Documents 113-133
SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER 1962: U.S. POLICY ON BERLIN DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
113. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, September 7, 1962, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.5162A/9-762. Secret. Drafted by Meloy and approved in S on September 18. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office.
SUBJECT
De Gaulle Visit to Germany and Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Ambassador Hervé Alphand, French Embassy
Mr. Jean-Claude Winckler, Counselor, French Embassy
Mr. Francis E. Meloy, Jr., WE
The French Ambassador called on the Secretary at his own request following his return from Paris for a general discussion.
The Secretary, who had not yet seen the de Gaulle-Adenauer communique,/2/ inquired of Ambassador Alphand as to its contents. The Ambassador, who had just seen the communique, outlined very briefly its major points. The Secretary commented that it would appear that the communique contained a good deal more than such documents usually do.
/2/For text of the September 7 communiqué, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1962, pp. 1045-1046.
Ambassador Alphand repeated that the de Gaulle visit had gone very well especially in its public relations aspects. The fact that de Gaulle speaks some German had been helpful. The Ambassador said that the press had played up the dramatic aspects of the visit, noting that this was the first time a French Chief of State had paid a state visit to Germany since 921 A.D.
Ambassador Alphand said he hoped that the United States would not consider the de Gaulle-Adenauer understandings and the Franco-German rapprochement to be against U.S. interests. The Secretary said certainly not. At the expense of appearing somewhat naive he still felt he should point out that the United States had been engaged in two major world conflicts in which France and Germany were on opposite sides. An understanding between France and Germany for the drawing together of those two countries was therefore very much to be desired. On the other hand, however, if it should develop that there was contemplated a French-German axis or understanding at the expense of NATO and the Atlantic Community, the United States would very definitely be disturbed. Ambassador Alphand emphasized that such intent had been expressly denied.
The Ambassador inquired as to how the Secretary saw events developing with regard to Berlin. The Secretary said that he had asked our intelligence people to prepare an assessment of the current situation and future probabilities and that we would share this assessment with the French and our other allies in the next meeting on Berlin. The Secretary had a hunch that we are in for a serious time. The Soviets might withdraw from the air security center and attempt to insist that we fly from Schoenfeld. There may also be harassment in the air corridor to Berlin and indications of a Soviet build up of antiaircraft weapons in the corridor pointed this way. The Secretary said he could tell the Ambassador very privately that we may need to ask further congressional authority for calling up reserve troops./3/
/3/Later in the day President Kennedy sent identical letters to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House seeking authorization to activate units of the Ready Reserve. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, p. 665. The necessary authority was passed by both Houses and approved by the President on October 3.
The Secretary went on to say that we are concerned by the German defense budget reduction which may signal to Moscow a lack of sense of urgency, determination and firm common purpose.
The Secretary asked if there were any possibility that an additional French division might be assigned to NATO. The Ambassador replied that French troops returning from Algeria are being modernized and re-equipped. He was not in a position to say if any additional forces could be committed to NATO. The Secretary asked if the modernization of the French troops is something the Soviets could pick up. The Ambassador thought that the Soviets were well aware of this.
Ambassador Alphand asked if the Secretary anticipated a separate peace treaty between the Soviets and East Germany. The Secretary said that he did not think this likely within the next few weeks but that it could possibly happen before the end of the year. Ambassador Alphand said that the French Foreign Minister shares this view.
The Secretary said he would like to comment on the Cuban situation in connection with possible Soviet moves regarding Berlin. It appears that the Soviets are making a hurried crash effort at antiaircraft installations in Cuba. While there have been some tanks and other arms sent to Cuba, by far the greatest part of recent Soviet military shipments to Cuba has been antiaircraft materiel. The Soviets are training Cubans in the operation of this equipment which they have never done before. This may be a sign that the Soviets expect a serious crisis in Berlin and want to put Cuba in the best possible position to resist any U.S. move which we might be tempted to make as a result of an emergency in Berlin. The Soviets may be trying to anticipate and get braced for a Berlin crisis. We should not link Soviet actions in Cuba too closely to Berlin but they may be an indicator.
The Secretary said of course the United States would not trade an easing of the Cuban situation for concessions in Berlin. He commented in passing that we do not understand the recurring waves of alerts in Cuba.
The Secretary expressed appreciation to Ambassador Alphand for information being passed to us by the French regarding Cuba.
Ambassador Alphand said the French are concerned for the entire Caribbean area, and for the effects on the rest of Latin America if the Soviets are successful in Cuba./4/
/4/Ambassador Alphand also asked whether the United States was considering bringing the Berlin question before the United Nations, expressing the French view that the United Nations was not competent on the issue. Rusk replied that the United States would not take such an initiative unless there were a direct threat to the peace. (Memorandum of conversation, September 7; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-762) A memorandum of the conversation on the Common Market is ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
114. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, September 10, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin. Top Secret. Drafted by Klein.
SUBJECT
"Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in the Berlin Conflict"
The attached paper on the "Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in the Berlin Conflict" is submitted for your approval prior to being tabled first in the Ambassadorial Group and then in the NATO Council./2/
/2/Not attached to the source text, but a copy of this 6-page paper (BQD-M-30) is in Department of State, G/PM Files: Lot 69 D 258, Poodle Blanket. On September 8 Secretaries McNamara and Rusk had sent the President a joint memorandum attaching a copy of BQD-M-30 and stating that he should approve a U.S. position on a preferred sequence of military actions in a Berlin conflict based on it. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin) Kennedy, Rusk, McNamara, Tyler, Hillenbrand, Lemnitzer, Nitze, Bundy, and Klein met at 6 p.m. on September 10 to discuss the preferred sequence, and the President agreed to the position. (Notes by Klein; ibid.) On September 13 the Washington Ambassadorial Group discussed the paper further, numbered the paragraphs, and made some minor revisions. At this meeting Rusk stated that NATO acceptance of the preferred sequence could be an important signal to induce Soviet caution in Berlin and warned that the four Allied NATO Permanent Representatives should be prepared to deal with suggestions for new political initiatives from the other members of the Alliance. (Topol 337 to Paris, September 14; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-1462) For text of the revised paper, see Document 115.
The paper as it now stands reflects the agreed views of the Departments of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It also takes cognizance of many of the substantive comments and criticisms submitted earlier by General Norstad (General Norstad's message ALO 749, attached)/3/ although all of General Norstad's objections clearly have not been met.
/3/Not attached to the source text, but a copy is in Department of State, G/PM Files: Lot 59 D 258, NATO Military Plans.
Three basic differences remain. First, there is General Norstad's objection to the concept of the sequence paper. General Norstad questions the political and military wisdom of our spelling out in any such form our view of the possible sequence of events in Berlin. He also thinks it unrealistic to attempt to predict such a sequence. Instead, he prefers the cataloguing of possible actions to meet the Soviet challenge without putting such actions in any specific order. Mr. Nitze, on the other hand--and this is also the view of the Departments of State and Defense and the JCS--denies that the sequence paper is intended to establish a hard and fast line of development. It is a conceptual framework for planning purposes, spelling out challenges from the other side.
Second, there is the question of procedure. General Norstad argues for an oral presentation rather than the tabling of a written document. Apart from his apparent concern about possible leaks, he claims that this effort will be misunderstood and lead to unnecessary confusion and division in NATO. Paul Nitze denies this. He insists that introduced in an appropriate context, and given a proper explanation of the sequence paper's uses and limitations, a written document is a more manageable vehicle for these purposes than an oral briefing and less likely to be misinterpreted and/or misunderstood by the individual representatives in the Council.
Lastly, there is a remaining substantive difference which is somewhat camouflaged by the language of the paper. General Norstad objects strongly to the restrictions the sequence paper imposes on the use of nuclear weapons prior to Phase IV. As the responsible military commander in the field, he feels these restrictions tie him down unnecessarily and deny him the means he needs to carry out his mission. Like the French and Germans, although probably for different reasons, he tends to favor a selective use of nuclear weapons earlier in the scheme, after less extensive non-nuclear combatant action than the U.S. Government (as reflected in NSAM 109)/4/ would prefer. Nitze, however, claims that the use of nuclear weapons at a point in the sequence scheme which General Norstad seems to prefer, would not really serve the purposes allegedly intended. Moreover, Nitze denies that the language of the paper dealing with the use of nuclear weapons is over-restrictive. He considers that the language now incorporated at the end of paragraph 2 of the general introduction provides whatever leeway is really needed to deal with the problems as they develop.
/4/For text, see vol. XIV, Document 185.
McG. B.
115. Report by the Military Sub-Group of the Washington Ambassadorial Group/1/
BQD-M-30 (Revised)
Washington, September 12, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, G/PM Files: Lot 59 D 258, NATO Military Plans. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. A record of the discussion of this paper by the Military Sub-Group on September 12, Sub BQD-Military 33, is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, FRC 65 A 3501, 092 Berlin, Germany.
REVISED MILITARY SUB-GROUP PROPOSAL FOR WASHINGTON AMBASSADORIAL GROUP REPORT ON THE PREFERRED SEQUENCE OF MILITARY ACTIONS IN A BERLIN CONFLICT
General
1. In its instructions to NATO military authorities, CM(61)104,/2/ the Council expressed several considerations that ought to underlie Berlin planning. One dealt with the need for military and other actions to fit together in an overall strategy. The Council has previously been informed concerning the tripartite Live Oak military plans, and the Council has before it a paper on the NATO-Tripartite relationship. SACEUR's and SACLANT's plans, along with the appraisal by the Standing Group in consultation with the Military Committee, have now come before the Council. It yet remains to be seen how these tripartite and NATO military actions might fit in relation to each other and to the various non-military activities that likewise would be part of the overall strategy seeking to preserve vital Alliance interests.
/2/Not found.
2. The Council may therefore wish to give attention to what would be my government's conception of the preferred sequence of military actions in the event military force must be used in the Berlin situation. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the account which follows will always be subject to the nature of Soviet action, and in this connection the Allies must be prepared at all times to use nuclear weapons if the nature of the Soviet response clearly requires their use in accordance with NATO guidelines on use agreed at Athens./3/
/3/For documentation on the North Atlantic Council meeting at Athens May 4-6, see volume XIII.
3. In the account which follows, the extensive non-military actions which would be taken are broadly described merely to cross-reference their general timing relative to military actions. No attempt has been made to describe Western reaction if Soviet action should threaten NATO territory or integrity beyond the point of a Berlin blockade, since it is assumed that present NATO strategy would be applied in such event.
4. Any attempt to set out a preferred sequence of Western action has to remain rather general and cannot establish firmly separated categories and concepts for various phases. Soviet action against Western access to Berlin can be initiated in various ways whose differing natures would tend to influence Western reactions to a large degree.
5. Governmental decisions will be necessary for implementation of any of the military plans at the time. Several factors which bear decisively on such decisions will remain of uncertain nature and indeterminable relative weight. Such factors are, for example: Soviet reaction to prior military and non-military moves in a heightening crisis, the danger of stimulating uprising and revolt in East Germany or satellite areas, the state of world and home opinion, and the relative state of Western and Soviet mobilization.
6. Governments will also have to consider whether steps are necessary to ensure that the Soviet Union remains in no doubt as to the continued validity of the existing Western guarantees for West Berlin.
7. The broad, general considerations relating to progress through the several phases are:
a. There is a compelling necessity for the Allies to succeed in protecting their vital interests relating to Berlin and to ensure that this success is recognized in the Free World. They should make clear to the Soviet Union the enormous risks involved in opposing Allied communications to Berlin by force. The purpose of Allied operations, however, should not be to overpower the Soviet Union or to disintegrate the satellite area, but to make the Soviet government change their policy on Berlin. Therefore, the Allies should give the Soviet Union opportunity to draw back and even--without creating the appearance of failure on our part--help them to cover up this retreat.
b. No military operations after the initial probes would appear convincing to the Soviet Union unless preceded or accompanied by urgent Western actions to increase their military strength and readiness for war. The most effective means of inducing the Soviet Union to change their policy may be intensive mobilization measures themselves.
c. The Allies should take all practicable advantage of the possibilities of measures which do not initiate offensive military action before taking stronger steps. Such measures on the military side might include, for example, mobilization, build-up and deployment of forces, certain alert measures, certain maritime and air measures, and, on the non-military side, economic embargo measures and diplomatic actions.
d. The Allies should take all practicable advantage of the possibilities of non-nuclear military action before proceeding to the use of nuclear weapons. This does not necessarily mean the implementation of all available non-nuclear plans.
Phase I
8. If Soviet/"GDR" administrative or other action interferes with Berlin access by ground or air the Allies will initiate action designed to deter Soviet/"GDR" continued or additional interference and, failing that, to establish the fact that the Soviet Union/"GDR" intends to use force to interfere with Berlin access.
9. Planning for the appropriate action to meet a variety of contingencies (interference with air access to Berlin, ranging from minor administrative harassment to a determined Soviet effort to interdict all Allied transport; interference with ground access to Berlin, Allied and/or German; harassments within Berlin) is being conducted among the four governments.
10. The purpose of such planning is to agree as far as possible in advance what in each contingency would be the appropriate response and countermeasures, with final decisions, however, being reserved for governments at the time, as is normally the case in contingency planning. This planning is continuous and continuing.
11. It is hoped that a quick and determined Allied response to the initial Soviet move will deter the Soviets from continued or additional interference. This proved to be the case in March 1962 when the Soviets initiated harassments in the air corridors.
12. If, however, this hope is falsified, and when the degree of interference reaches a point where continued access is in doubt, an Allied military probe of Soviet/"GDR" intentions will be launched without delay. Selected Live Oak plans, such as Jack Pine, Free Style, and Back Stroke/4/ (which is an operation identical with Free Style but conducted from the Berlin end of the autobahn) will be executed. Any unblocked mode of access would continue to be used.
/4/Jack Pine was a tripartite plan to maintain air access to Berlin; Free Style and Back Stroke were tripartite platoon sized probes from Helmstedt and Berlin, respectively, to determine if the Soviet Union was prepared to use force to prevent passage of Allied convoys on the Autobahn. (Memorandum from Nitze to McNamara, I-25251/62, July 20; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, FRC 66 B 3542, 091 Germany)
13. Control of military operations will remain tripartite, but NATO military and political authorities will be kept informed and consulted if time permits, and NATO governments would be asked to undertake appropriate states of vigilance or alert (see OES TS CTS/62/1)./5/
/5/Not found.
14. Western action would either restore access or make it clear that force is being used by the Soviet Union/"GDR" to deny access to Berlin.
Phase II
15. If the actions under Phase I have shown that force is being used by the Soviet Union/"GDR" to deny access to Berlin, the Allies will bring increasing pressure, short of offensive combat, to bear on the Soviets in an effort to induce them to desist and re-open access.
16. This phase would be characterized by intense diplomatic activity (e.g. representations in Moscow, mobilization of world opinion against the USSR, and any other action which would seem relevant [,(French would delete) for instance, at the U.N.]/6/ conducted against the background of mounting Western pressures. These would include a growing military build-up; naval measures (national, tripartite, and/or NATO) and air measures; and economic countermeasures, including repressive measures against Bloc maritime and air traffic, of ascending intensity up to and including a full embargo, together with restrictions on the movement of Soviet Bloc nationals and officials, with the aim ultimately, in this or a later phase, of isolating the Bloc. The aim of all these measures would be to bring increasing pressure to bear on the Soviet Union to restore our rights and vital interests.
/6/Brackets in the source text.
17. A major element of military action will be for NATO nations to mobilize and deploy jointly additional military forces, particularly into the Central Region, at an accelerating rate, while at the same time rapidly increasing the combat readiness of all M-Day forces, with the dual purpose of (1) achieving force levels and states of readiness necessary to the defense of NATO and the launching of BERCON/MARCON operations, and (2) displaying to the Soviets that armed conflict will be the consequence of continued infringement on vital Allied interests.
18. Any unblocked access to Berlin should continue to be used fully. In the event of partial or intermittent blockage of air access, the three Powers would if necessary use fighter escorts in an effort to keep flights going. Should the risks and loss of aircraft be too great to warrant further flights unless air operations were deliberately extended outside the corridors (i.e., beyond Jack Pine operations), NATO would have to face, in the light of the state of the military build-up and the general situation, the necessity for taking appropriate measures concerning air access.
19. The length of this phase cannot be forecast since it will depend on the development of events, notably in the air corridors and in Berlin itself. If the blockage of Berlin is total, and if the pressures applied by the Allies lead to violent Soviet response, the Allies may be compelled to move on the operations envisaged for Phase III. But in the absence of such compulsion, there are advantages for the Allies in not moving too early into Phase III, because the growing military build-up will be a firm demonstration of Allied determination to assert their rights in Berlin, and this and other Phase II measures need time to have their impact on the Soviets.
Phase III
20. If, despite Allied actions in Phase II, Berlin access has not been restored, the time will have come to draw on the catalog of plans "from which appropriate action would be selected by political authorities in the light of circumstances and with the aim of applying increasing pressure which would present with unmistakable clarity to the Soviets the enormous risks in continued denial of access" (para. 6 (b) of NAC Resolution 104).
21. At the present stage of the NATO deliberations, there is no question of approving the execution of any particular plan since it is laid down in para. 8 of the NAC Resolution that "the execution of approved plans will be the subject of decisions by governments at the time." The Council may, however, wish at this stage, in the light of the Standing Group's appraisal in consultation with the Military Committee, and in view of the fundamentally political purposes of the military operations planned, to consider the preferred sequence in which plans might be implemented.
22. If there is consensus on the general considerations set out in the introduction to this paper, it would seem to follow, in accordance with the concept that operations should be graduated but determined, that the initial operations to be executed by the Allies in this phase (possibly after a further appropriate tripartite probe) should be non-nuclear and should not be open to misinterpretation by the Russians as an attack directed at the stability of the Soviet satellite empire (notably East Germany) or on the Soviet nuclear strike capability. Accordingly, the choice would seem to lie among:
a. Air operations which, though extending outside the corridors, would be related to reopening air access.
b. Ground operations with limited objectives on one of the main access routes, with appropriate air support.
c. Intensified maritime control or blockage measures.
d. Some combination of the above.
23. If these operations fail to make the Soviets back down, the courses of action which might achieve NATO aims would be to increase conventionally the scope of the action, to add another action, or to take some form of nuclear action. Without knowledge of the actual circumstances that would exist in such a critical situation, it is hardly possible to judge which of these courses would be chosen at the time. Whichever course is adopted, general war would be imminent. If the course chosen were conventional action and this fails to make the Soviet Union back down and has not precipitated general war, the last remaining pressure to be exerted will be to resort to some form of nuclear action.
Phase VI
24. Whenever nuclear action were taken, and whether it were demonstrative, selective, or otherwise, events would have moved into a new phase, dominated by the nuclear equation.
116. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, September 17, 1962, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-1762. Secret. Repeated to London, Bonn, Moscow, Paris, USAREUR, and SHAPE.
412. Policy. Paris also for USRO and McGuire. USAREUR for POLAD. SHAPE for Stoessel and US Element Live Oak. Sov shift Sept 4 to Sandkrug Bridge for Memorial guard transit and return to buses Sept 14 have for time being corrected troublesome situation which contained constant danger of incident. At same time Sov attempt to exploit use of armor for political-psychological reasons in West Berlin has been halted.
More important perhaps is that Allies have regulated a significant element of Sov activity in West Berlin. On their face the actions the Sovs have been induced to take have been minor. However, that Allies have required Sovs to change place of entry and mode of transport for War Memorial guard is significant. It could put allies in better position to deal with anticipated period of Sov efforts exports exploit presence in West Berlin.
Furthermore, Allies' moves presumably have somewhat improved West Berlin confidence. This regard, difficult to evaluate importance of these moves, but it is not likely that of themselves they will do more than reduce the generally negative balance that now exists, or that their effect will be durable in the face of any further Sov encroachments that West is unable or unwilling to rebuff.
Return to buses by Sovs puts heavy responsibility on Allies for preventing even minor attacks by West Berliners on these vehicles. British have taken elaborate police precautions on route to Memorial for initial days, and Brandt issued good statement Sept 14 to effect West Berliners should not make task of Allies difficult by untoward behavior in this respect. Acid test efficacy of these measures will be next emotion-laden (Fechter-type) incident.
Explanation for Sov decisions to change crossing point and return to buses is probably simplest one, namely that issues were not considered by Sovs as propitious, or as important enough, for making stand which could clearly have escalated and might even have resulted in their being denied access to West Berlin entirely. To this degree Sov acquiescence evidence that they value their presence in West Berlin. In addition, by insisting that Allied messages re changes be conveyed via CINC channel, and by emphasizing this aspect in press treatment on crossing point shift, Sovs undoubtedly hoped drive home point that Allies were forced to comply practically with recent abolition of office of Sov Commandant in East Berlin. (That there was no East German publicity about UKMLM call on HQ GSFG re APC's may be due to non-involvement East Germans and some Sov loss of face over issue.)
It must be anticipated that Sovs will exploit these events in future, perhaps to provide justification for demands of their own re Allied access to West Berlin. They may furthermore have plans for sector/sector retaliatory action, such as further limitation in number of crossing points as rumored here in last few days.
Hulick
117. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson)/1/
September 17, 1962, 3:58 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192. No classification marking. Stevenson was in New York; Rusk was in Washington.
TELEPHONE CALL FROM AMB STEVENSON
Sec returned the call and S said he talked to the Pres on the boat over the weekend re the proposal of Khrushchev to us about an observer (UN) in Berlin./2/ S said we owe an answer because Gromyko will raise it. S wanted to remind Sec to get someone to work on it. Pres' reaction and S's are positive on the whole--might have real merit from our point of view without real loss if we establish a UN in Berlin as a whole assuming we can get a good man. Question is he going to be an observer for all of Berlin or West Berlin with authority to place UN observers in and out and along access points. Sec does not think the latter comes into it now. S mentioned his having access to East Berlin and be instructed to inform the SYG on all aspects etc. Sec thinks now someone could be asked to have a look at the situation in Berlin for the SYG without taking on operational functions at this stage. S said yes. Sec said he should report back to the GA at some point. S mentioned appointing a Swede which they think will be hard to get etc. S said we want veto power over this or we can be embarrassed. S wants from the Sec: 1. Shall we go ahead? 2. When? 3. What form of language? Sec mentioned taking it up with French and Germans. S agreed but said we should communicate privately with him--we owe him something on it.
/2/Stevenson had been a guest of the President at Newport, Rhode Island, September 15-16, for the America's Cup races.
[Here follows discussion of the Congo.]
118. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, September 18, 1962, 4:19 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-1862. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Tyler and approved by Rusk.
745. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. At the President's request, I spoke privately and very frankly to Erhard last night./2/ I told him that the continuing stream of doubts and suspicions of American motives and intentions emanating from Europe (latest example Sydney Gruson's story datelined Bonn Sept 16) was having increasingly adverse effect here. I reminded Erhard forcefully of our extensive commitment to the security of Germany and Berlin, and of the scale of our financial and military contribution compared with that of our Allies. I left no doubt that we were getting mighty tired of the recurring cycle of suspicion, calling for reassurances which in turn seemed to evaporate rapidly.
/2/Erhard was in Washington for the meeting of the International Monetary Fund. A memorandum of his conversation with Rusk on September 14, concerning British entry into the Common Market, is in vol. XIII, Document 49.
Erhard took my blunt remarks in good part and said he understood and sympathized fully. He added that the current situation did not reflect feelings of the German people, but was due to particular circumstances "which would be overcome." He said he would inform Chancellor and his colleagues of our talk, and promised he would do his best personally to ensure that a new note would be heard from Bonn in the future./3/
/3/On September 21 Dowling reported that Rusk's remarks seemed to be having some effect as Erhard's arrival statement at Frankfurt and his projected speech to the Berlin Industries Fair reflected the Secretary's concern. Dowling added that he had talked to a number of U.S. correspondents about the problem, and their despatches seemed to be reflecting a decline in the number of disruptive reports. (Telegram 872 from Bonn; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/9-2162)
Rusk
119. Memorandum From the Vice President's Military Aide (Burris) to Vice President Johnson/1/
Washington, September 18, 1962.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Vice President's Security Files, Col. Burris' Reports. Secret.
RE
Khrushchev Moves Towards Berlin Showdown
Information from several sources suggests that Khrushchev has conceived a schedule for a resolution on his own terms of the Berlin problem. His discussions with U Thant and with the departing German Ambassador Kroll are especially significant./2/ Reports in the press to the effect that nothing is contemplated until after the November elections is simply a notation of the culmination of the period of build up and preparation for the event. U Thant reported to Mr. Stevenson that he counseled Khrushchev not to bring the Berlin question before the U.N., but urged him to continue negotiations within the four-power framework. He conceded that it might be desirable to bring the Berlin question before the U.N. at some later date. In this connection Khrushchev repeated the Soviet desire to establish U.N. presence in Berlin.
/2/U Thant had visited Moscow at the end of August. Thompson reported on September 14 that following a lengthy conversation with Khrushchev, Kroll was convinced that the Soviet Union planned to sign a peace treaty with East Germany shortly after the U.S. elections. Kroll told Thompson that Khrushchev did not seem to believe Western assertions that it would defend its position in West Berlin even at the risk of war. (Telegram 672 from Moscow, September 14; Department of State, Central Files, 601.62A61/9-1462) For Kroll's account of this final meeting with Khrushchev, see Lebenserinnerungen eines Botschafters, pp. 571-575.
In recent years the Soviets have been known to grossly misinterpret Western intentions. Khrushchev's statement to U Thant that President Kennedy and Macmillan understand the Soviet position on Berlin but are inhibited from taking action by the necessity to accommodate Adenauer seems typical of Soviet misinterpretation. On the other hand, the statement could well be a crude effort to alienate the Allies. U Thant came away convinced that Khrushchev will proceed with the peace treaty, but gained no impression as to timing.
Khrushchev stated quite emphatically to Kroll just before he left Moscow that Soviet actions leading to the separate peace treaty will begin soon and in time to permit recourse to the U.N. if such action appears appropriate or necessary. He stated that action would be initiated soon to prepare public opinion for the separate treaty, the plan for which is complete. Khrushchev noted that the treaty which has been drawn up will render continued Western occupation of Berlin impossible.
In what might be another Soviet misinterpretation, Khrushchev has come to the conclusion that Western leaders have proven themselves so anxious to avoid conflict that they will accept the treaty and accommodate themselves to it. Nevertheless, he has made the observation that he will take the matter to the United Nations if Western actions present to him an unacceptable risk of war. In any case, Khrushchev appears to have concluded after years of talking and pressuring the Allies, coupled with often brazen threats of force, that he can now, with impunity, achieve his avowed purpose and seal another country, including the City of Berlin, within the Communist Bloc. Whether or not the West intends basically to permit this to occur, it has at least permitted Khrushchev to come to the conclusion that he can now proceed with his plan. More resolute actions all along the line--often avoided out of ostensible fear of precipitating conflict or even angry reaction--would certainly have avoided that which appears inevitable. Our diplomats and certain political appointees seem unable or unwilling to accept the fact that it is impossible to negotiate politely with the Soviets on an issue like Berlin. The Russians traditionally, and especially the Communists more recently, understand and respond only to recognized strength and willingness to apply it, and to firmly and clearly stated intentions to do so in support of national policy or position.
120. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Berlin, September 25, 1962, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-2562. Secret. Repeated to the Department of State, London, Moscow, Paris, SHAPE, and USAREUR. The source text is the Department of State copy.
407. Paris also for USRO and McGuire. USAREUR for POLAD. SHAPE for Stoessel and US Element Live Oak. Ref: USCINCEUR ECJCO 9-14604/14 Sept (not sent all addees)./2/ Mission understands that consideration being given by CINCEUR to desirability withdrawing battle group which has augmented Berlin garrison since August 61. It is our further understanding that in this consideration account being taken of political and psychological factors which basic to this issue. Purpose this message is to stress this point and the risk attached to any attempt to plan reduction at particular point in future on assumption that conditions then would permit it.
/2/Not found.
When battle group moved to Berlin in August 61 it was recognized subsequent withdrawal would pose problems. Move however had definite (and principally psychological) purpose which it by and large achieved. Mission believes withdrawal battle group under conditions of great uncertainty as to Sov intention re Berlin would be most unwise. In light of past experience such move could be interpreted by important segments of public and governmental opinion in West Berlin, the FRG and other NATO countries as a sign of US weakness on Berlin issue. At very least it would raise serious questions in minds of Berliners as to American intentions. Danger also exists that unintentional disclosure plans could prove exceedingly embarrassing.
Mission believes that consideration should not be given to withdrawing battle group unless a reasonably long period of calm has existed in Berlin, or else when something positive could be gained from withdrawal, for example as forthcoming gesture in connection with settlement of the Berlin issue. Fact that it may be long time before these conditions exist must be accepted.
General Watson concurs./3/
/3/On September 25 the Embassy in Moscow strongly supported these views, stating that withdrawal at the present time would likely be interpreted by the Soviet Union as a weakening of U.S. intentions with respect to Berlin. (Telegram 757; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-2562) In telegram 1503 from Paris, also September 25, SHAPE commented that although there had been some tentative thinking about the possibility of terminating the Berlin garrison augmentation, this had not gone beyond the exploratory stage. (Ibid.) ECJCO 9-14604 had merely been an inquiry on how the reorganization might be handled with no dates mentioned.
Hulick
121. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations/1/
Washington, September 25, 1962, 7:57 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-2562. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Mautner (BTF); cleared by Anderson, RPM, and INR; and approved by Cash. Repeated to Berlin and pouched to Moscow, London, and Bonn.
Topol 399. Deliver Finletter 8 am Sept. 26. You may convey to NAC following Department assessment.
TASS statement September 11/2/ postponing further pressure for negotiations until after US November elections indicates Soviets apparently deferring separate peace treaty signature for several months. Likely they contemplate some further discussions on Berlin problem before actually signing treaty, which in turn would postpone treaty action sometime beyond November. Department does not believe this postponement excludes interim Soviet unilateral action on local Berlin scene designed to achieve further de facto changes prior to eventual peace treaty but probably does preclude major steps likely to entail serious risks. Limited infringement on Allied access to Berlin, attempts to involve GDR in control of Allied access, harassment of local helicopter flights in Berlin Control Zone, or maneuvers designed to affect West Berlin morale as vital ingredient of economic viability of city still possibilities at moment.
/2/For text of the TASS statement, see Pravda or Izvestiia, September 12, 1962.
Intelligence sources indicate existence of various bloc security preparations scheduled for completion between September and November. Preparations appear such as could be utilized either to implement individual measures designed to heighten tensions considerably, or to cope with tensions resulting from moves up to and including peace treaty. However, although preparations are being made and planning deadline may exist (reportedly November) current Soviet and bloc military posture does not indicate anticipation of any imminent steps which might be expected to provoke violent Western countermeasures.
In any event Soviet willingness revert to bus transport for WM guards September 14 suggests Moscow opposed to exacerbation of Berlin situation at moment. However Soviets may also believe they have established principle of CINC channel for Berlin matters with this episode and thereby maneuvered West into tacit acceptance of abolition Soviet Kommandatura in East Berlin. Kommandatura abolition thus far represents only demonstrative alteration of certain institutional aspects Berlin status but Soviets may now be encouraged attempt additional de facto changes implicit in measure (e.g. Allied dealings with GDR in East Berlin).
Recent indications point to Soviet consideration of UNGA as suitable vehicle for exerting pressure on West to be more forthcoming in negotiations. Furthermore Assembly could provide Soviets with forum for presenting their case and for ascertaining reaction of or influencing UN members. Possibility also exists Soviets may be contemplating UN initiative after some unilateral Berlin move in order deter Western countermeasures. However Soviets still appear undecided about raising Berlin issue in UN probably because they doubt UN can be confined to mere discussion without bringing about direct UN interference in Berlin and German question. September 5 Soviet note/3/ blaming Berlin tensions exclusively on Western Powers and West Germans, without venturing serious proposals for alleviating tensions, suggests preparation of case for public record. Such approach would be logical preliminary if UN involvement under consideration. But it is likely Moscow will in fact wait as long as possible before final decision on taking issue to UN. In any event if Khrushchev were to come to New York to present Berlin or other issue to GA, Department believes his major interest would be summit meeting with President Kennedy on Berlin rather than UN debate.
/3/For text of the Soviet note, see Pravda, September 6, 1962, or Izvestiia, September 7, 1962. Extracts are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 720.
Summarizing, Department believes Soviets at present in a phase of Berlin policy in which they are exerting pressure and maneuvering to bring about what they would regard as remunerative negotiations while simultaneously strengthening position in Berlin to put them in more advantageous situation for later action preempting some changes inherent in peace treaty.
FYI. Dept. has noted Polto 253./4/ Material on Western response to peace treaty, which authorized for distribution NAC year ago and on which NAC has not commented, presently undergoing minor revisions. As soon as this process completed material will again be submitted to NAC for discussion and comments.
/4/Polto 253, September 5, reported that the Belgian Permanent Representative had stressed the "absolute necessity" for the North Atlantic Council to consult as soon as possible on Berlin contingency plans and the philosophy behind them. (Department of State, Central Files, 375/9-562)
Ball
122. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Berlin, September 25, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Hulick on September 28. A note on the source text indicates that it was not cleared with Bundy. Bundy visited Berlin September 25-26 as part of a trip to Europe. Additional documentation on the trip is ibid., Trips and Conferences Series, McGeorge Bundy Trip to Europe.
SUBJECT
Conference at Berlin City Hall
PARTICIPANTS
Berlin
Governing Mayor Brandt
Mayor Amrehn
Senator for Economics, Dr. Schiller
Senator for Federal Affairs, Mr. Schutz
United States
Mr. Bundy
Ambassador Dowling
General Watson
Mr. Hulick
Mayor Brandt started the conversation by expressing his appreciation for Mr. Bundy's visit. Mr. Bundy responded by stating that Berlin was today the most important place in the world; and that he was glad to have this opportunity to see the Mayor just before his trip to the United States. He indicated that the President very much hoped that the Mayor would be able to come to Washington for a talk with the President. (In a brief meeting with the press following the conference, Mr. Bundy confirmed that, in addition to seeing the Secretary, the Mayor would also be seeing the President.) Mayor Brandt then outlined the itinerary of his U.S. visit as follows: Saturday, Sunday, and Monday (September 29 through October 1) he would be in New York, conferring with the Ford Foundation on Sunday on the latter's contribution to the viability program, and on Monday with General Clay; Tuesday and Wednesday he would spend at Harvard for his lectures. He indicated he would come to Washington on Thursday morning and would be available to see the President until Friday afternoon, when he was scheduled to depart on his return flight to Berlin.
Mr. Bundy expressed the admiration of the President, his Administration, and the people of the United States, for the determination and intelligence with which the Berliners and their Government leaders were managing their affairs under such trying circumstances.
Ambassador Dowling then asked the Mayor what possible actions he anticipated from the Ulbricht regime over the next few months. Mayor Brandt stated that indications had recently been received from the East German regime that some arrangements in the trade field could bring some amelioration of a humanitarian nature with respect to the problem of movement of persons within Berlin. On the trade side, the East was not pressing now for the original credit, but seeking an agreement to increase the swing within the present IZT agreement. Mayor Brandt indicated that in his recent discussion with the Chancellor, they had reached agreement to explore this matter in a positive manner to see if the East German regime was serious, and, in exchange for an increase in the IZT swing, would agree to procedures to bring separated families together and to permit visits to take place. For this purpose they are prepared to give Mr. Leopold an additional authorization as a negotiator to work out an agreement facilitating movement of people.
Mayor Brandt then outlined three other subjects which he had discussed with the Chancellor. The first dealt with the question of a plebiscite in West Berlin. Admitting that when this was first suggested a year ago the Berlin authorities had not been enthusiastic from the timing point of view, he indicated that they now believed a carefully tailored referendum-type plebiscite could be very helpful. Brandt indicated that they have a plebiscite law ready; and that all they need is agreement on exactly the right questions to be asked. He indicated that their present thinking was that the questions put to a vote should bring out the unquestioning desire of the Berliners to (1) confirm once and for all Berlin's existing ties and relations to the Federal Republic, and (2) the continued presence of the three Allied Powers in Berlin. Elaborating on the first point, the Mayor stated it was necessary to do something which would underline the fact that the links of Berlin to the Federal Republic exist not because of some article in a constitution, with respect to which the Allies have had to maintain reservations, but as something which reflects a living and vital element of self determination on the part of the West Berliners. He also indicated his conviction and that of his colleagues, based on their frequent talks with representatives of the important non-aligned nations, that the wartime agreements, now seventeen years old, were no longer satisfactory or convincing as a basis to obtain their support for the maintenance of Berlin's ties to the Federal Republic and continued presence of the three Allied Powers; and that a new and convincing basis had to be found. He indicated his belief that a popular referendum dealing with these two questions could produce this new basis, which would be more convincing from an international point of view in UN discussions and elsewhere.
Mayor Brandt indicated that the second subject on which he and the Chancellor had reached agreement was that of making the Wall and the inhuman Communist actions connected therewith a matter of great international confrontation. The Mayor indicated that they have received what they consider to be reliable information to the effect that Khrushchev has instructed Ulbricht to be more careful and to avoid creating incidents along the wall. He said he and the Chancellor were agreed that pressure should be maintained on the Ulbricht regime to this end, stating that as a first step the Federal Republic would soon be publishing a White Book. He expressed the hope that the Allied Governments would support this campaign with actions of their own.
Mayor Brandt stated that the third item of discussion, on which he and the Chancellor held different views, concerned the question of whether GDR harassment of German civilian access might be expected in the coming months. He reported the Chancellor as being more optimistic than he, that because of the Ulbricht regime's economic situation, harassing of German access was unlikely. Brandt said that he was not convinced of this; and that in his view it was an urgent matter to determine with the Allies at exactly what point GDR harassment of German civilian access would be considered unacceptable and what specific measures would be applied to counteract such actions. He stated the Germans will take on their full share of the burden; that they regard this as an extremely important question; but that they were genuinely concerned that the discussions so far in the Four-Power Steering Group in Washington have led to the idea of invoking a policy of self denial and blockade too soon. He said a blockade raises many problems, especially a breakdown of Berlin industry and a severe adverse popular psychological reaction which would be much more serious than in 1948, since Berlin had now reached a much higher standard of living. He indicated his strong desire to have the Allies, in conjunction with Berlin and Federal Republic officials, reach an agreement on a clear definition of what the common goal would be in the event of self-denial and a blockade, coupled with forthright and convincing counter-measures by the Western powers to achieve this goal. He stated it was not a convincing position to say that preservation of everything as it exists (the status quo) is sufficient and acceptable. He said we must return to demanding something new and concrete to really guarantee free German access. Referring to the Jessup-Malik solution of 1949,/2/ he said this was not specific or concrete enough, having dealt more with broad principles.
/2/For text of Jessup-Malik agreement, May 5, 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. III, p. 751.
Mayor Amrehn at this point asked whether new negotiations between the President and Khrushchev were pending. Mr. Bundy responded by saying there was nothing new about such a meeting to his knowledge and the matter rested as indicated by the President in his recent press conference statement/3/ to the effect that if Khrushchev comes to the United States for the General Assembly, the President would be willing to see him, just as he would any other head of state or prime minister. If such a meeting should materialize, Mr. Bundy stated that what Mayor Brandt had been saying would be more rather than less important, especially with respect to the trade negotiations and the idea of a referendum. With respect to the referendum, as outlined by the Mayor, Mr. Bundy indicated it would be important to have the support of the free expression of the Berliners' position on the points mentioned in any future talks or negotiations with the Soviet leaders.
/3/For a transcript of the President's news conference on August 22, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 631-639.
Mayor Amrehn stated that after the U.S. elections in November, Berlin would probably face a new critical situation. Mr. Bundy responded by saying that the whole question of Berlin depends upon the will of the Berliners. He commented that the counter-measures taken to meet the Soviet harassment in the air corridors in February and March seemed to have been just about right. He said it will not always be easy to develop effective counter-measures; and that we must be ready to take on the responsibility of effective counter-measures rapidly. Coming back to the question of German access rights, Mayor Amrhen asked whether or not a new codification of these rights would be ready soon. He expressed his belief that the details must be nailed down. Referring to the occasional arrests which occur on the autobahn, Mayor Amrehn stated that one of the newest harassing restrictions introduced by the GDR on the autobahn from Berlin to Hamburg was to stipulate that the trip must be completed within a period of four to four and one half hours, and a restriction of halting enroute to the four designated stopping places. Mayor Amrehn insisted that a definite point must be fixed beyond which all agreed the viability of Berlin will be adversely affected. He added that Berlin authorities had some difficulty with the word viability as being too general as a concept to cover adequately the Berliners' vital interest in access and their ties to the Federal Republic.
Governing Mayor Brandt then referred to the difficulties of last month with respect to the death of Peter Fechter and the Soviet War Memorial Guards. He expressed the hope that it was understood in the White House that there was nothing serious to back up the news reports regarding a breakdown in morale and confidence in the United States. He said the people were worried, to be sure, but that the majority were in their factories and in their homes, as normal. The demonstrations were conducted largely by young people, the majority of whom hold to the same beliefs and positions as the Mayor does, but on this occasion expressed them differently than he would have. He said the main trouble stemmed from a minority of bad elements among the youth. He felt he had to handle the demonstrations in the way he had, with some delay in introducing severe police measures, so as not to antagonize the majority of the young people and turn them against him and the Allies by giving them the impression that he and the city authorities were placing them in the same category as the small minority of bad actors.
Mr. Bundy stated no one in the White House had the feeling that matters had gotten out of hand; that there was agreement that the measures taken seemed to be adequate to cope with the situation. He stressed that there was complete understanding for the political problem of management involved in the situation and that there was full recognition for the courage Mayor Brandt's government had shown in the end. He indicated the President had full understanding for the reaction of the young people and recognized that it was necessary and proper for them to show their feelings under the severe provocations. He concluded by stating that one must be ready in the future for new incidents and be prepared to act more rapidly.
With respect to making more concrete proposals for guaranteeing unhindered German civilian access, Mr. Bundy agreed this was important. At the same time, he said, we must all recognize that the Soviets are not interested in agreeing to anything like this. He took this occasion to stress the necessity for our being frank with one another. He said Berlin authorities should speak up when they think actions are required; and that we must be sure that we have the closest means of communication between Berlin and Washington. He stated that the two most important focal points were Berlin and Washington; that while one naturally had to take into account the views and positions of others (the Federal Republic, Paris and London), they were, in the final analysis, secondary compared to having the clearest understanding between the leaders in Berlin and Washington, who were the most directly involved (should a serious showdown, with all its implications, occur, was implied but not stated).
With respect to the plebiscite (referendum), Mr. Bundy indicated this might have some value, particularly if toward the end of the General Assembly the Berlin question was thrown into the debate. If such a referendum were held, he suggested it might be of value to have observers, such as the Indians, present, and that a free expression of the West German population on the questions suggested might be of some negotiation value in subsequent talks by either the Secretary with Gromyko or the President with Khrushchev.
Ambassador Dowling asked the Mayor whether he thought further actions by the Ulbricht regime or the Soviets would be more likely to come before or after conclusion of a separate peace treaty. Mayor Brandt expressed his belief it was more likely they would come piece by piece before conclusion of a peace treaty. Mr. Bundy then inquired how this might affect the timing of a plebiscite. Mayor Brandt said he thought it made the holding of a plebiscite more urgent and that one might think of holding it in November, after the American congressional elections.
Mayor Brandt then turned to the question of internal problems. He said these were not too serious; that the manpower situation had achieved recently an encouraging balance; and that there were slightly more people coming in than going out of Berlin, the influx being predominantly of the younger generation. Senator Schiller stated that the rate of investment in Berlin was slightly lower than that in the Federal Republic; that there was no inflationary problem; that Berlin productivity had improved; but that there was presently a cautious waiting attitude obtaining with regard to new investments in Berlin.
Mayor Brandt concluded by stating that the decision making machinery was very important and that one could not avoid feeling that it takes too long to reach decisions in order to cope with serious developments. Mr. Bundy took this occasion to refer to the S-Bahn situation as posing a serious problem. Within this context, he supported the Mayor's action in stressing publicly the importance of the three power status and rights in West Berlin.
The conference was concluded by Mayor Brandt passing to Mr. Bundy the greetings of President Luebke and the latter's desire to meet with Mr. Bundy for an hour or so at Wahn airport enroute to Cadenabbia, if this proved feasible for Mr. Bundy.
123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, September 25, 1962, 9:21 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-2562. Top Secret; Priority; No Other Distribution. Drafted and approved by Kaysen. Repeated to Copenhagen eyes only for Bundy, who was en route from Berlin. The situation described in this telegram had been discussed by Rusk and Ball and Schroeder and Bundy on September 24 and by Ball and Kaysen (twice) and Kaysen and Bundy on September 25 before arriving at the decision to approach Globke on the problem. For a record of the Kaysen-Bundy telephone conversation, see Declassified Documents, 1982, 1351; records of the other telephone conversations are in Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192.
827. Priority--deliver 8 a.m. Eyes only for the Ambassador from Kaysen. FYI. The President requests that you call Globke and convey to him orally the following message with the request that in turn he convey it personally to the Chancellor at Cadenabbia as soon as possible. You may add whatever you think is appropriate in the way of reassurance that the number of people in the U.S. Government who are now aware of the situation is still limited and will remain so as long as possible. End FYI.
The President wishes the Chancellor to know of a potentially troublesome matter that has just come to his attention.
In the course of investigating the activities of registered agents acting for foreign governments in the United States, the staff of a Senatorial committee has come into the possession of an exchange of teletype messages, dated in October 1961, between General Julius Klein and Mr. Julius Epstein, who was at that time in the employ of General Klein. In these messages, General Julius Klein reported that during a conversation in the Chancellor's office he was shown three cables sent by the German representatives in Washington and Paris to the Foreign Office. From the teletype it appears that General Klein, with the excuse that he could not read German rapidly, asked and received the Chancellor's permission to take the cables to his hotel for more careful study. Before returning them the following morning, General Klein had photostatic copies made for his own purposes. The teletype to Epstein sets forth the text of the three cables verbatim and uncoded. These cables were No. 1007 of October 5, 1961, from the German NATO Delegation in Paris to the Foreign Office, and Nos. 2712 and 2714 of October 8, 1961, from the Germany Embassy here to Bonn.
When these teletypes came into the possession of the Senatorial committee, a member of the staff of that committee realized that these cables formed the basis of the articles that have recently appeared in Rheinische Merkur and Der Spiegel. These articles were written by the same Julius Epstein to whom the teletypes were addressed. Epstein is no longer in General Klein's employment.
The cables contain a detailed account of discussions between the Four Powers following the President's conversation with Foreign Minister Gromyko. This account is reproduced almost word for word in the articles, although with a greatly distorted emphasis.
In view of the fact that the staff of a Congressional committee now know the source of these articles, the Chancellor's relations to the whole story may become public at any time. As is well known, the U.S. President cannot control the actions of the legislative branch. Further, so many people are involved in the proceedings of the committee that the risk of public disclosure is great.
The President, of course, is concerned that, in the event of a public disclosure, the matter should be handled on this side in such a way as to minimize its effects. He will do what he can, and would appreciate having by a private channel, if possible, any suggestions on this.
The President regrets that the Chancellor should be troubled by such matters at a time when together the Chancellor and he are carrying such a heavy burden of world problems./2/
/2/On September 27 Dowling gave Globke the President's message, emphasizing that Kennedy was bringing this unpleasant matter to the Chancellor's attention because of their friendship. Globke suggested that Adenauer might wish to write to some of the Senators on the committee, and Dowling told him this might be helpful. (Telegram 917 from Bonn; ibid., Central Files, 762.00/9-2762) On receipt of Dowling's telegram, Kaysen called him to say that letters from the Chancellor might cause further confusion. (Memorandum for the record, September 27; Declassified Documents, 1982, 1352) On September 28 Dowling passed this on to Globke, who reported that he too had been at a loss to devise an appropriate basis for such letters. (Telegram 929 from Bonn, September 28; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-2862)
Ball
124. Editorial Note
On September 28 Secretary of Defense McNamara, who had just returned to Washington from a 2-day inspection trip in West Germany, stated at a press conference that the Berlin situation, in military terms, was the most severe since actual combat operations during the Korean war. McNamara then stated that Khrushchev's insistence on a peace treaty with East Germany and the consequent restriction of U.S. rights in Berlin made the situation critical. To be sure that there were no illusions in the Soviet Union, McNamara noted the United States would "utilize whatever weapons are needed to preserve our vital interests. Quite clearly, we consider access to Berlin a vital interest." For extracts from the press conference, see The New York Times, September 29, 1962.
125. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy/1/
Moscow, undated.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. No classification marking. The full text is printed in volume VI.
[Here follow 7-1/2 pages on the cessation of nuclear testing.]
I believe that you, Mr. President, like me realize that until a reasonable solution is reached on West Berlin this source will always make our relations feverish. And under present circumstances we do not see any other way out but to sign a German peace treaty. On this basis it would be possible with no loss to the prestige of either side to solve the problem of West Berlin too, to guarantee, as you say, the freedom of the population of West Berlin by stationing there for some not very long time a certain number of symbolic troops under the UN flag. It would seem, what can be more reasonable, if there is a desire to actually reach an agreement and eliminate the hot-beds that from time to time make our relations feverish and sometimes bring them to the red-hot glow.
If there is somebody who is interested in preserving those hot-beds then such interest stems from nothing else but a desire to prevent by all means the normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and the U.S. And I say straightforwardly that it is, of course, Adenauer who is interested in that in the first place. By no means is he motivated by good intentions. The Hitlerite Germany lost the war with all the ensuing consequences. Its plans to expand "lebensraum" at the expense of other states ended in failure. This should be recognized once and for all. In fact, that is what the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and other countries fought for against the Hitlerite Germany. Why then should you and we now reckon with the revanchist strivings of the FRG and even encourage them delaying indefinitely the conclusion of a German peace treaty and preserving the present indefinite situation, fraught with danger? After all it is the absence of a peace treaty that feeds the hopes of aggressive revanchist circles in West Germany for a possibility to revise the results of World War II.
Now in all countries there are more and more people who think of and are concerned with the destinies of the world and who seek not to let it escalate to war. They more and more clearly understand that it is impossible to postpone any further the conclusion of a German peace treaty and to preserve the present dangerous situation.
During my conversations on all those questions with your Ambassador Thompson I told him that we are ready to take into consideration the circumstances that you are finding yourself in in connection with preparation for congressional elections. Such, evidently, are "traditions" in the United States that in the course of election struggle they forget, carried away by passions, about common sense and begin playing with fire, competing in saying more and louder absurd things that sow danger of world war. In order not to play in such conditions a role of some third force breaking from outside into this struggle between the competing parties we decided to put the German problem, so to say, on ice until the end of the elections. We had in mind that after elections we would resume the dialogue. We were under the impression that we would meet an understanding on the part of the American side, all the more that on many questions relating to German peace settlement a certain rapprochement of our positions has already been achieved that gives hope for a possibility of an agreement.
The only question on which the difference between us still remains is, as we believe, that of the presence of foreign troops in West Berlin. And even not the question of the presence of troops as such because on that we have already made a step in your direction, but only the question--the troops of what countries will be stationed there. You insist that the occupation troops of the U.S., Britain and France continue to stay in West Berlin. But that would not normalize the situation even after the signing of a peace treaty because the main source of friction between our countries--the use of West Berlin under the cover of occupation regime as a NATO base--would remain unremoved. That is why we considered and continue to consider that the best thing under the circumstances would be to station in West Berlin the UN troops. To stabilize the situation in Europe it would be also reasonable to have both German states--the GDR and the FRG--admitted to the UN, so that they normalize at last relations between each other and with other states--members of the UN.
Such is our position. I stated it in detail to Ambassador Thompson who, evidently, informed you about it.
[Here follow 6 pages on Cuba and a U-2 flight over Sakhalin.]
Therefore I would ask you to correctly understand our anxiety and not to do anything that could further aggravate the atmosphere and even explode the world. We on our part again say to you that we will do nothing with regard to West Berlin until the elections in the U.S. After the elections, apparently in the second half of November, it would be necessary in our opinion to continue the dialogue. Of great importance for finding the ways to solve both this problem and other pressing international problems are personal contacts of statesmen on the highest level. I think that if we, persons entrusted with great confidence and bearing enormous responsibility, constantly feel this responsibility, we will have to come to the realization of the necessity of reaching an agreement on West Berlin to eliminate this dangerous hot-bed which spoils our relations all the time.
126. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
New York, September 29, 1962, midnight.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/9-2962. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Davis. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2150)
Secto 58. Paris for USRO. Following based on uncleared memcon./2/ Secretary saw Brandt together with Senat info officer Bahr evening September 30 for one hour 15 minutes. Practically entire discussion centered on Berlin.
/2/SecDel/MC/82. (Ibid., CF 2152) The conversation took place at 6 p.m.
In response to Sec's question Brandt expressed thought that morale was not too bad in Berlin. Referring to Aug. riots and to criticism of Western powers published by some newspapers, Mayor said this was partly due to misunderstanding of what four-power status is, i.e. difference between four-power status based on agreements in regard to all Berlin and three-power commitments to West Berlin. This was not clear enough to Berlin and German people. It was not clear to them that sector wall was limit to guarantees.
