Documents 152-169
NOVEMBER 1962-JANUARY 1963: ALLIED CONSIDERATION OF RESUMING TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION
152. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, November 13, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1362. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Hillenbrand.
SUBJECT
Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor, Soviet Embassy
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, Director, Berlin Task Force
At his request Mr. Kornienko called on Mr. Hillenbrand to deliver a book which Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov had said he would send to Mr. Hillenbrand during a conversation at the Secretary of State's dinner for Foreign Minister Gromyko./2/ (The book turned out to be "West Berlin--The Facts", issued in English by the Foreign Language Publishing House in Moscow in 1962. It apparently has been distributed fairly widely in New York in connection with the General Assembly Session.)
/2/See Document 136.
Mr. Kornienko observed that it now seemed appropriate that the dialogue on Berlin should be resumed between the Soviet Union and the United States. It appeared to him that each side was waiting for the other to take the initiative to resume contacts on this subject. Speaking personally, he did not believe that Chairman Khrushchev would be coming to the General Assembly Session. Purely from a timing point of view, this would be very difficult. The Central Committee would be meeting in Moscow for a week or so starting on the 19th of November and the GA Session was supposed to end around December 10.
Mr. Hillenbrand commented that we seemed to be at a somewhat interdeterminate stage as far as Berlin discussions were concerned. It was not clear precisely how these should or would be resumed. After all, the leaders of both countries had been concentrating on other problems during the past month, and as he was aware, the Cuban question had to date not been satisfactorily settled.
As to summitry, Mr. Kornienko said that the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union now appeared to be the same in considering that a summit meeting might be useful under two sets of circumstances: during a crisis in order to avert conflict, and after substantial agreement had been reached at a lower level in order to confirm this agreement. Mr. Hillenbrand observed that, in the past, we had sometimes had the impression that summit meetings were thought of in terms of their propaganda effect or as useful in creating a mood which was not necessarily in harmony with the nature of the issues under dispute.
Mr. Kornienko referred to press reports this morning of Chancellor Adenauer's views, and noted that he was quoted as being opposed to any negotiations on Berlin and Germany at this time. Mr. Hillenbrand said we would, of course, be hearing directly with the Chancellor on these matters. This would be a more authoritative version of his views than those in press reports as to the accuracy of which we had no guarantee.
Referring to a recent Flora Lewis article in the Washington Post,/3/ Kornienko noted that, apart from the Chancellor's opposition to discussions now, he appeared to have accepted the four points mentioned by Miss Lewis. Mr. Hillenbrand observed that the points mentioned in the article had been contained in one form or another in the informal working paper which the Secretary had handed Foreign Minister Gromyko at Geneva last March on a personal basis. Kornienko said this was true, but these matters had not really been discussed in subsequent meetings between the Secretary and Gromyko. Mr. Hillenbrand commented that this was true, but as the Soviets were aware, the issue of Western troop presence in Berlin had been singled out by mutual agreement as the crucial one.
/3/The Washington Post, November 11, 1962.
After a further exchange as to why the previous discussions on Berlin had not seemed to make any headway, Mr. Kornienko noted that a few points seemed to have emerged which might provide a basis for further discussion. Apart from the idea of an Arbitration Commission, to which Foreign Minister Gromyko had called attention, the President had made a remark during his October 18 conversation with Gromyko/4/ about the possibility of discussing the status of the Western troops in Berlin which had been noted with interest.
/3/See Document 135.
The conversation concluded with Kornienko's remark that it now remained to be seen how the discussion between the Soviet Union and the United States on Berlin would be resumed.
153. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, November 14, 1962, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2181. Secret. Drafted by Lejins and approved in the White House on November 29. On October 10 the President had invited the Chancellor to visit Washington November 7-8. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204) On October 12 Adenauer accepted the invitation, but on October 22 Kennedy sent the Chancellor a second letter, outlining the speech he would make that night about the Soviet introduction of offensive nuclear missiles into Cuba. (Ibid.) On October 25 the Chancellor thanked the President for the presentation that Dowling had made on the Cuban situation and offered to postpone his visit. (Ibid.) The visit was subsequently scheduled for November 14-15. A summary of the visit was transmitted to Paris in circular telegram 929, November 17. (Ibid., Central Files, 033.62A11/11-1762)
In addition to the November 14 meetings (see also Document 154), on November 15 the President and the Chancellor discussed European regional questions; a memorandum of this conversation is printed in vol. XIII, Document 52. The Chancellor also met with Secretary Rusk to discuss China, India, NATO, and European regional issues. A memorandum of their conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/11-1562.
SUBJECT
Conversation between President and Chancellor Adenauer
PARTICIPANTS
The President
Mrs. Lejins, L/S, Dept. of State
Chancellor Adenauer
Mr. Weber, Interpreter
The private talks were held at the request of Chancellor Adenauer while he was walking with the President to his office.
Mr. Adenauer congratulated the President on the success achieved in the Cuban situation and indicated that this was the beginning of a new epoch for the West. He also stated that the President could rest assured that he would always find Germany firmly on his side in situations like this.
The President stated that he was very appreciative of this stand expressed by the Chancellor. He also appreciated the Chancellor's remarks to Ambassador Dowling when the Cuban affair first got started. It was obvious, of course, that the Cuban situation could have resulted in serious repercussions on Berlin, and everyone was aware of that at the time.
The Chancellor replied that he is well familiar with the world situation and realizes that the President had to make his decision on Cuba not with reference to any one single problem but in the light of the overall world situation. Thus, he could not be concerned only with the German question at the time. The latter is just one of the big problems which Providence has placed on the shoulders of Mr. Kennedy. With reference to today's reception, Mr. Adenauer recalled his visit to Paris a few months ago and a parade held in his honor on that occasion, showing French tanks and other military equipment. Chancellor Adenauer had stood side by side with President de Gaulle, and he termed the occasion an historical event. Today's ceremony at the White House, too, he did not consider just a colorful show, but a truly historical event.
The President expressed his appreciation for this sentiment.
Mr. Adenauer then made the request that he be given the opportunity to discuss his ideas on Berlin in only the smallest of circles.
President Kennedy indicated that he would honor this request. He stated that he wished to get the Chancellor's ideas on what Western procedures should be from this point on with regard to Berlin. He asked for the Chancellor's comments and what he considered the best timing with regard to arrangements which might give us hope to achieve some kind of a permanent settlement of that problem.
The Chancellor replied that he would like to express himself very cautiously on this point. He himself had no knowledge to what extent the Cuban situation could actually be considered solved. For that reason the decision as to what to do vis-a-vis the Russians, even on possible German initiatives, was up to the President. If the President were of the opinion that all his demands with regard to Cuba had been fulfilled by the Soviets, then he might try to proceed on the question of Berlin. If, however, he did not feel that his demands there had been fully met by the Soviets, then Mr. Adenauer felt it was better to wait.
The President indicated that he had been interested in a statement made to the press by Mr. Adenauer not long ago in which he expressed the opinion that not all missiles had been removed from Cuba. The President stated that no one knew of course with complete certainty whether all missiles had been removed. For all we knew some might have been hidden in caves or other spots on the island. It was our judgment, however, that the missiles had, for the most part, been removed. We had counted thirty-three of them from the air and supporting equipment for forty-eight, in other words two regiments. We had now counted forty-two missiles being taken out. The President did not believe that there was much advantage to the Soviet Union in keeping a few missiles in Cuba. If another missile attempt were to be made in Cuba at a later time, it would be better to take everything out now and start anew some other time. He was pretty sure, however, that the Cuban missile episode was ended. The Soviets knew now that the next time they started something of this sort we would invade Cuba. While we were pretty sure that the missiles had been removed, we had not achieved any agreement as yet on the bombers, which we definitely wanted removed. We were also insisting on inspection. At the same time we felt that our own system of air inspection is much better and surer than having UN observers on the spot for inspection purposes. We felt that we could rely better on our own cameras. The second problem, however, at present really the chief one, was that Khrushchev had grossly lied on the Cuban situation and the President therefore had no confidence in Khrushchev at all. For this reason also he was not interested in the West taking the initiative vis-a-vis the Russians in the Berlin question, but rather favored waiting for their moves.
The Chancellor fully agreed with this opinion. He felt that it was not very important whether any remnants of equipment had been left in Cuba to salve Castro's feelings. He also considered that the chief thing was that Khrushchev had lied dismally to the President. He had tried to launch as criminal and as dangerous an attack on the United States as anyone had ever undertaken, and the President had been successful in warding it off. If the President were to resume talks with the Soviets at once after all these happenings, Khrushchev would think that the President was willing to let bygones be bygones. He would therefore be encouraged to start trouble somewhere else. In this connection the Chancellor pointed out something he had learned from Nazi times. A dictatorship completely changes the moral fiber and manner of thinking of the person involved, for example Khrushchev, completely warping the personality so that his way of thinking will be entirely different from that of the President or Mr. Adenauer for instance.
The President stated that there is ample evidence that the aim of Khrushchev is the same as the aim of the Chinese Communists, only his methods are somewhat different. His long range ambitions remain the same but his tactics have been somewhat complicated by the setback he has suffered in Cuba. Three factors in the world situation are different from what they were about two months ago: One was the failure of Khrushchev's designs in Cuba; the second was his difficulties with the Communist Chinese; and the third was the complications arising out of the Chinese-Indian conflict. The importance of these was how they would affect Khrushchev's further actions. One thing was clear, of course, he wants to get both the United States and Germany.
The Chancellor concurred and went on to say that a slow revolution was taking place in Russia. No one knew how far this revolution had progressed. Of one thing Mr. Adenauer felt sure, however, namely that Khrushchev would not risk all his achievements by starting a war. He will try to achieve further successes by intrigue and through cold war. This needs to be watched very carefully. He, too, was of the opinion that we should take our time and carefully observe developments but not act as though nothing had happened. As an outsider, Mr. Adenauer wished to say that the United States had been in very grave danger indeed and the President had averted this danger. This constituted a tremendous victory for the President himself and for the American people. On the other side, however, there was a real criminal, Khrushchev, who needed careful watching. Therefore, the Chancellor advised observing developments carefully before having any further dealings with Khrushchev. The Chancellor was speaking as a German, of course. His opinion, however, differed from that of his own Foreign Minister, Dr. Schroeder, who would act differently in this matter. The latter might be inclined to draw up a new memorandum on German-Soviet relations. Germany had done this in 1958 and still had had no reply from Moscow. Now, however, the Chancellor felt that the decision on whether to proceed with regard to the Soviets was up to President Kennedy. At the same time the Chancellor felt that Cuba from Khrushchev's standpoint should be chalked up as a failure. Likewise, the Chinese situation presented grave difficulties to him as did the Chinese-Indian conflict. Perhaps it would be well for us to sit back and wait and let Khrushchev think matters over a bit and see what happens.
The President then stated that no one seems to be able really to read the Soviets; certainly no one in the United States. None of the Soviet experts in the United States would ever have imagined that Khrushchev would undertake to station missiles in Cuba. On the other hand the Soviets would never have thought that we would react the way we did or else they would not have placed the missiles in Cuba. Thus, neither side appears very adept at interpreting the other, and both sides are to some extent blind. Nevertheless, within the limitations of our judgment, we must try to evaluate what effect the previously mentioned factors will have on Khrushchev's reactions, and then decide on the basis thereof whether it might be advantageous to talk with Khrushchev on the Berlin question now, or whether it might be better to wait say six months or even longer. Mr. Kennedy doubted that we would be able to tell anything certain until the bomber question had been settled. The Chancellor replied that most people do not judge Khrushchev correctly, since they generally talk in terms of what he has not achieved or wants to achieve and rarely speak in terms of what he has achieved. The Chancellor believes that Khrushchev has achieved a great deal during the past ten years for instance. In 1953 Russia had no atom weapons, but in 1962 she was sending nuclear missiles to Cuba. The Chancellor is convinced that Khrushchev values very highly what he has achieved so far. Mr. Adenauer recalled that he had previously told the President about his meetings with Khrushchev in 1955, when for a period of six days he met with Mr. Khrushchev as many as three times a day, experiencing all of Mr. Khrushchev's moods. Khrushchev is smart, completely ruthless and has no conscience whatsoever, but he is a Soviet patriot at heart and he will not risk his achievements in a war. Only now he has understood the determination of the United States and US strength and he will have to digest this for awhile before he can adapt his actions to this in the future. The Chancellor considers it definitely a mistake to resume dealings with Khrushchev at once because, he repeated, then Khrushchev would feel that everyone is willing to forget what happened and he will act accordingly. The Chancellor agreed that perhaps his reactions with reference to the bomber removal might indicate what conclusions Khrushchev is drawing. Also the Chinese situation should make him think. Mr. Adenauer recalled that in 1955 Khrushchev had actually asked Germany to help him against Red China and Adenauer was convinced that Khrushchev lives in real fear of China. Therefore, the Chancellor advises dragging our feet vis-a-vis the Soviets. If Khrushchev swallows all of Cuba including the bomber question then the President will have time to think matters over. If then he decides the time is ripe to take further steps, he may count on Germany to live up to its obligations. But the time is not ripe now.
