Documents 170-198
JANUARY-JUNE 1963: RESUMPTION OF TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S TRIP TO GERMANY
170. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, January 18, 1963, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1863. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Berlin, Bonn, Paris, and London.
1764. Paris for USRO, Stoessel and McGuire; US Element Live Oak. Embtel 1763 (sent Dept only)./2/ Following our discussion communications, I told Gromyko I would be glad take back with me any views he or Khrushchev might wish to give me before departure for transmission to President and Secretary.
/2/Telegram 1763, also dated January 18, discussed communications links between Washington and Moscow. (Ibid., 911.2161/1-1863)
Gromyko launched into discussion of Germany/Berlin.
On Germany/Berlin, Gromyko said Sov Govt had made its position clear many times, most recently in Khrushchev's and his speeches to Supreme Soviet and in Khrushchev's Jan 16 speech at SED Congress./3/ There consequently no need for him to repeat it to me now.
/3/For text of Khrushchev's January 16 address, see Pravda or Izvestiia, January 17, 1963. For extracts, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 831-833, or American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 532-533.
He wished say, however, that Sov Govt considers its proposals good basis for agreement which take into account interests of all parties, including USSR and USA. Those who think question of German peace settlement has lost its topicality and urgency would be making great mistake. Soviets had emphasized and continue now to emphasize that German peace treaty and settlement on this basis of problem of West Berlin remain urgent and acute.
Sov Govt had set no date for peace treaty. It was better not to close door to negotiations on this subject. If US or its Allies should conclude from this that problem was not urgent, they would be making big mistake.
Sov Govt was proceeding from assumption that statements which US Govt had made regarding desirability of continuing talks, particularly during his conversations with Secretary remain in force.
However, Sovs cannot understand why certain leading American personalities were making statements now regarding absence of urgency on Germany/Berlin. For example, Secretary had made statement only couple of days ago./4/ In it, he said US Govt believes exchange of views must be continued. That is right. That was positive side his statement. Gromyko understood it to mean that US was ready continue talks with view to reaching agreement. But Secretary also said this only in very general way, without taking it to logical conclusion, i.e., that talks should be renewed soon and should not be delayed.
/4/For text of this January 12 statement, see ibid., pp. 531-532.
If Sovs were to name a date as term during which talks should be completed, that would complicate question for both sides. Sov Govt proceeded from assumption that USG remains ready to talk. If this is so, talks should be resumed and exchange of views should continue.
When interpreter had finished translating this, Gromyko said he had "additional explanation": Sov Govt emphasized importance of settlement Germany/Berlin, since this would strengthen confidence between states and would increase possibility for favorable solution of disarmament problems. There was lack of confidence in world today. It was necessary settle this problem so progress could be made on disarmament.
At end his presentation, I said I should of course report his remarks immediately and fully. Without getting into discussion of Germany/Berlin, I wanted to confirm that US is interested in reaching understanding which would reduce tensions in Central Europe. As Secretary had told him, we do not consider there can be any question of unilateral procrastination when two sides are attempting to reach agreement. Soviets had put forward some proposals and so had we, but we had had no response to our proposals. This was mutual responsibility.
I said we had noticed in recent Soviet statement on subject some indications that Sovs might be ready to take our vital interests more fully into account, e.g., on troop question. If Soviet side had any concrete suggestions to make, I was prepared to take them back to Washington with me.
Gromyko did not respond to my offer convey any suggestions to Washington.
Kohler
171. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, January 26, 1963, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution.
1840. Policy. Gromyko called me in at 2:30 pm Moscow time today and made two oral statements: (1) proposing continuation Soviet-US talks on German peace settlement, and (2) protesting large-diameter pipe embargo. He asked I transmit these to President and Secretary when I returned Washington. I said I would do so and noted timeliness their presentation, since this would give us chance discuss them while I was in Washington.
Gromyko said that Soviets did not intend give either statement press (adding that they sometimes thought communication with USG was confidential and then found that leak had taken place "on other side Atlantic").
We agreed to tell press only that I had been called in to see Gromyko and we had discussed matters bilateral interest.
Text Gromyko's statement on German problem follows. (Pipe protest contained next following tel.)/2/
/2/Telegram 1841, January 26. (Ibid., Str 12-3 USSR)
Begin text. In connection with discussion of January 18,/3/ I inform you that Soviet Government is ready to continue Soviet-American exchange of views on questions relating to German peace settlement and normalization on that basis of situation in West Berlin, with a view to concluding these negotiations through attainment in near future of appropriate understanding.
/3/See Document 170.
Regarding methods of continuing exchange of views, following considerations are offered.
We should find acceptable talks in Washington, through Soviet Ambassador, or here, in Moscow, through Ambassador of USA. If American side agrees that exchange of views should be continued in Moscow, we should welcome that.
Of course, we are ready to receive other special American repre-sentatives as well, whose participation in discussion of German problem President of USA might find useful.
Soviet Government will give instructions to its representatives to continue discussion of concrete questions, relating to German peace settlement and normalization of situation in West Berlin, taking into account exchange of views which has already taken place, with the goal of preparing drafts of appropriate agreements.
When such drafts have been agreed upon, it would be possible to reach agreement on procedure and means for their definitive approval. End text.
Kohler
172. Editorial Note
On January 31 Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Tyler and Ambassador at Large Thompson each sent a memorandum to Secretary of State Rusk dealing with Berlin, in preparation for a meeting with the President on the following day. Tyler, who also addressed a nuclear test ban treaty and the sale of large-diameter pipe to the Soviet Union, recommended that the United States respond affirmatively to Gromyko's initiative for continuing talks on Berlin and that the dialog should take place in Washington. Attached to Tyler's memorandum, was a memorandum drafted by Hillenbrand on January 31, which expanded on the reasons for responding positively, noted that nothing more than "passive negativism" could be expected from the French, and concluded that the United States should inform the Washington Ambassadorial Group that it proposed to resume the talks with the Soviet Union. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-RU/1-3163)
Thompson's memorandum dealt exclusively with Berlin and recommended that German Ambassador Knappstein be informed that the United States would, at the next Ambassadorial Group meeting, propose to continue bilateral U.S.-Soviet talks in an effort to find out what the Soviet Union had in mind concerning the presence of Allied forces in West Berlin. (Ibid., 762.00/1-3163)
The meeting with the President took place at 12:25 p.m. on February 2, but other than an entry in the President's Appointment Book, which indicates that Kennedy, Rusk, Tyler, Kohler, and Thompson attended, no record of the meeting has been found. However, the participants apparently agreed to inform Knappstein along the lines suggested by Thompson, since, at a meeting in Tyler's office on February 4, Kohler, Hillenbrand, and Tyler reviewed in detail Gromyko's proposal and told the Ambassador that the United States intended to raise the subject of a positive response to the Soviet offer at the next Ambassadorial Group meeting. (Memorandum of conversation and telegram 1794 to Bonn, February 4; both ibid., POL 28 Berlin)
173. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 6, 1963, 8:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 Berlin. Secret. Drafted and ini-tialed by Brandin and approved in S on February 7. The meeting was held during breakfast at the Department of State. Carstens visited Washington February 4-7 at the request of the German Government, primarily to discuss the U.S. reaction to the French-German Treaty signed January 22. A memorandum of his conversation with Secretary Rusk, February 5, is in vol. XIII, Document 71.
SUBJECT
Soviet Overtures on Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
Germans
State Secretary Karl Carstens
Ambassador Karl Heinrich Knappstein
Counselor Swidbert Schnippenkoetter
Americans
The Secretary
Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler, EUR
Ambassador Walter C. Dowling, Bonn
Mr. Robert M. Brandin, EUR/GER
The Secretary said it was necessary to consider the recent overtures about Berlin which the Soviets had made to Ambassador Kohler, noting that these would be discussed in the Ambassadorial Group later in the day./2/
/2/During this meeting Tyler read Gromyko's statement (see Document 170), and Kohler added that he believed this was the most serious Soviet approach on Berlin since 1958. In response to Tyler's invitation for comments, the British and French representatives stated that they were without instructions, and Carstens repeated the points made in the conversation with Secretary Rusk. (Telegram 4175 to London, February 6; Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 Berlin)
Dr. Carstens cautioned against any haste. There seemed to be no present danger of a separate treaty. The posture of Western unity was not imposing at the moment. Moreover, as the President had said in November,/3/ the USSR must clearly accept Western presence in Berlin. On this last point the USSR was still rather evasive, apparently having said nothing about it.
/3/See Document 153.
The Secretary clarified that what the President meant in November was that no arrangement could be concluded that did not accept Western presence in Berlin. The President did not insist that such recognition be a precondition to discussions. We seemed to feel we should not talk under pressure and that it was not necessary to talk if things were quiet.
Dr. Carstens said this was the situation we all had to live with in view of Berlin's exposed and isolated position. This tactic had been successful so far.
The Secretary asked whether there was a danger of steady erosion in Berlin in the absence of clarification of its status.
Dr. Carstens replied that an improvement in the situation of Berlin would have a good effect, but it was doubtful we could achieve such improvement. Therefore, it was better to live with what we had. He did not think there was a danger of serious erosion in Berlin. The population had decreased slightly, but this was an inevitable consequence when cities were isolated from their natural hinterlands.
Mr. Tyler wondered what the effect would be within the Western Alliance if we did not respond to the Soviet overtures to Ambassador Kohler.
Dr. Carstens thought there was little hope of finding an agreed basis for negotiations among the members of the Western Alliance as a whole.
The Secretary noted there was a difference between expecting or hoping for a solution and keeping channels open. Our idea in proposing that the Berlin problem be discussed by Deputy Foreign Ministers was simply to keep discussions going, as in the case of Austria.
Ambassador Dowling said the conversations with the USSR had helped to prevent an erosion of the situation. He thought we should keep the talks going along quietly without being adamant or hasty.
The Secretary stressed the importance of a united front to keep Khrushchev from getting the wrong ideas. The Secretary referred to Gromyko's hint that talks should be on a broader basis. Khrushchev had also said that West Berlin was not important to the Allies who were only echoing Adenauer. There was also a report that de Gaulle had told Khrushchev that France did not need West Berlin. To deal with these Soviet tactics, the United States had always stressed its own national interest in Berlin.
Dr. Carstens said there was a question of what should be discussed with the USSR--the German problem or the Berlin problem. There was much in favor of reintroducing the German question.
The Secretary recalled this possibility had been discussed among the Foreign Ministers in December./4/ Soviet propaganda emphasized that the USSR alone was making proposals. Perhaps we should present counterproposals at all levels--e.g., All-Germany, All-Berlin, modus vivendi, etc. There was a danger of a psychological erosion in the attitude of the rest of the world toward the Berlin question. If the USSR proposed changes in the status quo for its purposes, why should we not propose changes for our purposes?
/4/See Document 163.
Dr. Carstens said such an approach would have the advantage of reintroducing the proposals made by the West in 1959 about Germany. He emphasized that there was more confidence in West Berlin now as a result of Cuba than there had been at any time in the last four years.
174. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, February 14, 1963, noon.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 Berlin. Secret; Priority.
2093./2/ Eyes only for Secretary and Amb. Dowling. During course of Under Secretary Gilpatric's discussion with Chancellor yesterday, which lasted almost two hours, Adenauer charged that US had gone back on agreement reached between him and President, to effect that we would take no initiative with Soviets over Berlin and Germany.
/2/On the source text 2095 is crossed out and 2093 written above it.
In his opening statement, Gilpatric said that President has been concerned over recent signs of greater Soviet intransigence since de Gaulle's January 14 press conference,/3/ citing as examples both nuclear test negotiations and Soviet attitude on removal of troops from Cuba. Chancellor said that he also felt that during month of January Soviets had become tougher. However, he thought there were two reasons for this, and that in addition to French-UK-US differences over Brussels negotiations and Nassau, Khrushchev had also been encouraged by Kohler's initiative. In this connection, Adenauer referred to his agreement with President last November, in view of which he had been "amazed" to learn that before Kohler left Moscow, he had asked Gromyko if he had any message for President, which led Gromyko only two days later to say that Soviets wished to resume discussions over Berlin and Germany.
/3/For a transcript of de Gaulle's January 14 press conference, see Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, May 19, 1958-January 31, 1964, pp. 208-222.
Gilpatric replied that he did not agree with Chancellor's interpretation and that what actually happened was clearly initiative by Gromyko and not by Kohler, who had merely made usual routine inquiry, as any other Ambassador, leaving for consultations at home.
Most of meeting with Adenauer taken up by lengthy and frequently emotional discourse by Chancellor on long history of Franco-German relations, including strong defense of recent reconciliation and treaty. As result, there was virtually no discussion of defense problems, apart from Gilpatric's opening statement and Chancellor's concluding comment. After emphasizing how "flabbergasted" he was at reaction in U.S. to Franco-German Treaty, Adenauer asked that President be assured that treaty in no way affects Germany's support of NATO or recognition of U.S. free world leadership./4/
/4/Later in the day the Department of State informed Morris that he should see Carstens, express U.S. surprise at the Chancellor's accusation, and repeat to him that Gromyko had made the initiative, not Kohler. (Telegram 1891 to Bonn; Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 Berlin)
Gilpatric will report fully on discussions upon arrival Friday.
