Documents 199-218
JUNE-OCTOBER 1963: DISCUSSIONS AT MOSCOW, NEW YORK, AND WASHINGTON
199. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, June 27, 1963, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Kennedy. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, Dublin, Moscow, London, Paris, and USAREUR. Passed to the White House on June 28.
1350. Dublin for Presidential party. USAREUR for POLAD. Presidential visit Berlin was major political event in history this city, and one whose full implication unlikely be apparent for some time.
Conveying accurate first-blush reaction is problem in proper choice of superlatives. The tumultuous reception accorded President was clearly unprecedented and at times overwhelming. The record crowd of approximately 1.5 million lining entire 35-mile route and massed before City Hall had been anticipated. In the event, however, the emotional quality of that great crowd, its enthusiastic friendliness and openhearted spirit was an unpredictably moving experience. To us it seemed that the Berliner wished to express at one time his high regard for, and trust in the President, his open gratitude for US support past and present, his commitment to the West in the face of Communist pressures and his proud confidence in himself and the future. By so doing in company of bulk of his fellow citizens, the Berliner may well have deepened that trust, gratitude, commitment and confidence. As one editorial commented: Any remaining reserve in German-American relations is dissipated and whatever threats Khrushchev may bring can now be met with confidence.
Berliners clearly were enraptured by the President--perhaps as much by the human warmth, personal involvement and evident modesty frequently cited in today's press, as by his generous words of praise and encouragement to them. Not overlooked, however, even in the first reaction were the President's sober messages concerning the indivisibility of freedom and the heavy demands which it places upon us all. We expect those messages will be taken up by a broad range of leadership groups here after the emotional after-glow of the visit subsides. This process began even today with a thoughtful editorial in the independent newspaper Tagesspiegel interpreting the President's university speech as a warning to make full use of present opportunities to advance long-term goals (Berlintel 1349)./2/
/2/Dated June 27. (Ibid.)
We would not be surprised if further discussion here were to turn on the need for and shape of German/Berlin initiatives in the German problem, the possibilities and limits of relations with the Communist world, and the further development of Berlin ties to the West, i.e., to the Federal Republic, Europe and the Atlantic partnership. In all this we believe that the President's forceful reiteration of the very real US self-interest in Berlin will be a useful counter to the insidious Communist argument that the Soviet interest in Berlin is more lasting than the American.
June 26 was also great day for Chancellor Adenauer and General Clay who were warmly received by the crowds, and especially for Mayor Brandt. Latter gave stirring demonstration of his rapport with and confident control of Berlin populace by stilling huge, enthusiastic crowd before City Hall into respectful, moving silence while President signed Golden Book to accompaniment of tolling freedom bell. The reflected glory of being host on such a day seems likely to strengthen further Brandt's political appeal in Berlin and perhaps in West Germany as well. It may also serve to exacerbate certain frustrations of the Berlin leadership at the necessity of continuing to work within an occupation structure which can be cumbersome and which they, including Brandt, occasionally feel does not fully comprehend the Berlin psychology.
It should not be overlooked that June 26 was a day of some importance for the French and British in Berlin owing to the President's public praise of their contribution to the Allied effort here and owing to the prominent role accorded by US to the UK and France in the Presidential program. We believe this has given a useful boost to local US relations with the British and particularly with the French. We also expect beneficial local gains in our relations with the trade unions, universities and other important groups particularly affected.
In short, June 26 was a great day for the US in Berlin and one which fully realized the several objectives set forth two months ago in our tel 1122,/3/ i.e., (a) to demonstrate anew and unmistakably breadth and depth of US-Berlin solidarity; (b) to underline tripartite unity of Western responsibility here; (c) to reassure thoughtful Berlin leaders who still may be apprehensive over long-run prospects for city, and (d) to give President representative impression of Berlin setting and spirit.
/3/Dated May 1. (Ibid.)
Calhoun
200. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, July 3, 1963, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 Berlin. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bonn.
12. During talk with Gov Mayor Brandt July 2 latter gave me general rundown on his talk with President Kennedy on June 25 in Bonn./2/ Brandt said they took up four general subjects.
/2/No other record of this conversation, which took place at 8:15 a.m., has been found.
1) A personal exchange of views on German political situation and leaders with particular reference to period between now and 1965 elections.
2) A discussion of general European policy, including reference to forthcoming international meetings in Stockholm and Berlin, where Brandt will have opportunity talk with Harold Wilson and Monnet, among others. Brandt believed that summer meeting in Stockholm and autumn meeting in Berlin would afford opportunities to examine where Europe is going and how to broaden participation in European community.
3) Brandt said President had asked for his views on MLF, and had told President frankly that from political viewpoint he was not enthusiastic, although recognizing that there may be important military reasons for moving ahead in this field.
4) Regarding Berlin, President asked Brandt for his ideas regarding speeches and statements to be made there, and this had led to general exchange on current situation. According to Brandt they discussed specifically latter's ideas on alleviation of human misfortune caused by the wall through limited contacts and visits between two parts of Berlin, initially of families most affected by division. Brandt apparently described his current efforts through Red Cross to bring about quiet and informal discussion of these possibilities by both sides.
Brandt commented at end that he was both surprised and pleased at depth and detail of President's information about Berlin.
Calhoun
201. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, July 27, 1963, noon.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman. Secret; Eyes Only. Passed to the White House.
365. From Harriman./2/ Harriman, accompanied by Kohler, Kaysen and Akalovsky, met with Khrushchev in latter's Kremlin office from 3 to 5:45 p.m., July 26. Khrushchev accompanied by Gromyko and Dobrynin.
/2/Harriman was in Moscow July 14-25 for discussions leading to the initialing of a nuclear test ban agreement.
[Here follows extensive discussion of the test ban agreement, trade, China, and nuclear weapons.]
Khrushchev said perhaps we should move from particular to general. Of course, it would be better if we solved general problem because in such case particulars would fall in place. However, great efforts would be required to resolve general problem and apparently we unable to do it now. Yet, particular or individual measures would also mean progress toward disarmament and they were easier to achieve. Noted we were celebrating today agreement on what was also a partial disarmament measure. At this point Gromyko whispered in Khrushchev's ear.
Khrushchev continued Sovs believed conditions were now right for conclusion NAP between NATO and Warsaw. Everybody supported this except one man who was against, i.e., Adenauer. De Gaulle, without coming out against NAP on his own, supported Adenauer but he did it only to have Adenauer on his side in his fight against US. All other NATO members were in favor of idea. He had spoken with Spaak and Wilson/3/ and they favored such step. He knew Macmillan would also agree. This matter was ripest for solution. Thus if only US mustered courage to get Adenauer to agree, this step could be made. For if Adenauer agreed de Gaulle would be disarmed.
/3/Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister, and Harold Wilson, British Labour Party leader.
Khrushchev then said people in West Germany were now seeking new ways, e.g., Brandt too judging by his recent statements seemed to be concerned about present situation and wanted find new ways. US should prompt West Germans to find new ways, but it now appeared that US as victorious power was afraid of the vanquished. Thus, NAP was ripe for solution, and Sovs were pleased they had found understanding re this question on US and UK part. As to further steps, he had listed them in his recent speech./4/ Indeed, in interview he had given to Pravda and Izvestia today, he had also referred to those steps. One of such steps could be establishment of control posts on communications routes to prevent surprise attack; such measure would not harm prestige of any country. Also a peace treaty with Germany was necessary because so long as there was no peace treaty there could be no question of disarmament. For before healing wound one must remove pus. This was standard surgical procedure, and Sovs saw no difficulty in doing it. Some people spoke of general elections in Germany, but such elections were quite inconceivable; indeed, they were impossible. Khrushchev said he fully understood US desire see united capitalist Germany and Sovs were not offended at all that US entertained such desires. For that part, Sovs also wanted have united socialist Germany. However, US desires were unrealistic because things did not depend only on US desires. Sov desires were also unrealistic because things did not depend only on Sov desires. Meanwhile, West Germany, East Germany and West Berlin existed and this situation should be legalized. Khrushchev suggested it could be written into document that all parties would assist Germans in agreeing on creation of single unified state. Once pus was removed we could sit down and discuss solution of disarmament. There was nothing insuperable. Said he deeply convinced that everything that was being done now was done to satisfy Adenauer's caprice.
/4/For text of this July 19 speech (ENDC/113, August 23, 1963), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 542-543, or Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 247-249.
Khrushchev went on that while he did not wish to be visionary he did not rule out possibility of US policy prompting Germans seeking a Rapallo-type arrangement with USSR. Rapallo policy had been in both German and Sov interests, and such policy in interest all classes in West Germany even today. This idea was now growing in minds of West Germans and would progress even further. For West Germans had joined NATO in hope they would thereby satisfy their national aspirations. They had hoped that leaning on US, which at that time had had monopoly of nuclear power, they would achieve situation where USSR would be forced agree liquidation GDR and establishment united capitalist Germany. However, those hopes had not been destined to come true and there was no chance they would materialize. De Gaulle had said he recognized borders established after last war. US had said similar things in private, and thus only difference was that de Gaulle had stated this publicly while US said this tete-a-tete.
Harriman turned to Kohler who pointed out US had not expressed formal recognition of borders but had merely said force would not be used to change them.
Khrushchev suggested Harriman should not beat around bush: Harriman understood what he meant and he understood what Harriman meant. Macmillan had taken similar stand, and other NATO members, such as Norway, Holland and Belgium believed this was most reasonable position. True he was not sure about Luxembourg, and this caused him great concern. Even Adenauer recognized this, for he said he had no intention of changing existing borders by means of war. Thus, Adenauer had suffered defeat in all of his aspirations, and was now leaving arena. New man would come, although he, Khrushchev, did not know who it would be, but if even he should fail understand this point he would have to go. Other man would replace him and eventually there would be another Wirt (signer of Rapallo) in power and East Germans would sign another Rapallo. Reiterated Rapallo had been in interest of all Germans. For under Rapallo Germans had obtained unlimited orders from USSR and had received raw materials from Sovs, both industrial and agricultural; Sovs had been unlimited consumers of German industrial commodities. Such situation in interest of both Germans and Sovs and would be contributing factor to world peace. Repeated should support forces seeking new avenues, and that would be most noble course US could take. Otherwise Germans would eventually turn against US.
Harriman said he not losing any sleep over this. Brandt had said West Berlin should increase exchange of goods with East. This healthy idea and West Germany should do same. However, so long as Sovs sat on East Germany they could not expect friendship from West Germany.
Khrushchev interjected this was where main US delusion lay.
Harriman commented Khrushchev was very heavy.
Khrushchev said he weighed a lot but did not asphyxiate Germans. In fact, he was in state of weightlessness with respect to Germans and their interests.
Harriman said like in outer space.
Harriman continued German question had been discussed by Rusk with Gromyko and Dobrynin and hoped they would be able continue discussion this matter as it related to non-aggression in West Berlin. Recalled he had told Gromyko we believed there was relationship between access to W. Berlin and non-aggression arrangement. Sovs should take this into account.
Khrushchev interjected this would not work. West Berlin problem related only to peace treaty. He could say here and now that on basis relationship between access and NAP there could be no results.
Harriman continued this matter would be first discussed in Paris. Rusk could discuss it with Sovs. Secretary planned stay after formalities of signing TB treaty were over and have talks which had been planned before. While he did not wish commit Secretary, he believed Secretary might have some response from our allies re consultations we had agreed upon yesterday, although consultations would not be completed. [Here follows discussion of the production of fissionable materials.]
Khrushchev then said wished return question of Germany. Said he somewhat surprised by what Harriman had said, and although Harriman had repeated his remarks he, Khrushchev, did not believe Harriman really thought so. Specifically he had in mind Harriman's remark re Sovs sitting on GDR. This remark meant Harriman not properly informed re situation in GDR. In fact, per capita consumption of meat in GDR was somewhat greater than that in FRG, something like 63 kg. versus 60 kg. Same went for consumption of butter. Indeed, during his visit to GDR he had been pleasantly surprised by situation there. Situation in GDR had changed greatly after border and control thereof had been established. People there were very happy with their govt, except of course for some category of population; but then even in US there were some people who were displeased with US Govt.
Khrushchev continued more and more people in West Germany beginning realize present situation in Germany was to US advantage but not to German advantage, e.g., at Kohler's recommendation US had applied pressure on Germans and had deprived them of orders for pipe. Germans would never forgive US for this. Adenauer had held meeting with businessmen on this subject and had promised them further development of trade with socialist countries. If US continued to prevent Germans from signing peace treaty, he quite sure there would be another Rapallo. Did not know how many years this would take, perhaps 5 or 10, but this was only way out for Germans. Reason for this was the Germans becoming convinced US, France, and other Allies could do nothing to GDR and unable establish united capitalist Germany.
