. We should find other ways of describing the rest of our position. Brentano nodded his clear understanding and agreement to this presentation and said that he thought there had indeed been misunderstanding in Bonn.
Third, I disclaimed expert qualifications on the access authority or the technical commissions, but I indicated that, in our judgment, the access authority would not end the ultimate responsibility of the Four Powers. Indeed, I said that I thought in the end there were two Great Powers confronting each other here, and that all pieces of paper would take their meaning in the end from this fundamental fact. As to the technical commissions, I was somewhat more energetic, indicating our own belief that the West Germans should have confidence in their own ability to avoid being trapped by Communist opposite numbers. I recognized that there was a difference of emphasis here, and recalled that the Chancellor had expressed some worries of his own on this score last year, but I insisted that, in our judgment, these contacts, while not of critical importance, could have an affirmative value in the light of the relative quality and attraction of the Federal Republic as against the puppet Pankow regime.
Brentano denied that there was a problem of confidence in the German attitude toward the technical commissions, and argued again that such a "doctrine of contacts" might lead some Germans to believe that they must make their own arrangements with the East Germans and eventually with the Soviet Union. If there should ever be talk of reuni-fication by means of neutrality, he, von Brentano, would prefer to go into exile, and so would most other men in German public life, even among the opposition. The whole of German policy in recent years had been built on the firm connection to NATO and the West, and he feared any action which might seem to move away from this line of policy.
I remarked that I could see no such danger in the notion of "contacts." I said that the United States neither could nor would lessen its own interest in the fate of Germany, and that we too had an enormous investment in the solid commitment of the Federal Republic to NATO and the West. This was a keystone of our policy, and we knew that the attitude of the German people themselves was an essential element in this policy. We in our time had heard the arguments in favor of the neutralization of Germany, and able Americans had argued that Germany should be neutralized on the Austrian model. For myself, I thought there was only one thing wrong with such a policy: it would not work. Germany was no Austria, if only because of her size. Brentano nodded his agreement, and I went on to say that I thought Germany and the United States thus shared in the problem of the East German regime. We could not now get rid of it except by war. The Austrian solution was impractical. The Federal Republic must remain a part of the West. What could we expect?
I then suggested that the larger arena of relations with the Soviet Union would remain a matter of central concern to the United States, and there remained the possibility of an internal improvement in the GDR. I said that just as we had encouraged and supported a new atmosphere in Poland, we thought it worth working toward a mellowing of the Ulbricht regime. It would be a gain if East Germany could move from Ulbricht toward Gomulka, and it was in this sense that we saw some virtue in contacts. Brentano agreed with everything except the last clause of this exposition.
After a further exchange of assurances that consultation is good and leaks bad, we parted cordially./4/
/4/Following his meeting with Brentano, Bundy discussed the situation with Grewe, who indicated that he felt his position was so badly damaged that he should withdraw. (Memorandum for the record; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany) Later that day Bundy sent a memorandum to the President reviewing his conversations with Grewe and Brentano. (Ibid.)
McG. B.
P.S. I did emphasize our great confidence in Schroeder and in regular channels, and I think von Brentano took the point.
47. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, May 9, 1962, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5-962. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution.
2670. Embtel 2667./2/ When I saw Carstens this morning, I asked for clarification of Chancellor's Berlin press conference statements, saying I was dismayed, as I was sure that President and the Secretary had been. Carstens indicated Schroeder and he were equally mystified, and even unhappier.
/2/Telegram 2667, May 9, reported that the Chancellor's May 7 press conference was an inept performance and that Dowling would see Carstens to ask for clarification. (Ibid., 762.00/5-962) Extracts from the press conference are in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 698-700 and Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1962, pp. 486-488. The "uncorrected text" was transmitted in telegram 2675 from Bonn, May 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 762A.13/5-962) On May 8 the Department of State issued a statement giving its views on the access authority in response to the Chancellor's remarks. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 700-701. Further remarks on the problem were made by the Chancellor at a second press conference on May 8 and by President Kennedy at his press conference on May 9. For extracts from the former, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1962, pp. 488-489; for a transcript of the latter, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 375-383.
Carstens went on to say he was confident Adenauer had not meant to convey dissatisfaction with US policy, or to imply any basic disagreement between US and FedRep. He said Foreign Office was already endeavoring to interpret to German press Chancellor's remarks--which had been made in response to queries--in this sense. In response to my request, he promised to try to get unofficial transcript for me by end of day.
After some further discussion, Carstens and I agreed he should first have talk with Chancellor, after which I would see him for general discussion his current views. At my prompting, Carstens said he would ask Adenauer to send "explanation" to the President. I hope to see Chancellor first of next week.
At luncheon today, I asked von Eckardt to attempt at his scheduled press conference this afternoon to make it clear that Chancellor had not meant to indicate any basic disagreement with US policy. He said he would try to do so.
