Documents 219-256
OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1963: CONVOY INCIDENTS AND CHANCELLOR ERHARD'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES
219. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, October 10, 1963, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Gromyko/Kennedy. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on October 16 and in the White House on October 21. The meeting was held at the White House. Gromyko was in the United States for the 18th session of the U.N. General Assembly. The participants also discussed bombs in orbit, the Test Ban Treaty, a non-aggression pact, observation posts, military budgets, the MLF, U.S.-Soviet relations, disarmament, and Cuba. Memoranda of all these conversations are ibid.
SUBJECT
The German Problem and West Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
US
The President
The Secretary
Ambassador Thompson
Assistant Secretary Tyler
Mr. Akalovsky, ACDA/IR
USSR
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Sukhodrev, Foreign Ministry
What were these steps [following the Test Ban Treaty]/2/ in the view of the Soviet Government? First, there was the German problem. As before, the USSR attached great importance to it. There was no need to speak at length about this, because Mr. Khrushchev had spoken in a rather detailed manner about this problem in Vienna, and this made his, Mr. Gromyko's, task that much easier. However, he wished to say that the USSR still believed that this problem was not only important but also acute. Why was it acute? Everybody knew that certain measures had been taken in connection with borders. The situation was better, and there was less tension now around, and in connection with, West Berlin. However, from the standpoint of European security and of eliminating the possibility of German aggression in the future, the Soviet Union believed that the German problem and the question of the German peace treaty must be resolved. The Soviet Union believed that on the part of the United States Government there was a lack of appreciation of the acuteness of the question of a German peace treaty from the standpoint of the prospects for lasting peace.
/2/Brackets in the source text.
Mr. Gromyko continued that the US and the USSR had exchanged views on different aspects of the question of a German peace treaty. There was no need to go into those aspects now as the President was surely familiar with them. On some, and even many, of those aspects, the position of the two sides either coincided or the differences had been narrowed. However, when the question of the presence of Western forces in West Berlin had been reached, the US and USSR disagreed and parted. He had believed that in New York and now in Washington the two sides could proceed from where they had stopped last time. However, he had unfortunately noticed that now the US Government appeared no longer to believe that this was an urgent matter. In this connection, he wished to repeat that the USSR attached great importance to the German problem and particularly to the problem of a German peace treaty. Mr. Gromyko said he would appreciate the President's comments on this matter so that the Soviet Union could acquire a deeper understanding of the US position and so that he could report the President's views to Mr. Khrushchev.
The President said we knew the priority Mr. Khrushchev attached to this matter. He had discussed the problem with Mr. Khrushchev and every time he had met with Mr. Gromyko. As far as the US was concerned, we would be glad to discuss this problem. However, the question was whether the interests of both sides could be incorporated in one agreement. The problem was of concern to both sides, and it was not a matter of desire to reach agreement but rather whether we could reach it. One of the major problems was of course that of troops, i.e., the composition and how long they would stay. Another major problem was the question of the status of West Berlin. As far as access was concerned, it appeared to be somewhat clarified and perhaps agreement could be reached on that point. The President noted that the situation had eased de facto in the last months and expressed the hope that it could be maintained that way. In any event, he did not wish to create the impression that we were not interested in discussing the problem.
Mr. Gromyko recalled the President's remark at the meeting last year/3/ about the possibility of some legal adjustments in the status of West Berlin. In this connection, he noted that he had asked the Secretary what the US meant by temporary arrangements. The USSR was interested to know what the US view was on legal adjustments in the status of West Berlin and on the meaning of the term temporary arrangements. He wondered what the expression "temporary arrangements" meant in terms of time because arrangements covering one, or two, or three, or ten, or twenty years would be of course quite different things. He said he would appreciate a more detailed exposition of US views on this point.
/3/See Document 135.
The Secretary commented that we were concerned by the use on the part of the USSR of the term "permanent", which created the impression that we wanted to keep our troops forever. In this connection, he recalled his remark to Mr. Gromyko in New York/4/ that all existing arrangements were temporary, and that there were two things wrong with the Soviet proposals regarding troops in West Berlin. The first point was that the Soviet proposal provided for intermingling other forces with Western forces, and this only in West Berlin and not throughout Berlin. The second point was that the Soviet proposal provided for a time limit, something like five years, without agreement as to what would happen afterwards. What we meant when we used the term "temporary" was "pending final settlement". If the USSR were to say now that it would agree to the stationing of Western forces in West Berlin pending a final and definite settlement of the total German problem, then we could see how stability could be added to access and to internal arrangements. In other words, we had to agree on the full scope of the problem in the final analysis. The US was not thinking in terms of permanency but in terms of temporariness pending a final settlement. Meanwhile we could see what we could do to stabilize the situation.
/4/See Document 216.
Mr. Gromyko commented this was not much of a fresh look.
The President observed that perhaps things were better than they looked. Over the past several months we had done a considerable amount of pulling and hauling in our country, and considering the internal and external difficulties of both of our countries they had done quite well. He said he was rather more optimistic than pessimistic. In this connection, he recalled the 1961 unamimous resolution by Congress against trade with the Soviet Union and noted that now a big wheat deal had been made, which was a change in US policy. The Test Ban Agreement, the understanding regarding weapons in outer space, and the Civil Air Agreement were all signs of an improvement in the situation.
Mr. Gromyko said the President was right that the atmosphere had improved, but noted that unresolved questions remain unresolved questions. In any event, he thought it was his duty to raise this matter and to try to convince the US Government and the President personally that both countries should seek possibilities for resolving it. He wondered whether he could tell the Soviet Government and Mr. Khrushchev personally that the President still attached importance to the German problem and that the United States Government would continue efforts to seek a solution with the USSR and the other parties concerned.
220. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/
Washington, October 11, 1963, 10:07 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 38-10. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Drafted and approved by Davis. Also sent to Bonn, London, Paris, and Berlin and repeated electronically to the White House.
1155. Secretary summoned Ambassador Dobrynin at 9:00 a.m. October 11 and described the situation at Babelsberg check point where eighteen U.S. vehicles are being detained by Soviet armed forces./2/ Secretary pointed out this is same convoy which was held up at Marienborn check point yesterday and which after being detained for several hours was finally permitted to proceed on autobahn eastward. Pointed out that this was a unilateral attempt by the Soviets to change well-established procedures and the use of force to do so. Commented it sets back all the efforts we have been making to solve issues between us.
/2/Convoy U.S. 27 had arrived at the Marienborn checkpoint at 8:59 a.m. on October 10. It was held up for nearly 24 hours because the Soviets demanded that all passengers dismount for a head count. After being released just after midnight on October 10, it was again detained at the Babelsberg checkpoint and surrounded by Soviet APCs with loaded and uncovered machine guns. A detailed chronology of this and related incidents, October 9-13, was transmitted in telegram 478 from Berlin, October 13. (Ibid.)
Expressed hope that seriousness incident would be brought to personal attention of Khrushchev.
Dobrynin disclaimed any knowledge of most recent incident but commented message had gone out to Moscow last night regarding first incident that everything was in order.
Secretary again reiterated our great concern at the direct use of force to change well-established and existing procedures and asked Dobrynin to inform Foreign Minister Gromyko immediately as well as Moscow./3/
Rusk
/3/At 10:46 a.m. the Department of State advised the Embassy in Moscow that Kohler should see the Acting Soviet Foreign Minister or highest available Foreign Ministry official to repeat and underline the representations that Rusk had made to Dobrynin. (Telegram 1177 to Moscow, October 11; ibid.)
221. Memorandum of Conference With President Kennedy/1/
Washington, October 11, 1963, 12:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President, Berlin Convoy Incidents. Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith.
SUBJECT
Berlin
OTHERS PRESENT
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
General Taylor
Ambassador Thompson
Assistant Secretary Nitze
Deputy Assistant Secretary Richard Davis (State)
General Clifton
Mr. David Klein
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Bromley Smith
Secretary Rusk reported to the President that Russian Ambassador Dobrynin had been told of the holdup of the U.S. convoy./2/ The Russians were told that hours were of great importance in resolving this question. Both Dobrynin and Gromyko appeared to be upset on hearing of the blocking of the U.S. convoy./3/
/2/See Document 220.
/3/This reference and ones later in the memorandum indicate that Gromyko had been apprised of the convoy incident. Presumably this happened at the dinner Rusk gave for Gromyko at 8:15 on October 10, but no conclusive evidence has been found to determine when Gromyko was informed.
Secretary Rusk said we should go ahead and assemble the tripartite Free Style forces/4/ but he believed that a larger allied force should also be brought to a state of readiness. He favored a unit as large as that called Trade Winds./5/ He said the four Ambassadors would meet again at 3:00 PM to report on their governments' views as to actions to be taken to end the existing situation./6/
/4/A platoon-sized probe from Helmstedt to Berlin.
/5/A battalion-sized probe from Helmstedt to Berlin.
/6/Thompson had chaired a meeting of the Ambassadorial Group at 9:30 a.m. to review Rusk's conversation with Dobrynin during the morning and a conversation with Gromyko on the previous day. He suggested to the Ambassadorial Group that a Free Style probe be assembled. (Telegram 1033 to Bonn, October 11, 12:57 p.m.; Department of State, Central Files, POL 38-8)
General Taylor noted that it would take eight days to assemble Trade Winds.