Harriman said Khrushchev mistaken as US had never stopped Germans from entering in peace treaty. As Kohler [Khrushchev] knew very well, West Germans themselves had always been unwilling to do so. We had never stopped them. Not only Adenauer but also broad masses in West Germany held this view.
Khrushchev interjected this had been true until now, but turning point was approaching.
Harriman continued West Germany would never turn to Sovs so long as they prevented unification. Once Germany was unified, he believed Germans would be much more cooperative. In any event, there was no point arguing who right in this matter. Point was to come to some constructive understanding. Expressed hope Rusk could pursue this discussion when here. Commented US had never prevented increased interchange between Germans and expressed hope what Khrushchev said meant he was ready to tear down Berlin wall.
Khrushchev said could assure Harriman wall would not be removed even when peace treaty signed. Wall would be torn down only when unified socialist Germany established.
Harriman remarked this long time off.
Khrushchev said did not know and was not saying when this would happen, but what he was saying was present situation would remain until then. Sovs felt fine, even very fine, with wall; they felt cozier and more tranquil. Therefore, Sovs in no hurry. Wall played very important role and he furious with himself not to have thought of it earlier.
Harriman recalled Khrushchev had said to him Lippmann was right re wall.
Khrushchev replied Lippmann was right, but it had not been Lipp-mann who had recommended establishment of wall to Sovs. In reply to Harriman's question he said from time to time Sovs would step on President's foot so he could realize he should cut out his corns.
Harriman had observed previously that Khrushchev had used this simile in conversation with Spaak. Said did not know that President had corns, but assuming he had how did Khrushchev propose to tread on them.
Khrushchev said that was a secret.
Harriman commented that might be Khrushchev's secret weapon.
Khrushchev continued that, for instance, he had seen press reports about plans establish civil air communications with West Berlin. Said such communications would not be allowed; if necessary planes would be forced down and extreme measures would be resorted to. Asserted establishment such communications contrary to Potsdam Agreement which allowed only US, UK, and French military transport planes in corridors. Thus, here was one corn, and Sovs would find corns without difficulty.
Khrushchev continued he could cite another corn. Western powers now enjoy low tariff privileges for cargo transport in Germany, privileges which had been acquired by right of victorious power. However, this could not be tolerated any longer, because 18 years had passed since end of war. This arrangement entails financial loss by GDR and would be ended.
A third corn, Khrushchev went on, lay in following situation. Western powers now using GDR cables for their telephone and telegraph communications and pay nothing or next to nothing for such use. Thus, Sovs would find corns, these as well as some more. Said he sure world public opinion would regard these claims by GDR as fully justified. US should take them into account, as GDR might soon advance them. Sovs believed all these measures economically justified. Western powers had been using GDR territory on grounds they had won war; 18 years had passed since end of war--did they want enjoy these privileges for hundred years? Moreover, he wished point out that West Germany had been supposed pay reparations to USSR, but had not paid with US support.
In short, Khrushchev said, best thing to do was to wash our hands and put final end to WW II by signing peace treaty, so that questions could be resolved on peaceful basis by agreement between Govts FRG, GDR and West Berlin. Observed as soon as discussion turned to this problem relations between us too cooled off, and this was additional proof this boil must be done away with. Wondered why the hell US or USSR needed it; Sovs certainly did not.
Harriman remarked Rusk would talk with Gromyko about this question, and did not believe useful for him take Khrushchev's time to pursue it further.
Khrushchev smiled and commented Harriman apparently wanted leave unpleasant questions to Rusk.
Harriman said he was interested in what he had said, and had been glad to listen. Said he understood Khrushchev had said to Spaak he would take off his hat and bow apologizing after he stepped on corns.
Khrushchev laughed and said yes, that was way it was done sometimes. One stepped on someone's foot accidently, apologized, but then ground his heel a bit.
Harriman commented as long as Khrushchev said it with a smile, he was not taking it seriously. Said he was not trying throw all unpleasant questions on Rusk, but noted he had been exiled to Far East for two years. It was Secretary who had been dealing with this problem. [Here follows discussion of Laos and Cuba.]
Kohler
202. Memorandum of Meeting/1/
Washington, August 2, 1963, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President. Secret. Drafted by Kaysen.
The President met with Secretary Rusk in the Cabinet Room to discuss the Secretary's trip to Moscow. Also present were: Messrs. Ball, Harriman, Foster, Thompson, Bundy, Kaysen, Davis, Read. The meeting lasted for approximately 45 minutes.
The Secretary went through the points listed in Mr. Thompson's memorandum of August 1 on the agenda for the Secretary's visit to Moscow./2/ The following points received particular emphasis in the discussions:
/2/Not printed. (Ibid.)
[Here follows discussion of bombs in orbit, Laos, a possible Khrushchev visit to the United Nations, trade, bilateral U.S.-Soviet issues, and Cuba.]
7. The discussion then moved on to non-aggression arrangements (2). The President made a number of points. First, while there appeared to be little in such arrangements for us, we should keep an affirmative position and try to maintain the mood which Harriman's visit created. On the other hand, it was clear that we had to get finished with the test ban treaty before we could do anything further on this subject. It was important to find out what the Soviets saw in this proposition, and whether such arrangements could give us additional security in Berlin.
8. He asked for Mr. Thompson's comments, and Mr. Thompson pointed out the disadvantages of any non-aggression arrangement in its impact on the Allies and in particular the Germans. The President noted that Mr. Harriman had a different view and asked him to state it. Mr. Harriman pointed out the consequences of a detente in permitting a further loosening of ties between the satellites and the Soviet Union. This would apply to East Germany as well, and make more possible an improvement in the East German situation along the lines that Brandt had asked for. He spoke of Khrushchev's concern over a possible repetition of the 1953 uprising in East Germany, and urged that we had the same concern. Secretary Rusk commented on the Italian reaction to the proposals for a non-aggression pact in terms of this as a further step in legitimatizing the Italian Communist Party.
9. The President observed that while Berlin was not now in trouble and in his judgment, did not seem likely to be in the near future, the connection between an improvement in the Berlin situation and a non-aggression pact was one that was useful for us to maintain in terms of our relations with the Germans. The President said that while it was important to deal with the West German problem, he thought that Kohler's views were too negative, and we should have a more positive attitude. Mr. Thompson pointed out again the difficulties which a non-aggression pact would create in the Alliance and its effect in discouraging hope in East Germany, and suggested that if we ran up against a dead end in our negotiations with the Allies, we might try unilateral NATO declarations. On the other hand, he agreed that if we could make a gain in Berlin, it would be useful, and warned that it is likely that the Soviets will soon incorporate East Berlin into East Germany if they do not get a non-aggression pact. The Secretary doubted whether a mere declaration by NATO would answer Khrushchev's needs.
10. Discussion then turned to the problems of getting the Federal Republic to sign the test ban treaty. The President said he thought it is very important to get them to sign, both from a domestic point of view and from the point of view of the Soviets. There were some discussions of the way that the questions raised by the Germans in the last few days could be answered. The Secretary said that these questions reflected as much on Von Brentano's political attitude toward Schroeder as they did the concerns of the German Government in general. The Secretary pointed out that while Von Brentano was Foreign Minister, Germany had adhered to several conventions to which East Germany had also adhered. Further, Secretary of State Dulles had taken note of East Germany's adherence to the Prisoner-of-War Convention and stated that on this matter, the U.S. was in treaty relations with East Germany.
It was agreed that the Secretary should not say anything on East German adherence at the time the treaty was signed, in view of what the President had already said at his press conference. We could make it plain to the Soviets that we would treat East Germany as they proposed to treat Taiwan. It was left unclear as to whether this point should be communicated to the Federal Republic now, or wait til later.
CK
203. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, August 5, 1963, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Priority. Received at 6:15 p.m. and relayed to the White House. Repeated to Berlin.
475. Eyes only Acting Secretary and Ambassador. Secretary McNamara accompanied by Hillenbrand saw Chancellor this morning for one hour 40 minutes./2/ Although Chancellor wandered considerably over current political scene and back through history, main points which emerged were:
/2/McNamara was in Europe visiting U.S. military installations.
1. Still has very great difficulties with effect of Test Ban Treaty on status of Ger, but emphasis, at least in his own mind appears to have shifted from Articles II and III of treaty to Article IV with its reference to exercise of "national sovereignty."
2. While admitting apparent present success for U.S. policy in signing of partial test ban, he feels it will prove to be essentially a Soviet success in long run and that ceremonial signing today in Moscow constitutes a political victory for Khrushchev which will greatly enhance his prestige. On German adherence, although he was not entirely clear, he apparently anticipates doing nothing definitive until after Bundestag reconvenes October 9.
4. He believes American policy suffers from credulousness about Soviet intentions as well as from being erratic. In this connection, he was critical both of State Department and his own Foreign Office.
5. With reference to Sino-Soviet dispute, he believes present U.S. tactic of attempting to exploit it is mistake and that best policy for West would be simply let Russians and Chinese fight it out among themselves.
6. According to Chancellor, who cited this as example of Soviet duplicity, Khrushchev had a few weeks ago indicated to Germans that he would be willing to pay visit to Bonn and to negotiate seriously with Federal Republic. (Chancellor requested that this information be considered as highly confidential.)
Chancellor began his opening remarks, which lasted 57 minutes, by saying that he wanted to be considered as belonging to those Allies who always state the truth and speak frankly. These were the best Allies. In his recent press conference, President Kennedy had shown that he was not correctly informed, the Chancellor stated./3/ The President had indicated that the language of the Test Ban Treaty had been on the table for a full year and that now all of a sudden people seemed to be excited about it. The Chancellor noted that in the Geneva text there was only one depository. Now, however, there were three depositories, because one hoped in this way to avoid the GDR recognition problem. What worried the German Government was Article IV of the treaty, which stipulated that it was of unlimited duration but that each party, in exercising its "national sovereignty", would have the right to withdraw from the treaty under certain circumstances. This reference to "national sovereignty" would, upon GDR adherence to the treaty, clearly constitute an express recognition of the "national sovereignty" of the GDR. It would create an unfortunate precedent which could not be repudiated in any subsequent treaties which might now come from the Moscow talks. Under longstanding agreements, the U.S. recognized the Federal Republic as the only government entitled to speak for the German people as a whole, but now the GDR would be recognized as a sovereign area.
/3/For a transcript of the President's August 1 news conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 612-619.
He could only say, the Chancellor continued, that the U.S. had sold this great concession too cheaply, much too cheaply. With the signing of the treaty in Moscow the U.S. "very probably" had a certain success. Some 30 countries had already indicated their readiness to adhere. But such an initial success was not necessarily a final success.
At this point Chancellor went off on a lengthy excursion combining references to Bismarck's fear of the Russians on the Elbe, the parlous state of political situation in Italy and in France (if de Gaulle were to be assassinated or to die) and his great distrust of the political sense of the late Pope John XXIII who did not appreciate the nature of the Communist danger. His conclusion was that, if confidence were lost in the wisdom and foresight of U.S. policy, Western Europe would be lost.
He was convinced, the Chancellor said, that these various considerations had not been brought to the President's attention before the signing of the Moscow treaty today. He did not believe that Mr. Harriman or Lord Hailsham/4/ (he described the latter as always living far removed from the Holy Spirit) understood the significance of what was happening. The Chancellor expressed his concern that the State Department was not what it had been under John Foster Dulles, that policy now seemed to be more erratic and not as well considered. Since contacts were still close between the German and American Governments, he had a personal feeling that this was the case. He did not wish to mix in purely U.S. interests, but he felt this was a matter of common interest. For example, he did not know why the U.S. seemed to attach so much importance to appearing to the Chinese as a good friend of Khrushchev. He thought this was a mistake; Khrushchev could come to an agreement with the Chinese tomorrow. Basically the Soviets and Chinese were offshoots of the same tree.
/4/Lord President of the Council and Minister of Science for the United Kingdom.
As far as FedRep adherence to the Test Ban Treaty was concerned, the Chancellor continued, this must be approved by the Bundestag which was now in summer recess. Its vacation ends on October 9. To call the Bundestag into special session now would be inopportune. It would merely cause excitement, and he could not be sure what its attitude would be on the treaty. He knew that CDU floor leader von Brentano had the same views as he (the Chancellor). However, this was not the view of Foreign Minister Schroeder, who in his general judgment was somewhat softer.
The Chancellor noted that Schroeder, in a letter of August 1,/5/ had proposed that, to ease the German accession problem, Secretary of State Rusk should make a statement in Moscow. Under Secretary Ball had indicated to the German Charge in Washington/6/ that this would not be possible but that such a statement might be made on August 12 before the U.S. Senate. Here the Chancellor speculated about whether or not the U.S. Senate would ratify the Test Ban Treaty, and concluded that he didn't know. In any event, the German Federal Republic would not want to do anything that would make the position more difficult. However the German press (here the Chancellor noted a number of papers by name including the Springer papers) was strongly against German adherence to the Test Ban Treaty. The Federal Government was being very reserved on the subject, but could not keep the press quiet.