Dowling
48. Editorial Note
On May 11 the President's Press Secretary Pierre Salinger arrived in Moscow for a 5-day visit. During two extensive conversations on May 12 Chairman Khrushchev told Salinger that the Soviet Union could not recognize the right of the Western powers to keep their troops in Berlin and rejected the U.S. idea of an access authority. Reports on the conversations were transmitted in telegrams 2935 and 2965 from Moscow, May 13 and 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/5-1362 and 101/5-1562) For Salinger's account of the visit, including extracts from the conversations on Berlin, see With Kennedy, pages 222-237. Further documentation on the visit is in volume V.
49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, May 12, 1962, 7:55 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5-1262. Secret. The source text indicates that the telegram was drafted by Bundy, but he told Rusk in a telephone call at 3:48 p.m. that the President had "worked hard on it in an effort to communicate sharply with the old gentleman." (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192) It was cleared by Tyler and Hillenbrand and initialed by Rusk.
3100. Eyes only Ambassador. Following which supplements Deptel 3071/2/ is intended to provide broader framework for your talk with Chancellor Adenauer. You may wish to begin by saying that we regret situation which has developed and which has resulted in sensational press treatment and speculation detrimental to our common interests. Both sides need to take stock, to correct misconceptions and to plan course for future which will avoid repetition of events of past few weeks. It is in this spirit that US Government has instructed you to make observations which follow.
/2/Telegram 3071, May 9, transmitted the text of a broadcast by Daniel Schorr that morning that stated that the Chancellor was torpedoing the U.S.-Soviet talks and recited a list of German grievances. The telegram stated that this and other similar statements out of Bonn could only be damaging to the President's relations with the Chancellor. If the Chancellor had serious reservations about U.S. policy, the President expected "to hear about them directly and not through offensive remarks repeated by journalists." (Ibid., Central Files, 762.00/5-962)
On Berlin question, we are sending you in separate telegram chronologies relating to consultation on "Principles Paper" and International Access Authority paper./3/ You may wish to draw on these as appropriate to illustrate that process of substantive consultation with Germans has been both continuing and full. In this connection, you may also draw as pertinent on various messages repeated to Bonn reporting on Secretary's discussions with Dobrynin.
/3/Telegram 3095 to Bonn, May 12. (Ibid., 762.0221/5-1262)
Point on consultation leads logically to Chancellor's alleged feeling, as indicated to General Clay in Berlin, that he was badly treated because he had not received reply to his letter of April 14, 1962, to President./4/ You may wish to note that, upon his return here, General Clay had mentioned the Chancellor's feeling in this matter. You might point out that, on April 15, 1962, Secretary of State discussed telephonically Chancellor's letter with President, who was in Virginia over Sunday. You were thereafter directed immediately by telephone to communicate to Schroeder that, while Secretary would go ahead with his scheduled meeting with Dobrynin on April 16, he would not put forward any further paper at this meeting. You might add that while you were unable to reach Schroeder you did reach Dr. Carstens on evening April 15, who said he would inform both Chancellor and Foreign Minister Schroeder same evening. In view of this prompt response to Chancellor's letter which dealt with no other subject, a formal reply was not considered necessary as it was assumed governments would be in touch with each other in continuous consultation on substance of Western position. At almost same time, unfortunate leaks occurred of which we are all too sadly aware and distracted attention from normal consultative process.
/4/Document 37.
You should note that we had impression Athens meeting between Foreign Minister Schroeder and Secretary of State as well as between four Western Foreign Ministers/5/ had gone off in good fashion, had cleared up remaining misconceptions and had resulted in large measure of agreement. Consultations in Athens between senior officials of two countries carried forward work on substantive paper, and we are now awaiting through regular diplomatic channels final German response to points worked out at Athens ad referendum. We were, therefore, naturally surprised by press reports and speculations following upon Chancellor's two press conferences in Berlin which tended to create impression of major differences between us.
/5/See Document 45 and footnote 5 thereto.
At this point line of argument set forth in Deptel 3071 should be presented, but last two sentences of Schorr broadcast should be omitted.
You should supplement Deptel 3071 by emphasizing that continuing reports from Bonn in recent days have carried similar material. You should state as your own view this can only be increasingly irritating to the President and may raise in his mind a question whether German and American understanding is clear as he thought it was in his most satisfactory meeting with the Chancellor last November. You should state that it is this stream of reports of private comments, rather than any particular disagreement over a minor negotiating tactic, that is bound to give the President concern.
You should point out as your own observation that Chancellor probably has no idea how many accounts of this kind have been reported by newspapermen, broadcasters, and weekly journalists in recent weeks. If Chancellor should attempt a denial, you should indicate that there are so many of these sources that the President cannot be expected to believe that their accounts are invented. Finally, you should indicate as your own idea that a President who has plenty of important and pressing political problems on all fronts can hardly be expected to look with good humor on hints that these things were all done better by John Foster Dulles. It is a principle of this Administration that President Kennedy and not John Foster Dulles is now in charge of foreign policy.