Morris
175. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 15, 1963, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President. Secret. Drafted by David Klein. The meeting was held in President Kennedy's office.
PRESENT
The President
Secretary Rusk
Ambassador Thompson
Ambassador Dowling
William Tyler
McGeorge Bundy
SUBJECT
Berlin
The President raised for discussion our response to Gromyko's proposal to Ambassador Kohler for the resumption of bilateral discussions on Germany and Berlin. The President said he was concerned because the Germans and the French were not in favor of further exploratory talks and, given Chancellor Adenauer's present mood and suspicions, the Chancellor could at any time attempt to exploit these discussions to our detriment./2/ The President said for our own protection it was necessary to have the French and the Germans as fully locked into these talks as possible. He suggested that if this were not possible, we might tell the Soviets that we could not carry on with the talks in the absence of Allied support.
/2/At the Ambassadorial Group meeting on February 14 Ormsby Gore reported that the United Kingdom favored an affirmative answer to Gromyko. Alphand and Knapp-stein, while not in favor of talks on Berlin, indicated that France and Germany would not oppose further exploratory conversations with the Soviet Union. Ambassador Thompson stressed how awkward it would be for the United States to say it was not ready to talk and informed the group that Kohler would be instructed to discover the Soviet position before proceeding further. (Telegram 4344 to London, February 14; Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 Berlin)
The Secretary argued that discussions with the Soviets on Berlin were necessary if only to keep the Berlin situation under control. Moreover, it was important to keep the channels of communication with the Soviets open to determine what was in the Soviet mind. In any event, he did not think it possible to refuse to discuss Berlin with the Soviets on the ground that our Allies were opposed to such talks.
The President, however, wondered whether there was any advantage in moving ahead without the Germans fully in tow. Unless they were fully locked in, the Germans would be in a position to take advantage of the accomplishments of the talks, but remain ever ready to criticize us if things went wrong. The President also questioned whether there was any real advantage in putting ourselves in an exposed position vis-a-vis our Allies in the absence of indications that the Soviets were prepared to come up with constructive Berlin proposals. He asked whether a more profitable course might be to try to get from Gromyko some indication of Soviet thinking before again raising the question of Berlin discussions with the Allies. Unless the Soviets were prepared to be forthcoming, he saw no useful purpose in continuing a dialogue bound to arouse the suspicion, even the antagonism, of our Allies.
Ambassador Thompson interjected to say that it would be awkward for the U.S. to say it was not prepared to continue exploratory talks with the Soviets on Berlin. Moreover, if we refused to meet the Soviets' request now, they could heat up the situation and put us in a position where we would be forced to discuss the problem under pressures they deliberately created.
After further discussion, the President laid down the following course of action:
1. He asked that Foy Kohler be instructed not to reply to Gromyko's overture on Berlin until we had a further opportunity to attempt to reconcile our position with that of the Germans./3/ (Ambassador Dowling thought he might be able to discuss this matter with the Chancellor on Tuesday.) If Ambassador Kohler had to speak to Gromyko before we talked with the Germans, Kohler should say he was awaiting instructions.
/3/Instructions to Kohler along this line were transmitted in telegram 1712 to Moscow at 2:10 p.m. on February 15. (Ibid., POL US-USSR) On February 16 Kohler reported that he had been noncommittal when Gromyko had approached him about Berlin at a reception the previous day and that he had indicated he would ask Gromyko for a meeting the following week. (Telegram 1995 from Moscow; ibid., POL 38)
2. He directed Ambassador Dowling to see the Chancellor immediately on his return to Bonn to discuss the question of further exploratory talks on Berlin with the Soviets. He asked that Ambassador Dowling make it clear to the Chancellor that we did not relish the idea of talking with the Kremlin if the Germans objected to our doing so. If the Chancellor objected to the talks in the context of the Gromyko proposal, the President would again review the situation./4/
/4/See Document 176.
3. In this connection, the President suggested that Ambassador Dowling assure the Chancellor that the President attaches great importance to close and mutual cooperation with him and make clear that if there are to be further exploratory talks with the Soviets on Germany and Berlin, we would like to be sure the German Government considers such talks worthwhile.
4. The President also suggested Ambassador Dowling tell the Chancellor that Ambassador Thompson thought that if we refused to speak with the Soviets now, they might apply new pressures on Berlin and force us to talk with them under less favorable circumstances.
The Secretary undertook to instruct Ambassadors Kohler and Dowling accordingly.
DK
176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, February 16, 1963, 10:40 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 Berlin. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Tyler on February 15; cleared by Thompson, Hillenbrand, and the President; and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Moscow, Paris, London, and Berlin.
1914. Eyes only for Ambassadors and Lightner. When you see the Chancellor you should tell him that the President has asked you personally to assure him that his impression that US Govt took initiative with Soviets to resume talks on Berlin and Germany is erroneous.
You should tell Chancellor we note that German position, as set forth by Amb Knappstein in Ambassadorial Group meeting Feb 14,/2/ is that FRG sees no advantage in reacting swiftly to Gromyko overture, but that if US Govt wishes to resume talks FRG will not oppose. You should make it very clear to the Chancellor that if talks were resumed with the Soviets, we would want to limit their scope to exploring with the Soviet Govt whether a resumption of bilateral exploratory talks could lead to finding a basis for fruitful negotiations. We entirely agree that there should be no negotiations as such unless the Soviets are prepared to recognize the Western troop presence in Berlin without any unacceptable qualification. It seems to us that position now taken by German Govt toward talks is more negative than it was a year ago, and that there is now no difference between the German and French positions on this point. You should say that the President attaches great importance to close and mutually confident cooperation between him and the Chancellor, and that he has asked you to tell the Chancellor this. If we are to talk to the Soviets at all in response to their initiative, we would like to do so in the knowledge that the German Govt feels that such preliminary exploration is worth undertaking. You should tell the Chancellor that we have delayed sending Amb Kohler instructions in order to have this further exchange of views with him, and that we would like to have his completely candid thoughts and suggestions on the matter. If you think it helpful you might point to probability that refusal to talk with Soviets now may result in their increasing pressures on Berlin to force such talks, and this would be less desirable context in which to have exploratory conversations with them. You should say that we don't relish the idea of talking to the Russians if the Germans are really against our doing so, and if the Chancellor feels that it would be a mistake we would like to review the situation./3/
/2/See footnote 1, Document 175.
/3/On February 19 Morris, who discussed Berlin with the Chancellor because of Dowling's sudden illness, reported that he had found Adenauer in a relaxed and reasonable frame of mind. After Morris reviewed the approach by Gromyko, the Chancellor replied that he now understood who had taken the initiative and that he was satisfied that President Kennedy was in the best position to judge how to respond to the Soviet proposal. (Telegram 2149 from Bonn; Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 Berlin)
Rusk
177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/
Washington, February 21, 1963, 10:28 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Secret; Priority. Drafted and initialed by Hillenbrand on February 19; cleared by Thompson, Tyler, Guthrie, and Bundy; and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, and Berlin.
1771. Eyes only for Ambassadors and Lightner. In light of Chancellor's attitude reported Bonn's 2149 repeated Moscow 243/2/ and weighing all factors, we have concluded that, given our underlying assumption that responsible governments must do all they can to keep open channels of diplomatic communication on issues as potentially explosive as Berlin, there is no sound alternative to resumption of talks, now that Soviets have taken initiative.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 176.
During course of next meeting with Gromyko at which you will presumably have at least one other subject to cover (wide diameter pipe), you should inform him along following lines: 1) US Government has carefully considered statement which Soviet Foreign Minister made during your meeting with him on January 26;/3/ 2) you have been instructed to advise him US agrees to resumption bilateral exploratory talks on Berlin and Germany to see whether basis for fruitful negotiations exists; 3) US will not have mandate to speak for three occupying powers in Berlin; 4) we have weighted considerations as to best location for talks and would prefer that they be held in Washington. Since we assume from Gromyko's statement of January 26 that this would be acceptable, we anticipate that Soviet Government will wish to instruct Ambassador Dobrynin accordingly.
/3/See Document 171.
In view of foregoing, believe you will wish to avoid any further discussion of Berlin during meeting with Gromyko. If, however, he insists on making substantive comments, you are sufficiently aware of US position to make appropriate responses within your discretion. While we have not come to final conclusions as to precise tactics which we will follow here, primary objective of any resumed talks must obviously be to ascertain whether Soviet position has in any way softened on vital question of continuing Western troop presence. If Gromyko's remarks make this appropriate, you may wish to comment along same lines as reported penultimate para of Moscow's 1764 of January 18,/4/ noting that, if Soviets have any concrete suggestions to make, they should do so when talks are resumed in Washington.
/4/Document 170.
FYI. While we have considered fully case for resumption of talks in Moscow, on balance we have concluded that arguments in favor of Washington, with which you are familiar, seem prevailing at this point. We will, of course, keep you fully informed of all developments, and do not exclude later use of Moscow should this prove desirable.
Rusk
178. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, February 21, 1963, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AV 13 GER. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, Moscow, London, USAREUR, CINCEUR, and SHAPE.
908. Paris also for USRO; USAREUR and CINCEUR for POLADs; SHAPE for US Element Live Oak and Stoessel. Berlintel 905./2/ Reftel reports Feb 21 Yakubovsky to Freeman message re helicopter flights over East Berlin. This message received just as final steps taken in preparation for periodic flight Feb 24 or first good weather thereafter (last such flight Dec 19). Berlin brigade's plan proposed several days ago approved Feb 21 by USCOB.
/2/Telegram 905, also dated February 21, transmitted the text of a letter from Yakubovsky to Freeman that stated that Soviet military authorities could not guarantee the safety of U.S. helicopter flights over East Berlin and advised Freeman to stop them. (Ibid.)
Yakubovsky letter now raises issue whether flight should proceed on schedule. In considering question, we have had following points in mind:
1) Letter appears fit into pattern of increased harassments by Soviets and East Germans we have noted recently. Apparent increase in GDR harassment of Allied traffic at Friedrichstrasse has been observed over past three months. Signs of Soviet activity commenced second week in February with their handling of minor train incident at Marienborn. Incident (dismounting of train commander on side away from station) was minor in itself but Soviets raised it with each successive train commander that night and ultimately called meeting with US checkpoint commander. Similarly, very minor case of mistaken identity at Helmstedt Autobahn checkpoint on Feb 16 also led to Soviets calling similar meeting, even after incident was closed. At this meeting, however, Soviets reraised train issue and proposed higher level discussion be held "in Berlin" on that subject. Finally, on Feb 19, Soviet duty officer at Babelsberg Autobahn checkpoint asked for minor change in our procedure for filling out movement orders and threatened to deny passage to the next convoy if this not done (we are protesting this behavior to checkpoint commander).
We are led to speculate that, having in a sense won their point on Autobahn convoys of six and seven vehicles, and seeking exploit aftermath of Cuba, Soviets may be renewing pressure at other points on periphery of Allied position here. They may reason that we will be reluctant contest their encroachments in atmosphere following Cuba and Soviet concessions there. Evidence is only fragmentary and preliminary, but something does seem to be afoot.
2) This is third letter on this subject between CINCs since Dec 26, 1962. It is not markedly more harsh in tone than other Soviet communications on subject, including long series of protests in BASC.
3) If we do not wish to abandon flights altogether, which would seem particularly undesirable if analysis in para no. 1 above is correct, best timing for another flight from purely political point of view would be soon as possible, and prior any US reply to today's letter. After this flight, reply could be sent and several weeks or more pass before in normal course events next flight would be considered.
In light of these considerations it is present intention to proceed with flight as planned on first good weather after Feb 23./3/
/3/On February 23, in a telegram approved by the White House, the Department of State advised the Mission at Berlin to postpone the next helicopter flight until February 27 to give policymakers in Washington time to decide whether to reply to the letter first. (Telegram 606 to Berlin; ibid.) On February 25 President Kennedy authorized making the next flight before replying. (Memorandum for the Record, February 25; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin)
Gen Polk concurs.
Lightner
179. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, February 25, 1963, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Relayed to the White House.
2094. Policy. Deptel 1771./2/ At one-hour meeting this afternoon with Gromyko I made oral statement embodying points contained second para reftel, adding on personal basis that, while in Washington, I had expressed opinion that we might now make progress on problem of Germany/Berlin on basis mutual recognition each other's interests. I trusted I would not be proved wrong.
/2/Document 177.
Gromyko said he noted our favorable reply to question of continuation talks. With regard my supplementary remark, he said he wished to say that, in SovGovt's opinion, if there were genuine desire on part USG and its Allies to reach agreement, then there would be basis for understanding. He said Soviet proposals, as put forward in exchange of views between US and USSR, are good basis for agreement. In supporting these proposals, Soviets did so not simply because they were their own proposals, but, and here he had in mind question of Western troops in West Berlin, because Soviets believe they correspond to interests of USSR, US, Britain, and France. He asked that USG assess these proposals objectively and without bias, and said that Soviet proposals, including those which had been put forward in conversations with and speeches of Chairman Khrushchev, are designed to facilitate agreement. He said he would report to Soviet Govt and to Khrushchev on US answer on resumption talks and we should evidently revert to this matter in near future. Reports of discussions of pipeline, communications, test-ban, Cuba, and Embassy building plans follow septels./3/
/3/All dated February 25, telegrams 2095 and 2096 (Department of State, Central Files, STR 12-3 USSR) and 2097-2099 (ibid., DEF 18-3, BG 6 Moscow, and POL 27-5 USSR, respectively).
