Documents 90-112
AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1962: CONTINGENCY PLANNING, THE DEATH OF PETER FECHTER, AND THE ABOLITION OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOVIET COMMANDANT
90. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, August 1, 1962, 11 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/8-162. Secret; Priority. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Paris, Moscow, London, USAREUR, USAFE, and SHAPE.
134. Paris also for USRO, Stoessel and McGuire. USAREUR for POLAD. SHAPE for US Element Live Oak. Ref: Berlin tel 120 Dept, sent Bonn 108, Paris 62./2/ Following Soviet threat that helicopter might be shot down if it remained vicinity Karlshorst July 30, we were faced with question how to proceed with respect future flights. To abandon flights, which had been made for many years, seemed clearly unwise (as Bonn noted in Embtel 313 Dept)./3/However, also recognized greatest discretion called for in choice and timing of flights. Safest course seemed to be to fly at an early time brief, innocuous flight at high altitude, and thereafter fly carefully spaced and controlled flights to maintain our right to do so and to fulfill at same time intelligence purposes. Brief flight of 13 minutes therefore flown today at altitudes above 1000 feet avoiding Karlshorst area. It was without incident. Press inquiries re possibility such flight having occurred have been answered with statement that routine helicopter flights took place (many normally occur each day over US Sector) but we do not divulge their routes.
Pattern and character of future local flights being carefully considered and will be subject of separate message./4/
Lightner
/2/Telegram 120 from Berlin, July 30, reported that the Soviet BASC controller had protested a U.S. helicopter flight over Karlshorst and had stated that if it returned, it would be shot down. (Ibid., 962.72/7-3062) Later that day Major General Watson, U.S. Commandant for Berlin, sent a letter to his Soviet counterpart vigorously protesting this threat. (Telegram 121 from Berlin, July 31; ibid., 962.72/7-3162)
/3/Telegram 313 from Bonn, July 31, agreed with the Mission at Berlin's analysis that the Soviet threat introduced a new element of intimidation, but stressed that it should be viewed with caution since it could not be confirmed. (Ibid.)
/4/On August 2 the Department of State advised the Mission at Berlin that local flights were being reviewed by the Departments of State and Defense. Pending completion of the review, the JCS requested that flights over Soviet installations in East Berlin be suspended and that other flights into the Eastern sector be kept to the minimum consistent with operational requirements. (Telegram 115 to Berlin; ibid., 962.72/8-162)
91. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, August 2, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Secret. According to another copy, this memorandum was drafted by Cash and Hillenbrand on August 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 661.62B1/8-262)
SUBJECT
Contingency Planning for Soviet-GDR Peace Treaty
At their meeting in Geneva on July 23,/2/ the four Western Foreign Ministers agreed that the developing situation indicated that it would be prudent to have a quadripartite review of Western contingency planning concerning a Soviet-GDR peace treaty.
/2/Presumably Rusk is referring to the meeting on July 21; see Document 82.
The purpose of this memorandum is to review the existing plans and revalidate the fundamental assumptions supporting them prior to engaging in the quadripartite re-examination. These assumptions, broadly stated, are:
1) that inasmuch as the West cannot in the last analysis prevent the conclusion of a Soviet-GDR peace treaty, Western efforts should be directed toward minimizing the importance of the treaty; and
2) that the Western Powers are prepared to accept implementation of existing procedures on ground access to Berlin by East German personnel substituting for Soviet personnel.
Assumptions Underlying Plans for Western Response to Peace Treaty
The complex of assumptions underlying the specific plans for the Western political and diplomatic response to the separate peace treaty, itself, are as follows. The Western Powers must realistically assume that the Soviets will probably carry out their announced intention to sign a peace treaty with the GDR. Available political and economic countermeasures are insufficient to prevent the signature of the treaty or to affect subsequent Soviet actions appreciably. They would, in addition, probably have unacceptable side effects. In these circumstances, Western reaction should be such that the signing does not appear to constitute a victory for the Soviet bloc such as the erection of the Wall was considered in some quarters. If the Western Powers adopt a position of deep concern and foreboding over the signing of a separate peace treaty, this will necessarily make that signing appear to be a defeat of very substantial proportions. If the Western Powers treat it, on the other hand, as an action which has no necessary significance unless efforts are made to interfere with Western access rights, there would be much less basis for assertions of a resounding loss.
Therefore, Western efforts should be directed toward minimizing the importance of the treaty. To achieve this result, it is necessary to establish widespread acceptance of the legal and political futility of the act, and to limit states outside the Communist orbit from adhering to, or supporting, the treaty. At the same time, the position should be maintained that the conclusion of the separate peace treaty would be another repudiation by the Soviets of their solemn obligations and of basic international principles.
Assumption Underlying Plans for Withdrawal of Soviets from Check Points
If, at any time, it seems that the withdrawal by the Soviets from their functions with respect to Allied access to Berlin is imminent, the three Governments would presumably act in accordance with the agreed contingency plans. The assumption underlying these plans is that the Western Powers are prepared to accept execution of existing procedures on ground access to Berlin by East German personnel substituting for Soviet personnel.
This matter has been the subject of intensive unilateral and multipartite discussion. From 1959 to 1961 the quadripartite position was that in the absence of their explicit delegation as agents of the Soviets (which was considered unlikely), East Germans would not be permitted to date-time stamp Allied travel documents as the Soviets do. Instead there would be instituted the so-called "peel-off" procedure, which in essence was intended to identify Allied movements as being entitled to unrestricted access to Berlin, and would have involved the handing over to East German personnel at the check point of a copy of the Allied travel order but would not accept stamping of a travel order as a condition of passage. However, as the result of the Macmillan visit to Washington in the spring of 1961, and after informal US discussion during the following months, the US and UK revised their positions to permit implementation of existing procedures by East German personnel. Persist-ent physical interference with access to Berlin was chosen as the point at which the West would have to demonstrate its determination. The French and Germans subsequently--and somewhat unenthusiastic-ally--agreed. The essential argument in favor of this position was that the earlier plans did not draw the line at a point which would receive public understanding and support in that they would involve a procedural innovation likely to give rise to criticism that the West was making an issue over who stamped a document.
It was argued that a Western position of leaving well enough alone and not being the one to demand a change in its favor would appear reasonable and unprovocative, and that US allies would move to this position in any event. There would possibly be some questioning in the US press, public, and Congress as to whether the most suitable breaking point had been chosen. There would also be grave difficulties in making the US position plausible to the uncommitted countries. All this would be apparent to the Soviets, and they would be encouraged to press ahead to exploit the Western disarray. In the face of Bloc pressures and Allied disunity, it seems likely that the US, UK, and France would eventually accept the same paper-stamping from the East Germans that they now accept from the Soviets. It would be better to straighten this issue out beforehand to avoid a last-minute change under fire.
Since the decision to accept East German stamping was made, both the US Embassy in Bonn and the US Mission in Berlin have questioned it. Their essential argument is that although who stamps a document is not a good issue over which to use force if necessary, the issue is actually much more than that and really boils down to whether or not the US, the UK, and France are determined to maintain their right of free and unrestricted ground access to Berlin. They argue: 1) that the question of "persistent physical interference with access to Berlin" will never arise; 2) that substitution of East German personnel will be the most visible and objectionable single action that is ever taken by the Soviets; and 3) that thereafter the East Germans will take one infinitesimal step after another--each much less saleable as a breaking point than substitution--until, over a period of time, by gradual erosion Western ground access is completely at the mercy of the Ulbricht regime. Khrushchev recently said to Gorbach and Kreisky when the Austrians visited Moscow that this was more or less what he had in mind, i.e. that action in the period after the peace treaty will be so slow and circumspect that the West will never be provided with a point at which the use of force can be justified. Those who object to East German stamping argue that it will lead at best to self-blockade on the ground and at worst to de jure acceptance of the GDR or withdrawal from Berlin or eventually both.
Although these arguments have a certain weight, the point can be made that there is nothing inevitable about the erosion of the Allied position. The Soviets have had a similar eroding capacity since the ending of the blockade in 1949. By being firm on essentials and skillful in the handling of individual disputes, the Western Powers have prevented any substantial erosion of their basic access rights. In a number of cases present procedures are actually an improvement over those which existed in the immediate post-blockade years. Hence, this line of argument would go, there is no intrinsic reason why, by alert reaction to attempts to change established procedures, the Western Powers should not be able to preserve their essential access against GDR attempts to erode it, given, of course, the continuing unwillingness on the Communist side to press any specific dispute to the point of major confrontation.
Contingency Plans for Peace Treaty
Three stages are envisaged in the agreed contingency planning for the treaty. The first is action, to be taken when indicated by events, to prepare public opinion so that the conclusion of a separate peace treaty will not be regarded as a Soviet victory. The second begins when invitations are dispatched to a peace conference, or its organization is announced. The third is after signature of the treaty.
For the first stage, guidelines have been prepared as the basis for a series of high-level, authoritative public statements. These guidelines set out the essential points that: 1) by the Bolz-Zorin exchange of letters at the time of the last Soviet-GDR treaty in 1955/3/ the Soviets reserved for themselves the processing of the traffic of the Western garrisons in Berlin which passes through East Germany; 2) subsequently the Western Powers have continued to hold the Soviet Government responsible when problems have arisen concerning Berlin, communications therewith, or Germany as a whole; 3) the mere conclusion of a purported "peace treaty" would not in any way change the existing situation; and 4) the Western Powers will continue to look to the Soviet Government to fulfill its responsibilities and will take whatever action seems necessary and proper to the extent to which the Soviet Government fails to do so.
/3/Regarding these letters, September 20, 1955, see footnote 3, Document 8.
In the second stage, representations would be made to the Governments of all the states invited to attend the peace conference, which would include suitable emphasis upon the legal arguments against a separate peace. The representations would also develop the point that this treaty would do nothing to establish peaceful conditions in Europe, but would be much more likely to have precisely the opposite effect. Primary responsibilities for representations to the Governments invited have been assigned.
At the same time, the Three Powers and the Federal Republic would sent notes to the Soviet Government covering the legal aspects and pointing out to the Soviet Government its obligations arising out of Four Power responsibility. Drafts of such notes have been prepared.
These notes would also be published as a statement of the Western position. Supplemental talking points have been prepared for press guidance and for use in discussions with the various countries invited to the Soviet peace conference.
For the third stage, after signature of the treaty, a draft has been prepared for a statement to be made by the Three Powers in conjunction with the Federal Government. Essentially this statement would say: 1) that the Soviet Government has knowingly created a situation which could lead to a breach of the peace; 2) that the so-called "peace treaty" has no international validity; 3) that it cannot affect in any way whatsoever the obligations of the USSR under agreements and arrangements on the subject of Germany, including Berlin, previously concluded between France, the UK, the US and the USSR; 4) that the three Western Powers are prepared to defend their interests with respect to Germany and to fulfill their obligation to maintain the freedom and security of Berlin; 5) that they are, nevertheless, prepared at any time to resume negotiations with the Soviets looking toward a just and reasonable settlement of the questions of Germany and European security; and 6) that they hope that, in view of the danger implicit in its course, the Soviet Government will recognize the wisdom and importance of resuming negotiations.
If the second stage campaign has been successful, and few or no nations outside the Sino-Soviet bloc have signed the treaty, this fact would be capitalized on to minimize further the significance of the treaty and even to ridicule the Soviet diplomatic effort.
It may be advisable for the Western Governments to point out publicly that the coming into force of the treaty will not give rise to any untoward results so long as the Soviets and East Germans do not take unilateral actions injurious to Western interests such as altering present access procedures, or attempting to interfere with the presence of Allied troops in West Berlin, or with its other links to the West. The announcements should be coordinated with any steps toward Solution C, which, under the circumstances, might be pertinent.
The position taken by the Three Powers should be endorsed by all the NATO Governments.
An additional legal and historical background paper has been prepared for use in diplomatic and press guidance.
Possible Military Measures
No specific decision has yet been made as to whether military measures should be taken in connection with the peace treaty. Nothing in the current planning would preclude the undertaking of military measures, including a further buildup, in an attempt to affect the terms of the treaty or its subsequent implementation, but this would require a subtle campaign to avoid the impression that the purpose was to prevent the calling of a conference or the conclusion of a treaty, over which the West can exercise no control. A real problem in such a course would be whether these measures--particularly a buildup--could be sustained over, and whether they would be effective against, the long period of very cautious, piecemeal treaty implementation that may ensue. However, the possibility of influencing by military measures the content of the treaty and its implementation is certainly worth examining. The JCS is currently studying the question of possible military measures taking into account the level of the present buildup. A decision concerning the desirability of a buildup will be difficult to take in advance, because it will have to be governed somewhat by the state of the discussions with the Soviets at the time and by the indications of whether diplomatic moves have some prospect of influencing the Soviets, or whether they are determined to go ahead in an uninhibited way. Once the JCS has completed its studies, a basis will exist for taking appropriate US decisions in the light of the estimated need when it has been concluded that the Soviets plan to proceed with their treaty.