The President reiterated that he felt it was important to decide whether the happenings of the last two months might have made Khrushchev more vulnerable to pressure and therefore more ready to enter into an agreement on Berlin than he might be six months hence or in a year. The President realized that we could never be really sure that the right moment was at hand, but he was certain that he would not be able to tell anything for at least three more weeks.
The Chancellor thought the idea was very simple. Khrushchev had disgraced himself before the world and his people. If there were to be any talks with him at the present time, he would try to do everything in his power to prove that he was not getting soft or too old in order to wipe out his disgrace. Therefore, we could expect that in any talks now on any but the Cuban question Mr. Khrushchev would take a very unyielding stand.
The President agreed that this might be the case. On the other hand, he felt that Khrushchev had talked about Berlin for so long that he might be willing to accept some kind of a settlement precisely in view of the difficulties he had had in Cuba, with the Chinese, etc. Perhaps, he would value getting some kind of an agreement on paper which might strengthen him domestically and which he needed vis-a-vis China. Thus, perhaps, he might be willing to accept something now that he would not be willing to accept later. Therefore the President felt that we should watch Cuban developments carefully and be ready for any indication from Moscow that might give us a clue whether it would be better to act now or later. Not that the President felt we should start; we should wait to see what they might be intending to do.
The Chancellor agreed that if Khrushchev felt the need for domestic reasons to achieve a settlement of some question he would come and seek the agreement on his own. If, however, the United States and Germany would approach him as partners, as it were, then Khrushchev would become very hard and unyielding. Therefore the Chancellor fully agreed that it was necessary to wait and to watch for Khrushchev's reactions.
The Chancellor then indicated that there was another matter that he wished to raise privately. He said that Germany, historically, has good relations with some of the Latin American countries. These are based on human rather than political considerations. Thus a Minister from Brazil, whose name the Chancellor could not at the moment recall, visited the Chancellor recently. This Minister had started a Christian Democratic Union in Brazil and was getting the German party's publications in that connection. In his talk with the Chancellor he discussed some of the Latin American attitudes toward the United States, and the Chancellor wished to propose an idea for the President to examine. It was not necessarily his own idea. His proposal envisaged establishing vis-a-vis the South American countries, started by the United States and Europe, a kind of OECD.
The President indicated that he was convinced that Europe should play a much more important role in South America. That hemisphere represented a real danger spot, especially Brazil. At the same time there were many common factors between Europe and Latin America such as language, religion and culture. Moreover, the historically conditioned hostility vis-a-vis the United States does not exist with reference to Europe. He then asked the Chancellor to indicate the areas of disagreement or attitudes which the man from Brazil had mentioned.
The Chancellor stated that the Brazilian had complained about the patronizing attitude displayed by the United States vis-a-vis Latin America. The Latin Americans considered themselves on a par with the Europeans and resented such attitudes. At the same time the Brazilian had indicated that he had been in Washington and complained of the treatment received, either at the White House or the State Department, the Chancellor could not remember which. The Brazilian was therefore complaining out of hurt pride. The Chancellor then pointed out that the Brazilian in question is now in Washington and if the President permits he will pass the man's name to the Secretary of State who could then perhaps ask the Brazilian to come and see him.
The President thought that this might be a good idea. Then, he stated that as regards Berlin, he felt there was agreement that we should wait until the complete solution of the present Cuban problem. We should not make any approach to the Russians on Berlin but stand ready to listen to their proposals and consider what our position should be in case they came up with proposals that were different from those made by them in the past. Gromyko had visited the President in October and had voiced proposals which were completely unreasonable and downright insulting. There was no point discussing proposals of that kind. If, however, Khrushchev came up with different proposals we should be prepared to exploit them. Until then we would have to wait. Also since no one appeared to be very good at reading the Communist world we should be prepared to deal with the possibility of one or more different reactions. Thus we should be ready to deal with Khrushchev if he turned out to have become more unreasonable on the basis of his pres-ent difficulties, but we should also not discount the possibility that he might be prompted to want to seek some kind of a settlement. We should be ready in either case.
The Chancellor then indicated that the Soviets were definitely having economic difficulties. He made reference to the West German trade agreement with the Soviet Zone. He stated that some time ago the Soviet Zone representative approached West Germany expressly with the consent and knowledge of the Soviet authorities, stating that if West Germany were to give the Soviet Zone several hundred million DM's they would be ready to enter into an agreement giving permission to the West Berliners to come and go in the Zone undisturbed, but not the other way around. The Chancellor had expected that this matter might have been settled by the time of his trip to the United States, but this was not the case. He therefore proposed to keep the President informed of developments. He felt however that the fact that these questions were raised at the Zone's initiative with Russian approval was an encouraging sign.
Before joining the larger group in the Cabinet Room the President indicated that he and the Chancellor would have further private talks./2/
/2/In the meeting with the larger group the President and the Chancellor discussed Cuba and Berlin briefly, but devoted most of the conversation to NATO. A memorandum of that part of the discussion is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2181.
154. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, November 14, 1962, 4:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.62A11/11-2062. Secret. Drafted by Lejins and Tyler and approved in S on November 20 and in the White House on November 29. The meeting was held at the White House.
SUBJECT
President-Adenauer Talks--2nd Plenary Session
PARTICIPANTS
US
The President
The Secretary of State
Mr. Tyler
Mrs. Lejins (interpreter)
Germany
Chancellor Adenauer
Foreign Minister Schroeder
Dr. Carstens
Mr. Weber (interpreter)
Chancellor Adenauer indicated that he had had a chance to discuss the question raised during the morning meeting/2/ with General Heusinger and had found that views concerning this matter had been clarified considerably since the Cuban crisis.
/2/See footnote 1, Document 153.
The President replied that he had had the opportunity to discuss the same question with General Taylor and wished to inform the Chancellor of the following: (1) Our troops are equipped with some Davy Crocketts but it is our opinion that the Soviets do not have much similar equipment; (2) If our troops were to use some of this nuclear equipment in the case of an emergency, the same type of equipment would immediately be released on the same basis to the other forces fighting together with us so that there would be no difference in their equipment.
The Chancellor expressed his satisfaction at this news.
The President indicated that he had asked General Taylor to come and discuss this matter with the Chancellor. He wondered, however, whether the Chancellor might prefer to have General Taylor speak with General Heusinger and then have Heusinger inform the Chancellor about the discussion.
The Chancellor answered that he would prefer the latter since he himself is no expert in these matters.
The President said that he understood Defense Secretary McNamara would be the Chancellor's dinner companion this evening and they would therefore have a chance to discuss this matter too.
Adenauer then stated that he briefly wished to explain a few things about de Gaulle in this small group in order to contribute to a better understanding of de Gaulle's position. Adenauer had chided de Gaulle in 1959 for committing so few troops to NATO. De Gaulle had answered: I do not know your opinion of generals but if you commit them to NATO, you lose control over them completely. Adenauer stated that he had not really understood the meaning of de Gaulle's words until the troubles later with the OAS.
The President said that he did not really see the connection because having the generals in Algeria was quite a different matter, since that problem was one in which much emotion was involved. Committing troops in Western Europe is an entirely different problem since there they are used in our attempts to tackle our major problem, namely the Soviets. The President conceded that the uncertain disposition of these troops might possibly have some political implications, but the danger of not having sufficient troops available to NATO in our dealings with the Soviets was far more dangerous.
The Chancellor then stated he felt that the President did not quite appreciate the French situation. If it were left to the National Assembly, de Gaulle would be overthrown at once. The parties represented in the Assembly are rooted back home, and the officers come from those same areas. This is where de Gaulle's concern came from. Adenauer indicated that the political situation in France is extremely weak. We should not forget that the Communist Party in France is the second largest party and that they are the kind of Communists who are willing to fight on the barricades. It is a little known fact that three military depots were plundered by OAS revolutionary forces only a short time ago without meeting any resistance. One of them was in Versailles. This was done obviously to get arms for the revolutionary OAS. The Chancellor was convinced that if de Gaulle were overthrown the result would be a catastrophe for France. De Gaulle is really trying to give France some inner strength. He told the Chancellor that this is at the bottom of his disagreement with the Parliament. If France had even one party ready to assume sole responsibility then the situation would be in good hands. There was no such party, however, and the six or seven parties in existence were all alike. Each knew that when one government fell the other one would come in and each in turn would have a chance to furnish the Prime Minister. Therefore things kept going around like a merry-go-round. The situation in France had really been desperate until de Gaulle took over and if he had not come in when he did, there was real danger of a true civil war.
The President stated that this problem was related to another one which he wished to discuss with the Chancellor. This was the matter of our dollar balance, which of course always affects the burdens we are carrying overseas. Under no circumstances did we want to retrench in our overseas defense efforts, which were costing us about $3 billion annually. (The Chancellor expressed surprise that it was so little. He had thought it would be considerably more.) For this reason the United States greatly appreciated the Strauss/Gilpatric arrangement whereby German orders would be placed in the United States in the amount of $250 million per year. Since our difficulties in October we had had to draw on our dollar resources even more and had since then heard the disquieting rumor that for budgetary reasons the Federal Republic was expecting not to fulfill this agreement this year. This would mean that our deficit would be that much higher this year and this would have a very bad psychological effect. The President hoped that Germany could see its way to making the purchases as anticipated.
The Chancellor indicated that he was not informed in this matter and that he would look into it on his return. He would do everything in his power to see that Germany's promise was kept.
The President stated that we were appreciative of the aid extended so far in this respect by the Federal Republic, for instance their percentage of dollar holdings. It was important that our deficit did not go up over last year. If it remained the same, it was tolerable, but if it increased it constituted a worsening of the situation. He had heard that Germany expected to make up next year what they would not be buying this year but it would be better if it were done this year. The President then stated that he would like to give the Chancellor a one-page memorandum on this matter to take home with him.
Returning to the Cuban situation, the President indicated that it was still very much unsettled. The possibility existed that we might have to resort to more drastic steps, if the bomber situation was not solved satisfactorily. The future was therefore still uncertain. The President then reiterated the consensus reached at the morning meeting concerning Berlin, namely that both he and the Chancellor thought that it was inappropriate for the West to undertake any initiative vis-a-vis the Soviets until a final solution had been achieved in Cuba, and future Soviet intentions became more clear. After successful completion of the Cuban affair we should be prepared with our position in case the Soviets came up with proposals that were better than what they had come up with in October. Perhaps the right moment for this might come in two or three months. No one could know the exact time. Perhaps it might be less.
The Chancellor then said that he thought the President might be interested in hearing the German ideas about a possible cooling off period of ten years and asked Dr. Carstens to present this problem in English./3/
/3/On November 12 Carstens, who had preceded Adenauer to the United States, gave Tyler a 2-page paper on Berlin, dated November 11. A copy of the paper, which is described here, together with a paper discussing it, drafted by Hillenbrand on November 12, was transmitted to the President by Rusk on November 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1362)
Dr. Carstens stated that this matter was being treated as highly confidential in Germany and that the United States was the first one to be told about it. It had not been discussed with either the British or the French and even in Germany was confined to a very small circle. Germany felt, however, that if the US approved, this plan might perhaps be submitted to the Soviets but it had probably best come from the United States. Dr. Carstens then briefly enumerated the eight points of the proposal: (1) A ten-year standstill period on Berlin and the German question in general, i.e., no peace treaty, etc.
(2) This point is one well known to all parties concerned. It deals with an international access authority with administration and control over certain traffic routes. (In reply to the President's question whether they had thought about who the members of the authority would be, Dr. Carstens replied that they had avoided this, since the plan was meant to be a very general one in order not to get bogged down in all the difficulties which would be created by too much detail.)
(3) Establishment of two mixed German commissions with representatives from both West and East Germany. These commissions were to handle two problems: (a) Increase economic exchange between the two parts of Germany; (b) Establish a free movement of persons between the two areas; talks on the latter subject have been going on between the two parts of Germany for some time.
This third point would actually meet the Soviet demand that East and West Germany get together to work out some of their problems themselves, and so far the Federal Republic had always refused. If these two commissions proved successful, this plan envisaged setting up additional mixed commissions to handle additional problems of a limited nature.
(4) A non-aggression declaration by the NATO and the Warsaw Pact powers together with a statement renouncing the use of force to solve international questions, especially frontier readjustments.
(5) After the ten-year cool-off this plan envisaged a plebiscite under international control on the question of German reunification.