In response Sec said in reality limit is what has come to be power to act. Assertion four-power rights can become very important, for instance, if Berlin question introduced into UN. We cannot accept talking solely about West Berlin and this we have always emphasized in our talks with Gromyko. True, steps were taken in 1948 and 1955 which removed any effective Western voice in happenings in east Berlin and east Germany.
Brandt said he would like to discuss:
1. Morale in city, and
2. Plebiscite.
Morale in city would be immensely helped if it would be possible to reach some arrangements with east Germans to counteract most inhumane aspects of wall. He had had 4-hour talk last week with Adenauer and they had just had new information from east Germans in discussing trade that perhaps they would be willing to discuss "other things" though they denied any connection or relation to trade. east Germans inferred they had approval of "great ally". This discussion on trade did not involve credits as previously proposed but larger swing in existing trade. Brandt favors extension greater swing and this will be discussed through Leopold-Behrendt channel.
Brandt expressed hope "other things" which east Germans might concede would be permission unite or bring closer divided families (a subject already being discussed through the Red Cross), permission for older people to join families even though not bound by closest blood relationship and finally permission West Berliners visit their relatives in east Berlin. There was another idea which West Berliners had discussed among themselves, namely proposal to establish visiting centers where relatives might visit for two or three hours at a time. Such centers might be established on sector border or in exclaves. Brandt apparently does not favor this idea referring to this as "prison conditions". He does not expect very much out of this but said possible church leaders in east Germany could maintain some links with West.
Brandt said Leopold would be authorized discuss greater swing balance by letter from erhard and "other things" such as movement of people by letter from Brandt and perhaps letter from Globke authorizing talks on all technical matters. Brandt said this was delicate matter and would be skating on thin ice but Chancellor knows about this. Sec commented that if by using this channel easements of this sort could be worked out, it should be tried even though it will not solve main problem.
Turning to plebiscite, Brandt said when Adenauer had brought up this idea in past, he had not favored it. expressed opinion it might be useful rather soon have word from West Berliners. It would be good for psychological reasons to have West Berliners expressing their own views instead of others expressing views on their behalf. He had mentioned this to Bundy/3/ and also to the three Deputy Commandants. Could propose referendum for whole Berlin which, if refused, could be applied in West Berlin requesting vote on (a) continued Allied presence and (b) maintainance existing links with Bonn. Brandt thought plebiscite on these questions could play important role politically and morally.
/3/See Document 122.
Secretary said he agreed in one respect, i.e., if Berlin question comes before UN or if there is harsh confrontation with Soviets, one of our strongest points would be to say "ask the people involved." When this idea had first been talked about between the President and Adenauer, there had been newspaper leaks and it was deemed not advisable to proceed. However, timing was important question. Khrushchev may or may not come in November. Question whether vote might be held before he comes or later will need careful consideration. In short, the question was when do you play this card. In response to Secretary's question, Brandt said they would need three weeks after decision taken to hold plebiscite, actually to carry out vote.
Brandt then said he would like to touch on another idea. The Russians have been talking much about Berlin as a NATO base and asserting that Bonn cannot have any say in West Berlin. He wanted to ask whether we could go back to the 1955 agreements on FRG independence and examine again annexes how FRG relations with West Berlin could be defined./4/ The Secretary remarked that we would have to look into this in detail before he could comment. (Sec suggests Dept. officers may wish discuss this point in more detail with Brandt when he visits Washington toward end week.)
/4/For text of these agreements, signed at Paris October 23, 1954, and entered into effect in 1955, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. V, Part 2, pp. 1435 ff.
Secretary said he wanted to make one point in regard to Allied vs. civilian access to West Berlin. While we do not see in existing agreements clear rights for civilian access, we have insisted in all our talks with Soviets that civilian access goes hand in hand with our own rights for access. Although there is perhaps theoretical difference, we have supposed that in certain circumstances we should have to incorporate civilian traffic into ours as exercise of our full rights. We cannot accept shut-off or close-down of civilian traffic.
Brandt observed difficulty was people do not have clear definition of what is meant by three points Western vital interests: Allied presence, access to Berlin and viability. Asked whether we could not put down on paper clear definition of what is meant by these three points. Cited difficulties arising if east Germans suddenly introduced visa requirement and pointed out they could do this in various ways by which many people in Germany or outside would not really understand import. Brandt had impression four-power group in Washington had been "going too fast" on ground access measures while relying more on air access. Thought it perhaps not good to talk too much on countermeasures.
Sec expressed thought that principal support for expanded civil access to Berlin lies in self-interest of other side in trade agreements. Brandt thought this was true only to certain degree since if Khrushchev made a political decision to go ahead then he would have already taken into account economic countermeasures. Sec remarked Khrushchev had other things to worry about too. Soviet bloc has annual trade of four and half billion with OeCD countries. Khrushchev has said to recent visitors that after signing peace treaty he would cut off military access. If he does there would be "roaring crisis" but it is possible Soviets first target will be military access.
Brandt raised question whether West has given sufficient answer to Soviets at this session GA. He agreed we must not do anything to bring UN into the question at this time. But many friends from non-aligned countries had asked what they could do for West Berlin, for instance, Malayans on recent visit asked what they might do for Brandt in New York. Sec said he would like to state in extreme confidence that UN relation to Berlin problem was point of difference between US, French and FRG. When it was question involving US in war, our policy was to give great deal of attention to UN. UN is one reason why we are not isolationists. De Gaulle and Adenauer had allergy to UN and thus we have reached no common view though under certain contingencies there was general agreement we would go to UN. Sec again emphasized confidential nature his comments.
Brandt stated Adenauer attitude toward America much better than even month ago. Sec added our principal burden is psychological. Some people seem think that unless we repeat every month our assurances, they lose meaning. On the other hand, we believe constant repetition inflates words and they become cheap. Sec complimented Brandt on response to press inquiry he had not come to obtain additional assurances, "we don't need assurances." This was best thing Brandt could have said.
Brandt asked whether in future talks with Soviets we might consider proposing talks at Ambassadorial level in Bonn between three Western Ambassadors and Soviet colleague. Soviet officials on cocktail circuit in Berlin had inferred this might be acceptable idea. Brandt added that at some point experts from east and West Germany could join in discussion technical matters. Sec said he would be glad to look into this idea. If there were a meeting between President and Khrushchev this suggestion might help save Khrushchev's prestige.
Brandt then referred to his forthcoming lectures at Harvard which would be mainly concerned with european integration. He would say something on Berlin and since one or two things might be critical he would like to tell the Sec beforehand. He would make point welfare Berlin was more important than wall and hence in present circumstances they could not encourage disturbances or revolt in east Germany. However, there was one exception, if there were military attack against West Berlin he could not ask east Germans to remain quiet. Sec agreed.
In subsequent discussion whether east German Armed Forces reliable and would fight against Western forces or against FRG forces, question arose re contingency planning for actions to be taken in east Germany if and when access was blocked. (Sec asked Department consider possibility briefing Brandt more fully on contingency planning this point.)
Info Officer Bahr remarked difficult understand when access problem would arise, for instance, would it be when passports or visas required. Sec said FRG must think more about this question of recognition. When we had proposed international access authority, there was sharp reaction from Bonn. We resented this reaction since we were least involved when 11 NATO members have east German trade missions in their countries. Brandt commented he did not know what de facto recognition is though he knows there are certain de facto relations. Sec said we would not extend de jure recognition to east Germany. But we do not wish attempt define de facto recognition which means nothing in law. Furthermore there are certain advantages in not trying to define this point. Brandt referred back to his idea having Ambassadors meet in Bonn and at certain point bring in German experts. Wondered whether Khrushchev might tell Ulbricht keep quiet and consider this recognition. Sec said two things bear on this, 1) astonishing failure of east Germany, and 2) speaking entirely frankly, free Germans have not yet developed proper confidence in themselves. The great gravitational force is to the West. He was not suggesting new policy but thought more channels could be opened up and it would be possible to achieve more. Important that barriers do not come from our side.
Rusk
127. Editorial Note
On October 2 McGeorge Bundy visited Chancellor Adenauer at Cadenabbia. Reports on this meeting are fragmentary. [text not declassified] In a memorandum to the President, dated October 4, Bundy stated that the Chancellor had told him he was in favor of a plebiscite and of bargaining with the east Germans to improve conditions for human contacts across the wall in exchange for expanded trade. Adenauer believed the plebiscite would help Berlin morale, but its wording must be considered carefully. The Chancellor also reported that the east Germans had already made a proposal on the question of contacts. (Memorandum for the President; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany)
On November 5 Dowling transmitted a longer account, which included consideration of the relative strength of the Soviet Union, China, and Europe and a discussion of French-U.S. differences on nuclear weapons and the location of nuclear weapons in Germany. This account also included a summary of the conversation between Bundy and Adenauer on the plane trip back to Bonn. After dwelling at length on European unity and the U.S. nuclear umbrella, Adenauer and Bundy briefly discussed Berlin. The Chancellor agreed that mitigation of the situation must be sought, but there was no evidence to indicate that the Soviet Union was prepared to pay a major price for recognition of east Germany. (Ibid., Trips and Conferences Series, McGeorge Bundy Trip to Europe)
128. Record of Meeting/1/
Washington, October 5, 1962, noon.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany. Secret. Drafted by Kaysen. The time of the meeting is taken from the President's Appointment Book. (Ibid.) A similar record drafted by Creel is ibid. A summary of the meeting was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 925, October 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-662) For Brandt's account of this meeting, see Begegnungen und einsichten, pp. 94-95. Brandt had also discussed Berlin with Tyler, Hillenbrand, and Creel at 10 a.m. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-562)
The President met in his office with Mayor Willy Brandt of West Berlin. Also present were Ambassador Knappstein, Mr. Bahr, Mayor Brandt's press officer, Mr. Hillenbrand and Mr. Creel.
The President opened the discussion by asking Mayor Brandt how the situation in Berlin appeared to him at the moment. Brandt responded that at present it was good. Morale had recovered from the blow of the wall. The economy was in fairly good shape although perhaps not as well as it could be. He expected that in the near future some pressures would be exercised on access routes but it was difficult to forecast how.
The President raised the question of what we were prepared to do to maintain civilian access to West Berlin if the east Germans got control of the access routes. Mr. Brandt said he saw the problem in terms of how to respond in such a way as not to interfere with the viability of Berlin. He thought that many of the countermeasures we now contemplated were deficient on two counts. They were ineffective as a means of pressure on the Soviet Union, and they were bad for West Berlin's economy. While we had to defend the principle of free access if possible, we had to pay some attention to the realities of the situation. The President asked if Mayor Brandt thought it was wise for us to blockade ourselves if the east Germans asked for visas. Mayor Brandt responded he would, of course, prefer not to accept visas, but if the choice was presented he would prefer to maintain access rather than resort to countermeasures. He suggested it would be possible to get a German traffic agency which corresponded to the IZT and operated at the same practical level. Perhaps the agency could in some way be combined with the Office for Interzonal Trade. In response to the President's questions on how IZT now functions, the Mayor explained that the two negotiators were located in east and West Berlin and visited each other regularly. Special papers provided for their free access across the wall.
In response to the President's question of what papers were involved in visits to the Leipzig Fair, Mayor Brandt answered that West Germans show a passport or identity card, together with a letter from the east German authorities giving permission to go to the Fair.
The President returned to the question of whether we could get an arrangement on civilian access connected with and corresponding to the arrangement on IZT. Mayor Brandt responded that this was a matter which should be explored urgently now, rather than waiting for the signature of a treaty. The President remarked that, of course, east Germany will ask for the greatest degree of recognition in connection with any such arrangement, and Mayor Brandt added that they will also ask for a larger volume of trade. The President expressed his view that West Berlin and West Germany should discuss this matter, come to an agreement, and take the lead in developing concrete proposals. He recited the history of our proposals on an international access authority and the German reaction thereto. Mayor Brandt expressed agreement with the President's view on the desirability of German initiative in this matter.
Ambassador Knappstein remarked that we, of course, could not predict what form pressure on access would take; that it was obvious that the Soviets regarded military access as more important--perhaps they would start with it. The President responded by stating that military access was our problem; that we would move to an airlift and if this were interfered with, it would mean war.
He then returned to the problem of civilian trade and asked for a German initiative before the event. Mayor Brandt commented that speaking for himself and his colleagues in the Berlin Senate, he would consider it deplorable if the idea of an international access authority is dead. It is better to deal with Ulbricht as one of thirteen than as one of two. The Mayor said it was his own impression that something could be done on this basis and yet we could still preserve the formal theory of Soviet-Allied control.
The Mayor then raised the question of the desirability of 4-Power discussions in Bonn among the ambassadors of the Soviet Union, U.S., U.K., and France. He thought this would be a useful channel now that the Soviet commandant had disappeared from Berlin. Perhaps the 4 Powers in Bonn could agree to instruct German experts to work out a trade and access agreement. The President commented that this would be good if the Soviets in fact wished to lessen tension. At present, unfortunately, there was no evidence this was so. All our talks with Gromyko suggested just the opposite. The Soviets continue to raise the issue of troops which we have stated repeatedly is not negotiable.
The President returned again to the issue of civilian land traffic and some degree of acceptance of east German presence. He repeated his comments on the misunderstandings that had arisen in Bonn on our previous proposals and the desirability, accordingly, of a German initiative. He asked Mr. Hillenbrand to comment on this point. Mr. Hillenbrand distinguished between the German and Allied views on this question and pointed out there were some technical problems of German passport law which stood in the way of a denial policy at the moment. Ambassador Knappstein observed that if the Federal Republic accepted east German visas this would give the east Germans the opportunity to practice selective exclusion against visitors to Berlin. The President responded that they have that power now and they can always do it. We, in turn, can counter by using the air route. The really difficult problem was goods, and not people: people can fly; goods must go by rail, truck or canal. The President reiterated his view that it was much more advantageous for us to take the initiative immediately, than to be put in the position of responding once the Soviets had signed a peace treaty with east Germany. Ambassador Knappstein remarked how difficult it was to plan ahead on these matters.
The President then raised the question of a plebiscite in West Germany. He said he favored a plebiscite and the important problem was one of timing. Should we do it immediately or should we wait until Khrushchev appeared at the UN and then respond to his actions there in this way? Mayor Brandt said that he himself wanted it as soon as possible, which would be a minimum of three weeks from the day the decision was taken. Unfortunately, a Berlin paper (Tagesspiegel) had benefited from a leak on this story and it was now a matter of public discussion. Mayor Brandt emphasized the advantages of a plebiscite for the Berliners themselves as a morale builder and argued this as a ground for rapid action. The President pointed out that the other side of the argument was, of course, the desirability of being able to respond to Khrushchev. Mayor Brandt said in that case, we might propose an all-Berlin plebiscite to Khrushchev and after he rejected it, have one in West Berlin. This course would have the difficulty that the questions raised in West Berlin would be different than those asked in east Berlin. The central questions are the presence of Allied troops and links to the Federal Republic. Neither of these is exactly appropriate to ask in east Berlin. The President said that this was a problem that required more thought. He wanted both sides to think about the timing and come to a conclusion as quickly as possible. Mayor Brandt observed that this would be difficult with the Quadripartite planning machinery. The President thought that agreement should be reached between the Federal Republic and West Berlin, there should then be a discussion between them and the U.S. and on this basis a decision should be taken. Mayor Brandt said that 15 December was the last date on which it would be useful to hold a plebiscite this year. It was hard to have it in the Christmas season. The President agreed and called for an early decision.
The President asked Mayor Brandt his evaluation of our contingency plans in relation to the difficulties that he, Brandt, expected in the near future. The Mayor responded that, while he expected some interference, it was difficult to predict the kind of interference and that he found it hard to respond to the President's question.
The President turned to east Germany and the state of its army and economy. Mayor Brandt said he thought the army was not too reliable, but that properly deployed with Russian troops stiffening them, they would fight. They would probably fight Americans better than West Germans. In response to a question by the President, Mayor Brandt stated east Germany would never be able to defend itself without support from the Soviet Union no matter how the Soviets armed it, and the Soviets would not rely on it to do so. He said the east German economy was not significantly worse than it was last year but it certainly was no better. There had been a serious psychological deterioration since the building of the wall.
The President commented on two defects in our contingency plans. First, they proved not to provide for important contingencies, e.g., the wall. Second, there was a lack of political commitment. He was especially critical of the lack of political commitment on the military contingency plans. He then went on to remark that we had made our commitments to Berlin clear in terms of our increase in military strength and expenditures. The contrast with the French and even the Germans was clear. Unless we built up our conventional strength, our nuclear power would not really deter. It would be hard for the Russians to believe that we would pause for 60 days of mobilization and then begin a nuclear war. The geography of Berlin was such that the disadvantage lay with us because it was we who would have to make the first military move. This detracted from the credibility of our threat of nuclear war and made necessary readiness to use our conventional forces.
The President then summarized the discussion as follows:
1. Berlin was a key American commitment. Our actions were our assurances. If it were not for Berlin we could feel free to take action in Cuba. He thanked Mayor Brandt for his airport statement in which Brandt had said that it was unnecessary for him to ask us for assurances.
2. It was important to make every attempt at a peaceful solution. If we did not we would defeat our own aims because we would fail to maintain the viability of Berlin. In this position we had had the support of West Berlin, but opposition from the French and some opposition from Bonn. It is clear that at the moment the Soviet Union is doing nothing but repeating a clearly non-negotiable proposition on Allied troop withdrawal.
3. We would probably be faced by a decision on access shortly, consequent on Khrushchev's signing a peace treaty. Therefore, it was vitally important that there be a German initiative on this matter now.
4. The asymmetry of U.S. commitments to NATO and those of the other larger NATO powers was striking. If the other major NATO powers did what we have done, Khrushchev would believe we were serious. Their joint population and wealth was such that they could do it.
After the summary the President repeated the importance of using our heads now and not waiting until the crisis. He then expressed his confidence in Mayor Brandt. Mayor Brandt responded by remarking that he, too, thought we were in a weak position when we feared to try new ideas. Our attempt to stand on the status quo always leads to the status quo minus. We had to act. The President agreed and repeated his remarks on the geography of Berlin, the access issue, and the consequent desirability of taking action on access now.
Mayor Brandt and the President then conversed privately in the garden for about ten minutes. The whole meeting lasted an hour.
C.K./2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
129. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
New York, October 6, 1962, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-662. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, Berlin, Moscow, and London.
Secto 89. Paris pass USRO. entire three hour post-luncheon Gromyko-Secretary conversation devoted to Berlin. Following summary main points based on uncleared memcon which being pouched./2/
/2/SecDel/MC/92. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2153)
Gromyko opened by asking whether Brandt had exerted much pressure on US. Secretary denied Brandt put pressure on US, emphasizing US speaking for itself since its vital interests involved. Referring to Khrushchev's remarks to foreign visitors that everybody in West except Adenauer agreed with Moscow, Secretary stressed if that impression really prevailing in Moscow it totally incorrect. Secretary noted Brandt anxious find way ease situation in Berlin and also referred to contacts between FRG, Berlin and east-Germany directed at same objective, stating relaxation tensions in Berlin in constructive manner would make difference in situation.
Gromyko denied Soviet Government under impression US speaking only for Adenauer and had no position of its own, but claimed Adenauer's extremist position influenced US position, which evidenced by chain of facts relevant to substance US-USSR talks in Geneva and earlier in New York. Re FRG's efforts decrease tensions, claimed no evidence to that effect so far. Reiterated standard Soviet argument re existence two independent German states and that Soviet position based on that fact. Stated US-USSR talks so far had produced narrowing of gap on some points but there are still obstacles on road toward agreement. Asserted US-USSR's first preference still to reach agreed solution and said that if US doesn't wish sign peace treaty with GDR, then agreement could be reached on status West Berlin, presence Western forces West Berlin, and access to West Berlin. Gromyko thought that if West unwilling reach agreement on these points, the time approaching when one should take stock of situation to see where both sides stood. emphasized question of peace settlement with Germany not one of prestige but rather of peace in europe.
Secretary recalled Soviet statements that unification should be left to Germans themselves, noted that difficulty was Soviets apparently meant it was up to Ulbricht rather than German people as such, stressed importance of not closing door on unification by what we say or do and pointed to dangers that might emanate in time from divided Germany. Secretary stated our first choice is peace treaty with one unified Germany, but since there is no agreement as to how World War II should be ended legally, we had to look at factual situation, which includes two parts of Germany and Western presence in Berlin as third fact to be fully taken into account. Provided this done arrangement could be reached.
Re US-USSR exchanges so far, Secretary deplored lack of reciprocity on Soviet part and noted that the more we tried to close gap the more USSR backed away and attempted put pressure on us to move where we could not do so.
After Secretary had reviewed US positions on such matters as status West Berlin and presence Western forces West Berlin, he referred to Gromyko's remark re taking stock of situation and emphasized US prepared sit down and analyze situation at any time. Noted no need wait for US elections.
Gromyko then reiterated along well-known lines Soviet position re revanchism in West Germany, and respect for sovereignty GDR. Re stock-taking, stated he meant no bookkeeping operation but rather political analysis respective positions two sides and drawing appropriate conclusions. Stressed main problem now, which would influence settlement of entire set of questions, was presence Western forces West Berlin. Reiterated Soviet position on that issue and Soviet argument re NATO bases West Berlin. Denied USSR had retreated from points of rapprochement achieved so far.
Gromyko then summarized Soviet analysis situation as follows. essential elements German peace settlement are: (1) Recognition German borders; (2) NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression pact; (3) Non-armament FRG and GDR with nuclear weapons; (4) Cessation subversive activities West Berlin against GDR; and (5) Complete respect for GDR sovereignty. Asserted USSR would use all its prestige and influence to ensure with Western powers or with UN free and uninterrupted access to West Berlin by land, water and air and noted there were other, minor questions to be resolved such as non-introduction nuclear weapons to West Berlin, transit and customs arrangements, et cetera, but reiterated main stumbling block is US insistence on perpetuation stationing Western forces and occupation status West Berlin. Concluded by saying he had expounded Soviet position again on behalf Soviet Government and Khrushchev in hope it would meet with understanding on part US Government and that both sides would be able move forward on that basis. Said USSR would deeply regret if it had to act without US or its allies. Noted Secretary's remark that there is no need wait for US elections and stated USSR always prepared exchange views if warranted by situation.
Gromyko then referred to Home's remark re possibility of creating international air access authority./3/ While noting Home had spoken only in general terms, Gromyko wondered how such an authority could be reconciled with respect GDR sovereignty and recalled Soviet proposal for creation arbitration organ to act in case of dispute re transit and communications. Suggested US and UK might take another look at Soviet proposal since it could perhaps accommodate Home's suggestion.
/3/Home had advanced this proposal at meetings with Gromyko in New York on September 28 and October 1. Minister Hood briefed the Washington Ambassadorial Group on the proposal and the meetings with Gromyko on October 9. (Topol 487 to Paris, October 9; ibid., Central Files, 762.00/10-962)
Secretary pointed out Gromyko's use of term revanchist appeared indicate all Germans who sought unification their country were revanchists. Refuted claim Berlin NATO base, pointing out western troops were there for political and not military purpose. Stressed fact all Soviet proposals re composition forces West Berlin were aimed at undermining Western presence West Berlin and changing character West Berlin. Re Home's reference to access authority, Secretary stated it was application of idea discussed sometime ago. Soviet suggestion for arbitral body had not led to detailed discussion because question very quickly arose to what kind of city access would lead. If understanding were reached on that question, then technical problems would be easier to resolve. Secretary wondered how Soviets could expect West rely on fresh agreements at very time they wished break existing agreements. Questioned value suggestion for non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw at very time when Soviets applying aggressive pressure with respect West Berlin. Soviets asking for confidence at very time they destroying confidence in existing arrangements. Secretary concluded he would report conversation to President and we would study it very carefully to see whether anything opened up. Stressed, however, we could not leave West Berlin so on that point we were back to Vienna.
Gromyko reiterated Soviet arguments re revanchism and NATO base West Berlin and again referred to air access authority. Stated parallel discussion latter question useful, but agreed it ran into main question of to what access would lead. Reiterated suggestion US take another look at Soviet proposal for arbitration organ and noted that proposal could perhaps be discussed again at later date.
Secretary stated we would review carefully problem of access. Believed access as such not impossible to resolve, but pointed out main question would still remain.
Rusk
130. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, October 9, 1962, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, France, General. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted and initialed by Tyler and approved in S on October 12 and in the White House on October 24. The source text is labeled "Part 1 of 4 Parts." Parts 2 and 3 dealt with Laos and the Congo respectively; Part 4 also dealt with Berlin, containing a 2-paragraph discussion between Rusk and Couve de Murville on contingency planning. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-962) Couve de Murville was in the United States to attend the 17th session of the U.N. General Assembly.
SUBJECT
Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
US
The President
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Bohlen
Mr. Tyler, Assistant Secretary
France
Couve de Murville, Foreign Minister
Ambassador Alphand
The President asked the Foreign Minister for his judgment on the situation. He replied that the Soviets seemed not to have made up their minds as to what they would do. The Wall had settled the physical problem of the flow of refugees from east to West. What was now left was largely a question of prestige. He thought the Russians would have to do something one day. The question was how much risk they were prepared to take. He thought they were prepared to take some risk but not a major risk leading to war. He thought Khrushchev would want to pull off something like a treaty with the GDR to show that he had brought about a change in the situation from what had existed previously. He thought it not unlikely that Khrushchev would come to New York under cover of the General Assembly in order to talk over Berlin with the President.
The Secretary asked if Berlin had been discussed between de Gaulle and Adenauer during the recent German visit. The Foreign Minister said the subject had been mentioned but not really discussed.
The President said he was worried about the slowness of measures foreseen under our contingency planning and the time needed for a military probe to be carried out. According to present plans, four days would be required to put our troops onto the Autobahn. He felt we should have improved planning not only in the area of possible contingencies, but with regard to the centralization of responsibilities in Berlin. He thought that the idea of a 60-day pause for mobilization was unacceptable.
The Foreign Minister agreed that the contingency planning was not very realistic. He felt it had been in a direction contrary to what should have been done. He said our present position was to probe the Soviets although we knew what the result was going to be. Then we would get stuck and we would then merely think the situation over. He felt that if something were to be done at all, it should be immediate. He said that in 1948 we had been able to carry out an airlift while accepting ground blockade because the Soviets did not then have nuclear weapons. This time if ground access were cut, we would run the risk of being dragged into war. He thought that our present posture was ineffectual, and potentially more dangerous than something more incisive would be.
The Secretary said our planning had been conducted on a basis of Allied forces in being. If the West had had more forces under NATO, we would have had more choice.