Secretary Rusk recommended that we ask our allies to approve the immediate assembly of Free Style forces. He also recommended that we ask the British and French to send in convoys for the purpose of building up allied forces blocked by the Soviets. The President doubted that we should increase the number of forces blocked, believing that the one U.S. convoy now blocked was sufficient. Secretary Rusk said we must consider all explanations of the current Soviet action in blocking our convoy. We may be heading for a major crisis with the USSR. Possibly we are coming to the end of a major Russian deception program although he personally doubted that the Russians had been attempting to deceive us by agreeing to a limited test ban treaty and by offering to purchase U.S. wheat. The Soviet action may be a reflection of divided councils in Moscow. It may be an effort to show off Soviet muscle for the benefit of the Chinese and before the forthcoming international Communist conference. The action may be the result of a local Soviet commander's unauthorized action which, for prestige reasons, Moscow has backed up. No one explanation is sufficient. If there are divided councils in Moscow, we should play out our resistance which might provide enough time to the Russians to get them back into line.
Secretary Rusk said our first effort should be to align our allies with us. They would be asked to join us in a protest note to the Russians. In response to a question as to whether the tripartite protest would be made public, Secretary Rusk said he felt that public opinion would move very fast if the convoy were not released promptly. He referred to the public position of Senator Goldwater and foresaw an immediate effect on the wheat negotiations if the present situation is not immediately clarified. If our troops have bivouacked, it is possible that the Russians would permit them to mount their trucks in the morning and pass on through. If the Russians acted this way, we would need to send immediately another U.S. convoy to make clear our right of access to Berlin.
Ambassador Thompson recalled that we had never told the Russians the dividing line between convoys which dismount and those which do not. We have never told them the specific numbers which we use to decide which is a dismounting convoy and which is not.
In response to the President's question as to how the Soviets knew what our procedures are, Mr. Nitze said the Soviets have learned on the basis of long experience with our convoys. The reason we have not told the Russians exactly what we do is because our position is that they have no right to restrict our access in any way.
The President read the attached report of the Soviet commandant's conversation with an American colonel./7/ He said it sounded as if the Russians had a final position. It did not sound as if they would be changing their view, i.e. that we have changed our procedures, thereby justifying their action in blocking the convoy.
/7/Not found.
General Taylor said we should never have started the practice of dismounting troops in the Berlin convoy. The first dismounting had been a mistake. The practice had been continued and it was now expected by the Russians.
The President expressed doubt that we should keep piling up troops at the blocking point. Secretary Rusk agreed we should not so act today.
Secretary McNamara asked that both U.S. convoys be kept in place, the small one which is blocked and a larger one which is nearby and has been cleared to proceed but is not leaving the scene until further ordered to do so. He recommended that additional large dismounting convoys be sent in both directions.
The President asked how the Soviets could extricate themselves from this situation. He thought that the only way would be for them to permit the convoy to proceed.
Secretary Rusk expressed concern that the U.S. helicopters which are flying above the blocked convoy might create an incident. The President instructed that these helicopters stay high above ground, fly over for the sole purpose of taking pictures, and then leave the scene. Secretary Rusk and General Taylor reported that we have received no information of any kind about Soviet troop movements toward the autobahn.
Ambassador Thompson, referring to the meeting of the Ambassadors in the morning, said the British were interested in knowing whether anything unusual had taken place between the Russians and the Americans prior to the blocking of the convoy. He asked that we have our officers in the field report whether any incident took place before the Soviets announced their refusal to permit the convoy to proceed.
General Taylor agreed that the big convoy, not now blocked, should stay where it is to meet the possibility that we may need additional troops on the scene. Secretary Rusk agreed with General Taylor, adding that if the big convoy left it might appear that we were abandoning the smaller convoy.
In response to the President's suggestion that a large convoy be sent to Berlin, Secretary McNamara said such a convoy could leave today from West Germany, dismount in accordance with established procedures, and proceed to Berlin unless blocked by the Russians.
Mr. Nitze asked why we should not now order the assembly of the forces called Back Stroke./8/ This force is tripartite and assembles in Berlin. It moves from Berlin to the autobahn in an effort to get to West Germany. Mr. Nitze thought we might need to use this force. Secretary Rusk replied that it would be all right to assemble this force in Berlin, but not at the checkpoint. If it appeared at the checkpoint, it might appear to the Russians to be a menacing threat with which they would have to deal for prestige reasons. Secretary McNamara said the Back Stroke force could be assembled in eight hours. The purpose of assembling it would be to add pressure against the Russians.
/8/A platoon-sized probe from Berlin to Helmstedt.
The President asked whether it was believed that if a tripartite group was allowed to pass by the Russians, other convoys would be allowed to go through.
Secretary Rusk suggested that the U.S. commandant in Berlin talk to the Soviet army official in East Germany, telling him that the blocked convoy had to go through. If the Russians have anything about allied procedures they want to discuss, they would be asked to do so. The approach to the Russians would be not to negotiate the release of the convoy, but rather to find out what the Russians are seeking to accomplish. The conversation with the Russians on allied procedures would take place only after the blocked convoy was released.
General Taylor suggested that it would be possible to send out armed U.S. bulldozers with instructions to remove the barriers blocking the convoy.
Secretary Rusk raised again the importance of a tripartite note of protest which would reflect allied agreement on how to deal with the Soviet blocking action.
Secretary McNamara commented that we need badly a face-to-face local meeting with Soviet military officials. He thought the commanders should meet at the checkpoint. We do not know how the Soviet commanders would react if confronted with a personal protest by the U.S. commander.
Secretary Rusk noted that Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had delayed his return from here to New York until noon in order to send messages to the Foreign Office.
The President summarized the actions which are to be taken immediately. A copy of these actions is attached, along with a more detailed list of actions sent to our commanders in Paris./9/
/9/The more detailed list is not attached, but the instructions were transmitted in JCS 3023, October 11, 2:55 p.m. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President, Berlin Convoy Incidents)
The President was shown a copy of the report of the Berlin commandants' meeting./10/ General Taylor added that General Lemnitzer, who was in the U.S. on vacation, is now in the Pentagon and would normally return to Paris at once.
/10/ASBCS/499/63, October 11. (Ibid.) The meeting was held at 1 p.m. Berlin time.
The President said that if we were asked what our position was now on the wheat negotiations, we should say nothing. We could say that Secretary Rusk had seen Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington and Ambassador Kohler had made protests to the Foreign Office in Moscow.
Secretary Rusk agreed that we should brush off any questions as to what effect the blocking of the U.S. convoy would have on our wheat negotiations. He noted that the Soviet trade mission to the U.S. will not leave Moscow for several days.
Mr. Bundy said that we should play the wheat card in private with the Russians before we make any reference to it in public. The President's view was that the wheat deal wouldn't mean much to the Russians if they were set on blocking our access to Berlin. Secretary Rusk added that if the incident continued to the point where we took it to the UN Security Council, then we would use the wheat sales as a major point, including efforts to persuade the Canadians not to go through with their wheat shipments to Russia.
Ambassador Thompson said he believed the incident on the autobahn had not been intentionally planned. He could not believe that the Russians would simultaneously seek to reach agreements with us and seek to block access to Berlin. Secretary Rusk agreed and commented again that Gromyko, when told of the autobahn situation, acted like a man upset. The incident may have been part of an effort to embarrass Gromyko at the exact moment when he was talking with the President. Mr. Nitze commented that the incident reflected the use of force to change existing procedures.
The President asked that the group meet again with him later in the day.
Bromley Smith/11/
/11/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Attachment/12/
/12/Secret.
RECORD OF ACTION OF MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
October 11, 1963, 12:30 P.M.
1. Send to Berlin U.S. dismounting convoy as soon as possible.
2. Instruct General Baker to ask General Ariko for meeting as soon as possible to tell Soviets blocked convoy must be allowed to pass but if Soviets want to talk about general convoy procedures apart from this special case, we are prepared to hear his views.
3. Until further decision, keep large U.S. convoy (27) bivouacked at checkpoint.
4. Seek prompt U.K. and French approval of draft tripartite note of protest to Moscow.
5. Urge U.K. and French approval of assembly of Free Style forces.
6. Urge U.K. and France to send dismounting convoys from West Germany and non-dismounting convoys from Berlin.
222. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/
Washington, October 11, 1963, 2:31 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin Convoy Incidents. Top Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Thompson and approved by Rusk. Repeated electronically to the White House.
1160. Eyes only for Kohler from Secretary. I am puzzled by the timing and motivation of Soviet action in convoy holdup on autobahn. Following possibilities occur to me:
1. That we are heading for a major crisis and that Soviet efforts in recent months were part of a huge deception effort.
2. That there has been a split in the regime in Moscow.
3. That Khrushchev, beset with other difficulties, has felt it necessary to demonstrate a forceful policy in a manner which he did not consider too dangerous, and
4. That Soviet military in Germany are trying to precipitate difficulties for one reason or another, such as preventing possible cutback in Soviet military.
Suggest you be alert to report promptly any signs that may develop in Moscow which would throw light on this problem and let me have any thoughts you have on the subject.
Rusk
223. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, October 11, 1963, midnight.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 38-10. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, London, and Paris. A notation on the source text states that it was received at 7:10 p.m. and relayed to the White House at 7:47 p.m., but it must have been available earlier since it is referred to in the meeting with the President at 5:30 p.m.; see Document 224.
1233. Subj: Detention American convoy at Babelsberg. After some delay, I was able to see Zorin at 2000 local time, after he returned to Foreign Office for purpose. (We were told yesterday Kuznetzov "out of town".) I repeated to him Secretary's instructions as received by phone from Davis,/2/ stressing: serious nature situation; unacceptability Soviet attempt change established procedures unilaterally and by force; effect in jeopardizing efforts improve relations; and incompatability with Gromyko statements to President. I asked matter be brought personal attention Khrushchev soonest.