(6) and (7) These two points dealt with the two possible results of the plebiscite. In case the majority of both areas voted for reunification, then free elections were to be held to elect a German government which would then send representatives to a German peace conference. At the same time certain arrangements would be made to ensure that the resulting military strength of Germany could not be shifted in such a way as to create any more favorable or unfavorable situation for the military alliances to which either East or West Germany belong at the present time. Later, this unified Germany would then become a member of the UN.
The second possible result being provided for under these two points was in case the majority of the Eastern Zone would vote against reunification. In that case, the Western powers agreed to recognize the existence of two separate Germanies, which, after the necessary intermediate steps, would both become members of the UN and a peace conference would be held with representatives of both Germanies present. The problem of Berlin would still remain in this latter case, and a plebiscite would probably be suggested to determine the city's status.
(8) During the ten-year cooling-off period there would be in operation a four-power committee composed of Deputy Foreign Ministers which would be dealing with the problems arising during that time.
Mr. Carstens stated that Mr. Tyler was the only person with whom he had had occasion to discuss this German proposal very briefly since his arrival in Washington.
The President said that he had not heard of this as yet. On the surface it appeared to him that this 8-point proposal would give us all we want without giving the Soviets much of anything. The Soviets would not buy the idea, he thought, of a stand-still because that would mean the continued presence of Western troops in Berlin, and the Soviets wanted these definitely out. Moreover, we had renounced the use of force before. All the Soviet Union would appear to be getting out of this plan would be the somewhat uncertain Eastern German status under an access authority. The President thought that we could live with this 8-point agreement. As an argument vis-a-vis the Soviets we could state that we are giving up our claim to immediate reunification, but the Soviets might not be impressed by that. Moreover, if the Soviets hold to their October demands that Western troops be withdrawn, we will not get anywhere. If they change their attitude on troops they might be willing to sign an agreement of this sort. The acceptability thereof would probably depend on the status of West Berlin and what that is called and the status of the Western forces in Berlin. In this connection, he indicated, the suggestion relayed by Sir Frank Roberts might be useful./4/
/4/On November 13 Lord Hood had sent Rusk a report of Roberts' farewell conversation with Khrushchev. In this discussion Khrushchev had suggested that the Western forces might remain "temporarily" in West Berlin under the U.N. flag. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204) In a conversation with Hillenbrand at 5 p.m. on November 14 Hood discussed Khrushchev's idea, stating that the British were willing to consider injecting a U.N. presence into Berlin. (Ibid., Central Files, 762.00/11-1462)
Dr. Carstens explained that he felt that three elements of the 8-power plan should be attractive to the Soviets:
(1) The 10-year waiting period. Eastern Germany had now been under Soviet control for 17 years. Ten more years would give the Soviets that much additional chance to indoctrinate the population and therefore would increase the chances that a plebiscite would come out against reunification of Western Germany.
(2) The fact that the West promises to recognize East Germany as a sovereign state if the plebiscite turns in that direction.
(3) The direct contact envisaged by the proposal between repre-sentatives of East and West Germany on an official basis which the Soviets had been agitating for, for a long time.
Secretary Rusk inquired about East German views on the political implications of the access arrangements.
Foreign Minister Schroeder indicated that what had been envisaged so far in this matter was very limited in scope. The primary aim was for family reunions, and nothing pertaining to general access had been touched upon.
The Chancellor then suggested that the United States might perhaps examine the access implications of the US having turned over to the Soviets such territories as Pomerania and Thuringia. While the US had held these areas, free access to Berlin should have been assured. West German law experts had looked into this matter without coming up with anything useful. Perhaps American experts of international law were more clever.
The President stated that the presence of Western forces in Berlin had been the key question in that situation for the past year. It was the primary concern of Khrushchev's proposal in October, and the President was not quite sure what Sir Frank Roberts had meant.
The Foreign Minister indicated that there were two reports on this matter: one, the report given out by Sir Frank Roberts to his fellow ambassadors in Moscow;/5/ the second, these ideas as reported over here by Lord Hood. Khrushchev had used the word "temporarily," and apparently had spoken only of exchanging the flag of the Western powers for the United Nations flag. It was not clear whether this was meant to be a face-saving device or not. However, Dr. Schroeder was fearful that once the change in flag had been made, Khrushchev might feel encouraged to raise new problems every day, using the UN as an additional lever. This possibility could be excluded only if the changeover were accompanied by an explicit statement that all other bases remained unchanged. He feared, however, that Khrushchev would not go along with the latter. The President expressed agreement with this point of view. It was his understanding, too, that Roberts had said the word "temporarily" was used only once. He felt the proposal was worth considering provided we ensured that West Berlin remain free and that the commitments of the US, France and the UK remained clear without the UN being able to take them over. Under those circumstances it might be useful to make the change for the UN flag. But the three powers would have to be carefully watching any infringement of their rights and if the UN should act counter to these rights, the former status would be reverted to at once. Perhaps we should listen somewhat more to find out whether the Russians are interested merely in a face-saving device, and if it were possible to omit the word "temporarily," some progress could perhaps be achieved.
/5/Transmitted in telegrams 1264 and 1265 from Moscow, November 13. (Both ibid., 611.61/11-1362)
Foreign Minister Schroeder explained that he thought perhaps a sort of combination of the eight points in the German proposal and Khrushchev's suggestion to Sir Frank Roberts might prove useful. If there were agreement on that, the tactical question to be decided upon would be the timing of the Western proposal to this effect. He hastened to say that everything would, of course, have to wait until a settlement in the Cuban affair.
The President stated that there was no indication how soon the Cuban problem could be considered settled. Serious consequences might result if the Soviets refused to take out the bombers. If this were the case, the US was faced with several alternatives. They could reimpose the quarantine at full force, which was not good psychologically because world opinion might state that the missiles had been taken out and that Russia should not be expected to back down twice, as it were. Thus it might be difficult for us to keep the backing of other countries. On the other hand, we might eliminate the quarantine which was not really in operation at the present time, and, without invading Cuba, maintain our overflights to keep the situation in check. The decision may be forced upon us within the next ten days to two weeks. If the Soviets agree to take the bombers out of Cuba, then we can consider that particular chapter closed. Thus the President was of the opinion that the Cuban situation should be resolved one way or another first. If Khrushchev refuses to meet our requirements there, then there is no point to try to discuss anything with him. If, however, Khrushchev agrees to our requirements in Cuba, then we might inquire as to Soviet proposals without, however, making any of our own for the time being. If the Soviets put forth proposals on Berlin, then we should try to clarify the status of Western troops in West Berlin. The answer to that will be the decisive one.
The Chancellor wondered what the possible implications might be of Soviet fears of Red Chinese progress in Asia.
The President was of the opinion that it was very difficult for us to determine this. Perhaps his fears in Asia might force Khrushchev to be more reasonable at this moment, and if this were the case we should certainly seize the moment. In summary, the President reiterated that we should continue in the Cuban matter to see what Soviet reaction will be there. If we fail there, all further dealings with the Soviets will by necessity need to be delayed. If we achieve a reasonable solution in Cuba, let us await Soviet initiative on Berlin, see their attitude concerning Western troops in Berlin, and then, if the time appears right, come back at them with something like the 8-point proposal.
The Chancellor indicated that this appeared the correct approach. The President was of the opinion that conversations concerning the suggestion reported by Sir Frank Roberts should be expanded to see whether there might be some acceptable formula behind it, and if there was, consideration should be given to the way in which the Western Powers could give way to the UN flag under full assurance, however, of the three-power status. In any event, however, he felt that any progress in this respect was possible only if Khrushchev actually was inclined to relax the Berlin situation.
The Chancellor pointed out that patience and more patience was indicated.
The President agreed, provided it was coupled with a willingness to take the necessary chance if and when it came.
The Secretary of State felt that it might be useful to discuss the 8-point proposal in the quadripartite Ambassadorial Group. The 10-year cooling-off period actually was not such a revolutionary idea from the Soviet standpoint. Actually they had been talking about a four to five years delay, and it was therefore not unthinkable that they might agree to extending this period to ten years. Moreover, consideration of this plan might lead at an early date to a meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers over an extended period, as in the case of Austria.
The President indicated that it would be very important to keep this entire matter out of the press, or it might create grave problems. Therefore, he felt that only after preliminary discussion and deliberation should this plan or idea be put into the machinery, as it were, but not before.
Dr. Carstens pointed out that it would be difficult to keep these plans from our Allies for any length of time.
The President repeated that he felt it was important to keep this out of the press. He stated that it happened frequently that the Quadripartite Group would get into an argument over a given idea and this would leak to the press, only to have the Soviets come out with a statement that they are not interested in this proposal at all.
The Chancellor stated that the proposals in question are sort of day dreams which it is better not to talk about.
The President again reiterated that it might be best perhaps for US and German representatives to go further into the possible implementation of the 8-point proposal, but to bring in the Allies only when it was time to work out the details.
The Secretary of State stated that it was important to avoid the impression that the plan that will be proposed is something new and tremendous. He felt it was better to launch this thing quietly and without fanfare and not as a new plan.
The President indicated that he would be agreeable to whatever procedures appeared best, but he felt that it was important that controversy on the plan among the Quadripartite Group should be kept to a minimum.
The Secretary of State suggested that the Quadripartite Group, when the time came, should not be confronted with this plan as a systematic 8-point program, but rather only the ideas contained therein should be communicated as such.
Again the President reiterated that it was important not to make anything spectactular out of this new project because then the Soviets would get wind of it and would be certain to say that they are not interested. In any event we should put forth any kind of project only after the Soviets had put forth proposals different from their October proposals, because Gromyko's demands in October had been something fearful.
The Chancellor repeated that we should wait for Khrushchev's reaction and appear ready to talk further only if the situation appeared favorable.
Dr. Carstens then stated that French Ambassador Alphand had asked to see him the next day. What should or could Carstens tell him in view of the present discussion?
The Chancellor stated that he felt it was easy. Carstens should tell Alphand that until the Cuban situation was solved it was wrong to begin discussions on anything else and therefore it was decided to let matters rest until a solution of the Cuban situation had been achieved.
Dr. Carstens added "and until the presence of Western troops in West Berlin had been clarified."
The President agreed. He added that it was clear that we would have to consult the French and the UK before we did any talking with the Soviets. In the meantime, the whole matter had to be kept out of the press because otherwise it would be made to appear as a new Western initiative, and then de Gaulle would come out, to begin with, with the statement that this was wrong. And then we would be in another deadlock.
The Chancellor indicated that under the circumstances it might be well to break up the meeting since, the longer it lasted, the more suspicious the press would become of what was going on inside.
The President then summed up that it was the consensus of the meeting that it should not be made to appear as though the Chancellor's visit had resulted in a decision to take the initiative anew with regard to Berlin. We might state that we exchanged views on the Berlin situation and that the exchange was satisfactory. He then outlined once more the steps to be taken, depending on the Cuban outcome, to await a Soviet proposal, etc.
The Chancellor suggested that one sentence be added to the communiqu? to the effect that the question of Berlin and Germany had been touched upon in the general discussion./6/
/6/For text of the joint communiqu? issued on November 15, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 626-627.
Dr. Schroeder then asked whether it might not be advisable for the Germans to draw up another memorandum outlining Western Germany's views with reference to a separate peace treaty and general German-Soviet relations.
The Chancellor jumped in to say that as long as the Cuba situation was not settled no such steps should be taken.
The President also indicated that he could not see the advantage of any such action and that it would be best to wait for Soviet reaction before any steps are undertaken on the side of the West.
The Secretary of State pointed out that it was important to note that all during the Cuban crisis both Moscow and Ulbricht had been very quiet about Berlin. They had not stirred up any excitement about it in their public speeches. Perhaps they had been caught off timing in general, or perhaps off their timing on Berlin; and therefore, perhaps, they wanted to wait and see what would happen.
Dr. Schroeder said that West Germany had received only one indication from a representative from the Soviet Zone to the effect that the matter of the draft treaty was not acute at this time.
The Chancellor reiterated that it was clear no move should be undertaken vis-a-vis the Soviet Union until the Cuban situation became clear, because any such step on the part of the partners of the US might be interpreted as criticism of US measures, and the West could not afford to have this impression created. The Secretary of State stated that it was well to continue the talk about the 8-point program but he warned the German representatives to be careful about what they said about any possibility of formal recognition of two Germanys. That was, after all, a major trump to be played at the very end.
The President, in closing, stated that when the Soviets had tried to insert new topics in the discussions on the Cuba question between Kuznetsov and McCloy,/7/ they had been told repeatedly that we refused to discuss anything in these talks except Cuba. Therefore it was wise, as agreed, to refrain from raising any other issues with the Soviets until after the settlement of the Cuban crisis. This was a protection for the US.
/7/Documentation on these discussions at the United Nations is scheduled for publication in volume XI.
The Chancellor indicated that he considered this standpoint correct.
155. Letter From President Kennedy to Governing Mayor Brandt/1/
Washington, November 14, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.