/5/A copy of this letter is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.
/6/A memorandum of this conversation on August 3 is ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
Apart from the British, no European countries had been consulted in advance, the Chancellor pointed out. Some would say that to end explosions in the atmosphere or in outer space was a blessing, but such explosions would continue underground which was closer physically to people on earth than explosions behind the moon.
The Chancellor said he feared for the fact that the talks in Moscow would continue for a week. The Chancellor recounted that on August 13, 1961, when the wall was built in Berlin, Brandt went immediately to the U.S. Commandant and asked that something be done to stop it. He had to wait 60 hours for an answer, and then the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow had said to the German Ambassador "thank God for the wall, it will help to solve the refugee problem." The Chancellor said he had refrained from saying any of these things publicly to date because of the obvious bad effect it would have. When he was in Washington late in 1961, he had repeated the remarks attributed to the American Ambassador in Moscow to Ambassador Grewe. The latter said he was not surprised since he had heard the same views in the State Department. He did not believe that the U.S. properly understood the danger of Communism. He then, somewhat irrelevantly, cited a conversation which he had had last year with Eleanor Dulles, sister of the late Secretary of State, who, in response to a query of his as to whether the State Department had any greater influence over policy than before, had replied "no more than last year."
Here again the Chancellor went off on a historical excursion covering the Mongol invasions of Europe and the 300 years of Turkish occupation of Hungary and Greece, as a prelude to making the point that, if the hordes from the East had overrun Europe before, they could do it again. The U.S. simply did not understand the nature of the danger in Europe. Our major preoccupation was Latin America, but the danger of Communism existed in the entire world. He was concerned about the fate of the free world, which included the U.S., in an era of interrelated interests.
After expressing the great personal prestige which the Chancellor enjoyed in the U.S. because of his role in creating the Federal Republic, Secretary McNamara referred to the President's statement during his recent visit here that the German border was our border and German freedom was our freedom. We were willing to risk our cities to protect German cities. This was the essence of our foreign policy and it was shared by all of the ranking officials of the U.S. Government, including those in the State Department. Moreover, the President, more than any other leader in recent years, has recognized that we must conduct our foreign policy on the basis of growing military strength. We had increased our military budget annually by $9 billion, and with all our budgetary deficit and balance-of-payments problems, had expanded our defense expenditures more than $30 billion since the present administration had come into office. This had greatly increased our military strength. It had made it possible for us to respond as we had in Cuba, and meant that we were in a better position to defend Europe. As a result of this, Secretary McNamara continued, we believe the Soviets were forced to act as they had both with respect to their relations with the West and Red China. We were putting them under ever greater pressure, both economically and politically. Our growing military strength was thus inevitably strengthening the foreign policy of the U.S. and the West.
The Chancellor commented that we were doing all we could to achieve this result, but he feared we were too credulous about Soviet intentions. Secretary McNamara referred to the alleged remark by Khrushchev during his U.S. visit that his grandchildren would bury us. His views remain now what they were then. We had no illusions about this; only the military power of West could prevent Soviet achievement of its objectives. He did not believe there was any difference in German or U.S. ultimate objectives. We thought we could bring pressure to bear on the Soviets which would deepen the rift with the Red Chinese and force their policy in a direction more favorable to our objectives. It was in the Western interest to use this means of leverage.
Here the Chancellor said he wanted to tell Secretary McNamara something on a strictly confidential basis. A few weeks ago Mr. Khrushchev had informed him that he was ready to come to Bonn and negotiate with the Federal Republic. This proved he would negotiate with anyone. He feared that, through the Moscow agreement,/7/ we were causing differences among the Allies and not helping to strengthen their confidence in the U.S. This was regrettable. Some of the satellites which had recently been showing signs of moving away from Moscow would not be impressed by apparent American favoring of Khrushchev. The ceremonies in Moscow today were bound to strengthen the Soviets. Why could we not have insisted that Mr. Gromyko come to Washington for the signing, the Chancellor asked. Instead Moscow was made the center of foreign policy. This was bound to have a lasting and beneficial effect on the Soviets and cost them nothing. They could claim that the beginning of a new era took place in Moscow. He considered the U.S. judgment in this matter as lacking in true appreciation of the situation as that of Pope John XXIII when he received Khrushchev.
/7/The nuclear test ban agreement.
Secretary McNamara said the Chancellor would surely recognize that the tensions in the Communist movement worldwide were greater than at any time in past five or ten years. The struggle for control between Red China and the Soviet Union was being heightened by the test ban negotiations and signing of the treaty in Moscow. The Chancellor argued that, on the contrary, he felt the U.S. was helping Khrushchev and that this would lessen tensions between the Red Chinese and the Soviet Union. He asked again why the signing ceremony had not taken place in Washington. Secretary McNamara observed that we were forcing the Communists all over the world to take sides between the Red Chinese and the Soviet Union and that, in practice we now had two Communist Parties in many countries instead of one. The Chancellor said Mr. McNamara would surely agree that the Western powers had no interest in giving material support to Khrushchev. The Red Chinese danger was for the future, the Soviet danger was in the present. Yet the U.S. was now strengthening Khrushchev's position. Anything like the Moscow treaty would have been impossible six years ago.
Secretary McNamara cited the record over the past 24 months of the increasing nuclear warhead strength of our strategic alert forces, the increase contemplated in this category for the next 24 months, and the increase in the past 24 months of warhead strength in Europe. Without waiting for a translation, the Chancellor again asked why we helped enhance the status of Khrushchev and strengthen the self-confidence of those who were beginning to doubt in his entourage.
After a further exchange as to whether our policy was strengthening the Communists or tending to divide them by forcing them to choose, Secretary McNamara said that, at any rate, the Chancellor would recognize the need for agreement on a continued increase of Western military strength. He was sure the Federal Republic would continue to move in this direction and encourage other Allies to do likewise. The Chancellor said his purpose today was to infect the Defense Secretary with mistrust of the Soviets. Secretary McNamara commented that we must never mistrust the purpose and policy of our Allies.
The Chancellor at this point invited Secretary McNamara briefly to give his impressions of his recent trip to Germany, so that there would be something which could be told to the press. He did not want to reveal that the test ban and related matters had been the principal subject of conversation. After further discussion, Federal press chief Von Hase was called in and the general line agreed that Secretary McNamara had informed the Chancellor of the impressions which he had gained during his visit to the Federal Republic and of the results of his talks with Defense Minister von Hassel. The U.S. Secretary of Defense had expressed his satisfaction with the results of these talks and the agreements reached, which were designed to strengthen the U.S. and German forces. He and the Defense Minister had agreed on the continuing need to maintain and to increase the defensive strength of the Western Alliance.
Department please repeat to Moscow as appropriate.
McGhee
204. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, August 5, 1963, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Confidential; Priority. Passed to the White House. Rusk was in Moscow August 3-10 to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
Secto 14. Secretary accompanied by entire US official party had one hour meeting with Khrushchev in latter's Kremlin office at 11 am August 5. Following memcon is uncleared and subject to revision:
[Here follow 3 pages of discussion of the Test Ban Treaty.]
However, Khrushchev continued, Sovs believed basic problem was German problem. So long as German problem remained unresolved, two sides would be like hedgehogs sticking their needles into each other. German problem was such as made each side wish have it resolved in its own way. He could understand very well that if US could resolve German problem in its own way, i.e., by liquidating social system in GDR and establishing united capitalist Germany that would be great victory for President, Congress, and those who supported capitalism. Likewise, if FRG were made part of socialist camp that would be tremendous victory for Communism. But all this was sheer fantasy, for it could not be achieved without war. He wondered therefore whether time had not come when we, mature people who knew life and had seen war, should try move things from rails of war to rails of peace, namely, record situation as it existed now and forget about Adenauer and other people opposing such course. It was not only US who had such allies, for God had not forgotten USSR either and had given it allies who did not understand its policy. He believed however all such allies would eventually realize they had been wrong and unrealistic.
Secretary said US recognized German problem was fundamental and most important to future of our two countries and of our associates. He said he was prepared discuss this matter with representatives of Soviet Government during his stay here in order to see whether some understanding possible. We on our side recognize that in view past history what happened in Germany was of great importance to USSR. Likewise, again for historical reasons, we too were interested greatly in having peace in Central Europe. US recognized this very well as it had also been involved in two world wars. Secretary then observed two sides perhaps differed in their respective interpretations as to what was happening in that area now. For our part, we believed German people were prepared put past behind them and become part of peaceful community of nations. We also believed we must not make situation such as would deprive German people of opportunity pursue this course or create danger of war. He reiterated he prepared discuss these matters while here. Referring to Khrushchev's hedgehog simile, Secretary said he not sure who were those hedgehogs; however he had impression that during past few years relaxation had occurred in Central Europe. FRG's increased relations with countries to East in such fields as trade, commerce, and exchange of persons had, in his view, reduced tensions.
Khrushchev interjected Secretary had mentioned "countries to East" and apparently did not wish use term "socialist", but Sovs would teach us to use this term and, after all, time was best teacher.
Secretary continued he had been encouraged by this trend over past few years and believed possibility for peaceful settlement had now improved as compared to possibility existing two or three years ago.
Khrushchev agreed.
[Here follow comparisons of the social systems in the United States and the Soviet Union, at first between Rusk and Khrushchev and then between Senator Fulbright and Khrushchev.]
Rusk
205. Letter From President Kennedy to Chancellor Adenauer/1/
Washington, August 6, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 US/Kennedy. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. The letter was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 374, August 6 at 9:58 p.m., with the instruction that it be delivered as soon as possible. (Ibid., DEF 18-4)
DEAR MR. CHANCELLOR: Secretary McNamara has just come back and reported to me his long conversation with you./2/ He has suggested that it might be useful for me to send you a letter commenting on some of the things which you and he talked about, and I think his suggestion is a good one. As he reports the conversation, you talked about two major topics. The larger of them is the question of the basic policy of the West toward the Soviet Union, in which, as I understand it, your worry is that the U.S. may be too easily beguiled by the smiles and tricks of the Soviet Government.
/2/See Document 203. The President, Ball, and McNamara discussed McNamara's conversation with Adenauer at a meeting at the White House at 5:35 p.m. on August 5, and in a telegram to Moscow at 9 p.m. that day Kennedy advised Secretary Rusk that, in view of the Chancellor's anxiety and suspicion about the Test Ban Treaty, he should stop in Bonn on the way back to Washington. (Tosec 30; Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S)
I understand this concern, but I must tell you in all frankness that I do not think it is justified. It seems to me, in fact, as far from the mark as the kind of thing I sometimes hear from political groups in this country who say that it is wrong to trust the democratic commitment and the loyalty to the Alliance of the Federal Republic. The truth is, in my judgment, that one of the wisest things our two countries have done the last fifteen years is to trust each other, and I think the record of the United States Government as a whole, and of this Administration in particular, makes it pretty clear that we are not disposed to be taken in by Soviet duplicity.
I myself believe that it is much too soon to throw our hats in the air because of a single agreement on a single subject, the limited test ban--important as that subject is. I believe that we have reached even this small understanding as much through our strength and resolution as through the process of negotiation, and I recognize, as you do, that we are dealing still with a government which has repeatedly posed threats to the freedom of West Berlin and which, as late as October of last year, undertook a peculiarly dangerous and reckless act of duplicity in Cuba. So we are not under illusions about the Soviet Government, and you may be quite sure that Secretary McNamara, who has pressed so hard and so successfully for a strengthening of Western defense in the last three years, is not a man who is likely to be lulled into forgetfulness or neglect of his duty by a single limited agreement. It is Secretary McNamara, after all, who has been my chief lieutenant in a process of reinforcement which has added nine billion dollars a year to our defense budget, and has increased the number of our battle-ready divisions by forty per cent. It was with Secretary McNamara that I called up 150,000 Reserves at the height of the Berlin crisis in 1961. And he and I feel, just as you do, that this is not time to let down our guard.
It may be, as you say, that there is some danger of relaxation in Europe, and you can count on us to work energetically against any such tendency. That is one reason why Secretary McNamara has pressed so hard in Bonn to find ways and means of meeting the overseas cost of the great forces which we have placed in Germany for the common defense.
Our own commitment and alertness, of course, have to be world-wide. If the Chinese should break out into new acts of aggression, it is only the United States among Western countries that will have the necessary means and determination for reply. We are the only Western power fully engaged in a two-front struggle in the cold war, and I think there is little reason for any feeling that we are blind to its dangers and demands.
Let me repeat that I do understand and respect your honest concern here, for I recognize also that in a large and varied country like this one there will always be people who can bring you reports that this or that individual or group is spreading dangerous opinions. But such rumors deserve to be set against the reality of what our Governments have done together for fifteen years.