You should then expand on the President's basic views as you understand them. Beginning after Vienna last June he committed his country to a major military response to Khrushchev's challenge. 160,000 reserves were called to service; the budget was unbalanced by an additional three and one-half billion dollar defense appropriation, and the United States took the lead in determined preparations to meet all contingencies arising from the Berlin crisis. The response of the US to this crisis far exceeded that of any other NATO nation, both absolutely and relatively. And as the crisis deepened each moment of real test found the US at the center of responsibility. Every test of will in Berlin has been a test fundamentally for the US, and you may wish to note that each of these tests has been passed, so that in spite of the Wall the self-confidence of Berlin has been essentially restored, as the Chancellor will have seen last week. FYI. Our information is that the Berliners are much less troubled with the particular provisions of the International Access Authority than some of those in Bonn. End FYI.
The President thus does not understand public or private doubts about the determination of the US and he understands still less any inclination for Germans to say that General de Gaulle is the only hope; General de Gaulle has talked very energetically but has thus far done very little; there are still only 2 French divisions in West Germany. It is American determination and not French rhetoric that is holding the line against Soviet pressure. Moreover, we not only carry the main burden in Berlin but the overwhelming responsibility also for the critical areas of Southeast Asia which are under Communist pressure. Statesmen like the Chancellor, whose principal concern is with the resistance of Communism, should be the first to understand that covert criticism of the US is destructive.
Nor does the President understand how there can be an objection at this late date to the diplomatic explorations on Berlin which have been going on. At every stage these have been the subject of intense and careful consultation, and if the Chancellor has been surprised at any point it can only be because he did not fully inform himself of the work of his own government. Thus the President was indeed startled by the Chancellor's letter of April 14th with its sudden and unexplained request that negotiations be discontinued. What the President did, as the Chancellor knows, was to continue the discussions without putting into them anything that had not long been agreed between our two countries. The US remains determined to continue this close consultation, but the President is glad that the Federal Government now definitely supports further negotiation.
The President, in short, is determined to keep on with the double policy of strong military defense and a constant search for an honorable settlement if possible. He fully understands and has repeatedly stated himself that negotiations may not succeed. But he believes the effort must be made.
If appropriate opportunity occurs you should also make it clear to the Chancellor that we would be greatly troubled if there were any serious change in his government's long-stated desire to have Great Britain join the Common Market. Arguments on this point are being sent forward separately,/6/ and the President thinks you may wish to press them with the Foreign Secretary and other Bonn officials rather than directly with the Chancellor. But there should be no doubt in anyone's mind that if Bonn should join Paris in making entry into the Common Market unreasonably difficult, the main responsibility for results will fall on Germany and not on France, with grave consequences to Bonn's position in the Western alliance.
/6/Not found.
Rusk
50. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, May 14, 1962, midnight.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5-1462. Secret; Niact. Passed to the White House.
2737. Eyes only for the President and the Secretary. Department telegrams 3071 and 3100./2/ I had long conversation of about two hours with Chancellor this afternoon. My reception was unusually cordial, with his underlying attitude being one of injured innocence characteristic of child caught with hand in cookie jar. Conversation, though not wholly coherent or consistent, was frankest and most open exchange of views I have ever had with Chancellor, with embarrassing tendency on his part to deal in personalities. Perhaps most significant element was his desire, explicit and implicit, to re-establish his relationship with the President and the Secretary.
/2/See Document 49 and footnote 1 thereto.
Conversation opened by my expression of our regret at situation which had resulted in sensational press treatment and speculation detrimental to common interests, interrupted only by Adenauer's assertion that his answers to queries in Berlin press conference had been misinterpreted. He asked if I had brought to the President's attention his introductory remarks at this conference; I replied that I had, but that press reports had out-run my own. I then referred to his hurt feelings re lack of reply to his letter of April 14, and recounted circumstances of oral reply; he interjected that Carstens had not informed him of this, but he now understood and accepted my explanation.
After remarking that the President and the Secretary had thought Athens meeting had cleared up any misconceptions, I read him Schorr's broadcast from Berlin of May 9 (Chancellor remarked he simply could not understand where responsible journalists got such ideas), and went on to say that more disturbing to us were reports brought to Washington of private conversations critical of American policies and indicating lack of confidence in the administration.
Chancellor again expressed unhappiness at lack of press responsibility, and referred to press reports of his comments in Berlin against US entry into European Community; he said these were wholly false. When I suggested that reports of his attitude towards US could not be wholly invented, he remarked that he too had been unhappy at reports and indications from Washington re the President's impatience with him and with Germans. He reminded me of great satisfaction with US-German relations which he had expressed to me at conclusion of his visit to Washington last November, and turned to Osterheld (who, with interpreter, was only other official present at conversation) for confirmation that just a few days ago he had been thinking of writing private letter to the President regretting what seemed to be cooling of relationship, and asking what could be done to repair situation. "Tell me," he said, "am I not right in sensing a change in the State Department's attitude on German matters? Kohler has shown himself to be against us, and even Hillenbrand, who knows Germany and whom I remember from his past experience here, seems no longer to understand our position." I said I could not agree with him, and pointed to full consultation we had had with his government, and to fact that our moves in talks with Soviets had been taken only after Allied agreement. He assented, but without appearing fully to agree with me and went on to remark that what I had said made him feel much better, [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].