Conclusion
In the review, therefore, of Allied contingency planning for a separate peace treaty, I would propose that we continue to maintain the existing basic assumptions:
1) that inasmuch as the West cannot prevent the conclusion of a Soviet-GDR peace treaty, Western efforts should be directed toward minimizing the importance of the treaty; and
2) that the Western Powers are prepared to accept implementation of existing procedures on ground access to Berlin by East German personnel substituting for Soviet personnel.
A further relevant subject is that of the relationship of possible military mobilization measures to existing contingency planning. This can be examined once the JCS has completed its current studies.
Dean Rusk
92. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington August 9, 1962, 3:06 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information but it was approved in S on August 21. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)
SUBJECT
Secretary's Conversation of August 8 with Ambassador Dobrynin
PARTICIPANTS
(See attachment)/2/
/2/Not printed.
The Secretary stated that he would like to report briefly on his conversation of August 8 with Ambassador Dobrynin./3/ He said he could report briefly because no perceptible business was transacted. Apparently Mr. Dobrynin had no fresh instructions on any subject that came up and the conversation did not advance any of the issues discussed. The Secretary said he had mentioned three subjects:
/3/A short memorandum of the Secretary's conversation with Dobrynin on August 8 is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-862.
[Here follow sections on a nuclear test ban treaty and non-diffusion of nuclear weapons.]
3. Deputy Foreign Ministers' Forum. The Secretary recalled that the question of a Deputy Foreign Ministers' forum had been raised with Gromyko as early as the previous spring. The Secretary had asked Dobrynin whether he had instructions from Gromyko on the question of establishment of a Deputy Foreign Ministers' forum for discussion of matters relating to Germany and Berlin. Gromyko had said at Geneva that he would have word for us as to whether the subject would be dealt with in this way. Dobrynin replied that he would mention this question to Moscow but observed that Khrushchev and Gromyko were on vacation now.
The Secretary said the question of the UN delegation had come up and that Dobrynin had said nothing about Khrushchev's coming. He had said the Soviet delegation was usually decided upon around the first of September and had predicted that Gromyko would probably be there.
The Secretary invited comments or questions.
Lord Hood said it was a rather depressing story.
The Secretary agreed. He had asked Dobrynin whether it would be safe for him to take a vacation in August, but Dobrynin had not been responsive.
Mr. von Lilienfeld asked what impression the Secretary had as to the next move.
The Secretary said he thought that exploratory talks and probes have about run their course. For some time both he and Dobrynin had been repeating themselves. The Secretary stated he had been as long winded and repetitious as the Soviets. He said that unless they have something new to offer he does not see much coming out of the bilaterals. He felt that they might seek a different forum or might have something to say to some other member of the Western group. He recalled that Gromyko at Geneva had indicated that he was glad to pursue bilateral talks but had referred to talks with the Western Four as "better still".
The Secretary recalled that he had emphasized to Dobrynin that we could not accept charges that we have delayed. If we had delayed a year and a half in agreeing with them, they have likewise delayed that long in agreeing with us. He had told Dobrynin, however, that we can always rush to a crisis, while a resolution of differences must necessarily proceed more slowly.
As to what the Russians are going to do, the Secretary said they seek to leave the impression with us that something is going to happen. We are not inclined to think they will announce the signing of a peace treaty with East Germany overnight. They will probably take some action with other governments of calling a conference first. Next Monday will be the anniversary of the wall and the Soviets might be inclined to celebrate it with harassment or a new move. The Secretary said he did not know what they will do and was by no means certain they had themselves decided. He mentioned it was about time for another Soviet space spectacular.
Lord Hood said they probably have not decided what to do but that one idea in their minds is probably to sign a peace treaty.
The Secretary recalled that he had not had reactions from all of the Western Four on whether if the Soviets called a conference we should propose a meeting of Foreign Ministers or Deputy Foreign Ministers in response.
As to the coming debate in the United Nations General Assembly, the Secretary thought the introduction of specific substantive questions could lead to confusion. He thought, however, we would find wide support for the idea of talking instead of shooting--for the idea that neither side should take any action which would aggravate tensions. He thought, however, that a number of solutions on the question of troops or of access would look easier to the UN membership than to those of us who bear primary responsibility.
Lord Hood said he had received comments from his government on a number of papers, but not on this specific proposal regarding Western responses to a Soviet call for a conference.
Mr. von Lilienfeld said that he had received and transmitted to us comments on the conference question but not on the related papers. He commented that we should do something to regain the initiative of action on our side.
The Secretary said he did not know how much we could rely on Soviet advance planning, but that they wanted to send their Minister of Agriculture in September. He said if we were expecting to precipitate a crisis with another state, we would certainly not be sending one of our cabinet members to visit the state at the time.
Lord Hood asked whether we thought the Soviets, if they decided to go ahead with a peace treaty, might not want to minimize the awkward consequence by compensating gestures. They might well be interested in a meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers and propose that we seek to agree on how to handle our disagreements.
The Secretary commented that this might be a rational reaction, but if the Soviets were not pressing matters to a crisis it seems they would have desired to pick up various opportunities which have been before them to avoid a crisis. In recent months they have increased their public commitment to action on Berlin, and have increased for themselves the prestige problem involved in not doing anything.
Mr. von Lilienfeld commented that they had in several ways, however, seemed to accept the idea that the West would still be in Berlin in the future.
Mr. Lebel asked whether they would be likely to precede a move in Berlin with a move in the UNGA.
The Secretary replied that he would feel more relaxed if he thought GA action would necessarily be their first move.
Lord Hood raised the question whether they could get the United Nations to approve the idea of a peace conference.
The Secretary said that we will be in a powerful position in the United Nations if we say to the Assembly in effect, "Ask the Berliners and ask the East Germans what they want to do". This fact may give the Soviets some pause in deciding what to do in the United Nations. He asked if anyone had any doubts as to what the sentiments of the Berlin people would be.
Mr. von Lilienfeld recalled they had made their views clear in every case where they had had an opportunity to do so. He added that there had been indications that the Soviet test series might be concluded by October and this might have a bearing upon Khrushchev's attendance and Soviet strategy at the Assembly.
The Secretary said there are enough hints and noises around to indicate that the anniversary of the wall may take on some significance to the Soviets. We do not, however, expect a move of the kind that would precipitate a military crisis.
Lord Hood commented there may be harassments.
The Secretary and Mr. Hillenbrand recalled that our mission in Berlin had sent a message indicating the possibility of harassments at Friedrichstrasse and possibly a move to cut off access to East Berlin./4/ Mr. Hillenbrand said we have contingency plans for this possibility, but that they should be reviewed.
/4/Telegram 160 from Berlin, August 8, received in the Department of State at 11:44 a.m. (Ibid., 661.62B/8-862)
The Secretary commented that we could well have some move of that sort.
Mr. von Lilienfeld asked if there had been any shift in emphasis by the Soviets from the question of the presence of Western troops to the question of sovereignty of the GDR.
The Secretary said not really. If this were the Soviet intention they had overlooked opportunities to make it clear. The Secretary recalled that the only stiff talk by the Russians to him was on the first day of his recent Geneva meeting with Gromyko. Gromyko had read from a paper on that occasion and the rest of the several days of conversations appeared to be an effort to soften the impact of the prepared statement. Even as Gromyko was reading it, he pointed out that the statement did not take into account things which he had already said that same day.
Mr. Hillenbrand, in response to the Secretary's question, said he considered the difference between Gromyko's statement on the first day and on subsequent days to be more a difference of tone than of substance.
The Secretary recalled that when he had rejected Gromyko's threat, Gromyko had not come back and redoubled it.
The Secretary stated he supposed that all intelligence services were alerted with their antenna out to sense any indications of a new Soviet move. Our intelligence service had been alerted.
Lord Hood asked what was next as regards the exchanges with Dobrynin.
The Secretary said that they owe us comments on two propositions, namely, the proposal regarding a Deputy Foreign Ministers' forum and the matter of non-dissemination involved in the Irish Resolution. He did not expect that Dobrynin would be giving us further comments on the test ban question in the near future.
93. Memorandum From William Y. Smith to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/
Washington, August 9, 1962.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 38, 505 Berlin Contingency Planning. Top Secret. Initialed by Smith. A similar account drafted by General Gray is ibid.
SUBJECT
Briefing for the President on Berlin/2/
/2/The briefing was held at 10:35 a.m. (Rusk Appointment Book; Johnson Library)
IN ATTENDANCE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Deputy Secretary Gilpatric
Mr. McCone
General Lemnitzer
Ambassador Dowling
Mr. Bundy
and various "horse holders"
1. The briefing you tried to arrange in August 1961 finally came off a year later. The intervening period has been used both to widen the areas of agreement and to sharpen those of disagreement among the Allies. Mr. Ausland's briefing followed the attached text/3/ very closely. Only two interruptions of significance occurred at points indicated in the text.
/3/Not found.
2. The first major interruption occurred when Secretary McNamara observed that the Allies still could not agree on what sort of mobilization was needed in Phase II (non-combatant actions after significant blockage of access) and that this agreement was not likely to be achieved until consensus had been reached on what military measures to take (e.g., when to use tactical nuclears) in Phases III and IV. The President asked what the difficulties were in reaching agreement with our Allies. In the ensuing discussion, the following points were made:
a. Secretary McNamara acknowledged our European Allies wanted to use nuclear weapons earlier in the military operations than did we. In response to the President's question as to whether the Allies chose this course in order to eliminate the need for economic and military build-up actions, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara agreed that the Allied feeling came from several sources:
(1) The Europeans prefer to rely on the early use of nuclear weapons because of their deterrent effect.
(2) The Germans especially fear that reliance on conventional strategy would enable the Russians to seize part or all of Germany and then negotiate.
b. Secretary McNamara said he thought the European arguments were wrong for three reasons: they overestimated the strength of the USSR; they imply that their salvation rested on the early use of tactical nuclear weapons without understanding the effects of these weapons; and finally, they afforded the Allies an excuse not to build up the conventional forces they had agreed to in the NATO Council.
c. The President wondered how much real difference there was in our positions, since we were only asking our Allies to build their forces to 30 divisions, and the planning for these goals rested on an assumption of early use of tactical nuclear weapons. Secretary McNamara replied that analysis last summer had shown that with 30 divisions we could hold a considerable period of time--not months, but at least some weeks.
d. As an aside, the President asked whether we had asked the Germans to build their conventional forces to 750,000 men as reported in the New York Times this morning. The Times article sounded so authentic and precise that the President questioned if it had been backgrounded. It had not been. Secretary McNamara pointed out that the story was wrong on two counts: we had indeed asked the Germans to increase their forces, but not by any definite number, and the Germans had not refused. Furthermore, Defense Minister Strauss had requested Secretary McNamara to ask him to build up Germany's conventional forces. Mr. McNamara did so, and that's how our request came about.
e. The President asked why Adenauer didn't stand up and support US positions before De Gaulle. The answer was that the Germans are sure of our support, but are not as sure of the French; therefore they defer more to French whims. But they do not always give in. The President said that perhaps we spent too much time reassuring our Allies. Ambassador Dowling commented that the time will soon come when indeed we should ask the Germans if their protests are serious and to let them know that we are becoming concerned about their motives in all this discussion.
3. The second interruption occurred when the President asked whether there is as much disagreement between the US and our Allies on the use of tactical nuclear weapons as there seems to be. He would agree with the Europeans that if the Russians started a mass attack against Europe, we almost would be forced to use nuclear weapons against the first Russian who came across the line. Therefore, our disagreements seemed to be exaggerated. We seem to be involved in a theoretical argument with our Allies; and no one ever gives on these. He questioned if we couldn't find some way around the impasse, say by telling our Allies that we would agree to the early use of tactical nuclear weapons if they would build up 30 divisions. We could do this, since the 30 division figure assumed the early use of nuclear weapons. Such an approach would put the pressure on them. The following points were then made:
a. Secretary McNamara said if we agreed to the early use of nuclear weapons, our Allies would say this obviated the necessity for going to 30 divisions, just as Kissinger's article had done in the July issue of Foreign Affairs. (Kissinger actually said that more than 30 divisions would be needed to implement successfully a strategy employing tactical nuclear weapons.)
b. Secretary McNamara also said it was wrong to assume the early use of nuclear weapons since, as Secretary Rusk had stated earlier, all the heads of governments would want to know the conditions which justified the use of nuclear weapons and to reach this decision would require time and some conventional defensive efforts.
c. The President said that if there were no Berlin situation, he would be inclined to agree with the Allies on the use of tactical nuclear weapons. It is the Berlin situation in which we might become involved in actions to restore access which makes the European position invalid.
d. Secretaries McNamara and Rusk agreed that the Allied reluctance to build up conventional forces sprang from two basic factors: they believed that nuclear strategy offered the best hope of insuring deterrence, and also they did not want to spend the money.