As to the particular question of the limited test ban treaty, I am glad to see both in Secretary McNamara's and in William Tyler's reports that you do regard it as a success, although you have some specific questions about its possible impact on the status of the regime in East Germany. I too think it a success, for reasons which I stated at length last week and with which I will not bother you again now./3/ I do not think it matters much where a treaty of this kind is signed or who claims the credit for it. The point about the treaty is that it makes sense for the world and that it does not jeopardize the essential security of either side. That is what makes it possible and useful.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 203.
The problem of the status of the East German regime is an important one, and I fully recognize your special concern with it. In our judgment, fully adequate precautions have been taken on this point. We do not think that either as a whole or in its separate parts does the treaty create any danger of increased recognition or international status for the East German regime. The use of the term "states," which goes back a year, and the reference to sovereign rights, which is a product of the more recent negotiations, are both of them standard phrases which do not confer any new standing upon any regime which adheres to the treaty, and this solid legal judgment is one which we are prepared to make clear as often as is necessary. Moreover, we believe that the new process of accession is distinctly advantageous to us from this point of view, in that the Federal Republic, which is recognized by all three depository governments, has an opportunity to deposit its accession without challenge from any of them, while the Pankow regime will obviously have to confine its accession to the USSR. Thus the process of adherence itself will make it clear which regime is recognized by all, and which is a puppet of one.
Having heard Secretary McNamara's report, I have asked Dean Rusk to follow up with a visit in Bonn over this weekend, particularly so that you may be able to talk with him about the wider problems of our dealings with the Soviet Union. You will find him both careful and determined. You may be sure that he commands my full confidence. He won his diplomatic spurs in the first hard months of the Korean war, and you may speak to him in full assurance that neither he nor the Government for which he speaks is less deserving of your trust than any with which you have dealt in the past./4/
/4/On August 17 Chancellor Adenauer thanked the President for this letter and for having Secretary Rusk stop in Bonn to brief him on his talks in Moscow. The Chancellor continued that this briefing and Rusk's testimony before the Senate on the Test Ban Treaty had allayed the serious reservations that the Federal Government had about the Moscow agreement. (Letter to the President, transmitted in telegram 652 from Bonn, August 17; Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 W GER)
With warm personal regards,
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
206. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, August 6, 1963, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 US-USSR. Confidential; Priority. Received at 3:23 p.m. and repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, and Moscow.
153. Info SACEUR for POLAD; CINCEUR for POLAD; USNMR SHAPE for Burns; USELMLO via other means. Paris also for USRO.
From McGhee. I met for hour and one-half with Sov Amb to GDR Abrasimov in Sov Emb East Berlin Aug 5./2/ Visit, first courtesy call to Amb as Sov representative in residual quadripartite matters, had been carefully arranged. Abrasimov at first attempted put conversation on broad plane by referring to common Sov-US interests in ensuring FRG adherence to Test Ban Treaty. Abrasimov asked for my views on Bonn attitude this issue. Since I did not wish to pursue such a general line, but to stick to Berlin matters, merely said felt confident everyone would eventually sign except the few states whose views were already known.
/2/For an abbreviated account by McGhee of this meeting, based on this telegram, see An Ambassador's Account, pp. 95-97.
Abrasimov said test ban agreement showed progress could be made on other issues. If US would accept Khrushchev's "free city" proposal and if it would recognize GDR, Berlin and German problems could be solved easily. I replied that US after many discussions on this subject over the past several years, was unconvinced Sov proposals for Berlin offer sufficient guarantees for maintenance Western vital interests in city. US believes Berlin problem can be solved ultimately only in framework reunification of Germany on basis East German people able freely express their will.
Solution Berlin and German problems as a whole are, I continued, large issues requiring extensive intergovernmental discussion and it appears unlikely we will be able to make much progress in this meeting. We do, however, along with our British and French colleagues, have serious responsibility in minimizing points of friction in day-to-day matters affecting Berlin. Abrasimov and I could make useful contribution to good relations between two sides by ensuring that tensions in Berlin were minimized. Increased tensions could have serious effects on three-year talks now in progress. I urged Abrasimov to use undoubtedly great influence on GDR to this end.
Abrasimov disclaimed authority for East Berlin. He was empowered to deal only with West Berlin. What we referred to as East Berlin was part of independent state of GDR, recognized, if not by US, by 14 states. I replied that we did not consider that this did, by any means, relieve the USSR of its obligations under the quadripartite agreements of 1944-45. I pointed out that there was reciprocity involved as between US rights in East Berlin and Sov rights in West Berlin. If Sovs disregarded US interests in East Berlin, they could hardly expect US show regard for their interests in West Berlin.
I then raised following specific points:
(1) GDR June 21 decree on "barred zone" around West Berlin and June 22 decree on undefined "security zones." These measures could in no way affect US rights under quadripartite agreements. However, they could possibly be source of tension between US and USSR. I urged Abrasimov to exert influence on GDR in order ensure such tension did not arise. Abrasimov said creation security zones was right of sovereign state. If such zones were, for good cause, erected in West Berlin, he would not object.
(2) USCOB visit to East Berlin. I pointed out Soviet general officers visit West Berlin freely, yet USCOB continues be affected by Sov/GDR measures barring his predecessor, Gen. Watson, from East Berlin. USCOB had not exercised right to visit East Berlin solely because of US desire avoid incident which could produce tension. US wished obtain prior Soviet assurances there would be no incidents with East Germans before USCOB went to East Berlin. I urged two sides forget Commandant bans and start afresh on this issue. Abrasimov indicated understanding for my argument and said he would take matter up with Soviet military authorities.
(3) Svenson case. I showed Abrasimov message written by Svenson on his immunization record and given to Italian tourists in East Berlin. (Berlintel 92 Dept, 81 Bonn)/3/ Abrasimov asked for photostat of Svenson immunization record (I said we would provide this) and promised investigate matter with East German authorities. I said if no satisfactory reply received as to Svenson welfare in light his message appealing for help, I would recommend matter be taken up formally with USSR, and there would also possibly be considerable publicity on case.
/3/Dated July 21. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 US)
Abrasimov raised following issues:
(1) He said Western Allies had made all of West Berlin closed zone in sense they did not permit Soviet news correspondents to reside there. Denial of resident permits inconsistent with Western plea for freedom of movement in Berlin. I pointed out Soviet correspondents free to go where they pleased in West Berlin, and issue not comparable to creation "barred zone" around West Berlin.
(2) Abrasimov protested Allied action preventing Sovs from refurbishing Lietzenburgerstrasse property. He said Sovs had been informed US opposition is key factor in issue. I said Sovs more fortunate in regard Lietzenburgerstrasse property than US in regard former US Embassy Berlin, which now located within "barred zone." Abrasimov, facetiously, said he was sure US could obtain permission if it wished build Embassy in East Berlin.
(3) Abrasimov protested fact Sov artists and sportsmen unable appear West Berlin. He said Sovs would not agree arrange through Bonn for appearances of cultural performers and sportsmen in West Berlin. I said I was not fully acquainted with details this issue but would inform myself and see what if anything could be done.
Abrasimov said he looked forward paying return call. I said this could be arranged, if agreeable to Abrasimov, during my next visit to Berlin in about six to seven weeks. Atmosphere of meeting was relaxed. At end discussion Abrasimov showed me through various public reception rooms of Embassy.
No identification difficulties or other problems encountered either entering or leaving Sov Sector. East German control personnel did not approach my vehicle at any point but simply raised barriers as vehicle approached them. As had been agreed with Sovs, Sov Emb vehicle with protocol officer provided escort from crossing point to Emb and back to crossing point.
Dept will use judgment as to relay to Moscow.
Calhoun
207. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, August 6, 1963, midnight.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only. Received at 9:07 p.m. and passed to the White House.
Secto 26. Second session tripartite talks held at Spiridonovka beginning 1545 and ending 1725./2/ At Gromyko's initiative session was entirely devoted to Germany and Berlin. Following is uncleared summary subject to revision. Full report follows./3/
/2/A report on the first tripartite session on August 6, which dealt with the Test Ban Treaty, was transmitted in Secto 20, August 8. (Ibid.)
/3/Secto 28, August 7. (Ibid.)
Gromyko began by stressing need to reach settlement of German question and on that basis question of West Berlin. To leave German problem indefinitely unsettled fraught with danger. Soviet Government attached great importance to German peace settlement.
Lord Home replied first, stating as Khrushchev yesterday rightly pointed out settlement could not be one-sided./4/ Khrushchev had added that people ought to be allowed to decide own destiny. Until system can be found where German people can express by means of secret ballot their desires there can be no satisfactory settlement. Knew Soviets cannot agree but Lord Home said he had concluded no settlement possible now. Hence this question should be put aside and we should address ourselves to more modest steps such as test ban. For instance, if agreement could be reached on observers not only in US, UK and USSR but also Western Germany and East Germany tensions would be reduced. He would not say anything about Berlin at moment.
/4/Home and members of the British delegation, like Rusk and his colleagues, had met with Khrushchev on August 5.
Secretary said he had one or two observations. First, looking at objective elements of tension, these have shown considerable improvement in the last one to three years. Some of elements which have caused tensions between two Germanies and therefore between countries responsible for Germany have been eased and therefore tensions have slackened.
There was more normal atmosphere in Central Europe as whole referring to both socialist as well as capitalist parts that area.
Secretary continued we still believe valid approach expressed in our March 22, 1962 draft of principles handed Gromyko./5/ Asked Mr. Gromyko if he did not think procedures and approach suggested therein still had significance. We don't believe matter is urgent or critical unless one chooses to make it so. Expressed readiness to sit down and discuss ways to prevent tension arising.
/5/Document 20.
Gromyko replied Western powers quite aware of Soviet proposals, some of them written, regarding access routes to Berlin which is not at all most important question. Soviet Union had not received answers. Had received some general statements but on some proposals no answers at all. Soviets have put forward proposals for settlement of German question and on this basis question settlement West Berlin. Important to liquidate remnants Second World War. Recalled Khru-shchev's statement that "without settlement of German problem and on that basis question of West Berlin difficult to contemplate progress in disarmament measures."
Gromyko continued by recalling past discussions in Geneva, New York and Washington. We faced most complicated question because no agreement reached on presence Western troops. Impossible for Western troops to stay forever. Western powers should say how they propose to regularize situation in West Berlin. Would not repeat Sov Govt views but USSR proceeds from point of view that West Berlin ties to rest of world should be unhindered. Also sovereignty of East Germany must be respected. Called upon Governments US-UK to make sober evaluation of situation. Elimination remnant World War II corresponded to interest of powers concerned and to all other states. Secretary Rusk had said situation more quiet lately but Soviet Government thinks situation dangerous and pregnant with uncertainties. Thinks this is question which must be settled.
Lord Home suggested there was nothing much better than present machinery of Rusk-Dobrynin talks though thus far no solution. As regards Mr. Gromyko's complaint Western powers had advanced no new proposals, Lord Home pointed out it was Soviets who wished change existing situation and hence they should come forward with acceptable proposals. Western interest was only that West Berlin remain free and access unhindered. Gromyko's statement concerning unhindered access gave Lord Home some hope. But question was how Soviets would underwrite this and guarantee with us unhindered access.
Gromyko asked what kind of freedom existed in West Berlin which is guarded by foreign bayonets. Main thing was presence of occupation troops. How could this be justified after so many years. Important draw line under World War II. Soviet proposals well known.
Gromyko continued, Lord Home had referred to free elections. This argument reeked of "moth balls." As to Khrushchev's statement impossible change situation by either side engulfing the other, why not take logical conclusion and recognize existence two sovereign German states.
Gromyko then took up Lord Home's reference to machinery and said while it was useful and perhaps necessary, still there was danger of relying only on this machinery. No matter how capable Secy Rusk or Ambassador Dobrynin were this could go on 10-25 or 100 years. He was not referring to them in a personal sense. There was no known instrument which could detect progress in these discussions.
Secy said, as he had mentioned to Gromyko in past, question was more of access to what and this involves presence Western troops in West Berlin. Almost waste of time to go on if this is not accepted. We ready to explore what access arrangements are possible. Recalled that Western powers had once talked among themselves on this problem and story had broken in press whereupon Moscow Radio had rejected proposals even before receiving them.
Secy emphasized what he had said before--need for genuine reciprocity. Hard believe few thousand troops in Berlin threatened several Soviet divisions in East Germany. We have been told East Germany was gone, East Berlin none of our business and instead all demands were concentrated on diminishing Western position in West Berlin. We see no reciprocity in this. We readily concede Soviet Union is great power but so are we. We not interested on theoretical basis on maintaining remnants World War II but had living commitment to more than two million people. We should like to remove remnants of World War II but we do not want this to become seeds of World War III. Tensions have been reduced in both parts of Central Europe by developments in last two years.