[1 paragraph (12-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
I referred once more to private reports of his dissatisfaction with US policy, particularly those subsequent to Athens meeting, but he again evaded issue, saying that perhaps part of problem was lack of precision in diplomatic understanding. He asked if I thought Schroeder and Carstens were less precise in their dealings with us than Brentano had been. I refuted this, although I had to admit there seemed to have been misunderstanding re "principles paper" which was given to Soviets on March 22.
Chancellor then read to me from memorandum which he had prepared for Foreign Office commenting on our latest revision of "principles paper," but which he had not yet sent forward to Schroeder, detailing various objections thereto. There were number of recommendations for language changes, and introduction showed reluctance to have paper presented to Soviets yet, but basic objections continued to center on international access authority, non-aggression agreement, and nuclear diffusion ban. On first, I said we were prepared to consider any German proposal which he thought better; on second I said merely I disagreed with Stikker,/3/ and third I used to return to theme of Deptel 3100 and to recite the President's basic views, his commitment of our resources to Khrushchev's challenge, and awesome responsibility which led him to continue talks with Soviets while preparing for all contingencies. Adenauer said, with fervor, that he hoped I would tell the President that he supported this policy fully. He added that during previous US administration, there had been much talk of "co-existence", but neither side had thought this was possible. It was right, he felt, to hold open possibility of honorable agreement with Soviets, at same time endeavoring to convince them that West would protect its interests (he retailed for me again his conversation with Khrushchev in 1955, in which German assistance was asked against both Red China and US).
/3/Dirk U. Stikker, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
I asked Chancellor if he supported our policy of continuing talks with Soviets. He said yes, entirely, adding that he only hoped we would continue our efforts to bring France along with us. I replied that he could perhaps do more than we, and he referred with evident pleasure to his forthcoming State visit to Paris in July, saying it would be significant event in Franco-German relations, and adding he would continue his efforts with de Gaulle.
I then asked Adenauer if it would be fair to say, in summing up our conversation this afternoon, that he was in agreement with our basic policy on Berlin. He assented readily, and agreed when I said that I assumed we would be hearing shortly from Foreign Office of his detailed objections to revised "principles paper", although he pointed out again that his memorandum had not yet gone forward to Schroeder and there might be changes in it.
As final point, I referred again to damages which might be caused by misunderstandings and by public or private criticisms. Adenauer agreed, saying he was grateful for our conversation, that he felt much better about situation, and was now determined to write the President a personal letter in next day or two to explain his position in frank and open terms, and to set out his basic confidence in American policy.
[1 paragraph (7-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
My comments follow in next numbered telegram./4/
/4/Document 51.
Dowling
51. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, May 14, 1962, midnight.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5-1462. Secret; Priority. Passed to the White House.
2738. Eyes only for the President and the Secretary. My 2737./2/ As you know, Adenauer has in past gone off the rails from time to time without any apparent logical reason. He has, however, thereafter behaved himself for a while after being called to task, and I would expect the same to happen this time but for two factors which I find disturbing.
/2/Document 50.
First is fact he seems to have turned for moment at least against Schroeder and Carstens, on whom we can therefore not rely for assist-ance in pressing our case. I shall see Adenauer again for detailed argument re his objections to "principles paper" as soon as I can get them from Foreign Office. (I shall press for early date.) In meantime, I shall see Brentano again to ensure his favorable advice to Chancellor. It was he who was largely instrumental in arousing Chancellor's latent worries, but problem of course is that given Adenauer's suspicions and pessimistic nature, it is much easier to awaken his concern than to relieve it.
Second and more important factor is prospect for further damage which Chancellor's State visit to Paris will afford. I hope I achieved some result this afternoon, but I have no illusion that my persuasions will equal those of de Gaulle. Further inoculation is needed, and I can think of no safer treatment than another visit to Washington, which might easily come about as an outgrowth of correspondence which Adenauer says he is initiating. If a pretext is needed, I would think an honorary degree could be arranged, and I have little doubt that the Chancellor would accept your invitation for a personal talk.
Dowling
52. Editorial Note
On May 15 General Lucius D. Clay, the President's Special Representative in Berlin, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on his tour in the city and Chancellor Adenauer's concern about U.S. policy in Berlin. Clay stated that the confidence of West Berliners had largely returned after the building of the wall and that there would be an interlude of indeterminate length in Soviet harassment of the city. Clay then reported that the Chancellor had two fears, neither of which Clay believed was shared by the German people: 1) transfer of authority to an international access authority which would void Western responsibility if there were a crisis, and 2) a degree of recognition of the German Democratic Republic. For text of his testimony as well as questions by the committee, see Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), 1962, volume XIV, pages 481-500.
53. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, May 16, 1962, 12:54 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5-1662. Secret; Priority. Drafted by the President.
3120. Eyes only for Ambassador. Following is text of letter from President Kennedy to Chancellor Adenauer which the President handed to Ambassador Grewe May 15:/2/
/2/Grewe met with the President at 5:30 p.m. on May 15 and on the next day with Rusk at noon. No records of these meetings have been found, but they are described briefly by Grewe in Ruckblenden, p. 560.
"Dear Mr. Chancellor:
I have just read Ambassador Dowling's report of his meeting with you,/3/ and I write to say simply that I am very glad of this good beginning in getting our relations back where they were in November. I am sure that as long as we can keep in this kind of touch directly and through our trusted advisers we shall be all right. I want to say, too, that I personally regret that my failure to give a formal answer to your letter of April 14th gave you concern. I did send a prompt oral response, which was necessary because I was out of town, and because a meeting with the Soviet Ambassador had been scheduled for the very next day--but a letter should have followed; our relations to each other are too important to be marred by such matters.
/3/Document 50.
In the same spirit let me say that I am sure the impression you formed of Secretary Rusk's message to Foreign Minister Schroeder was the result of an unhappy accident in the meaning of words in our two languages. I believe we are both very well served by our loyal and able Foreign Ministers, and for that matter by their professional staffs. They are trying to keep us together, and we must not be hard on them.
I am glad that you are giving your close personal attention to the papers now under discussion between our two governments, and we shall look forward to hearing your views. As I see the matter, our agreements greatly outweigh our differences, and we have time enough to work out a clear position before any paper goes on to the Soviets.
At the same time, I think it is very clear that we shall all gain greatly if we can get this Berlin crisis moderated in a fashion that honorably protects both the people of Berlin and our own interests. We doubt if there is any prospect of a real settlement with the Soviets, but we do think there is a chance of getting this three-and-a-half-year-old crisis cooled off by an arrangement that centers on the very few things both sides can say in the same language. Our tactical purpose is to test this possibility--and to do it in a way which continues to protect our common interests--while proving to all concerned that a decent solution is possible whenever the Soviets are ready to accept it.
With warmest good wishes and with thanks again for your courtesy to Ambassador Dowling. Sincerely, John Kennedy"
Rusk
54. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, May 17, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Secret.
SUBJECT
The Next Steps on Berlin
I am attaching the working paper on "The Next Steps on Berlin" which is now on its way to Chip Bohlen and the Secretary for their comments and suggestions. At this juncture we have no idea what will emerge after the Secretary and Chip Bohlen have had a chance to wrestle with the problem.
As we see the exercise (Martin,/2/ Henry Owen and I went over it at some length), there are two problems which must be resolved for the achievement of a satisfactory Berlin arrangement--Soviet acceptance of our military presence in Berlin and acceptable arrangements for our access to the city and a gesture on our part which meets the Soviet concept of "respect for GDR sovereignty".
/2/Martin J. Hillenbrand.
Foy/3/ feels strongly that in view of the Salinger conversations/4/ in Moscow (I have not seen the Moscow report on them and therefore am prepared to accept Foy's reaction), the question of the Western military presence in Berlin must be nailed down firmly before we move too far ahead in our exploratory discussions with the Soviets.
/3/Foy D. Kohler.
/4/See Document 48.
And as soon as there is some indication of Soviet give in this matter, we can make a significant move on the question of "respect for GDR sovereignty", indicating a readiness to accept a GDR presence at the access control points. These would be the essential elements of the "deal", with the non-aggression and non-diffusion commitments added.
You talked yesterday about a possible change in nomenclature for the Western forces such as "police forces", which might make our military presence saleable to the Soviets. I am not aware of any indication that a police force would be more acceptable to the Soviets than a military force unless this was suggested by Salinger in his Moscow talks. However, in his comments to Gardner Cowles, Khrushchev did say "Western troops must leave Berlin or at least give up their occupation status", which I took to mean that some formula which removed the words "occupation forces" might be acceptable. We could explore this possibility with the Soviets once we had some indication that they were prepared to live with our forces in Berlin.
As for tactics, the consensus of Hillenbrand, Owen and Klein was that we should avoid tabling papers; attempt for the time being to get German agreement on the substance of the revised Draft Principles Paper; and let the Secretary present to the Soviets orally what the Germans have agreed to substantively, with the Secretary improvising the orchestration as he goes along.
A new paper might be needed later. For the present however we should avoid new documents, and eliminate the interminable debate with our Allies over words, phrases and punctuation.
German agreement to the present draft of the Principles Paper should give us sufficient license to move ahead with the Dobrynin dialogue. And this would be consistent with the President's commitment to Adenauer on the question of consultation.
Henry again suggested an early offer to the Soviets of accepting the GDR at the check points. After some discussion, it was agreed that this might be in order but only after two or three more rounds with Dobrynin, and provided Dobrynin gave some indication of give in the Soviet position on the Western military presence in Berlin.