2. Several other matters were discussed briefly:
a. The President asked what we would do in the next couple of months in Berlin planning. The answer was to get greater Allied agreement on military mobilization plans. Secretary McNamara said he expected progress in the next 4-6 weeks.
b. The President asked how our planning stood to meet a Russian action for signing a GDR peace treaty over some weekend. The answer was we have fairly good plans, but that this is considered an unlikely event. The Russians will want to exploit the signing of the peace treaty and perhaps call some sort of peace conference. Thus, although the signing of a peace treaty may occur, it is unlikely to occur suddenly.
c. The President asked what we should do if the Russians take the Berlin problem to the UN. Secretary Rusk said this might not be all bad because the general philosophy at the UN is: "Continue talking, don't shoot." The President asked if we couldn't somehow tie any Khrushchev proposal to a plebiscite in West Berlin which would let the Berliners choose whether they preferred their present status, the USSR proposal of incorporation into East Germany, or becoming a free city under the UN. Although there was no specific discussion of these proposals, there was general agreement that a plebiscite would turn out advantageous for us, and that whatever the Russians did at the UN, we would attempt to play up the lack of free determination of the East German people in these events.
d. In response to a presidential request to Secretary McNamara about whether Congress should be asked for powers to call up additional reserve forces this fall, Secretary McNamara said he thought such a request should await the adjourning days of Congress. During the interim he would talk to Senator Russell and Congressman Vinson to let them know that the Administration would probably ask for authority to call up 50,000 to 100,000 men if needed. During this brief discussion, Secretary McNamara gave one of his numerical recitations of what we had called up last year and how we stood at the present time. It was impressive for his knowledge of details, if not for its overall impact.
WYS
94. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, August 13, 1962, 10:32 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-1362. Secret; Limited Distribution; Eyes Only. Drafted by Anderson. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)
SUBJECT
Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The Secretary
GER--Martin J. Hillenbrand
SOV--W.O. Anderson
USSR
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Counselor Georgi M. Kornienko
The Ambassador opened the conversation by stating that he had been instructed to convey to the Secretary the considered views of his government on the Secretary's proposal that there be a Deputy Foreign Ministers Conference to discuss the Berlin problem. Although he frequently referred to a Russian language text, he stipulated that the approach was "oral" in nature. He outlined the following position.
As the Secretary already is aware, the Soviet Government is prepared, as previously, to explore with the other interested governments all possibilities for settling the problems of West Berlin and Germany. However, the Soviet Government cannot agree to the proposal for a Deputy Foreign Ministers Conference since it would give the appearance of negotiations which, in fact, would have no real chance of success. In fact, there has been no progress on resolving the key issue of withdrawing Western forces from West Berlin and terminating the occupation regime there; a Deputy Foreign Ministers Conference is likely to delay settlement. Secretary Rusk himself at Geneva had commented to Foreign Minister Gromyko that he could not envisage what a Deputy Foreign Ministers Conference would discuss. The desirability of ending the international arms race and easing tensions among states demands "drawing a line under World War II" and liquidating the occupation regime in West Berlin. For its part, the Soviet Government has earnestly sought to resolve the problem of West Berlin. Premier Khrushchev himself has made a number of compromise proposals: e.g., the recent one that certain UN forces be introduced into West Berlin. Unfortunately, the U.S. Government has shown no real interest in settling the West Berlin problem. The Soviet Government feels that "the American position" would put the Soviet Government in a position of settling the West Berlin problem in the absence of "our allies" who participated in World War II against Nazi Germany. This faces the USSR with the necessity to sign a peace treaty with the GDR. The Soviet Government feels it cannot remain inactive on the West Berlin problem because those who oppose an improvement in the international climate have been taking advantage of the absence of an agreement, as witness recent developments in West Berlin.
The Secretary stated that, first, he would like to correct an apparent misunderstanding. When discussing the possibility of a Deputy Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva with Foreign Minister Gromyko, he did not state that he did not know what such a Conference would discuss. On the contrary, he had discussed this subject with specific reference to the statement of General Principles previously given to the Foreign Minister and had pointed out to the Foreign Minister that the General Principles indicated the line along which the U.S. thought Conference discussion might go. However, Soviet views thereon were desired and requested. The Secretary then expressed a hope that the Soviet Government will give further thought to steps which the four Commandants in Berlin might take to alleviate local tension. In this context, the Secretary alluded to recent press reports of incidents along the Berlin wall occasioned by strong emotions accompanying the anniversary of the building of the wall. Ambassador Dobrynin commented that the views of his Government on the situation in West Berlin along the wall were conveyed in his Government's most recent note/2/ and he had seen nothing but brief press reports of subsequent developments.
/2/For text of the August 10 Soviet note, which protested new provocations in West Berlin against the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, see Department of State Bulletin, August 27, 1962, p. 320; for a response by the Department of State on the following day, see ibid., pp. 319-320.
After referring briefly in a commendatory vein to the progress of the Soviet Union's two men in space, the Secretary reverted to the subject of Berlin and said that he regretted the Soviet government had not reacted favorably to the proposal for a Deputy Foreign Ministers Conference. The proposal was not intended to be a means to delay agreement but was advanced in a sincere belief that, if acted upon, it would constitute a positive step. He assured the Ambassador that the Soviet Government's views, as conveyed by the Ambassador, would be given careful study.
Note: Subsequent to the conversation reported above, Mr. Anderson obtained from Counselor Kornienko, on a personal and informal basis, a copy of the Russian language text from which Ambassador Dobrynin had read during his interview with the Secretary. An informal translation of the Russian text is attached./3/
/3/Not printed.
95. Transcript of Conversation Between Frank E. Cash, Jr., and Arthur R. Day/1/
August 19, 1962, 7:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. Cash was in Washington; Day was in Berlin.
Message from Mr. Day:
"Following the shooting of the refugee on Friday,/2/ we in the Mission and General Watson considered that we should keep the initiative with the Soviets and keep the pressure on them which resulted from this incident. Meanwhile, the action of the West Berlin crowds against Soviet busses near Friedrichstrasse/3/ led us to believe that sooner or later the Soviets would react in some way to this situation.
/2/On August 17 Peter Fechter had been shot while trying to escape from East Berlin. He bled to death within sight of Checkpoint Charlie. On August 21 the President sent a memorandum to Rusk asking for an account of the shooting and subsequent events. (Ibid.) A copy of Rusk's account, August 24, is ibid.
/3/In response to the shooting, crowds in West Berlin on August 18, 19, and 20 stoned buses carrying guards to the Soviet war memorial in West Berlin.
We therefore decided that General Watson should invite the Acting Soviet Commandant to a Four Power Commandants Meeting to discuss means of reducing tension in the city. We decided that General Watson should inform the Soviet Acting Commandant that he was lifting the ban on the entry of the Soviet Commandant and his Political Advisor into West Berlin for the purpose of conducting this and subsequent meetings.
Meanwhile, at about 1800 hours today another Soviet bus was attacked by a crowd about one block from Friedrichstrasse and about 19 windows in the bus were broken by stones before the bus could proceed. About 1900, the Deputy Soviet Commandant requested a meeting with General Watson and also with the British Commandant, which we assume is related to the incident of an hour earlier.
We considered that it was highly desirable to move ahead with the initiative we had earlier determined on in order to keep the discussions with the Soviets concerned with the basic issues of tension along the Wall and not to narrow it to the bus incidents. We therefore met urgently with the UK and French and agreed that Watson should send a letter tonight along the line of that which I described earlier proposing a Four Power Commandants meeting for tomorrow afternoon.
We asked the Soviet Deputy Commandant to call on Hulick, Acting Deputy Commandant, at 2300 at which time we intended to deliver the letter to him. He did not appear, however, and we have now taken steps to deliver the letter to Soviet Headquarters.
We intend to meet with the British and French tomorrow morning to discuss with them the line of action to take with the Soviets should they accept this invitation.
I should tell you that the atmosphere in Berlin right now has a considerable anti-American overtone as a result of the shooting on Friday and our inability to aid the wounded refugee. The crowd which formed during the day along the border attacked by jeers and slogans the Americans as well as the Soviets. Within the past hour we had a small demonstration outside the Mission gates in which autos passed back and forth blowing their horns in protest. I don't want to exaggerate this sentiment, but it does exist and it is difficult to say right now whether it will die away or increase.
We would be interested in any comment you may have with regard to the course of action we have taken.
Cash: I think it is logical and reasonable. I see no problem as far as we are concerned. I will discuss it with Mr. Tyler and if we have any further word, will call you on the KY-9.
Day: We would be interested in any guidance you would have on what we should discuss with the Soviets, but unless you have something else, don't call. We are sending a telegram with the text of the letter to the Acting Soviet Commandant. Hulick advises that we have been informed there is no one at the Soviet Headquarters tonight to receive the letter, but our messenger will go anyway and try to leave it."/4/ End of Transcript.
/4/Following this conversation, the letter was delivered at 2:15 a.m. on August 20 to Soviet Headquarters in East Berlin. Seven hours later it was returned. It was released to the press that morning. (Telegrams 214 and 215 from Berlin, August 20; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2062) For text of the letter, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 822-823.
Mr. Day also advised that at 2130 the Soviet Deputy Commandant called at both US and UK Headquarters. He was told General Watson was not available, but would be writing the Soviet Commandant. At the British Headquarters, he spoke with the "Military attache" (an aide to the UK Commandant) and simply asked that the Soviet bus at the War Memorial be permitted to return to East Berlin without the special British military and West Berlin police guards which had been arranged.
96. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin/1/
Washington, August 20, 1962, 8:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2062. Confidential; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted by Cash, cleared by Tyler, and approved by Rusk.
188. For Hulick from Secretary. Re our telecon/2/ I wish confirm that I understand problem of possible use US forces to control crowds if West Berlin police prove inadequate. I agree maximum use should be made of West Berlin police but in final analysis Three Powers are responsible in West Berlin. West Berliners cannot have it both ways--they cannot have our protection on basis occupation rights and on other hand ignore our directives. You should not therefore shrink from use US forces if this becomes necessary to maintain law and order.
/2/No record of this telephone conversation has been found.
Rusk
97. Telegram From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Norstad) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Paris, August 21, 1962.
/1/Source: Eisenhower Library, Norstad Papers, Subject File, Dowling. Secret; By Special Means; Personal. Repeated to Bonn personal for Dowling, to CINCUSEUR personal for General Freeman, and to USCOB personal for General Watson. The source text indicates that it was delivered to Gilpatric in McNamara's absence and passed to the Department of State.
PRS 2078. 1. Although escapees have been shot, injured and killed before, the particular characteristics of Friday's incident have understandably caused a reaction not only in Berlin, but throughout the world. We must accept the fact that a solution to this problem, or at least some action on our part, is of a higher order of urgency than heretofore. The so-called "mobs" in West Berlin are a factor to be considered, but we cannot let mobs dictate actions in a time of such sensitivity and on a matter of such importance.
2. Circumstances make it necessary that we be prepared to deal with a recurrence of this type of incident, unlikely as an exact repetition may be, but our preparations must not in themselves raise the level of danger. I feel, therefore, that something along the following lines should be considered.
a. We should make it known publicly that we consider Friday's incident as having gone beyond the limits of the local military and political situation in Berlin and having constituted an offense against humanity without regard to political boundaries. We must make it clear that, while the responsibility of rendering medical aid in East Berlin is clearly that of the Soviet Union or its East German satellite, failure on the part of the appropriate authorities to take prompt and effective action in a case of this kind will compel Western Allies to do so.
b. We should have available, but not prominently displayed, the U.S. Army medical personnel capable of dealing with a situation of this kind, and similar action should, if possible, be taken in the French and the British sectors.
c. If medical attention is not made immediately available by the Soviets or the East Berlin authorities, a Western representative should notify the guards, or other Soviet or East German officials, actually on the spot, of our intention to render such aid. This announcement should be followed promptly by the movement of the medical personnel to the relief of the victim.
d. Medical teams should give immediate attention and should move the victim to a West Berlin hospital facility, unless the Soviet East Berlin authorities announce their intention to promptly and effectively take charge of the case.
e. We must be prepared, that is, the Berlin Commandant must be authorized, to use the military force necessary to protect the medical team in the performance of its mission, including gunfire, if necessary. Troops, tanks, or other military equipment which may be needed, should be positioned to give the support required, but the conduct of our personnel and the location of weapons should not be such as to constitute unnecessarily a challenge, a dare, to the Soviets.