Dept please repeat as desired.
Kohler
180. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, March 7, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 Berlin. Secret. Drafted and ini-tialed by Thompson. Copies were sent to Tyler, Hillenbrand, Guthrie, and Cleveland.
SUBJECT
Berlin negotiations
The timing of the Soviet proposal to reopen talks on Berlin is somewhat curious, since there are many reasons which would favor a delay. The following occurred to me as possible explanations of their motives:
1. Khrushchev may miscalculate what his possibilities are of obtaining an agreement along the lines of his statements to Ambassador Roberts and others involving a major U.N. responsibility.
2. Khrushchev may have felt compelled because of commitments made to Ulbricht and possibly others, to keep the question alive.
3. The Soviets may simply intend to exploit known differences of opinion between the Western Allies.
4. Khrushchev may have decided that it would not be advisable and possible to reach a modus vivendi satisfactory to both sides.
5. Khrushchev may have decided that an agreement on Berlin which he could accept is hopeless, and that the present round of talks is designed to prepare for a break following which he would take some action such as signing a separate peace treaty, but in a manner which would avoid a military confrontation.
On the assumption that at an early stage in the talks the Soviets will put forward their "NATO flag" proposal, I suggest that you should concentrate at first on bringing out the "bugs" for us in any such scheme. You might probe hard on two points; namely
1. The extent to which they envisage a real change in the status of our forces and in giving the U.N. command responsibilities, and
2. The length of time they envisage for the arrangements proposed.
So long as they maintain an unacceptable position on these two points, I suggest we should avoid getting drawn into any discussion of what kind of U.N. presence we would accept. While I agree with the general line in the IO paper,/2/ I believe that for us to get drawn into a discussion of possible U.N. arrangements in the absence of a Soviet willingness to be realistic about points that are not negotiable for us would merely upset our Allies to no good purpose, would tend to prolong the discussions, and possibly mislead the Soviets into thinking that our position on these matters was not as firm as it actually is. I suggest, however, that without obtaining a Soviet backdown on these points we could, if they are disposed to do so, discuss such matters as access arrangements.
/2/Presumably Thompson is referring to a 2-page memorandum from Cleveland to Rusk, drafted on March 1, which summarized a longer paper (attached) entitled "UN Involvement in Berlin Settlement." Cleveland's memorandum noted that the paper had been discussed by Thompson, Tyler, Hillenbrand, and other interested officers in the Department of State, and was now agreed. A copy of the memorandum is attached to a March 5 memorandum from Klein to Bundy in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
In probing on the Soviet U.N. proposal, you might usefully explore, or expose, what they have in mind and what their objectives are. You could stress that Berlin is not a NATO base, and ask them to explain why they consider it necessary to change the status of our forces there. They have repeatedly stated that they have no military value and that if war were to break out, the more we had there, the better from their point of view, since they would all be easily captured or destroyed. Until Germany is reunified, it can be argued that these troops would be less likely to bring on a conflict than would be the case if East and West German troops were facing each other alone.
In what way do they think their removal or weakening would contribute to stability? It is not an answer to this question simply to state that this would draw a line under World War II or would remove a NATO base. These troops cannot be used offensively, and the Soviets know it. We cannot help but think that they would like to have the Western presence in Berlin weakened in order that the East Germans could bring pressure on the West Berlin population, discourage them psychologically, and probably eventually arrange for a complete take over. If asked why we consider it necessary to keep them there, the answer might be in the first place to fulfill commitments we have made and, in particular, to see that measures of force, under the guise of strikes or other subterfuges are not employed to subvert or overthrow the present setup in Berlin. By pressing the Soviets to say what it is specifically in the present situation that disturbs them, you may be able to show that what they are working toward is a setup in which they, or the East Germans, could change these things unilaterally--for example, RIAS activities, etc.
181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, March 20, 1963, 10:05 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 Berlin. Secret. Drafted by Holloway; cleared by Hillenbrand, Guthrie, and RPM; and approved and initialed by Thompson. Also sent to Bonn, London, Moscow, and Berlin.
4447. Paris also for USRO, Stoessel, McGuire. Thompson today informed Ambassadorial Group of Semenov aide-m[moire to McSweeney on March 18,/2/ replying to US comments of February 25 on resumption exploratory talks on Berlin./3/ Text of aide-m[moire pouched all addressees March 18. Dobrynin told Thompson yesterday that he had instructions. Because of Secretary's absence and Dobrynin trip to New York, talks will probably be postponed until sometime next week. Dobrynin seemed in no hurry and suggested that delay in receiving instructions had probably been due to Gromyko absence in Scandinavia.
/2/In this 3-paragraph aide-m[moire, given to Charg[ John McSweeney on March 18, the Soviet Union agreed to continue the U.S.-Soviet exchange of views on Berlin, agreed to conduct the talks in Washington, and stated that Dobrynin would be instructed accordingly. (Telegram 2325 from Moscow, March 18; ibid., POL US-USSR)
/3/See Document 179.
Ormsby Gore reported on Khrushchev-Trevelyan talk of March 6 in which Khrushchev sought to disabuse British of any notion that Sovs had forgotten Berlin./4/ No time limit on Berlin settlement mentioned. Khrushchev did refer to possibility that West Berlin's communications could be "guaranteed internationally" reminding Trevelyan that "bridges could rot and not be repaired for a year and half." Another reference to past was reminder of Soviet proposal in 1955 for mutual checks on Western and Soviet troops in Germany. Khrushchev professed puzzlement at US aims in Berlin talks, suggesting that domestic political needs were foremost. In answer to Home's question Soldatov/5/ indicated "UN flag" in West Berlin meant Western troops under UN command.
/4/On March 11 the Embassy in Moscow reported that Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, the new British Ambassador, and Horst Groepper, the new West German Ambassador, had briefed Kohler and the French Ambassador on their meetings with Khrushchev, March 6 and 9, respectively. On Berlin Khrushchev had reiterated the Soviet position without suggesting a deadline, but had not mentioned U.N. presence or Western forces in West Berlin. (Telegrams 2237 and 2240; Department of State, Central Files, POL 17-1 UK-USSR and POL 17-1 W GER-USSR)
/5/ Alexandr Andreyevich Soldatov, Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom.
British also reported Lord Home's conversation of March 11 with Soldatov at latter's request. Home disclaimed any intention of setting up parallel UK/Soviet talks on Berlin, but did suggest that Sovs would have to propose something new if progress were to be expected. Soldatov suggested that peace treaty with German states could lead to progress on disarmament treaty, while Home countered that some progress on disarmament might encourage solutions on other problems. Soldatov's aim seemed also to remind West that Sovs had not shelved Berlin.
Germans reported on Groepper conversation with Khrushchev on March 9 which also had nothing new. Khrushchev twice mentioned that Sovs would agree to nothing which would be detrimental to GDR. Khrushchev proposed peace treaty with two German states in which West Berlin would become free city with guaranteed communications, with non-interference guaranteed and with border of German states fixed irrevocably. Signatories to peace treaty could re-affirm their aim of reunification, but as reunification not possible now, peace treaty could not wait.
For USRO: You may inform NAC of Soviet aide-m[moire, and possible schedule for talks.
Ball
182. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, March 26, 1963, 2:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 Berlin. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted and initialed by Hillenbrand and approved in S on March 28. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 2294, March 27. (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
US
The Secretary
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Hillenbrand
USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of USSR
Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor, Embassy
After an initial exchange of pleasantries, Ambassador Dobrynin read a prepared statement along the following lines (translation from Russian text handed us informally):
"In connection with the agreement reached with the Ambassador of the United States in Moscow, Mr. Kohler, the Soviet Government has instructed me to continue, taking into account the exchange of opinions which took place in 1961 and 1962, the discussion of concrete questions in connection with a German peace settlement and normalization of the situation in West Berlin. For its part, the Soviet Government will strive to make the discussion of these questions constructive. It would like to express the hope that this attitude toward the matter will also be shown on the part of the United States and that the exchange of opinions will be concluded in the nearest future with the achievement of the agreement necessary in the interests of strengthening peace and security in Europe.
"In the course of the earlier exchange of opinions the parties succeeded in reaching definite results on well-known questions in connection with a German peace settlement. There was also achieved definite mutual understanding concerning the necessity for normalization on this basis of the situation in West Berlin taking into account actually existing conditions which came about on German territory as a result of the past war.
"The main question on which it was not possible to overcome differences is the question of the presence of foreign troops in West Berlin. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, has pointed out repeatedly that the Government of the USSR in principle is not against the presence in West Berlin of troops of the three powers, if the Western powers attach importance to this at the present time. However, the troops which may be stationed in West Berlin for purposes of guarantees must be there not under the NATO flag, but under the UN flag. Their stay in West Berlin, of course, must not be permanent. The occupation regime in this city has outlived itself, and it must be liquidated. In order to impart a truly international character to the guarantees for West Berlin it is necessary, as the Soviet Government has emphasized many times, to include in the composition of UN troops in West Berlin also military units of certain other UN member states, according to an appropriate agreement.
"The Soviet Government is convinced that this proposal is a good basis for reaching an agreement on this most difficult and acute question. Unfortunately, the Government of the USA still has not expressed its attitude toward this proposal, and this proposal still has not been subjected to concrete discussion.
"The Soviet Government, as in the past, maintains the opinion that the most sensible solution of the question of the normalization of the situation in West Berlin, and a solution which corresponds most to the conditions of peace time, would be its transformation into an independent political entity--a free, demilitarized city. Such a solution would also take into account the wishes of the Western powers with regard to freedom of access to West Berlin consonant with requisite respect for the sovereignty of the GDR and guarantee to the population of this city the right to decide by itself questions of its social-economic system, to retain that way of life which it most prefers.
"Naturally, we proceed from the fact that in appropriate form those positive results will be realized which were achieved by the previous exchange of opinions by the parties on the questions of: finalizing and strengthening of the existing German borders; guarantee of free access to West Berlin; respect for the sovereignty of the GDR; precluding the armament of the FRG and the GDR with nuclear weapons; conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty organization.
"We hope that the resumption of the Soviet-American exchange of opinions will be a step forward in the direction of a solution of the problem of drawing a line under the Second World War, the fundamental improvement of the situation in Europe and the consolidation of universal peace.
"An agreement on a German peace settlement and a normalization on this basis of the situation in West Berlin would have great significance also from the point of view of creating more favorable conditions for solving the problem of disarmament and strengthening confidence between the USSR and the USA, as well as among other states.
"We understand that, in such important international questions as the question of a German peace settlement and normalization of the situation in West Berlin, there are many aspects which have to be considered in working out agreed decisions. But given the presence of good will and a sincere desire for reaching agreement, without a doubt it would be possible to overcome existing difficulties and to come to an agreement which would take into account the interests of all parties.
"The Soviet Government anticipates that the results of the exchange of opinions will be fruitful and, after they have been agreed upon by each of the parties with its allies, arrangements can be made concerning the manner and method for definitive formulation of agreement."
The Secretary commented that, as far as we are concerned, we are prepared to explore the present situation. Although Berlin is a subject which is a vital matter to both sides, we thought it should not be allowed to assume crisis proportions. Although there were some in the West who questioned the value of these discussions, as far as the President was concerned, we were willing to explore the subject further. It should be no surprise that we do not accept the specific Soviet formula regarding a peace settlement and the normalization of the Berlin situation on that basis as an appropriate description for the exercise. We would describe it in more general terms. We think there is a point in exploration, if thereby the question can be reduced in size and importance. This does not mean that the subject is less serious to us than before as a major US responsibility. Ambassador Dobrynin was familiar with the inherent difficulties in the problem.
The Secretary continued by asking whether, in Ambassador Dobrynin's judgment, there had not been a reduction in the tensions surrounding Berlin during recent weeks and months. There seemed to be somewhat less tension in the GDR and the relations between the Germans themselves likewise seemed to be somewhat less tense. We were interested in the agreement between the Federal Republic and Poland for the establishment of trade offices as indicative of a reduction of tension in the area. Ambassador Dobrynin said he could accept this assessment but would not over-emphasize the easing of the situation. Basically the situation was still an uneasy one since it was unbalanced with the essential issues remaining unsolved. He said he would like to explore with the US the Soviet proposals for the replacement of the NATO flag in Berlin by the flag of the United Nations. This exploration could take place in a concrete way, on an item by item basis, either in connection with a Soviet proposal or "in connection with your list."
The Secretary asked whether Dobrynin had any further idea with respect to the UN involvement contemplated? Did he have any further thoughts on this?