The Foreign Minister referred to the reoccupation of the Rhineland by Hitler in 1936, when France didn't move because of the restraining influence of her military advisers. He felt that military advice does not sufficiently take into account essential political factors. He felt we should not wait and think things over while the Russians were mobilizing. It may well be that the Russians feel we are putting on a show to try to impress them, but that they would not be persuaded by this that we mean what we say. The President said we ought to have forces ready to go within one or two hours on the Autobahn.
Commenting on the small number of French troops on German soil, the Foreign Minister explained that he thought it was a little risky to have such a large concentration of troops in Germany itself and that there might be some advantage for them to be deployed in greater depth. At this point the Foreign Minister sought to buttress this view by referring vaguely to views which he claimed General Norstad had expressed to him in the same sense. However when the President commented that he thought he was familiar with General Norstad's views and that he had always been in favor of forward strategy, the Foreign Minister did not comment further.
The President read from and discussed a report by General Taylor on the time required to move troops in the event of crisis./2/ The Foreign Minister said it was evident that the time envisaged was much too long and that we should react within 24 hours. He said if ground access was cut, the West needed to move immediately on (1) economic and other measures in the field of blockade and (2) sending a small unit onto the Autobahn within 24 hours. He said it should not be difficult to keep a few hundred men on an alert basis. They need not be massed on the Brunswick airfield but should be in a position to be rapidly transported to the checkpoint. The President commented that point 2 above was more important and urgent than point 1.
/2/The President is referring to CM-7-62, October 6, which, inter alia, provided an analysis of the actions necessary to put the West in position to launch a battalion-sized probe on the Berlin Autobahn. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 B 3542, 091 Germany)
Ambassador Bohlen commented that one trouble was that governments were unwilling to commit themselves and to delegate authority for action ahead of events, except for matters relating to air access which was a simpler problem. Thus governments had to react and take decisions after the events with which they were confronted.
The President said that Khrushchev was probably counting on a slow reaction from the West. The President thought he might write a letter to de Gaulle setting down some of the things that were bothering him with regard to our present contingency planning, and see whether perhaps General de Gaulle would favor the idea of trying to obtain certain advance commitments by governments. The Foreign Minister said he thought this would be useful.
The Foreign Minister reverted to the subject of the two French divisions under NATO and said he could see that the President was interested and even worried about this matter. He exposed at some length the political reasons why it was desirable to keep French troops on French soil. Twenty years had passed since the French Army had been stationed in France. It had lost contact with the people of the country and this had caused serious trouble. It was necessary to readjust the relationship between French forces and the French population. If they were on German soil, they would still be in a foreign country and out of touch with domestic sentiment (the Foreign Minister stressed the sensitivity of what he had just said, adding that this was something which General de Gaulle would never tell the President himself).
The Secretary wondered what interpretation Khrushchev would place on the absence of French troops from German soil.
The Foreign Minister said he didn't wish the President to believe that France was relying on the US nuclear capability as an excuse for not doing her conventional share. He said the problem was to try to prevent misunderstanding on the part of Khrushchev.
The President said that Khrushchev had not moved to seize Berlin militarily because he knew what this would entail but we had a real problem with regard to ground access. He asked for the Foreign Minister's view as to what we should do on the ground after we found our access blocked.
The Foreign Minister said things would move fast. either we would begin to talk right away or there would be war.
The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister whether he would favor talking at this point. The Foreign Minister's reply was unclear and generally evasive.
Ambassador Bohlen suggested that consideration be given to a Four Power communication to the Soviet Union, which would include the Germans.
The President referred to the points which Gromyko had made to the Secretary in their conversation/3/ in relation to the withdrawal of troops. He said Khrushchev would have to drop his insistence on this point. This was not a matter which could be negotiated.
/3/See Document 129.
The Secretary said we were taking an urgent and searching look at the whole access question. He thought there was a possibility of the Soviets dropping the troops issue. He thought study should be given to the possibility of some variant of the Soviet arbitral commission.
The Foreign Minister said that Khrushchev would not wage war over Berlin. What he was doing was asking us to quit. The Foreign Minister thought that there might be the danger of a new uprising in east Germany, as had happened in 1953.
The Secretary said Brandt felt we had underestimated the potential role of the east Germans.
The Foreign Minister said that a crisis would not last long, but would come to a head rapidly.
The President said that as a result of the Soviet actions on Cuba, there was much less prospect of reaching agreement on Berlin. Thus Khrushchev might try to force something. He asked the Foreign Minister what the French would do if the Soviets were to cut access on the ground. The Foreign Minister replied that if this were to happen both in the air and on the ground, we should begin by taking appropriate action in the air. He said that if they were to cut both military and civilian traffic on the ground, we should use force and go ahead with the probe. If only military traffic on the ground were cut off, we should consider whether it was necessary to use force ourselves by undertaking a probe, because air access could be used for supplying the military garrisons.
The President pressed the Foreign Minister again and asked if his thought was that if military traffic on the ground were cut off, we should not have recourse to a military probe. The Foreign Minister's answer was evasive.
131. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, October 10, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-1062. Secret. Drafted by Creel and initialed by Tyler.
SUBJECT
West German Attitude Toward Proposal for International Access Authority
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Karl Heinrich Knappstein, German embassy
Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler, EUR
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, Director, BTF
Mr. Robert C. Creel, Director, GeR
Ambassador Knappstein called on Mr. Tyler this afternoon at his own request. He said he had not come to make a demarche but to consult on a matter which "worries me a little". In Mayor Brandt's talk with the President on October 5, 1962/2/ the latter had made several statements which "worried us" since it appeared that possibly they had been made on the basis of incomplete information. These statements were that thus far all United States proposals for a solution of the problem of civilian access to Berlin had been rejected by either Moscow or Bonn, that the United States would make no more proposals on this subject, and that it was now up to the West Berliners and West Germans to get together and make their own proposals for a solution.
/2/See Document 128.
Knappstein said he felt that some of these statements were not entirely supported by the facts. He was also bothered by recent newspaper articles reporting a shift in the West German attitude toward the proposal for an International Access Authority. These reports gave the wrong impression that the Germans have been opposed to this proposal. In fact, however, Foreign Minister Schroeder had told Secretary Rusk last June in Bonn/3/ that the Federal Republic was in basic agreement with the United States draft regarding the composition of the Governing Board for an Access Authority. Knappstein said he considered it important to clear the matter up before Minister Schroeder arrived in the United States. He was most anxious to do away with "these little misunderstandings". He, therefore, wished to consult us on whether it would not be advisable for the German embassy to issue a public statement to the press setting forth the facts. He then read a proposed statement, which laid stress on the fact that agreement to the International Access Authority proposal had been given by Minister Schroeder last June.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 68.
Mr. Tyler said his intial reaction to this suggestion was to wonder whether such a statement might not serve only to stir things up and blow them out of proportion. It would tend to focus attention pointedly on the existence of an area of misunderstanding and might well lead to all sorts of public speculation which could be damaging to our relations. It would tend to revive in the press the ghost of the previous misunderstandings of some months ago. It was possible the current flurry might blow over quickly. He would, therefore, advise against making any such statement to the press at this time.
Mr. Hillenbrand commented that the President's remarks had been limited to the question of civilian access. It was correct to say that our proposals for an International Access Authority had at one time publicly been shot down by the Germans. Probably the impression which had remained strongest in our minds was the great public hullabaloo which had resulted from the Chancellor's public denunciation last Spring of the international access proposal.
Mr. Tyler commented that the basic idea involved here was that we considered it appropriate for the Germans to take a more active role in working for a solution of our mutual problems.
Ambassador Knappstein said that upon reflection he tended to agree with Mr. Tyler that the suggested press statement might only serve to stir things up. At the same time he was anxious to get the matter in proper focus before the arrival of Minister Schroeder and the latter's talk with the President. He felt he should consult with Mr. Bundy on the problem right away. He wished the President to be aware before his talk with Schroeder that the Germans had in fact accepted last June the proposal for an access authority.
At two separate points during the conversation Ambassador Knappstein commented, rather defensively, that he had felt it would have been inappropriate for him to take any major part in the discussion between the President and Mayor Brandt.
132. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, October 15, 1962, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2175. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted and approved by Hillenbrand. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Berlin, and USUN.
997. Paris pass USRO. Following based on full and uncleared memorandum of conversation which being pouched./2/
/2/A copy of this 9-page memorandum of conversation is ibid., Central Files, 762.00/10-1562.
In two and one-quarter hour discussion with Secretary this afternoon Schroeder reviewed at some length German estimate of Soviet intentions re Berlin and situation in GDR./3/ On balance, did not believe Khrushchev prepared to risk major confrontation over Berlin if Western determination maintained. Re GDR concluded that despite allegiance 75 to 90 per cent of population to ideals of freedom, uprising unlikely in view of anticipated harsh repressive measures. Population apparently looking to long future rather than for any imminent improvements.
/3/Schroeder visited Washington October 13-18. In his first meeting with Rusk at noon on October 14, Schroeder raised the question of the Adenauer November 7-8 visit, the Secretary's meeting with Gromyko (see Document 129), transfer of nuclear weapons, India's possible participation in a German peace treaty, the Federal Republic's relations with satellite countries, New Guinea, and Yugoslavia. Memoranda of these conversations are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2175. A copy of the October 10 letter from the President to Chancellor Adenauer inviting Schroeder to visit the United States is ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. At 11 a.m. on October 15 Dowling, Tyler, and Hillenbrand, at the Foreign Minister's request, briefed him on Berlin contingency planning. A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., Central Files, 762.00/10-1562.
Secretary stressed that picture of Western determination as it appears to Khrushchev must appear somewhat confused. NATO force and logistical inadequacies likely to operate against certainty that West will fight for Berlin. Danger is that Western Powers so sure Khrushchev will not fight over Berlin that they are not willing to take the concrete measures necessary to evidence their firmness.
Schroeder observed that decisive point to Khrushchev could not be accretions to european forces but US determination and willingness use nuclear deterrent. He (Schroeder) therefore welcomed indications US prepared to go it alone in defense of Berlin should that be necessary.
Secretary agreed US nuclear deterrent ultimately decisive but to be persuasive to Soviets US people and their Government must have conviction their european Allies are making comparable effort.
Schroeder noted his belief that free and demilitarized city proposal had really been intended by Khrushchev as compromise proposal. He probably now working towards some sort of sliding scale of Allied presence as further compromise with some possible UN role added.
In discussion of possible Soviet tactics in UN, Secretary made point we should not fear UN action on Berlin. We would have many assets in such discussion. Should not, however, bring to UN prematurely and thus lose step which might play important subsequent role. Secretary also recalled Gromyko's apparent interest in last talk in New York in shifting discussion to access despite our having made quite clear that Western presence in city is nonnegotiable.
Schroeder doubted that Soviets were at this point actually prepared to accept Berlin as is and discuss improvement of access, but emphasized FedRep support for concept of International Access Authority. He reported on current discussions within IZT framework of east German credits, emphasizing that FedRep forthcomingness could only be expected if there were compensating political improvements on part GDR. east Germans were now examining FedRep proposal for 250 million DM increase in IZT swing arrangement. (In aside Schroeder remarked that enthusiasm of economics Ministry had apparently led to change of Leopold's instructions to raise FedRep offer from 100 million DM to 250 million DM.)
Meeting concluded with Schroeder's exposition and subsequent discussion of his doubts re present contingency planning for possible GDR demand for passports and visas to cover German civilian travel to and from Berlin./4/
/4/At the Secretary's dinner for Schroeder at 8 p.m. on October 15, the two discussed the idea of a Berlin plebiscite and Berlin contingency planning. Memoranda of these conversations are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2175.
Rusk
133. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, October 16, 1962, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files, eyes Only Telegrams Microfilm. Secret; Priority.
981. Policy. Khrushchev-Kohler--Part V./2/ Berlin and Khrushchev trip to UN. Khrushchev then said that perhaps after elections he would meet President in New York and they would reach agreement on nuclear test ban. Soviets sincerely wanted agreement. He had understood in Vienna that President also wanted agreement and believes he has not lost interest since then. Soviets, too, think this is one of matters that is ripe for solution.
/2/Parts I-IV summarized the introductory remarks and discussion of harassment of shipping, Cuba, U-2 flights, the nuclear test ban, and U.S. elections. Copies of all these telegrams, 973, 974, 978, and 979, are ibid. Further documentation on this first meeting between Ambassador Kohler and Khrushchev is in volume V.
After this problem, he said, most important is question of Germany-Berlin. President has been heating up atmosphere and has called up 150,000 reserves./3/ Soviets did not intend to follow US example in this. Some people say that he has told foreign delegations that President did not dare to start a war, but they interpret him wrongly. He does not want to say something offensive to President and his remarks have been distorted. When he talks with foreigners, he says Soviets will sign a peace treaty, with all the consequences that would follow, and he also says that any war would inevitably grow into nuclear war. Consequently, anyone who would start a war would be either a lunatic or a coward. In the last couple of days, he read a statement by some US military officer who said US would unilaterally start a war if USSR signed separate peace treaty. This was silly statement. This officer perhaps knows how to talk to his wife, but he does not know how to talk to the press. "We will sign a peace treaty, but no one who is sane will start a war." Peace treaty does not threaten anyone. People who lose their self-control and talk like that officer are either cowards or lunatics. But if agreement is not reached with US, Soviets cannot postpone signature of peace treaty indefinitely.
/3/Presumably Khrushchev is referring to President Kennedy's approval on October 3 of P.L. 87-736, authorizing mobilization of the Ready Reserve.
Adenauer says, Khrushchev continued, that if USSR signs peace treaty, US must do its duty and start war. Adenauer is too old and is losing his mind. He is stupid old man (glupy starik). But West Germany would be first country to be burned up, within first hour of war. Adenauer is 86 and perhaps he doesn't care. But German people want their children to live. However, Americans listen very carefully to Adenauer and he is leading Americans. Khrushchev said he would give his reply to Adenauer about time latter goes to US, and it would be published then.
US elections will take place, he said, and then we'll try to renew dialogue and reach agreement. Soviets won't sign peace treaty immediately; they know unilateral signing would be aggravation.
He asked what problem still remained. Only stationing of troops; there is no problem on access. Soviets believe access, both by land and by air, should be guaranteed with or without treaty. They have made still another concession by agreeing to presence of troops in West Berlin under UN flag. So only problem is composition of troops, which may include US troops, but must also include others, so that not only NATO military bloc would have troops there. If US doesn't agree, that would force Soviets to sign peace treaty despite fact US is threatening to start war. Must be recognized that, in our electronic age, when one button is pressed, other button is pressed automatically. There is no sense in dialogue of threats. This is silly policy. So US should take position of reason.
Khrushchev asked why US needs West Berlin. US, Britain and de Gaulle are sticking to West Berlin because Adenauer interested in it. Adenauer's interest is natural. But why is America interested? No one threatens West Berlin. US says it is for freedom of West Berlin. Soviets are also for that freedom. But we must liquidate state of war and military base in West Berlin, which is a remnant of war.
If agreement can be reached on stopping tests and West Berlin, this would help us to solve problem of disarmament. Khrushchev said he thought US not ready for disarmament agreement; Congress is not ready and President's hands are tied, so let us solve some other questions. Let's do away with bases and disband our troops. US can send rockets from its own territory. These are not old times when infantry was used, so he was surprised when President called 150,000 reserves. These are not times of Kutuzoy or Suvorov, when battles were fought with bayonets.
He said probably he would travel to UNGA at end November. early in November, he would be busy with domestic problems. If situation were favorable then, he would be glad to meet with President. He had good recollections meeting with President. Then perhaps they could: (1) agree on test ban, which he would like to do; (2) exchange views on disarmament; and (3) he would also alike to agree on West Berlin and create a calmer atmosphere for disarmament. For time being, Soviets would do nothing and make no statements until elections. He had given his word on that.
I said I thought President would find his statement interesting and, referring to President's press-conference comment on readiness to meet, said I would hope meanwhile there would be no developments which would make a meeting difficult. Perhaps progress could be made at a lower level in preparation for such a meeting. Gromyko was to see President day after tomorrow and then have working dinner with Secretary. Berlin would probably be discussed. I should therefore withhold my own comment on his remarks on Berlin.
Khrushchev repeated that they would not undertake anything to worsen relations. He regretted that things had not worked out in accordance with his discussion with Ambassador Thompson. It was regrettable that Cuban question had blown up right in middle of election campaign. He had read accounts of Gromyko's talks with Rusk and Home and there was nothing new on West Berlin problem there. Home had raised question of control of flights, but this was trifle. If, as result President's meeting with Gromyko, Rusk and Gromyko could agree on something, that would be good, but he doubted they could.
Khrushchev then noted he had not known earlier that appointment was fixed for Gromyko with President. I said we had just learned this today. Khrushchev said he was glad and thanked President for finding time to receive Gromyko.
Khrushchev said he wanted to review these questions today and had not raised any new problems since we had to settle old ones. He wished me good health in Russian climate and hoped political climate would also be good. He said great countries like ours had special responsibilities. For themselves, they wanted peace and peaceful competition. Great ships had to sail in high seas and he hoped they would sail without interference.
I said I took good note of what he had said and would report to President his statements on Germany and Berlin. Perhaps Secretary would be discussing this with Gromyko, but I thought I should add that we had gone as far as we could, short of our vital interests, that is, stationing of our forces. We are for co-existing in this situation. I was very glad to hear Chairman say he wanted to talk further about it and was sure President would, too.
Khrushchev asked me to convey best wishes to President and hope that he would have success in election campaign, as well as wishes for good health and success to his family, his wife and mother.
Meeting ended at 1250 hours Moscow time.
Kohler
134. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, October 17, 1962, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted and initialed by Creel and approved in the White House on October 26. The meeting was held at the White House. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 1021, October 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-1862)
SUBJECT
Berlin Access and Related Problems
PARTICIPANTS
Germans
Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder
Ambassador Karl Heinrich Knappstein, German embassy
Dr. Reinkemeyer, Chief, Soviet Affairs, Foreign Office
Dr. Simon, Personal Aide to the Foreign Minister
Mr. Swidbert Schnippenkoetter, Counselor, German embassy
Mr. Kusterer, Interpreter
Americans
The President
Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President
Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler, EUR
Ambassador Walter C. Dowling, Bonn
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, Director, BTF
Mr. Robert C. Creel, Director, GeR
The President said he was glad to see the Foreign Minister. He had come at a helpful time, since there was a strong feeling there would be difficulties over Berlin within the next two to three months. He would appreciate hearing the Foreign Minister's thoughts as to the actions the Soviets were likely to take and on our contingency plans to meet them.
The Foreign Minister thanked the President for this opportunity to meet with him and said he brought cordial greetings from the Chancellor. He regarded his own visit as a useful preparation for the Chancellor's visit next month.
Regarding Berlin, Schroeder said he was not certain in his own mind whether the Soviets really intended to sharpen the crisis by their own actions in late November or before the end of the year. He felt it more likely that they would continue to bring various psychological pressures to bear and meanwhile they would wish to keep talking in the hope of achieving their objectives without war. There were several factors to consider: First, the Soviets had thus far received little support from other countries regarding their project for a separate peace treaty with east Germany. From the standpoint of their posture before world public opinion it would not be so attractive to the Soviets to have only themselves and their "sub-contractors" in the Bloc as signatories of the treaty. From our own viewpoint the attitude taken thus far by the non-committed states had been a positive factor. Second, with regard to what specific measures the Soviets might take in Berlin, from their standpoint they did not have a great deal of leeway and there were only a limited number of steps which they could take if they were to avoid a real confrontation. There was also the question of what actions might be taken by the Soviet Zone authorities.
One big problem in this area related to civilian access, where the other side might introduce a passport and visa requirement. In such event we would have to take care to avoid any deterioration in the access situation. The difficulty was that most of the questions here related to pieces of paper; at the outset the other side, instead of giving the piece of paper now in use, would introduce a requirement for a visa. The problem was that while the change from the standpoint of what met the eye would not be very great, from the legal standpoint the change would be a very subtantial one. To accept visas would mean subjecting land access to the complete discretion of the east Zone authorities and would increase recognition of the east Zone regime. (Schroeder referred in passing to the difficulty created by the fact many foreigners traveling to Berlin, including United States civilians, had already accepted GDR visas, which he said was unfortunate.)
The Foreign Minister said he was convinced that if we should accept any deterioration in civilian access, we would one day find ourselves on the spot as concerned military access. If new paper formalities were introduced for military access, it would be difficult from the standpoint of international law to reject these if we had already accepted them for civilian access. The Foreign Minister then outlined the hypothetical situation under which on December 1 the Soviets would sign a separate peace treaty with east Germany to take effect on January 1. They might specify that for a transitional period of six months Western troops could stay in Berlin, but also that meanwhile a new piece of paper would be required for travel to Berlin which could be obtained either at Pankow or at the border checkpoint. What would the West do between December 1 and January 1 and what would it do after January 1? World opinion would have to be considered; there was the risk that if we decided to keep access open by force, world opinion would say that there had not been a sufficient change in procedures to justify this. He felt we needed to make it perfectly clear to the Soviets that if they tried this game they would not succeed and that any effort on their part to proceed by installment would fail. The conclusion to be drawn was that our contingency planning must consider realistically the matter of reacting strongly to prevent any deterioration in the field of civilian access to Berlin. In the political, diplomatic and psychological fields, we must do everything possible to make clear to the Soviets that we have no intention of accepting the visa requirement and would react strongly if this were imposed. Furthermore, the relationship and interdependence between civilian and military traffic must be taken realistically into account in our contingency planning.
The President agreed there was a clear interrelationship between civilian and military traffic, but said there was at the same time a substantial difference in that our military forces could be supplied by air. Furthermore, civilian traffic was now treated on a different basis from military traffic and the east Zone authorities had for some time had considerably greater authority over civilian than military traffic. Was this not true?
The Foreign Minister agreed but said the danger nevertheless existed that once we had accepted a deterioration in civilian traffic, changes in military traffic which were optically minor in character would be difficult to reject. The big question was whether or not we could accept any deterioration in civilian traffic. If the answer was "no", then what specifically did we do about it? Theoretically, of course, we could resort to an airlift for the transport of personnel, but given problems about the weather, electronic countermeasures, etc., this would not solve the problem of access of goods. One essential at stake here was the viability of Berlin, which would be threatened by reliance on an airlift. If the airlift and economic countermeasures did not prove effective, we might find that we would have to retreat from our position, which would involve a great loss of prestige. Therefore, the question of how we should react at the outset was extremely important. He was not satisfied with the middle solution being recommended up to now, which was to continue vital traffic to Berlin, accept visas for this under protest, and apply economic countermeasures. He said he felt it was necessary to re-think our whole planning on this question.
One additional factor to take into account was the reaction of the Berliners themselves. Their main concern was not the recognition problem but unrestricted access. There was, therefore, some difference in perspective between Berlin's and the Western position as a whole; it was necessary to try to harmonize these interests.
The President inquired: Suppose they insist on visas and we do not accept this and ground traffic to Berlin stops, then where are we?
The Foreign Minister said basically the question in such a case was whether we will and can keep access open by force or whether we should resort to an airlift and await the effect of our countermeasures. He himself considered it a dangerous position to think we could solve the problem of access by an airlift.
The President said our plans were clear on what to do in the event of a blockage of traffic by force. The basic question was whether, if the blockage was in fact only by paper, we would be justified in using force.
The Foreign Minister commented that if we accept visas at this point, even though viability is clearly involved, what are our chances in the military field of refusing procedural changes and what chances do we have to react by force to them if we have accepted the visa for civilian traffic?
The President again said that civilian traffic was a different problem since military traffic could be moved by air. If we did not accept visas for civilian traffic then we would have a self-imposed blockade. We might find ourselves in a slightly ridiculous position, and the Berliners themselves might not be entirely sympathetic nor understand why their viability was being threatened merely because of disagreements and too legalistic arguments over whether or not to accept a piece of paper.
The Foreign Minister said he was fully aware this was a difficult problem. He considered that land access was very important to military traffic and that the problem of military access could not now be solved by an airlift. The situation was different from 1948-49. He did not believe that we could now resort to an airlift without suffering a severe diplomatic and political defeat. He stressed again we must get our position worked out clearly and in detail to cover every possible situation. He again expressed concern over our solution up to now to let essential civilian traffic continue by accepting visas under protest, while at the same time applying economic countermeasures by reduction or termination of interzonal trade and the employment of further measures by the Allies and in NATO. If all these measures remained without effect we were in a situation where we had reduced access to Berlin dangerously and would still be faced with the decision whether or not eventually to accept the visa requirement. We would be operating on a declining scale.
The President said he was not sure we should make visas the great issue. We did not want Berlin blockaded. Was the visa issue the one on which we would employ force rather than countermeasures? Were we in a position to fight our way up the Autobahn over the visa requirement when we had been accepting for a long time a piece of paper for civilian traffic?
The Foreign Minister said that the problem was whether we should accept the Soviets' salami tactics of piece-by-piece encroachment. He recognized the great difficulty was in the political-psychological field since people would ask why should we use force over this small matter. The danger in this was that we could lose the game by installments without any really major development having taken place. As for the popular reaction in Germany, it is clear that people would be discouraged over continued acceptance of minor encroachments. The people in Pankow would regard it as a victory for them if the visa requirement were accepted. Furthermore, the Soviets would look on this development as a further success which would encourage them to take additional steps.
The Foreign Minister said he wished to stress that Berlin could be held only if the Soviets could be convinced there was some specific point beyond which they could not go without encountering a strong reaction from us. While Khrushchev might be convinced that at some point the West would be prepared to fight a nuclear war over Berlin, he was likely nevertheless to continue to try to reach his objectives piece by piece. The problem for us to decide was how to deal with each move as it occurs, whether it be a visa requirement or not. He felt that the problem went much further than merely involving acceptance of a piece of paper.
The President agreed it was important to reach a decision on this within the next three or four weeks. He said we must be careful not to draw the line at the wrong place. As concerned civilian traffic to Berlin, this was now in fact controlled by the east Germans who issued papers, stamps, etc. It was not clear that an introduction of a visa requirement was a dramatic enough development to set in train all the major actions involved in our contingency planning. If we made a big issue over a piece of paper and then had to retreat, this would be a defeat for us. We wondered whether the actual movement of civilian traffic in and out of Berlin was not the big issue rather than the acceptance of visas.
The Foreign Minister said there was one big potential difference between visas and the present documentation requirements. It was not excluded that in issuing visas the east German authorities would eventually require that they be obtained in east Berlin, or possibly in an effort to appear reasonable, they might offer to open visa-issuing offices in West Berlin or West Germany. They could also if they wished impose a limit, such as 50,000 a month, on the number of visas to be issued for travel to Berlin.
The President said he thought that our economic countermeasures would prove sufficiently oppressive so that measures of this type would not be useful to the other side.
The Foreign Minister said he was not convinced that economic countermeasures would prove effective if the other side had already decided it was prepared to run the full risk of their imposition.