3. By telephone call from Watson I have learned that an ambulance will be stationed at the Friedrichstrasse Gate and a statement will be issued this afternoon. I have no other information on these points, but I suggest that a statement saying we will deal with the situation, without being specific, may be far more effective and would not risk the mere presence of an ambulance suggesting the limits of our action in case of another incident, or serving as an invitation to escapees, or as an implicit condonation of the shooting of those attempting to leave East Berlin./2/
/2/On August 21 Dowling transmitted his concurrence in the course of action laid out by Norstad. (Telegram 520 from Bonn; ibid.)
98. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, August 21, 1962, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/8-2162. Secret; Priority. Received at 8:58 a.m.
530. Policy. Eyes only for the President and the Secretary. I called on Adenauer at my request late yesterday. He had just come from long meeting with party leaders (which in fact was still in session) and appeared despressed. After asking about my home leave, he remarked "we have problems, don't we?", and fetched from his desk telegram he had just received from Paris saying de Gaulle was calling special Cabinet session this week to consider political and military questions relating to European unity. He implied he was concerned about what de Gaulle might have in mind, saying that nothing could be done without America. I replied I thought America was still present. "But is it", he countered. I said perhaps that was what I wanted to talk to him about.
I then recounted for Chancellor concern regarding his attitude which I had found in Washington--concern which I shared and was at loss to account for--and gave him the President's letter,/2/ together with German translation which I had prepared for him.
/2/In his letter, dated August 16, the President thanked Adenauer for his sympathetic attitude on the question of U.S. poultry exports to Germany, explained the rationale for recent U.S. military assignments, and reiterated U.S. determination to maintain adequate levels of nuclear weapons in Europe. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)
Adenauer read translation eagerly, and was amused re reference to poultry, saying "Senator Fulbright certainly keeps after the President and me, doesn't he?"As he read further, his face brightened perceptibly, and at end he exclaimed, "This is a wonderful letter. It is just what I wanted from the President. I am so glad." He then asked me if he might interrupt conversation to telephone Brentano, who was still at party meeting, saying he assumed it would be all right to say he had had word from the President. I assured him that it was.
When Adenauer returned to room, I referred to his fears, expressed in previous conversations, re influence on US opinion towards Germany of Shirer book,/3/ etc., and said as result of my stay at home I could reassure him on this score. I went on to say, however, there was a development which was disturbing, and that was spate of reports out of Germany about his lack of confidence in US policy and of German doubts and suspicions generally, which was beginning to find counter-reaction re German attitudes both in Washington and in American opinion generally. I referred to the President's conviction re necessity for preservation of unity in face of test on Berlin which we may face in coming months, and said this was mutual task. Adenauer agreed, but said recent stories I referred to had all come from American correspondents in Europe and Washington. I said this was not wholly correct, to which Chancellor rejoined by asking with innocent air what I thought could be done. I replied, equally straightfaced, that I thought best solution was to confine discussion of any divergence in views to official channels. He agreed, and commented that he had recently had very good talks with Eisenhower and Norstad,/4/ both of which had heartened him--although at same time he implied that what he had been waiting for was word from the President himself.
/3/William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, New York, 1960.
/4/A report on Adenauer's conversation with Norstad on August 16 was transmitted in telegram 865 from Paris, August 17 (vol. XIII, Document 151); no record of the meeting with Eisenhower, who visited Germany at the beginning of August, has been found.
Adenauer then admitted that he had been disturbed by European interpretations of Taylor's attitude towards nuclear defense as set out in his book./5/ I replied that I would have thought Taylor's statements before Senate committee,/6/ and more especially the President's recent statements, as well as McNamara's report to NATO meeting in Athens,/7/ would be most adequate reassurance for most doubtful of Europeans. I then argued again that voicing doubts re American policies to journalists, rather than official exchanges, could only result in eventual erosion of unity which he clearly wished.
/5/The Uncertain Trumpet, New York, 1960.
/6/For a summary of Taylor's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on August 9, see The New York Times, August 10, 1962, pp. 1-2.
/7/Regarding McNamara's report at Athens in May, see vol. XIII, Document 137.
Conversation concluded by Adenauer asking me to convey his special gratitude to the President for his "wonderful" letter; "and it came at just the right moment", he remarked. He added he would reply to the President shortly./8/
/8/In his reply of August 22, the Chancellor said that the President's letter had relieved him of a great worry. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)
As I was leaving, Adenauer referred to the situation in Berlin, saying that hindsight showed both Western forces and West Berlin police should have made effort to aid refugee who was left to die on Eastern side of wall last week, and he urged that we take measures to meet any future situation of this kind. I replied that Western Commandants had been meeting during afternoon to determine what might be done in future, and I was hopeful we might find positive measures to recommend to our governments. "Do it soon", he said; "and let the West Berliners know", saying we must appreciate the emotional strain which the populace was under.
Dowling
99. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, August 21, 1962, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Cash and approved in S on September 6. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office.
SUBJECT
Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
USSR
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
US
The Secretary
Mr. Frank E. Cash, Jr., EUR/GER
The Secretary opened by commenting that he wanted to say a few words about the present situation in Berlin. He said he felt it was very important that the Soviet and Western Commandants get together to deal with the problem of tensions in the city. He said it was necessary to go back to the building of the wall, itself, to find the major cause for the sense of deep dismay and anger felt by both West and East Berliners. The separation of families and the splitting of the life of the city had made a deep impact. It was inevitable that the wall would contribute to tensions in Berlin. Following the building of the wall there had been a number of incidents mostly the result of East Berliners trying to get to West Berlin. There had been shootings, violence, and bullets flying into West Berlin endangering lives, all of which had created a sense of dismay and outrage. Last Friday when the East Berlin police shot an 18 year old boy and left him lying for one hour with no assistance, a wave of revulsion and horror had gone around the world. It is hard to understand how anyone could be so callous, and we cannot believe that this represents the policy or the attitude of the Soviet Government. On more than one occasion we have urged that the four Commandants should meet to consult on the way to handle problems arising in Berlin. We think such a meeting could improve the situation. Neither the Soviets nor we want these problems put in the hands of the Germans on both sides of the wall, leaving it to them to stir up a situation reaching beyond Berlin with which the Great Powers, rather than the Germans, must deal. During the last two days the Soviet Deputy Commandant has come without appointment to ask to see General Watson. General Watson has asked the Acting Soviet Commandant to meet to consult on recent events. We will take the necessary steps to maintain law and order in West Berlin, but this can be difficult in a city of 2-1/4 million people. The demonstrations since the incident on Friday have created problems, but these are matters where quadripartite cooperation is required because one thing leads to another. The US, French, and British Commandants have urged a meeting with the Soviet Commandant to reduce tensions and ensure law and order. The Secretary said he would urge once again that this matter be reconsidered so that the Soviet Commandant could meet with his Western counterparts. He hoped very much that the Ambassador would send the President's and his genuine urging that the Commandants get together to handle these problems in a peaceful fashion.
Ambassador Dobrynin said the only information he had was from the Western press, but it seemed that there had been stoning of Soviet soldiers and buses. This is really a matter of great concern. He would report what the Secretary had said.
The Secretary said that there was a direct connection between the killing of the 18 year old boy on Friday and the stones thrown at both Soviet and American soldiers. He noted that for a time the Soviets had refused an escort for their buses.
Ambassador Dobrynin said there was no change in the position of the Soviet Government, but he would report what the Secretary said.
The Secretary said he wished to underline the importance of the Soviet Government's permitting the East German regime to carry out incidents which caused tension. He said one could not logically create tension in Berlin and then complain that the city was a source of tension.
Ambassador Dobrynin said that the Secretary knew the Soviet arguments, and there was no need to repeat them.
The Secretary and Ambassador Dobrynin agreed that they would say to the press that they had had an exchange of views on the current situation in Berlin./2/
/2/For text of this statement, see Department of State Wireless Bulletin, No. 233, August 22, 1962. Following this conversation Tyler briefed the Ambassadorial Group. The group also considered the draft of a note to the Soviet Union protesting the killing of Peter Fechter. (Telegram 485 to Bonn, August 21; ibid., Central Files, 611.61/8-2162) For text of the U.S. protest note, delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on August 24, see Department of State Bulletin, September 10, 1962, pp. 378-379.
100. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, August 23, 1962, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2362. Secret; Niact. Received at 12:31 p.m. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, USAREUR, and SHAPE.
241. Paris also for USRO and McGuire. SHAPE for Stoessel and US Element Live Oak. USAREUR for POLAD. Part one of three-part message./2/
/2/In part two (telegram 244, August 23) the Mission examined the likely short-term effect of the closing of the Soviet Commandant's office. (Ibid.) Part three is Document 105.
Summary
The Soviet action in liquidating the office of the Commandant in East Berlin is long step in direction in which they have been moving for some time./3/ Timing may have been influenced by increased pressure being brought to bear by Allies for Commandants to meet and by strong reaction in West against GDR activities along wall for which Allies were holding Soviets responsible. However, move of this sort had very likely been planned for some time for relatively early execution. To Soviets it must have seemed highly desirable to eliminate once and for all their special responsibilities for East Berlin as distinct from Soviet Zone. By their act they have formally lopped off East Berlin from greater Berlin and have left Western sectors in effect as 3-power managed city in midst of East Germany with specific Soviet presence and quadripartite as well as unilateral functions remaining in it (quadripartite--BASC, Spandau; unilateral--war memorial).
/3/For text of the August 22 Soviet statement abolishing the post of Soviet Commandant in Berlin, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 714-715. In response, on August 24, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France stated that the abolition would "have no effect whatsoever on either Allied rights or Soviet responsibilities in Berlin." For text of the tripartite statement, see ibid., pp. 715-716.
Operationally, we shall be confronted very likely by Soviet efforts reduce role of Allied Commandants to level of Soviet troop commander. Immediate practical effects on our operations however will not necessarily be great. (This is not to say there will not be such effects--witness threat of Autobahn trouble on August 24.) While this is so, psychological and long-term importance of this formal Soviet step should not be underestimated. With passage of time, perhaps even matter of months, image of Berlin in eyes of world and even of Berliners themselves will likely be considerably affected. In absence effective counteraction on our part, connection of Allied presence in West Berlin to its origins in 4-power post war occupation control will become vaguer and vaguer until it may be lost entirely at which time Allies will appear simply to be managers of entity known as West Berlin and located in midst of GDR. Within West Berlin there is danger that if Commandants lose substance of their role which gives them right and power to control the city, Berliners will be less and less willing to accept such control. There has been evidence of this already in recent past.
Meanwhile Soviets can be expected to attempt to graft Allied Berlin presence onto NATO, having cut it away from 4-power principle. When they consider this graft psychologically complete, by which time Allied access to East Berlin would presumably have ceased, they will if their past tactics are any indication take the further concrete steps which logically follow from it. Among latter would be further pressure to secure international acceptance of West Berlin as free city, recognized 4-power presence in West Berlin, etc.
While this is bleak enough picture, it is of course nothing really new. We had not foreseen maneuver in this particular form on part of Soviets but had been aware that their efforts being directed along lines described above. Soviet move accelerates certain trends and brings more clearly into focus problems which face us here. Effective steps can be devised to meet continuous Soviet challenge. As this challenge becomes more basic in its nature, however, and latest development is quite basic in its attack on our position, our responses must be weighed with particular care.
Hulick
101. Memorandum From the Assistant to the President's Military Representative (Legere) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/
Washington, August 23, 1962.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 38, 510 Partition of Berlin. Secret.
1. Attached is a Klein memo to Bundy/2/ on the latest Berlin development. I think all its points are well taken.
/2/Dated August 22, not printed.
2. In summary, Klein reminds that if the East Germans stop Allied military access into East Berlin, our contingency plans call for stopping Soviet access to the Tiergarten memorial. But the Soviet communique of yesterday/3/ ties Allied access between West Germany and West Berlin to their access to the Tiergarten memorial and Spandau. HENCE, if the East Germans stop us at Friedrichstrasse and we follow through with our plan of stopping Soviet access to the Tiergarten memorial, the Soviets could use this sequence to "justify" halting Allied access from West Germany to West Berlin, and the fat would be in the fire. Klein ends by noting that a State-Defense-JCS working group worked last night to develop possible courses of action./4/
/3/See footnote 2, Document 100.
/4/No record of this meeting has been found.
3. There is a Berlin Task Force meeting this morning. I assume the course or courses of action from last night's study will be discussed. The "vital interest" logic would unfortunately indicate the following course:
a. If the East Germans block us at Friedrichstrasse, no "vital interest" is affected;
b. Therefore, don't follow the plan of blocking Soviet access to their memorial because if we do,
c. They will block our access from West Germany to West Berlin--a "vital interest."