Ambassador Dobrynin said he was prepared to discuss the question fully. How the Soviets felt about the role of UN troops had been mentioned to Ambassador Kohler on December 3, 1962 by Deputy Foreign Minister Semonev. What the Soviets propose is to replace the troops presently in West Berlin with, say, a force made up one half of troops of the three Western powers and the other half of troops from other UN countries (perhaps one or two neutral countries, one or two other NATO countries and one or two other Warsaw Pact countries). These troops would stay there on the basis of a guarantee. But this subject had never been discussed concretely. The Soviets had never received a detailed reply on this issue. They wanted to start from the point where the talks with the US had left off, that is to start with an exploration of the last Soviet offer.
The Secretary observed that this proposal was one of several which the Soviets have made over a period of time. Thus, for example, they had started with the idea of Western and Soviet troops in West Berlin, then introduced the idea of NATO-Warsaw Pact troops, and then the UN had been brought into the picture. The difficulty about these proposals, the Secretary continued, is that they are unbalanced. They did not seem to show that element of reciprocality which he had stressed before. A basic factor on the German scene since the end of the war is that the Four Powers were to hold Berlin in trust for the German people. It had been the capital of Germany and in all likelihood would be again. The Four Powers were to hold it for this purpose. To forget Berlin and to take only West Berlin destroyed this basic idea. To dilute the Western forces worked against the security of Berlin. When he had inquired, the Secretary noted, the Soviets had made clear that they were referring only to West Berlin. This was the reason why the discussions had not gone very far forward. It is difficult to find a solution to the whole without thinking of the parts, but it is also difficult to find a solution for the parts without reference to the whole. The Soviets have left open the possibility of the Germans coming together to discuss reunification. The Soviets have suggested one procedure to achieve reunification, we another. In any event Berlin belongs to the Germans. We have tried not to tear it out of context. If there is to be a change, we have felt it should apply to Berlin as a whole and an imbalance in proposals created a serious problem for us.
We have not understood, the Secretary continued, what is "really in your mind" on the point which the Soviets have made about the Western troops in Berlin being NATO troops. In the sense that the US is a member of NATO they might be considered to be such. But the Berlin garrison has never been assigned to or constituted a part of the NATO forces. To think of West Berlin as a NATO base is not realistic on either military or political grounds. If we were looking for a NATO base, we wouldn't put it in West Berlin. We wondered if there were something here which we had not fully understood. Why was this NATO aspect of such concern to the Soviets? The presence of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in the Berlin area was, if anything, a stabilizing factor. The Secretary said he did not think the Soviets wanted a situation where the Four Powers did not share the responsibility for a final settlement in Germany. We attached some importance to the Four Power responsibility as a stabilizing element pending a final settlement of the German question.
The Secretary went on to say that we had not replied in detail with respect to a particular UN formula for reasons which he had mentioned. Another way to test such a formula would be to put oneself in the position of a West Berliner. What would he think of it?
At one point, the Secretary continued, Gromyko and he had been considering whether it would be useful to talk further on the access problem and to see what might be worked out on this subject. However, this broke down because it quickly became a question of access to what. The Secretary said he did not know if it would be useful to think of the access problem a bit. Today the Ambassador and he were just exploring.
As an analogy, the Secretary observed, we thought it useful to complete the nuclear test treaty even though we did not know the precise number of inspections which could be agreed. An arrangement could be discussed to protect our security interests as against Soviet interest in avoiding espionage. We still thought it useful to complete the treaty text, although there was still no agreement on the number of inspections. We might likewise consider whether there was any point in talking about the access problem. He did not, however, see quite how to take hold of this. In the background there was always the problem of troops. The Soviets have said that the presence of some Western troops is not an obstacle, but the dilution of that presence, not on the basis of reciprocity and for a limited time, makes this a real problem. The Soviets had proposed a period of four years, for example. The Secretary said he did not know a better way to undermine the confidence of the West Berlin population than this.
Ambassador Dobrynin said he could not accept what the Secretary had said about Four Power responsibility. The fact is that West Germany, East Germany and West Berlin exist as "separate states," if one could use this term. After 17 years the responsibility of the Four was not the same as in 1945. Their responsibility then was to conclude a peace treaty with Germany. The Soviets have nothing against reunification or against finding a formula which would mention reunification. The Soviets would not oppose agreement between the two Germanies on this subject.
As to access, Ambassador Dobrynin continued, since the main point at issue was the troop question, that is the question of access to whom, it would be easier to find a solution to the access problem after the troop question was settled. The analogy which the Secretary had drawn with the nuclear test discussions proved just the opposite of what the Secretary had indicated. There was a need to reach agreement on specific figures first, the nuclear test discussions had shown. Therefore, the Soviets felt the troop question was the most difficult and that the question was how to substitute the UN flag for the NATO flag. The Soviets were prepared to discuss this item by item. They were prepared to continue discussions to find a way to an agreement. Their suggestion is that the two sides begin with a more detailed discussion of the Soviet proposal, item by item. Then they could take a look at the status of West Berlin and discuss this item by item. The Soviets did not refuse to discuss the access question but they thought that the two should begin with the most difficult question: access to whose troops and the basis of a change from NATO to the UN.
The Secretary said he considered the conversation today in the nature of a preliminary exploratory talk. We had wanted to hear from Dobrynin the basis on which Foreign Minister Gromyko had raised the Berlin question with Ambassador Kohler. We would expect to go over these matters again. Ambassador Dobrynin commented that the discussion was preliminary to the preliminaries.
The Secretary noted that he was not talking about delay as such but he could remember saying to Gromyko at one point that time has a way of taking care of some of these questions. He was not sure that there were not developments in Central Europe, to which the Soviets presumably agreed and to which we had no objections, which tended to take some of the danger from the situation. For example, there was the agreement between Poland and the Federal Republic to exchange trade missions. A few years ago, the Poles seemed to have more concern about the Federal Republic than today in the light of their present willingness to establish relations of this kind. The Secretary asked what elements Dobrynin saw as imposing urgency in the present situation. After all, there was nothing magical about 17 years.
Ambassador Dobrynin said the recent agreement between Poland and the Federal Republic was perhaps a hopeful but certainly an isolated sign. Such improved trade relations were not tantamount to a real improvement in basic factors. Although he did not want to raise this question now, he could only cite the famous pipe example. Today the West Germans make an agreement with Poland; tomorrow Adenauer might overturn this agreement. There was no stability in the present situation. He could not agree that everything was moving in one direction. Other developments were moving in an unfavorable direction, for example with respect to non-proliferation or the West German claim to have rights in West Berlin. The question of a multilateral force was certainly not a hopeful one. Delay could not be justified in the hope of improvement. The situation might be even more complicated in a year or two. The Secretary commented that he himself thought that the trend was not in an unfavorable direction. Dobrynin cited the growing influence of the Federal Republic in NATO as another unfavorable trend. He went on to say that the unsettled question of Berlin affected relations between the US and Soviet Union.
In response to the Secretary's query as to how he saw developments in East Germany, Dobrynin said that the GDR was more actively participating in CEMA. It was joining other Eastern European countries in increasing economic specialization.
The Secretary asked what the Soviet Government had in mind when it talked of a limited time for any arrangement on Berlin. What happened thereafter? Dobrynin said that West Berlin would then become a free neutralized city with some UN presence and certain guarantees given by "your country and my country." The Soviet Union was prepared to give guarantees. The UN headquarters could be put near Mayor Brandt's office, if this were desired. The limited time, therefore, referred to the Western troop presence, the Secretary observed. Dobrynin noted that the time period was to be four years in the Soviet proposal. The Soviets were prepared to discuss all of this.
The Secretary said that perhaps we had better plan to sit down for a systematic review of these points to see if there are any possibilities. Dobrynin asked whether the US would prepare a list. The Secretary observed that, as Dobrynin had gathered, the question of Western troop presence is a fundamental point for us. We were responsible for the security of West Berlin. He wanted to mention again the importance of reciprocity. Ambassador Dobrynin suggested that they take item by item during the next discussion. The Secretary assented and noted that our purpose was to talk about anything reasonable. Both he and Ambassador Thompson stressed that this did not mean acceptance of the presence of a UN flag in West Berlin for a NATO flag which was not there. The question of a UN flag for the Warsaw Pact flag in East Berlin would also have to be discussed.
Ambassador Dobrynin commented that the Secretary knew the Soviet position with respect to East Berlin. It was a part of East Germany both practically and juridically. On the other hand, from the Western viewpoint, West Berlin had a special status and was never part of the Federal Republic. He was not instructed to discuss the situation in East Berlin point by point. There was nothing new in this Soviet position.
The Secretary observed that this is where the point of reciprocity came in. The Soviets did not want to discuss those subjects about which they had tied a string. Yet they did not have any responsibilities in West Berlin which we did not have in East Berlin. Ambassador Dobrynin commented that the situation was different. Ambassador Thompson noted that the situation was different because we had kept it different. Dobrynin said that East Berlin was part of the GDR, and the Secretary pointed out that it was a part of the city of Berlin. Dobrynin said that the Soviet Union did not oppose the unification of Berlin as a capital of a reunited Germany. The Soviets had nothing against reunification, though it was difficult to discuss practical points as to how it could be achieved.
The Secretary said that, in the next talk, each should review the position from his point of view. Acceptance of such a review would not mean acceptance in principle of the other's position. They could spend some time in a systematic review. Dobrynin suggested that, in order to begin with something, they should start with the Soviet proposal.
The Secretary recalled that, from time to time, we had mentioned three levels of discussion: a final settlement of the German question, a factual solution and a modus vivendi. Did Ambassador Dobrynin see any remote possibility that we could find a final solution to the German question, for example along the lines of our 1959 proposals? Dobrynin said he did feel we could reach some practical arrangement. The Secretary said both should review the background of the talks and go over them systematically.
The Secretary and Ambassador Dobrynin agreed that, in response to press inquiries, they would say merely that they had begun their exchange of views. If queried as to whether any new proposals had been made, they would say that this was just the beginning of talks and no papers had been exchanged.
183. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
US/MC/5 Paris, April 8, 1963, 5:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen. The meeting was held at the Elys[e Palace. The source text is labeled "Part III of V."
SEATO COUNCIL MEETING Paris, April 8-10, 1963
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Bohlen
French
General de Gaulle
Mr. de La Grandville
SUBJECT
Berlin
The Secretary then said that on Berlin there was very little new to report. This did not surprise him since he had always thought that there would be a solution to the Berlin problem only if we offered one in the shape of concessions to the Soviet Union. If we did not do this, there would be no solution. He thought the thing for us to do was merely to hold fast to our present diplomatic and military positions.
Although the Soviets had initiated the talks, they did not seem too interested in pressing them. He had seen Dobrynin a week ago,/2/ who had nothing to offer beyond the repetition of the UN suggestion which they had made months before--even before the October crisis. This suggestion involved the placing of UN forces in Berlin along with the Western troops for four or five years, after which time the city would become the free, neutralized city about which the Soviets had been speaking. This, needless to say, was totally unacceptable to us--both the U.S. and its allies. The Soviets claimed that there had been no reply to this proposal. The Secretary said he would be seeing Dobrynin again following his return to make our negative position absolutely clear. He repeated that the Soviets did not seem to be pressing the Berlin question although this could change overnight. However, there were no external signs of Soviet anxiety on this question.
/2/See Document 182.
184. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 12, 1963, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 Berlin. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted and initialed by Hillenbrand and approved in S on April 18. Rusk and Dobrynin also discussed nuclear non-proliferation and Laos. Memoranda of these parts of the conversation are ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
SUBJECT
Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
US
The Secretary
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Hillenbrand
USSR
Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of USSR
Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor, Embassy
The Secretary began by referring to certain language with which Ambassador Dobrynin had opened their previous meeting,/2/ specifically his statement that "In the course of the earlier exchange of opinions the parties succeeded in reaching definite results on well-known questions in connection with a German peace settlement. There was also achieved definite mutual understanding concerning the necessity for normalization on this basis of the situation in West Berlin taking into account actually existing conditions which came about on German territory as a result of the past war." This general language was a little hard to read, the Secretary observed. He wanted to enter an early reservation so that the Soviets would not think we had agreed to something to which we had not agreed.
/2/See Document 182.
We would like to see the Berlin problem cleared up, the Secretary continued. There was perhaps no other problem which was so disruptive of relations between the two countries. In this connection the Secretary referred to the continuous exchanges and the many incidents over Berlin. As he had told Mikoyan recently,/3/ he hoped the question could be resolved by agreement and thus a crisis be avoided. This would be possible if both sides would be willing to take account of the vital interests of the other. As he had said before, the Secretary went on, this taking into account of "actually existing conditions which came about on German territory as a result of the past war" included our position in Berlin. This also had to be taken into account. Normalization does not apply only to Berlin but also to the division of Germany which has existed since the end of the war.
/3/See Document 158.
The Secretary then referred to the remarks in Dobrynin's opening statement at their last meeting to the effect that the Soviet Government proceeded "from the fact that in appropriate form those positive results will be realized which were achieved by the previous exchange of opinions by the parties on the questions of: formalizing and strengthening of the existing German borders; guarantee of free access to West Berlin; respect for the sovereignty of the GDR; precluding the armament of the FRG and the GDR with nuclear weapons; conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty organizations." It was true, the Secretary said, that, as indicated in the Statement of Principles which he had handed to Gromyko in Geneva, we felt that some real progress had been made on these points. But we did want to note some possibility of misunderstanding. We want it to be understood that these are subjects which would require discussion before any agreement could be reached.