/2/No record of this conversation has been found.
In reply to Zorin's request for details, I said I was not yet fully informed present situation, but apparently it was similar yesterday's in which Soviet officers demanded our convoy dismount in contravention customary procedure.
Zorin said Dobrynin telephoned half hour before to report Secretary's statement,/3/ but Zorin had no further details present situation Babelsberg. Concerning Marienborn incident he said convoys would not comply with usual inspection procedure, thus causing delay; when convoys complied they were allowed proceed. Zorin pointed out there is good deal of convoy traffic at present time, most convoys complied with established procedures but these did not. He said this situation represented nothing new from Sov side, but merely a refusal by US troops to meet usual demands. Zorin, in accordance with my request, would check into situation and asked us check facts as well. Khrushchev was not in town but Zorin would deliver message those acting his stead.
/3/A record of this Rusk-Dobrynin conversation is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin, Autobahn Crisis.
I pointed out that our reports on situation differed. I said my understanding was that Marienborn convoys were released without dismounting. In any case Sov function was to facilitate US passage--not grant, deny or control. I again stressed urgency of situation, saying convoys now blocked by armored cars, and publicity bound be harmful. Finally I noted that when questioned by correspondents today I said I doubted that this situation had arisen as a result of deliberate Soviet policy to cause crisis. Zorin agreed and stressed that Sov side had no intention create difficulties and that if this true of US side, all would be well.
Since my call on Zorin bound to come to attention local American correspondents, I have felt it best course to inform them without details that purpose of call was to protest, on instructions, detention of convoy by Sovs at Babelsberg.
Kohler
224. Memorandum of Conference With President Kennedy/1/
Washington, October 11, 1963, 5:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President, Berlin Convoy Incidents. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.
SUBJECT
Berlin
OTHERS PRESENT
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Ambassador Thompson
Assistant Secretary Tyler
Assistant Secretary Nitze
Assistant Secretary Manning
General Clay (JCS)
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Salinger
General Clifton
Mr. David Klein
Mr. Bromley Smith
Assistant Secretary of State Tyler opened the meeting by summarizing the Kohler/Zorin conversation in Moscow./2/ Zorin had left the impression that the Russians had no intention of causing real trouble over Berlin access and that they were not seeking to change established convoy procedures. Mr. Tyler also summarized a conversation with French Ambassador Alphand/3/ who, after receiving instructions from Paris, had said that the French approved of assembling Free Style forces, of sending additional convoys, including their own, to Berlin, and of sending a protest to Moscow immediately. In a meeting in Paris with Lyon, both Lucet and Laloy/4/ said the French Government is anxious to cooperate closely with its allies in all matters and to do everything possible to show a solid allied front.
/2/See Document 223.
/3/No record of this conversation has been found.
/4/A record of this meeting was transmitted in telegram 1768 from Paris, October 12. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 38-10)
The President asked whether it was believed that this was a significant test of our intentions. Ambassador Thompson replied that he did not believe it was a deliberate attempt at the top to cause trouble. He said minor incidents of the past few days may have stirred up lower Soviet officials who responded by blocking the convoy. He recalled that we had never given a copy of our convoy rules to the Russians. He speculated that the Russians may be trying to find out exactly when we are willing to dismount and when not. The timing of the current incident indicates, however, that someone may be stirring up trouble.
The President pointed out that the Russians say there are sixty-six men in the blocked convoy while we say there are thirty. The difference is that we subtract a driver and assistant driver for each of the eighteen vehicles in the convoy.
Ambassador Thompson called attention to the draft tripartite note which had been agreed to by the British and the French./5/
/5/A copy of the note was transmitted to Moscow in telegram 1169, October 11, 6:44 p.m. (Ibid.)
The President asked why we should not instruct our commander to tell the Russians that they must release the blocked convoy but that we were prepared thereafter to talk about existing convoy procedures. Secretary McNamara replied that we had already instructed our commander, General Baker, to do just this.
Secretary Rusk asked whether it would not be wise for Ambassador Thompson to discuss the current situation with Dobrynin again, telling him the details of our convoy dismounting practices. Mr. Nitze pointed out the difficulty of explaining allied practices which vary. He said that we must not get in a position of negotiating about procedures because our right of access if not negotiable, i.e., it arises out of our conquest of Germany.
Ambassador Thompson reported that the French had agreed to the assembly of the Free Style forces and the British Ambassador said he had sufficient authority to do so without reference to London./6/
/6/Thompson had chaired another meeting of the Ambassadorial Group at 3 p.m. during which the British and French made these statements. (Telegram 1052 to Bonn, October 11, 8:52 p.m.; ibid., POL 38-8)
The President asked whether the allies think the situation serious and whether they believe our position is justified. Ambassador Thompson replied that all agree the situation is serious, that it has been planned for, and, therefore, we should go ahead as had been agreed earlier.
The President commented that the longer the situation goes on the more serious it becomes. He believed we should make one attempt to straighten out any misunderstanding about numbers with the Russians. In the meantime, we should avoid sending convoys which fall within the disputed area.
The President instructed Ambassador Thompson to ask Ambassador Dobrynin to tell Zorin to instruct the Russian commander to meet with General Baker as soon as possible to discuss dismounting procedures. Secretary Rusk said Ambassador Thompson should tell Dobrynin of the numbers we use and explain why we are not now changing the procedures, adding that we are ready to talk procedures as soon as the convoy is released.
The President asked whether the tripartite protest could be made public. Secretary Rusk expressed the hope that the entire situation would be cleared up before the note was published.
The President agreed to Secretary Rusk's suggestion that Free Style forces be assembled first thing tomorrow rather than during the night. Secretary McNamara questioned whether we should assemble the Free Style forces. If the Russian action was the result of a mistake, the assembly of the Free Style forces would complicate Soviet efforts to correct the situation. The President said that if it takes two days to assemble the forces, he believed we should begin now to bring them together, and he instructed that the assembly begin tomorrow.
[1 paragraph (4-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
225. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, October 11, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 38-10. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Thompson.
SUBJECT
Holdup of US Convoy on Autobahn
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State
I had the Soviet Ambassador come in at 7:00 p.m. and informed him of Ambassador Kohler's conversations with Smirnovsky and Zorin/2/ on the holdup of our convoy on the autobahn. I said our position was that our right of free access to Berlin meant that we had no obligation to give notification or dismount troops in convoys, but that in order to facilitate the movement of convoys certain practices had grown up. I said Mr. Zorin seemed to be confused as he had mentioned that we dismounted whenever a convoy consisted of more than five vehicles. I said this had never been the case and he was apparently confused by the fact that we often gave the checkpoint prior notification when the convoy was larger than five vehicles. I explained what our actual practice was with regard to dismounting and gave him a factual account of what had happened in the last few days.
/2/Regarding the conversation with Zorin, see Document 223; the conversation with Smirnovsky has not been further identified.
When the Ambassador asked what I wanted him to do, I urged that he explain the facts to Mr. Zorin and urge that our convoy be allowed to proceed. At first the Ambassador was very reluctant, and did not seem convinced by my arguments.
At this time, General Clay telephoned me and gave me a list of the dates of our convoys of similar size since May first, including number of vehicles and number of men involved. I pointed out that only two had been held up and these for short periods of time.
The Ambassador seemed impressed by this list and particularly the fact that similar convoys had been passed on August twenty-sixth and September thirtieth.
I also pointed out that the Soviets now knew that the information we had given them concerning the number of men in the disputed convoy was accurate and there was, therefore, no longer any reason to hold it up.
He said of course that the question of principle and procedure was now involved, but agreed to send a message to Zorin promptly. He indicated that he and Gromyko had been quite upset over this incident and the attention being given to it in the press.
I also referred to the difficulty which this caused us and the setback to our efforts to improve relations.
As he was leaving, he said it was incomprehensible to him how this could have happened.
226. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, October 12, 1963, 3 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 38-10. Secret; Flash. Received at 10:33 p.m. on October 11 and relayed to the White House, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA at 11:20 p.m. Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, Paris, and London.
1234. Zorin summoned me to FonOff at 10:30 pm local time to inform me that after my earlier demarche/2/ Sov authorities had made thorough investigation of Berlin situation and had ascertained that situation described by me did not correspond to facts./3/
/2/See Document 223.
/3/Shortly before noon October 12, the Soviets removed the vehicles blocking Convoy U.S. 27 and processed the convoy into Berlin.
According to Zorin, facts were that early this morning convoy consisting of 18 vehicles, 61 men, appeared at checkpoint, refused comply with established procedures and was held up. Such refusal, said Zorin, was clearly in violation of agreed understanding that personnel in convoys of more than five vehicles were obliged to dismount. Shortly thereafter a second convoy consisting of 27 vehicles and 140 personnel complied with existing procedures and thus was cleared by Soviet authorities. Thereupon a US Army major appeared on the scene and informed Sov officer in charge at checkpoint that convoy which had already been cleared would not proceed until other convoy also cleared. When Sov officer in charge refused to accede to US officer's demand latter ordered the second convoy to stand in place and as result both convoys remain at checkpoint. Thus, according to Zorin, it is crystal clear from carefully checked facts that there has been no violation of established procedures on part Sov authorities, that hold up is result of deliberately planned maneuver of US military authorities in Berlin who have themselves attempted unilaterally to change existing procedures and establish new ones. It is obvious to the Sov Govt that the US military authorities in Berlin have incorrectly informed the US Govt of the situation at checkpoint and have deliberately acted in such a way as to complicate situation.