As for transforming the character of the talks--by shifting their level and locus--and perhaps letting Bohlen and/or Kohler carry them on privately with Dobrynin away from the Department, the consensus was that this would be useful, but only after the Secretary made progress in nailing down the principal points under discussion.
The immediate task then is to establish Soviet intentions, to ascertain whether serious negotiations are possible. And if there appears to be promise of Soviet movement, we should set down the principal elements of an acceptable arrangement along the general lines of the proposed Draft Principles.
Allied consultation remains a tricky problem. In view of the experience of the last few weeks, however, the general feeling is that some of the difficulty might be avoided if there were fewer papers tabled and greater reliance placed on oral explanations with the Soviets.
Attachment
THE NEXT STEPS ON BERLIN
1. We assume that (a) the possibilities of reaching an understanding with the Soviets on Berlin have not yet been exhausted, no matter how slim they may now seem, and (b) the case for continuing U.S. contacts with the Soviets on Berlin remains strong, whatever be the current judgment as to the urgency or lack of urgency with which the latter view the situation. Under present circumstances there would accordingly seem to be five possible courses of action which we might consider:
a. To concede fully that we cannot move any farther or faster than the Germans want us to. This would mean waiting for the substantive comments which they promised at Athens to give us on the revised "principles paper" and the International Access Authority paper but not presenting the Soviets with any further paper until they had made some major concession or at least until the situation had developed to a point where the Germans accepted the tactical desirability of putting such a paper forward. It would presumably mean continuing the exchanges between the Secretary of State and Ambassador Dobrynin, but at a deliberate pace and without the introduction of any significant new substantive materials on the part of the West.
b. To accept the German judgment that we should put another paper forward at this time but, in the light of their substantive comments on the revised "principles paper", to have the Secretary, in his discretion, explore orally with Dobrynin possible language changes in the "principles paper" given to the Soviets at Geneva.
c. To put pressure on the Germans after receiving their comments on the revised "principles paper" with a view to their accepting, no matter how reluctantly, that we present it to the Soviets at an early stage rather than awaiting some major concession.
d. To foreshorten the negotiations process drastically through fairly unorthodox methods in order to achieve either early agreement or clear deadlock within a period of some 6 to 8 weeks. This might involve giving the Soviets a revised "principles paper", embodying, in effect, our fallback positions, and stressing that, if the Soviets want changes additional to those made, then we would have to consider the talks as deadlocked and our proposals withdrawn. While we would not break off contacts, we would say that the U.S. had no intention of using them to discuss further changes in our "principles paper" and that the talks might well be transferred to a lower level.
e. To start with the assumption that the experience of the past month has shown that the U.S. cannot conduct exploratory talks with the Soviets in a useful way and at the same time observe the amenities of conventional consultation with our Allies. We might, therefore, try to put our contacts with the Soviets on an even more private and confidential basis, without consulting our Allies in advance or from meeting to meeting. We would make it clear to the Soviets that any proposals advanced or discussed were entirely provisional without any commitment on our part or that of our Allies. Only if there seemed to be a real prospect of agreement with the Soviets along lines which might have been developed in these discussions, would we then take up substantive proposals with our Allies preparatory to moving into the more formal kind of negotiations required for a definitive arrangement in which they would be included.
2. None of the foregoing fails to raise serious problems, but, on balance, 1(b) seems to involve the least practical difficulties and still to be consistent with the objective of continuing contacts with the Soviets to further explore whether the possibility of an agreement exists.
3. We cannot permit ourselves to be diplomatically sterilized, as the most extreme interpretations of Adenauer's position would make us, nor can we logically refuse to discuss our "principles paper" with the Soviets as something which might conceivably be modified to take account of the Geneva talks, as long as our basic interests are being preserved. At the same time, to put forward a revised version of the "principles paper" in writing, against the express wishes of the Germans, would run counter to the assurances we have given them and might precipitate another Donnybrook of the kind we just had.
4. The shock approach suggested in 1(d) might have to be considered if we had any reason to think that time were running out, and that the Soviets would ineluctably move ahead within the near future to take the unilateral action which they have threatened, unless some dramatic Western gesture of this sort were made. This does not seem to be the case. Ambassador Thompson in Moscow believes it unlikely that the Soviets will pay our price for a real Berlin solution and that the present "neither peace nor war" situation will continue. After an effort at some sort of a deal with the West Germans, Ambassador Thompson thinks, Khrushchev would sign his separate peace treaty but would take steps to prevent it from bringing on serious conflict with the West. Moreover, for the U.S. to offer further concessions without any indication of give in the Soviet position, would be a debatable negotiating tactic. The Soviets would be unlikely to be impressed by U.S. statements that this was the ultimate in concessions, and it is not clear precisely what the alternative course of action for the U.S. would be if the Soviets did not accept these concessions and we were then forced to carry out our threat to cut off discussions with the Soviets on the "principles paper". Such a statement of purpose on the part of the U.S. may become desirable at some point in the discussions, but it does not seem to have been reached at the present stage.