4. I personally cannot help thinking of the way we used the selfsame "vital interest" logic a year ago to justify our acceptance of The Wall, only to wring our hands a few months later for not having reacted more vigorously. My idea of a logical approach to this problem is to try to deduce the Soviet motive for executing this latest move, because it surely wasn't pointless. As I see it, there are three major possible motives, either singly or in combination:
a. Remove their (Soviet) responsibility in world opinion for the atrocities at the Wall;
b. Prepare the way for the East Germans to make a de jure as well as de facto international boundary of the sector-sector border (the extended erection of customs-type shacks at crossing points would support this theory).
c. Establish a Freeman-Yakubovsky channel for Berlin matters in order to dry up the usefulness of our Allied officials in Berlin, thus tending to reinforce the idea of West Berlin as just a piece of municipal real estate inside the DDR, not worth all the local wrangles, which hereafter can be "settled" at military CINC level.
5. Whatever the motive, we should not back down one inch on anything anywhere, or the Soviets will have taken us again. If we are blocked from East Berlin, we should shut the Soviets off from their Memorial as planned. If they then make trouble on the autobahn for us, tant pis; we cannot avoid trouble with those birds unless we are prepared to back down every time they scowl at us. So maybe it's better to have a little trouble sooner. Above all, General Clay is so eternally right when he says that if we stand up to them like men they will back down, not bomb New York and Washington.
[1 paragraph (8-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
L
102. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, August 23, 1962, 3:05 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2362. Secret. Drafted by Anderson and approved in S on September 7. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office. A detailed summary of this conversation was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 510, August 23. (Ibid., 611.61/8-2362)
SUBJECT
Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Embassy
Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor, Soviet Embassy
The Secretary
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
William O. Anderson, EUR/SOV
After discussing another matter with the Ambassador,/2/ the Secretary stated he might mention press reports received during the day concerning a problem involving Soviet armored vehicles used to carry members of the Soviet armed forces to the memorial in West Berlin./3/ The Ambassador then interjected a statement that he had no information beyond what he has seen in the American press. The Secretary continued that he could understand Soviet concern as regards the problem created by stones but we are concerned by the fact that recent reports indicate that armed Soviet men are riding outside armored vehicles. This practice would seem to destroy the logic of using the armed vehicles for crossing into West Berlin. We for our part are trying to avoid incidents, the chances of which would seem to be increased by positioning armed men outside the vehicles. The Ambassador interjected quickly that the Soviet soldiers are not brandishing arms. The Secretary went on to say, as a point of information, that we in fact escort our own armored vehicles when they are passing through the streets of West Berlin. He would hope that this matter can be worked out quickly on the spot. The Ambassador commented that these matters essentially are details and can be worked out by the proper persons. The Secretary added that we have noticed that details have a habit of growing into matters of concern and should be taken care of at the outset. He added that "we" (i.e., the Secretary and the Ambassador) should not have to talk about such things as the passage of a few vehicles.
/2/Memoranda of the conversations on the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons and U.S. relations with the Federal Republic of Germany are ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
/3/In telegram 251 from Berlin, August 23, Hulick reported that three APCs had appeared at Checkpoint Charlie with armed soldiers standing in them. Although the soldiers sat down when asked, they stood up again on the way to the Soviet war memorial in West Berlin and on the return trip. (Ibid., Central Files, 762.00/8-2362)
103. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President's Special Counsel (Sorensen)/1/
Washington, August 23, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Secret.
SUBJECT
Berlin
The Berlin crisis has warmed up a lot in recent weeks and looks as if it is getting worse. The Soviet Government has not stated any new deadline, but has indicated on every channel its continued belief that the only way of making progress is for the Western occupation forces, in one way or another, to get out of West Berlin. We have of course said that this is impossible. This has been said in conversations between Rusk and Gromyko, around the Laos meeting, between Rusk and Dobrynin here, and on the pen-pal circuit (which Dobrynin reads but does not talk about). The latest pen-pal exchange is attached for your information./2/
/2/Not attached, but presumably Documents 73 and 78.
We have no hard intelligence estimate of Soviet intentions about a peace treaty, but yesterday's abolition of the Soviet Commandant's office looks like the first in a series of steps aimed at changing their official position on Berlin still further. The most notable phenomenon to me in recent weeks has been the constant increase in Soviet noises and the lack of any correspondingly angry public statement on our side. This owes much to the President's own temper, and much also to the fact that the Soviets have been crying wolf since 1958.
In my own judgment, the most useful thing you can do with Dobrynin if he brings up Berlin--and perhaps even if he does not--is to say as clearly and emphatically as you can that it would be a most dangerous business to confuse our calmness and good manners with any weakening of determination whatsoever. Any move against our vital interests in Berlin will be met by appropriate, prompt, and energetic responses, and no one can doubt the dangers which such activity would imply for all concerned. Moreover, if the Soviet Government insists upon forcing the issue in terms of propaganda and public opinion, we shall have no alternative but to make clear just who it is that is disturbing the peace in Berlin.
You should of course say none of this in tones of threat, but rather in the interest of clarity of communication. The importance of your saying it is precisely that you are not Foy Kohler or Chip Bohlen and can speak with the authority of political engagement in this Administration./3/
McG. B./4/
/3/In a memorandum for the files on his lunch with Dobrynin at 1:15 on August 23, Sorensen reported that the conversation was general, "representing more of a `get acquainted' session than a significant exchange of views." With regard to the fall elections, Sorensen stated "that the President could not possibly lay himself open to Republican charges of appeasement in his response to any buildup in Berlin pressures between now and November 6." (Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Cuba, General, 1962)
/4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
At a second meeting on September 6 Dobrynin told Sorensen that he had been instructed to relay a personal message from Khrushchev that nothing would be undertaken before the congressional elections to complicate the international situation or aggravate tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. This included a German peace settlement and West Berlin. (Memorandum for the files, September 6; ibid.) For Sorensen's recollection of these meetings, see Kennedy, pp. 667-668.
104. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin/1/
Washington, August 23, 1962, 7:44 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.54/8-2362. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Brandin and Penberthy and cleared in draft by General Gray, Bundy, Tyler, Secretary Rusk, and ISA. Also sent to Bonn and Paris and repeated to London, Moscow, and USAREUR.
508. Paris for Stoessel also pass USRO, McGuire and US Element Live Oak. Following is guidance for dealing with movement of armed Soviet personnel in APCs on way to Sov War Memorial:
1. Upon arrival at checkpoint Sov officer should be told that APCs will be allowed to proceed to destination, but armed personnel must remain inside vehicles rather than ride outside with consequent display of weapons.
2. When armed personnel are inside vehicles, vehicles should be permitted to proceed.
3. Issue of word "escort" should not be forced on Soviets. Vehicles, however, should be accompanied. If Sovs demand that there be no escort, they should be informed that US vehicles will accompany them to be of assistance and to see that trip proceeds without difficulty.
4. If Soviets disregard these conditions en route and armed personnel appear on outside of vehicles, Soviet vehicles should not be stopped short of destination because of danger of incident from collecting crowd.
5. Every effort should be made to persuade British to follow similar procedure on return trip.
6. If Soviets fail to comply, matter should be referred to Washington.
7. This message being transmitted through military channels to USCINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR and USCOB./2/
Rusk
/2/On August 24, Dowling, who was in Berlin, asked for reconsideration of this guidance. In particular he wanted authority for the U.S. Commandant to demand assurances that the Soviets would not allow armed personnel to appear outside the APCs and, failing this, authority to deny access to West Berlin to the APCs. (Telephone message; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, and telegram 254 from Berlin; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2462) Dowling explained that Soviet use of armed guards was a "deliberate and flagrant provocation" that would undermine confidence in West Berlin if allowed to go unchallenged. The authority was granted in telegram 214 to Berlin, August 24. (Ibid., 762.54/8-2462)
105. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, August 25, 1962, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2562. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, USAREUR, and SHAPE.
268. Paris also for USRO and McGuire. USAREUR for POLAD. SHAPE for Stoessel and US Element Live Oak. Ref Berlin's 241 and 244 to Dept, 215 and 217 to Bonn./2/
/2/Telegrams 241 and 244 from Berlin are parts one and two of the three-part message. See Document 100 and footnote 1 thereto.
Part three of three-part message. Among longer-run problems covered in part one, following four deserve further elaboration:
1. Soviet presence in West Berlin.
Soviets have eliminated any unique aspects their presence in East Berlin, which now simply part of their presence in Soviet Zone generally. Only Soviet activities for which they will assume responsibility relating to special status of Berlin are now in West Berlin. This situation has two significant aspects: Soviet presence West Berlin is something Sovs will foster as contribution to thesis of 4-power West Berlin; and it is also basis for Soviet claim for access rights to West Berlin. In latter respect Soviets can be expected argue that all four are now in same situation. War Memorial may become most important of symbols Soviet presence since it unilateral and thus can be presented as their "sector" in West Berlin giving them right of presence. Soviet presence in West Berlin would no longer be based, therefore, on previous right of circulation all four powers in 4-power city including East Berlin, but on principle of right of access to installations.
Under these conditions we can expect long-term problem of our relations with Soviets to develop along two lines: first, issues re right of Soviet access to West Berlin; and secondarily, issues re right of free circulation within West Berlin, involving Sov relations in West Berlin with Allied Commandants. In latter connection, Sovs could conceivably attempt designate a representative in West Berlin, perhaps installing him in offices in quadripartite ACA Building as representative of Sov High Commissioner.
2. "Meaning" of Soviet presence in West Berlin.
In Mission's tel 100 to Dept, 87 to Bonn,/3/ point was made that Sovs might eventually seek to transform their CINC relations with Western CINCs into Warsaw Pact-NATO pact relations. This connection, it significant that in both USSR and GDR communiques/4/ commenting on abolition post of Sov Commandant, emphasis was placed on NATO pact character of Western Allied garrisons in West Berlin.
/3/Telegrams 98, 99, and 100, July 26, speculated on Soviet and East German "erosive" actions that might be taken against West Berlin in light of their recent statements. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2662)
/4/For text of the August 22 East German statement, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1962, pp. 961-962.
In seeking to establish Warsaw Pact-NATO pact equivalence, Sovs probably would wish to give some role in West Berlin to Czech and Polish military missions "accredited" to ACA. In light of their own past conduct re military missions, Sovs could not insist on right of Czech and Pole military missions to reside in Western sectors. They might, however, insist on their right of access to ACA Building to conduct business and to raise questions regarding West Berlin. Thus issue of access to, and circulation within, West Berlin of Czech and Pole military missions may also become problem in our relations with Sovs in future.
3. West Berlin attitude toward Allied Kommandatura.
There have been over the years frustrations on part West Berliners with cumbersome tripartite machinery. In addition, events particularly in past year have brought some increase in uncertainty of West Berliners regarding our determination in long run to maintain security of city. If there is added to this a downgrading of Commandants as result development higher level contacts with Yakubovsky, restiveness of West Berliners with Allied control likely to increase. This tendency should not be over-emphasized since West Berliners are aware their ultimate security lies with three Western governments. However, it can be expected that pressure by West Berlin government on Allied Kommandatura through attempts to assert independence and take unilateral actions will increase. We have seen numerous symptoms of this in past few months (S-bahn posters, arming of customs police, etc.). Though incidents on borders will continue for immediate future to be most inflammatory issue, it is likely that, over long run, problems posed by East German claims to "sovereignty" over S-bahn will take on crucial significance.
4. Signing of German peace treaty.
To extent that Sovs are successful in achieving any of goals described in foregoing sections, they would have brought about additional conditions which they have insisted be part of peace treaty. Re other clauses of peace treaty, Sovs might be expected in near future to begin harassment designed to change mechanism of Allied land access to West Berlin, perhaps initially along lines of association and eventual substitution East German Vopos for Soviet personnel on access routes. This connection, Mission wishes re-affirm views expressed in our tels 98 and 99 to Dept, sent Bonn 85 and 86,/5/ emphasizing that, as Sovs achieve goals, peace treaty when finally signed will be simply formalization of conditions existing at that time (as we have just experienced with dissolution of Soviet Kommandatura in East Berlin).
/5/See footnote 2 above.
Hulick
106. Letter From President Kennedy to Senator Mike Mansfield/1/
Washington, August 28, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2862. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information
DEAR MIKE: I want to thank you for your thoughtful memorandum of August 25 about the situation in Berlin./2/
/2/A copy of this memorandum, attached to a White House memorandum of transmittal, dated August 30, is ibid., 762.00/8-3062.
1. Your memorandum concentrates mainly on the problem of East Berlin. I think the truth is that East Berlin is not an issue of war and peace for us, and therefore we should not adopt any of the more drastic alternatives proposed in your memorandum. The time for a fight over an effective Western role in East Berlin passed, if it ever existed, many years ago--about the time of the first blockade. Our contingency plans therefore do not call for shooting over developments which may affect the relatively unimportant access we now have to East Berlin.