Zorin continued that Sov military authorities are under strict orders to carry out established procedures; if US authorities should abide by such procedures then there would be no problem. Appropriate instructions, therefore, should be given to US military authorities to comply with procedures and to avoid complicating situation in Berlin. With regard to general Sov policy, Zorin said Sov Govt stands for peace, has no intention of doing anything to worsen existing relationships. For reasons he had stated Zorin said Sov Govt could not accept protest which I had made in earlier meeting.
In reply I questioned Zorin's statement with regard to what he referred to as an agreed understanding that convoys of more than five vehicles were subject to the dismounting procedure. I said that in my long experience with Berlin problems I had never heard that such an agreement existed. My understanding was that the principal requirement was that Sov authorities should be in a position to estimate the number of personnel in a particular convoy and if for this purpose dismounting should be required then it would be so ordered by the convoy commander. Meanwhile I could assure him that our military authorities had strict instructions to comply with established procedures but also were obliged to insure that existing procedures were not changed unilaterally by Sov authorities. Obviously then our military authorities regarded the requirement to dismount in this case as a deviation from standing procedures on the part of Sov authorities and thus they had refused to comply. While I would, of course, report Zorin's remarks immediately to my govt, I hoped that current situation could be liquidated and convoys permitted to proceed. If the problem had arisen as a result of disagreement between us as to what size convoy should be subjected to the dismounting procedure, then perhaps this was a question which should be discussed between us later.
Zorin countered with a reiteration of his argument that the present crisis had arisen because of the refusal of one convoy to comply with the procedure with which similar convoy had complied. He could see no logic in this. He pointed out that from time to time our military authorities have deliberately created incidents which complicate the situation in Berlin; the last of these took place in May when a convoy was also delayed for several hours. In his view, if US military authorities would comply with existing procedures in every case then there would be no incident.
I again told Zorin that in my view there was clearly a difference between us as to what constituted normal practices and procedures. So far as I was aware there existed no agreement as to what size convoy should be subject to the dismounting procedure; our authorities followed the practice of dismounting only to facilitate a determination by Sov authorities as to number of personnel in the convoy. In all honesty and contrary to his assertion, we had had the impression that the Sov military, to use a phrase I had sometimes heard, were trying to "tread on our corns".
Zorin said he could not agree. It was perfectly clear from the facts of the situation that Sov authorities had not introduced nor did they intend to introduce any change in existing procedures. On the other hand, it was equally clear that our military authorities wished precisely to do this. In Zorin's view, refusal to comply with existing procedures was a deliberate act on the part of our military authorities.
I again assured Zorin I would report his remarks and once more expressed the hope that the present tension could be removed. Subsequently we could discuss in the proper forum what was an obvious disagreement as to established procedures. Meanwhile I could assure Zorin that neither the US Govt nor US military authorities had attempted to change what we understand as established procedures.
Zorin concluded the conversation by expressing the hope that our military authorities would be given instructions to comply with existing procedures.
Kohler
227. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko/1/
October 12, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 36 GER. Secret. Drafted by Rusk on October 14.
While I was in Cincinnati at the Hebrew Union College on Saturday, October 12, Mr. Gromyko called me from New York. His mood was friendly and he used my first name throughout.
He opened by saying that he had received additional information from Moscow containing details from their military in Germany, in which he expressed confidence, to the effect that United States military in Germany had attempted to change existing procedures on the autobahn. He emphasized (a) that it was not the Soviet intention to change existing procedures in any respect and that it was important for both sides (and he repeated both sides) to adhere meticulously to existing arrangements; (b) he wished to underline strongly what Mr. Zorin had told Ambassador Kohler, namely, that the Soviet Government did not wish to create any incidents with respect to Berlin which might increase tensions; (c) he was most anxious that the recent incident on the autobahn not be interpreted as limiting or cutting across what Mr. Gromyko had said to the President about Soviet general policy during his visit at the White House. He asked me personally to look into the recent incident to see if I would not agree that our own military had attempted to change existing procedures.
I told him that I had looked into these procedures in considerable detail but that I would review it again. I said that our view was that our military had indeed complied with procedures well established by practice and that the incident arose because of what seemed to us to be a unilateral effort by Soviet military to interfere with such existing procedures. I told him that some misunderstanding might have been possible because the Soviets may not themselves be clear as to our own procedures. I said that we could not accept any limitation of our rights of access by agreements on procedures that in any way limited such access but that Ambassador Thompson had talked about our practice with Ambassador Dobrynin and I felt that this could help to clarify the situation. I also expressed appreciation for what I felt had been the effort made by Mr. Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin to get the recent incident resolved as quickly as possible. He indicated his unhappiness about the recent treatment of the autobahn incident in the American press, and I told him that we were attempting to help the press to keep the matter in perspective and hoped their people would do the same.
With regard to a General Assembly resolution on bombs in orbit, I told Mr. Gromyko that Ambassador Stelle and Mr. Foster would be available in New York, beginning on Monday, and that Ambassador Stelle was in New York over the weekend if he were needed for any points of clarification. He indicated that he would probably not take up the matter before Monday.
DR
228. Memorandum From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations/1/
Washington, October 15, 1963, 7:43 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 38-10. Secret; Immediate. Drafted in the Berlin Task Force and cleared by Ausland, Davis, G/PM, and the Department of Defense (ISA). Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, London, Paris, Moscow, U.S. Element Live Oak, CINCEUR, USAREUR, SHAPE, USAFE, and CINCLANT.
Topol 481. Ref: Polto 441--NAC Agenda--Berlin./2/ Paris deliver Durbrow 8 a.m. October 16. US Rep should convey following to NAC October 16 as Department's preliminary assessment Soviet motives and conduct in Autobahn incidents.
/2/Polto 441, October 11, transmitted the agenda for the October 16 North Atlantic Council meeting. (Ibid., NATO 3-1)
Our review of probable Soviet motives suggests that delay US convoys Autobahn October 10 to 12 did not mark any shift in Soviet policy either with respect Soviet efforts to secure general easing of international tensions or with respect to continued Soviet efforts to press for small unilateral advantages on Berlin scene.
On basis our preliminary reconstruction events, we believe USSR did not intend to bring about major confrontation last week, and train events may have been set in motion by no higher ranking a person than Marienborn checkpoint commander. His move was supported by his superiors and apparently also at ministerial level in Moscow. Higher level Soviet authorities may not have been fully informed concerning US criteria in accordance with which troops are dismounted from vehicles as a matter of courtesy. Release of convoy at Babelsberg on Saturday may well have been result of Presidium-level intervention when it became apparent that broader foreign policy goals were in jeopardy.
This interpretation of events does not, however, absolve Moscow from responsibility for continuing Soviet efforts to erode Western rights in Berlin and on access routes. So long as day-to-day practice calls for making attempts at nibbling away at Western rights and imposing tighter controls, possibilities will exist that further serious incidents may occur on Autobahn or other routes to Berlin and in City./3/
/3/The Mission at Berlin and the Embassy in Moscow evaluated the events quite differently. In telegram 479 from Berlin, October 13, Hulick concluded that the Soviet action "was deliberate and had both important tactical and political motives." It seemed clear that the Soviet Union had the "aim of stepping on corns as general and overriding goal from the beginning." The convoy was released only when it became clear that the United States would not change its Autobahn procedures and after the crisis had escalated sufficiently to constitute a serious issue for the United States at a high political level. (Ibid., POL 38-10) In telegram 1253 from Moscow on October 13, Kohler reported his conviction that the Soviet Government had not intended to provoke an incident at that time. He speculated that mid-level Soviet authorities in Germany had initiated the incident, possibly after a routine check with Moscow, and concluded that there was probably considerable confusion on the Soviet side about U.S. convoy procedures, a fact that contributed to the problem. (Ibid.)
In event NATO Reps inquire under what circumstances troops are dismounted from convoys you may inform them that principal criterion is number of troops in convoy; in general, we dismount convoys which include 31 or more personnel in addition to driver and assistant driver of each vehicle (we also informed Soviets of above 31 figure during the course of the discussions which took place at the time of last week's crisis). We did not and do not concede that Soviets have any legal or other right to demand dismounting of more than 30-man convoys. We exercise this action at our own initiative as a matter of simple administrative procedure to facilitate processing through checkpoints. Smaller groups clearly do not require dismounting since number of men in group can be quickly and easily calculated.
Rusk
229. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, October 18, 1963, 11:40 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 38-10. Confidential; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ausland on October 17; cleared by Clay, Rusk (in draft), Tyler, Klein, the Department of Defense (ISA), L, and GER; and approved by Davis. Repeated to Paris, Berlin, London, Moscow, U.S. Element Live Oak, SHAPE, CINCEUR, USAREUR, and USAFE.
1130. Paris also for USRO. Ref: Berlin 504, Bonn 1378./2/ Subject: Allied Autobahn Convoys.
/2/Dated October 16, telegram 504 from Berlin reported that at their meeting on that day, the Berlin Commandants agreed that the only way to settle Autobahn harassments was to make convoy procedures "cut and dried" and convey them to the Soviet Union at a high level. (Ibid.) Telegram 1378 from Bonn, also dated October 16, summarized a meeting of the Bonn Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group that day, which discussed a British convoy that was being held up by the Soviet Union. The Group agreed that convoy procedures should be harmonized and the Soviet Union notified about the agreed procedures. (Ibid.)
1. Possibility exists we may be faced with Soviet challenge on autobahn in effort to impose new convoy procedures, this despite Gromyko's categorical assurances to Secretary that Soviets were not trying to change procedures or cause incidents. Therefore, planning should proceed on this assumption.