Secretary commented though his discussions with Dobrynin have become repetitious, farreaching fundamental problems involved. As responsible powers we ought to find way to handle peacefully, hence our Principles Paper 1962 tried take into account elements affecting USSR not only in regard to question West Berlin and access thereto but also concerning no use of force change borders and question of nuclear weapons, in short, one small word could transform nature whole problem. This word was "reciprocity".
Gromyko replied Soviets do not fear word "reciprocity". Soviet proposals took into account common interests. After repeating Soviet line on presence foreign troops and status West Berlin Gromyko said if he mentioned partial measures which ought to be implemented, this should not be taken to mean they disregarded fundamental measures for liquidation remnants World War II.
Secretary said would be glad hear anything Gromyko would wish to say while he is here, before or during GA.
Lord Home suggested they could talk about partial measures in tomorrow's bilateral Soviet-UK session. Perhaps Dobrynin and Secretary could talk again before GA and then Foreign Ministers could have basic review in New York.
Gromyko then asked if Ministers had 10 more minutes. He would speak to partial measures though without prejudice to Soviet belief in urgency settlement main problem of Germany. These partial measures concerned payment of all services rendered by GDR for communications between GDR (not clear whether he meant West Berlin) and FRG, i.e., it concerned transit communications. Mentioned (1) new tariffs for passengers and military transport by rail; (2) tolls for using Autobahns by troops and military goods by auto transport of Western powers; (3) payment by occupation troops for use of communication cables going through territory of GDR to and from West Berlin; (4) question of air communications. Gromyko said in this regard situation not at all normal when international companies now using these routes and some West German cities planning also to use these routes. This was clearly untenable situation. There were also plans for aircraft bearing mark of fourth country appearing in air routes between West Berlin and FRG.
Gromyko continued, existing communications situation discriminatory against GDR.
As last point he mentioned discrimination against GDR in international events such as sports, scientific conferences, etc. All this was part of NATO campaign against GDR.
Gromyko said he had named only a few points. There were other practical questions which needed solution and all these steps should be taken without delay. Even solution these measures would not affect main problem settlement of German problem and West Berlin. Soviet Union was not against "fresh look" suggested by Secretary but present mechanism was squeaking and not working. Called upon US-UK to consider long-range and basic interests of all our countries and not quarrel endlessly about West Berlin. Our governments have many mutual interests other than interests of militarists of West German circles.
Secretary said we must give further thought practical measures to increase well-being and prosperity peoples in this area. Rejected designation of Bonn as militaristic. Soviet Union supported self-determination almost everywhere except in Central Europe. Germans want to live in their own country in their own way. This is not militarism.
Rusk
208. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
US/MC/5 Pitsunda
August 9, 1963, 10:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER. Secret; Eyes Only. The source text bears no drafting information, but it was approved in S on August 28. The meeting was held at Khrushchev's dacha. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Secto 53 from Moscow, August 9. (Ibid., ORG 7 S)
PARTICIPANTS
US
The Secretary
Ambassador Kohler
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Richard Davis, EUR
Mr. Akalovsky, ACDA/IR
USSR
Mr. Khrushchev
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Vinogradov
SUBJECT
Part II--Germany and Berlin
Using as a springboard the discussion of the sequence of events leading to a non-aggression pact, Mr. Khrushchev launched into a discussion of Germany and Berlin./2/
/2/In the previous discussion Khrushchev, after expressing satisfaction about the signing of the Test Ban Treaty, said that it would be useful to move ahead on other questions and added that a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression pact was a question that could be easily solved. Rusk then reiterated the U.S. position that a non-aggression pact should come at the end of the road after issues like Laos and Berlin had been resolved, but stated that the United States would discuss the question with its Allies. (Memorandum of conversation, US/MC/4; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev/Rusk)
He said the USSR believed it would be useful for our two countries and for the world at large to resolve the most difficult, and at the same time the easiest question, because all the difficulties surrounding it were contrived, i.e., that of a peace treaty with Germany. He thought this was both a basic and quarrelsome problem. He thought it was quarrelsome because it reminded him of a story in which some official was asked whether or not he believed in God; the official replied "not at the office but at home". Thus if one asked the US whether it was for a peace treaty it would reply "in confidence yes, but not in public". Khrushchev recalled that in his conversation with President Eisenhower he had not gained the impression that the latter was opposed. The same went for De Gaulle, who had only insisted that West Germany should remain part of the Western alliance. To this, Mr. Khrushchev said, he had replied that would be all right and it was West Germany's own business. As to Germany's division, De Gaulle had said two parts were fine and three would be even better. However, De Gaulle had said things should be left as they were and we should not hurry as there would be nothing to gain. Yet such a provision could not be understood by the peoples of the world. Also, as Ambassador Thompson would remember, he, Khrushchev, had asked Eisenhower why the US was arming West Germany and thus was creating a dangerous situation. Eisenhower had replied West Germany was competing with the US in the economic field and therefore the US wanted to make West Germany spend money on arms. This, he thought, was a straightforward answer by a soldier. Khrushchev believed it was paradoxical that De Gaulle should be the most negative with regard to the negotiations, for it was De Gaulle who had gone farthest with respect to the question of borders. De Gaulle had stated borders should stay as they were, and he had stated publicly what others only whispered.
Mr. Khrushchev went on to say that if one looked at the US NATO allies Adenauer was the only one to oppose a peace treaty in substance. De Gaulle agreed in substance but was opposed in form. The reason for his opposition was that in struggling against the United States he needed a strong supporter in Europe; therefore, he placed his stakes on Adenauer. While he needed a strong state to support him, De Gaulle had assured the USSR he was against West Germany's having nuclear weapons and that he did not want war against the Soviet Union. This course was in effect political speculation, but it could provoke bloodshed among the peoples of the world. It was also a sign of imperialist degeneration, but he, Khrushchev, did not wish to get involved in a discussion of this kind now and would prefer to leave this matter aside for awhile.
Khrushchev said that as far as the UK was concerned, the Conserv-atives were in favor but they did not wish to introduce discord in the Western orchestra. The Laborites agreed with the Soviet position on this point. Spaak too had said on several occasions that in those European countries where workers' parties were in the government the governments were in favor of a peace treaty. Spaak was also in favor of a non-aggression pact and had stated so in public. Denmark, Norway, Holland and Luxembourg held the same position. Thus only West Germany remained, and also France. France was opposed, in the interest of a struggle for leadership in Europe. France wanted to kick the United States out of political leadership in Europe and take its place. However, France was too weak to do so alone and needed West Germany's support.
Thus Khrushchev believed the United States' position was the same as that of the UK. If it were not for such speculations by France, the United States could sign a peace treaty. Nothing would be lost although the gain would not be great either, but the cause of peace would benefit and the cold war would be liquidated. Adenauer has now become a leading figure in world politics, because he wanted to impose an aggressive policy on the Western powers; thus victors were now on the leash of the vanquished.
If one were to analyze the Soviet and the US position, Khrushchev continued, one would see that all NATO countries, including Adenauer, had come to the conclusion that borders could not be changed by force now, and were prepared to record this publicly but not formalize it. The objectives of a peace treaty were the same. Ten years after Dulles had spoken of rolling back socialism eastward, the West had recognized this but was not prepared to formalize this juridically. Khrushchev said he did not know what would happen ten years hence, but the USSR and other socialist states might lose patience and sign a peace treaty unilaterally. The US said this would mean war, but he believed the US would have more wisdom than stupidity, because wars were waged only when basic interests were involved. In this case Adenauer's interests were involved, but then Adenauer might be dead by that time for all of us were mortal.
The Secretary said he wished to comment briefly on the situation. First he wanted to make two general observations since they had some bearing on the German problem. He said his deepest impression on this short visit to the Soviet Union was to see Soviet people at work and pursuing their daily affairs. He had also driven by automobile between New York and San Francisco on several occasions and had seen American people at work. On the basis of what he had seen in Moscow, Leningrad, and during his very brief stay here in the south, he had no doubt that the Soviet people, just as the American people, had no greater desire than to work in peace. Therefore, it was up to our respective governments to ensure such opportunity to their peoples. Another observation he wished to make was that, in his view, Mr. Khrushchev and President Kennedy were perhaps the only people who realized what modern war was. There were others, of course, who knew about the military and other aspects of modern war, but it was Mr. Khrushchev and the President who carried the ultimate responsibility. It was therefore important for the two leaders to find a possibility of collaborating on as many points as possible. The Secretary noted that the President had quoted Mr. Khrushchev's remarks on the nature of modern war. He continued that our two countries had a common historical background with respect to this situation, although the Soviet Union had perhaps greater experience because it had suffered so much from Hitler's Germany. However, it was a fundamental fact that our two countries had fought together against Hitler and they must not permit this problem to divide them. A peace treaty as such did not bother us. In 1954, the Western powers had declared solemnly that they would not seek change of the borders by force; while the circumstances in which that declaration had been made were somewhat different, the pledge still stood and this was fundamental.
The Secretary continued that while Mr. Khrushchev might not agree with what he was going to say, he hoped Mr. Khrushchev would take his remarks seriously and accept that we are genuine in our belief. We believed that any settlements if they were to be secure and safe had to be related to the wishes of the peoples involved. The Secretary said he had no sure knowledge of how the East Germans would express themselves if they were permitted to do so, but he believed that if the Soviet Union and we separated the Germans without their consent and then walked away, this would only sow seeds of great danger and perhaps of eventual conflict in Central Europe, because the Germans were restless and wished to organize themselves according to their own desires. We agreed and held the same view as the Soviet Union that the Germans should not have a national nuclear capability; indeed we felt very strongly that there were enough nuclear powers in the world and our strong pursuit of this policy had resulted in considerable strain in our relations with France. We saw no desire whatsoever of having West Germany equipped with nuclear weapons, either through its own efforts or by somebody else.
The Secretary then said this situation should be examined. He believed that if we allowed things to develop in the proper direction, more normal relations would be brought about not only between the two parts of Germany, but also between West Germany and the socialist countries to the east. He wondered whether Mr. Khrushchev would agree that considerable improvement in this respect had already taken place as compared to the situation two or three years ago.
The Secretary also thought we could make some advance in the disarmament field. There were a number of steps which could in a significant and practical way bring us closer to the solution of the real problems of disarmament. Such steps could remove some problems in the relationship between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. We believed there were difficulties at this time with respect to sweeping disarmament but we could take a number of smaller steps to begin the momentum towards real disarmament. The Secretary hoped that over the next several months points could be found on which agreement could be reached, because whatever the arrangements in Central Europe they were based on the hope for disarmament, and we hoped we could find disarmament arrangements which would apply to both the capitalist and the socialist parts of Europe.
The Secretary believed that the governments of today, indeed all of us, have inherited some problems from the immediate post-war period. Those problems were difficult and each side had inherited its own difficulties. As to the United States, we had withdrawn considerable forces from what was now East Germany and had introduced our forces in West Berlin. We had done so to abide by the provisions of the agreement which had been previously reached with respect to Germany. At that time, some people felt there would be difficulties in connection with our presence in West Berlin and some had insisted that a territorial corridor to West Berlin be established. This had not been pressed because it had been felt that it could be interpreted as lack of confidence in the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the Berlin blockade occurred; after access had been restored, the arrangements were again such as did not reflect lack of confidence in the Soviet Government. Our two sides must find ways of attempting to increase confidence by moving ahead on measures in such fields as humanitarian, trade, and cultural. Steps in these fields would all increase confidence and strengthen the hopes for the future. However, at the moment--perhaps Mr. Khrushchev would agree--acceptance of substantial responsibility by both the Soviet Union and the United States and our presence in Germany was an element of stability and not instability. For we did not know who might do what to whom if we were not there and if we did not accept responsibility for stability and peace in that part of the world.
Mr. Khrushchev nodded but said a peace treaty should nonetheless be signed. The signing of such a treaty was an unavoidable act after any war. He said he agreed with what the Secretary had said, and the Secretary's remarks contained many reasonable points. However, the conclusion to be drawn was that a peace treaty should be signed. In the absence of such a treaty, there would always be frictions. For example, if one took the GDR, the Western Powers had communications going through the GDR territory, for the use of which the Western Powers did not pay. The GDR was obviously discontented and it could break the cables; what could be done in such a case, for the GDR would have the right to take such action. Furthermore, the US had encouraged West Germany not to pay reparations; even plants which were subject to disassembly and transfer under the Potsdam agreement had not been disassembled or transferred. While other countries, such as East Germany, Rumania, Finland, Hungary, etc., had paid their reparations, West Germany, the richest country of them all and the one most responsible for the war, had not paid and in refusing to do so had leaned on US support.
Khrushchev said the USSR agreed that a peace treaty should state that the way for a reunification of Germany remained open and that each party to the treaty would facilitate this effort. However, we should stand aside and leave it to the two German states to resolve the problem. While he said that we should stand aside, he wished to point out that naturally we had our respective positions and sympathies: the Soviet Union was for the system in East Germany. However, the West could not change the system in the GDR, nor could the Soviet Union change the system in West Germany. It was not as the Secretary had said that the people of the whole of Germany could decide their destiny; it was a question of the peoples in the two German states to decide what their future would be.