2. The crucial question remains that of West Berlin, and our attention is currently focused on what we should do to sustain the vital interests which do indeed exist there, in the event of further Soviet steps looking toward the increasingly complete incorporation of East Berlin into East Germany. There may be important things which we can do to strengthen our own ties to West Berlin, and perhaps the ties of West Berlin to West Germany, in this event. The three basic rights--of presence, access, and viability--which we have been asserting throughout this Administration all relate to West Berlin and not East Berlin; it is on this position that we shall continue to base our planning.
3. I entirely agree with your view that we should keep our Allies with us as we move ahead in this crisis and use the UN wherever it can help us. But both Allies and the UN seem to me to have their main importance in connection with West Berlin, and not with the remnants of our role in a section of the city which has been under effective Soviet control for a decade and a half.
Sincerely,
JFK/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
107. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, August 31, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, BQD-CC. Top Secret. Drafted by Kaysen.
SUBJECT
Meeting in the Cabinet Room, August 29, 1962, to Review Berlin Contingency Planning/2/
/2/The meeting was held at 5:46 p.m. (President's Appointment Book; ibid.)
PRESENT
The President, The Secretary of State, Mr. Ball, Mr. Brandin, Mr. Cash; Mr. Nitze; General Taylor, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Kaysen
The Secretary opened by remarking that General Clay would be in for a briefing on the subject in the morning before seeing the President. The President said he would get Clay's reaction on the problem to be discussed today.
The Secretary then sketched our present situation. The Soviet Union is pushing the Western Powers out of East Berlin, and at the same time striving to make West Berlin a Four-Power city in which they have an active role. We are now nearly at the end of the first process; the second part is beginning to move forward more rapidly. The problem on which we must shortly make a decision is thus whether we should not begin to head off the Soviet efforts to increase their role in West Berlin. The Secretary's first inclination was toward such action, lest there be serious consequences for the confidence and morale of the West Berlin population, which in turn would react on our position in West Berlin. The immediate problem in turn divides as follows: we might try: to increase our own presence in East Berlin, decrease the Soviet presence in West Berlin, or both. He is asking our Mission in Berlin and our Embassy in Bonn to supply us with a complete catalog of Soviet activities in West Berlin. These now go far beyond the activities related to BASC, Spandau and the War Memorial, and include, for instance, TASS offices and Polish and Czech Military Missions. For the present, the Secretary believes that we should keep to our plan of refusing to show identification of allied military personnel to East Germans in East Berlin. If, as a consequence, the Soviets refuse to permit entry of our military personnel into East Berlin, then we should respond by closing West Berlin to the Soviets.
The President asked whether we should make this trade on the particular point of showing identification. He also remarked that the War Memorial may be a particularly sensitive point with the Soviets, and it might well be an affront to them to be excluded from the War Memorial if we admitted them to West Berlin at all.
Mr. Bundy and Mr. Nitze then presented Ambassador Dowling's argument. We have nothing to lose in East Berlin; our present minimal activity is of marginal significance. On the other hand, if we allow Soviet presence in West Berlin to increase, we run a double risk. First, the show of Soviet military power in West Berlin affects the West Berliners adversely in a way which harms Berlin's long-term viability. Second, we may, through usage, create a situation in which it is easy for the Soviets to tie our access to West Berlin from West Germany with their access to West Berlin from East Berlin.
The President again commented on the probable special sensitivity of the War Memorial. Mr. Nitze noted that the location of the Memorial was the result of a deal between the British and the Russians. He went on to suggest that while there may be no need to deny access to the War Memorial, we could require them to come to it by the Brandenberg Gate, which meant a journey of less than 100 yards in West Berlin. Further, we could require that they come in buses and not APC's. The President thought the alternative: use of APC's and the Brandenberg Gate, or use of buses and the Friederichstrasse Gate, a reasonable one to present to the Soviets.
The Secretary then directed the attention of the group to the draft telegram for Berlin and the European capitals, inviting their comments on the alternatives which the Secretary had stated (attached)./3/ The President remarked that there was nothing to prevent the Soviets from doing what was sketched in the first paragraph of the message; namely, equate Soviet position in West Berlin with allied access to West Berlin. Mr. Bundy pointed out the importance of usage in this respect. Although there was nothing to prevent them from making this identification now, our acquiescence in the increasing Soviet presence in West Berlin would make such an identification more natural.
/3/Not found. The telegram as transmitted at 9:10 p.m. is printed as Document 108.
The President again asked whether we should not continue to permit Soviet access to the three special areas. Mr. Nitze urged the advantages of early action. Since the immediate tension had lessened, and the hostile actions of the West Berliners which had caused the Soviets to put their troops into APC's are not continuing, this was an appropriate moment for us to ask the Soviets to return to buses. He referred to the arguments of Mr. Hulick in Berlin 282 (attached)./4/
/4/Telegram 282, August 28, analyzed the shift from initial Soviet bellicosity in presenting APCs with armed guards at Checkpoint Charlie to compliance with the U.S. regulation on Soviet movements in West Berlin. The telegram suggested that this was not a Soviet "backdown," but more likely a desire not to precipitate a crisis over access to West Berlin. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2862)
The President asked why it would not be sufficient response to an East German request for papers from our troops, to deny ourselves entrance to East Berlin, and then admit the Soviets on credentials good only at the Brandenberg Gate. Mr. Bundy thought this would be an inadequate response, and that neither the Soviets nor the Germans would feel it sufficiently forceful. General Taylor remarked that relations between East and West Berlin were a microcosm of relations between West Germany and Berlin, and we should consider any action within Berlin in this light. Mr. Bundy pointed to the central question of what trade we were willing to make. In his judgment our access rights in East Berlin for their access rights in West Berlin was an advantageous trade. Mayor Brandt shared this view, and had indeed urged it.
The President asked whether a request for passes was an appropriate issue on which to hand such a trade. Mr. Bundy responded that the significance of the request was not as important as the problem of substantive judgment on whether or not the trade was in our interest. If it was, we should find the earliest occasion to make it. The Secretary pointed out the asymmetry of the "paper" issue. Since the Soviet Union and the East Germans wish to create a state frontier at the sector boundary, they would be happy to show whatever papers we asked for.
The President observed that he saw no specific danger in Soviet presence at the War Memorial, BASC and Spandau. Mr. Nitze and Mr. Bundy responded that the issue was not their presence. The issue was our control of the terms on which they could come to West Berlin. If we did not assert our control, then we would be moving rapidly to a Four-Power West Berlin. General Taylor asked Mr. Nitze whether we were not in fact already in this state; Mr. Nitze thought not yet.
Mr. Nitze asked that we return to the question of what should be done now. He would recommend that we request the Russians to return to the use of buses and indicate that we will not permit entry in APC's. The President asked whether he would recommend that we require them to come through the Brandenberg Gate as well. Mr. Nitze said he was willing to wait on this point.
The President asked whether we have ever sent tanks or other armoured vehicles into East Berlin. Mr. Brandin responded that we have sent tanks only as far as the Friederichstrasse checkpoint. Our own patrols in East Berlin have been made in jeeps; the soldiers do carry side arms. Secretary Rusk remarked that if the Soviets come through the Brandenberg Gate, the use of APC's is no longer an issue, since they in fact are not going through any significant part of West Berlin. The President asked Mr. Nitze to repeat his argument, and Mr. Nitze again stated that the central issue was our control of Soviet access for West Berlin. In answer to the President's question as to whether this was in doubt, Mr. Nitze cited the Soviet protests on the issue of our escorts for their APC's as evidence of their efforts to erode our control. General Taylor and Mr. Nitze said that we had yielded to this protest, in part at least, by agreeing to describe our accompanying vehicles in other terms than as "escorts."
The President asked whether we should tie permission for the Soviets to use APC's to acceptance of our escorts. General Taylor responded that we should not accept any restrictions on the use of our own vehicles in West Berlin.
The President summarized the issues as follows. Should we do something now or wait? Should we confine the Soviets to the use of the Brandenberg Gate and permit APC's? Should we give the Soviets the choice of coming in buses or using the Brandenberg Gate, or should we give them only the alternatives of exclusion or the use of the buses through the Brandenberg Gate? Should the War Memorial be in the category of BASC and Spandau as points to which we would continue to permit Soviet entry even if we excluded them from the rest of West Berlin, or should it be treated along with the rest of West Berlin? The Secretary indicated that he would have the outgoing telegram re-drafted to request comment on these questions. He agreed that as presently drafted it seemed to reflect decisions on some of them, which in fact have not yet been taken. In response to the President's question, he said that the draft had not been discussed quadripartitely.
Mr. Nitze pointed out that if we are going to make any request, we must be prepared to respond to Soviet refusal to accede to it. He would recommend that we block their access to West Berlin if they do not accede to whatever request we think appropriate. The President again raised the question of whether we should take the initiative in making a request or wait to respond to some Soviet move. His own inclination was to wait. The Secretary pointed out that we were dealing with a symbolic, rather than in a substantive realm. The problem essentially is how do we give the Soviets an unmistakable signal as to our intentions within West Berlin. Mr. Nitze thought it was better to take the risks of action now than to defer them.
The President then remarked that he saw no harm in the APC's as such, since we could stop them at any time. They did not limit our vital rights of access or military presence. Further, we could stop them at any time. The Secretary responded that this was just the problem. General Taylor observed that although the initial use of the APC's might have been a natural reaction of the Soviet Commander to the violence offered to his troops, their use was no longer justified. The President said that the reaction of the West Berliners to the APC's was understandable and not unexpected, but in itself was not a sufficient reason for us to take action. Further, it might have been easy if we had prevented the entry of the APC's at their first appearance, but now we were in a different position. Mr. Nitze pointed out that the West Berliners' feelings were not the issue, but rather our confrontation with the Soviets. The President again raised the question of whether we should take the initiative, and indicated that he preferred to respond to a Soviet move that went outside the existing rules.
The Secretary raised the question of whether it might be useful to move in the opposite direction by putting more American and other Western troops in East Berlin. Mr. Nitze and Mr. Bundy pointed out the possible difficulties our troops could create for us. The arrest of a number of American soldiers, in the absence of a Soviet Commandant in Berlin, might well put the President in a difficult position.
Mr. Bundy went on to review the problem of passes. He pointed out that last year we engaged our prestige on the issue of whether American military personnel would show passes to East Germans, and we succeeded in making our point. If we now retreated from this position, the Soviets and Germans both would read it as weakness. The President agreed that American military personnel should not show passes to get into East Berlin and that we should rather deny ourselves entry. He observed that on the Autobahn the situation was of course different. Mr. Bundy remarked that if we denied ourselves access to East Berlin, in order to avoid showing passes to East Germans, we must at that point cut off Soviet access to West Berlin. Without Soviet presence in East Berlin, there was no justification for a Soviet presence in West Berlin. He repeated Mayor Brandt's point that we no longer have any important interest in access to East Berlin, and therefore we should not trade anything in West Berlin for access to East Berlin.
The President asked whether the alternative might be to limit the Soviets to the three areas mentioned, and again raised the question of timing. Mr. Bundy gave his view that now was the time to deal with the APC's. The President expressed his preference for staying on our pres-ent position for the moment. General Taylor pointed out that we had a middle course of action; namely, requiring that the Soviets use the Brandenberg Gate for APC's going to the War Memorial. The Secretary said that this was also the notion of the British Commandant. He observed that we probably could get Allied agreement to restrict access to the three places mentioned under specified contingencies. Mr. Bundy remarked that in order to come out with this result, we had to push for a great deal more, rather than merely ask for it.
The President suggested that the message be revised to reflect the discussion and sent out. In response to the President's question, the Secretary gave his judgment that it was not an appropriate moment to send General Clay back to Berlin.
CK/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
108. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin/1/
Washington, August 29, 1962, 9:10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2862. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ausland, cleared in draft by Rusk and in substance by Gray and Nitze, and approved by Brandin. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, Moscow, London, USAREUR, and USAFE.
244. Paris pass USRO, Stoessel, McGuire, and US Element Live Oak. Reference: Berlin's 282./2/ Subject: Allied Access to East Berlin and Soviet Presence in West Berlin./3/
/2/See footnote 3, Document 107.
/3/On August 27 Klein had sent a memorandum to Bundy giving a similar analysis of the question of Western access to the Eastern sector of Berlin. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin)
1. We agree that one possible interpretation of recent Soviet actions is that their efforts are directed toward complete elimination Allied position in East Berlin and strengthening Soviet presence in West Berlin. Even before abolition Soviet Commandant, they were already well on way toward elimination Allied position East Berlin, unless Allies were prepared acquiesce in unacceptable conditions, such as showing identification. They may now be attempting guard against Allied action against their position West Berlin, by switching equation from Allied position in East Berlin versus Soviet position in West Berlin versus Allied access to West Berlin.
2. One response open to us is to direct our efforts toward maintenance East Berlin-West Berlin equation. We could conceivably do this in two ways, by increasing our presence in East Berlin and/or by reducing Soviet presence in West Berlin.