2. Soviets have been trying for some time to alter established procedures for Allied autobahn convoys, as they relate to advance notification and dismounting. They have also been trying to get US to adopt British and French practice of lowering tailgates on request, although US vehicles are so constructed as to make this unnecessary.
3. Question of advance notification has had checkered career over the years, with practices varying widely. In recent past, however, Soviets have sought to demand that the checkpoint be informed in advance of all convoys of more than five vehicles. Although not accepting this requirement, Allies have so composed their convoys as to avoid issue.
4. So far as we are aware, dismounting to be counted is relatively new practice, introduced by US convoy commander for first time when US augmentation battle group sent to Berlin in August, 1961. Soviets apparently took liking to practice and it became standard part of convoy ritual. Allied practices have varied from time to time, and Soviet desires have never been entirely clear.
5. During 1962 Allied authorities in Bonn and Berlin unsuccessfully attempted to reach agreement on standard procedures. This attempt apparently failed because US and French were unwilling to adopt UK procedures. These went too far to meet Soviet demands, which US and French deemed unreasonable. British were unwilling to adopt US procedures since to do so would require them in effect to engage in a roll-back vis-?-vis the Soviets. Bonn Embassies recommended to governments that they agree to disagree on procedures but to back each other in case of trouble. UK Foreign Office approved this recommendation and declined our (bilateral) proposal to consider question in Ambassadorial Group.
6. Recent Soviet actions have focused attention again on procedural differences. Three Commandants in Berlin have suggested common procedures to Live Oak and recommended that Soviets not be informed of differing Allied procedures until attempt made to agree on common procedures (Berlin 504). Quadripartite Bonn Ambassadorial Group (Bonn 1378) has recommended to governments and Washington Ambassadorial Group that Soviets be informed of Allied procedures in such a way as to preclude negotiations on procedures. It has also recommended that this should be done independently of harmonization but that subsequent attempt be made to harmonize procedures in such way as to avoid weakening our position.
7. We propose now to take up following questions on urgent basis in Ambassadorial Group:
a. Should Allied governments make another attempt to agree on harmonized procedures?
b. Whether procedures are harmonized or not, should Allies inform Soviets of their procedures?
c. If so, in what form and where?
In view opportunity presented by recent incidents, we believe we should make serious new effort harmonize procedures. We are mindful, however, that convoy procedures, even on three disputed questions, are complicated, and it may not be easy to work out agreed formulae. We are now awaiting General Lemnitzer's recommendations (Berlin 504).
9. Whether we can agree on procedures or not, we are also inclined support recommendations of Commandants and Bonn Ambassadors that we inform Soviets. (We have already given Soviets certain information on dismount procedure in connection recent convoy incident.)
10. Our attitude toward locale for informing Soviets will depend on whether Allies agree on procedures. If we do, we would favor aide-memoire delivered in Moscow. If we do not, we would favor capitals.
Rusk
230. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, October 21, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin, Convoy Procedures. Secret.
SUBJECT
Agenda for Meeting on Berlin (Military Convoys) at 5PM Today
1. Soviet intentions in autobahn incidents of last week. (John McCone is prepared to lead off.)
2. Notifying the Soviets of our procedures. (Secretary Ball will lead off.)
(a) There is a consensus that the Soviets ought to be notified. Only General Lemnitzer disagrees.
(b) The proposal is that notification should take the form of a letter from General Freeman, USAREUR, to his Soviet counterpart. A copy of such a letter is attached as Tab A./2/
/2/ Neither Tab A nor Tab B was attached to the source text, but copies of the letter and the timetable (scenario) are attached to a memorandum from Tyler to Rusk, October 21, which outlines the questions to be covered during the meeting with the President, and concludes that the United States should be under no illusion that harmonizing procedures and explaining them to the Soviet Union would avoid future incidents. It would, however, maximize Allied unity on access and put the West in the best public relations posture. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 38-10)
(d) There is agreement that this step should be supplemented by a meeting between the Secretary of State (or Ambassador Thompson) and Dobrynin informing the Soviet Ambassador of the Freeman letter and stressing the seriousness with which we view the autobahn incidents of last week. My own view is that this one should be done first, to give the Soviet political leadership control of the matter from the start. You may not want to decide this until Thompson returns from Turkey. (He'll be back later tonight.)
3. Scheduling future convoys. (Bob McNamara or General Taylor will lead.)
(a) There is State-DOD agreement that a non-dismount convoy should be run lest the option for such convoy be lost by disuse.
(b) The next non-dismount convoy is scheduled for Friday, Oct. 25. This probably will not run on schedule. The consensus is that this convoy should go after the Soviets are notified. A proposed timetable for notifying the Soviets and running the next convoy is attached as Tab B.
Note: At this juncture, the British are prepared to go along with our notification procedure. The French do not agree but will not obstruct notification.
McG. B.
231. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, October 21, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin, Convoy Procedures. Secret. Drafted by David Klein and William Y. Smith.
SUBJECT
Meeting with the President, Monday, October 21, 5:00 p.m., in the Cabinet Room--Berlin Convoy Procedures
PARTICIPANTS
The President
State
Under Secretary George Ball
Mr. William Tyler
Mr. Richard Davis
Mr. John Ausland
CIA
Director John McCone
Mr. Janney
Mr. Whitman
Defense
Secretary Robert McNamara
General Maxwell Taylor
Mr. Paul Nitze
Brigadier General Lucius Clay, Jr.
White House
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. David Klein
Lt Colonel W. Y. Smith
After discussion on the recent convoy problems with the Soviets, the President decided:
1. The Soviet Union should be informed of US convoy procedures.
2. The US procedures--harmonized with UK but not involving visible change in US position/1/--should be passed to Ambassador Dobrynin to give the Soviet political leadership rather than the military authorities control of the matter from the start.
/1/This phrase was added by hand, apparently by Bundy.
3. The Soviets should be advised of existing national convoy procedures. Nevertheless, the Allies should attempt to achieve de facto harmonization of these procedures.
4. The next non-dismountable US convoy should be scheduled after Ambassador Dobrynin has been informed of the procedures, with the exact timing of the convoy to be decided later.
DK WYS
232. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Bonn, October 25, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by McGhee and approved in S on November 7. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Secto 2 from Bonn, October 26. (Ibid., Central Files, ORG S)
SUBJECT
U.S.-German Relations
East-West Relations
PARTICIPANTS
United States
Secretary Rusk/2/
/2/Rusk visited Germany October 25-27 for ceremonies connected with the dedication of a memorial to General George C. Marshall.
Ambassador McGhee
Germany
Chancellor Erhard
State Secretary Westrick
Dr. Osterheld, Office of the Chancellor
The Secretary of State met with Chancellor Erhard October 25. There were present, in addition to myself, State Secretary Westrick and Dr. Osterheld from the Chancellor's Office. The Chancellor welcomed the Secretary and expressed the pleasure it gave him to be able to receive Mr. Rusk. He reiterated that Germany would continue to be loyal to the NATO alliance and to the United States. He was glad to report that the opposition had, up to this point, received favorably the policy statement he had made upon assuming office with his new Government.
The Secretary said that he in turn wished to congratulate the Chancellor upon his new position. The Chancellor's policy statement had received a very favorable response in the United States. Both the President and he looked forward to the Chancellor's visit to the United States. In the meantime, Under Secretary Ball would be visiting Bonn and could go over with him the various matters which might be the subject of discussion in Washington.
The Chancellor said that when he was in Washington he would reaffirm the understanding that existed between the two countries. There is, he said, complete confidence in the U.S. on the part of the German Government and members of the Bundestag. However, public reaction is more volatile. There is "a lingering fear in the public mind that troops will be reduced in the future."
The Secretary reassured the Chancellor that he would deal with this matter in his Frankfurt speech./3/ He said he wished to emphasize in this connection the burdens that the U.S. had borne in the post-war period. For example, the United States has since 1945 sustained 100,000 casualties in the cold war, and has casualties every day in South Viet-Nam. He was afraid that expressions in the German press of distrust toward the United States had caused a bad reaction in our country.
/3/For text of Rusk's address on October 27, see Department of State Bulletin, November 11, 1963, pp. 726-731.
The Chancellor said that the German questions about retention of United States forces and continuing interest in Germany should be considered as a "mark of respect" for the United States. Germans are dismayed at the possibility of "getting out of touch" with the United States. There is no possibility for the defense of Germany unless America is "in on it". The public reaction was not altogether rational, but it was a factor which had to be taken into account. He sometimes felt that the German people panic into too high a state of excitement in the face of an uncertainty. This happened during the recent autobahn incidents. Erhard said he would make his own position perfectly clear when he was in the United States.
The Secretary agreed that both governments should be mindful of one another's public opinion problems. He asked the Chancellor what the reaction of the German people would be if they knew how much actual atomic strength presently existed in Germany in U.S. custody.
Chancellor Erhard said the people were advised on this point, but there would be no adverse reaction if they had even more information.
The Secretary said that he was struck by the great opportunity which leaders such as the Chancellor and President Kennedy had at the present time. Very great historical changes were in progress. Any such situation had its risks but also offered opportunities.
The Chancellor said that he too felt that the speed of change in the world was greater than ever before. The West should be firm with regard to principles, but not rigid tactically. He hoped to talk with the President about a number of things. There were a number of questions in his mind. What had motivated the Russians in the recent autobahn incident? Was it to show strength in the face of a possible suspicion of weakness or was it to build up bargaining points to use in later negotiations?