Khrushchev continued the West had corns in the GDR. They should be removed so that there would be no temptation to step on them. It was Walter Lippmann who had invented this expression, and it was a wise expression. So, a peace treaty should be signed.
The Secretary observed this was one of the problems. These corns were tempting given the geography of the situation. However, it was important to resist such temptation for it would be hard for us to apologize if our corns were under someone's foot.
Khrushchev interjected he who stepped on corns apologized but then stepped again grinding his heel. The Secretary observed this was not very polite. Khrushchev asked whether it was polite not to sign a peace treaty and to have corns in foreign territory. The Secretary said we had withdrawn from Thuringia and Saxony to abide faithfully by our agreement. Khrushchev said the USSR did not want West Berlin. West Berlin should be a third German state with a special status to be respected by all.
The Secretary continued that with regard to the principle of unification, that was a very important point and the Chairman himself had said on several occasions that the way should remain open.
Khrushchev commented it was necessary to leave it open.
The Secretary wondered whether it was really important from the Soviets' viewpoint to ask the two parts of Germany individually about unification, rather than to ask the German people as a whole. In saying this he was not asking that West Germany outvote East Germany, but there was an important difference here. He was not talking in terms of short-range problems or tactics, but rather in terms of long-range problems relating to the Continent. In referring to the Continent, he had in mind what De Gaulle had called Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, i.e., the entire continental area.
Khrushchev believed this matter was not subject to discussion, because both parts of Germany had their governments, their parliaments and elections. The GDR would hold elections in the near future, elections which ensured the most democratic way of soliciting popular opinion. There was no question of asking the two States again. Furthermore, had the US asked the people of Pakistan before it recognized Ayub Khan, who had dismissed the legitimately-elected government and used armed force to seize power. Also, in Guatemala bandits had seized power and thrown out the legitimately-elected president, and they had done so with the support of the US intelligence service. He wondered whether the people of Guatemala had been asked about it. Another example was Diem, who was persecuting the people of Viet Nam; the United States had recognized Diem without consulting the people, but if it were to ask the people, both Diem and the United States would be kicked out. Therefore, we should not dwell on this matter. He wished to add, however, that the United States had voted with force: it had used force to kick out the British and it had been right in doing so. The USSR had done the same; it had kicked out the White Guards and the US, UK, and Polish interventionists who had been helping the Whites. Thus, peoples had their own ways of settling their affairs. He would suggest that we do not get involved in such a discussion, because that would only lead us into a jungle. He wished to note, however, that nobody had asked the Spanish people about Franco; this bandit-like government had seized power without anybody's consulting the will of the people. There were many governments like this.
The Secretary pointed out there was substantial difference between situations where the form of government was an internal matter, and, of course, we could have a lively discussion about many governments in the world, and the situation, such as the one under discussion, where the question was what was the state, who was to live where, and who was to live together or separately. He believed the people had to be asked these questions.
Mr. Khrushchev said he wished to interrupt the Secretary and make an unpleasant point. Under the 1954 agreement all of Viet Nam had to have elections four years later. However, the US had not allowed those elections. Consequently the US was interpreting this problem in a mercantile way, namely, it regarded as democratic everything that was profitable.
The Secretary continued he did not wish to press this point, for he realized that Mr. Khrushchev had his own position and that as much as he regretted it, it did not appear to be possible to resolve this particular point this morning.
Khrushchev agreed and suggested it would be better to put this matter aside. He did not believe the Secretary's and his efforts would be sufficient to resolve the problem and thought history would have to come to assistance.
Khrushchev then suggested that the discussion should turn to more innocent matters, such as trade (covered in part III of the memorandum of conversation)./3/
/3/Part III on trade is printed in vol. V, Document 210; Part IV on Laos is printed in vol. XXIV, Document 484.
209. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, August 10, 1963, 7:40 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2290. Secret; Operational Immediate; No Other Distribution. Drafted and initialed by Rusk.
Secto 60. Eyes only for the President from the Secretary. Following are results and impressions of talks today with Chancellor, Erhard, and Schroeder individually and in group meetings./2/
/2/Secretary Rusk was in Bonn August 10-11 after he left the Soviet Union. Memoranda of the conversations with Adenauer and Schroeder, US/MC/8 and 9, are ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Sectos 57 and 58, August 10 and 11, also reported on Rusk's conversations in Bonn. (Ibid., Central Files, POL US-USSR and ORG 7 S)
1. Federal Republic will almost certainly sign test ban treaty. My information is that decision to sign was practically in the bag but for reasons obscured in local politics, fact of my visit seemed to provide an occasion to button it up. Federal Republic has already briefed press that decision to sign is taken and that Cabinet meeting on Monday will attend to details. US Embassy and Chayes/3/ have done excellent job in sorting out many points of detail with the Germans which were being used more as pretexts than real reasons. Apparently the von Brentano assault on Schroeder has been repulsed for the time being.
/3/Abram J. Chayes, Legal Adviser of the Department of State.
2. In private talk Chancellor went about as far as his personality would permit in expressing regret for "misunderstandings" which might have arisen from his talk with McNamara. He claims that what he meant to convey was that Soviet position is getting weaker and that we should not rush to bail them out through agreements which strengthen Khrushchev's hands. Thanking him for his clarification, I took advantage of chance to tell him why the "misunderstanding" had caused us deep concern along the lines of your letter to him, your cable to me./4/ I am under no illusion my effort effected a cure but it might last for at least a few days.
/4/Document 205 and footnote 3 thereto.
3. Again in private talk Chancellor was quite emotional about withdrawal of six hundred troops from West Berlin./5/ He claimed it would be interpreted as a political gesture to Khrushchev, that it would undercut the effect of your visit to Germany and Berlin, and that political consequences were far more important than numbers of troops involved. I gave him full line of arguments but did not succeed in persuading him. I told him that I would of course report his views to you but made no commitment about reviewing the position or changing the decision. We may hear from him again on this but if West Berlin takes it in stride my guess is that he will not press it unduly, particularly since he is going to Lake Como on the nineteenth for extended vacation.
/5/During July the United States had reorganized its Berlin garrison, reducing the number of troops by about 600, but increasing its weaponry.
4. Chancellor was entirely cordial personally, looked in fine health and was most agreeable at dinner tonight with Government and Parliamentary leaders. There was not even any nostalgia expressed for the good old John Foster Dulles days.
Other matters will be reported in Embassy telegrams.
Rusk
210. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, August 15, 1963, 2:36 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 Berlin. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ausland; cleared by Ambassador at Large Thompson, Valdes (SOV), and Baraz (INR/SOV); and approved by Davis. Repeated to Berlin, Paris, London, Moscow, SHAPE, U.S. Element Live Oak, CINCEUR, USAREUR, and USAFE.
475. Paris also pass USRO. Ref: Deptel 462./2/ Subj: Practical Measures on Berlin.
/2/Telegram 462, August 14, summarized the practical measures that Gromyko had outlined to Secretary Rusk on August 6 (see Document 207). (Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 Berlin)
1. We can at this point only speculate on what lay behind Gromyko's references on August 7 to "practical measures" to Secretary and Home. We note, however, that these follow Khrushchev threat to step on Allied "corns" to Spaak. They also follow Ulbricht July 31 speech to Volkskammer,/3/ in which he complained regarding Allied access to east Berlin, use of air corridors by civil airlines, and TTDs. All these appear to be directed toward enhancement status GDR.
/3/For text of this speech, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1963, pp. 587-600.
2. These statements could also be related to GDR moves related to IZT. We note in this regard apparent GDR effort move discussion "political" questions out of IZT framework (Bonn 546)./4/
/4/Dated August 10. (Department of State, Central Files, FT 4 E GER-W GER)
3. Soviets may, therefore, be trying to shift focus on Berlin from Allied troops to Allied access. Coupled with effort to increase Soviet presence in west Berlin, this could be designed pursue Soviet objectives through step by step approach which kept pressure on but minimized risks. Practical measures may also have been raised to serve notice on West that continued lull in Berlin cannot be taken for granted.
4. It remains to be seen whether Soviets intend pursue question "practical measures" with us, will allow GDR see what they can do, or will use combination Soviet and GDR efforts. We are also not yet clear as to how Soviets propose relate "practical measures" on Berlin to NAP and partial disarmament measures.
Rusk
211. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, August 20, 1963, 1:04 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Operational Immediate. The source text bears the notation "Text rec'd from White House."
522. Eyes only for Ambassador. Following, for immediate delivery, is text President's reply to Chancellor's letter of August 17:/2/
/2/See footnote 3, Document 205.
"Dear Mr. Chancellor:
Thank you for your thoughtful letter of August 17. I am pleased that we are moving together on the test ban treaty.
I am sure that the Federal Republic's decision to sign the test ban will be to its advantage. As I said in my letter of August 6,/3/ not only has every precaution been taken to avoid giving the Soviet Zone regime the political recognition and prestige it does not have and will not have; but the deposit of your instrument of ratification with all three depositories will demonstrate in an unmistakable way that the Federal Republic can and does speak for the German people.
/3/Document 205.
Secretary Rusk has talked to me about his visit to Bonn. I thank you for the courtesy extended him and for your frank and cordial conversations with him. He said you were concerned about the possible effect of the reorganization of our Berlin garrison. As he pointed out, this action is but a part of a world-wide reorganization of the United States Army. A small reduction in the total number of U.S. troops in Berlin will result, but more United States soldiers will remain there than were present prior to August 1961. In addition, our Berlin garrison will now have additional equipment and weapons which will increase its combat capability and make it a substantially stronger force than it was.
I fully agree that it is important that our Governments maintain the closest contact on future problems of mutual interest. In this regard, we are about to begin consultations on issues affecting East-West negotiations in the NATO Council and the quadripartite Ambassadorial Group. I believe that our officials should maintain, in addition, close bilateral contacts both in Washington and Bonn.
Recently I looked into the way your Government was consulted on the Berlin garrison reorganization and on other matters. While there was contact between our officials regarding the reorganization plan, the consultation was not done in sufficient time. I have instructed our officers to make a special effort to maintain the closest cohesion in the foreign affairs of our two countries and I hope there will be no more problems of this kind. If there are, please let me know immediately.
Sincerely, John F. Kennedy"
Ball
212. Memorandum for the Files by the Ambassador at Large (Thompson)/1/
Washington, August 22, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 21. Secret.
12:57 p.m.--Thursday, August 22, 1963
The President telephoned me to inquire what our response is to be to the Germans on the peace plan./2/
/2/When Secretary Rusk had briefed Schroeder on August 10 about his conversations in Moscow (see Document 209), Schroeder had given him the text of a German peace plan. A copy of the plan is attached to a memorandum from Klein to Bundy in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.
I said a meeting was held this morning with Mr. Bundy, Nitze and others. One result was that it was suggested that the Secretary write a letter to Schroeder trying to divert him into making a speech instead of putting forth the plan. Another suggestion was that either Mr. Bundy or Ambassador Thompson call on Schroeder under cover of consulting with other allies.
The President inquired whether the German proposal had been put before the NATO Council. I said reference to the German proposal had been made in the Council. What we would like them to do is to discuss it in general terms and not put forward the specific terms.
The President inquired as to what the French say about it.
I said they supported it in the first place and will now, probably. I said this matter was discussed at length this morning in Mr. Bundy's office and it was decided that we should try to get them to put it in the form of a speech, which would give more flexibility. I said it was a pretty bad thing and could provoke the Russians into taking some action. I mentioned Home's talk with Schroeder in which the latter explained what they had in mind. He said the British are pretty unhappy about it.
The President inquired how it went in NATO on observation posts, and asked whether the "New York Times" story/3/ was accurate. I assured the President that it was not and that discussion had gone well.
/3/Presumably reference is to a story on page 10 of The New York Times, August 21, 1963.
LEThompson/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
213. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, August 27, 1963, 7:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Confidential. Drafted by Rusk and Thompson and cleared by Bundy.
607. Following for earliest convenient delivery is text of letter from Secretary to Schroeder:
"Dear Gerhard:
Thank you for your letter of August seventeenth./2/
/2/Not printed. (Ibid.)
I share your satisfaction that the Federal Government has signed the Test Ban Treaty. As you may have observed, the Treaty is being subjected to a thorough and careful examination by our Senate, but I am confident that it will be approved by a very substantial majority.
Since the President has written to the Chancellor/3/ about the general question of consultation, I shall limit myself to saying that the Department of State, our Embassy in Bonn, and I are all anxious to maintain the closest liaison on questions of mutual interest.
/3/See Document 211.
Judging by the reports I have seen on the discussions thus far in the North Atlantic Council, they are likely to go into the questions of observation posts and nonaggression arrangements very thoroughly. We have not ourselves arrived at any final conclusions as to our own views on these subjects. Nor will we wish to do so, pending our learning more of your views and the attitudes of the other members of NATO.