At this point in the conversation, which had already lasted for an hour, the President suggested we might turn to other matters. He referred to the history of the discussions with Gromyko over Berlin, which had thus far been unsuccessful. There now appeared at least a possibility that the Soviets might withdraw their main condition regarding Western troop withdrawal and shift their accent to the access problem. We had repeatedly made clear that the issue of maintaining our troops in Berlin was not negotiable. It was, therefore, not clear why Khrushchev was coming over. Did the Foreign Minister have any thoughts on this?
Schroeder said it was not clear to him whether Khrushchev would come to the United Nations or not. He had in any event skillfully used this possibility to get the West to indulge in a great deal of unproductive speculation. If he did come it was not clear he would be prepared to steer the hardest course. He would in any event expect that something could be accomplished. In March and July at Geneva the Soviets had stressed that the only crucial issue remaining unresolved was the Western presence in Berlin. He felt that they were too optimistic over other issues, such as nuclear weapons, non-diffusion, non-aggression pact, etc., which they presented as practically agreed. He felt the Soviets were still convinced some further compromise over Berlin was possible. They had probably regarded their original proposal for a free demilitarized city in November, 1958 as a compromise offer intended to serve as a face-saver. At Geneva they had suggested the possibility of a phased withdrawal of Western troops from Berlin concurrently with reduction of troops from other countries which would be introduced over a period of four years, at the end of which the problem would be settled. They were probably still thinking in terms of a compromise, and he thought that if Khrushchev came to this country he would be thinking in terms of some new compromise offer, perhaps strengthening elengthening] the time period to ten, eight or six years, rather than wishing to run the risk of a showdown over Berlin. He said this was just his personal opinion and he could not prove he was right.
The President stated that, returning briefly to the visa problem, it seemed imperative to get this settled before the end of the month. It should be discussed in the Ambassadorial Group with the British and French. (Schroeder interjected that the agreement of the Berliners was also important.)
Schroeder commented that while our contingency planning had been going on for a year or so, there was still not complete agreement at several points. The time had come where our over-all planning must be brought up-to-date and possibly "streamlined". Secretary McNamara had made this same point to him yesterday./2/ Schroeder suggested it might be advisable to conduct war games in which all contingencies would be played through, with our most intelligent players acting in the role of Soviets. (In a further brief discussion of this suggestion the President stated that in fact geography was the greatest asset on the Soviet side of the game.)
/2/A memorandum of McNamara's conversation with Schroeder is in the Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany/Security.
The President then turned to this morning's newspaper account of an interview given in Germany by Defense Minister Strauss in which he had made two main points: 1) the comradeship established between the French and Germans on military matters, and 2) the role of German troops in the defense of Berlin. On the latter point the President said that in case of a crunch the issue would be decided by which side had the greater strength rather than by legal considerations over our right to be in Berlin.
Schroeder replied that he did not have the full text of Strauss' interview. As concerned the matter of French-German comradeship in arms (he asked "did Strauss really say that"?), he would make only one statement, viz., that on this point he had as realistic a view as the President himself. He considered the second point to be more important. As concerned the German commitment in NATO, it was the same as that of the United States and there should be no question about this. The point Strauss apparently was making regarding the use of German troops over Berlin presumably reflected the actual situation as concerned the relationship between Live Oak and NATO. That related to the situation on paper; in practical fact, however, in the event of military conflict over Berlin the Germans would be in there from the first moment because they were right up in front.
The President referred to his recent talk with the French Foreign Minister/3/ as indicating a sharp division between us over Allied military strategy, particularly as concerned the disposition of forces. We had not been able to convince the French to move their troops forward, and if this could not be done it would be difficult of make effective military plans. The President felt West Germany had an important role to play in resolving these differences.
/3/See Document 130.
Schroeder said the Germans intended to try to make clear to de Gaulle that the present situation was not satisfactory. The French had claimed that their problem arose from the need to maintain French forces coming from Algeria on French soil for the time being. This point was not very convincing. Schroeder felt that the French over-all military strategy was based on the premise that there were two battles to consider: the one in Germany, which would be lost, and the one in France, which would be won. This had in fact been the premise of the most recent military maneuver conducted by the French. This seemed to him to be thinking of another century, but also possibly indicated that in such matters the French were great military geniuses.
The President said he hoped that Messrs./4/ Strauss and Messmer would be able to settle this matter of troop dispositions. Schroeder commented it would be better to reach agreement with de Gaulle than with Messmer.
/4/Pierre A. Messmer, French Defense Minister.
The President said he would have to leave shortly for Connecticut. He much appreciated the efforts which had been made by Minister Schroeder to coordinate our joint policy. We would consider carefully his views on the visa problem and reach a decision. The basic problem was that we would either have to decide that here is where we take our stand, or else we should prepare the way for playing down the issue and making it unimportant. The President commented that he did not regard the forthcoming Khrushchev visit as particularly desirable in the absence of evidence, which we did not yet have, of any change in his attitude over Berlin. He would not himself encourage Khrushchev to come, but if he wished to come the President would see him. Meanwhile we should improve our planning. There should be more realistic discussions in the Ambassadorial Group. In addition, he felt that Governments should be more committed in advance to actions agreed on by the planners. He cited as an example that until recently he had not realized that it would take three days before we could mount our initiative probing on the Autobahn. We, for our part, were ready to say what we would do, and he felt that all four Governments should be prepared to give more in the way of firm commitments. In conclusion, the President stated that Minister Schroeder's visit had been very useful.
Minister Schroeder thanked the President for this meeting and said he hoped that by their next meeting on November 7 we would have our planning perfected and be ready for definitive discussions.
135. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, October 18, 1962, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-1862. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky on October 21 and approved in the White House on October 23. The meeting was held in the White House. The source text is labeled "Part I." Part II, which dealt with Cuba, is scheduled for publication in volume XI; Part III, which dealt with nuclear testing, is printed in vol. VII, Document--; and Part IV, which dealt with U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations, is printed in vol. V, Document 151. A summary of this conversation was transmitted to Moscow in telegram 958, October 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-2062) Gromyko was in the United States to attend the 17th session of the U.N. General Assembly.
SUBJECT
Germany and Berlin; Possible Visit by Khrushchev
PARTICIPANTS
US
The President
The Secretary
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Akalovsky
USSR
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Mr. Semenov
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Sukhodrev
Mr. Gromyko opened the conversation by stating that the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev, had asked him to convey his greetings and best wishes to the President, to Mrs. Kennedy, and to all of the President's family. Mrs. Khrushchev joined in these greetings.
The President thanked him for these wishes.
Mr. Gromyko continued that he wished to thank the President for having found time to meet with him and exchange views on certain matters. He said he wished to state the policy and the views of the Soviet Government on a number of important questions. Subject to the President's approval, he thought he might take those questions one by one and listen to the comments the President might wish to make on each of them individually.
The President said this was all right with him.
Mr. Gromyko then stated that Mr. Khrushchev had instructed him to take the opportunity of his trip to the United States and to convey to the President that Mr. Khrushchev continued to hope that the President's efforts, like his own, would be directed toward the elimination of differences and of points at issue between our two countries. Such elimination had been and continued to be the invariable desire of the Soviet Government and of the Soviet people. The Soviet Government regretted that no agreement had been reached in the course of the exchanges of views between the US and the USSR on the question of a German peace treaty and of normalizing the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a treaty. Unfortunately, the latest meetings with the Secretary had not changed the situation. No progress had been made in spite of the fact that, as had been also stressed by US representatives, West Berlin and its status did not present a major problem and was not a vital issue for the United States or its Allies. Indeed, the West Berlin situation was a legacy of the last war. The Soviet Government had stated on a number of occasions that the Soviet Union had no direct vital interests in West Berlin and did not need West Berlin. The Soviet Government deemed it necessary to conclude a German peace treaty and resolve the West Berlin problem on the basis of such a treaty by declaring West Berlin a free and demilitarized city; such a solution would meet the interests of world peace. Of course, the Soviet Union could never agree to West Berlin's remaining a NATO base, to a continuation of the presence of occupation troops of the three Western powers and to the maintenance of the occupation regime in West Berlin; nor could it agree to West Berlin's remaining a hotbed of aggressive explosion. The fact was that presence of occupation forces of the three Western powers in West Berlin yielded nothing to the West strategically, and this proved that there was no reason for keeping those forces in West Berlin.
Mr. Gromyko then said that the Soviet Government had already indicated that it would do nothing with regard to West Berlin before the US elections, unless it was compelled to do otherwise by the activities of the other side. However, the Soviet Government proceeded from the fact that it was necessary to hold an active dialogue in November to bring about concrete results with regard to a German peace treaty and to the normalization of the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a treaty. The Soviet Government would like to hope that at that time an understanding concerning a German peace treaty, including the question of the forces of the three Western powers and of the status of West Berlin, would at last be reached. If there should be no such understanding, the Soviet Government would be compelled, and Mr. Gromyko wished to emphasize the word "compelled", to sign, together with a number of other states, a peace treaty with the GDR without an understanding with the Western Powers. The Soviet Union would also be compelled to take such steps as were integrally linked with a peace settlement, steps of which the United States Government and the President personally had been informed on a number of occasions, including by Mr. Khrushchev personally. The Soviet Government proceeded from the assumption that the United States Government would take such steps as being only inevitable in this connection and would understand that they represented a peaceful effort. As to the threats that could be heard in the United States in connection with the possibility of the USSR's signing a peace treaty with the GDR in the event that no understanding with the West was reached, i.e., in the event that the Soviet Union acted as the West had acted with respect to Japan, the Soviet Government wished to emphasize once again that such threats could not produce the effect desired by those who made them. Threats had no effect on the USSR whatsoever; instead of indulging in them it would be better to root out the remnants of World War II.
Mr. Gromyko said he was speaking on behalf of the Soviet Government as sincerely as Mr. Khrushchev had spoken in Vienna when he spoke in favor of an agreed solution of the problem of the German peace settlement. Mr. Gromyko recalled that the President had said that he appreciated frankness. The Soviet Government also appreciated frankness, because frank conversations were the shortest way to understanding and clarification of respective positions. As Mr. Khrushchev had said, the NATO military base and the occupation regime in West Berlin represented a rotten tooth which must be pulled out, and no one would be harmed by that. One could not take seriously assertions that it was necessary to maintain a NATO base in West Berlin in order to protect the West Berlin population. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Government was in favor of respecting the freedom of the West Berlin population, but no NATO base was needed for that purpose.
Mr. Gromyko continued that the Soviet Government had some specific points concerning what had been discussed in the course of the US/USSR exchanges of views. Recently, in conversations with Lord Home and the Secretary, it had been suggested that an international air access authority be established. It had also been stated that such an arrangement would involve respect for the sovereignty of the GDR. The Soviet Union was prepared to take account of this suggestion and proposed the following two alternatives: (a) creation of an international arbitration authority to be concerned with all types of access; the Soviet views on such an authority had been stated in detail to the Secretary in earlier conversations; or (b) creation of such an authority to deal solely with air access. The latter was a new proposal, and it could be discussed in greater detail later tonight with the Secretary. In making this step forward toward the position of the United States and the United Kingdom, the Soviet Government proceeded on the assumption that at the same time a solution to all other problems relating to a German peace settlement and West Berlin would be found.
Mr. Gromyko then recalled the Secretary's remarks during the last meeting to the effect that United States favored the development of contacts between West and East Germans. The Soviet Union, he said, was also in favor of such contacts because they would promote alleviation of the situation in Germany and Europe as a whole. However, it went without saying that the development of such contacts did not mean solution of the main problem. Mr. Gromyko went on to say that the Soviet Union was also prepared to take into account US views regarding unification and it was prepared to include in a German peace settlement and a German peace treaty provision concerning the possibility of German unification. This could be done either in the form of an agreed joint statement of the powers concerned, or such a provision could be included in a peace treaty with the GDR. As to the Soviet position on unification, it was well known to the United States; the Soviet Union believed that reunification was a matter for the two German states to resolve.
Mr. Gromyko then said he wished to stress that when a solution of the West Berlin problem was found on a basis corresponding to the interests of peace and the interests of the GDR sovereignty, and when other related problems, on which there had been some rapprochement between the US and the USSR, were also resolved, then actually there would remain no problem on which the two countries were in direct confrontation. Under those circumstances disarmament would also be easier to solve, particularly in view of the invigorated international situation which would then prevail, and particularly in Europe. Mr. Gromyko said that those were the views of the Soviet Government concerning a German peace settlement and the question of West Berlin.
The President said he knew that the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko had discussed the Berlin problem for many months; thus the USSR was familiar with our position. Also, he, the President, had discussed this problem with Mr. Gromyko here at the White House in September of last year. The US, the President emphasized, was anxious to work out mutually satisfactory procedures on access. The US had made several proposals on this point, and the USSR had made some too. However, the matter which was of greatest concern to us was that of the withdrawal of Western forces. West Berlin was not a NATO base and the Western forces there had no offensive capabilities. The United States desired that West Berlin not be used as a base for subversion. However, we were unable to withdraw our forces and thus endanger the freedom of West Berlin. We were prepared to engage in a dialogue in November, but this of course involved our friends, including the French. However on the question of withdrawing the Western forces from West Berlin we were in disagreement. As to other matters, the President said he thought they should continue to be explored; those matters included access, both air and ground, the role and the juridical status of forces in West Berlin, etc. All of these matters could be discussed. However there could be no discussion of the presence of Western forces, which was a matter of survival; thus we disagreed on that point. If the US were to accept what the Soviet Union had suggested, i.e., if we were to withdraw our forces, the city and access to it would be under complete control of East Germany, and East Germany could also control movement of persons and goods. Under such conditions the city could no longer remain free; our commitments would become invalid, and we would have withdrawn from the positions the US and the West had taken for many years. The President said he did not believe that the Soviet proposal would guarantee the security of West Berlin, and its freedom could not be maintained under such conditions.
Mr. Gromyko said he wished to comment on one particular remark by the President. He said that the Soviet Union had tried to dispel the apprehensions and suspicions voiced by the US Government concerning the creation of a free and demilitarized city of West Berlin. The President had said that if the Soviet proposal were to be accepted West Berlin would come under the control of the GDR and that the social order of West Berlin would be threatened by this. Mr. Gromyko asserted that there was no reason for such fears, or doubts, or suspicions, because the USSR was prepared to undertake solemn guarantees, together with the US and the other Western Powers and also with the UN, insuring respect for the status of West Berlin. He professed not to be able to understand why the President believed that the collective weight and prestige of those nations or the weight and prestige of the UN would not constitute sufficient guarantees of what the President called the freedom of West Berlin. As to access, Mr. Gromyko said that there was no problem here. The Soviet Union favored unrestricted access to West Berlin as a free and demilitarized city; it was in favor of unrestricted ties between that city and the outer world, and it was in favor of the development of trade and cultural relations with the city. In the course of the US/USSR exchanges of views, the Soviet Government had tried to convince the United States that it was in favor of the strictest possible guarantees in this respect.
The President said that he appreciated this, but emphasized that if the Soviet Union desired to continue to permit the people of West Berlin to choose their fate, he did not see why withdrawal of Western forces was of any importance. Contrary to Soviet assertions, West Berlin was not a NATO base and our troops there were symbolic. Since we had said that this point was vital to us, we failed to see why it should not be possible to work out access with our troops remaining in West Berlin. The President reiterated that those troops were a symbolic guarantee of the freedom of the city, and that of course was of great significance. If the Soviet Union desired to let the West Berlin population choose its own government, then presence of those troops should not create any problem. Those troops were not endangering the security of the Soviet Union or any other country in East Europe.
Mr. Gromyko said that it was well known, and the President would not deny this, that presence of Western forces in West Berlin was a result of World War II. Both Western and Soviet troops had come to Germany and West Berlin as occupation troops as a result of the defeat of Nazi Germany. However, he wished to point out with the President's permission that the most dangerous slice of the last war had remained in West Berlin in the form of Western forces. The President was of course right in saying--and Mr. Khrushchev had agreed on this point with the President at Vienna--that the Western forces in West Berlin could play nonmilitary role. However this made the Soviet Union wonder all the more why, despite this fact, the West still insisted on maintaining those forces. Moreover, it should be noted that even a small number of troops can represent a danger of war.
Mr. Gromyko continued that he wished to emphasize once again--and this was also Mr. Khrushchev's view--that if the question of West Berlin were to be resolved on a mutually satisfactory basis, there would remain no other questions on which our two states were at loggerheads, with the possible exception of disarmament. If such a solution were found, the peoples of our two countries and of the world at large would sigh in relief and would thank the President and Mr. Khrushchev for their efforts in bringing about such a success.
After some discussion of certain other matters, Mr. Gromyko said that in conclusion he wished to state that Mr. Khrushchev had instructed him to convey to the President Mr. Khrushchev's belief that it would be useful if the Heads of the Government of the United States and the USSR met to discuss the problems which were dividing the two Powers, and first and foremost the question of a German peace treaty and of West Berlin. If Mr. Khrushchev should have an opportunity of doing so, he would come to New York in the latter part of November in connection with the General Assembly. Thus, what was meant was the possibility of Khrushchev's coming after the U.S. elections.
The President said that if Mr. Khrushchev should come to the United States he would be glad to meet with him again. However, the President thought that it would be a mistake to describe such a meeting as dealing with a peace treaty and West Berlin, since others were involved in these matters and more formal discussions would be required. Thus if the Chairman should come, he would be glad to meet with him and discuss any questions, without however attempting to organize an agenda.
136. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, October 18, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-1862. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on October 23. The meeting, which was held at the Department of State, took place during Rusk's dinner for Gromyko. A summary was transmitted to Moscow in telegram 953, October 19. (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
Germany and Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The Secretary
Mr. Akalovsky
U.S.S.R.
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Mr. Sukhodrev
After dinner, the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko conversed alone.
Mr. Gromyko said that since he was going to leave soon, he wished to make some clarifications with respect to the points which he had discussed with the President earlier today,/2/ and particularly on the question of a German peace treaty and of the normalization of the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a treaty. Reading from a prepared text, he said that the major obstacle to agreement between the two sides was the question of the withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin. If agreement were to be reached on this question, the Soviet Union believed that the path to agreement would be cleared. The Soviet Union could not accept the present situation, no matter what arguments the U.S. adduced in contending that West Berlin was not a NATO military base, because objective reality was objective reality. The Soviet Union did not underestimate, or to put it in a positive way, it appreciated the significance of the rapprochement on a number of questions relating to a German peace settlement, which had resulted from the USSR exchanges of views. The Secretary, of course, knew what those questions were. This rapprochement was a definite and substantial step forward, but it did not resolve the main issue. Mr. Gromyko went on to say that during his last conversation with the Secretary, certain important points relating to a German peace settlement had been touched upon. The Soviet Union was prepared and believed it to be useful to clarify the respective positions and to set forth in more specific terms its own attitude on certain points raised by the Secretary. He said that he now wished to discuss certain points in greater detail than he had discussed them with the President.
/2/See Document 135.
Mr. Gromyko continued that the Secretary, as well as Lord Home, had touched upon the question of an international access authority and of an international air access authority. The Western side had emphasized that this proposal was based on respect for the sovereignty of the GDR and on the existing international practices. If such were indeed the intentions of the U.S., then, as he had said to the President, the USSR could take account of the Western position. The USSR was prepared to agree to the creation of an international arbitration authority to deal with air access to West Berlin and to act in settling frictions if they were to arise in the course of the actual implementation of an agreement on access. He said he wished to stress that such an authority would be an arbitration body and not a body that would be incompatible with the sovereignty of the GDR. The Soviet Union proceeded from the premise that technical services related to air traffic to and from West Berlin would be handled with the participation of GDR authorities. Alternatively, and this would represent a broader arrangement, the USSR could also agree to West Berlin's being a party to the proposed international arbitration body; the Soviet Union was willing to agree to such an arrangement in order to facilitate agreement. Basically, the Soviet Union proposed a choice between (a) an international arbitration body to deal with all types of access, i.e., land, water, and air access, and the US was familiar with the Soviet proposals for such a body; or (b) an international arbitration body to deal only with air access. Thus, as the Secretary could see, the Soviet Government was guided by the desire of satisfying the wishes of the Western Powers and of meeting the Western Powers half way. The USSR believed that these proposals by the Soviet Union offered a basis for understanding, assuming that a solution of other problems, and primarily that of the withdrawal of Western forces, was found.
Referring to the Secretary's remarks at the last meeting regarding the desirability of contacts between West and East Germans, Mr. Gromyko noted that he had already said to the President that the Soviet Union appreciated the Secretary's statement to the effect that the U.S. Government favored such contacts. He wished to reiterate that such a position of the U.S. could further the alleviation of tensions in Germany and Europe, particularly if measures were taken to stop provocations against the GDR and to guard the Western side of the GDR border. Of course, the U.S. Government was aware of the fact that the Soviet Union had always been in favor of the development of cultural and trade relations between the GDR and the FRG and between West Berlin and the GDR. Development of such contacts and relations would contribute to a more tranquil situation and to more normal relations between the GDR and West Germany. However, it could not be overlooked that the development of such contacts would not mean a solution of the main problems facing the U.S. and the USSR in connection with a German peace settlement and the normalization of the West Berlin situation, and above all the question of the forces of the three Western Powers in West Berlin.
As to the question of German unification, Mr. Gromyko said that he had already indicated to the President what could be said about German unification in the process of concluding a German peace treaty, together with agreed solution of other questions linked with such a treaty. He wished to emphasize that the Soviet Union desired an agreed solution of the questions relating to a German peace settlement, including a peace treaty with the GDR; if such a solution were reached then a provision might be included concerning the possibility of German reunification. In this connection, he wished to state that such a provision would not be contrary to the position of the Soviet Union, because the Soviet Union had never believed that the door to unification should be shut tight. The Soviet Union had always expressed the view that if the Germans were to agree on a platform for unification, the Soviet Union would accept it as a fact. As was well known, the Soviet Union considered that the question of German unification was a matter for the two sovereign German states to resolve. As to the provision concerning German unification, such a provision could be incorporated either in an agreed joint statement of the Powers concerned or in a peace treaty with the GDR. In any event, the Soviet Union believed that if agreement were reached with the West on the questions which must be resolved in connection with a German peace settlement, including the major issue of the withdrawal of the occupation forces of the three Western Powers from West Berlin and the elimination of the NATO military base in West Berlin, a mutual understanding on this point would not be a problem. Mr. Gromyko said that he deemed it necessary to make these remarks in the hope that they would find due understanding on the part of U.S. and the other Western Powers and would facilitate agreement on other questions which must be resolved in connection with a German peace settlement.
The Secretary thanked Mr. Gromyko for this further elaboration of the remarks he had made to the President. Referring to access, the Secretary said he believed that agreement on this problem should be possible. Basically, if the Four-Power arrangements contained in the Jessup-Malik agreement on access were to be adhered to, there should be no problem. In other words, access would not intrude in the activities of the East German authorities, nor would those authorities intrude in access. For instance, when planes flew from Vienna to Athens over Yugoslav territory, they did so with the permission of Yugoslav authorities and thus they did not intrude in Yugoslav sovereignty; on the other hand, Yugoslav authorities did not interfere in that traffic. If the Four Powers could agree on a type of arrangement similar to that contained in the Jessup-Malik agreement, there should be no difficulty. We had no intention of intruding in the activities of GDR authorities. It was standard practice for aircraft to fly over the territory of a country without that country interfering in such flights.
The Secretary then stressed that the major problem was that of the presence of Western forces in West Berlin and stated that in all seriousness there was no agreement on that question. On that question, the Soviet Union must decide whether it wanted to go to war to remove those forces. This point was fundamental to the West, but it appeared that the more we explained our point of view, the greater the appetite became on the part of the Soviet Union to accomplish its objective. There was certainly no agreement on this question. We had sought to meet the Soviet Union on such questions as boundaries and nuclear matters, but on this point there was no understanding. No one could speak in terms of eternity, but at present this was an utterly fundamental question. The Secretary said that the U.S., and the President personally, would study most carefully what Mr. Gromyko had said to see whether anything could be done.
The Secretary pointed out that when Lord Home had spoken about air access, he had not been speaking for the U.S. or the Western group as a whole. As far as we were concerned, we supposed that all types of access, and not only air access, should be considered. Since Mr. Gromyko had put forward two alternatives, we wished to indicate our belief that the general problem should be treated as a whole.
The Secretary then emphasized that he did believe that there was considerable advantage in contacts between West Germany and East Germany and between West Berlin and East Berlin, because such contacts could promote the interests of both sides and decrease tensions. Thus, we were entirely in agreement that steps should be taken in that direction.
The Secretary continued that the U.S. had tried to take certain steps in the direction of narrowing the gap between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., although this has created certain tensions between the U.S. and some of its allies. However, there was a point where vital interests were involved, and with reasonable effort on both sides a solution to such problems should be found. The Secretary recalled that we had interposed with regard to the provision in the West German Constitution declaring West Berlin a Land of the FRG. Likewise, we had pursued a policy in the nuclear field which eased the problem the Soviet Union appeared to have with regard to nuclear matter in Central Europe. The Secretary also recalled that he had indicated privately to Mr. Gromyko that the Eastern boundaries were not a problem in a de facto and practical sense. However, there were some points where we just could not agree. He hoped that the Soviet Union would introduce some evidence of reciprocity in those questions so that vital interests of both sides would be taken into account.
The Secretary then observed that the President was leaving town tomorrow and that he was to call on him tonight. He said we would discuss access with Ambassador Dobrynin. We were already engaged in discussions with our allies and hoped that we could bring the positions of the two sides close together. However, he wished to stress once again that the basic problem was that of the Western forces in West Berlin.
Mr. Gromyko said that as far as the sovereignty of the GDR was concerned, the Soviet Union could never agree to dividing the GDR sovereignty in two parts or to any arrangement encroaching on that sovereignty. The Soviet Union could never sign any agreement providing for such an arrangement. What the U.S. appeared to have in mind was respect for the sovereignty of the GDR in form, with actions which would contradict the principle of observance of that sovereignty. Such plans should be cast aside. What the Soviet Union had in mind was that standing international practices must be applied in full.
Mr. Gromyko continued that the Soviet Union was negotiating with the U.S. on a German peace settlement in the hope that a solution could be reached on an agreed basis. If there were no such hope, the Soviet Union would not have negotiated with the U.S. and would not have wasted its time. However, if it were to be impossible to reach an understanding, there should be no doubt in anybody's mind that the Soviet Union would sign a peace treaty with the GDR and that all measures would be taken which must be implemented in connection with a peace treaty and which would safeguard the GDR sovereignty, including measures related to access. It depended on the Western Powers what would follow then. The Soviet Union wished to sign a peace treaty and proposed peace. The Soviet Union was in favor of reducing tensions in the world. If there was to be war, the West would have to make it, but the Soviet Union would be able to stand up for itself, and this also went for a number of other states which wished to sign a peace treaty. This was the Soviet position, which he wished to emphasize once again.