The Secretary replied that several explanations could be offered for Soviet actions on the autobahn. One, which he had considered, was that the people on the spot had probably suspected that we were trying to tighten up our dismount procedures and reacted without advice from Moscow. He was convinced that neither Dobrynin nor Gromyko knew of the incident. Once they were apprised of it, they had attempted to iron matters out. There was certainly no evidence that Moscow had originated the incident.
Erhard said a new uncertainty would be added to the situation if, in addition to Khrushchev's power, there was some independent military power in the Soviet Union.
The Secretary said that he did not believe that Khrushchev himself had stimulated the autobahn incident. If he had done so, it would in all probability have been more serious. The Soviet representatives at the checkpoint would not in the end have accepted our existing procedures. He pointed out that our own bureaucracy sometimes gets into the same sort of situation as the Russian representatives on the autobahn did. Admittedly, however, the subsequent incident affecting a UK dismount convoy looked different. He was not sure that the explanation of the first convoy incident still held good for the second.
Chancellor Erhard asked if there were any other suggestions which were being considered for discussion by the United States with the Soviets.
The Secretary said that prospects for further discussions were not very good. He wanted to make it clear that there was at the present time no detente. There was, so to speak, only a hunting license for a detente. The nonaggression pact was dead because the Soviets would not come clean on Berlin. The observation post negotiations were dead because the Soviets associated them with nuclear free zones. The question of agreement on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons was dead because the Soviets linked it with MLF. There was no agreement on Cuba or Laos.
It was possible that we might make a limited agreement in the field of civil aviation exchanging one or two civil flights a week. There might be some increased trade with the Soviets, but not much, because there was not much that Americans wished to buy from the Soviet Union. The Soviets had proposed to decrease defense budgets. However, this was unacceptable to the United States in the absence of inspection. The big problems with Russia still remain unsolved.
The Secretary said that in his opinion complete agreement with the Soviets will take a long time and will be achieved only through small steps. There is no possibility of moving rapidly to a detente. At the same time there is danger of people thinking there is a detente which does not exist.
233. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, October 26, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.
SUBJECT
United States Policy Toward German Proposals to Buy Reunification Through Economic Assistance to Soviet Union
Approaching political problems as a retired professor of economics, Chancellor Erhard is preoccupied with the thought that West Germany might buy an agreement for reunification from the Russians through the use of their industrial capability. While the idea is apparently still in an inchoate state, the general scheme would be to offer the Soviet Union grants or long-term loans of perhaps $2.5 billion a year for ten or more years in consideration that the Soviets agree to a phased program of self-determination for Germany. This proposal has been reflected in telegrams from George McGhee reporting conversations with Erhard, Axel Springer (the publisher), and Westrick (Erhard's assistant)./2/ A similar idea was suggested in Rostow's talk with Muller-Roschach./3/
/2/McGhee reported on his conversation with Springer in telegram 1278 from Bonn, October 9. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 EUR-W GER; summarized in An Ambassador's Account, pp. 99-100) He described his conversation with Ludgar Westrick in telegram 1481 from Bonn, October 21. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER)
/3/A memorandum of Rostow's conversation with Herbert Muller-Roschach, Head of the Planning Staff of the German Foreign Ministry, on October 8, is ibid.
Chancellor Erhard has now indicated that he plans to discuss this proposal with you during his visit next month. Prior to Erhard's visit, Ambassador Thompson and I are planning to have preliminary talks with him and other members of his Government so as to make sure that his first visit will be substantively fruitful.
The Erhard proposal springs, I think, from the healthy feeling that Germany should itself make some contribution toward bringing about reunification. At the same time, the Germans fear that the United States might reach agreements with the Soviet Union that would have the effect--intentionally or otherwise--of consolidating the status quo, including the division of Germany. In these circumstances we must be careful in dealing with any Germany initiative not to contribute to that fear.
With this in mind, I would propose that Ambassador Thompson and I should take the following line in talking with Chancellor Erhard:
1. We should express the readiness of the USG to examine with great care and seriousness any German proposal.
2. We should express the opinion that there is almost no possibility that the Soviets would seriously consider such a deal at the present time.
3. We should state that any arrangement involving self-determination for Germany would raise broad questions of European security as the Soviets would certainly insist upon security provisions such as the denuclearization of Germany, withdrawal of foreign troops and bases, etc. If the Germans, therefore, wish to pursue their ideas they should come up with a complete plan which would show how they would plan to deal with these problems.
4. Any settlement of this nature would involve United States, British, and French interests and we, therefore, believe that the Germans should approach all three Powers at the same time.
5. Our general purpose should be to discourage such a German initiative, at least in its present half-baked and unrealistic form. At the same time we should avoid discouraging the Germans from working at the problem and trying to find fresh approaches under which the Germans could themselves make a major contribution.
6. The attached talking points might be useful in this connection./4/
/4/Not printed.
George W. Ball
234. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, November 4, 1963, 1:47 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 38-10. Secret; Flash. Drafted and initialed by Ausland and approved and initialed by Thompson. Repeated to Berlin, Paris, London, Moscow, SHAPE, U.S. Element Live Oak, CINCEUR, USAREUR, and USAFE.
1344. Paris also pass USRO. Subject: US Autobahn Convoy.
1. Secretary called in Soviet Charge (Kornienko) at 11:30 am Washington time. He said that he wanted to see Kornienko on a serious matter which involved a US convoy which was being held up on the autobahn./2/ The Secretary said he was astonished by this in view of the background of the past few weeks. Following October 10 convoy incident Gromyko phoned Secretary in Cincinnati/3/ and assured him Soviets were not trying to change existing procedures and that it was important that both followed existing procedures. In order to avoid any misunderstanding we had informed local Soviet military authorities in Germany last Tuesday of procedures which in substance were those we had followed for years./4/ Present convoy was well within non-dismount limits set forth in our procedures. Secretary then recounted discussion at checkpoint regarding dismounting and lowering tailgates. Latter request had been rejected because tailgates of vehicles in question were under height established by our procedures. Procedures in question were for convenience of both US and Soviets. US convoy commander had in fact first (in 1961) ordered his troops to dismount in order to facilitate processing. This problem did not arise with small convoys. Since we are not trying to change procedures and Gromyko and Yakubovsky had said they were not trying to change them we are puzzled as to why incident arose. Secretary said he need not remind Kornienko of why we attached importance to question of convoy procedures. In addition, these incidents hamper effort to reach agreement on one or another matter since incident of this sort attracts world-wide attention.
/2/On November 4 the Embassy in Bonn had, in a Flash telegram received in the Department of State at 5:02 a.m. that day, reported that U.S. Convoy T-1 was being detained at Marienborn due to Soviet insistence that the men in the back of the trucks dismount. (Telegram 1651; ibid.)
/3/See Document 227.
/4/On October 19 General Lemnitzer had transmitted his recommendations for harmonizing Western procedures for convoys on the Autobahn. (SHLO 9-00085; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin, Autobahn Crisis) These recommendations were discussed by the Washington Ambassadorial Group and approved by the four Western governments, subject to a few changes, on October 24. (Telegram 1233 to Bonn, October 14; Department of State, Central Files, POL 38-10) The new procedures were explained to Soviet authorities on October 29; see The New York Times, November 7, 1963.
Kornienko said that he had no information on this incident. He understood that Soviet military authorities had made no change in their requirements. If these are complied with there will be no trouble. Kornienko also suggested that there had been an agreement to dismount from convoys of more than five vehicles. The Secretary said that the five vehicle figure was related to advance notification.
Thompson reminded Kornienko of the information he had given Dobrynin regarding previous small convoys./5/
/5/See Document 225.
Secretary asked Kornienko to inform Moscow promptly. He also asked Kornienko to inform Dobrynin since Secretary may wish to speak to him in near future.
Rusk
235. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, November 4, 1963, 11 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 38-10. Secret; Immediate. Received at 6:58 p.m. and passed to the White House at 7:50 p.m. and to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, and the CIA at 8:03 p.m. Repeated to Berlin, Moscow, Paris, London, USAREUR, CINCEUR, and U.S. Element Live Oak.
1677. Paris also for USRO and Burns; USAREUR and CINCEUR for POLADs. Autobahn convoy.
1. If, despite approach to Sov Charge and setting of time limit,/2/ Sovs continue block passage of convoy, I believe we should follow two-pronged course designed (a) to put maximum pressure on SovGovt from point of view its relations with US and (b) to intensify confrontation on Autobahn (without any threat of resort to arms) to point where Sovs realize we not likely to back down and Sov posture of detente placed in jeopardy.
/2/Regarding the approach to the Soviet Charge, see Document 234. At 10 p.m. the U.S. Provost Marshal with the convoy had delivered a 2-hour time limit ultimatum for release of the convoy; at midnight, when the time limit ran out, the convoy attempted to move forward, but was blocked by Soviet APCs. (Telegram 621 from Berlin, November 5; Department of State, Central Files, POL 38-10)
2. To do this I would suggest following:
A. US Charge in Moscow should be instructed make urgent approach highest available level emphasizing serious impact Autobahn harassments could have on our efforts find areas of accommodation with USSR.
B. As soon as possible thereafter non-dismount convoy, of approximately same makeup as US-2, should be dispatched from Berlin westward. If held up publicity, and pressure on Sovs, certain to mount.
C. Agreement of other governments should be sought to authorize Live Oak to order Free Style assembly./3/ Word of this will undoubtedly reach Moscow, particularly in light recent activation, and would make Sovs realize they face more intensified tripartite action.