5. If such a new tactical approach were to be followed, it presumably would have to be done without prior consultation with our Allies, following the procedures suggested in 1(e). This latter might, of course, also be used for a more leisurely approach. The difficulty with 1(e) is that it leaves us at the mercy of the Soviets. By leaking out the contents of such "private" discussions, they could completely foul up our relations with our Allies and bring about a real rather than a synthetic crisis of confidence. Soviet bad faith apart, it is difficult to believe that talks could actually be carried on without becoming known to our Allies. The pressures therefore for information would be difficult to resist.
6. As to the substance of our position, we should shortly have the German comments on the "principles paper" discussed at Athens. These may or may not be helpful, but under the circumstances we would presumably have more flexibility orally than in trying to put in a new paper. Two revisions of the International Access Authority paper have been prepared as the U.S. side--one attempts to adapt the Soviet version presented to us in Geneva; the other attempts to adapt our version by incorporating a number of Soviet suggestions. Since the main German objection was to the make-up of the Board of Governors, and since neither of these versions takes care of this point, it would seem desirable to await the German comments on the old paper which they have promised before floating the new versions./5/
/5/On May 22 Carstens called Dowling to the Foreign Ministry and handed him an aide-memoire giving the German observations on the draft principles paper and the access authority. In reviewing the comments Dowling observed that there were no surprises, and that Carstens had used the term "important" only in regard to nuclear diffusion (stressing that there must be no valid basis for any Soviet objection to a NATO multilateral force) and West German military access to Berlin. (Telegram 2826 from Bonn, May 22; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/5-2262) A translation of the aide-memoire was transmitted in telegram 2827 from Bonn, May 22. (Ibid.)
55. Memorandum From the Assistant to the President's Military Representative (Legere) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/
Washington, May 22, 1962.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 38, Negotiations. Secret.
SUBJECT
Berlin Meeting with President at 1630 Hours, 21 May/2/
/2/Other than this account and references in Rusk's Appointment Book and the President's Appointment Book, no record of this meeting, which was attended by Bundy, Kohler, Hillenbrand, Bohlen, Rusk, and the President, has been found.
1. I now have a little information on yesterday's meeting which was supposed to have addressed the alternative "next steps on Berlin" which appear in the attached paper./3/ I understand from Mr. Klein and from other sources that the meeting was more or less of a complete fiasco. The President had his mind on something else and apparently had not read the paper very carefully. In the second place, the Secretary of State unfortunately had not done his homework either. This left Mr. Bohlen who, as one of my informers said, seems to have a capacity for saying the right thing at the wrong time. In short, the meeting appears to have accomplished nothing whatever.
/3/Attachment to Document 54.
L
56. Editorial Note
On May 17 Under Secretary of State Ball left Washington for a trip to Copenhagen, Stockholm, Paris, and Rome to discuss economic matters. On May 21 Secretary of State Rusk cabled him at Rome, asking him to detour from his itinerary and stop at Bonn for talks with Chancellor Adenauer. Rusk informed Ball that the primary purpose of his visit was to assist in the restoration of U.S. relations with Germany so that the broad interests which both countries had in Berlin and Europe could "be dealt with on their merits without confused static from Bonn." Rusk concluded that Ball would "undoubtedly not wish to discuss details of our Berlin position" with the Chancellor, but he might make some of the points in the instructions to Dowling (Document 49). (Telegram 2863 to Rome; Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-RU/5-2162)
Ball and Dowling discussed Berlin, European integration, a NATO multilateral force, and the Common Market agricultural policy with Chancellor Adenauer on May 23. Ball stated that the President was pleased that relations between the United States and Germany had been restored to a "harmonious basis." The Chancellor replied that he too was pleased that good relations had been restored, "adding he had been upset, not so much personally as officially," because of the importance of the questions to be dealt with. He stated that he regarded the chapter as closed. (Telegram 2858 from Bonn, May 23; ibid., 110.11-RU/5-2362)
57. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, May 24, 1962, 7:54 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/5-2462. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hillenbrand, cleared by Tyler, and approved and initialed by Kohler.
6319. If opportunity presents itself in your meeting with de Gaulle you should attempt correct some misconceptions on his part on underlying rationale of US exploratory talks with Soviets on Berlin which became apparent during his May 15 press conference./2/ Same line could also be used as appropriate in Embassy contacts with FonOff.
/2/For a transcript of de Gaulle's press conference, May 15, see Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, May 19, 1958-January 31, 1964, pp. 172-184.
By negative implication de Gaulle apparently under impression US is engaged in definitive attempt to settle problem of Germany. This may be among Soviet objectives as embodied in their concept of drawing line under World War II, but US is under no illusions on this point. Our position remains, as it has always been, that only lasting solution to German and Berlin problems would be reunification of country in freedom with reunited Berlin as capital of this unified Germany. We are also realistic enough to recognize that this goal is unlikely to be achieved in foreseeable future, given basically conflicting Communist and Free World interests in Central Europe.