MY DEAR MR. MAYOR: Thank you for your kind letter of October 29./2/
/2/In this letter Brandt congratulated the President on his handling of the Cuban crisis and urged, if the Cuban situation allowed, the implementation of decisions concerning access to Berlin and the holding of a plebiscite. (Ibid.)
I think that on the plebiscite question you should continue to try to develop unified German proposals, as we agreed in our conversation here last month./3/ Until we have a clearer picture of how Soviet policy on Berlin is going to develop in the next few weeks I do not believe that we can arrive at a definitive position on the timing of such a plebiscite. With regard to access questions I agree that we should give high priority to resolving differences in viewpoint as quickly as possible. It is imperative that the contingency planning in this field be agreed all around.
/3/See Document 128.
It is also too early to tell what effect recent events may have on a new round of negotiations with the Soviets. The first thing is to get some further progress in the fulfillment of our Cuban understanding, but after that, I agree, there may be some chance of more realistic talks, and we on our side must be ready for them.
With every good wish,
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
156. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Chancellor Adenauer/1/
Washington, November 15, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.
As I said yesterday, I am gravely disturbed by reports about the level of German defense expenditures, and I want to state my concern frankly. It appears that the German defense budgets for 1962 and 1963, as they now stand, will not finance the scheduled build-up of German forces to NATO-agreed force goals, and will not meet the scheduled payments for military goods and services received from the United States under the Strauss-Gilpatric agreement./2/
/2/Not further identified.
A high state of readiness of NATO forces--and most particularly those of Germany and the United States--is essential if we are to be able to defend Berlin. This requires all of us to maintain the necessary level of defense expenditures. We cannot talk with firmness unless we act with firmness.
We, for our part, despite a serious balance of payments problem, are maintaining major military forces in Europe which, in Germany alone, entail an annual United States balance-of-payments expenditure of about $700 million. We feel we have the right to expect Germany, in turn, to do its full share.
The arrangements under which Germany is procuring military goods and services from the United States have mutual advantages; they enable the Federal Republic to procure these items at the lowest costs, and they help to offset the balance-of-payments costs of United States defense expenditures in Germany. If the Federal Republic did not meet its part of the military procurement arrangement this year, important payments which the United States expects during the rest of this year would be postponed. This would not only add to our balance-of-payments deficit; it would have destructive psychological effects.
I trust the German Government will meet both its NATO commitments and its procurement arrangements with us. We understand this will require an immediate supplemental appropriation of two billion D-Marks to the 1962 German defense budget, and a comparable supplemental figure to the 1963 budget. We believe total German resources are ample to meet these needs, if the necessary measures are taken. We are sure the German people will respond generously if the real nature of the need is made clear to them by an act of political leadership./3/
/3/On December 12 Chancellor Adenauer wrote to the President that in response to this memorandum he had assigned an additional division to NATO and resolved to increase the West German defense budget by 1.1 billion DM. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)
JFK
157. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/
Washington, November 28, 1962, 7:34 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.13/11-2362. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand and revised in the White House, cleared in draft by Rusk and in substance by the President and Bundy, and approved by Davis.
1172. Re Moscow's 1339./2/ Following are your instructions for luncheon meeting with Semenov:
/2/Telegram 1339, November 23, reported that during Kohler's first courtesy call on Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov, Semenov had suggested he and the Ambassador meet informally to discuss Germany. The telegram noted that Kohler would try to arrange a meeting for November 29 or 30 and asked for instructions. (Ibid.)
1. We have assumed that in post-Cuba phase Soviets might (a) show by their attitude in other areas of difference with West that they have embarked upon a fairly radical course of policy change within which eventual discussions on Berlin would fall into natural place, or (b) more likely, in absence of such broad policy change, reopen talks on Berlin within the framework of previous exchanges but possibly with some changes in past positions. President said to Adenauer during recent visit that if Khrushchev meets our requirements in Cuba, we might inquire as to Soviet proposals on Berlin without, however, making any of our own for time being.
2. Although certain aspects of Cuban situation remain unresolved, we want to take advantage of opportunity provided by Semenov's opening to initiate probe present direction of Soviet thinking on Berlin. (While you should make clear at outset that you are undertaking talks with him on personal basis without any governmental commitment although both you and he will presumably be reporting to your principals, we realistically assume that you will be regarded as speaking on basis of at least general instructions.)
3. A solid settlement in Berlin on terms that keep the city free and viable is a target of high priority for us, and we do not wish to miss any opportunity that may now exist for a Berlin settlement. You should maintain the position that since the Soviet Government started the Berlin crisis, the initative for new proposals should rest with Moscow, but you should leave no doubt that we are much interested in a workable settlement. You should point out that we see no good in facing difficult negotiations with Germans and French except in terms of a real prospect of settlement.
4. As we see it, there are two broad possibilities for such a settlement. One is a de facto continuation of the status quo, in which any peace treaty would leave the real situation unchanged, and each side would interpret the position in its own way. This is probably easier to negotiate but less satisfactory for the long pull than a broader settlement. The terms of a wider agreement must include for us plainly acknowledged right of Western troop presence and improved access rights like those proposed under our international access authority. A number of adjustments of interest to the Soviets could be made in return for improved access and wholly accepted presence. Without communicating all of the above to Semenov, you should make it plain to him that any Berlin settlement which shifts from the status quo must include advantages for us as well as for them, and that the advantages of greatest interest to us are improved access and a wholly acknowledged right of Western presence. It would be appropriate to indicate that we would be interested in knowing how Soviets would construct a wider agreement including these two features.
5. Since Semenov will probably not be able to respond immediately to this hint, you should also endeavor to draw him out as to the significance of his remark that the Cuban crisis was not without its implications for German problem. As you know, lessons which Soviets have presumably drawn from Cuban experience have been subject of considerable speculation but of little hard information. One line which had been put out through both satellite and direct sources is that lesson of Cuba is that, if both sides are prepared to make concessions as in Cuban case, then similar willingness of both sides to make concessions on Berlin should likewise lead to resolution of that problem. Should Senenov take this position, you might point out that, in discussions of past 16 months, we have already indicated a number of areas in which West has indicated willingness to make accommodations. However, compromise cannot extend to what we have defined as our vital interest in Berlin situation, although even here we are willing to look at situation in endeavor to examine modalities provided any changes are consistent with safeguarding of those vital interests.
6. A further point which it might be useful to probe would be role now assigned to peace treaty by Soviets. We have noted recent deemphasis of peace treaty in both Soviet and GDR statements. Semenov will undoubtedly continue to pay lip service to peace treaty, but we would be interested in your impressions from talking with him that this is definitely on back burner.
7. We are much interested in Khrushchev's recent conversation with Ambassador Roberts/3/ and his suggestion that troops might remain temporarily under a certain unspecified UN role. In the degree that this could be a face-saver for Soviets while Allied troop presence and guarantee remain, this proposal is of real interest to us. A major purpose of your talks with Semenov should therefore be to ascertain whether this suggestion represents a real shift in the Soviet position or is merely a device for limiting both the duration and the effectiveness of Western presence. You should make it clear that we cannot express any judgment on what they have in mind until they have spelled it out. You might, for example, seek to determine what the Soviets have in mind among such possibilities (without offering them a catalog for shopping) as following: (a) simple registration of any agreement on Berlin with UN, (b) agreement to report to UN on such matters as the size, composition, and activities of forces in Berlin, (c) some form of UN representation and authority in West Berlin, (d) some new status involving West Berlin request for Allied troops under some UN umbrella, (e) a move of elements of UN itself to West Berlin, (f) a UN role in other respects than troop presence--as for example access or perforation of wall. You should probe as to the role and authority of West Berlin Senat, Western garrisons, and Federal Republic under any such arrangements. In all this, you should make it clear that we could accept no arrangement which did not allow visible continuation of our own guarantee of the freedom of West Berlin, and we repeat that you should avoid any suggestion of a US position on such possibilities.
/3/See footnote 3, Document 154.
8. You are familiar with standard arguments made repeatedly by Secretary in his numerous conversations with Soviets over past 16 months. To extent you deem desirable, you should repeat these arguments as appropriate. We would want to avoid giving impression that our position has weakened in any way on what we have defined as our vital interests in Berlin situation. Our position is that of reasonable man whose strength and restraint have both been demonstrated.
9. We believe foregoing should suffice for exchange with Semenov. With your knowledge of US-Soviet bilateral exchanges, you will recognize anything really new or significant which he might say and can exercise judgment as to whether to pursue it by discreet questioning.
FYI. We would hope that you could have lunch with Semenov without this getting to press corps. While we accept inevitability of your having to brief French, British, and German colleagues, at least in general, on your discussion, we would also hope that information could be limited to them. In talking with them, you should be careful to avoid giving impression that you are in any way negotiating rather than engaging purely in probing operation on informal basis at Soviet initiative. President is dubious about possibility of carrying out really useful exchanges with Soviets if we follow usual procedure of full briefings for three and then for NATO. In past, this has led either to leaks and public discussion of Allied differences before reactions of Soviets have been ascertained, or to debate within Alliance on theoretical points which have not played role in talks with Soviets. While President is, therefore, prepared to have you initiate probe with Semenov, at appropriate point he may wish to use other channels.
Rusk
158. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, November 30, 1962, 1-3:40 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-3062. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Davis and approved in S on December 5. The source text is labeled "Memo No. 5." Mikoyan had stopped in Washington after visiting Havana. A summary of this conversation and one with the President on November 29, at which Berlin was not discussed, was transmitted to Paris in Topol 757, December 4. (Ibid., 611.61/12-462) Rusk and Mikoyan also discussed a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., 611.61/11-3062.
SUBJECT
Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
The United States:
The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Richard H. Davis, EUR
Mr. Kamman, Interpreter
The Soviet Union:
First Dep. Premier Anastas Mikoyan
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Kornienko, Counselor, Sov. Emb.
Mr. Chistov
Mr. Vinogradov, Interpreter
Turning from the discussion on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Mr. Mikoyan said he had another question to raise. The Cuban question, he observed, could have brought us to nuclear war, but now the crucial period was over and we should be able to settle this question peacefully. However, there was a second question which could lead us to war, and this is Germany. We have consulted with, and submitted many proposals to our World War II Allies. Two or three years have passed during which there have been extensive negotiations with Ambassador Thompson in Moscow and between the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko. This has brought about considerable progress. When Mr. Dulles complained about the Soviet ultimatum of six months in the first Soviet proposal on Germany and said it could not possibly be worked out in this time, the Soviet Union had not insisted. Moreover, it was not an ultimatum. A time limit is not as important for us as the willingness of our World War II Allies to finalize this question. Looking back, we do not regret postponing the issue because in our discussions certain progress has been made.
The Soviet Union could not, Mr. Mikoyan continued, go beyond the proposals already made by Chairman Khrushchev. The Soviet Union was concerned by the presence of Western troops in Berlin. He would like to ask a question: since the Western powers were not making new proposals, or apparently making any constructive efforts, did the United States think that this situation could be frozen in perpetuity? Did the United States expect the occupation forces to remain in West Berlin for all time? All these questions were legitimate but the United States did not answer them. If the Soviet Union became convinced that their World War II Allies don't want an agreement, then the Soviet Union would proceed alone. It did not wish to do so but we could not live together with an occupation regime in West Berlin and no peace treaty. However, Mr. Mikoyan concluded, he would not repeat the thoughts in Chairman Khrushchev's messages to the President on this subject.
The Secretary stated that we had had many discussions in the past but he was glad to tell Mr. Mikoyan of our position. In the course of these past discussions a number of points had arisen on which considerable progress had been made. We had tried to meet the USSR in a spirit of reciprocity. Now we have come to a point where in trying to meet the Soviet Union on one point, it is then set aside and the USSR moves on to another point. In all frankness, more genuine reciprocity from the Soviet side is needed. For example, we were told East Berlin cannot be discussed, i.e., Allied interests in East Berlin are not for discussion. We were told we must discuss West Berlin. This position reflects an absence of the spirit of reciprocity. We have said for years that the presence of Western troops and a guaranteed freedom for Berlin is a vital interest of the United States. We haven't said that this situation will be perpetuated for eternity. We would like to see a peace treaty for all Germany and we have made many proposals, but we are faced with the fact of disagreement between us.
Mr. Mikoyan asked on what basis did the United States intend to keep its troops in West Berlin and for how long.
The Secretary responded that time limits were difficult to talk about except in terms of a general settlement of the German question. At this point there is a sharp difference between the Soviet Union and the United States. This can be managed so as not to produce other crises while we proceed to other questions which might help our relations. In this way time can be of help, and in the long run will improve the possibilities of agreement. Also the time factor can be affected by relations between the East and West Germans, for instance, in the matter of trade, which would indicate they were prepared to live in peace. Again time would be a factor when the West Berliners no longer have the threat of a man with opinions and objectives like Ulbricht hanging over them.