With reference to "respect for the sovereignty of the GDR", the Secretary noted that he had previously said that we did not see how a satisfactory arrangement on access need interfere with GDR sovereignty. The two could be mutually non-interfering in character. Access to Berlin need not involve interference with or intrusion into East German affairs. The Secretary said he had pointed out that many States by agreeing to transit rights over them do so without interfering with their sovereignty, for example in the case of aircraft overflights. We would not want to leave the implication, however, that we are talking about the political question of recognizing GDR sovereignty. We understand that there is such a place as East Germany and we do not act as if we did not understand this. But that is another matter.
At this point the Secretary began a lengthy discussion of nuclear nonproliferation (covered in a separate memorandum of conversation). During the course of this, Dobrynin came back to the Secretary's remarks on his Berlin statement made at the previous meeting./4/ He said that he wanted to clarify the Soviet reference to "positive results" point by point. As to borders, his government proceeded from the assumption that there was a sort of understanding between the Secretary and Gromyko and the President and Gromyko on this subject. The Secretary asked whether the Soviet language was intended to apply to the borders of Germany as a whole. Dobrynin answered in the affirmative. Ambassador Thompson's remark that the word "formalizing" was broad in its meaning led to a brief discussion whether this was the best translation from the Russian. The Embassy had apparently translated the key word as "fixing" rather than "formalizing". In response to the Secretary's query whether the Soviets were also referring to the demarcation line between East and West Germany, Dobrynin said that the Soviets were aware that the United States did not recognize the GDR but this demarcation line was a border. He assumed that the Secretary did not wish to add anything new to what he had discussed with Gromyko. The Secretary said there was no change in the conversation from our side but we did not want this to be understood as anything like formalizing or that we considered it would lead to formalizing. The Secretary noted that we had talked of a parallel arrangement. The three Western powers would agree with the Soviet Union on access. The Soviets would speak to the East Germans and this would take care of GDR sovereignty. This would be non-interference. Dobrynin commented that the Secretary knew the Soviet position; it was not a question of formal recognition.
/4/A typed notation on the source text indicates that the text of this paragraph from this point through the sentence ending "would lead to formalizing" was classified Secret; Noforn.
The Secretary observed that he had also said that, if the central question of our vital interests were solved, he saw no difficulty in these other questions falling into place. He wanted to point out that various aspects of these matters were not agreed, though there had been some progress or movement. Dobrynin commented that this is why the Soviets had used the expression "positive results". The Secretary noted that the Soviet Ambassador in Paris had said that the Soviet Union and the United States had reached agreement./5/ That was why the Secretary felt that he had to say that we had not reached agreement. Our Allies had come to us and said that we should show them the agreement. We did not want any general formula to conceal a misunderstanding as to what had actually been said on these various points. Dobrynin agreed there had been no formal agreement but merely what the Soviet language stated.
/5/See footnote 1, Document 168.
Returning to the first quotation from the Soviet statement which he had noted, the Secretary pointed out that this was nothing but the same old Soviet formula which turned up everywhere. Dobrynin said that the subject had been discussed many months. The Secretary responded that no agreement had yet been found that fitted this language. Dobrynin said that the language merely described the situation. The Secretary observed that the Soviet reference to "actually existing conditions" was undermined in the next paragraph directed against the presence of foreign troops in West Berlin. Dobrynin commented that he did not see anything new here.
At this point the discussion of nuclear non-proliferation resumed.
Just before the end of the meeting, Dobrynin asked about future discussions on Berlin. How did the Secretary feel about an exchange of views on the troop question and related matters. The Secretary responded that these could be discussed in the near future. On the troop issue, he might say that difficult questions for us were involved in dealing with this issue solely in terms of West Berlin, substituting a UN flag for the NATO flag, diluting our forces in West Berlin, or the limited time period involved. How could we consider that our vital interests were met thereby? Dobrynin suggested that they go through the subjects point by point and that the Secretary say what was wrong with the Soviet proposals.
185. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, April 13, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Kennedy. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. The time of transmission is illegible.
2484. Please deliver following personal and confidential message from Secretary to FonMin Schroeder at earliest appropriate opportunity:
"I feel I must tell you that a Bundestag session in Berlin at this time,/2/ with all the attendant difficulties and frictions which this would generate, might well give rise to a situation which could compromise the possibility of the President visiting Berlin in the course of his forthcoming trip to Europe. I am sure that such a course of events would run counter to your wishes in the matter as well as to our own. I am therefore looking to you and your colleagues to use your influence in every appropriate way to help bring about a satisfactory resolution of this matter.
/2/On April 6 a German Foreign Ministry representative had stated in the Bonn Quadripartite Group that the President of the Bundestag intended to call a plenary meeting of that body in Berlin May 20-22. (Telegram 2685 from Bonn, April 8; ibid., POL 15-2 W GER)
I anticipate that the three allied governments responsible for Berlin will be in touch with you shortly on this point."/3/
/3/On April 19 the three Western powers presented identical aides-m[moire to the German Foreign Ministry expressing their "serious reservations" about holding a Bundestag meeting in Berlin. (Telegram 2799 from Bonn, April 19; ibid.)
Rusk
186. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Moscow, April 26, 1963, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-8. The source text bears no drafting information, but it was approved in M on May 6. The source text is labeled "Part IV of IV." The meeting was held in Khrushchev's office in the Kremlin. Harriman was in Moscow for talks on Laos.
SUBJECT
Nuclear Test Ban and Germany
PARTICIPANTS
USSR
N. S. Khrushchev
Andrei Gromyko
S. G. Lapin
Viktor Sukhodrev--translator
US
Under Secretary W. Averell Harriman
Ambassador Foy D. Kohler
Mr. Michael V. Forrestal
Mr. William H. Sullivan
In response to Khrushchev's request for Harriman's "advice", the Governor suggested that the USSR come to an agreement on a nuclear test ban. This would enable them to devote more of their resources to civilian production. He assured Mr. Khrushchev that the President wanted this very much.
Mr. Khrushchev replied soberly that the Soviets have been thinking about this for some time and they want it too. He added that they are now preparing their position and the President could expect an answer in the near future. He said, however, that the Soviets attach greater importance to the German question, although he was not saying these two subjects were linked./2/ Harriman asked what aspect of the German situation: Berlin or an independent nuclear capability for the Germans.
/2/In the telegraphic summary of this conversation a parenthetical notation states "(Although, in fact, he linked them twice)." (Telegram 2771 from Moscow, April 28; ibid., POL 7 US/Harriman)
Khrushchev said that the Soviets want a normalization of Europe. The Americans should free themselves of Adenauer's influence. The socialist countries have gained more in Berlin from the wall than they would have gained by a peace treaty, which would have provided that no wall could be built. "Berlin is no longer a source of any trouble." He said they raised the German question only because a settlement there would contribute to the alleviation of tensions. The Soviets seek no advantages in that country. If there were a German peace treaty nothing would change; the only result would be that the current situation involving two Germanies would be legitimized.
Harriman said that since the Soviets were satisfied with the current situation in Berlin, why do they not wish to get on with other important things such as a test ban agreement? Khrushchev replied: "We'll sign one right away, but, with no espionage inspections, ever."
Harriman said he wished to raise one aspect of nuclear proliferation which concerned him and, he assumed, was of concern to Chairman Khrushchev. He said Khrushchev had expressed his worry about the Germans. Why hadn't he said anything about the Chinese and the possibility that they may have nuclear weapons in the near future. Khrushchev suggested Harriman take that up with the Chinese. The Soviets and the United States could talk about Germany because we were mutual victors in the war against Germany, but China was one of the Soviet's allies and Harriman should treat them as equals. Harriman said he had personally wanted to go to talk with the Chinese a few years ago but that Mikoyan would not cooperate. Khrushchev replied that Mikoyan was not the Foreign Minister of China and could not get Harriman into China.
In response to Governor Harriman's invitation to luncheon the Chairman regretted that he would be especially busy for the next two days and would not have time. He stressed that he and his colleagues regard Mr. Harriman with the highest esteem and would like to return our relations to the state they were in during the period when Mr. Harriman was Ambassador. He proposed: "I will give my word that I will find a basis for a test ban agreeable to both sides provided you agree to work out the basis of a German settlement which would recognize the two Germanies as they now exist".
Harriman replied he could not buy a "pig-in-a-poke". The United States is always ready to talk about both the test ban and about the German settlement. Khrushchev remarked with a smile that Harriman was an old diplomat who knew how to talk without saying anything. He asked the Governor to convey his best wishes to the President and his family, and to tell the President that he wanted to continue to cooperate with the United States in finding reasonable language and in the search for a solution to all the world's problems. In closing, he also asked the Governor to convey his best regards to Secretary Rusk.
Governor Harriman thanked the Chairman for these words and said he would convey them to the President and the Secretary.
187. Editorial Note
In a letter to President Kennedy on April 29, Chairman Khrushchev reviewed the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. In a paragraph near the end of the letter he wrote:
"I agree with you that we have before us also other questions and problems aside from those mentioned in your message. In the first instance I would mention the conclusion of a German peace treaty and normalization of the situation in West Berlin on that basis. The solution of this problem, and given mutual desire that is not now such a difficult matter, would undoubtedly bear the greatest returns both from the standpoint of the interest of consolidating peace and for a serious improvement in Soviet-American relations. As long as the remnants of the Second World War, which constantly make themselves known, continue to exist, then both you and we will be forced to devote ever greater funds to armaments, that is to increasing our ability to destroy each other. And understandably in such a situation it is difficult to count on agreement on disarmament, which requires above all faith and still more faith for its attainment. Therefore, if one realistically evaluates the situation, one cannot but come to the conclusion that the conclusion of a German peace treaty would create better conditions also for the resolution of the question of questions of the modern day--universal and complete disarmament." (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163)
The full text of this letter is printed in volume VI.
188. Editorial Note
After presenting his credentials to President Luebke on May 18, the new Ambassador to Germany, George C. McGhee, paid his first official call on Chancellor Adenauer on May 20. The conversation lasted 2-1/2 hours and was devoted almost entirely to arrangements for President Kennedy's June 23-26 visit to Germany. McGhee reported on this meeting in telegram 3129 from Bonn, May 21 (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Kennedy) and in two memoranda of conversation attached to airgram 2165 from Bonn, May 22. (Ibid.) For a detailed report based on the latter, see An Ambassador's Account, pages 26-31.
189. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
US/MC/10
Ottawa, May 21, 1963, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2263. Secret. Drafted by Cash and approved in S on May 28. The meeting was held at the U.S. Embassy.
UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE THIRTY-FIRST MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Ottawa, Canada, May 22-24, 1963
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Butterworth
Mr. Tyler
Mr. Cash
Germany
Foreign Minister Schroeder
Herr Krapf
Ambassador Grewe
Herr Kusterer
United Kingdom
Foreign Secretary Home
Defense Minister Thorneycroft
Lord Hood
Mr. Thomson
France
Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
M. Lucet
M. Gillet
M. Lebel
SUBJECT
Berlin and Germany
The Secretary opened with an account of his May 18 discussion with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin./2/ The latter's principal effort was to get across the idea that this is a crucial time of policy re-examination in Moscow, during which it is exceedingly important to find some point on which the Soviets can reach some agreement with the West. The discussion covered nuclear testing, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, Laos, Cuba, and a glancing reference to Berlin. For some strange reason, even though the Soviets asked for the talks on Berlin, they are not pressing them. Dobrynin even said that US-USSR agreement on civil air transportation would be psychologically important during this particular period.
/2/The memorandum of this conversation, which took place on board the Patrick J, has only a passing reference to Berlin. (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Chron) At a private dinner on May 17 Dobrynin had asked Thompson why the United States opposed the Soviet proposals on Berlin. Thompson had replied that they would adversely affect the Allies' position in Berlin and have a "disastrous" effect on the West's commitment to West Berliners and Germans generally. (Tosec 3 to Ottawa, May 20; ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2265)
The Ambassador concentrated hard on the Soviets' NATO-Warsaw Pact Nonaggression Pact (NAP) proposal. He agreed it would be of little practical significance, but it would do no harm and would show some people in Moscow that East-West agreement on something was possible. He indicated more than once that the NAP form was not important, and that the problem of nonrecognition could be discussed. The Secretary had replied that while this was not an easy problem, he did not think the NATO nations were completely negative on this matter. However, all of them had bad memories of the Kellogg-Briand pact. If NATO agreed to an NAP, and a Berlin crisis broke out subsequently, NATO would look extremely foolish. The complete lack of progress on substantive issues outstanding between the Soviets and the West makes an NAP hardly worth while. Dobrynin responded that he could understand this, but an agreement--even though of no practical significance--would greatly diminish the prospect of a Berlin crisis. He did not seem particularly interested in the Berlin talks as such but emphasized the importance of reaching agreement on any point--especially an NAP.