I must confess that I am concerned about a recurring dilemma in the process of NATO consultation. Quite naturally we wish to take fully into account the views of our allies in the shaping of our own attitudes on important questions. On the other hand, it frequently is not possible to get the views of other governments except as a reaction to specific proposals or points of view from the American side. It seems to me that we should work toward a process of genuine consultation in which governments, in the first stage, are ready to put in provisional or tentative views for the consideration of the other allies in order that these views can be taken into full account by all of us in reaching conclusions.
You raised one specific question regarding observation posts--how the Soviet Zone of occupation could be included in such an agreement. So far, the Soviets appear to be linking their proposal on observation posts with unacceptable conditions. If, however, an agreement on this subject should prove negotiable, there is no question but that the problem of including the Soviet Zone of occupation would become one of the key questions. I would think that, from a military point of view, you as well as we would want arrangements affecting surprise attack to include an area in which there are more than twenty Soviet divisions in direct contact with NATO forces. We are examining various alternative solutions, but have not yet come to any conclusions. If you have any suggestions, I should be glad to hear them.
Although not mentioned in your letter, I should like to refer to your proposals concerning your draft of a Revised Peace Plan. I appreciated your raising the subject with me in Bonn before coming to any conclusion and am gratified to learn that you decided to consult in the Ambassadorial Group rather than proceeding direct with the publication. I have more difficulty with the timing and procedure of your proposals than with their substance. As you know, this plan has a long history. I believe that the textual differences between us are not insurmountable and could be overcome if the necessity arose.
As to timing, I think we are agreed that your proposal would not now be negotiable. As you know, the Sino-Soviet quarrel is now in an acute stage and the Soviets have been accused by the Chinese of not defending the interests of the so-called GDR. Moreover, the Soviets appear to be sensitive to articles in the Western press suggesting that because of their differences with the Chinese, they are obliged to turn to the West. In these circumstances, I fear that putting forward your plan as a concrete proposal at this time may precipitate Soviet actions, particularly in Berlin, designed to demonstrate the firmness of their position.
My greatest concern, however, relates to the proposed procedure of the German Government publishing an exact text of a proposal submitted to its allies in the absence of any prospect of serious negotiation upon it with the Soviet Union. This would have the disadvantage of focusing public attention upon even the most minor change which might be made in the plan should negotiations upon it become possible at some time in the future. Moreover, it would give the Soviets ample opportunity to attack and discredit the plan and possibly take a position which would make it difficult for the four of us to put it forward at an appropriate time.
I am, however, in full sympathy with your desire to keep attention focused upon our common objective of reunification, and I wonder if a better way to do this could not be found. For example, could you not make a major address in which you would outline your views on the questions dealt with in the Peace Plan, particularly the problem of reunification? If you would advise us in advance of what you were planning to say, we could be ready to comment in a constructive way.
Although we will probably be discussing these questions when we see each other in New York, I should appreciate any reactions you might have before then to these suggestions. I think it most important that our Governments keep in step, and I hope that we can arrive at an early agreement on how best to proceed.
With warm personal regards, I am
Sincerely, Dean"
Rusk
214. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, September 19, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany. Secret. Drafted by McGhee on September 25 and approved in the White House on October 1.
SUBJECT
United States-German Relations
PARTICIPANTS
The President
Ambassador George C. McGhee
I met with the President today. We were alone. The discussion lasted for approximately one-half hour.
The President asked whether I considered that his recent visit to Germany had proven helpful, and in particular whether it had been of any assistance in overcoming the recent issues faced with the FRG over the Test Ban Treaty.
I replied that the visit had, from every viewpoint, been a very positive factor in our relations with Germany. It has given us a reservoir of good will and confidence, both in the President and our country, which will last for a long time to come. We had, however, drawn some bit on this credit during the recent Test Ban Treaty as a result of what the Germans considered to be a lack of full consultation. It was my hope that such a situation would not reoccur.
I asked the President if he had an opportunity to read my telegram of September 18 to the Department, which covered my meeting with Foreign Minister Schroeder following his return from discussions in Paris with Couve de Murville, the French Foreign Minister./2/ Since the President had not, I gave him a copy and he read it. He seemed particularly impressed by the negative attitude displayed by the French on almost every issue.
/2/Telegram 1006 from Bonn transmitted Schroeder's account of his meeting with Couve de Murville on September 17. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 W GER)
He commented briefly on the current German resistance to the negotiation of East-West treaties which might have the effect of producing a detente. Adenauer had consistently opposed agreements with the Soviets and efforts to relax tension. Would he ever change? Would other German leaders share his views? There was some discussion as to whether relaxation of tensions would be more likely to lead to achievement of Germany's objectives of reunification than a continuation of tension. I presented the view, which I believe the President shared, that a better case could be made for the former.
I advised the President of two matters which Vice Chancellor Erhard had raised with me./3/ First was the question of a visit to this country, which he wished to make as soon as possible after he comes into office, which would presumably be about October 15. Erhard suggested November. The Department had proposed that he be invited as a Presidential guest.
/3/Erhard had raised these issues in a conversation with McGhee on September 6. (Telegram 884 from Bonn, September 7; ibid., INCO-Poultry US)
The President agreed that the necessary arrangements should be made.
The second point that Erhard asked me to raise concerned his sketchy thoughts concerning an increase in German trade, presumably requiring credits, with the USSR. I mentioned that this seemed to fit in with the latest thinking in the United States Government to the effect that it might be desirable to increase our own trade with the USSR. Since Erhard seemed to be in favor of a considerable German effort in this regard, the President's meeting with him might provide the impetus for a common effort. Erhard believed that the Western nations should concert in their approach to the Soviets on trade matters and should offer similar terms. Erhard also, of course, hoped that we could get a suitable quid pro quo. From the German standpoint, this would be something affecting East Germany or Berlin or reunification. The President indicated he did not wish any German effort in this regard to appear to be something the Germans owed the Soviets.
I referred to the forthcoming visit to the United States of Berthold Beitz, plenipotentiary of Krupp, and Axel Springer, the newspaper owner. I said that I hoped the President could see both of them. Each was of great importance in the German picture. The President had met both of them at the dinner he gave in Bonn and had indicated that he probably would be able to see them. The President said he would like to see both of them if his schedule permitted.
I raised the question of troop relocation, pointing out the rumors that United States forces in Germany might be reduced. I pointed out that this would not result in any saving if we have confidence in the continuation of the off-set arrangement and would pose a great difficulty for us at this time in our relations with the Germans. I pointed out what this would mean to Erhard at the time he would be coming into office. The withdrawal of troops would in effect constitute a vote of no confidence. It would greatly weaken his position.
The President said he had decided against any force reductions in Germany, although there would be reductions in service troops in France.
I raised the question of the observation posts negotiations, pointing out that I felt there was no insurmountable problem on the German side provided we could find a solution to the points raised by Schroeder in the telegram which the President had read.
I advised the President that the Germans were very firm on their plans on the MLF. The President replied we were equally firm. We, as well as the Germans, are willing to go ahead even without the British. He asked what the German reaction was to our proposal that we initiate mixed manning exercises in the near future. I replied that their preliminary reactions had been good.
I advised the President that, in my opinion, we should work out a compromise on the poultry questions. Perhaps we could get agreement that the Commission be given a mandate to negotiate a new regulation. The Germans, for their part, did not like the present regulation and would be quite happy to go to some quota basis, which is what we proposed in Geneva. The President asked me to talk with Mr. Herter/4/ about this.
/4/Christian A. Herter, former Secretary of State, was the U.S. Special Trade Representative.
[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]
The President asked why we were not able to give up all our reserved powers in Western Europe. I pointed out that most of the remaining powers outside Berlin would only come into effect in emergency situations, at which time we would grant our authority to the German Government, which does not have similar authority. Until legislation is passed authorizing the FRG to act in an emergency, the Western Allies probably should retain its rights so that we can enable the FRG to act in an emergency. I saw no reason, however, why we shouldn't be willing to offer to give up these rights once the Germans had obtained the necessary emergency legislation. We would look into this.
215. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, September 24, 1963, 9:39 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2315. Secret. Drafted by Creel, Finn, and Stalder (GER) and approved by Tyler. Repeated to Paris, Rome, London, Berlin, and USUN for Secretary Rusk.
867. Following for FYI only is summary of FRG Foreign Minister Schroeder's visit to Washington based on uncleared memoranda of conversation, which subject amendment upon review. Memcons will follow.
President met with Schroeder for hour September 24. Subjects discussed were 1) status of East-West discussions, 2) MLF and 3) troop reductions./2/ 1) President and Schroeder agreed that measures reducing danger of war are useful and provide better atmosphere as regards Berlin, even though there is no agreement in prospect which would improve possibility of German reunification. Schroeder said atmosphere of tension affords no prospect of progress toward German reunification, but stressed need for clear and frequently repeated understanding of Western objectives re Germany and Berlin to prevent feeling in Germany that German problem being ignored. After discussion of Test Ban Treaty, President said important thing as regards future consultation is that FRG receives our views as soon as formulated and vice versa. 2) On MLF President said we should proceed vigorously and should get one mixed-manned ship to sea as soon as possible with US, German and Italian personnel. Early action would have effect of encouraging UK participation. Schroeder agreed. Re French statement (Habib Deloncle at Strasbourg Sept 23) suggesting UK join with French in European nuclear effort, Schroeder said this seemed more like tempting offer for future than concrete offer for present but reinforced need to proceed with MLF. 3) On troop withdrawals President said there would for present be no withdrawals from Germany other than previously announced from Berlin. Schroeder stressed desirability of advance consultation and preparation of public opinion before any future reductions.
/2/Memoranda of conversation on these topics are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.
At Sept 20 session Secretary and Schroeder first met for 35 minutes without advisers or interpreters and discussed inter alia extension of Test Ban Treaty to Berlin./3/ Highlight of conference during remainder first hour and subsequent two-hour working lunch was Schroeder's exposition on subject German attitudes toward Western initiatives with Soviets./4/ He cautioned that pursuit of Western policy to move ahead from problems at periphery to major problems at the center could be effective only so long as we kept constantly in sight (a) basic Communist objectives and (b) Western objectives on the problems at the center. Relaxation of tensions on the basis of progress on peripheral issues ran risk of consolidating status quo on central issues. From German perspective, every arrangement with Soviets which did not have effect of improving German situation would create problems for German public opinion. Constant reiteration of basic Western aims and purposes would reassure Germans these were being kept in mind and would make it easier for Germans to support initiatives with Soviets. Schroeder expressed particular appreciation in this context for President's positive reference in UN speech to need for German reunification./5/
/3/No other record of this meeting has been found.
/4/A memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR.
/5/For text of President Kennedy's September 20 address before the General Assembly, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 693-698.
In subsequent luncheon discussion Secretary commented on Schroeder's earlier remark re danger that relaxation of tensions would lead to consolidation of status quo./6/ Secretary, observing this not necessarily so, said postwar experience indicated rather that tension has had a tendency to lead to consolidation of status quo as concerned division of Germany. As we move into more completely nuclear world, this tendency will increase. Secretary noted our commitment to German reunification; said question was how to achieve. Achievement unlikely through increase in tension; after all, since 1945 we have not moved one inch toward reunification. Schroeder agreed but said tension perhaps had advantage of keeping the question open. If tensions relaxed, people would tend to think of present situation as normal and to consider Germans as obstacle to understanding if they keep raising question of reunification.
/6/A memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 W EUR.
Other subjects discussed with Secretary were MLF (Secretary expressed strong feeling of President that we must proceed with MLF and stated US belief UK will join if MLF gets under way) and FRG sale of F-86s to Pakistan (to Schroeder inquiry whether delivery 80 aircraft, which MOD "in generous moment" had promised Paks, might be accomplished through US, Secretary replied he saw no advantage in middleman role for US, which would not only transfer problem to US but "make it 10 times worse"). Other subjects briefly touched on were trade with Soviet Bloc, general NATO problems, European agricultural policy and GDR status with Olympic Committee.
Schroeder's other meetings included appointments with Bundy and Sorensen, stag dinner hosted by Knappstein including Fulbright, Murrow, Foster, McGhee, Tyler, Nitze, Rostow,/7/ appearances at Steuben Day parade in NY Sept 20, lunch hosted by Amb McGhee at Middleburg Sept 22 including Ball, Murrow, and Lippmann, visit to SAC Sept 23, and lunch at Senate Sept 24 hosted by Fulbright.
/7/J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Edward R. Murrow, Director of USIA; and Walt W. Rostow, Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State.
Schroeder scheduled meet with Secretary and Lord Home in NY morning of Sept 27 and return to Bonn Sept 28 or 29.
Ball
216. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
New York, October 3, 1963, 1 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Limit Distribution.