Mr. Gromyko went on to say that the U.S.S.R. could not agree to the West's maintaining a military NATO base in the center of the GDR. The West had come to Germany and West Berlin as a result of the defeat of Nazi Germany, and so had the Soviet Union. He wondered why the West wished to stay there indefinitely. He said he wished to reiterate and reemphasize that the Soviet Union was proposing a peaceful act.
The Secretary stressed that the presence of the Soviet Union in East Germany was also a result of Nazi Germany's defeat; there was no difference between Soviet presence in East Germany and our presence in West Berlin. He suggested that the possibility of a few survivors deciding who was right on this question be set aside and that both he and Mr. Gromyko as Foreign Ministers were in duty bound to avoid such disastrous results. If the Soviet Union meant by GDR sovereignty that the GDR would control access, that was totally unacceptable. Our view was that there should be no interference by the GDR in access, in accordance with standard practice of international law. If the GDR would not interfere, there would be no problem. However, if the GDR wanted to supervise a restricted access there was no prospect for agreement. We agreed that the Soviet Union was a great power; however, the Soviet Union must accept that the U.S. was also a great power.
Mr. Gromyko asserted there was no analogy between Western presence in West Berlin and Soviet presence in East Germany. The U.S.S.R. was in the GDR on an entirely different basis, on the basis of contractual commitments, just as the U.S. was in West Germany on the basis of some contractual commitments with West Germany. The Soviet Union had proposed that all foreign troops be withdrawn from foreign territories, but unfortunately the U.S. had refused. As to West Berlin, that was an entirely different matter and there was no analogy whatsoever here, because the troops in West Berlin were occupation troops and the occupation regime still prevailed in that city. As to sovereignty, it was easy for the Secretary to rationalize. The Secretary apparently meant if the GDR should intervene in access that would be unacceptable and would not correspond to the U.S. concept of sovereignty, whereas things would be all right if the GDR refrained from such acts. Mr. Gromyko said he wished to stress that there were no two types of sovereignty; there was only one notion of sovereignty and only one norm of international practice, and such practice must be applied to the GDR as to any other country. International norms which were standard practice must fully apply to the GDR. Access could not be a barrier here, because the GDR had stated its willingness to assume obligations to ensure unrestricted access. The Soviet Union had stated that it was prepared to underwrite those obligations together with the Western Powers or with the UN. The Soviet Union had always stressed its belief that it should be possible to make unrestricted access compatible with the GDR sovereignty; in fact, the Secretary himself had said this. Thus, he could not understand why the Secretary was taking such liberties in treating sovereignty; little could remain of sovereignty as a result of such treatment, and the Soviet Union could not agree to that. Mr. Gromyko said he wished to make these clarifications because there was perhaps some lack of understanding of the Soviet position on the part of the U.S. Both sides were negotiating and their respective positions must be understood correctly. He had been patiently clarifying the Soviet position because perhaps there was some misunderstanding which should be eliminated.
The Secretary then said he wished to ask a direct question. He wished Mr. Gromyko would tell him whether today, as of this day, he considered that the Soviet Union had obligations to the U.S., the U.K, and France, with respect to the presence of Western forces in and access to West Berlin. He wondered whether Mr. Gromyko regarded this as existing obligations.
Mr. Gromyko said that, speaking briefly, the Soviet view was that the occupation regime in West Berlin had outlived itself and that it could not live forever. The U.S. Government appeared to believe, in spite of the fact that 17 years had passed since World War II, that the occupation regime and the occupation forces in West Berlin represented a normal situation. Yet the Soviet Union believed that this was not a normal situation; indeed it was an absolutely abnormal situation. It was impossible to conceive that the Western Powers could really believe they could tear up such allied obligations as were not agreeable to the West, while insisting on those obligations which were to its liking. The U.S.S.R. could not accept such an approach, which was tantamount to an arbitrary interpretation of the situation. Moreover, a free and demilitarized city of West Berlin would not harm anyone; a German peace settlement and normalization of the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a settlement could not injure anyone. Everybody would gain from a solution of this problem on that basis, and particularly the cause of peace. Whatever concessions, if the term concession could be used at all, that the West would make would be not to the U.S.S.R. but to the cause of world peace, and that would be a significant concession indeed.
The Secretary pointed out that Mr. Gromyko had failed to answer his question. He asked again whether the Soviet Union believed it had formal obligations to the Western Powers with regard to the presence of Western forces in Berlin and with regard to access.
Mr. Gromyko asserted that he had answered the question.
The Secretary said that leaving aside whether the Soviet Union wanted to change the situation, he wanted a yes or no answer to his question.
Mr. Gromyko replied that, briefly speaking, the Soviet Union believed that the occupation regime in West Berlin with all of its attributes had outlived itself. Seventeen years had passed since World War II and that regime must be ended. This was required by the U.S.S.R., it was needed by the U.S. and it was needed by all countries. The U.S. should not look for any devious motives behind this position. The Soviet Union was against basing foreign policy on such motives and if anybody did so it was not the U.S.S.R. Mr. Gromyko then said he wanted to ask the Secretary a question of his own. He wondered why the West believed it needed a NATO military base in West Berlin and where were U.S. vital interests in that connection. After all, the U.S. was here and West Berlin was there. As to what the Secretary called freedom of West Berlin, the Soviet Union had suggested that a joint agreement be signed to guarantee West Berlin's way of life. But the U.S. did not want to do this; it seemed not to trust its prestige and might which would underlie such an agreement. Gromyko wondered what was wrong with this suggestion; after all, all of the great powers and, if necessary, the UN would back up such guarantee.
The Secretary suggested to take the peels off the banana and to look at the heart of the matter. The Soviet Union was a great power and so was the United States. We were in West Berlin, although one could not talk in terms of eternity, which was a fiction in the Soviet mind. At pres-ent we were in West Berlin and we would not be driven out. We were a great power and we would not accept defeat unless the U.S.S.R. fought a war and attempted to defeat us. This was not a threat, it was a fact, since we were committed to the people of West Berlin. The Soviet Government and the Central Committee must consider this. The U.S. wanted to resolve this problem peacefully, but it could not be resolved peacefully on the basis of U.S. defeat. Solution to this problem must be sought on the basis of a mutual recognition of the vital interests of both sides and on the basis of mutual respect. We had gone a long way to recognize the vital interests of the U.S.S.R., and the U.S.S.R. must recognize ours. There was a point beyond which lay surrender and we could not go beyond that point. The Soviet people were courageous, but so were the American people. What we asked for was mutual respect, and without that there could be no peace.
Mr. Gromyko said he agreed with the Secretary's remark about mutual respect. He thought this was a good formula; agreement must be sought on the basis of mutual respect. However, the Soviet Union could not find such respect on the part of the U.S. The Secretary's remark indicated that the U.S. wished to adhere to a one-sided position. It wished to preserve the NATO military base in West Berlin and to preserve Western forces in West Berlin, although U.S. interests in this connection were not guided by the interests of maintaining the freedom of West Berlin or of safeguarding U.S. security. What the U.S. wanted was to maintain the hotbed of fever which was shaking all of Europe. He wondered where was mutual respect here. The Soviet Union had no desire of placing the U.S. in a position of capitulation, and the Secretary had incorrectly described the Soviet position. Quite the contrary, the Soviet Union believed that the U.S. was a great power. The U.S.S.R. was also a great power and had considerable strength. The President and Mr. Khru-shchev had had a frank exchange of views on this point. However, the U.S. position on West Berlin did not indicate that the U.S. recognized this fact and that it based its policy on it. The U.S. had consistently been shying away from any proposal based on the interests of peace and respect for the sovereignty of the GDR. Thus, the Secretary's reproach that the U.S.S.R. wanted to place the U.S. in a position of surrender was inaccurate. The U.S. position only strengthened the Soviet Union's view that a solution of this problem was required by the security of the U.S.S.R. and many other states, by the security interests of all of Europe, and indeed of the U.S. itself. The U.S.S.R. was convinced that this was so. The U.S.S.R. and many other states wanted to draw a line under World War II. The Central Committee and other leading bodies in the U.S.S.R. had discussed the probable motives by which the U.S. was guided in clinging to West Berlin as a military base. United States security interests were certainly not among those motives. Thus, the conclusion had been drawn that the U.S. wished to retain West Berlin as a hotbed of tensions.
The Secretary replied that Mr. Gromyko had greatly distorted this question. The fact was that on one side the U.S.S.R. wanted to raise its flag in East Berlin and East Germany and on the other side it wanted to lower our flag in West Berlin. That was totally unacceptable. The U.S.S.R. was in East Germany only because of the Nazi surrender. We had voluntarily abandoned Thuringia and Saxony to abide by the arrangements concluded during the war. We would not allow a situation where the Soviet Union would abandon its responsibilities and obligations in Germany. The Soviet Union must reckon with our vital interests. After all, we were not children, we were adults.
Mr. Gromyko replied that the Soviet Union did not place this problem in the plane of the U.S. allowing or not allowing something. The U.S.S.R. proceeded from objective realities, which were not contingent upon U.S. actions. The U.S.S.R. did not intend to raise its flag, it only wished to raise the flag of peace. The Soviet Union had never signed any obligation providing for the West's eternally staying in West Berlin and maintaining a NATO base there. Nobody in his right mind could have assumed such an obligation. In fact, there was no such obligation. It was the U.S. and its allies who had torn up their obligation and wished to keep only those obligations which were advantageous to them while discarding those which were not to their liking.
Mr. Gromyko then expressed regret that no agreement was discernible on the main question. This was clear from the present exchange of views, and he agreed with the Secretary on this point. This was a regrettable and sad situation.
The Secretary said that the basic problem remained where it had been since 1945, namely, whether the Soviet Union was willing to conduct its foreign policy on the basis of its solemn obligations and agreements or wanted to resort to the law of jungle. The U.S. wished a peaceful settlement, and there was no question about that. If such a settlement should prove impossible, the U.S. would not shirk its responsibilities. The Secretary then reiterated that we had gone a long way to resolve this question and all other questions relating to a German settlement, although our efforts to bring the positions of the two sides closer together had caused tensions with some of our allies. He wished to stress that the heart of the matter was whether the U.S.S.R. would recognize that the U.S. was a great power and could not be pushed around. He could assure Mr. Gromyko that the U.S. public would not be pushed around. Surely, agreement could be reached on the basis of reciprocity, but without reciprocity there was no possibility of agreement. So long as Mr. Kennedy was President and he, Mr. Rusk, Secretary of State, there would be no possibility of agreement without reciprocity.
Mr. Gromyko contended the Secretary's reproach regarding Soviet policy since World War II was unjustified. The Soviet Union had carried the main burden in that war, and many U.S. statesmen, including President Roosevelt, had correctly and objectively appreciated the Soviet Union's role and its burden in defeating the Nazis.
The Secretary interjected that the Soviet-Hitler agreement had opened the door to World War II, so that not too many tears should be shed over that.
Mr. Gromyko responded that this was an old story resorted to by people when they lost their equilibrium, and suggested that no time be wasted on this point.
The Secretary pointed out that the U.S. had never been an ally of Hitler, whereas the U.S.S.R. had in 1939-1940.
Mr. Gromyko continued that the aspersions the Secretary attempted to cast on Soviet policy were unjustified. It was not the U.S.S.R. but the West that had built bases surrounding the territories of other states, it was not the U.S.S.R. but the West that had started raising tensions, and it was not the USSR but the West that had torn up agreements. Thus, if the term law of jungle could be applied, it was the U.S. that had resorted to it in many instances since World War II. The Secretary was incorrect in saying that the U.S.S.R. was not dealing on the basis of reciprocity. The Secretary's assertion could not be proven in one single instance. The Soviet Union had emphasized and suggested that solutions should be sought on the basis of mutual acceptability and complete equality of both sides. The U.S. was for the observance of this principle only in words, whereas in fact it had a narrow view of problems and looked at them from the standpoint of NATO and the Western Powers. The U.S. rejected almost automatically and out of hand Soviet proposals so long as it was able to retain West Berlin as a NATO military base.
Mr. Gromyko said that in general he wanted to tell the Secretary that solution to the various problems could not be found on the basis of strong language; one must be more reasonable and cooler, because much was behind words and much depended on what one said. If the Secretary and the President sought common ground with the Soviet Union, they would find no lack of similar desire on the part of the Soviet Union. However, unfortunately as of now the Secretary's remarks did not indicate that the U.S. wished to pursue this course. Mr. Gromyko recalled that he stressed to the President today the Soviet view that it would be good if common language could be found between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on questions dividing them, including the question of a German peace treaty and of normalizing the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a treaty. He observed that apparently this conversation was drawing to an end.
The Secretary noted that Mr. Gromyko's last formulation was the same as the one used in Vienna in 1961, i.e., "German peace treaty and normalization of the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a treaty." He regretted that not more progress had been achieved, pointing out that the U.S. had tried to meet the U.S.S.R. on many questions involved in this problem. As to the main question, Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Khru-shchev must decide on what basis they were prepared to reach agreement. We knew on what basis we were prepared to reach agreement. The Soviet Union must decide whether there would be peace or not. We believed that all nations must live on the basis of peace, and if the U.S.S.R. joined UN members and lived in peace, that would revolutionize the world and there would be no problem with the U.S.
The Secretary continued that we would follow up on the points Mr. Gromyko had mentioned and try to narrow the differences. We had tried to narrow the differences in the past and would continue to do so in the future, in the hope that common language could be found. The Secretary then recalled Mr. Khrushchev's remark to one of his visitors that the Rusk-Gromyko talks would produce no progress and that the situation would remain more or less as it was. The Secretary regretted that no particular progress on this problem had been made during Mr. Gromyko's stay in the U.S., and stated that both sides must see whether they could bring these matters closer to agreement.
Mr. Gromyko expressed doubt that the Secretary had any reason to equate U.S. policy with the sentiments of UN members. He thought that the Secretary had attempted to place such a sign of equation. The Soviet Union was familiar with the sentiments in the UN and believed that the overwhelming majority of UN members favored a peaceful and just solution of acute international problems. Those feelings were not in accord with U.S. policy on most acute problems. Thus, the Secretary's attempt to equate U.S. policy with those feelings was unjustified. Mr. Gromyko then thanked the Secretary for the dinner and his hospitality.
The Secretary pointed out that, to his recollection, not a single proposal or resolution advanced in the UN by the U.S.S.R. against opposition by the U.S. had succeeded or been adopted.
Mr. Gromyko agreed and said that the Soviet Union was also familiar with the weaknesses and the darker aspects of UN activities. However, he was speaking of the general feeling of UN members, who were in favor of peaceful solution of international problems, of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, and of peaceful coexistence. This fact was as unquestionable as the fact that the sun would rise tomorrow. Mr. Gromyko concluded the conversation by saying that he merely wished to point out that no sign of equation could be placed between U.S. policy and the sentiments of UN members. Any attempt to do so was a little too much.
The conversation ended at 12:20 a.m.
137. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, October 18, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin. Secret.
SUBJECT
Review of Berlin Contingency Planning and Reorganization of the Planning Machinery
The Secretary has approved the Task Force's proposal to have the Ambassadorial Group reexamine Berlin contingency plans and take a careful look at the machinery for handling the Berlin operation with a view to tightening the plans and assuring that the machinery can provide the most effective responses to Soviet moves in Berlin. (The approved Task force paper is attached.)
Despite last week's loud cries and complaints about our paper/2/ describing the state of contingency planning, a good part of the contents of that paper are reproduced in the approved Task Force document.
/2/Not further identified.
This exercise could produce useful results. I am not sure about the recommendations dealing with the single Commander in Berlin and a single Ambassador in Bonn. Something more positive and specific is needed in Berlin. The problem of a single Ambassador is far more complicated than the paper indicates. But we will deal with these as we go along in the exercise.
An important question, however, is how this set of proposals fits into the broader scenario which you had in mind. On this we need a reading from you on how this Ambassadorial exercise can be dovetailed with other contemplated actions. One exercise need not exclude the other, but it is important that they reinforce each other. Can we get a reading from you on this?
DK
Attachment/3/
/3/Secret. Drafted by Ausland. On October 19 Thompson distributed a shorter version of this paper, BQD-99, to the Washington Ambassadorial Group, calling for a review of contingency planning with special attention to organization, planning, and delegation of authority. (Telegram 1039 to Bonn, October 20; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-2862) 1 2
Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to Secretary of State Rusk
SUBJECT
Review of Berlin Contingency Planning
This memorandum is in response to your request that the Berlin Task Force undertake a review of Berlin contingency planning, in order to identify all elements of the planning which have been left for further determination. You asked that this problem be discussed quadripartitely, with a view to obtaining agreement to recommend to governments advance commitments as much as possible.
In addition, the President has recently discussed a basic review of Berlin planning with the French and German Foreign Ministers./4/
/4/See Documents 130 and 134.
This paper examines three key aspects of planning: (1) organization, (2) planning, and (3) delegation of authority. Organization is the key to the preparation of plans and their application to specific situations by the person to whom authority is delegated. Planning is the key to the delegation of authority. Delegation of authority (advance commitments by government) is the key to rapid response to specific situations.
Organization
The present organization for the Berlin problem is illustrated by the attached chart (Tab A)./5/ This, however, over-simplifies the problem, since it implies that Berlin, Bonn, and Washington are organized on the same basis as Live Oak. This is, however, not the case.
/5/Not found.
Live Oak is an integrated, full-time staff, with one man in charge.
Berlin is run by three Commandants, with the help of a Governing Mayor. Although there is a Chairman Commandant, he has no authority to deal with most of the problems which arise in Berlin or on the access routes. Although there is provision for a single commander in event of "any grave emergency," the staff that is supposed to assist him--the Allied (Military) Staff--would be competent to handle only certain problems, such as civil unrest and an armed attack.
Berlin problems are handled in Bonn by the Foreign Office and three Ambassadors, assisted by a part-time quadripartite committee.
Although the Washington Ambassadorial Group is led by the US Chairman, it has no full-time quadripartite staff. The sub-groups are staffed by very few officers, particularly as far as the Embassies are concerned, who often have other duties and are invariably over-worked. Furthermore, the Ambassadorial Group (State Department) is not tied in with the Live Oak communications system.
If maximum improvements were desired in this organization, the following steps should be taken:
1. Leadership. Make provision for the President to designate a Single Commander in Berlin and Single Ambassador in Bonn whenever "any grave emergency" arises in Berlin or on the access routes.
2. Staff. Establish full-time quadripartite staffs with military advisers in Washington and Bonn and an integrated (political and military) full-time tripartite staff in Berlin.
3. Facilities. Make available in the State Department, the American Embassy in Bonn, and the British Headquarters in Berlin adequate space and facilities for these staffs.
4. Communications. Tie the Ambassadorial Group (State Department) in with the Live Oak on-line telegraph communications system.
It should be understood that these steps are closely related and none can be fully effective without the other; on the other hand, we believe that some improvements should be possible at this time.
Planning and delegation of authority
The present state of Allied planning and delegation of authority is indicated by Tab B./6/ This indicates that the planning now underway relates to:
/6/Not found.
1. Military
a. Quadripartite naval counter-measures: Seaspray
b. NATO alerts/military build-up
c. NATO BERCON/MARCON plans/Tripartite-NATO relationship/preferred sequence paper
2. Political
a. Civilian ground access: Passports, visas, and customs and possible Allied aegis
b. Peace treaty
c. United Nations
3. Counter-measures
a. Military (tripartite autobahn patrols, autobahn convoys for individual Allied travelers, etc.)
b. Non-military (selective economic and other non-military counter-measures)
The chart also indicates that delegations of authority are primarily related to military plans (Jack Pine and autobahn convoy rules of conduct). Very little authority has been delegated in the non-military areas, primarily because governments are unwilling.
Both planning and the delegation of authority could be facilitated if the organizational suggestions made above were carried out. If there were agreement for the President to appoint a Single Commander in Berlin and a Single Ambassador in Bonn, plans could be prepared on the basis of the assumption that they would exercise certain delegated authority. This would require, however, that the Single Commander and Single Ambassador have full-time staffs, supported by adequate facilities and communications.
Conclusions
1. Organization. Although we should direct our efforts toward the goal of ultimately obtaining quadripartite agreement to the President having authority to appoint a Single Commander in Berlin and Single Ambassador in Bonn, we should not introduce this into the quadripartite forum at this time. We should concentrate rather on the development of an integrated full-time tripartite staff in Berlin and a full-time quadripartite staff with military advisers in Bonn. In order to facilitate communication between the Ambassadorial Group and Berlin, Bonn, and Live Oak, we should arrange for the Ambassadorial Group (State Department) to be linked to the Live Oak communications net. We should also prepare space and facilities for a quadripartite staff in Washington.
2. Planning. The Ambassadorial Group should double its efforts, in order to accomplish the following no later than November 15:
a. Establishment of Seaspray, for the coordination of naval counter-measures.
b. Submission to NAC of quadripartite plans for a Phase II military build-up.
c. Submission to NAC of quadripartite plans regarding a possible peace treaty.
d. A basic review of plans to meet a possible GDR demand for passports, visas, and customs.
In addition, as suggested by Foreign Minister Schroeder, the Ambassadorial Group could review existing plans to be sure they are current and consistent with each other.
3. Delegation of authority. The Ambassadorial Group should also review present plans, to determine if there are any further areas in which authority could be delegated to Berlin, Bonn, or Live Oak. It should examine in particular:
a. Free Style and related Allied ground access plans.
b. Jack Pine and related air access plans.
c. Plans related to civilian access.
Recommendation
That you authorize us to initiate a review of Berlin contingency in the Ambassadorial Group along the lines indicated in the conclusions above./7/
/7/There is no indication on the source text of Rusk's action on the recommendation.
138. Record of Meeting of the Military Sub-Group of the Washington Ambassadorial Group/1/
Sub BQD-Military 35
Washington, October 22, 1962, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, 092 Germany. Top Secret. Prepared in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
PARTICIPANTS
United States
Mr. Nitze, ISA, Chairman
General Gray, JCS
Dr. Mountain, ISA
Col. Meacham, ISA
Col. Armstrong, ISA
Capt. Cotten, ISA
Col. Preer, SG
Mr. Hillenbrand, State
Mr. Ausland, State
Mr. Blitgen, State
Mr. Smyser, State
Mr. Klein, White House
United Kingdom
Lord Hood
General West
Mr. Brooke
Mr. Greenhill
Colonel Coke
Captain Fanshawe
France
M. Winckler
Admiral Douget
Colonel Hounau
M. Pelen
Germany
Mr. Schnippenkoetter
Dr. Wieck
General Steinhoff
General Huekelheim
[Here follows discussion of Cuba.]
M. Winckler: What is your assumption on possible reaction in Berlin?
Mr. Hillenbrand: One of the possible ways in which the Soviets might choose to react would be through measures in Berlin, as for example by harassment, possibly just against the U.S., possibly of a wider scope. However, Berlin isn't the only place in which they might choose to react.
Mr. Nitze: They have several alternatives. One of the reasons for the use of "quarantine" and not "blockade" is to avoid the connection which Khrushchev is trying to make between Cuba and Berlin.
M. Winckler: Is your assumption now, considering the present balance of forces, that Khrushchev will not move in Berlin?
Mr. Nitze: I think it is wholly accurate to say that Gromyko stated more forcefully than has been done before the Soviet intention to proceed in Berlin.
Lord Hood: Regarding the Soviet promise not to act on Berlin before the U.S. elections, they said, "unless the U.S. acts". This is the "unless".
Mr. Nitze: It has become clear what they meant by holding off until the U.S. elections. Would it not be useful for us to explore in this group what we judge Soviet intentions are in the steps they have taken?
Lord Hood: Any statements I could make would be off the top of my head.
M. Winckler: I think it would be a profitable thing to do.
Mr. Nitze: I can give only my personal feelings, but from a long range point of view the Soviet intention could be to secure the removal of U.S. forces from overseas bases, which would include Western forces in Berlin. As an intermediate goal, the Soviets may be seeking to put pressure on the Alliance structure in the hope of producing fissures in it. The U.S., of course, has been under ICBM's for some time, but this Soviet move in Cuba is a very extreme one. It changes the balance of power.
M. Winckler: This is a pretty big gamble.
Mr. Nitze: Yes, it is a quantum jump on Khrushchev's part. This suggests to me, personally, if the crisis has been stepped up by this quantum jump, that the perspective in which to view some of the issues before this group has changed and some of the issues have become minor to the extent that we ought to settle them quickly or forget about them, and also that we have got to deal with some of the major issues. A failure to act is dangerous, and we might proceed on the basis that (a) we must have unity in the Alliance, (b) minor issues must be disposed of, and (c) we must deal with the major issues with both caution and resolution.
As to the tactical reasons behind this Soviet move, some have suggested that it was necessary to keep the momentum of Soviet leadership. This I regard as questionable, although you may remember the report of a Soviet Ambassador stating to someone that he had seen the Soviet plans for Berlin and they now meet the Chinese criteria. It is possible that Khrushchev's interests in Latin America are behind this move, and that this is a major ploy in this direction. He may be thinking of setting up a negotiating position. Again, he might have contingent objectives, and depending on our reaction, may pursue one or another.
[Here follows additional discussion of Cuba.]
Mr. Schnippenkoetter: I have two points. First, are the number of topics to be discussed between Washington and Moscow now wider than before: What does this mean for Berlin? Is Berlin being put aside, or does it come into sharper focus in this situation?
Mr. Nitze: We can't tell until we see what the Soviets say.
Lord Hood: Or, even more important, what they do.
Mr. Nitze: I would say that high on the list of probabilities, is some move in Berlin.
Lord Hood: I agree.
M. Winckler: I think this means that we must move on such matters as alerts, etc.
Mr. Nitze: I think it is fair to expect that our business here will boom.
Mr. Schnippenkoetter: My second point is that Berlin contingency plans have been made in a context which was principally limited to Berlin. Does the new picture which emerges from these actions taken by your government alter the general nature of our plans? Does this place new restraints on these plans or will this situation speed them up and strengthen them?
Mr. Nitze: Our planning has been based on the development of a crisis, and although the initiation of the crisis could be in Berlin, our planning has proceeded beyond that immediate area. I would therefore say that the basis for our planning has been sound and is not overturned by these recent events. (Discussion then halted so that the group could listen to the President's speech. At the end of the speech, there was no further group discussion and the meeting adjourned at 7:20 P.M.)
139. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (Smith) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone/1/
Washington, October 23, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Materials. Top Secret. At the 10 a.m. meeting of the Executive Committee of the NSC on October 23 President Kennedy had asked McCone for an analysis of the effect of a blockade on Berlin. (Minutes of the Executive Committee; Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2362)
SUBJECT
Survivability of West Berlin/2/
/2/This memorandum has been coordinated with the representative of the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. [Footnote in the source text.]