What we are trying to deal with is factual situation, one of ingredients of which is capacity of Soviets to sign separate peace treaty with GDR and to refuse any longer to carry out their responsibilities towards Western Occupation Powers in Berlin. As one of powers principally concerned in involved discussions of this subject since Khrushchev first precipitated Berlin crisis in November, 1958, French Government should be very well aware that reasonable Western response to this Soviet threat must be first to try to prevent such unilateral action by Soviets, but if this cannot be done, to attempt in advance to achieve some arrangement or modus vivendi which will enable vital Western interests in Berlin situation to be preserved.
In explaining US approach, we have found useful conceptual framework analyzing discussions with Soviets as taking place on three levels. In this connection, you should draw on exposition in Deptel 5567 to Paris on April 17, reporting Secretary's discussion with Dobrynin on previous day./3/ We believe use of this framework can be helpful in clearing up misconceptions as to purpose of "principles paper" handed to Gromyko by Secretary in Geneva on personal and informal basis.
/3/Telegram 5567 to Paris is the same as telegram 2363 to Moscow; see the source note, Document 39.
We cannot agree that certain broader elements included in this paper, such as nuclear nondiffusion, NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression statements and possible West German/East German mixed commissions amount to attempt to settle German problem. These are either merely declaratory of existing US policy or attempt to provide mechanisms (as in case of mixed commissions which suggested by Germans themselves) to improve de facto situation for benefit of Berliners, West Germans and population of East Germany.
FYI. We would not, of course, anticipate that you could persuade de Gaulle of soundness US approach, given his position that mere posturing behind US nuclear deterrent will somehow or other suffice to prevent Soviets from taking unilateral actions which we cannot prevent and which will necessarily result in de facto deterioration of Berlin situation. On other hand, we do not wish to seem to agree, even by implication, with his assessment that present US/Soviet exchanges amount to tacit willingness on our part to join with Soviets in drawing line under World War II in manner they desire. End FYI.
You might add that we have been in full consultation with the German Government, as we have moved from meeting to meeting with Soviets, and have also tried to keep French fully informed to extent that French Government itself has been willing to permit this. We shall continue our probing of Soviet position. Maintenance of contacts with Soviets on this highly charged question is desirable and we consider that we must continue to explore possibility, consistent with our vital interests, of achieving some modus vivendi. In the event of breakdown and major confrontation over Berlin, we should be able to say that we have discharged fully our responsibility to our people in search for a peaceful solution. We have been glad to note from President de Gaulle's press conference statement that France does not object to employment by US of its diplomatic resources towards this objective./4/
Rusk
/4/Ambassador Gavin met with President de Gaulle on May 26, but was unable to make the points raised in this telegram, since de Gaulle ended the meeting before the Ambassador could respond to his exposition of the French position on Berlin. (Telegram 5700 from Paris, May 28; Department of State, Central Files, 611.51/5-2862; printed in vol. XIII, Document 252.
58. Letter From Chancellor Adenauer to President Kennedy/1/
Bonn, May 25, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. The source text is labeled "Unofficial Translation." Attached to a May 29 transmittal note from the German Embassy.
MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I thank you sincerely for your letter of May 15, 1962./2/ I share your view that we cannot afford letting our cooperation be disturbed by misunderstandings out of all proportion to the difficult tasks before us. I also concur with you that the differences between us are much less than the agreements and that there is time enough to work out a clear cut position before a paper is presented to the Soviets.
/2/See Document 53.
No one could feel greater satisfaction than I myself, my government and the German people if it were possible to settle the Berlin crisis--which has been smouldering for years--without our common interests being harmed. I agree with you that to this end every possibility must be conscientiously explored and that it is advisable to make clear to the world that an honorable solution is possible as soon as the Soviets are prepared to accept it.
I believe that we will reach a consensus on the most suitable methods to achieve this object. Certainly, we, on our part, will need firmness and patience and we will not be able to make many new proposals to the Soviets. One of these new possibilities to continue the talks with the Soviets I had conveyed through Federal Minister Schroder to Secretary Rusk at the Athens meeting. On some questions, we are quite prepared to talk if the Soviets were ready to allow more humane conditions to be created in the Soviet occupation zone.
I am told that Secretary Rusk is considering a visit to Bonn during the second half of June. I would warmly welcome the realization of this plan and I believe that, particularly during the present phase, frequent and intimate discussions between our two governments are most useful.
Ambassador Dowling spoke to me recently about your interest in Great Britain's admission to the Common Market./3/ So far, I have not communicated in this matter with President de Gaulle. I think it would be best to await first of all the meeting between President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan./4/
/3/Presumably a reference to the meeting on May 23 described in Document 56.
/4/June 2-3
With best wishes.
Sincerely yours,
Adenauer/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that indicates that Adenauer signed the original.
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