The Secretary told the Foreign Ministers that it might be worth while looking at this matter against the background of what seems to be going on in Moscow. It appears that the Soviets are going through a period of reappraisal. They have suffered serious political losses in expensive areas such as Iraq and Indonesia, and it is possible that a dangerous situation may develop. The time between now and July, when the talks with the Chinese begin, is very important, and it would be worth our while to spend some time examining what is going on in the Kremlin.
Lord Home agreed that there was a thorough re-examination going on in Moscow. He recalled that Gromyko had seemed interested last fall when the Foreign Secretary had mentioned the possibility of an NAP. One could not tell, however, whether anything sufficiently worth while could be developed.
The Secretary said that as he recalled the NAP draft the Soviets presented in Geneva,/3/ it called for ratification in each particular country. He supposed, however, that ratification could be avoided by letters from the respective Secretaries General denouncing aggression and calling for the settlement of all disputes by peaceful means. It is just possible that this would be of interest to the Soviets. The US Government has reached no conclusions. We have been skeptical since 1945. However, Dobrynin left the impression that this might be a good time for the Soviets to have something to point to in the way of an agreement with the West which would be of psychological, rather than practical, importance. We have, of course, during the last two years of talks on Berlin thought of an NAP as the end of the trail rather than the beginning.
/3/Dated February 20, U.N. doc. ENDC/77; printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 388-389.
Couve remarked that as the Soviets don't seem particularly interested in discussing Berlin, this problem is more or less liquidated.
Lord Home asked whether an NAP wouldn't make it easier for the Soviets to leave Berlin alone.
Couve commented that an NAP might very well lead to recognition of the East German regime.
The Secretary replied that Dobrynin seemed to be saying that nonrecognition would not be an obstacle. At this point the Secretary read some excerpts from the NAP text the Soviets submitted in Geneva on February 20, 1963, and circulated a copy. He remarked that the formalities could be discounted. An NAP might be in the form of simultaneous declarations from each side with no direct connection.
Schroeder said he felt the Soviets were seeking something which would to some extent cement the status quo. Even without a peace treaty and recognition of the East German regime, an NAP would go far toward stabilizing the status quo. An NAP is very important to the Soviets as proven by their bringing it into the Geneva discussions. Such a pact should be the end of a chain of events, not the beginning. Khrushchev, incidentally, thinks he invented the NAP in Geneva in 1955 and therefore has a special interest in it.
Lord Home asked what sort of declarations of nonaggressive intent could be made by NATO which would go further than what has already been done.
The Secretary read the operative portions of the Soviet NAP draft of February 20 as a possible example.
Schroeder remarked that for the first time this would get the basic conflict out of a Four Power context into somewhat of a UN context.
The Secretary interjected at this point that he was this evening engaging in a discussion with colleagues and not in an official expression of US policy.
He added that during the last six months there had been a number of encouraging significant developments among the satellites, e.g. Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania.
He would speculate that the Communist system has an inevitable great crisis to face when it must choose between pressing, or abandoning, world revolution. In October Khrushchev removed his missiles from Cuba on the pretext that he had obtained from us a guarantee that we would not invade Cuba, which we had no intention of doing anyway. He might be grasping at fairly slender straws.
Couve said an NAP might be useful to the Soviets even though appearing insignificant. It would be a very important move and would be considered by many as the beginning of a d[tente. This did not mean that it was inappropriate. It might even be appropriate.
The Secretary said the recognition problem could be forgotten for the moment. We had previously rejected an NAP to avoid putting NATO and the Warsaw Pact on an equal footing. Pressing the status quo could be a serious matter if it implied acceptance of the division of Germany. However, we should give the NAP a fresh look against the background of Moscow's problems.
Lord Home commented that one problem would obviously be to avoid recognition of East Germany, but he did not see how one could bring about a d[tente with the Soviets--if the Russians want one--without giving serious consideration to something like an NAP.
Schroeder remarked that a few years ago he, himself, supported ideas like an NAP. He had felt that if it were important to the Soviets and unimportant to the West, it should be undertaken. But today the situation is different. An NAP would now seem like the end of an epoch. The psychological effect would be that concepts such as self-determination and reunification would appear to be buried. It would be better to continue the relative tension that exists today rather than pay the price for a d[tente which would be no real d[tente because no problem would have been solved.
The Secretary asked about the current NATO consideration of a possible NAP.
Grewe said consideration of a POLAD report on this subject was interrupted by the current meeting in Ottawa but would soon be resumed./4/
/4/Not further identified.
The Secretary said it might be well for the Ambassadorial Group to study this problem before NATO froze it one way or the other. He was not prepared to give a firm view of the US Government, which has been very skeptical about an NAP, but in view of Dobrynin's remarks and what is probably going on in Moscow, we should not fail to examine the problem.
Lord Home asked if Dobrynin had given the impression that an NAP would make it easier for the Soviets to leave Berlin alone.
The Secretary said the Ambassador had not put it that way but had said it would make a Berlin crisis far less likely. We can't simply brush this aside.
Lord Home asked how contact would be maintained with the Soviets on this subject.
The Secretary said either side could make the next move. No specific arrangement was made to pursue this topic. It is likely that the Soviets will revert to this before their talks with the Chinese now slated to begin on July 5. We should be ready with an answer.
Couve said the real issue was what was in the best interests of the West--not of the USSR. The two are not necessarily identical.
The Secretary said the Ambassadorial Group should be asked to pull together as much information as possible concerning what is going on in the Bloc with the changes in military command, the Kozlov illness, the Rumanian refusal to accept its assigned role in the economic plans, etc. We don't have a really good idea of what has happened since October 22.
Krapf asked if an NAP was the cheapest concession that could be made to the Soviets.
The Secretary said Dobrynin had mentioned the civil air agreement, which seems to be of some importance to the Soviets, although Khrushchev is not particularly interested. They have made some gestures concerning outer space, and have even hinted that maybe the US and the USSR should combine their efforts to put men on the moon.
They do not seem, he continued, to be really interested in talking about Berlin. Dobrynin has offered nothing new in the two talks that have taken place in the current series, and he did not devote half-a-dozen sentences to the subject on May 18.
Couve said it is certainly not in the Western interest to stop a move toward a d[tente if there is a possibility for one.
The Secretary asked about the current status of the IZT talks.
Schroeder said first he would like to point out that the Soviets' concept of a d[tente was to obtain acceptance of a situation they have created.
As to the IZT talks, no progress has been made because the East Germans have refused to discuss all political concessions.
Some progress has been made with Poland, Hungary, and Rumania, but the Soviets permit this because it helps the economic development of these countries and lightens the burden on the Soviet Union. The West Germans are anxious to keep these Eastern European contacts open. The two most difficult problems are the inclusion of Berlin in agreements with Eastern European countries and the problem of diplomatic relations.
Lord Home suggested that this might be discussed in the Ambassadorial Group.
Schroeder added that Khrushchev is realizing that the Bloc countries, and even the Soviet Zone of Germany, are becoming increasingly difficult to control.
The Secretary reiterated the need for a fundamental reassessment, under the guidance of the Ambassadorial Group, of our intelligence on the Soviet Union.
Schroeder stressed the importance of contingency planning--keeping it up to date and carrying it forward especially in: 1) the protection of civilian traffic; 2) passports and visas; and 3) economic countermeasures.
Lord Home returned to the NAP saying that since the Russians might want a reply by July, it would be well to be armed with parallel declarations.
The Secretary suggested that the Ambassadorial Group examine alternate forms for an NAP.
Grewe reminded the Ministers that the NAP was still being discussed in Paris and Geneva. It will be difficult, he added, to continue to refuse to discuss it substantively in the Geneva ENDC.
The Secretary agreed that the whole NAP subject, including the Geneva and Paris aspects, should be studied promptly.
190. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, May 22, 1963, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Kennedy. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Berlin and Bonn.
2957. Zorin asked me call on him at MFA at noon and made following oral statement.
Begin text. In connection with trip of President USA to Europe, including West Berlin, scheduled for June, Chancellor Adenauer has declared that he, as head of government of FRG, together with other West German leaders, intends to accompany President Kennedy officially on his trip to West Berlin. According to available information, Adenauer intends to meet President in West Berlin and remain there during his visit.
It is as yet difficult for us to judge whether these plans of Adenauer are supported by White House. It is however completely obvious that these plans of FRG Chancellor bear an openly provocative character. They are clearly directed toward aggravating situation and creating additional difficulties for resolution of important international question, on which Soviet-American exchange of views has now been resumed. Moreover, everyone knows--and this has repeatedly been confirmed by USA--that West Berlin is not part of FRG. End text.
I told Zorin I should report this to my government and give him official reply upon its instructions. On basis my familiarity with question, however, I wished point out that much of US-Soviet discussion Berlin had centered precisely around question free movement persons between West Germany and West Berlin. I could see nothing in such movements that could be described as "provocative". There had been many meetings in East Berlin at which Soviet leaders had been present together with Ulbricht. Both of us had the same responsibilities in this matter for all of Berlin. I therefore could not see how Chancellor's travel to West Berlin could be called "provocative". Nor did I see how it could be regarded as prejudicial to US-Soviet talks.
Zorin said: First, this was not a question of simple movement of persons. Adenauer was not just West German citizen with ordinary passport, but head of FRG Government, which had nothing to do with West Berlin. Consequently, these two aspects of matter could not be put on same plane. Second, it was altogether different situation when Khrushchev was there with Ulbricht. East Berlin is part, and capital, of GDR and no one had ever disputed this. On other hand, West Berlin not part of FRG; even US admits that. Consequently, these two things can't be put on same plane: It was not unlawful for Khrushchev to be in East Berlin, whereas Adenauer had nothing to do with West Berlin. Thirdly, I had said there was nothing provocative in this, but Soviets considered this kind of step as not directed toward facilitating US-Soviet talks, but rather toward hindering them. Our points of view on this are different, but first two points he had put were purely factual ones.
I responded by agreeing there was difference between situations in East and West Berlin, but this was because Soviet action had made them different. However, I did not propose that he and I should take over discussions of Germany and Berlin already started by Secretary and Dobrynin. I should bring his representation to attention of my government and report his additional remarks.
Comment: Perhaps emboldened by reports of Franco-British-US attitude toward Bundestag meeting in Berlin, Soviets appear intent on trying a little splitting maneuver on US and FRG. (FRG Embassy, which we have informed of approach, tells us they have not as yet received any representation on subject.)
Kohler
191. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/
Washington, May 25, 1963, 12:37 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Kennedy. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Creel on May 24; cleared by Penberthy, Davis, Bundy (in substance), and Guthrie and Thompson (in draft); and approved by Tyler. Repeated to Berlin and Bonn.
2551. Moscow's 2957./2/ Concur in line you took with Zorin re Adenauer presence in Berlin. Request you inform Zorin we are surprised that Soviets would wish raise at this juncture propriety of Chancellor Adenauer's being in West Berlin at time of President's visit and that we do not see how this could be considered in any way "provocative" or as prejudicial to US-Soviet talks.
/2/Document 190.
Believe you should also, in interest setting record straight, take direct issue with Zorin's statement to you that East Berlin is "part of GDR and no one had ever disputed this." You could recall to him in this connection following passage in Embassy's note to Soviet FonOff of August 17, 1961:/3/ "It (US Govt) reiterates that it does not accept the pretension that the Soviet Sector of Berlin forms a part of the so-called `German Democratic Republic' and that Berlin is situated on its territory. Such a pretension is in itself a violation of the solemnly pledged word of the USSR in the agreement on the Zones of Occupation in Germany and the administration of Greater Berlin." Identical notes were sent by UK and France. You should stress that this has always been and still remains our clear position on this issue.
/3/For text of this note, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 777-778.
FYI. German Embassy here has made inquiries of Dept re our attitude toward Zorin d[marche, which FRG Embassy Moscow had already reported. We are informing Germans here of tenor above instructions to you.
Rusk
192. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, May 27, 1963, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Kennedy. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bonn and Berlin.
2996. Deptel 2551./2/ In forty-five minute meeting today, I made oral statement to Zorin as per reftel.
/2/Document 191.
Replying, Zorin referred to first part my statement (expressing USG's surprise at Sov representation) and said US did not answer May 22 statement and apparently did not wish to answer it. US did not wish to admit that Adenauer presence West Berlin while President there could not be viewed as factor contributing to Sov-US exchange of views and to lessening of international tension, both between US and USSR and with regard to situation in Europe. He said he could not view our "surprise" as justified. When Adenauer decided to visit West Berlin during President's visit there, he understood full well this would serve to sharpen tensions between US and USSR. If US finds Sov statement surprising, this means US doesn't recognize importance of such step. He could therefore only regret that statement had not been accepted and express Soviet concern on that account.
With regard portion of statement setting record straight on East Berlin, Zorin said this did not relate to his oral statement, but to comment he had made on my commentary on statement. He did not want to polemicize about it, but could only conclude from it that we agreed with what he had said about West Berlin's not being part of FRG since we did not dispute that part of his statement. In that case, what business did Chancellor of FRG have there, what connection was there between his visit and that of President? This confirmed that his statement had been well-founded.