/3/At 7:30 p.m. Washington time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a Flash message, ordered the assembly of a Free Style probe. (JCS 3399 to CINCEUR; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin, Autobahn Crisis)
D. British and French Govts should be requested make supporting demarches in Moscow, emphasizing Sov interference with Berlin access is matter of most serious joint concern.
E. If no progress made in 48 hours some form of tripartite convoy should be launched, clearly in non-dismount category. Some modification of Free Style might be used for this purpose. Important point would be to emphasize tripartite nature of exercise. If passage prevented, Sovs will stand in defiance all three govts and should by then be under most serious pressure both in terms of worldwide publicity and prospects of imminent deflation of their peaceful coexistence posture.
3. I believe approach along above lines would have good chance of success without serious danger of exchange of fire. If it fails, then we would be clearly in second phase of contingency plans with invocation of further diplomatic pressures, non military countermeasures, and preparatory military and precautionary measures.
4. NATO should, of course, be kept fully informed.
5. Foregoing has been discussed over KY-9 with Gen Polk who concurs. Suggest Lemnitzer may also wish comment directly to Washington.
6. If Department approves course of action suggested, it may wish to alert Allies in Washington today,/4/ or authorize us to do so here where we have time advantage./5/
McGhee
/4/The Department of State informed the Washington Ambassadorial Group along these lines at a meeting at 10 p.m. (Telegram 1353 to Bonn, November 4; Department of State Central Files, POL 38-10)
/5/At 3 a.m. on November 5, the Mission at Berlin transmitted its strong endorsement of this course of action. (Telegram 610 from Berlin; ibid.) 3 4
236. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, November 5, 1963, 8:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 38-10. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Davis and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Berlin, Paris, London, Moscow, SHAPE, U.S. Element Live Oak, CINCEUR, USAREUR, USAFE, and USUN.
1364. Paris also pass USRO. After Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin's call on Under Secretary re inclusion West Berlin in test ban treaty, Secretary saw Dobrynin to inquire whether he had any reply to make to representations Secretary had made November 4 to Kornienko, Minister Soviet Embassy./2/ Dobrynin replied in negative and disclaimed any knowledge of incident. He asserted however that US convoy must have been expecting trouble since they were equipped with sleeping bags, rations, etc.
/2/The meeting with Dobynin took place at 6:10 p.m.; regarding the meeting with Kornienko, see Document 234.
Secretary expressed astonishment at Soviet action in view of information we had passed to local Soviet military authorities in Germany on October 29 of procedures which we had followed for years. Secretary mentioned other considerations as taken up with Kornienko and reported in Deptel 1344 to Bonn. Dobrynin had nothing to add./3/
Rusk
/3/At about the same time that Rusk and Dobrynin were meeting, the Soviets agreed to release the convoy without the troops dismounting or lowering the tailgates of the trucks. (Telegram 641 from Berlin, November 6; Department of State, Central Files, POL 38-10) Despite this release the Washington Ambassadorial Group agreed that a protest note to the Soviet Union should be sent by each of the three Western powers. For text of this note, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 857-858; for text of the Soviet reply, November 21, see ibid., pp. 858-859.
237. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, November 7, 1963, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 38-10. Secret; Priority. Received at 2:52 p.m. Also sent to USAREUR and CINCEUR and repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, and Berlin.
1735. Paris for USRO and USELMLO; USAREUR and CINCEUR for POLADs. Subject: Autobahn convoy harassment.
1. Khrushchev's comments yesterday/2/ make unmistakably clear that Autobahn convoy harassments receiving highest level attention in Moscow. We must realistically assume that they may continue, at least intermittently, for some time to come. Khrushchev's direct involvement has quickly raised level of political concern in Germany and is being viewed as confirmation of widely held German belief that from beginning Autobahn incidents have been planned Soviet policy.
/2/For extracts from Khrushchev's conversation with U.S. businessmen in Moscow on November 6 during which he claimed that the United States had yielded to Soviet procedures and intimated that the incident might have touched off a nuclear war, see The New York Times, November 7, 1963.
2. In case of Oct 10-12 incident and subsequent stoppage of British convoy, general reaction locally was satisfaction over victory of Western firmness in face of Soviet "power tactics". US clearly gained prestige at expense of Sovs.
In most recent incident, reaction so far has been similar to extent that all recognize and commend US firmness and Allied solidarity. There has been wide recognition that stoppage of small US convoy is direct threat to Berlin and thus US maintenance of principle of free access is of vital importance to all Germans. No credence whatever given to Sov contention that US convoy conformed to Sov requirements and was then allowed to pass. New element in reaction compared to Oct 10-12, however, has been evidences of doubt as to whether firmness on spot is sufficient to handle threat implied by interference with convoys. This is true both of press and knowledgeable Germans to whom we have talked.
3. Die Welt for example concludes long front-page article on Autobahn today with statement "firmness in specific cases of intense harassment is not enough; freedom of Berlin access must henceforth be given a more central place in the political strategy of the West." Deputy SPD Chairman Wehner reflected same feeling in statement to press yesterday on subject. SPD, he said, welcomes firmness shown by US and has been impressed by Allied solidarity. He feared Sovs would shortly make further difficulties, however, and wondered if, in the long run, it would not be better to settle the control procedures through a written agreement (Vertraglich). Such an agreement should in no case, he added, confirm Sov thesis that Sovs alone determine control procedures.
4. Reinkemeyer (Deputy Director FonOff Division II) commented last night that he still felt Autobahn harassment was evidence of Soviet "stupidity". Sovs completely misestimated Western reaction and thought they could tighten hold on Berlin while pursuing strategy of relaxation elsewhere. Their action had served to stiffen Western resistance and encourage Allied cooperation. Reinkemeyer felt that in event of further stoppages (which he considered likely) some different method would be needed to deal with situation since, while Allied firmness admirable, future stoppages would tend to highlight Allied impotence in face of Sov APC's.
5. Procedure which has been utilized successfully so far in handling convoy stoppages is likely more and more in future to convey impression of Allied vulnerability to Sov harassments. Local reaction, which is now almost entirely positive, could change rather quickly to concern that US unable prevent Sovs from interfering with convoy access. We should think one thing that might be helpful would be to reach prior Allied agreement on protest to be delivered jointly in Moscow as soon as any case of Sov interference with convoy access occurs. This would quickly make clear to Sovs and to German public that Allies not viewing incident in isolation from other aspects of relations with Moscow and that we not relying solely on local firmness to resolve situation.
6. To facilitate governmental coordination, we are recommending to CINCEUR and to USCOB that non-dismount convoys henceforth be dispatched at mid-day rather than early morning so that if interference occurs, allowing for time difference, four-power consultations in Washington can be quickly arranged.
7. We hope discuss entire problem with Amb Thompson on 11th and may have additional recommendations to submit thereafter.
McGhee
238. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, November 7, 1963, noon.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 38-10. Confidential; Priority. Received at 6:50 p.m. and repeated to Berlin, Bonn, London, and Paris.
1598. At Kremlin reception tonight (Nov 7) I had chance to protest first to Kosygin,/2/ then to Gromyko about Soviet actions on Autobahn, concern about which had brought me back to Moscow. Kosygin deprecated seriousness of incident relative to other problems, insisted Sovs were for [not] seeking change rules on access. When I stressed serious effects on public opinion and resulting impediment to improvement of relations and progress toward solution other problems, he admitted "soldiers sometimes too eager fulfill instructions" and expressed hope incidents would not recur.
/2/Aleksei N. Kosygin, First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers.
Gromyko took similar but harder line, insisted elements in Pentagon trying change rules and provoke incidents and US Govt not accurately informed by US military, which I vigorously denied. Toward end of reception he sought me out to bring up subject again and I invited UK Ambassador Trevelyan to join us. This time Gromyko referred to agreement concluded between Allied military in Germany in 1945 specifying that military authorities should establish access procedures to be followed./3/ He also referred to specific communication sent in 1958 by Soviet Commanding General in Germany to US Commanding General regarding Autobahn./4/ These were basis of established practices respecting Autobahn traffic. Soviets were not changing them one iota but they must be "obeyed" (in English) by Allied forces if troubles were to be avoided.
/3/For a record of the June 29, 1945, meeting at which this agreement was reached, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. III, pp. 353-361.
/4/In a memorandum to Rusk on November 8, Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs Kearney speculated that Gromyko was referring to a letter dated July 17, 1958, from General Zakharov to General Hodes on the movement of troops and supplies to Berlin. A copy of the letter was attached to the memorandum. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 38-6)
When Trevelyan and I denied knowledge any such "agreement" as he alleged and referred to our own effort to avoid misunderstanding by our communication on procedures of Oct 29,/5/ he said he would be informed. When I cited record of scores of convoys similar to or larger than recent one which had passed in past months, as Thompson had informed Dobrynin, Gromyko said occasional courtesies, especially in conditions of inclement weather, should not be taken as change in rules. I said dismounting by our own convoys had never been practiced at all until large groups went through two years ago, and that dismounting of any convoys was purely courtesy on our part. Conversation terminated inconclusively on this note.
/5/See footnote 3, Document 234.
Kohler
239. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, November 7, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin, Autobahn Crisis. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.
SUBJECT
Proposed Delay of Soviet Ships in the Panama Canal
Soviet blockings of Berlin autobahn convoys in the last month make it useful to consider counteraction to vary the one-sided pattern of tension and release by a demonstration of tripartite or U.S. potential in similar harassment of the Soviet Bloc.