The Secretary continued that our approach had been broadly along three lines: First, to settle the German question as a whole, which would mean the end of the occupation; secondly, recognizing existing facts, of which there are three important elements--the existence of East Germany, West Germany and West Berlin; thirdly, given the fact of disagreement, we must consider how we might manage this problem in order to promote the possibilities of agreement in the long run, but handle the fact of disagreement peacefully. This was one of the reasons why we had proposed Deputy Foreign Ministers. Unfortunately, we had not been able to reach agreement on any of these three variants. Both of our countries possess great power and Berlin was important to both. Therefore we must prepare to discuss the question with great care. We feel that if the Soviet approach is the same, we can find a way to deal with this issue.
Mr. Mikoyan said the Secretary's last remark was constructive and he entirely shared it. With many of the Secretary's past remarks he could not agree. West Berlin was situated in the territory of the GDR. East Berlin is the capital city of a sovereign state. Accordingly, by all the rules, West Berlin should be considered a part of the GDR, and it could have claimed West Berlin. But the USSR and the GDR, understanding the position of the Western Powers, had agreed that West Berlin remain a special unit without becoming part of the GDR. There was no intention to interfere with West Berlin unless it became a member of military pacts. The Soviet Union had agreed to talk with the United States on how to finish the occupation status. It would be much better if a peace treaty were signed by all the Allies against Germany in World War II, but if this were not possible, because of the stubbornness of Adenauer or other Western Allies, the Soviet Union could sign a separate treaty. But the Soviet Union would prefer to find an agreed solution. Time does settle questions, but time can also create contradictions and explosions can occur. The Berlin and German questions have been delayed for a long time but such delay makes the situation more dangerous. The United States should give more thought to its position but it should not delay too long.
The Secretary said we were prepared to go into this question at any time. If there was introduced an element of genuine reciprocity, he thought a solution could be found. However, he felt that we had had agreements in the past on questions with the USSR but these agreements haven't lasted very long. In this connection the Secretary referred to the 1945 agreements when Allied troops had withdrawn from a considerable portion of East Germany, and to the 1949 agreements which through certain events we felt had been violated to some degree. The United States wants to remove Berlin and Germany as a constant source of difficulties, but we must recognize the difficulty in finding a solution.
The Secretary said he wanted to comment on Mr. Mikoyan's remark about delay. The United States is not attempting to delay discussions. The delays which have occurred are bilateral responsibility. One can always hurry into a crisis, but it is much better if we can find a way to resolve this question without a crisis. The Secretary said he was confident that he could speak for President Kennedy in that he wants to find a satisfactory solution to this issue. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have many other things to do for their peoples.
Mr. Mikoyan responded that in order to find an end to this issue, questions must be discussed. The President should not expect from the Soviet Union additional proposals. The Soviet Union expects constructive proposals from the United States.
The Secretary observed the United States had made quite a few proposals but received the reply that these could not be discussed.
Mr. Mikoyan said it was really the other way around and urged that the United States think the situation over. The Soviet Union believes that there must be movement ahead. Mr. Mikoyan disclaimed any intention of conducting negotiations, but he wanted the Secretary to understand the seriousness of this issue for the USSR.
The Secretary expressed the hope that Moscow would give a great deal of thought to this issue; indeed all of the Powers concerned must give hard thought to it. Referring to Mr. Mikoyan's remark about Adenauer, the Secretary emphasized that the United States was not speaking on behalf of our Allies or their interest, but rather of the vital interests of the United States. It would be a great mistake to think the United States was paralyzed or tongue-tied by the attitude of one or more of its Allies. The United States still hoped that progress could be made on this issue.
Mr. Mikoyan jokingly remarked "so there is an independent policy of the United States". He concluded by remarking that Soviet interests and ours could be reconciled, which was a good omen.
159. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, December 3, 1962, 11 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/12-362. Secret; Limited Distribution.
1415. Embtel 1410./2/ Following is detailed report conversation with Semenov December 3 at which Sukhodrev served as interpreter.
/2/In telegram 1410, December 3, Kohler summarized his conversation with Semenov, stating that it provided no real clarification, no discernible hint of change in the Soviet position on Berlin, and no forward progress. Kohler concluded, however, that Semenov seemed inclined to continue the dialog. (Ibid.)
At outset substantive portion conversation, I expressed interest in fact that both Mikoyan, in conversation with President,/3/ and Semenov had indicated Cuban experience was not without implications for German problem. Semenov replied exchange of letters between President and Khrushchev/4/ had mentioned problems other than Cuba, specifically nuclear testing in first instance and disarmament. According his recollection issue of G/B touched upon. Semenov said peaceful resolution of Cuban problem did not automatically mean other problems could similarly be solved. I noted that question of G/B not really dwelt on in exchange of letters, but only one element entering into discussions of past year seemed to be singled out, namely NATO-Warsaw Pact relationship. Semenov replied this did not lessen urgency of resolution problem West Berlin since forces involved which could get out of control. Pet project of Strauss has always been bring US and USSR into direct confrontation in West Berlin. Strauss has gone but his theme remains with Weinstein serving as principal instrument of pursuit this policy. I said I had many discussions with Strauss and never heard anything along lines mentioned by Semenov.
/3/See the source note, Document 158.
/4/Texts of the letters exchanged between the President and Khrushchev during the Cuban crisis are printed in volume VI and volume XI.
I pointed out US interest is workable solution of Berlin problem. Thus far, however, USSR proposed four formulae which emphasized word "temporary" and which constituted variation on theme to oust US from West Berlin. Semenov said that this view incorrect and that Soviets not attempting get someone out of Berlin and assured me this is view of Soviet Government. If he reported to Soviet leaders that aim was to oust US, they would say it isn't so. It is not question of pushing US out but normalizing situation in West Berlin. I itemized four formulae presented by Soviets and said these contained no element of compromise. They all involved the withdrawal of Western forces either now or in future. Such an event would completely remove protection now accorded West Berlin and this was certainly one of most dangerous developments that could occur in Central Europe.
Recalling previous conversations, Semenov said political-social system in East Berlin same as in GDR. On other hand, West Berlin has social system differing completely with that within GDR. Thus there are now three separate entities in Germany, consisting of West Germany, GDR and West Berlin. An attempt must be made to assure peaceful coexistence these three entities. One can only speak of protection when an attack against something is contemplated, which is not the case. USSR believes West Berlin should be free and independent as long as sovereign rights GDR protected. Neither USSR nor GDR has slightest need for West Berlin and both are prepared provide guarantees to West Berlin. US believes guarantees should be in form of troop contingents. Although USSR does not think so, it is willing to meet US half way. US side itself has said troops should not remain in West Berlin ad infinitum; therefore US also recognizes principle of temporariness of troops. In essence question is one of peaceful coexistence in which both sides will observe international obligations. USSR wishes to see greater degree of trust and to insure that events do not lead to explosion. Latest events attest to fact that this is reasonable position.
I agreed trust desirable if explosion to be avoided. Speaking frankly, however, Cuban situation has improved matters in this regard. Our aim must be seek guarantees which are obvious and self-enforcing. In broader context, problem is less how several parts divided Germany will live together than how US and USSR will live side by side. USSR can have peaceful existence in this area and has it at moment because both sides are observing mutual obligations. Attempt by USSR however to oust Western presence from West Berlin contrary to mutual obligations and peaceful coexistence. If two sides can't coexist peacefully in Berlin, question arises what this term means.
Semenov said general question of peaceful coexistence between USSR and US involves broad issues which would involve wide exchange of views. His personal attitude toward me made such an exchange possible and he would do utmost to have frank discussions, proceeding from normal positions of both governments.
Semenov said developments in G/B are of concern to USSR since they have evolved in abnormal manner. In instances where troops are in direct confrontation with each other, situation could become dangerous should, for example, officer on either side undertake irrational act or should third parties continue their provocations. USSR intends to ensure freedom of West Berlin and to permit it to have ties with all countries. Development should proceed in such way as to preclude collision because this could have dangerous implications, especially since West Berlin located in heart of Europe. Soviet Union preoccupied by militaristic and revanchist tendencies in both West Germany and West Berlin. USSR worried and preoccupied not because it is afraid but because these forces are seeking to set US and USSR against each other. In past ten years these tendencies have strengthened and problem must be viewed not only with respect to past but with respect future probabilities. USSR doesn't want situation to develop into thermonuclear war. Therefore remnants World War II must be removed and situation in West Berlin normalized on basis of peace treaty. Semenov agreed that both sides have been abiding by international obligations but these obligations entered into as result Second World War and included German settlement. Situation however now changed and new obligations must be undertaken. USSR proposing that both sides undertake new obligations on basis of existing situation. The occupation in West Berlin cannot last forever. Soviet Union ready to assume new obligations and US side has indicated new settlement possible and expedient. In any case, he and I might make useful contribution by weighing what has been said by two sides and bringing positions into accord.
On question of peace treaty, I agreed both sides obligated seek peace settlement with Germany. From our point of view, peace treaty with two parts of Germany or separate peace treaty would not represent settlement but legalization of partition of Germany to which US cannot be party. US profoundly believes partition Germany not in Soviet interests since division only sows seeds of revanchism. In my view, peace treaty appeared more a slogan than practical approach to peaceful resolution of problem. I then stated presence Western forces not negotiable. We are in West Berlin by same force circumstances USSR in East Berlin and East Germany. US deeply committed to protection of two and one fourth million West Berliners. We consider troop presence essential guarantee of our commitment. It likely that direct confrontation our troops represents better situation than if Germans confronted one another since latter might not be as responsible as US and USSR. US desires to reach understanding as to how two sides can live together in Central Europe. We could either live as we are or, since Soviets wish to change situation, reach broader modus vivendi which would take into account interests of both sides and lead to more peaceful atmosphere. If Soviets sincere regarding mutual concessions and attempt to solve problem on broader basis, this would interest us. In past sixteen months, Soviet side has not reciprocated US attempts to meet interests which USSR consider vital.
After Semenov said he did not understand broader measures to which I had referred, I listed items contained in Principles Paper given Soviets at Geneva, noting that these were advanced on assumption Soviets would recognize our vital interests in West Berlin. Semenov noted he had taken part in recent exchanges of view and added exchanges had not been in vain. A rapprochement had been registered on some questions by two sides and statements of President and Secretary indicated attempt being made to reach mutually acceptable solutions. He commented that my statements seemed step backward, although he appreciated it was sometimes necessary to go back in order to make a big jump ahead.
I said key point made by President and Secretary was that US in West Berlin and that we would not get out. Soviets would have to use force to evict us. If Soviets accept fact of our presence in West Berlin as we accept fact of theirs in East Germany and East Berlin, then would be possible for two sides live together in Central Europe.
When I asked Semenov whether my recollections correct, he answered that I knew as well as he.
Semenov then read statement referred to in Embtel 1410 and promised send us copy unofficially. Embassy translation will be transmitted when received./5/
/5/The statement provided for replacing the Western forces in Berlin by U.N. police formations, which might include U.S., British, and French contingents, but which would all be withdrawn in 4 years. (Telegram 1423 from Moscow, December 4; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/12-462)
I said I appreciated clarification of Khrushchev remarks to Ambassador Roberts since they evidently different than Roberts understood them. Speaking personally, however, I said I didn't see how this represented concession since it was still aimed at removing our troops from West Berlin. Semenov replied goal is quite different and what is sought is peaceful settlement and normalization of situation in West Berlin. Statement requires careful examination and study in all its aspects and represents concession to US. I then repeated view that US cannot accept peace treaties with two Germanies since this would legalize partition and added that signature of peace treaty by USSR and others with GDR did not represent peaceful settlement German problem. On contrary, it could lead to dangerous provocation of peace. Semenov then said that US in 1947 considered it possible sign peace treaty with separate parts of Germany and that Dulles and Murphy were exponents of this view. Stalin, however, maintained different viewpoint which Soviets now consider to have been mistake. Life has borne out that US was correct. US however has retreated as USSR approached once-held US position. Secondly, Semenov said USSR wished register existing situation. While US not prepared sign peace treaty under existing circumstances, US has not opposed signature of treaty by USSR and GDR. USSR believed it good thing to have such questions as frontiers, access and respect for sovereignty GDR agreed upon prior to signature of separate treaty. Soviet Union considered it in its interest to agree on certain arrangements prior to signature separate treaty with GDR.
I said signing of such treaty would be meaningless in itself. However, we consider it dangerous if USSR would thereby try to change US position or Western position in West Berlin and with respect to access. If we could have accord which would protect our vital interests that would be acceptable to us.
What concerns us is implied threat that signature of separate peace treaty would bring with it certain consequences which would affect our vital interests. US not seeking to change situation to disadvantage USSR. Dramatic illustration of this attitude demonstrated by our conduct in events of August 13 last year, which we hope will not be misinterpreted. This experience indicated US would not move against USSR where it has physical control. If USSR seeking change, US willing to listen to and study proposals which take our vital interests into account. We are looking for such proposals but haven't found them. All those advanced attempt to bring a change to our disadvantage.