So far as what I had said about East Berlin was concerned, Zorin said he could not agree. US and its closest allies might think this, but whole rest of world regarded East Berlin as capital GDR, since government of that country is located there. But this point was in dispute and we could not settle it here.
I said I agreed that it was first part of our statement which responded to theirs, but that my government had wanted to set the record straight with the second part so as not to leave him under any impression that we agreed with his remark on status of East Berlin.
I said I wished, too, to straighten out any inference he appeared to be drawing in his statement, and still seemed to be drawing, that there might be different points of view between USG and FRG on Adenauer trip. Such implications had been made in Sov press, as well, most recently in Izvestiya May 25 article by M. Mikhailov. I then read him brief statement from May 9 Wireless Bulletin to effect President always assumed Chancellor would be with him in Berlin.
I said I might comment a little further on his statement that West Berlin is not part of FRG. This point had in a sense been answered by second part of my statement. Fact is that, by Four-Power agreement, all of us had agreed that all of Berlin should have Four-Power status. Within limits of possibilities, USG had remained faithful to that agreement, while USSR had made East Berlin a separate part. In these circumstances, closest possible ties and working conditions had developed between West Berlin and FRG. Not whole rest of world, but USSR and its close friends, may believe East Berlin is part of GDR. This is, however, one of important points at issue between us.
Zorin broke in here to ask if I were saying West Berlin was part of FRG.
I said I was not, but was saying all of us had agreed Berlin should be kept together as the capital of a future reunited Germany.
Zorin said it had not been they, but the US, which first created a self-sufficient West Berlin. Not the USSR, but the US, had created the FRG before the GDR had been created. Not the USSR, but the [omission--US?], had first violated the Four-Power status of Berlin. Four-Power agreements on Berlin had no juridical force today and this was result solely of unilateral Western actions. It was not to advantage of US to look for the guilty ones, since historical facts were not on side of US. He could therefore confirm from second part of my statement that US does not consider West Berlin a part of FRG. Thus, burden of his May 22 statement remains justified. Why should Chancellor Adanauer be in West Berlin together with President? This decision had been dictated by political considerations and was not directed toward reducing tensions, but only towards aggravating them. That had been whole point of their statement: To warn US about political consequences of this step.
I said I must take issue with a couple of his remarks, since we differed on some of facts involved. Fact is that Sov side had walked out of Berlin Kommandatura in 1948 and had instituted blockade. Allied Kommandatura, now continuing as tripartite organ, had suspended provision of FRG Constitution making Berlin Land of FRG.
But West Berlin must live and, with Allied sanction, has developed close political, economic, financial, and cultural ties with FRG. Even Chairman Khrushchev has publicly recognized West Berlin and West Germany have same political system. We think it quite natural Chancellor should be in West Berlin when President is there.
I said I trusted I had not heard correctly about our agreements on West Berlin. I assumed Bolz-Zorin agreement, with which he was certainly familiar, was still in force.
Zorin said it was clear he could argue endlessly with me on subject. I agreed and repeated we did not want to assume work of Secretary and Amb Dobrynin.
Zorin said I had forgotten about separate currency reform in West Berlin, which had been put through long before blockade. It was that which had led to division of Berlin and Germany.
I said we differed on history, but I hoped he would consider seriously our position that we could see nothing provocative or tension-heightening in Chancellor's accompanying President to West Berlin.
Rising, Zorin said they could not agree with us on this and must maintain the view expressed in the May 22 statement.
Comment: Zorin nodded to my statement about Bolz-Zorin agreement but did not specifically comment. By his reasoning, appears we can take his failure to respond as agreement that it remains in force.
Kohler
193. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, June 14, 1963, 7:34 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 Berlin. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ausland; cleared by Anderson, Cash, Thompson, Department of Defense (ISA), and JCS; and approved by Davis. Repeated to Berlin, London, Paris, Moscow, SHAPE, U.S. Element Live Oak, CINCEUR, USAFE, and USAREUR.
3151. Paris also pass USRO. Reference: Bonn 3434 and 3435 and Berlin 1230./2/ Subject: Possible Soviet/GDR Action Related to East Berlin.
/2/Telegrams 3434 and 3435 from Bonn, June 13, and telegram 1230 from Berlin, June 7, each explored various aspects of possible Soviet moves in Berlin, including the incorporation of East Berlin into the German Democratic Republic, and advocated a review of contingency plans to meet the full range of possible Soviet actions. (All ibid.)
1. We agree that special attention should be given to collection and assessment of evidence bearing on possible Soviet/GDR actions related to east Berlin. We also agree that formal incorporation of east Berlin into GDR is one of more likely Soviet moves. We believe, however, that we should be careful not to focus so closely on this contingency that we might miss other signals which point to other possible Soviet moves related to Berlin.
2. We believe there should be a review of existing contingency plans, in order to be ready to deal with full range of possible Soviet/GDR actions related to east Berlin. This should include:
a. Possible Allied and/or German actions, including warnings, to forestall Soviet/GDR action.
b. Preparation of appropriate statements and protests.
c. Possible Allied actions to offset psychological impact on Germans of Soviet/GDR actions.
d. Possible Soviet/GDR action related to Allied and/or non-Allied access to east Berlin.
3. We believe that this review should be initiated on tripartite basis in Berlin. (We notice from Berlin's 1247 that there has already been preliminary discussion.)/3/ The planning should then be reviewed quadripartitely in Bonn, with aim of submitting recommendations to Ambassadorial Group by July 15.
/3/Telegram 1247, June 13, reported that the British had raised the question of contingency planning in response to incorporation of East Berlin at a Deputy Political Advisers meeting. (Ibid.)
4. Request that Live Oak be kept informed./4/
/4/On June 19 the Department of State advised the Embassy in Moscow that the Soviet Union might be planning some action for East Berlin, perhaps in connection with President Kennedy's visit to the city on June 26. The Embassy was further informed that if any Soviet official gave an indication of a change in the status of East Berlin, he should be told that this would cause the United States to review its position on the status of West Berlin without specifically stating that it would support incorporation of the western part into the Federal Republic of Germany. (Ibid.)
Rusk
194. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/
PET/O-6
Washington, June 14, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2274. Confidential. Drafted by Creel and cleared by Brandin and Tyler. Prepared for the President's European trip.
SCOPE: Germany
Background
While officially labeled an "informal working visit", the President's trip to West Germany and Berlin will have many of the trappings of a state visit and can be expected to attract more public attention and interest than any previous visit by a foreign statesman to modern Germany--including probably even de Gaulle's state visit of last September.
There are a number of reasons for this:
1) The visit will be the first to Germany by President Kennedy since assuming office and only the third by a US President to postwar Germany. (President Truman was in Berlin in 1945 for the Potsdam Conference and President Eisenhower visited Bonn in 1959.)
2) No American President has visited Berlin since 1945 when President Truman did so--under totally different circumstances--and no other non-German Chief of State from a NATO country has ever been in Berlin.
3) The visit comes at a time of change and flux in Western Europe when the role and influence of the American President have acquired added significance in German eyes.
4) The visit will be made against the backdrop of a scheduled further visit by de Gaulle to Germany in early July, following the anticipated entry into force of the Franco-German Treaty.
5) The visit comes at an important turning point in modern German history, on the eve of the transition from Adenauer to Erhard with its obvious relation to the shifting of generations in German political life.
Broad Objectives
1) To furnish tangible evidence of American good will toward the German people and of our recognition of the increasing importance of the Federal Republic as one of our major allies.
2) To underscore our abiding interest in the welfare, stability and freedom of Germany as an integral part of Europe and the Western community.
3) To provide graphic emphasis to the continuing American presence in and responsibility for Europe and to help restore some of the momentum toward European unity and Atlantic interdependence.
4) To emphasize for the benefit of all Germans--both West and East--our continued recognition of the importance of Berlin, and our determination to defend and maintain our position there.
5) To accord appropriate recognition and tribute to Chancellor Adenauer, in the twilight of his long tenure as Chancellor, for his invaluable and lasting contributions to the causes of democracy and freedom.
6) To give the President an opportunity to see--and be seen by--as many Germans as possible in representative major cities of Germany. (Although de Gaulle toured West Germany extensively last fall, he did not visit Frankfurt, Wiesbaden or Berlin.)
7) To strengthen German-American cooperation, understanding and sense of common purpose at the top level by discussion of current problems of mutual concern.
Problem Areas
1) There may be a few problems in the general area of protocol and precedence involving primarily Adenauer, Erhard and Brandt, each of whom will be engaged in a certain amount of jockeying for position. These could become particularly delicate in Berlin as concerns the respective role of the Chancellor and the Governing Mayor, but we should continue to regard this matter as primarily one for the Germans to work out among themselves. There will also be the problem of paying appropriate attention to Erhard in his role of Chancellor-apparent without giving offense to Chancellor Adenauer, the President's host.
2) As concerns the President's substantive talks with the Chancellor and other German leaders, these should not be viewed primarily as a vehicle for pressuring the Germans into a series of specific actions we would like them to take. Our dominant posture should be one of sympathetic interest in problems of mutual concern and of confidence that in close cooperation we can master them. At the same time, there are several major problem areas of particular concern to the United States which should be brought up with a view to making our interest and our position unmistakably clear. These areas include, at a minimum:
a) the MLF and attendant problems in the field of military strategy and planning.
b) trade policy (including United Kingdom entry into EEC) and current trade negotiations, and their relationship to our own policies under the Trade Expansion Act.
c) our balance of payments situation, with particular reference to current offset arrangements.
3) There will also be the problem throughout the visit, and particularly in Berlin, of how to deal with the problem of German reunification in a way which will meet the political and emotional requirements of the Germans themselves on this issue without holding forth false hopes or sounding overly provocative.
195. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Austria/1/
Washington, June 22, 1963, 1:48 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 38-9. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ausland on June 21; cleared by Creel, Davis, Thompson, AV, Department of Defense (ISA), and JCS; and approved and initialed by Rusk. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Berlin, Paris, London, Moscow, SHAPE, U.S. Element Live Oak, CINCEUR, USAREUR, and USAFE.
3228. Paris also pass USRO. Reference: Bonn 3540 and 3545./2/ Subject: Air Access to Berlin.
/2/Telegrams 3540 and 3545, both dated June 20, discussed various aspects of East German air service to Vienna from Schoenefeld Airport and the opening of a new crossing point in Berlin at the Waltersdorfer Chausee to enable passengers to get to Schoenefeld. (Ibid., POL 38-6 and AV 9 AUS-E GER) In a June 20 memorandum to Bundy, Klein pointed out that the Allies might find themselves in the anomalous position of wanting to close a hole in the wall that the East Germans had opened because it was not open to all Germans and because it threatened Allied access rights. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin)
1. Although picture is still somewhat murky, it appears to us that potentially serious threat to Allied air access may be on horizon.
2. As we understand situation, following are basic facts:
a. Regular GDR air service to Vienna from Schoenefeld has been initiated, with support of Austrian government.
b. There has also been some discussion of establishing direct Austrian air service between Vienna and Tempelhof, with aircraft overflying GDR outside Allied air corridors. (Although it is still not entirely clear who said what to whom on this subject, it would appear that West Berlin authorities, as well as Austrians and Soviets, have expressed interest in this. We apparently do not know attitude of GDR authorities.)
3. In this situation, our primary objective is to avoid any dilution of Allied rights of air access to Berlin. We believe that a process of dilution could be begun, if aircraft are allowed to land at West Berlin airfields which do not use air corridors. Furthermore, to allow Austrian airlines to land at Tempelhof under agreement with GDR would begin process of intermingling Allied and GDR aviation arrangements, which would advance Soviet/GDR objective of obscuring our rights of air access.
4. With regard to Schoenefeld-Vienna air service, we are prepared to support FRG effort to get Austrians to withdraw from agreement. We are in principle opposed to any step which builds up Schoenefeld as a rival to Tempelhof and lends support to GDR campaign to convince public that Tempelhof unsafe and Schoenefeld offers superior facilities. Furthermore, if Austrian arrangement (which is first time GDR has obtained traffic rights in non-bloc country on regular basis) allowed to stand, other Western airlines will be encouraged to follow suit, thus enhancing status GDR. (On other hand, in order to be consistent with paragraph 3 above, we have regretfully concluded that we would rather see any Western flights outside air corridors land at Schoenefeld than Tempelhof, if we are unable to discourage their taking place.)
5. In any discussion with Berlin authorities of use of Tempelhof by aircraft not using corridors or flying under arrangements with GDR, it should be made clear that we could not accept this. US has undertaken extensive commitments to maintain air access to Berlin and cannot permit its rights to be obscured in order to make travel more convenient for a relatively small number of air travelers. Allied air access is so important to viability Berlin that neither we nor Berliners can afford to expose it to unnecessary risks because of differences regarding air fares.
6. Vienna is authorized to work out with French, British and German Embassies best way to support German effort get Austrians end flights.
Rusk
196. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Wiesbaden, June 25, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Kennedy. Secret; Limit Distribution. The source text bears no time of transmission. Repeated to Bonn, Rome, Paris, London, and Berlin. Passed to the White House on June 26. Secretary Rusk and President Kennedy arrived in Bonn on June 23 for a 4-day visit, including a trip to Berlin.