3. With regard to Allied presence in East Berlin, we believe it is questionable as to how much we can accomplish. Our presence in East Berlin is not, however, in itself of same fundamental importance to us as Soviet position in West Berlin probably is to Soviets. We believe, however, we might consider expanding our activities in East Berlin, such as uniform personnel in official cars. We have also considered possibility of increasing travel into East Berlin by individuals, but wonder whether this would be desirable.
4. With regard to any effort to reduce Soviet presence in West Berlin, we would have to move carefully, if we want to bring our Allies along with us. We believe our first moves might be directed toward control of Soviet movement in West Berlin. On basis that the shorter the distance travelled the less likely there will be difficulty, we could, for example, insist that Soviets enter West Berlin at entry point nearest installation they wish to get to.
5. We recognize that course of action outlined above could produce situation which could lead to ending Allied movement in East Berlin and Soviet movement in West Berlin. It could also lead to Soviet action against air or surface access to West Berlin. Soviets could withdraw from BASC or otherwise harass air access. They could also harass Allied convoys or trains. We believe that this is risk we might have to take.
6. Request you submit urgently your suggestions for possible action directed toward following objectives, either as alternative courses or in combination:
a. Restricting Soviet presence in West Berlin, and
b. Increasing Allied presence in East Berlin./4/
/4/The analyses were transmitted in telegrams 307 and 310 from Berlin, August 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-3162)
7. You should not at this time discuss above with our Allies.
8. Request other addressees direct any comments on this message to Berlin, so they can be taken into account in preparation their suggestions.
9. In this connection, request you expedite reply to Deptel 240/5/ (not repeated other posts), which requests inventory Soviet activity West Berlin.
/5/Dated August 29. (Ibid., 762.0221/8-2862)
10. This message being sent separately through military channels.
Rusk
109. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, August 30, 1962, 10:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-3062. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Cash on August 30 and approved in S on September 6. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office.
SUBJECT
Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
General Clay
Mr. Cash
The Secretary opened by asking General Clay when he was last in Europe.
General Clay said he had been in Europe ten days ago, just after the refugee Peter Fechter had been shot at the wall. He had seen Mayor Brandt.
The Secretary said the East Germans had been putting out the line that they had not gone to the assistance of Fechter out of fear of the West Berlin police.
General Clay said that a similar incident had happened before in the British sector, but there had been no crowds to witness the event.
The Secretary said that one subject that is currently under consideration is how to bring into balance the question of East and West military personnel entering East and West Berlin. He said there were two ways this could be accomplished:
1. we could increase our presence in East Berlin; or
2. we could cut back Soviet bloc presence in West Berlin.
It is feared that the Soviets might achieve a quadripartite West Berlin and then equate their access to West Berlin to our access to West Berlin. He said he would appreciate General Clay's reactions.
General Clay responded that if we were not careful we would soon face the alternatives of either shooting or getting out of West Berlin if we waited until our vital interests were affected. We should try to avoid being faced with these alternatives. He would increase the Western presence in East Berlin. He would put an end to the use of the APC's. If the Soviets interfere with our increased presence in East Berlin, he would take action against Soviet personnel in West Berlin.
The Secretary asked General Clay's views about action against the Czech and Polish Military Missions.
General Clay said he did not think such action would have much immediate value concerning Berlin other than to impress the Czechs and Poles with the seriousness with which we view the situation. He added that he would force the Soviets to interfere first with our increased presence in East Berlin.
The Secretary said he would appreciate General Clay's comments on whether or not we would risk increased conflicts with the East German police if we increase our presence in East Berlin, an idea which he, incidentally, found attractive.
General Clay said this would provide a logical excuse for running the Soviets out of West Berlin. He felt that cutting both Western presence in East Berlin and Eastern presence in West Berlin would look like a sign of weakness.
The Secretary said he still got the impression that the Germans and French are not really thinking hard concerning what can be done. We haven't had any sign of their deep interest. They will say that it is important to keep the Soviets from signing a separate peace treaty, but then they fail to come up with practical measures to this end. The Secretary wondered if General Clay had any impression as to what the French and the Germans were thinking about in this connection.
General Clay replied negatively saying that he had stayed away from the Bonn Government on his last trip to Europe inasmuch as it was a business trip. He said that in his last conversation with Adenauer he gained the impression that the Chancellor was considerably influenced by de Gaulle's position. He added, however, that he was more concerned about the reactions of the people in Berlin and Germany than he was about the reactions of the Government. He thought recent developments had hurt us with the people primarily because of lack of reaction on our part. The principle now governing seems to be that we do nothing until our vital interests are involved. This really backs us into a corner. We must keep the East off balance. When General Clay was in Berlin there was an understanding that an unarmed attempt at rescue would be made in any case similar to the Fechter case. He was puzzled as to why no action had occurred. The Secretary said he did not know whether the necessary information had gotten to the officers concerned in time.
General Clay said he felt that this was no excuse. He continued by saying that the decision to admit the APC's had had a very bad effect. The Germans know that we did not send armored vehicles in through Checkpoint Charlie because we considered it would be provocative. And yet we have admitted the Soviet APC's. He did not think this could be interpreted as anything except a Soviet move for a quadripartite West Berlin. If we were afraid to move in this area because of fear of retaliation against our autobahn access, we might be afraid to move in cases of harassment of our autobahn access because of fear that this might then threaten air access.
The Secretary said there was no question but that we would react to interference with our access. We would move immediately into economic and other sanctions, but he was not sure how far other nations would follow us. Any time we attempted to take steps in the trade field, the others shied away from this. General Clay said he did not think particular blame could be attached to the Germans in this regard because the British have more trade with the Soviet bloc.
The Secretary said this might be right, but it would surprise him.
General Clay said that in addition, the movement of Germans into and out of Berlin is tied in with the interzonal trade. No Allied agreement covers the movement of Germans.
The Secretary continued by saying that one of the difficulties was that so many things were not spelled out in workable agreements in the very beginning of the occupation.
General Clay said there was a good deal to be said for this argument, but he didn't think this would have made much difference after we demobilized.
The Secretary asked where General Clay had been in 1945 and 1946.
General Clay responded that he had been in Berlin.The Secretary said that he was in the Pentagon and the State Department, and that among the colonels there had been a very strong feeling concerning the demobilization. However, the Pentagon had not put up much of a fight against it.
General Clay agreed but said that US officers in Germany had opposed demobilization. If we had kept ten divisions in Germany, there would have been no Eastern bloc. He said that the only charitable thing he could say was that when President Roosevelt entered into the agreements with the Soviets he intended to keep ten divisions in Europe to see that the agreements were carried out. If this had happened the world would look entirely different today. The General said he was unhappy with the present situation because if we did not take the initiative we would soon be backed into a corner.
The Secretary said he knew the President would be interested in General Clay's views.
General Clay said he had been shocked at both the lack of assistance for Fechter and the admission of the Soviet armored cars, but it was difficult to be critical of the people in the field who are trying to comply with what they think is desired of them. The only way we can change the course of events is by taking the initiative.
The Secretary asked if General Clay would have the Soviet troops for the War Memorial moved through the Brandenburg Gate.
General Clay said there would be obvious advantages in doing so because there would only be a short distance to travel, and there would be no crowds. This would remove the necessity for armed escorts. It would be an improvement over the present situation. In addition, the opening of the Brandenburg Gate would be a boost for West Berlin morale. This idea has considerable merit but only if it were a part of a series of things to be done to establish and maintain our position.
The Secretary asked if General Clay had any travel plans for the immediate future.
General Clay said he did not except that he planned tentatively to go to Berlin with the Atlantic Council in November.
The Secretary said there seemed to be some difference between Mayor Brandt and Bonn. Brandt was trying to get more circulation across the wall, and this would mean more dealings with the East Germans.
General Clay said the West Berliners were a little more realistic and were unconcerned about minor forms of recognition. This is a political issue in West Germany but not in Berlin. Brandt has to live with the situation, and the Chancellor doesn't. Increased circulation would have considerable effect in relieving tensions. The Secretary said he had seen a report that the East Germans were trying to make an assessment of East German feeling about the wall./2/
/2/Not further identified.
General Clay said they had always had trouble in getting police to guard the wall. He thought the East German forces along the wall would be tougher without the Russians than if the Russians were there.
The Secretary asked how much effort the West Berliners were putting into attempts to seduce the East German police covertly.
General Clay said he felt they were doing a pretty good job in this regard./3/
/3/During a meeting with the President at 11:30 a.m., Clay advocated increasing "appreciably" the presence of U.S. soldiers in East Berlin and ending the Soviet use of APCs in West Berlin. In case the East Germans demanded documentation from U.S. soldiers entering East Berlin, he recommended that the United States abstain from entering the Eastern sector and consider denying Soviet access to West Berlin including BASC, Spandau, and the war memorial. (Memorandum, August 30; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin)
110. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, August 31, 1962, 11:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany. Secret. Drafted by Davis on September 1. The meeting was held in President Kennedy's office.
SUBJECT
German Ambassador's Farewell Call
PARTICIPANTS
The President
Ambassador Grewe of the Federal Republic of Germany
Mr. William J. Tonesk, Deputy Chief of Protocol
Mr. Richard H. Davis, Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
NATO Council
The President received Ambassador Grewe at 11:30 this morning for his farewell call and after preliminary courtesies the President commented on the importance of the NATO Council to which the Ambassador is being assigned as the German representative. He added that the appointment of Ambassador Finletter indicated our great interest in the NATO Council and remarked that as the prestige of permanent representatives arise, the significance of the Council will increase.
The Ambassador replied that his predecessor on the Council, von Walther, had been a distinguished representative and he was looking forward to his own work. He expressed the opinion it might be useful to have some representative from the Ambassadorial Group on Berlin speak to the Council from time to time on the work of the group. He thought the Council felt it had not received in the past a full and up-to-date briefing.
UK Entry Into CM
The President referred to newspaper reports of the Chancellor's recent TV interview regarding Great Britain's entry into the Common Market and asked the Ambassador what he thought. The Ambassador somewhat embarrassedly explained that Macmillan in his answer to a question in the House of Commons in July had stated that entry into the Common Market did not mean entry into a European political union. There then followed Macmillan's letter of July 25 to the Chancellor seeking to clarify this statement./2/ The Chancellor in his TV interview was merely reflecting the earlier Macmillan statement. The Chancellor's remarks had been interpreted in a negative way and perhaps the formulation had been unfortunate. The President asked in view of the Rome Treaty how one could separate the economic from the political union of Europe to which the Ambassador replied that the political union was not formally linked with the Treaty, but in substance, of course, it could not be separated. The German public as well as most of the German political leaders realized this and he was sure Germany supported Britain's entry.
/2/Regarding Macmillan's exchange of letters with Adenauer in July, see Macmillan, At the End of the Day, pp. 123-125.
Western Foreign Ministers' Meeting
The President requested the Ambassador's views on the possibility of a Western Foreign Ministers' Meeting to which the Ambassador replied that since it was a German suggestion, they had been happy about the President's press conference statement./3/ They had understood the French also favored the idea but it later came out that they did not. The Germans hoped at least at a later stage that the Foreign Ministers could meet in view of the new problems and the new situation which had arisen in Berlin. The President expressed agreement that a meeting should take place some time in the coming weeks either in Washington or in Europe.
/3/For a transcript of the President's news conference on August 29, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 648-655.
Possibility Soviets Introducing German Question Into UN
In reply to the President's general question on this subject, the Ambassador expressed the opinion that the Soviets would not raise the question of Berlin in the UN in a specific manner since they probably estimate the votes would go against any change in the status quo. The Soviets might discuss Berlin and Germany in general in the GA in order to persuade the neutrals of the justice of Soviet proposals and to create a favorable atmosphere to carry out further Soviet intentions.
The Ambassador continued that the Soviets would probably emphasize the existence of two German states and the need for both to enter the UN. This had a certain appeal to the neutrals. It would be necessary to explain to them that this favors the Soviet viewpoint. Moreover, there was a problem of non-recognition which has become even more difficult.
Recognition of East Germany
Picking up the Ambassador's last remark, the President asked whether we could through the years continue to persuade other governments not to recognize the East German regime. The Ambassador said "yes" but that sacrifices would be necessary. Bonn was considering all aspects of this question but it was a painful decision. The President wondered whether the Soviets would pay rather heavily to get this non-recognition policy reconsidered and whether it was possible we might get something better rather than undergo a gradual erosion of our position. The Ambassador expressed some doubt that the Soviets would be willing to pay anything for recognition and pointed out the great difficulty for West Germany because all their old policies and indeed the Constitution would have to be revised if the non-recognition policy were abandoned. The President expressed appreciation of the internal difficulties. The Ambassador added that he was speaking only personally on this subject as he had no authorization to raise the question.