Secto 55. Following is brief resume conversation at Gromyko's dinner Oct 2.
In addition to matters discussed tete-a-tete between Secretary and Gromyko, following subjects were discussed in post-dinner conversation on which entire group sat in:
[Here follows discussion of Laos.]
2. Gromyko then changed subject and raised Germany and Berlin along familiar Sov line, but without using acrimonious or excessive language. Expressed interest in what US meant by "possible interim arrangement" and by possibility of taking "fresh look" at problem. Noted question presence Western forces West Berlin had been stumbling block in last year's discussions during which, he contended, both sides had been very close to agreement on many other points then discussed. Stressed Sovs could not agree to indefinite presence Western forces. Secretary replied forcefully Sovs had agreed to such presence under existing agreements and now seeking reduce Western position West Berlin with no reciprocity, and this of course unacceptable to us. Questioned possibility reach final solution German problem now in view Sov position on reunification, but expressed view in meantime perhaps some arrangements could be agreed upon to improve security both sides in that area. Noted no such arrangement should be at expense our Allies.
3. Gromyko then asked about NAP. Secretary asked in return whether an NAP would apply to West Berlin, with Gromyko taking usual line that reference to Berlin in an NAP would "drown" NAP and that NAP would provide for peaceful settlement all issues without exception.
Full memcon will follow./2/
/2/SecDel/MC/93, October 4. (Ibid., POL GER)
Rusk
217. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, October 3, 1963, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER. Secret; Limit Distribution.
1215. I met for an hour today with EconMin Erhard. He opened by saying that I would probably read press reports of the Cabinet meeting of yesterday to the effect that he intended to assume an antagonistic attitude toward the Soviets. He assured me that this was not the case--that he was opposed to putting pressure on Khrushchev at this time. Khrushchev now faces both the threat of 700 million hostile Chinese and the demands of his own bourgeois community for a higher standard of living, which are together beyond his capacity to meet. In order to meet them he must build up his economy.
Erhard commented that everyone seems to agree to this, but different interpretations are drawn as to what should be done about it. Some feel that we should take advantage of Khrushchev's present weakness by allowing his situation to deteriorate to the point where is more amenable. He (Erhard), on the other hand, believes that we should not act as though Khrushchev were weak, but should attempt to negotiate with him.
Adenauer made a statement last evening to the effect that he is opposed to the current wheat sales to the Soviets. Erhard said he approves such sales if they are needed to feed the Russian population. He would not, on the other hand, be in favor of them if they are intended to build up war reserves, as some say, but which he does not himself believe. He wanted to reassure the President on these points.
I told Dr. Erhard that I was sure the President would appreciate hearing his views. I described that results of the talks between FonMin Schroeder and the President and Secretary/2/ on the question of negotiations with Soviets and reduction of tensions as being very much along the same lines and quite satisfactory to our government. Dr. Erhard said that the German public insists on linking progress in East-West relations with the German problem. There is no distrust of the United States, but we must not give the appearance that the status quo is acceptable.
/2/See Document 215.
I advised Dr. Erhard that I had, since our earlier conversation, been authorized by the President to suggest one of two dates for his consideration for his proposed visit to Washington after his inauguration: November 11-14 or November 25-27 (Deptel 920)./3/ We were for the moment keeping the matter of his visit entirely out of German Foreign Office-Embassy channels and contemplated that no public announcement would be made until after he assumed office. He indicated approval of this procedure and said he would consider the two dates and let me know his choice at the earliest possible moment.
/3/Telegram 920, October 1, recommended that no formal invitation to Erhard be issued until he actually became Chancellor, but added that the White House preferred November 11-14 or 25-27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 W GER)
Dr. Erhard continued that he was anxious to talk with the President about the tactics of dealing with Khrushchev. He felt that the economic pressures on Khrushchev are not just for wheat but against his whole economy. If the West and the Soviet Union intensify their trading relations, thereby easing Khrushchev's position, the West must at the same time obtain certain concessions on the political side. Otherwise, Khrushchev will take their help and once it is no longer needed, will resume his rigid position. The possibility for trade with the Soviets on a payments basis is limited. Their currency is not convertible, which means that all trade must be on a barter basis. They want everything from Germany but cannot give anything in return that a highly developed country like Germany can use. If the Germans extend 5-10 year credits, they would be faced with renewing them indefinitely since the Soviets would not be able to pay.
For this reason, any assistance Germany gives must be in the form of grants as a price for reunification. The Germans would, in his judgment, be willing to make a very considerable sacrifice in this regard if they were assured of positive progress toward reunification. His thinking was that the Germans would contribute industrial installations for the development of Siberia over a period of 10-20 years. In return, Khrushchev could promise a complementary "phased program" involving the wall, reunification, self-determination, and freedom for Germany.
Erhard feels that it would not be appropriate for Germany to suggest such a program, since this would run counter to Russian prestige. It would be better if the U.S. would propose that the Russians be assisted, suggesting that, at the same time, the Russians must show respect for self-determination. To gain this self-determination, the Germans themselves would make the necessary sacrifice, which has up to this point largely been borne by the US. They would convince the Soviets that Germany is not desirous of continuing the cold war.
I said that I had mentioned to the President/4/ Dr. Erhard's preliminary views on this subject, which he had expressed to me before I left for Washington. The President looked forward to discussing this matter further with Dr. Erhard when he visits the US. Dr. Erhard's views on increased trade and assistance to Russia would be of particular interest in the light of the recent Canadian wheat sale and the rapidly changing public attitude in the United States toward trade with the Soviet Union. I did, however, say that the President had suggested that it would be better not to portray German assistance to Russia as something that they owed the Soviets, or something that was in expiation for the war. Dr. Erhard agreed.
/4/See Document 214.
I queried Dr. Erhard as to whether he had given any thought to the amounts that might be involved. He replied that this would be dependent on what the Soviets would offer in return, which should amount to something more than a vague hope. He admitted the difficulties of getting any concrete agreement from the Soviets on a phased program for reunification. Khrushchev would maintain that the GDR is a sovereign state and that he could not interfere in its affairs. It was, however, necessary for the Germans to obtain something concrete, if they are to be asked to make the necessary sacrifice.
In response to my query, Dr. Erhard said that he naturally expected to visit Paris after his inauguration. He did not specify the date and I did not press him. He did say, however, that he would not discuss with General de Gaulle the question of German assistance to Russia which he had just raised with me.
Comment: Erhard's heart is in the right place, but he displays considerable political naivete in the drift of the foregoing conversation. I think we have an opportunity to help him at this stage, and that he will be especially influenced by his conversations with President and other Washington officials.
I do not believe we should discourage Erhard from using his economic tools as means improving atmosphere for East-West negotiations. We should, however, attempt to dissuade him from his tendency to think in predominantly economic terms, and try to get him to look at the Soviet-Western confrontation in broader political and strategic terms.
McGhee
218. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, October 7, 1963, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Imhof and approved in S on October 13. The source text is labeled "Part 3 of 6 parts." Couve de Murville was in the United States to attend the 18th session of the U.N. General Assembly. In addition to Germany, the Foreign Ministers discussed NATO, East-West relations, and French-U.S. relations.
SUBJECT
Relations with Germany
PARTICIPANTS
French
Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
Ambassador Alphand
M. Charles Lucet, Director of Political Affairs, Foreign Ministry
M. Pierre Pelen, French Emb.
U.S.
The Secretary
Ambassador Bohlen
Mr. William R. Tyler
Mr. Johannes V. Imhof, WE
M. Couve de Murville said that the chief French concern with regard to the current talks with the Soviets was the impact which these talks could have on Germany. France considered it essential that Germany remain firmly tied to the West. This was one reason why France concluded the Treaty of Collaboration with Germany. The talks with the Soviets could awaken in Germany a spirit of neutrality. The very basis of French policy in Europe was to prevent this.
M. Couve de Murville said that he felt certain that on this there was agreement in principle between the U.S. and France (though not necessarily with the UK) and that the differences concerned the question of tactics. Germany was a divided country, basically unhappy and extremely sensitive to changes in the relationship between the West and the Soviet Union. Nobody can assure the Germans that their problems--especially reunification--will be dealt with soon, not to speak of a settlement.
The Secretary said that we strongly support German reunification. The Oder-Neisse Line was another matter. M. Couve de Murville noted that France was the only Western country which had made a declaration on the Oder-Neisse Line. Ambassador Bohlen observed that this declaration had not been reiterated recently. M. Couve de Murville said France would gladly reiterate its declaration as soon as we made a declaration.
The Secretary said that despite our strong support for German reunification, we have not moved an inch closer toward realizing this goal. East-West tension has, therefore, not advanced the cause of reunification. On the other hand, a lessening of tension might advance this cause. In general, a detente was bound to work in favor of the West and ideologically the Chinese Communists were probably right in opposing peaceful coexistence as harmful to the Marxist-Leninist system. New opportunities might open up if Soviet controls over Eastern Europe were further loosened. For example, a change of regime in East Germany might advance the cause of reunification.
M. Couve de Murville said that he shared the view that a detente in the long run would work to the advantage of the West. The problem was what would happen in the short run. It was essential that this detente is not reached on the basis of agreements which might hurt Western interests. M. Couve de Murville illustrated this point by referring to his recent talks with German Foreign Minister Schroeder. He had told Schroeder that the best one might expect from the current series of talks with the Soviets was that they would not change the status quo. Even a crystallization of the status quo (through a non-aggression pact for instance) would be a change for the worse. Couve said that Schroeder had not agreed with him and had instead advanced the concept of "movement" in East-West relations. Couve indicated that he considered this concept harmful and that it could lead to a bitter German disillusionment. The Secretary referred again to the possibility of improvements in the Soviet satellites which could improve the situation. Couve remarked that such a development would be most welcome and would in itself represent the beginning of a detente. If such a development came about, he thought it would occur not as a result of talks or agreements but because of changes in the situation and in power relationships.
The Secretary said that the Sino-Soviet split had changed the situation in favor of the West. However, we must not count on this because it always remained in the realm of the possible that this trend might be reversed and that the Soviets and the Chinese might patch up their differences. Couve asked whether there was anything that we could do to prevent this. The Secretary said that we could see to it that the ball was kept in the game and that the talks with the Soviets be continued.
Couve took exception to this view which he said was advanced primarily by the British and which he considered dangerous. He said that from a Western point of view and particularly from a European point of view, the Soviet-Chinese split was a most encouraging development. Europe, for a long time, had felt threatened by the Soviets and Soviet involvement with the Chinese lessened Soviet pressure on Europe. It would be a mistake, however, and most harmful, to argue that because of this situation the West should "help" Khrushchev. We should, on the contrary, take fullest advantage of this split. The Secretary agreed but pointed out that we must take no action that would discourage the split from continuing. Couve felt that the best way to keep the split in exist-ence was not to interfere nor to intervene. The Secretary asked what Couve understood by "intervention". For example, would an agreement to sell wheat to the Soviets be regarded as "intervention"? Couve said that such a sale would not constitute intervention. On the other hand, to conclude agreements simply for the sake of reaching agreements would constitute intervention. Mr. Tyler asked whether, under this definition, we should overlook an improvement of the situation in Germany through Soviet action. Couve said we should not overlook such an improvement but he believed it unlikely that it would occur. The Secretary said that there was perhaps one chance in a hundred.
M. Couve de Murville then referred to the widespread feeling in Germany that they were being confronted with a choice between the U.S. and France. He said that this was also a dangerous development. It would lead the Germans to question their relationship with the West which is neither in the U.S. nor in the French interest. The uncertainties created thereby could also set in motion a trend toward neutralization. Couve said that Britain favored a neutralized Germany and the British therefore saw this problem from quite a different angle. The Secretary said that Germany may become an issue in the British elections. He said he would like to discuss the relationship with Germany in greater detail. A harmonization of U.S.-French policies would automatically dispose of this problem. One of the causes of concern in Germany was France's reduced role in NATO.
Couve agreed that this problem should be discussed in greater detail. He said that defense was one aspect of it; another, perhaps even more important aspect, was the general question of European policy, the status of European countries, and their relations toward each other. Mr. Tyler added that the relationship of the European countries to the United States was another very important part of this problem and Couve agreed.
The Secretary said that we were not at all interested in any rivalry over Germany. Of course, we had wanted to be consulted on the inclusion of Berlin in the French-German Treaty of Collaboration because of our interests and responsibilities in Berlin. It was probably unavoidable that as long as policy differences between Washington and Paris existed they would be reflected to some extent in the relations with third countries. There certainly should be no need for a "choice". Couve agreed and said that France had never posed a choice for Germany but "they" (i.e., the Germans) were being told "every day" that they had to choose./2/
/2/On October 8 Rusk and Couve de Murville continued their discussion of Germany, focusing on agricultural and military aspects of Germany's role in Europe. A memorandum of this conversation is ibid.
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