ASSUMPTION: SOVIET BLOCKADE OF WEST BERLIN IN RETALIATION FOR US ACTIONS IN CUBA
1. West Berlin is economically prepared for a total blockade. We estimate that existing stocks of critical items are sufficient to maintain the physical well-being of the West Berlin population for at least six months. With respect to particular categories of critical supplies, we estimate:
Food: At least six months (with selective rationing)
Fuel (Coal): About 1 year
Medicines: Six months
Industrial material: Sufficient to maintain employment for 4-5 months.
2. The critical factor, however, is not physical or economic but psychological. Everything would depend on the context of the Soviet move, and how quickly and forcefully the US reacted. A total and uncontested blockade would cause the West Berliners to lose all hope in a matter of weeks. A blockade contested by a successful airlift would probably relieve initial apprehension and sustain morale for a few months. Over a longer period, however, morale would deteriorate rapidly in the absence of a reasonable expectation that the US would break the blockade. The West Berliners would become extraordinarily sensitive to, and suspicious of any indication from either side that the Cuban crisis might produce an accommodation at their expense.
Abbott Smith/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
140. Record of Meeting No. 1 of the Berlin-NATO Subcommittee/1/
NSC/Excom/BER-NATO
Washington, October 24, 1962, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Cuban Missile Crisis. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. At the second meeting of the Executive Committee of the NSC, October 23, at 6 p.m., President Kennedy confirmed Nitze as the chairman of the subcommittee on Berlin-NATO preparations and invited him to meet regularly with the Executive Committee in this capacity. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Executive Committee Meetings, Record of Action for Meeting No. 2) In an attachment to his record of the Daily White House Staff Meeting on October 24, Legere indicated that, in addition to representatives of the JCS, CIA, USIA, Treasury, and OSD, Nitze, Thompson, Hillenbrand, Schaetzel, Klein, and he were members of the subcommittee. Legere and Klein sent their joint account of the meeting to Bundy on October 24. (Ibid., Countries Series, Germany, Berlin)
1. Provision of Information to Allies.
[Here follow paragraphs a-f on Cuba.]
g. With regard to a possible political problem in Europe (some elements may blame the US for the Berlin crisis), the US should emphasize that the Soviet actions in Cuba led to a heightened Berlin crisis, and that if we had not acted toward the current Cuban situation the Berlin crisis would have been much worse. Consensus was to conduct a background briefing on a broad basis to include the possibility of releasing additional Gromyko talk material. (Action: Ambassador Thompson will discuss with Secretary Rusk)
2. Functions of the Sub-Committee.
The President desires this group of officials to focus on the combined crises of Berlin and Cuba. The Sub-Committee may not act on a day-to-day basis, but it must tie together long range policies and day-to-day operations. In addition, there may be items from the NSC meetings which this Sub-Committee may need to address urgently.
3. Evacuation of Dependents from Moscow.
This proposal was discussed briefly. (Action: Ambassador Thompson to have paper prepared for agenda)
4. Nuclear Cooperation with France.
An OSD paper was tabled for subsequent consideration./2/ (Action in State: Mr. Schaetzel)
/2/Not found.
5. Soviet Inspection of US Traffic to Berlin.
Considerable discussion on inspection included: question of linking Cuba and Berlin, need to include both East Berlin and West Berlin, requirement to coordinate with FRG, problem of possible blockage or inspection of traffic of all three Powers versus that of the US alone, the tail-gate problem in that the current UK and US practices are different, the possibility of Soviet demands to inspect rail traffic, and the question of "elbow room" or facesaver for the Soviets.
Consensus was that the US should not initiate this subject, but should be prepared for it if it comes up in the UN or elsewhere. A new paper will be prepared. (Action: Mr. Hillenbrand, State)
6. Dramatic Berlin Action to Surprise Soviets.
The need for this type of action was noted.
7. Nuclear Weapons in Berlin.
Consensus was that this would not be a useful undertaking.
8. US Build-up in the Berlin Crisis.
An OSD paper was tabled./3/ A short paper should be prepared to answer the President's question concerning the possibility of build-up in Europe if forces are frozen for Cuban contingency plans. This paper will request authority to initiate exploratory discussions with our quadripartite Allies. (Action: Mr. Nitze)
/3/The preliminary draft of this paper has not been found; for the final text, see Document 143.
9. Economic Countermeasures.
The readiness of governments, US and Allied, to implement economic countermeasures was reviewed. State will prepare a paper on status of readiness of Allied governments. (Action: Mr. Schaetzel, State)
10. Breaking of Diplomatic Relations.
The possibility that the Soviets may break relations with the US was briefly discussed. Two questions arise: a. Would the US want its Allies to break relations with the USSR?; b. Would the US want to break relations with the satellites? These questions require study to include the implications upon intelligence. (Action: Ambassador Thompson; and General Twitchell and Mr. Murphy)
141. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions/1/
Washington, October 24, 1962, 11:59 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2462. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Thompson, cleared by Tyler, and approved by Rusk. Sent to the NATO capitals, Bern, Stockholm, Vienna, and Berlin.
744. Policy. Unless you perceive objection, you should seek early occasion to complain to Foreign Minister or other appropriate official how this Government has viewed Soviet policy with respect to Cuban crisis.
Beginning in middle of summer, there were a number of indications that Khrushchev and Soviet Government had concluded there was no possibility Soviet Union could obtain its objectives with respect to Berlin through negotiation. There were also indications that Khrushchev felt too personally committed to achievement of his objectives in Berlin to retreat, as well as indications that factors which were pushing Soviet Government to a resolution of this problem were increasing (situation in East Germany, Communist Chinese pressure, etc.) and that Soviet Union had decided showdown on Berlin problem was inevitable within some months. There were also indications that Soviet Government and Khrushchev personally had developed doubts as to whether they could win in a showdown and that alternatives might be either an ignominious retreat or nuclear war.
Soviet Government privately and later publicly stated that while it would insist upon conclusive discussion of Berlin problem in relatively short period, it would not do so until after American Congressional elections. It maintained this position even though it was made clear to them that so far as US Government concerned, elections had no bearing on the problem.
A number of assurances were given by Soviet Government both privately and publicly that it would not arm Cuba with offensive weapons. This was not merely dialectical discussion but specific assurances against weapons that could reach the US. Tass statement of September 11 said that Soviet Union had no need to take such action. This statement, which was largely concerned with Cuban situation, related it to question of German peace treaty and other international problems.
When Gromyko saw President October 18,/2/ he made standard but strong statement about Berlin and German peace treaty issues and then made following statements about Cuba: Soviet assistance to Cuba "pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba"; that "training by Soviet specialists of Cuban nationals in handling defensive armaments was by no means offensive" and that "if it were otherwise, the Soviet Government would have never become involved in rendering such assistance."
/2/See Document 135.
Khrushchev indicated to Ambassador Kohler/3/ that he had virtually decided to come to UN meeting in New York latter part of November and Gromyko in his conversation with President confirmed this, although no specific date was set.
/3/See Document 133.
When Soviet action in arming Cuba with offensive nuclear missiles became evident, it was because of developments set forth above that this Government tended believe Soviet action was probably primarily geared to showdown on Berlin, intended to be timed with Khrushchev's arrival in US and completion of installation of these missiles in Cuba.
Addressees may discreetly use general line foregoing and particularly substance Gromyko's statement to President on Berlin on October 18, in background talks with foreign correspondents.
FYI. Purpose of this message is to improve understanding that any Berlin crisis will be due to Soviet action. In point of fact, Cuban crisis may well have effect of improving overall position of West in Berlin through clear-cut evidence of our resolution.
Rusk
142. Paper Agreed by the Berlin-NATO Subcommittee/1/
NSC/ExCom/Sub-Com BER-NATO #1
Washington, October 24, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but is attached to a memorandum from Nitze to the Executive Committee of the NSC, October 26, which states that the paper was agreed by the subcommittee at its meeting on October 25. A 2-page record of the second meeting of the Berlin-NATO Subcommittee is in Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Cuban Missile Crisis.
SOVIET/GDR INSPECTION OF ALLIED TRAFFIC INTO BERLIN
1. Problem:
Suppose the Soviets demanded they be allowed to examine all Allied cargo entering Berlin, as a quarantine against offensive weapons there. Suppose further that they suggested this might be the extent of their reply to our quarantine of Cuba. What should the US position be?
2. Background:
a. Allied air traffic entering Berlin has never been subjected to any form of Soviet examination.
b. Cargo being moved by autobahn or rail aboard properly documented Allied vehicles has never been subjected to Soviet examination.
c. The Soviets have repeatedly tried over the years to extend their control over Allied traffic to Berlin, but Allied insistence on the two points above has been adamant.
d. The Allies have brought neither nuclear weapons nor missiles (bazookas and recoilless rifles are not regarded as missiles, nor are they remotely comparable to MRBMs) into Berlin.
3. Discussion:
To concede to the Soviets a right on which we have continuously and strenuously insisted during nearly two decades would constitute a marked softening of the Allied position concerning Berlin. Implicit in the right to examine cargo, the Soviets would argue, is the right to determine what sort of cargo may enter. Soviet efforts to assert such rights would infringe upon vital Allied interests regarding the presence and security of Allied forces in Berlin.
The Berlin population would be seriously upset if the Allies were to allow examination of land cargoes, but they would be deprived of the foundation of their sense of freedom if the Soviets were permitted to examine Allied air traffic. It is the West Berliner's ability to fly in and out of West Berlin completely free of any Soviet or GDR inspection that sustains him psychologically.
Turning to the relationship with the Cuba quarantine, it would be a good thing indeed to know that the Soviets would have no other reaction than a demand to inspect Berlin traffic. But how could one count on it? What justification would there be for believing, and for assuring Allied populations and the West Berliners, that this represented the final slice of salami rather than one more slice among many?
If the Soviets were allowed to inspect the cargoes, they could later turn this "right" over to the GDR, thus extending in a major way the de facto sovereignty of the GDR.
The quadripartite Allies have quite recently reconfirmed the long-standing Allied position on refusing Soviet examination of cargo.
As the US has forcefully and publicly proclaimed, no logical connection exists between a free West Berlin whose people want Allied troops on hand and a Cuba whose subjugated people want Soviet forces and weapons to leave. To make such a trade-off as is suggested would corrupt this main element of the US political case.
4. Conclusion:
a. It would be against the security interests of the US and its Allies to permit such inspection.
b. Since we would not only suffer Soviet intrusion onto our long-standing rights in Berlin, but also lack assurance that intrusion would go no farther, such a demand would be unacceptable.
Paul H. Nitze
143. Memorandum for the President/1/
NSC/ExCom/BER-NATO #7 (Final)
Washington, October 27, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but is attached to a memorandum from Nitze to the Executive Committee of the NSC, October 27, stating that it had been agreed by the Berlin-NATO Subcommittee at its meeting that day. A record of the fourth meeting of the subcommittee, held at 11 a.m. on October 27, is in Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Miscellaneous.
SUBJECT
Buildup and Deployment in Phase II of a Berlin Contingency
The Department of Defense has prepared in broad outline a plan for the buildup and deployment of forces which is contemplated, if and as required, in Phase II of a Berlin contingency as described in NSAM-109./2/ It is based on the projection of information provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and has been coordinated informally with the Department of State. It does not yet, however, constitute a governmental position.
/2/Vol. XIV, Document 185.
The purpose of the plan is to make available on call varying levels of augmentation of forces, and to make possible rapid deployments, which will be appropriate to the degree of threat posed by Soviet action, and to provide alternatives to piecemeal expediency or premature general mobilization. It is intended to provide necessary forces, and their support, to meet a developing situation, and to deny to the Soviets the advantage of the accordion tactic of forcing us to oscillate between the extremes of normal readiness and all-out mobilization, with the severe national disruption this would entail.
The plan is divided into four increments, each of which, if ordered directly into effect, would encompass all the provisions of the preceding increment(s). There is no built-in automaticity, however, which would require implementation of a later increment if the previous one has proved sufficient to the need.
Each increment includes appropriate reserve alert and call-up and logistic measures. The first increment provides the heaviest force increase (a Corps force of 3 Army divisions, 1 Marine Division/Wing Team with amphibious task force, 10 Air Force Fighter Squadrons and naval units), the second a lesser ground force but more naval and air force (2 Army divisions, 1 Marine Division/Wing Team with amphibious task force, the US 2nd Fleet, and up to 25 TAC fighter squadrons with necessary combat and logistic support forces), the third includes 1 Army division force, and the fourth calls for general mobilization. No increment is directly dependent on any pre-set date or event for its execution but can be implemented when required. Each increment requires approximately 30 days for execution of the measures which it contains; execution of the increments in succession, if so ordered, is on a cumulative time scale.
Although the buildup and deployment plan is primarily oriented toward Berlin, it is adaptable in appreciable measure to a crisis anywhere and at any time. For instance, in the present Cuban context there remain substantial US strategic reserves to reinforce Europe on schedule by utilizing expanded commercial air and sea lift. Without regard to the timing of Cuban contingency plans, a modified first increment would include two Army Divisions forces slated to "marry up" with the equipment already positioned for them in Europe, a third Army division without support elements and 10 TAC Fighter Squadrons released from the Cuban contingency or mobilized from the reserves.
It would be useful if the corresponding plans of our Berlin partners could be generally built on the same incremental framework as our own. This would ensure that our mutual plans dovetail as closely as possible so as to present a united deterrent if the necessity to implement them should arise. It would, in addition, facilitate development of similar plans by the remaining NATO Allies, and lend added emphasis to the message conveyed to the Soviets.
In order to undertake discussions in the Quadripartite Military Sub-Group directed toward this end, authority is therefore requested to discuss on a no-commitment basis with the representatives of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom this general outline plan as discussed above, and to solicit from them their plans, in turn, for discussion ad referendum. Plans will be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment and concurrence prior to progressing beyond the informal discussion stage in the Quadripartite Military Sub-Group.
A supporting study is being prepared which assesses the implications for the budget and the Balance of Payments.
144. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, October 28, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin. Secret.
SUBJECT
Berlin--Some Random Thoughts--Late Sunday Night
1. The Soviets might now--conceivably--push hard on Berlin to offset their Cuban losses.
2. On balance, however, this seems doubtful. A move against Berlin would ultimately end in negotiations (unless the Soviets wanted to resort to the use of force, which hardly seems likely, at least under current Kremlin management). And this is not the most propitious time for the Soviets to enter into negotiations on Berlin. Therefore, if all other things remain equal, admittedly a large assumption, we should not have an early major push on Berlin.
3. The question then is whether we should not try to take the initiative and do something about Berlin at this time.
4. In many ways this is a good time for us, particularly if Cuba is settled on the terms that now seem likely. Our bargaining position is incomparably better than it was several weeks back. And since we would be negotiating from greater strength, we would have a greater degree of maneuverability than we have had at any time since 1953.
5. Also, if we could put together an interesting package, Nikita (assuming he remains at the helm) might find it useful to give it serious consideration, if only as a means to recover some of the substantial ground he lost by his Cuban adventure.
6. If all this is so, might we not try to see what kind of an arrangement we would want in Berlin--an arrangement that was also saleable to the Soviets--and let the Soviets know what was possible. In this connection, a reexamination of the 10-point declaration might be a useful starting point for an internal U.S. exercise which should be fully completed before it is discussed anywhere else.
7. For the negotiations themselves, Thompson/Dobrynin might be the best channel. I doubt that Nikita would now be eager for an early confrontation with the President. Gromyko is also an unlikely discussion partner since he is a discredited figure at this juncture and should be treated as such. And even though the New York channel has some possibilities, it has several clearly built-in disadvantages.
8. As for timing, if my working assumptions are correct (and all of them are clearly debatable) an early approach to the Soviets on Berlin would seem to make considerable political sense.
David Klein/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
145. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Regional Organizations/1/
Washington, October 28, 1962, 1:47 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-2862. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ausland and Kranich; cleared by Kitchen, Hillenbrand, Tyler, R/PM, and the Department of Defense (ISA); and approved by Johnson. Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, London, Moscow, SHAPE, U.S. Element Live Oak, CINCEUR, USAFE, and USAREUR.
Topol 581. Subject: Relationship Cuba Crisis to Berlin. In Quadripartite meeting UK representatives, supported by those of France and FRG, have strongly urged US to elaborate during NAC meeting October 30 on its assessment of relationship of Soviet action in Cuba to possible showdown on Berlin. In this connection German Embassy provided us with short and useful paper (which has been sent separately as airgram)/2/ indicating FRG expectation that Soviets may shortly take action in context Berlin. They foresee possible barring of Allied, mainly US, access to East Berlin as well as harassment of Allied military traffic to Berlin.
/2/CA-4547, October 26. (Ibid., 762.00/10-2662)
Circular 744/3/ sets forth in general terms assessment Soviet policy with respect to Cuban crisis, concluding that in general terms US tends to believe Soviet action was probably primarily geared to showdown on Berlin, intended to be timed with Khrushchev's arrival in US and completion of installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba. Following comments are designed to expand somewhat on this general concept as well as to assess possible Soviet resort to "adjustments" in plans for Berlin stemming from US action to eliminate Soviet missile bases. You should draw on Cirtel 744 and this message as guidance for comments in October 30 meeting.
/3/Document 141.
General credibility. You should emphasize that in view of previous clear statements that US could not tolerate Soviet offensive-type missile deployment in Cuba, these missiles must obviously be eliminated if US determination to honor commitments, including those concerning Berlin, is to remain credible throughout world. Allies appreciate US firmness is cornerstone their defense against Soviet aggression. Equally important, however, USSR must fully realize there exists no basis for miscalculation of US intentions. Otherwise, gravest possible risk of war might arise from Soviet underestimation US resolve to maintain vital interests of Alliance in Berlin.
Military significance. You should also emphasize that Soviet nuclear missile bases in Cuba are not just another complex of overseas bases. These bases have special significance since missiles based in USSR and targeted on US nuclear forces are still relatively few in number. In addition, we have radar systems which pick up missiles coming over ice-cap from Soviet Union. The limitations on Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile capability provides West with margin of nuclear superiority which is heart of Western deterrent. If Soviets had been permitted to complete substantial missile program in Cuba, balance of nuclear power could have been significantly shifted. IRBM's in Cuba would be free of radar detection and with zero alert time both ICBM sites and SAC bases could come under attack without warning and with greater accuracy due to short range. This could seriously prejudice US nuclear posture and with first strike from Cuba Soviets could seriously impair US capability to cover all necessary targets.
Timing. Obviously Soviet timetable for Berlin showdown upset by US action. Now remains to be seen whether Soviets will attempt to move against Allied interests in Berlin, as expected by FRG. If Soviets now reduced from what we estimated to be larger objectives to level of harassments they may choose to engage in harassment before Cuban missile sites are liquidated. Should Soviet Berlin action be directed mainly at US we would expect full Alliance support. In this respect FRG has indicated it would consider Soviet action against US traffic as an action against Allied traffic as a whole.
FYI. At quadripartite meeting October 27, it was agreed four Perm Reps should concert on handling discussion in NAC, on basis this message, UK assessment of effect of Cuban crisis on Berlin, and German paper referred to above. In view Limitel, request you obtain UK assessment from UK delegation.
Rusk
146. Memorandum From David Klein and Colonel Lawrence J. Legere to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, October 29, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin. Top Secret. Initialed by Klein.
SUBJECT
Meeting of the Nitze Subcommittee (October 29)
The principal item on the agenda was maintaining the momentum of the Cuban development, with specific attention to the question of strengthening NATO and the next steps in Berlin.
At the end of the meeting Paul Nitze suggested, and it was agreed, that insofar as Berlin was concerned, the next step was to examine possible arrangements which would stabilize the Berlin situation for a substantial period, and the tactical means for bringing this about. A primary consideration is to reach such arrangement without, if possible, forcing a direct U.S.-USSR military confrontation.
Although Ambassador Thompson went along with the proposed course of action on the understanding that the strictest security would be maintained, he clearly was out of sympathy with the project as proposed. He said that he was reluctant to touch Berlin at this time lest the Soviets become concerned that we were intent upon pushing them--and this time on a very vital issue for the Kremlin. In this context Ambassador Thompson dwelled at length on the differences between Cuba and Berlin in the Soviet view. Therefore he felt the immediate point of departure and concentration on talks with the Soviets should be disarmament or nuclear testing or non-aggression arrangements between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, all of which he believes would ultimately facilitate discussions on Berlin. Moreover, he is concerned that if Berlin is brought under consideration in the present climate, the Germans would push for a substantially harder position than we would want to take./2/
/2/In a memorandum to Secretary Rusk on October 29, Thompson reported that Nitze had told him after the Executive Committee meeting that morning that the President wanted Nitze's group "to work out urgently some alternative solutions to the Berlin problem." Thompson informed Rusk that he had raised the objections described in this memorandum. In a subsequent meeting among Thompson, Bundy and Nitze, it was agreed that this work would be done by Nitze, Hillenbrand, Thompson, Rostow, and such staffers as were needed. Thompson added that it appeared that the President believed the United States could push its Allies harder following the Cuban crisis. (Department of State, S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2, Thompson Memos)
Nevertheless, the consensus was that Berlin ought to be looked at now--first substantively and then tactically and the discussions kept under wraps until there was a decision to bring it to the fore.
This led to the question of NATO--consultation and maintaining the present momentum./3/ Nitze indicated he was prepared, if necessary, to go to Paris this week--Thursday perhaps--to describe for NAC the Cuban developments--in historical terms--avoiding any attempt at a prognosis of future moves. He felt that this was necessary and if done properly could provide us with a lever for pressing NAC to take a hard look at issues it has thus far been reluctant to act upon.
/3/At the meeting on October 29 the subcommittee also approved NSC/ExCom/BER-NATO #9, a 1-page memorandum for the President on consultation with the Allies, which stated that the Cuban crisis had highlighted the need for constant and systematic consultation and recommended that the Ambassadorial Group and both the civilian and military branches of NATO be regularly briefed on the situation. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
David Klein L.J. Legere/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.
147. Editorial Note
On October 30 Chairman Khrushchev sent a 16-page letter to President Kennedy discussing Cuba, nuclear testing, Berlin, and China. On Berlin he repeated the arguments that he had made to Ambassador Kohler (see Document 133) and stated that it was time to eliminate this "hotbed of international tension in the center of Europe." (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163) The full text of the letter is printed in volume VI.
148. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, November 5, 1962, noon.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-562. Secret; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Paris and Moscow.
598. Sovs must be convinced by this time we really mean that Allied presence in Berlin is non-negotiable. If there to be further talks with Sovs on Berlin, they may come round to recognize this fact, implicitly if not explicitly. While we no doubt prefer press consistent Allied position based on preserving Four-Power status and working out new access arrangements, might be good idea be prepared with alternative package if Sovs show interest in face-saving compromise. Sovs might well refuse discuss any such proposal but suggested approach and reasoning that follows is designed give Sovs chance claim progress toward their goals and at same time maintain our vital interests.
Our insistence on Allied presence does not stem from obsolete desire maintain wartime military government in Berlin. We too interested in drawing line under World War II, without abandoning objective of reunited Germany or obligation protect freedom West Berlin. In order narrow difference between us, might find way to end occupation regime and put Allied troops in West Berlin on contractual basis following example Sov troops East Germany. Our troops must remain in order fulfill commitment to defend West Berlin but Sov abandonment responsibilities over East Berlin suggests need for adjustments in West Berlin. Allies accordingly might give up wartime powers and sovereignty in West Berlin except obligation to defend city.
Question arises as to where sovereignty would then rest. It could not be given up to GDR nor to free city, i.e. third division of Germany. Only logical place for West Berlin, pending reunification of Germany, would be for it to join that part of Germany which has same political, economic and social system, i.e. FedRep. Allies therefore should withdraw reservation to full association of West Berlin with FedRep. This reservation was made on assumption Sov Government was committed to reunification of Germany on basis of free elections, an assumption which since 1958 has lost its validity through unilateral actions by USSR. At same time Allies would make contractual arrangement with FedRep by which they would retain task of continuing to ensure freedom and defense of West Berlin. In short, Allies would give up sovereignty and all functions of military government except defense which would include ultimate control over West Berlin police forces.
A new status for Allied presence in West Berlin and for West Berlin itself must meet squarely the problem of relations with East Berlin regime and access to Berlin. Admitting that there are many contacts with GDR at present especially among Germans and that such relations are bound to increase over the years, Allies might well accept same controls in traveling to and from Berlin that Germans accept, provided free access for both Allied and German traffic is guaranteed. This could be done through a quadipartite commitment and international access and control authority which would also have to be underwritten by FedRep and GDR.
To make this proposal more acceptable to Soviets it is assumed we would be willing to go quite a distance to meet their demands for recognition of Oder-Neisse line, NATO-Warsaw non-aggression pact, and non-diffusion of nuclear weapons. In addition we might, pending reunification of Germany, give de facto recognition to incorporation of East Berlin into East German state. Might also consider willingness have Federal Republic modify Hallstein doctrine.
In suggesting foregoing, part of which inspired by Senator Schiller's proposal in connection with plebiscite (conversation with Franklin Roosevelt), assumption is made that Allies would reaffirm in clearest way possible their guarantee to defend Berlin. There might be some difficulty in defining responsibilities of Allies and those of German authorities under contractual arrangement, but it should be possible to assure overriding authority of Allies in all defense matters both in planning and in emergencies. This might even require closer working relations with German authorities than exist at present in military and police field. Allies would cease to deal with practically all activities that come under Kommandatura. Reorganization on Allied side might even contemplate integrated command.
If at any stage in discussions it would seem useful to suggest that Allied forces under contract to protect Berlin might be constabulary rather than army forces, I assume this would make very little difference to us. We could probably only agree to do this in name as in fact they would remain military units.
It is recognized that this proposal means giving up Four-Power status which is legal basis for our presence in Berlin. The question is whether gains outweigh this legal disadvantage.
This proposal would undoubtedly be hailed as step toward recognition of GDR. However, many people including Schroeder, Brandt and I hope Adenauer himself recognize that we must take certain chances in this direction and be willing to make certain de facto arrangements. Modification Hallstein doctrine might permit FedRep to establish diplomatic relations with Poland, Czechoslavakia, etc., without affecting policies three Allies and NATO toward de jure recognition.
Proposal may be interpreted as attempt by Allies to pave way for ultimate withdrawing from their Berlin commitments. It cannot disguise fact Germans would be taking on powers formerly held by Allies. Berlin Senat might welcome greater autonomy but there probably would be real problem overcoming widespread German anxieties. Major effort would be required to show that contractual agreement to defend city affords adequate protection.
Sovs might of course refuse to discuss any plan that incorporated West Berlin in FedRep. In that case we would at least have shown our reasonableness and fact we not wedded to status quo. It would appear as serious offer to end what must seem to many people, particularly in uncommitted countries, to be anachronistic prolongation of military occupation.