Soviet Use of APC's
The President referred to his talk with General Clay yesterday/4/ and our concern with the Soviet use of APC's in conveying their personnel to the Soviet War Memorial in the British sector. There was a question whether we should prohibit or limit them. What were the Ambassador's views? The Ambassador felt the problem was the Soviet attempt to equate their access to BASC, Spandau, and the War Memorial with Western access to West Berlin. The problem of APC's was important from a psychological point of view. He expressed the opinion it was important now to equate Western patrols in East Berlin with Soviet access to the War Memorial and Spandau. The important point was reciprocity. The President remarked the question was whether to prohibit the APC's from coming since the necessity for them had passed. Perhaps we should require them to go through the Brandenburg Gate in the future but not to permit them to use APC's to Spandau.
/4/See footnote 2, Document 109.
Recent Exchange of Letters
The President said he appreciated the Chancellor's reply to his latest letter/5/ and said he believed the exchange had been useful. The Ambassador agreed but expressed the opinion it was necessary to have more personal contacts--not necessarily between the President and the Chancellor but, for example, between Secretary Rusk and Schroeder.
/5/See footnotes 1 and 7, Document 98.
US Commitment to Europe
The President wondered where the stories had arisen about a change in US strategic posture. The Ambassador replied that he thought the trouble had arisen from a change in US strategic concepts which was necessary. He was hopeful that viewpoints now had been brought much closer particularly through meetings between Strauss, McNamara, Nitze and Gilpatric. He realized there were different accents in US and European strategic concepts. The President referred to a talk he had with a "European" yesterday/6/ who wondered whether the US would really carry out its nuclear commitment to defend Europe. The President had replied, of course, but the very question revealed a strong current of disbelief which was probably encouraged by the French. The President added there should be no doubt of a US commitment since US security was so intimately tied to Europe's.
/6/This conversation has not been further identified.
The Ambassador answered that he fully believed this as his speeches in this country attested. He admitted there was an unhappy influence from the French side which we should try to counter.
Miscellaneous
The President referred to the fact the Ambassador had been here during two Administrations and during times which had been difficult and expressed his opinion that relations between the two countries were basically sound though they had their ups and downs like all relations. He commented that the Ambassador had the chance in NATO for very effective service in the common cause.
The Ambassador said he looked back with great pleasure on his service in Washington and thought that something had been achieved during his tour of office. The Alliance had passed through difficult times, particularly last year, but had met the test on the whole well. We had agreed on sharing financial burdens, there had been an enormous increase in exchanges, etc.
The President referred to a University of Michigan survey on the American mood toward Germany and contrasted it with the Shirer book. The Ambassador replied he thought the mood of the great majority of Americans toward Germany was favorable but a certain circle of intellectuals was quite negative. Their influence was out of proportion to their numbers and they had a certain appeal.
The Ambassador then remarked he wanted to emphasize how much he appreciated the President making himself available to see him on frequent occasions and he wished to stress the good cooperation which he had enjoyed with the Department of State. He said he realized some of the arguments he had used, he would not have used in the President's position but he hoped the President realized he had to speak of German national interests.
The President concluded by again expressing his appreciation of the Ambassador's efforts through a difficult period. Since 1958 the exist-ence of Soviet missiles had made operations more hazardous and most people did not appreciate that we were operating under a much more difficult pattern than before. He expressed agreement with the Ambassador's remarks on the usefulness of more frequent meetings and again expressed the thought the recent exchange of letters with the Chancellor had been helpful. The Ambassador remarked that the Chancellor is 86 and had deep-rooted distrust. The President remarked that the period of John Foster Dulles was often referred to as "rosy" in our relations but that if we really looked back at that period there had been difficult times too. The Ambassador agreed.
The meeting closed with a mutual exchange of courtesies.
111. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, September 1, 1962, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-162. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, USAREUR, and SHAPE.
667. Paris also for USRO and McGuire; SHAPE for Stoessel and US Element Live Oak; CINCUSAREUR for POLAD. Reference: Deptels 580, 586, Berlin's 307, 310./2/ I have already commented on problem raised by Clay in Berlin's 270 and 282/3/ and have little to add to excellent concrete suggestions made in Berlin's 307 and 310. As far as General Clay's views are concerned I agree with basic thesis but would like to add following observation on tactics we might utilize in dealing with Sov presence in West Berlin.
/2/Telegram 580 is printed as telegram 244 to Berlin, Document 108. Telegram 586 summarized Clay's views as presented to the President in their meeting on August 30 (see footnote 2, Document 109). Regarding telegrams 307 and 310, see footnote 3, Document 108.
/3/Telegram 270, August 25, summarized the pros and cons of showing identification papers in entering East Berlin and concluded that to do so would damage U.S. prestige and serve no useful end. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.54/8-2562) Regarding telegram 282, see footnote 3, Document 107.
The Russians have a real interest in maintaining a presence in West Berlin, not only as a means of influencing a possible Berlin settlement but also in providing themselves with a means to intimidate Western policy and action on access to West Berlin. Course of events since construction of wall, culminating in action of 22 August shows that while they may be willing to liquidate 4-power structure, they strongly wish to retain unilateral right of presence in West Berlin. This presence is important to them not only in symbolic and prestige terms, but in important process of equating their access to West Berlin through Friedrichstrasse with Allied access to West Berlin. As pointed out in previous messages, they are not interested in equating Sov entry into West Berlin with Allied entry into East Berlin, since East Berlin was sealed off by the wall and would be closed completely at any time by administrative requirements concerning identification. Addition of jeeps to Sov APC's may indicate that Sovs are attempting to make their "convoys" to war memorial even look like Allied convoys on Autobahn, thus emphasizing that they are seeking to establish this equation.
Aside from connection between Sov access to West Berlin and Allied access to West Berlin, presence of Sov forces at war memorial and Spandau has intense emotional and symbolic significance for Russians. They simply could not leave an unprotected war memorial in West Berlin or risk the release of Hess, Shirach and Speer without profound effect on their propaganda of unilateral victory in World War II and their charges of continued activity by "Hitlerites" and "revanchists".
Therefore, Soviets would not willingly relinquish their rights concerning memorial and Spandau and I believe they would go a long way in making certain concessions or seeking time before forced to do so. In no sense, would they give up these rights without intense retaliation.
I do not place as much emphasis on our presence in East Berlin as a basis for cutting off West Berlin to Sovs. Our continued presence in East Berlin serves no definite purpose and actual or symbolic presence of our forces there has only marginal utility in relation to our greater objectives in West Berlin. If we send increased numbers US personnel into East Berlin as a means of policy, we simply invite a program of individual harassment which would immerse us in a maze of protests obscuring our basic objectives.
As set out in mytel from Berlin,/4/ we should now concentrate on containment and control of Sov presence in West Berlin rather than to strive towards any symbolic or propaganda advantages in maintaining our presence in the East sector. Therefore, I agree with Gen Clay that under no circumstances must we show identification as a price of entering the East sector.
/4/See footnote 1, Document 104.
I agree completely with Gen Clay about presence of Sov APC's in West Berlin and in Embtel 652/5/ we have proposed plan which would lead to their removal from scene. While breaching wall at Brandenburg Gate may be too much to hope for, we could settle for Sandkrug Bridge but insist that Sov guards travel in buses rather than in armored cars.
/5/Dated August 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-3162)
For reasons advanced, most effective way to deal with Sovs would be to institute selective controls on entry of Sov war memorial and Spandau guards rather than by instituting a blanket prohibition which would include BASC personnel. If Sovs equate their entry with Allied access to W. Berlin, we could by various initiatives control, or prohibit, their access to objectives in W. Berlin which they too may consider important for their purposes. While we should seek by various means to prevent the Sovs drawing a precise relationship between West Berlin and Allied access routes, we should recognize that this is precisely what they may do. Therefore, we should be prepared to deny them access to West Berlin on same grounds they may hinder our access, rather than becoming involved in East sector.
BASC is an entirely different matter. Just as it in Soviet interest to maintain physical presence at memorial, it is certainly in our interest to maintain Sov presence in BASC. When Sovs fail to participate in BASC we could be faced with a situation of grave import which could require immediate implementation of our contingency plans in order to maintain free and uncontrolled air access to Berlin. We should, in short, do nothing to make Sov presence in BASC impossible as long as they wish to maintain it.
One way of assuring this for the time being is to treat Sov presence at war memorial, Spandau and BASC as separate problems rather than as one. What we should seek to prevent is Sov use of entry for changes of guard at memorial as mechanism for supplying personnel for other Soviet undertakings in West Berlin. Provisions for relieving guard at memorial should be confined to that alone. If and when problem arises about Spandau and BASC, it should be dealt with in terms of situation existing at that time without connection with provisions concerning memorial./6/
Dowling
/6/On September 4 Norstad cabled his concurrence with these views. (ECJCJ-9-13923; Eisenhower Library, Norstad Papers, Policy File, Berlin-Live Oak)
112. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of the Interior Udall and Chairman Khrushchev/1/
Petsunda, Georgia, Soviet Union, September 6, 1962, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Secret. Drafted by the U.S. interpreter, Kamman, with additions and corrections by Udall, who visited the Soviet Union for 11 days beginning August 29. A summary of the conversation, transmitted in telegram 616 from Moscow, September 7 (ibid., Central Files, 033.1100-UD/9-762), is printed in vol. V, Document 139.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]
K: I know Nixon and Eisenhower, and I must say that Kennedy is better in this respect. As a President he has understanding, but what he does not yet have is courage--courage to solve the German question. If he resolves this problem, he will rise to the heights. But he is faced with the necessity of solving it. Because the German situation is no longer tolerable. A treaty will inevitably be signed. If we and the President can agree, then there will be great opportunities for cooperation in science, technology, and outer space. Without a solution to this problem, our relations will continue to be cancerous and exacerbated. So we will help him solve the problem. We will put him in a situation where it is necessary to solve it. We will give him a choice--go to war, or sign a peace treaty. We will not allow your troops to be in Berlin. We will permit access to West Berlin for economic or commercial purposes, but not for military purposes. Everybody is saying nowadays that there will be a war. I don't agree. Sensible people won't start a war. What is Berlin to the United States? And a war could easily began there--if someone struck a blow at us, we would strike back. Do you need Berlin? Like hell you need it. Nor do we need it. But the President is not in a position to come to agreement. I'm telling you this off the record--I don't want to hurt your chances in the November elections. The President is boxed in--he can't move. To sum it up, Congress won't let him come to terms. If he had support in Congress, he could come to terms. But as it now stands, if the two of us made an agreement, Congress would veto it. You remember when Nixon came here, and Congress had just declared Captive Nations Week. I asked him, "Was that very smart?" He said, "I never would have done such a thing myself, but I can't vouch for fools in the Congress." I'm telling you this just between you and me. But you have many such fools in Congress.
U: There are some who are demagogues in the negative sense.
K: They should be gotten rid of. And so--we'll sign a peace treaty. If any lunatics in your country want war, Western Europe will hold them back. Except for Adenauer and DeGaulle--those two have some unusual ideas of their own. But they will get wise in a hurry. War in this day and age means no Paris and no France, all in the space of an hour. It's been a long time since you could spank us like a little boy--now we can swat your ass. So let's not talk about force. We're equally strong. You want Berlin. Access to it goes through East Germany. We have the advantage. If you want to do anything, you have to start a war. And nowadays that course is insanity. We ourselves will not start a war. We don't need one, nor do you. The economy of your country is more developed than ours, but ours will be as strong as yours one day. So, let us have peaceful competition. But we can have peace and come to agreement sooner once the Berlin issue is eliminated. Out of respect for your President we won't do anything until November. If it depends on us, there will be no war. I think the reply of the President to our note on the U-2 was satisfactory from this standpoint.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]
U: Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the opportunity to meet with you. I will respect your request to keep these remarks off the record, and will convey your messages to President Kennedy.
K: Yes--tell the press we talked about electric power plants.
U: Yes, I would like to tell them of our discussion of power stations and water development. On Berlin, the President has made his position very clear. He shares your views about the insanity, the suicide of nuclear war. He is a strong leader--a courageous man, a man of steel, just as you are. You, the President, and I myself were all participants in the last World War. The President respects your problems and your position, and you should attempt to understand his position on this grave question. I am sure the President has no greater ambition than to solve the Berlin problem peacefully, and to put an end to nuclear weapons testing, which has been the topic of discussion at Geneva. This is a time of dangers, and he will always do his best to find peaceful solutions to world problems.
K: We wish him success. We will freeze the Berlin question until November. Then he and I will continue our dialogue. I don't know what its outcome will be, but we will sign a peace treaty with Germany. Then we shall see whether you bring us to the brink of war. It takes two to jump at the brink; one person can't jump alone--and you have many on your side who must jump together (motioning with his hands). I personally do not want to jump. Please give my best personal regards to the President, his family, and his daughter from me and my wife.
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