Semenov said he did not want to repeat Soviet positions and merely wanted to point out that all that has been said by Soviet leaders retains its force. He hoped contacts would be continued in order to bring sides closer together although he was mindful of humility of his position and does not count on possibilities being too great. I noted that I would be going to Paris next week where I would see Secretary. I would send clarification of what Khrushchev has told Roberts to the Dept for study and would discuss with Secretary in Paris.
Kohler
160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, December 6, 1962, 3:21 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.54/11-2962. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted and initialed by Ausland; cleared by Hillenbrand, Bundy (in substance), Nitze, Thompson, Davis, and Weiss (all in draft); and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Berlin, Paris, London, Moscow, SHAPE, U.S. Element Live Oak, CINCEUR, USAREUR, and USAFE.
1340. Paris also pass USRO. Ref: Bonn's 1440./2/ Subject: Berlin: Advance Notification for Autobahn Convoys.
/2/In telegram 1440, November 29, Dowling supported the views expressed at a meeting with General Norstad on November 27 for unrestricted access to Berlin, but noted that Allied procedures differed on notifying the Soviets about convoys to Berlin. He stressed the need to resolve the question of notification without further extensive delay. (Ibid.)
1. I have reviewed recommendations submitted by you, Berlin, and General Norstad concerning our reaction to statement by Sergin on November 14 that US would thereafter have to submit advance notification for convoys of more than five vehicles. In doing this, I have taken into account views expressed by French and British.
2. US objectives regarding convoy procedures remain those set forth in Deptel 76 to Bonn, dated July 10:/3/ (a) to reach Allied agreement on convoy procedures related to inspection, dismounting, and advance notification and (b) to gain Soviet acceptance of or acquiescence in these Allied procedures.
/3/Not printed. (Ibid., 762.54/7-662)
3. From an analysis of messages from Berlin, Bonn, and Paris and our talks with British and French here, it would appear that we are at present confronted with following alternatives:
a. French would prefer not to send any note to Soviets and favor finessing issue by not sending six or seven vehicle convoys.
b. British favor note to Soviets, with oral comment that Allies hereafter will give notification on eight or more vehicles. British here indicate they might be prepared to see US, after suitable wait, send six or seven vehicle convoy, to test Soviet intentions. We agree with Bonn and Berlin that British probably hope Soviets will engage US in dialogue over convoy procedures.
c. You and General Norstad have recommended use of note contained Paris 2252./4/ Although you do not say so specifically, I understand you would propose to follow this at suitable point with convoy of more than five vehicles.
/4/Dated November 28. (Ibid., 762.54/11-2862) The 4-paragraph note reiterated Allied rights to unrestricted access to Berlin.
d. Soviets have proposed that hereafter convoys of more than five vehicles (not counting escort vehicle) give advance notification. (We recall in this regard that this is number of vehicles proposed by US and French Berlin Missions to British in June. See BQD CC-18.)/5/
/5/A copy of this paper is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
4. If written note were sent to Soviets, I believe it would be important to follow it up with convoy of six or seven vehicles, in order to back up our words with action. If such a convoy were sent, I agree that we should be prepared to invoke Rules of Conduct for Allied autobahn convoys (SHLO 600/128)./6/ If we start down this road, I agree with General Norstad that we should have as much support as possible from British and French.
/6/A copy of this paper, dated August 28, was attached to an August 30 memorandum from Norstad to six commands in Europe. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, 092 Germany)
5. Advantage of this course of action is that it would demonstrate to Soviets that we are unwilling accept unilateral Soviet demands regarding convoy procedures.
6. Disadvantage would be that, if Rules of Conduct implemented, we would have precipitated crisis over issue on which it might be hard to maintain Allied unity.
7. On balance we prefer not to precipitate issue by sending more than five vehicle convoy without advance notification at this time but neither do we wish to foreclose resort to this alternative at a later point in time. We recognize, of course, that prolonged delay in sending six or seven vehicle convoy without notification will tend to rigidify our position, but we are prepared to accept this risk. Total picture of Soviet position post-Cuba is still in process of emerging and we should like to retain as much flexibility as possible to stiffen our position on access if need be without at this time forcing issue of notification to a head.
8. You should, therefore, inform British and French that, although we shall reserve the right to do so at a later date, we do not plan at this time to send any further six or seven vehicle convoys. In your discretion, you should also (after informing the British and French) take advantage of next five vehicle convoy to make statement orally at Babelsberg checkpoint along lines message proposed by General Norstad. This should preferably be made by American officer to Soviet officer.
9. We are not transmitting this information to British or French in Ambassadorial Group, and would prefer to keep consultation on this subject in Bonn. Believe it advisable also that you include Germans or at least keep them informed.
Rusk
161. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (LeMay) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
JCSM-981-62
Washington, December 10, 1962.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 B 3542, 091 Germany. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. On January 17, 1963, McNamara sent a copy of this paper to Rusk. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1-763)
SUBJECT
Berlin Planning (U)
1. On several occasions in the past few months the Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed their concern to you that little, if any, progress is being made toward a solution of the Berlin problem. At best, our most comprehensive plans aim at a limited objective of return to the status quo ante following some infringement by the Soviets on our vital interests related to Berlin. Recent exhaustive examination of this problem, as transmitted to you in JCSM-556-62, dated 28 July 1962, subject: "Reappraisal of the Berlin Situation (U),"/2/ revealed that in the present situation we have extremely limited leverage, short of serious military action, to balance the unfavorable tactical situation resulting from the physical location of Berlin so far within the borders of the Soviet Bloc. Consequently, our necessarily limited responses in the Berlin situation do not consistently convey an adequate impression of our determination to defend our vital interests. This may have influenced Soviet thinking with respect to Cuba. Knowing that you share this concern, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forward in this memorandum the results of a recent Joint Strategic Survey Council study on the Berlin problem./3/
/2/Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 B 3542, 091 Germany)
/3/Attached but not printed.
2. The present United States political initiative seeks to take advantage of the lull in Communist aggressive actions against Berlin. Discussions at several diplomatic levels are probing to clarify Soviet intentions and possibly changing policies. Current United States efforts appear to include some degree of international participation in Berlin and its access routes. The Joint Strategic Survey Council study introduces an alternate to the "international" type of solution, and provides a basis for eventually diminishing rather than maintaining our military presence in Berlin. While most of the features in this proposal have previously been considered, as far as we know they have not been presented in a coordinated package in which both the early and later stages have been considered.
3. In forwarding the proposal outlined herein, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would emphasize that any agreement sought for the Berlin problem must be developed within the framework of continuing struggle between the Free World and the Communist Bloc. The German question is pivotal in this struggle; and West Germany's economic, political, and military assets remain important ingredients in the power equation. In this context, while the German and Berlin questions represent immediate manifestations of East-West divergencies, they should never be regarded as the basic source of these divergencies. Any plan, including that outlined below, which ignores this premise could be self defeating.
4. In considering the Berlin situation, the following paragraphs (initially addressed to an analysis of the Cuban situation) provide a rationale within which to address the Berlin problem:
"a. Both the United States and the Soviet Union each have many interests. Only a portion of these can accurately be described as 'vital interests,' i.e., interests which, if damaged, would cause serious and long-term harm to the status of security of one or the other of the two great powers.
"b. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have vital interests in Berlin; neither can afford being pushed too far without serious damage to its own military, political, and international positions. In Laos, to illustrate a different situation, both the United States and the Soviet Union have an interest, but neither has a vital interest. Neither would welcome a loss, but either could, if necessary, afford a loss without irreparable damage to its own security or to its own network of the international power structures.
"c. In both these illustrations, Berlin and Laos, there is a sort of equilibrium-of-interests. In the one case (Berlin), both have vital interests at stake, and, therefore, each must consider carefully the effect of its own moves on the other. In the other case (Laos), neither has vital interests, and, therefore, neither is induced to put forth its utmost effort with all forms of power in order to keep from losing.
"d. While both have a sort of equilibrium, the important difference between the two types of interests is that there is much more freedom of action in the situations which are not vital. The possible actions and responses-to-actions in those cases in which the great power has a vital interest are much narrower and at the same time much more predictable because of the narrowed range of alternatives."
It follows then that a solution in Berlin must necessarily involve a certain degree of disengagement of vital interests. One might logically reason that this process is the reverse of the process of involvement of vital interests such as the recent buildup in Cuba.
5. In furtherance of this theme, it is quite apparent that the Soviets, in proposing a treaty with East Germany, are in reality trying to disengage their political vital interests in Berlin by absorbing them into their vital interests in the East German Government. The price they would like us to pay for this is our military withdrawal and sacrifice of our military interests in Berlin. Since they are asking that a military vital interest of the United States be sacrificed for the disengagement of a political vital interest of the Soviets, the power equation would be out of balance, and the proposition is unacceptable. The only basis on which we can seriously consider negotiations would be that of a political disengagement for a political vital interest or a military disengagement for a military vital interest.
6. To illustrate this thesis, it would be appropriate to reverse the Soviet proposal and offer the Soviets Allied political disengagement in Berlin for a major Soviet military withdrawal (such as their military withdrawal from East Germany). Naturally, this would be as outrageous a proposal to the Soviets as their proposal is to us; for here we would be trading a political vital interest for their military vital interest, and, consequently, the equation would be out of balance. To keep the exchanges equitable, we could offer to accept the Soviet's East German treaty scheme expanded to include a comparable West German treaty scheme with neither side forsaking its military vital interests. This, then, would result in a political disengagement by both the major powers without the sacrificing of any of their military vital interests.
7. On the face of it, the equation is now in balance. Political disengagement on both sides and military involvement on both sides should be an acceptable solution to each. Some additional safeguards to make it palatable to each will be necessary. For instance, Khrushchev has referred to a NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression agreement; there might be ways in which this could be worked out. But most importantly, the problem of access to Berlin must be firmly nailed down.
8. a. If Berlin were on the border, the access problem would be easy. It is not, and this is the problem. Most suggestions up to this time have tended toward some sort of UN or other international supervision of access. An "international" solution would bring more, rather than fewer, fingers in the pie. Any form of international management would serve to perpetuate rather than eliminate Berlin as a point of international friction (the examples of UN interposition in the Gaza Strip, in Korea, in Laos, and in the Congo all point to this tendency). Therefore, it is proposed that we move in the other direction, away from the "international" type of solution. Since Berlin cannot be brought to the border, we propose taking the border to Berlin by creating some sort of an umbilical cord, a guaranteed access corridor, between West Germany and West Berlin controlled only by West Germans, with no intermediate accesses and no checkpoints. It is not implied that this guaranteed access should be the only access; the present water, air, rail, and road accesses could and should be continued with detailed arrangements worked out by the West and East Germans on the basis of their mutual self interests. But the insurance policy, the umbilical, would have to be in existence in addition to these. This umbilical cord could perhaps be a long-term lease, guaranteed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact, of a strip of land on each side of an existing autobahn (with new by-passes around towns and cities); or it might be a new autobahn, perhaps with a parallel railroad or a monorail, perhaps even an elevated autobahn, inside a leased strip all the way from the West German border into West Berlin. Rough cost estimates are $550 million for an elevated autobahn and less than that for a new autobahn on the surface. Neither of these is an exorbitant price for prospect of settlement of this thorny question, and the cost could be distributed at least between the United States and West Germany and perhaps throughout NATO.
b. The right of way through East Germany could be closed off by fences, mine fields, or whatever the East Germans may want; and non-access bridges or tunnels would ensure free East German crossings. But, whatever the detailed arrangements, this one insurance access must be guaranteed and must be under the exclusive control of the West Germans. By this means we have, in effect, moved West Berlin to the border. This establishment of the two parts of Germany in juxtaposition to each other with the basic political barrier of the opposing great powers removed leads naturally to an evolutionary development of the next step. We can assume that the arrangement will be peaceful, because it is guaranteed by both sides. We can hope that, since the external political barriers would have been removed, the physical barriers might break down. Inevitably Germans will talk to Germans and, quite reasonably, interflow between East and West Germany would develop and should be encouraged.
9. Thus, East Berlin would become a part of East Germany; West Berlin would become a part of West Germany; both great powers would have withdrawn from direct political participation in Berlin; both great powers would retain their military involvements through NATO and the Warsaw Pact in West and East Germany, and through those two countries in the divided city; West Berlin's viability would be preserved by the guaranteed and uncontrolled access; the prospect of a reunited Germany would be extended further into the future; and the criticality of Berlin as a direct US-Soviet confrontation point would recede to become part of the more manageable larger problem of Western Europe versus Eastern Europe.