Secto 11. Paris pass USRO. Berlin for USDel. Reference: Secto 7./2/ After President and Chancellor had started private discussions Palais Schaumburg morning June 24,/3/ Foreign Minister Schroeder suggested that Secretary and other scheduled participants convene in separate session. He thought it useful to have brief survey major issues current interest while we were waiting to join President and Chancellor.
/2/Secto 7, June 25, transmitted a brief 2-paragraph summary of the talks on June 24. (Ibid.)
/3/No record of the President's private conversation with Adenauer has been found.
Time available permitted discussion only two subjects--MLF and German reunification. Following summaries based on uncleared memcons./4/
/4/PET/MC/3 and 11. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110)
[Here follows discussion of the MLF.]
(2) German reunification.
Schroeder said a point which Germans took very much to heart was how problem of German reunification should be set forth publicly. Germans had noted that in recent US statements there were more references to Berlin and Berlin access than to reunification. For US, Schroeder said, Berlin has significance only in context of a policy aiming at German reunification. He was aware this presented practical difficulties to us in our relations with Soviets but thought we could express the matter in a more positive way. Could we not try convince Soviets that exercise of right of self-determination by Germans was in Soviets' own interest and need not have any unilateral adverse effect. Emphasis should be that to permit self-determination to Germans would help bring about safer and more secure situation for Soviets in Europe. Should we however continue to talk only about West Berlin and our rights there, this helped maintain atmosphere of tension.
Secretary said he glad have these comments. He wished to stress there should be no question of strength our feelings about German reunification in light our attitude about self-determination for peoples everywhere, including at home. He had spoken to Sovs, particularly Gromyko, on many occasions in these terms. He was himself convinced we could not have peace in Europe in absence of self-determination, which included German reunification. But then it was always necessary to face up to next question: what are you going to do about it?
Schroeder suggested there were at least certain indirect steps we could take in concern:
(a) Prevent GDR from acquiring additional status under international law and thereby promoting Soviet thesis re existence two Germanies, and
(b) Avoid any action by Western side which would tend to freeze status quo in Europe and thereby impair right of self-determination for peoples of Europe, including Germans.
(Latter comment obviously intended to apply to Dobrynin suggestion NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression agreement.)/5/
/5/Following this conversation the Foreign Ministers joined President Kennedy and Chancellor Adenauer for a more general conversation. A report on their discussion of the MLF is printed in vol. XIII, Document 203; Memoranda of their conversation on trade and the test ban negotiations (PET/MC/12 and 14) are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2275. 4
Rusk
197. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
US/MC/34
Bad Godesberg, June 24, 1963, 6:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Kennedy. Secret. Drafted by Davis and approved in S on August 8. The source text is labeled "Uncleared." The meeting was held in Ambassador McGhee's residence. Another memorandum of this conversation, PET/MC/15, is dated June 23, but a summary of the discussion transmitted in telegram 3592 from Bonn, June 25, states that the conversation took place "yesterday." (Ibid., POL 38-10)
PARTICIPANTS
Secretary Dean Rusk
Ambassador George McGhee
Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler
Minister Martin J. Hillenbrand
FSO--Robert D. Davis
Governing Mayor Willi Brandt
Berlin Senator Schuetz
Senat Press Chief Bahr
After noting that we had not come to any final decisions on the Waltersdorfer Chaussee crossing point, the Secretary said he would like to talk the matter out with Brandt and hear his views.
Brandt said that he would have serious doubts about closing the crossing point even though it works exclusively in the GDR interest. The whole set of crossing arrangements worked similarly, i.e. the limited crossing points and the distinctions between West Berlin and West German access to the Soviet Sector. The Vienna-Schoenefeld deal might soon collapse, and crossings would be limited to a very few Bloc travellers. The Western position was "anti-Wall," and any deviation from this would weaken our case in the world.
As to the Schoenefeld flights, the Austrians were trying to get permission for overflights over the GDR for Austrian Airlines (AUA) to land at Tempelhof. Brandt thought this was a good idea from the local standpoint, since it would give cheaper and faster service to Vienna. If GDR permission was withheld, he thought that Vienna would cancel the Schoenefeld service on July 31. AUA would, of course, have to get Allied permission for West Berlin landings, and he hoped the Allies would ask for Senat views.
He realized there was a feeling on the Allied side that air service outside the corridors might weaken the Allied legal position. He saw this point but was not convinced. There are now other non-Allied non-Communist access routes. He mentioned the several roads used for West German access, and the Swedish train to Stockholm. It was absolutely clear if the Allies had to decide negatively in view of the corridor problem, that the Senat would have to respect this.
The Secretary said we were not at that point yet. We were soliciting his views. Returning to the gate, had there been any contacts with the GDR as to whether West Berliners could use it? Brandt replied negatively. The Secretary said we were in favor of practical arrangements to ease life, and were confident of the superior attractive force of West Berlin and the FRG. But practical steps can create new problems. What is the popular opinion on this? Does it accuse the Allies of tolerating a unilateral action?
Brandt admitted there was strong feeling against the crossing point last week. But he had discussed the question with 20-25 senior Senat officials of the SPD on June 22. All were against closing the crossing, and the most radical views were only to support a popular boycott. West Berlin had never resorted to police measures. Actually a boycott already existed. The second flight of the Vienna service flew out empty on June 22.
The Secretary asked, not as a suggestion, but as a possible contingency, that if the West Berlin authorities asked us not to close the point, whether they would take the responsibility for public opinion. The confidence of the population was important for the security of Berlin. If confidence goes, security melts out from under us.
Brandt replied that no discussion would be at the expense of the Allies. There were a lot of young people who were irritated. The Senat knows how to convince them what to do from past experience. "We would not evade responsibility."
The Secretary said he understood that Brandt's policy was to punch holes in the Wall even with no advantage to his side.
Brandt said his policy had never been to keep people from leaving West Berlin, and this was a sound principle for the future.
When the Secretary asked whether the GDR did not arrest people on the Swedish train, Brandt said "No." There might be a few instances, but the passengers had a visa-like "piece of paper," which implied special permission.
The Secretary said there was a great deal of theology about Berlin, and it was often hard to learn the practical effects of policy. Popular opinion was a not unimportant part of the problem.
Brandt said it was an element. Some West Berliners resented use of Communist facilities, i.e. for travel to Bulgaria, in order to meet East German relatives there. Only wealthier people could afford this. Still the workers accepted it. (Schuetz interjected that newspapers were not the same as Berliners.) Brandt continued that Berlin could not become a ghetto and ignore the principle of free movement.
Ambassador McGhee asked whether there was no leverage to influence the GDR on the crossing point.
Brandt said "no," but he was not sure. Schuetz said the FRG thought so, through IZT. Leopold considered that GDR had traffic processing troubles which might create an interest in making interzonal traffic easier.
The Secretary said that there were several problems about the Austrian flights. Air access was of special sensitivity and was the critical element of our access. If part of air access were dependent on the agreement of the GDR and this dependence grew in amount, the GDR would say that we accept access with agreement of the Zone; the occupation was therefore over, and there was no need for Allied access.
Brandt professed to see the point, but doubted if this danger could arise from the Austrian service.
The Secretary said one service could grow to many, e.g. with Switzerland and Scandinavia.
Brandt said that SAS overflew the GDR from Prague, reportedly without any government agreement. This involved NATO Allies. The Austrians thought they could also work out something without government agreement.
The Secretary feared this might be a nibbling away at recognition of the GDR.
Assistant Secretary Tyler noted that our air access was virginal, pure and undiluted. The GDR had nothing to do with it. If the AUA overflew the GDR, the GDR air control system would govern the flights, and this would engender some measure of relations between BASC and the GDR. Corridor flights would no longer be autonomous.
Minister Hillenbrand explained that the Soviets were only notified of Allied flight plans; they did not otherwise participate in traffic control. AUA or other non-corridor flights to West Berlin would in effect be guided into Tempelhof by the Schoenefeld control tower, and this would present infinite possibilities for disruption of our air traffic.
Schuetz asked if they did not now schedule flights which required adjustment of Western flight plans.
Minister Hillenbrand replied negatively. They had tried to do something analogous in the February 1962 crisis.
The Secretary said that the Soviets had pushed hard to connect sovereignty of the GDR to access. We have resisted and told them to make their own arrangements, since we will not submit our access to the GDR. This would open us up to suffocation by Ulbricht. We are concerned about GDR consent for entry into West Berlin. This moves down a trail leading towards great problems, unless the East Germans have goodwill or the West Germans have an effective means to regulate such matters with them. We don't want to rely upon the East Germans and we don't want to lose the speciality of our air access. The case of the Swedish train is different.
Brandt said that everyone knew that he wanted no weakening of the status of Western access. The question is whether additions would weaken it.
The Secretary said that following this line of argument, he could imagine a situation in which several airlines flew to Tempelhof or Schoenefeld. If the subject were later to come to the U.N., the Soviets could make an argument that there already existed full and sufficient non-Allied access to Berlin, and that they wanted only to block U.S. military access. We could hardly get a majority on such an issue if we had participated in building up the alternatives.
Brandt argued that Sweden, Switzerland and Austria do not offer major routes. Schuetz added that Tempelhof could regulate which aircraft could land that the other side could not.
The Secretary asked whether technical arrangements could not be made to transfer the tower control from Schoenefeld to Tempelhof 50 miles out of Berlin.
Minister Hillenbrand observed that this was possible, but it was difficult to see how it could happen, since the aim of GDR policy in this area was to attack the validity of the Tempelhof ATC.
The Secretary asked if it were true that Brandt wanted to multiply means of access. Brandt said this was the case. The fare to Vienna would cost DM 80 less and take a shorter time, and we should examine the possibilities from a practical viewpoint. The Austrian Consul General had asked him whether he could discuss the matter with AUA, and Brandt had inquired whether there was any chance of the GDR agreeing to AUA overflights to West Berlin. The Austrian Consul General said he has asked the same question of Vienna, and on June 22 had received the answer that there were "substantial chances," given the support of the Soviets. Brandt personally had the feeling that the Austrians think that they don't stand a chance. However, even if the project does not lead to results, all of us should discuss the general problem since it might come up again. If there were an eventual possibility to get an interim agreement with the Soviets which would include new elements, would it not perhaps be necessary to add additional elements of access?
The Secretary said that this was a long-term problem. We welcomed possibilities of West and East Berlin working out reciprocal advantages by punching holes in the Wall, and we welcomed FRG trade and contacts. These aspects did not present any problems. What bothers us is to bring access into a position where it is subject to the agreement of the East Germans. He said frankly that we could make a deal with the Soviets tomorrow if we were willing to concede this point.
Brandt said that he agreed.
The Secretary continued that there are changes under way in the Bloc and rumors of differing attitudes. It was too early to see where these would lead. As late as last October, the U.S. was exposed to the most colossal deceit on the part of Khrushchev personally. We had no illusions that they would cut our throats if they could. We feel that the security of West Berlin fundamentally depends on the U.S. presence in West Berlin which is based on the right of victory, not on agreement. We won't be pushed out or negotiated out. This is utterly fundamental. Some day the situation may change and other considerations might govern, but our primordial principle is that we are there by right and not by the consent of anybody. Of course we might consider leaving if we heard the West Berliners shouting "Yanks go home."
The Secretary summarized by saying that we will be in consultation with the Federal Government and with West Berlin on the gate problem, since this is a matter in which they have an interest. We want to talk with the French and the British and will gladly say that Brandt's views and those of the Federal Republic should fully be taken into account. The Secretary personally thought it was a good idea to punch holes.
Air services other than through the corridors was another question. The Secretary characterized this as a more difficult problem and much more serious. We would talk about it with Brandt later. Perhaps the problem arose because the Austrian Commerce Ministry acted without consultation of the Foreign Office. The international ramifications were very considerable and he was not sure that the Austrians appreciated them.
Brandt promised to prepare a memorandum on what the Austrians had told him, which he hoped to finish the next day./2/
/2/Following this conversation Brandt and Rusk briefly discussed the subject of U.S. firms in Berlin. The Mayor reported that special efforts, including assistance by General Clay, had resulted in bringing in 10 U.S. firms, and stated that he also wanted to get them the same tax benefits that German firms had. (US/MC/35; ibid., POL 7 US/Kennedy)
198. Editorial Note
On June 26 President Kennedy flew from Wiesbaden Air Force Base to Berlin, arriving at Tegel Airport at 9:45 a.m. After arrival remarks at Tegel the President traveled by motorcade to the Congress Hall where he addressed the German National Congress of the Industrial Trade Union of Construction Workers. The Presidential party then stopped at the wall and at Checkpoint Charlie, before arriving at City Hall to sign the Golden Book and address an enormous crowd that had gathered in the Rudolph Wilde Platz. After lunch he made an address at the Free University of Berlin and then, at 5:15 p.m., left Berlin for Ireland. For texts of the remarks and addresses cited above, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pages 522-530. For Brandt's account of the visit, see Begegnungen und Einsichten, pages 72-74.
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