Mission's earlier suggestions to make Berlin eleventh Land were conceived of as unilateral actions to improve Western bargaining position or as retaliation against some major Sov harassment or against a separate peace treaty. Senator Schiller's recent suggestion which included contractual basis for Allied forces was proposed as question to be put to West Berlin people in plebiscite. New suggestion is based on thought it might be put up as part of package to the Russians for negotiation, since it goes considerable distance in meeting many of their demands. At appropriate time some kind of plebiscite in West Berlin with reference to this package might be desirable.
Before any such package could be mentioned to Sovs even as trial balloon it would presumably have to be discussed with Brit, French and Germans. This in itself could be delicate matter. Discussion among Germans would reveal certain differences in outlook between SPD-influenced Berlin and CDU-influenced Bonn govt recognition, ties, access, etc. (We submitting separate analysis this trend.) Hence believe somewhat futile to expect much in way of new initiatives from Germans. As in past new proposals unlikely to be made unless they originate from American side.
Lightner
149. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Berlin-NATO Subcommittee (Nitze) to President Kennedy/1/
I-26257/62
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: "Ret'd from Mrs. Lincoln 11/5/62."
The attached paper, "Berlin in Light of Cuba", arises from the work of the NSC Subcommittee on Berlin but is not an agreed paper. It represents my views after discussion with the group.
I believe that we should make every effort in good time to find a long-term solution to the Berlin question and, if possible, the German question. Otherwise we may find ourselves someday in a Berlin crisis, where we all will wish we had taken more radical measures to lance the boil despite the recognized risks, costs and difficulties. The view of others of the group is that the attached paper underestimates the difficulties in arriving at long-term solutions and that there are unwarranted dangers in considering what they believe to be impracticable ideas.
The key to practicability may well be in areas beyond Germany and Berlin, the area assigned to the Rostow group./2/ I have passed on to Walt some of my ideas in this broader area. They include the following:
/2/At the second meeting of the Executive Committee of the NSC on October 23, Rostow had been confirmed as the chairman of a subcommittee on advance planning. (Ibid., Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Vol. 1)
A. Disarmament
A radical proposal, but one which I believe could be to our interest on its own feet, would be Warsaw Pact-NATO nuclear forces, limited on each side to the minimum necessary to cover the problem of the inherent impossibility of being sure all warheads have been destroyed. This might involve no more than 500 delivery vehicles of our choice, with warheads of a yield aggregating no more than 50 megatons, on our side, and an equal number and yield on their side, with a complete prohibition on all other nuclear weapons, AICBM's etc., on both sides. The agreement to be contingent on their proposing inspection procedures satisfactory to us and vice-versa.
These agreements would be coupled with appropriate test ban, non-diffusion, and conventional force limitations.
B. Reduction of Far Eastern Tensions
1. The Republic of China to become the Republic of Taiwan.
2. Quemoy and Matsu to be evacuated.
3. The Chinese People's Republic to recognize the Republic of Taiwan.
4. The MacMahon line to be agreed.
5. The Korean 38th parallel line to be given permanent status.
6. North Vietnam to pull out its support of the Viet Cong.
7. The CPR to agree to the counterpart of the non-diffusion agreement.
8. Admission of the CPR to the United Nations.
C. Reduction of Middle East Tensions
1. Agreement that no bloc or Western arms be sent to Middle East.
2. Mutual assurances with respect to frontiers in the area.
D. Latin American Tensions
1. Agreement by the USSR and CPR to eschew any military connection with this Hemisphere.
Such arrangements have been unthinkable in the past context. I believe they could be to the interest of both the USSR and the U.S. If both sides agreed that this was so, I do not think it impossible we could bring them about. The competition between the Communist system and ours would continue but on quite different terms than otherwise foreseeable.
The above ideas ignore all the tactical problems. The tactical problems are immense and undoubtedly would greatly modify even the substance of any program of action. But one can't start putting a program together without some idea of the direction one wishes to go.
The relation of all this to Berlin is that Berlin has been a focal point in the over-all Western confrontation with the Bloc. The long-term solution of Berlin can hardly take place except as part of a general readjustment of the terms of that confrontation.
Paul H. Nitze
Attachment/3/
/3/Top Secret. The source text bears some handwritten revisions, all but one (see footnote 4 below) of an editorial nature.
BERLIN IN THE LIGHT OF CUBA
I. The Problem
If the Cuba settlement goes forward as outlined in the President's letter of October 27th/4/ and accepted by Mr. Khrushchev, a Summit meeting may be necessary within a reasonable period, and may be desirable. At a Summit, Berlin would undoubtedly be an important item of discussion. Such Berlin discussions would take place against a variety of proposals from the U.S. and the Soviets on other items of importance to one or both sides.
/4/Printed in volume VI.
It follows that we need a theory of our Berlin interest from which a variety of positions can be developed, depending upon the actual setting which emerges and which is not now accurately predictable.
It would be useful to have the broad lines of this theory tentatively agreed before Mr. Adenauer's visit, so that questions put to him can be appropriately aimed. Any indication to Mr. Adenauer that the U.S. is even studying drastic solutions should be carefully handled,/5/ however, to prevent extreme German reaction during exploratory phases.
/5/The original language was "scrupulously avoided."
II. New Elements of the Situation
A. The United States. The country has gone through a traumatic exposure to the imminence of war, the relationship of the military situation to the political outcome, and the necessity for firm but moderate diplomacy. Its confidence in itself and its leadership has been enhanced. It does not, however, wish to live indefinitely with a series of Cubas, one of which might be in a less favorable geographic position, or might be handled, by one side or the other, with less care and restraint, or might be the occasion for some accidental aberration. Both this enhanced confidence and enhanced concern dispose the U.S. to take a firmer line with our Allies, where this is required to further our aims, as well as affecting our attitude to the USSR.
B. The Soviet Union. A central question is whether the Soviets will have emerged from the Cuban experience with the feeling that avoidance of a comparable crisis over Berlin is paramount and that they must therefore be prepared to give on Berlin in light of demonstrated U.S. determination, or whether they will feel they must counter our Cuban success with gains of their own in Berlin or elsewhere. While there is great uncertainty as to the Soviet reaction, it probably combines a new wariness about U.S. response with a compulsion to recover lost prestige.
At a minimum, the Soviets can probably be expected to take political and diplomatic steps to counter the effects of the Cuban back-down on the Soviet power image, and to disabuse the U.S. of any notion that tactics like those applied in the Cuban crisis can be used to force concessions from the Soviet Union on long-standing issues under dispute, including Berlin. We cannot exclude the possibility that they may feel driven to exert strong pressures in the reasonably near future.
The Soviets may estimate that the Cuban crisis will open up room for maneuver. By making the danger of nuclear confrontation real and visceral for all the world, the crisis may seem to them to provide the catalyst needed to put new flexibility into the stalemated Berlin situation. It could create an environment where radical solutions are possible.
The Soviet judgment of this possibility will probably be conditioned by their assessment of the U.S. temper. If the U.S. appears firm and sober after the crisis, and if Khrushchev feels impelled to do something about Berlin in the near future, he may feel that serious negotiation at the Summit would be preferable to unilateral Soviet action.
The Soviets may well be motivated toward a serious attempt to stabilize the situation, not only by the prospect of nuclear confrontation in a disadvantageous balance, but also by a real desire to focus on economic competition.
The Soviets probably also face reappraisal of their strategic posture. It was an inadequate deterrent in Cuba; they may consider the alternatives of even more energetic efforts to redress the imbalance, or measures to reduce instabilities.
Finally, having apparently misread our reactions in the Cuban case, the Soviets may confine themselves to highly tentative moves until they reassess the situation.
C. Allies. Our NATO Allies now have greater confidence in the U.S. They have seen success result from our firmness and moderation. The U.K., in particular, was reassured by our restraint; France and Germany by our determination, under the risk of major conflict. U.S. prestige is higher; its capacity and maturity more respected; its freedom to lead enhanced.
We should be able to brush aside trivial Allied objections and reservations, and insist on concentrating on major issues.
At the same time, while the Allies supported our Cuban actions with minimum consultation, we can expect increased sensitivity about consultation in the future, both because the issues will be closer to them and more within their responsibility and because they naturally oppose any U.S. disposition to act unilaterally. Further, our Allies will be unsettled until they can explore the changed situation resulting from Cuba and can know through consultation our reading of it.
On balance, it appears that while our scope for unilateral action may be restricted, we have increased our capacity, with consultation, to bring our Allies along with us.
European suspicion that a sudden, secret, Berlin deal underlay the Soviet withdrawal from Cuba is a possible side effect of U.S. initiatives.
A variety of Allied interpretations of the Cuban outcome is possible (e.g., as to Soviet motivations, Soviet future intentions, the effectiveness of various elements of U.S. power, and the validity of the proposed sequence of actions in Berlin). It will be important to present and support U.S. conclusions.
III. Possible Approaches
The basic source of instability is obviously the division of Germany. Even if East Germany were prosperous, under a more liberal regime, and without the problem of Berlin, it is doubtful that the underlying sentiment for reunification would die out either in East Germany or West Germany.
Other important sources of instability are the division of Berlin symbolized by the Wall, the uncertain access to Berlin, the unsettled boundaries, and the absence of a definitive German peace treaty. The interaction of military threat and defense, viewed differently from each side, adds to the seriousness of the other instabilities.
Any long-term solution should cut as deeply as possible into these instabilities. The Soviet Union has in the past had a clear and unambiguous policy with respect to Berlin and Germany: a solution of all the above instabilities, perhaps over an extended time frame, in a manner acceptable to it. It has rejected all Western proposals not consistent with eventual progress toward the Soviet objectives. The Western powers, not having the means, diplomatic or otherwise, to reverse this position, have attempted to stand firm against further encroachments.
The question cannot now be answered whether Soviet policy on Berlin will have hardened or relaxed as a result of Cuba. Undoubtedly, however, it will be different. It is possible that they too will see the danger of another Cuban crisis over Berlin. If so, it is possible they will want a prompt solution of the important German and Berlin instabilities in a manner mutually agreeable to them and the U.S. Only on this hypothesis, which will be substantially affected by the possibilities of U.S.-Soviet agreement on other important areas of instability apart from Germany, can one see the possibility of a long-run solution of the Berlin situation satisfactory to the West.
In this situation, the U.S. interest is:
--at the maximum, for a long-term solution of the Berlin situation, one apt to last for twenty or more years;
--at the middle, for an agreed modus vivendi to carry us along with reduced friction, at least for some years;
--at the minimum, for measures in other areas which will hold off serious Berlin discussions or pressures until a more propitious time for negotiation.
IV. Long-Term Approaches
Possible long-term approaches toward stability include All-German, All-Berlin, and removal of West Berlin, solutions.
A. All-German
Objectively, and certainly from the U.S. interest, the best end would be an all-German solution in which, ultimately, the GDR would in effect be absorbed by The Federal Republic. It would remove all the instabilities listed in III (above).
Such a solution, running directly counter to central Soviet objectives, would probably be considered by Khrushchev only in the context of broad European security arrangements. To achieve it, we should be prepared to make substantial concessions on our side, short of removing Germany from the Atlantic and European political and economic communities.
Some form of merger of the existing two states would seem called for initially, and a wide variety of sequences and phasings of the various steps toward eventual unification would be possible. The nature of the arrangements, and the duration of the process would have to be designed to reduce Soviet resistance. Among the steps toward, or elements of, an all-German solution would be:
--Increased economic intercourse between the two Germanies, with substantial economic aid from West to East designed to equalize the economies.
--Arms control measures in the Germanies: a surprise attack inspection and warning system, progressive limitations on external forces, perhaps a phased reduction of GDR and FRG forces.
--Evolutionary integration of political institutions, beginning with a central administrative organ, progressing toward ultimate common government.
B. All-Berlin
If the unity of Germany cannot be achieved, the other major sources of instability could be removed or mitigated through an all-Berlin solution. It would eliminate the wall dividing Berlin, though it would probably require, from the Soviet viewpoint, maintenance of a barrier surrounding all Berlin.
The instability of access could be greatly reduced by the cession, or perhaps long-term lease, of an autobahn corridor to the city. Were this not obtained, access instability would remain high. An access authority with clear non-bloc control would mitigate but not eliminate the instability.
Under an All-Berlin solution with a corridor, we might be able to force through a definite peace treaty signed by both East and West (or perhaps parallel treaties), a settlement of German boundaries, and the recognition of the GDR. It would then be possible to remove occupation forces and rely on a UN presence and guarantee of the unified city. Other instabilities could be mitigated through liberalization of the GDR regime and increased trade with and credit to the GDR.
This solution, which would in essence accept the permanent division of Germany, would find strong resistance in the FRG. It would be politically difficult for any West German government to give it more than de facto acceptance. The German objective of reunification would remain a serious source of instability.
C. Removal of West Berlin
It is possible to conceive of solutions in which a substantial part of GDR territory, say all that part lying south and west of the Elbe, from Magdeburg to the Czech border, is transferred to the FRG in return for removal of the West Berlin populace out of West Berlin. The populace of Berlin, and all of the GDR, would be given a free choice of staying in the GDR or moving to the enlarged FRG.
The area south and west of the Elbe is the industrial heart of the GDR. The political wrench to both sides would be immense. Boundaries, access, etc. would, however, be definitely settled. It is conceivable that as a part of a serious effort to resolve the whole East-West tensions problem, the USSR would prefer some such long-term solution to those suggested under IV. A and B (above).
V. Modus Vivendi
If a long-term settlement is not feasible, a modus vivendi may not now be impossible.
Intermittently since Geneva in 1959, and steadily over the past year, we have been seeking without success to establish such an agreed modus vivendi, but it may be that the Cuban crisis will increase elasticity to some degree on both sides. The Soviets have had an example of U.S. firmness. They could now feel that rather than test us again, closer to the jugular, it would be preferable either to continue the debate, in the vicinity of the status quo, or to agree on a workable modus vivendi. On the Western side, the Cuban success has made less compelling the need to avoid any appearance of elasticity in order to preserve Allied confidence in our guarantees.
On the other hand, if the Soviets feel their recent losses strongly, they may find it even less possible to make concessions on long-debated issues.
Components of a modus vivendi have been combed over many times, especially in the last year. Aside from significantly reduced tension in Berlin and prospects for reasonable stability there, several other general criteria would have to be met. Allied vital interests would have to be safeguarded; these appear to be unchanged by the Cuban outcome, so that the presence and security of Allied troops, unhindered access, and economic viability cannot be adversely affected. On the Soviet side, assured control over East Germany and some enhancement, possibly nominal, of GDR status appear to be minima. Having these in hand, and depending on how one assesses the likely tone of Soviet policies toward Berlin, micrometer adjustments could be made in the following general schemes:
1. A series of interlocking declarations by the USSR, GDR, FRG, and tripartite powers about guaranteed access, troop presence, the name "Free City", and a separate treaty.
2. Some form of international access authority, accompanied by a separate treaty and unilateral declarations about Berlin (troops remain, no nuclear weapons, etc.).
3. Some new form of purely local arrangement involving the removal or amelioration of the Wall, guarantee of access, addition of UN administrative presence without changing the occupation powers' troop strengths or responsibilities, and a separate treaty.
VI. Hold-Off Serious Berlin Discussions; Improve Climate in Other Areas
A third broad line of approach is to refrain at this time from further initiatives on Berlin, on the assumption that the Soviets will also be willing to let the atmosphere cool before making new moves in the hyper-sensitive Berlin area.
This approach aims at allowing both sides to reassess the situation without altering the outstanding issues which underlie instability in Berlin. It attempts to create a more favorable environment for a Berlin solution by progress toward agreement and easing of tensions elsewhere.
Since the status quo is the essence of the existing Western Berlin position, this approach might seem to appeal more to us than to the Soviets, but it leaves us still exposed to the basic dangers of the situation.
Soviet receptivity to a hold-off approach on Berlin is uncertain. It might appeal to them as a way to dissipate U.S. momentum from Cuba, and to allow time for strengthening the Soviet posture against a future confrontation. Apart from possible repercussions of the Cuban crisis upon the Soviet attitude toward Berlin, a Soviet hold-off position is supported by some evidence that GDR and Soviet propaganda is stressing that further delay must be expected before the signing of a peace treaty. It would also be consistent with the trend noted in current discussions between West and East German representatives on the inter-zonal trade.
Measures for a hold-off approach might include:
--Progress in arms control: a test-ban agreement, a non-diffusion agreement, surprise attack measures, perhaps a Latin-American nuclear-free zone.
--A NATO-Warsaw Pact Non-Aggression Agreement.
--Satisfactory carrying through of Laos neutrality measures; reduction of external pressures on South Vietnam.
--Progress toward space cooperation.
VII. General
The effects of the Cuban crisis cannot yet be accurately seen. In any event, many elements of any solution are not under our control. In this situation, we must clearly analyze and be prepared to work toward a full spectrum of outcomes.
Insofar as we do control the movement of events, it would seem desirable to aim at a long-range solution. Long-range solutions face much the greatest obstacles; they may well, in the event, prove impossible to achieve. Lesser measures, however, and in particular the hold-off approach, leave us with the possibility of a Cuba-type crisis over Berlin only postponed. Even if there is a Soviet disposition to avoid Berlin initiatives for the time being, an extended moratorium is unlikely, and we could be faced with a challenge under no better conditions, perhaps with some of our bargaining counters expended on peripheral issues. It would therefore appear improvident to overlook any chance to get an enduring solution.
(Ambassador Thompson, on the other hand, holds in general that in the present tensions, and in the face of the present obstacles, acceptable movement in the Berlin problem is unlikely to be possible, and attempts in this line could do damage by arousing Allies and USSR alike. He would therefore support a hold-off approach, seeking to get useful agreements in other areas, improving the climate generally, and approaching the complex of Berlin issues later.)
150. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations/1/
Washington, November 7, 1962, 3:42 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-762. Secret; Priority; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Cash and Mautner, cleared by Thompson and Kranich, and approved by Hillenbrand. Repeated to Bonn and London.
Topol 618. Following is promised material re Soviet intentions for discussion in connection with "Plan for Western Response to Peace Treaty."
Begin Text.
ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SOVIET INTENTIONS
While Soviets themselves first suggested a relationship between Berlin and Cuba in September 11 TASS statement Moscow has, since outbreak of Cuban crisis, carefully avoided any hint of a direct link between events in Cuba and Berlin situation./1/ Various Soviet officials abroad evidently reflecting instructions have also indicated that USSR would not move against Berlin should it retaliate because of Cuban developments.
/1/In an earlier telegram on November 7 the Department of State had informed the Mission at Berlin that it had consistently sought to discourage press speculation about links between Cuba and Berlin. The telegram continued that the Department of State was taking the line that it had no indication of Soviet intentions to resume harassment of the Allied position in Berlin in the immediate future. (Telegram 440 to Berlin; ibid., 862B.181/11-662)
Moscow appears to be anxious that tension generated by Cuba not spill over into Berlin; whether because of fear of possible US reactions or to avoid prejudicing post-election negotiations (to which Moscow remains committed) or a combination of both factors remains to be seen. In any event Soviets continue reaffirm publicly their commitment to a "German peace treaty and resolution of Berlin situation on that basis" (Brezhnev October 30), and now avoid any public reference to a separate GDR treaty. Vigorous Polish support of GDR aims and interests up to and including separate treaty is thus all more striking in view of recent Soviet reticence.
We had previously thought Soviets were likely to set stage for coming round of talks with some gesture directed toward improving atmosphere in Berlin, most probably some minor alleviation of border traffic situation within Berlin. Arrangements toward this end now appear to be well underway. Desirability of a gesture of this nature would from Soviet standpoint appear to be even greater now than it was previously if USSR actually does desire to keep Berlin situation calm for time being.
And since Soviet moves to ease pressure on Berlin are usually accompanied by overtures to West Germans, some relaxation of travel restrictions of persons between East and West Germany similar to that in Berlin is also conceivable under present circumstances if it can be engineered in manner which does not endanger GDR security.
As a further element in Soviet calculations on Berlin, seeming Soviet retreat in Cuba will almost inevitably have repercussions in East German party organization and complicate its already almost insurmountable tasks. And uncertainty already evident in functionary corps will in turn feed and stimulate existing popular dissatisfaction with regime. If past experience is any guide, SED would perforce be compelled to maintain a semblance of closed ranks to protect its position and preserve Ulbricht dominance.
Whether in long run position of SED can be maintained with such methods in view of changing political climate and anti-Stalinist campaign in bloc is questionable however. It may be that after initial shock of Cuban events has been overcome Soviets may seriously consider liberalization of GDR regime.
If this actually were Kremlin's plan of action, radical change in circumstances now underway will require revision of Soviet planning on Berlin and probably cause at least considerable postponement of scheduled denouement outlined above. At this point however indications are that Soviets have been caught up short by US reaction in Cuba and are as yet undecided on specific courses of action with respect to Berlin other than avoiding tension in that area for time being.
Soviets have with foresight been careful to tie themselves to no timetable on Berlin and thus are free to procrastinate by a variety of means without serious loss of face.
In any event further US-Soviet exchanges on Berlin following US elections still seem almost certain and there is still a possibility that this new round will be initiated by a Khrushchev visit to UN. (Current Soviet propaganda line attributing preservation of world peace in Cuban context to Khrushchev's personal statesmanship may well be intended in part as buildup for UN appearance.) Present substance of Soviet and bloc commentaries does not however suggest USSR intends--in event of Khrushchev visit to UN--to raise Berlin issue per se before General Assembly. Emphasis appears instead to be tending toward matters of disarmament, ban on nuclear arms, and possible NATO-Warsaw Pact negotiations. Khrushchev will probably wish reserve any serious discussion of Berlin for personal meeting with President Kennedy, should he come to America. End text.
Rusk
151. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Advance Planning Subcommittee (Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, November 9, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin. Secret. Initialed by Rostow.
SUBJECT
Negotiations
Herewith a supplement to our negotiating paper,/2/ which the President and you may wish to read. (I attach a copy of our paper. You'll be getting five copies officially before noon Saturday.)
/2/The negotiating paper, entitled "Negotiations," November 9, is not attached to the source text, but is printed in vol. V, Document 160. The paper described a series of topics (bilateral, arms control, and Germany and Berlin), which had already been staffed and which were generally familiar to the U.S. Allies, that might be the subject of negotiations with the Soviet Union (Track A) and a more radical series of proposals on Germany and Berlin (Track B) that might be the subject of informal U.S.-Soviet discussions to see if progress might be made leading to a summit. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/11-962)
The supplement is Tommy Thompson's concept of a West Berlin solution. It is virtually the same as our expanded Berlin/Germany proposal in Track B, except that it does not provide for the 7-10 year stretch-out of the Western Peace Plan.
In addition, we shall be giving some thought to the possibility of a bolder diplomatic initiative which the U.S. might take beyond the quite radical proposals in Track B. Their weakness, as pure initiatives, is that (except for the radical disarmament proposal) they could not be surfaced with our allies until there is clear evidence that Mr. Khrushchev is ready for very serious business indeed.
There is, within our group, a desire to explore whether there exists some course of action or initiative we might take which would:
a. Not be a phony psywar exercise;
b. Not appear to Moscow to be an effort to force their hand on issues where, in fact, we don't have any serious military leverage; and
c. Not appear to be the result of over-anxiety about other issues, having just had a dangerous confrontation.
None of us is sure whether a bold initiative which meets these complex specifications actually exists; nevertheless, we shall try.
Attachment/3/
/3/Secret. Drafted by Thompson.
POSSIBLE BERLIN SOLUTIONS
West Berlin Solution
The following is a possible package deal on West Berlin, which attempts to take account of Soviet and East German interests as well as United States and West German interests. The general idea would be to make a number of changes which would have the possibility of removing the Berlin problem from the area of contention for a considerable period of time. The general approach would be that of a scale balance in which the weights on both sides could be changed without upsetting the overall balance. The following are only suggestive and in actual negotiation, if a concession on one side proved impractical, the offsetting concession on the other side would have to be dropped.
Western concessions:
1. Agree to some change in the status of our forces in West Berlin, putting them on a contractual basis, perhaps setting up some sort of trusteeship arrangement, or suspending exercise of occupation rights for duration of the agreement.
2. We would go a considerable distance toward de facto ac-knowledgement of East German sovereignty, for example by making them signatories, or at least participants, in access arrangements.
3. We would agree with Soviets to measures to take West Berlin out of the cold war along the lines of our 1959 Geneva proposals. There might be a limitation on power of radio and TV transmitters, elimination of certain espionage and subversive operations, prohibition on introduction of atomic weapons into West Berlin, and then possibly some representative of UN Secretary General to be stationed in West Berlin to observe implementation these provisions.
Ceiling on number of Western forces to be stationed in West Berlin and possibly change of designation to call them military police, but without any major change in their military equipment.
4. Statement that existing economic and political ties with West Germany would be maintained but there would be a prohibition for duration of the agreement against incorporation West Berlin into Federal Republic.
5. Western forces would accept the position that by the change of status of their forces in West Berlin they would not attempt to exercise their rights in East Berlin.
Communist concessions:
1. Accept the continued presence of Western forces in West Berlin without acquiring any substantial Soviet rights there.
2. Agree to some relatively secure access authority either along the lines which we have put to them, or an arrangement for West Berlin to lease the autobahn from the GDR for a specified period of time. (L has pointed out that arrangements similar to Soviet lease of canal to Finns would be good precedent and strong argument that this did not impair sovereignty.) Air access would be difficult problem.
3. Soviets and East Germans would agree to measures to take East Berlin out of cold war such as limitation on power of radio and TV transmitters, prohibition on stationing of atomic weapons in East Berlin, generalized prohibition against espionage and subversive activities, similar to Western declaration. Their unwillingness to have any such measures applied to East Berlin might be overcome if it were clear we were giving up our rights in East Berlin.
4. Declaration that these measures are instituted pending reunification.
Mixed German and/or mixed Berlin commissions might be set up in connection with the foregoing.
Along with these arrangements, might be package of measures in broader field of European security, such as NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression declaration, recognition by Britain, France, and United States of Oder-Neisse line, or at least declarations on the non-use of force to exchange [change] existing frontiers or demarcation lines, measures against surprise attack, possibly atomic testing and non-diffusion nuclear weapons and, if feasible, some immediately applicable disarmament measures.
It will be noted that such a package would enable the Soviet Union to proceed with signature of separate Peace Treaty unless we had a provision or understanding to the contrary. Such signature would do much to get Khrushchev off the hook he is on, but it may well be that if agreement reached along lines set forth above that Khrushchev may not attach so much importance to a separate treaty which has some disadvantages for him.
For the West, the chief advantage would be acquiring secure access arrangements, particularly for the West Germans.
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