10. When the matter of the political disengagement is in hand, we might reasonably look forward to a military-for-military disengagement. This action would again keep the equation in balance. A phased back-up, a reduction on a geographic or numerical basis of non-German forces, might be accomplished by substitution of West German military for tripartite military and of East Germans for Soviets in Berlin. This would accomplish one of our aims which is disengagement by both powers in Berlin. It does not appear practical now or in the foreseeable future to disengage West Germany from NATO nor East Germany from the Warsaw Pact. Any later and more extensive force reductions or redistributions would have to be considered in the total context of the NATO requirements then existing.
11. By the stratagem of an exclusively German city, which is itself a concession to the Soviets, we would give physically in Berlin but maintain our presence and treaty obligations through the West Germans who would, in fact, own the Allied sectors of Berlin and the access real estate. Both super powers, the United States and the Soviets, would eventually withdraw politically and militarily in Berlin and thus substantially disengage their vital interests there. In time, one could expect the natural tendency of a people with identical ethnics and culture to drift toward cohesion and nationalization. Thus, we might eventually reach our distant objective of unification and a legal plebiscite.
12. In summation, the major elements of the plan are:
a. East Berlin would become a part of East Germany and West Berlin would become a part of West Germany, with guaranteed arrangements for West Germany-to-West Berlin travel controlled only by West Germany (this is, for the United States, the critical element of the entire proposal).
b. Both the Allies and the Soviets would clean up the World War II remnants by each side recognizing and completing the treaties with both West Germany and East Germany.
c. Some nonaggression agreement or comparable and acceptable NATO-Warsaw Pact agreements could be accepted if not substantively harmful. This should not be offered by us, but should be available as a negotiating trade feature if asked for by the Soviets.
13. Berlin thus becomes a German, not a direct US-Soviet problem. The main task in the future would then be to permit the Germans to work out their own future while at the same time ensuring that they do not force a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict to serve their own private ends.
14. a. While it might not be feasible for the United States to offer this proposal today, there are good indications that thought in West Berlin and West Germany is moving in this direction. Opportunity to offer it may come in the near future, and will almost surely come at the time when political forces or the actuarial tables provide a successor to Chancellor Adenauer.
b. It is recognized that use of such a proposal would depend upon its acceptance by our Allies. The proposal in this study includes concepts which may require further development. Since the Berlin problem is under continuous and extensive study within the United States Government, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that the proposal be transmitted to the Secretary of State for consideration.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Curtis E. LeMay
162. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy/1/
Moscow, December 11, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No classification marking. The full text of the letter is printed in volume VI.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
[Here follow 7 pages in which Khrushchev discusses Cuba.]
Let us, Mr. President, eliminate promptly the consequences of the Cuban crisis and get down to solving other questions, and we have them in number. As far as nuclear test ban is concerned this is a minor question on the whole. I am going to address to you a confidential letter and proposals on this question/2/ and I hope that we will overcome difficulties existing in this question. The problem of disarmament is a different matter; it is a major and difficult question now.
/2/For text of this letter, dated December 19, see Department of State Bulletin, February 11, 1963, pp. 198-200.
But, of course, the main question is the German question and it is an easy and at the same time difficult one. I say that it is an easy and at the same time difficult question. But this is really so. It is easy because our proposals for concluding a peace treaty do not demand any concessions from either side, neither do they demand any losses from either side. These proposals only fix the situation which has developed as a result of World War II.
After the talks that our Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Gromyko had with your Secretary of State D. Rusk, only one question in effect remained unresolved--that of troops in West Berlin: troops of what countries, for what term and under what flag will be stationed there.
I would like you to understand me correctly on this question. Let us solve it. We will not escape the necessity to solve this question anyway. To tell the truth, this question is not worth an eggshell if a realistic approach is employed in appraising the situation in Germany where two sovereign German states have developed and if a course followed is aimed at an agreement on West Berlin and not at leaving it to remain a dangerous hot-bed of collision between states. Should really you and we--two great states--submit, willingly or unwillingly, our policy, the interests of our states to the old-aged man who both morally and physically is with one foot in grave? Should we really become toys in his hands? By concluding peace treaty we would lose nothing but we would gain a possibility to strengthen friendly relations between our states, would untie the knot in Europe which is fraught with danger for the whole world only because most extreme aggressive militarist forces in West Germany are interested in this.
Please, excuse me for my straightforwardness and frankness but I believe as before that a frank and straightforward exchange of opinion is needed to avoid the worst.
Please, convey to your wife and your whole family wishes of good health from myself, my wife and my entire family.
163. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Paris, December 12, 1962, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-1262. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, and Berlin. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Hillenbrand. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2197) Rusk and the other Foreign Ministers were in Paris for the NATO Ministerial Meeting December 13-15.
Secto 10. Subject: Quadripartite Ministerial Meeting, December 12, 1962.
Following based on uncleared memorandum of conversation:/2/
/2/US/MC/5, December 15. (Ibid., CF 2198)
After dinner four Foreign Ministers had lengthy private discussion. In larger group, Secretary subsequently summarized conclusions reached noting they had agreed that Ambassadorial Group in Washington should review Berlin contingency plans in order to insure promptest response to Soviet actions. This would include improvement of communications among governments, timing of appointment unified command in Berlin, assembly of Autobahn probe units and timing and application of economic sanctions. Objective would be to reach larger measure of previous agreement among governments. Home commented that with respect economic sanctions emphasis should be on Western response to total blockade of access.
Ministers had also agreed, Secretary continued, to direct Ambassadorial Group to study Western position in three categories:
(a) Satisfactory solution of German question. This would involve bringing 1959 approach up to date.
(b) Berlin arrangements based on de facto situation. This would include proposals on access, Western forces and all-Berlin solution.
(c) If no agreement possible within categories (a) and (b), Western position on possible modus vivendi to manage fact of disagreement with Soviets without hot crisis.
Couve noted that Western powers in 1959 had made all-Berlin proposal based on US draft./3/ Secretary said we needed something of this sort to protect against Soviet pressure to talk only of West Berlin.
/3/For text of this proposal, June 16, 1959, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 665-666.
Secretary emphasized importance of communications between governments in crisis management. Goal should be establishment of possibility of conference type consultation between four governments. This might involve teletype system, classified telephones, etc. Our Cuban experience had shown how communications could fall behind requirements. Both sides had had to resort to public statements, as for example Khrushchev on December 28. Lord Home said he hoped communications could be telegraphic rather than telephonic. Secretary commented that technical means for establishing such communications existed. Governments would have to be willing to consider costs. He noted that fairly good communications now existed between Washington and three capitals as well as Bonn and other capitals, but interlocking systems still required. If crisis occurred today he estimated it would take at least six hours to arrange hook-up for conference type discussion between Ministers. More rapid facilities should exist.
In discussion of handling subject of Berlin at NATO Ministerial Meeting following day, Ministers concluded there was no need for particular emphasis but that something would have to be said about Berlin in communique, since absence would otherwise be noted unfavorably. Schroeder suggested reference to December 1958 formula might be simplest approach./4/
/4/For text of the North Atlantic Council communique, December 15, 1962, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 570-572; for text of the December 16, 1958, Declaration on Berlin, see ibid., 1958, pp. 602-603.
Ministers agreed press line that Four had taken advantage of their presence in Paris for NATO Ministerial Meeting, as was customary, to consult on Berlin and related subjects. They had reviewed work of Ambassadorial Group and had given directives for further work of that group.
Rusk
164. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Nassau, December 19, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Thompson and approved by the White House on January 28. For further documentation on the talks between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan at Nassau December 18-21, see volume XIII.
SUBJECT
Berlin and Germany
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The President
Secretary McNamara
Mr. Ball
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Tyler
Ambassador Thompson
U.K.
Prime Minister Macmillan
Lord Home
Mr. Thorneycroft
Ambassador Ormsby Gore
Sir Robert Scott
Mr. Bligh
Lord Hood
The following are only the highlights of a dinner conversation, as no notes were taken:
Lord Home raised the question of Germany and the Berlin problem and asked if there were anything we ought to be doing. He expressed his own opinion that in view of the attitude of our French and German allies, it did not seem possible for us to take any initiative at the moment--which he thought was a pity. He had hoped that Mr. Khrushchev's conversation with Ambassador Roberts would have provided a basis for tackling the problem but Mr. Khrushchev had backed away from his own proposal.
Lord Home thought that some provision for some UN presence in Berlin would be useful in any plan for settlement. He indicated that what he had in mind was moving various bits and pieces of UN organizations to West Berlin. He also touched upon the question of what flag Western troops would be under.
Ambassador Thompson expressed the view that although the Soviets had made much of the troop issue, the heart of the matter was their desire for greater recognition of the sovereignty of East Germany and their desire to establish greater stability in that area.
Ambassador Bruce gave a long expos[ of his views on the German problem upon which the Prime Minister congratulated him after dinner, describing it as a brilliant presentation. Ambassador Bruce thought any prospects for German reunification were virtually nil. He discussed the possibility of an all-Berlin solution and thought personally that one of the few possibilities of a settlement which might work would be to move the UN headquarters to Berlin. He paid tribute to the role Chancellor Adenauer had played in keeping postwar Germany on the right track.
In reply to a question, Mr. Tyler pointed out that an important factor in the situation was the psychology of the population of West Berlin. He did not think that they would feel secure unless American and other Western troops remained and did not believe they would consider we had upheld our commitment to them if the security of Berlin were turned over to UN forces.
The President said he wondered if we were not making a mistake in always treating the Soviet leaders with consideration and courtesy.
Ambassador Thompson said he thought that our doing so had a definite effect for the good on Soviet policy. He pointed out that the orthodox communist view was that the capitalist--or, as they would call it imperialist world--was out to destroy them. Moreover, they were extremely sensitive and had a deep-seated inferiority complex. It was therefore important to get across to them that we were prepared to negotiate as equals. He cited the fact that Mr. Khrushchev had on a number of occasions, publicly and privately, referred to the fact that President Eisenhower had called him "friend."
In reply to a question from Lord Home, Ambassador Thompson said he thought that the Soviets would try to seek an agreement with the West in some other area before bringing the Berlin problem to a head. He thought that in view of the current state of Sino-Soviet relations, that Khrushchev must badly want an agreement with the West. He also mentioned the great strain on Soviet resources. He said he thought we should not take any initiative on Berlin at this time but should be preparing the position we would adopt when the Soviets did seriously raise the matter again, as he felt certain they would before many months had passed.
The President said the Soviets had had many opportunities to settle the Berlin problem but had, in the past year, gone even further out on a limb by making an issue of the presence of Western troops.
165. Memorandum From the Assistant to the President's Military Representative (Legere) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/
Washington, December 19, 1962.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 38, 505 Berlin Contingency Planning. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
JSSC Paper on "Berlin Planning" (JCSM-981-62)/2/
/2/Document 161.
1. General
a. In response to your request for my views on the subject paper, I think it is an imaginative initiative which deserves a decent hearing that it is not likely to receive. Attached at Tab A is a brief memorandum on the paper which I sent to Mr. Bundy on 12 December, hoping to stimulate his interest without asking him to focus on the entire paper itself./3/ As you will see from my memorandum to Mr. Bundy, I think that the paper represents the sort of proposition which, even though it may appear initially to be "non-negotiable", in the sense that the Sovs/GDR would not accept it, should nevertheless be advanced and publicized.
/3/ Not printed.
b. Since my 12 December memorandum to Mr. Bundy, I have talked further with Mr. David Klein about the subject paper, and he still thinks that it is rather outlandish. I can only say that, much as I like and admire Mr. Klein, "Old Berlin Hands" today are very much like the "Old Chinese Hands" of yesteryear, in that they have been in the game for so long that they shy away from anything except the compulsory ballet figures. In addition, I am certain that Mr. Klein's attitude quite understandably reflects his concern, and that of everyone in State, over the fact that Defense (and in this case JCS) is trying to intrude itself into the conduct of foreign policy. It is for this latter reason that I have said in paragraph 1. a above that I fear the JSSC paper will have trouble receiving a decent hearing.
2. Specific
a. The reasoning in paragraphs 5 and 6 is a little too theological for me; I simply fail to follow the overly fine distinctions and contrasts between political and military vital interests. In the interest of simplicity and vitality, I would cut out these two paragraphs entirely.
b. Paragraphs 10 and 11 strike me as "pussyfooting" a little, at a point where I think the paper should call a spade a spade. In my view, the paper should be crystal clear at this point in the development of its logic that what the paper is proposing is a stark withdrawal of all US, UK, French, and Soviet troops from both Berlins, and, what is more, I think that this withdrawal or disengagement feature should be made a part of the initial package offer to the Soviets. The reason for this latter view of mine is that it would increase the likelihood of Soviet acceptance or serious consideration, and would also tend to pull the teeth of some of the opponents of the paper, such as Mr. David Klein.
LJL
P.S. Walt Rostow might be a good man to furnish a bootleg copy at staff level./4/
/4/Legere added the postscript by hand. General Taylor wrote "OK" below it.
166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, January 9, 1963, 8:19 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-963. Secret. Drafted by Holloway, cleared by Hillenbrand and Guthrie, and approved and initialed by Thompson. Also sent to Bonn, London, Moscow, Berlin, and U.S. Element Live Oak.
3335. Paris also for USRO, Stoessel, McGuire. Thompson yesterday chaired Ambassadorial Group meeting called to initiate work resulting from Quadripartite Foreign Ministers meeting Paris Dec 12 on Berlin contingency planning and Western negotiating positions./2/
/2/See Document 163.
On contingency planning, Thompson referred to work under way on improvement communication facilities, and specifically four-way conference teletype facility for FonMins, which apparently technically feasible but expensive. However, experts' report still to be completed.
Group agreed continue discussion in Contingency Coordinating Group on appointment single Berlin Commandant in serious emergency at earlier stage than provided for in present plans such as implementation Free Style/Back Stroke or Jack Pine II./3/
/3/See footnote 3, Document 115.
Also agreed Military Subgroup wld seek agreement on additional authority for Live Oak as set forth SHLO 9-00013./4/ Additional authority to be sought for SACEUR to cut down Trade Wind/5/ assembly time.
/4/Not found.
/5/Trade Wind was a tripartite plan for using a battalion-sized force to attempt to get the Soviet Union to reopen the Autobahn.
Group also agreed on additional study to streamline economic countermeasures plans and procedures.
Thompson prefaced discussion on negotiation with review of Sov intentions on Berlin in light Khrushchev attendance SED Congress. Sov delegation heavily weighted on ideological side which suggests Sovs see Congress concentrating on dispute with ChiComs. Thompson gave personal view that Sovs will not come to complete break at Congress but may take steps leading to this, e.g. anathematizing Albanian party. Thompson thought complete break would be prefaced by purge of pro-Chinese elements in various parties which may have been what happened in Bulgaria recently. Also possible Khrushchev may use Congress to take first steps toward Ulbricht ouster. Given 1958 precedent, it is always possible Sovs may plan new Berlin initiative or steps toward this at Congress.
Thompson also explained that sentence in US/Sov agreement to disagree on Cuba/6/ which speaks of "agreement on other subjects" included at Sov insistence. We believe Khrushchev needed this at minimum to justify his Cuba policy in context Sino-Sov dispute. US does not expect any Sov initiative at present because of recentness of Cuba. Khrushchev at present in disadvantageous position to suggest any concessions to West. In any case, Thompson said we would expect Sov initiative toward any agreement to come not on Berlin but on matter such as disarmament, nuclear testing, etc. Thompson said US considers formal discussions ended on Cuba. In answer to question, said US has no formal basis for demand that Sovs remove ground forces from Cuba and has given no formal commitment on invasion, surveillance flights, etc. Noted that Cuban letter to UN which reserved Cuban right to any weapons provides justification continued aerial surveillance./7/
/6/For text of this January 7 agreement (U.N. doc. S/5227), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p. 243.
/7/For text of this letter (U.N. doc. S/5228), see ibid., pp. 243-244.
On Berlin negotiations Thompson reviewed Secretary's suggestion that Allies be prepared for three contingencies:
1. A Sov willingness discuss a truly satisfactory solution which would entail an updating of 1959 Western peace plan.
2. An arrangement on de facto situation in Berlin which might include proposals on access, Western forces and all-Berlin solution.
3. Arrangements for managing situation without hot crisis should agreement in first two categories not be possible.
As basis for preparing positions on these contingencies, Thompson suggested five papers might be relevant:
1. Revised Western Peace Plan including 1961 Washington Working Group report./8/
/8/Regarding this report, see vol. XIV, Document 149, footnote 1.
2. Substantive negotiating paper included in Dec 1961 Paris Working Group report./9/
/9/Regarding this report, see ibid., Document 243, footnote 2.
3. All-Berlin proposal given Gromyko in Feb 1962.
4. Principles Paper handed Gromyko informally in Mar 1962.
5. Revised International Access Authority proposal.
Thompson noted that not all papers are quadripartitely agreed.
Alphand raised question of US attitude toward Sov initiative on Berlin in light of sentence in Cuba agreement on "other subjects." Thompson said US had no formal position as yet, but obviously we did not want to take "too negative" position if Sovs really want serious discussion. For the moment, however, we see no such Sov desire. Alphand replied that while French see no threat from Sovs neither do they see any change in Sov positions, thus no new openings for Berlin negotiations are available to West.
Knappstein then read what were obviously Bonn instructions on negotiations. Exploratory talks have been "fruitless" and thus there is no reason go into negotiations. Should Sovs indicate willingness resume exploratory talks, West should insist on precondition that Western troops remain West Berlin. This means remain under present conditions and not for an interim period or under UN flag. If Soviets accept this precondition, West should begin negotiations with maximum rather than minimum proposal but one which should appeal to public and enhance ability to reach modus vivendi. Thompson replied that Sovs unlikely accept this precondition. Also pointed out that US has continually made clear to Sovs in all talks that Western troop presence not negotiable. On maximum negotiating position, Thompson noted Secretary's belief we might go back to all-Berlin proposals to remind Sovs that East Berlin is also negotiating material. However, problem of advancing a maximum position which is also credible must be faced.
Meeting adjourned with agreement to seek instructions on new ideas, new approaches for discussion after Khrushchev East Berlin visit ended.
For USRO: You may draw on Thompson remarks on negotiations and Cuba for NAC briefing, except for reference to documents which we do not wish NAC members to ask for.
Rusk
167. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, January 10, 1963, noon.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Kuznets-ov Talks. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Guthrie and approved in S on January 16. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office. Since Kuznetsov had worked effectively with U.S. officials at the United Nations during the Cuban crisis, the U.S. Government extended an invitation to visit Washington. On January 11 Thompson briefed Knappstein and Rusk briefed Alphand on the talks with Kuznetsov, stressing that there had been nothing new in the conversations. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1163 and 661.00/1-1163)
SUBJECT
Germany and Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The Secretary
John C. Guthrie, Director, SOV
U.S.S.R.
Vasiliy Vasilyevich Kuznetsov, First Deputy Foreign Minister
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Lev Isaakovich Mendelevich, Assistant to Kuznetsov
Viktor Pavlovich Karpov, First Secretary of Embassy (Interpreter)
Mr. Kuznetsov observed that as he had said to the President yesterday,/2/ the USSR and the United States must put more effort into the attempt to solve outstanding international problems. He said that he had mentioned the two most important as those of a German peace treaty and general and complete disarmament. With regard to Germany, he wished to stress that in the Soviet view the necessity of solving this question and removing the last traces of World War II must have priority as life requires this. It was clear, in Europe at least, he said, that without a solution of this problem a hotbed of war will continue to exist. The situation is now ripe for the conclusion of a German peace treaty. In fact, the viewpoints of the two sides are now much closer than they were a couple of years ago. It is now possible to reach an agreement and very little remains to be done. If both governments show a sincere desire, it should not take long to come to an agreement. Such an agreement would be useful for lessening tension in Europe while the problem of disarmament would be easier of solution. Kuznetsov added that he was not linking the German and disarmament problems.
/2/A memorandum of Kuznetsov's conversation with the President at 5 p.m. on January 9, devoted to Cuba, is scheduled for publication in volume XI.
The Secretary said that he would not attempt to review the 100 hours of talks on Berlin and Germany which had taken place over the last year or two. He would, however, urge again that Moscow approach the problem of Berlin with a general sense of reciprocity. What has caused the United States difficulty, he said, had been aptly expressed by the President's expression "What is mine is mine; what is yours is negotiable". Looking back to 1945, the Secretary observed, and throughout the whole postwar period there have been very few bilateral issues between the United States and the USSR. The great issues involved someone else and if these latter could be resolved, the strictly bilateral aspects of our relations would be a relatively simple matter.
Kuznetsov commented that with regard to the German problem the USSR has made many proposals. The United States has only to take its choice among them. He asked that the United States bear this in mind and said that it was now the turn of the United State to advance proposals.
168. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Missions/1/
Washington, January 15, 1963, 1:07 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/1-1563. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Thompson and Tyler; cleared by Davis, Manning, NEA, and S; and approved by Tyler. Sent to the NATO capitals, Madrid, Warsaw, and Berlin and repeated to Moscow.
1238. Paris pass USRO, Stoessel, McGuire. Soviets appear be attempting spread story that US Government has almost reached agreement with them in course discussions with Kuznetsov on nuclear testing and Berlin (Western troops to remain under UN flag). This only latest in series of planted Soviet statements (e.g. Soviet Amb Vinogradov's remarks in Paris and Gromyko speech)./2/
/2/On January 10 Vinogradov had stated in a speech at Paris that the United States and the Soviet Union were close to reaching a settlement on a number of World War II issues. The next day, in a circular telegram to European posts, the Department of State noted that Vinogradov's remarks appeared merely to echo what Gromyko had said to the Supreme Soviet on December 13, 1962, and that they were without foundation. (Circular telegram 1223; ibid., 762.00/1-1163)
Obvious purpose this campaign is to accredit notion that US has been negotiating with Soviet Union behind backs our allies, and thus feed suspicion and resentment against US. Although Kuznetsov mentioned to President German problem, including Berlin along with disarmament as major questions requiring solution, there was no discussion of the German problem. Kuznetsov did briefly discuss Berlin problem with Secretary/3/ but merely along lines restatement standard Soviet position. Last significant discussion with Soviets on Berlin was Secretary's talk with Gromyko (October 18, 1962)/4/ which did nothing to advance solution of problem. Kuznetsov has not been involved in testing and disarmament discussions.
/3/See Document 167.
/4/See Document 136.
Although US continues to hope progress on disarmament including nuclear testing can be made, addressees can in their discretion take appropriate means flatly deny Soviet allegations relating to Berlin and expose their real purpose.
Rusk
169. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, January 17, 1963, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/1-1763. Secret; Niact. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, SHAPE, and CINCEUR.
790. Paris also for USRO; USAREUR for POLAD; SHAPE for US Element Live Oak and Stoessel; CINCEUR for McGuire. Ref Deptel 1612 Bonn, 3443 Paris, 3713 London, 1478 Moscow./2/
/2/Dated January 16, this telegram informed the Mission that a meeting between Brandt and Khrushchev in East Berlin would undercut Four-Power responsibility in Berlin, and so acceptance of the Soviet offer of a meeting would be disadvantageous. If Brandt insisted, the Allies should avoid a public debate, since an open rift with the Mayor would be worse. (Ibid., 661.62A/1-1462)
British (Chairman) Deputy Commandant called on Mayor Brandt 1200 hours to give Allied reaction to Soviet suggestion Khrushchev-Brandt meeting East Berlin evening Jan 17 or 18. Tripartitely agreed Allied formula was along following lines: That we knew that Brandt was aware, as were we, of certain disadvantages in making such visit; nevertheless we left it up to Brandt to decide whether or not to go. This formula arrived at after unilateral consultations with Ambassadors in Bonn and based on strong views here that Allies should put decision squarely up to Brandt. Allied lack of enthusiasm for adventure has indeed been unilaterally expressed previously to Brandt by French Ambassador (via Foreign Office) in Bonn, British Ambassador in Berlin and by three Deputy Commandants.
It was also agreed that Rouse would tell Brandt that if he decided go ahead with visit, conditions he mentioned to Rouse yesterday were satisfactory: that meeting would not be in Sov Embassy; no GDR or SED representatives should attend; and Brandt would avoid giving impression he was spokesman for Allies.
Brandt told Rouse that Chancellor's reaction was very similar to Allies, that is, that he had some reservations but decision was up to Brandt. At Brandt's request, Rouse mentioned several of the disadvantages from the Allied point of view but reiterated no pressure intended and decision was for Brandt to make. He also specifically stated on behalf of Allies that replies to press inquiries re Allied involvement would follow closely formula outlined above.
Brandt said he had not made up his mind but would inform Rouse his decision later in afternoon. Rouse informed me 1500 hours Brandt decided accept and is proposing meeting 1930 this evening. He is laying down certain conditions based on those mentioned above. If meeting arranged, Senat plans issue brief press announcement. Interpreter from Bonn now on way to Berlin to assist Brandt, who would also be accompanied by Barr and Klein.
According Albertz/3/ Brandt's decision heavily influenced by last-minute telephone message from Chancellor that refusal would be detrimental to German/Soviet relations; hence Chancellor advised Brandt "to make personal sacrifice of agreeing to see Khrushchev."/4/
/3/Heinrich Albertz, Berlin Senator for the Interior.
/4/Later in the day the Mission at Berlin reported that the meeting had been "abruptly" cancelled after the Berlin CDU threatened to leave the city's governing coalition. (Telegram 796 from Berlin; Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/1-1763) For Brandt's account of these events, see Begegnungen und Einsichten, pp. 112-113.
Lightner
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