Early opportunities for such counteraction will occur on 8 November and 11 November when Soviet freighters bound from Vladivostok to Montreal are scheduled to begin transit of the Panama Canal. (An average of two Soviet ships per month use the Canal.) By "administrative" and "procedural" delays, which are subject to precise U.S. control, transit of Soviet ships through the Canal could be delayed for periods well in excess of delays of the last blocked U.S. convoy (about 42 hours).
There is a small-scale precedent for such counteractions in periodic detainment by U.S. forces of Soviet vehicles in West Berlin in retaliation for Soviet detainment of U.S. vehicles in East Berlin. On the other hand, we have in the past avoided focussing on restricted waterways in low-level countermeasures on grounds that the U.S. is so dependent on free maritime movement around the world. In this connection, a year ago during the Cuban crisis, for both policy reasons and treaty obligations, we defined the blockade line so as to exclude the Panama Canal itself.
Since our objective is to signal that the proposed action is related to autobahn harassments, the way in which we handle the matter with the Soviets and publicly is a key element. The most appropriate alternatives seem to be:
1. To hope that the Soviets will make the connection by themselves and take no positive action to communicate our motive, except perhaps by making the period of detention identical with that of the convoy.
2. To await a Soviet protest before allowing the ships to proceed and to then make an appropriate "unofficial" comment, while holding to the official explanation that the delays are purely administrative.
Which of these will govern will depend on the circumstances.
We think it unlikely that it will be necessary to leak the detention to the press, particularly if the ship is [not?] detained very long.
Conceivable Soviet counters to our action might include, for example, vigorous protests on interference with freedom of the seas, suggestions that the friends of the USSR might restrict U.S. or allied freedom of maritime movement elsewhere, further Berlin access delays, and no further reduction of Soviet troop strength in Cuba./2/
/2/At this point in the source text there is an asterisk and at the bottom of the page the following handwritten notation by U. Alexis Johnson: "They also might move against the Berlin barge traffic."
If such measures were ordered at the Panama Canal, the Canal operating authorities would be given guidance as to the nature, timing and exact total duration of the delays desired. The actions which could be taken are derived from Canal transit procedures and would be applied by Canal authorities as appropriate under circumstances and guidance. Some combination of the following actions could delay a Soviet ship for 42 hours (or longer):
1. Ordering vessel to anchorage before entering Canal and report no pilots available. Plausible delay: 5 or 6 hours.
2. Boarding vessel with admeasurers (individuals utilized to calculate tonnage for toll payment). Meticulously measure every part of cargo space. Plausible delay: 12-36 hours. Note: Most Soviet Bloc vessels on this route have been previously measured which would make this tactic obvious.
3. Having detailed security inspection for dangerous materials. Delay: 2-4 hours.
4. Having pilot board vessel, report difficulty in steering and anchor vessel for inspection by divers. Delay: 12 hours.
5. If vessel has any cargo, requiring removal for security inspection. This would require docking the vessel and give rise to the question of stevedoring and other dock charges since this has never been required before. (No grain storage exists at either end of the Canal.) Delay: 3-5 days.
6. Delaying providing tugs to move ship from dock to Canal. Delay: 2-4 hours.
7. Establishing priority of movement through Canal from Pacific to Atlantic or Atlantic to Pacific in opposition to movement by Soviet Bloc vessel. Delay: 8-10 hours.
8. Simulating mechanical difficulty with the locks. Delay: 4-6 hours.
The Department of State's view of this countermeasure is that while it offers us advantages, there are also certain risks which we should be aware of. The principal benefit of this action, in the Department's view, is that it would serve as a signal to the Russians of our concern about their actions on the autobahn. Furthermore, in contrast to our past attempts to devise suitable countermeasures to Soviet harassment, which were invariably frustrated by lack of appropriate options or administrative problems, this measure represents a present opportunity which can be carried out on quick notice by the U.S. side alone. (The State Department does feel, however, that our French, British and German Allies should be consulted, prior to implementation of this measure.) On the other hand, the State Department perceives the following disadvantages:
1. The action involved is so far removed from the autobahn that it might be regarded by the Soviets as a sign of weakness. This could, however, be obviated, by continuing to pursue a firm course of action on the autobahn.
2. The action represents a limited parallel, in view of the disproportionate use of the autobahn by the Allies and the Canal by the Soviets.
3. The action could invite counteraction on the Soviets' part. For example, if we hold up the Soviet vessel on November 11, this could provide the Soviets an excuse for holding up our convoy scheduled for November 12.
The Secretary of the Army, as your representative for the supervision of Canal Zone affairs, could implement delaying tactics on very short notice if you so direct.
We recommend that the Secretary of the Army be directed to take the necessary, but not publicly noticeable, preparatory actions to permit, when so directed, effective transit-delaying tactics of the kind described above against the Soviet ship scheduled to use the Panama Canal on 8 November, or if time does not permit, the ship now expected to arrive on 11 November.
Dean Rusk
Robert S. McNamara
240. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, November 12, 1963, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/BALL. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Passed to the White House and repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, and Brussels.
1783. Paris also for USRO. From Ball for Secretary Rusk, McGeorge Bundy and Ambassadors./2/
/2/Ball was in Bonn on the first stop on a trip to Germany, the United Kingdom, and France for talks on economic questions.
Under Secretary Ball met with Chancellor Erhard on Nov 12 for one and a half hours. He was accompanied by Ambassadors McGhee and Thompson, and Kaysen. Westrick was present on German side.
Ball opened the discussion after the usual courtesies by saying that it was his desire to explore those matters which the Chancellor wished to discuss in Washington. In response to the Chancellor's question, Ball said that the first topic which we considered important was to reach a common judgment on the situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and a common policy line on the basis of this judgment. It was clear that there was a rapid development of events in the Communist bloc which presented us with both dangers and opportunities.
Erhard agreed that the situation was a changing one. He was under no illusion that large changes in East-West relations were now feasible. However, he thought it important to remain in contact with the Soviet Union, to continue conversations, and to make such arrangements on smaller matters as would prove possible. He was happy to observe that Mr. Ball and the US share his view on the dangers of the extension of long-term credits to the Soviets by the West. It was unwise for us to help Khrushchev build up his long-run strength.
Ball said that the question of credits was urgent. We have a fair basis for judging Soviet reserves of gold and foreign exchange. We estimate that they will be paying some $800 million to $1 billion for wheat purchases this year and next, and we estimate their gold production at from $200 to $300 million per year. The Soviets had obtained credits in the past which are now coming due, and the amortization of these credits was about equal to the new credits they are obtaining. Khrushchev has stated that the Soviets intend to spend some $3 billion a year over seven years for chemical fertilizer plants. It was clear that their new land venture has been a failure and that they are taking these steps to solve their continuing agricultural problems. We estimate that about 40 per cent of this would be machinery and equipment, which they might try to purchase abroad. This investment program posed difficult choices in resource allocation and it seems certain that they will have to cut back on military expenditures and possibly on troop strength. This should dispose them to be more interested in measures of arms control and possibly even disarmament. This situation of resource pressure could also constitute a potential bargaining lever on political questions and thus it was important for the West to achieve a common position on long-term credits. Ball thought it would not be easy to achieve a common position on long-term credits in NATO. The Italian position was ambiguous, as was the Canadian; the UK appeared to desire to extend long-term credits; and Norway would probably take the same position. He said he would be seeing Mr. Heath/3/ and probably Foreign Minister Butler in a few days and would discuss the matter with them before it was taken up in the NATO Council.
/3/Edward Heath, British Lord Privy Seal.
Erhard responded that he shared Ball's estimate of the Soviet situation. Trade alone would offer the Soviets very limited opportunities, since they had little to supply to the West. Therefore, credits were the central problem in Soviet economic relations with the West. He also shared Ball's skepticism on the position of the UK. Germany, of course, would support the US position very strongly. It was his judgment that France would also support this position since it was consonant with de Gaulle's general views on relations with the Soviets. It was less clear what the others would do. Germany thinks it equally undesirable to extend long-term credits to the satellites, but does wish to improve trade relations with them to change the somewhat rigid position which had previously governed their relations.
Ball agreed in general, but thought it useful to make a distinction between the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries. There was a growing divergence between these countries and the Soviets which we should do our best to encourage. He quoted Khrushchev's statement to Harriman that the Soviet satellites were now too big to spank.
Erhard asked whether Khrushchev would see improved trade relations between Germany and Eastern European countries as hostile to the Soviet Union.
Thompson responded that while Khrushchev would not be particularly pleased, he could hardly object.
[Here follow extensive discussion of wheat prices and France's role in Europe.]
At Ball's request, Thompson made some observations on the Soviet situation.
The Chancellor asked Thompson whether we had a reliable and full explanation of the Soviet motives in blocking the convoys recently.
Thompson thought that the impulse had originated in the Soviet armed forces. It was clear to him that when Gromyko was calling on the President, Gromyko was ignorant of what was happening on the Autobahn. Khrushchev would not have ordered an interruption at that moment. If he had wished to have one, he would have done it earlier or waited for Gromyko's return.
The Chancellor observed that this might be a sufficient explanation for the first incident, but asked how it bore on the second.
Ambassador Thompson pointed out that once the prestige of the Soviet military was engaged, Khrushchev had to support them. He naturally desired to try to push us when he readily could, and he was not free to ignore pressures from the army. These, of course, were matters of conjecture; we could not speak with certainty on them. As for the Soviet economic situation, it was clearly difficult but not desperate. An increase in the supply of fertilizers alone would not solve the agricultural problem. Present supplies are being wastefully used, partly because of poor distribution and partly because of peasant ignorance. The allocation of resources would continue to trouble the Soviets, and while industrial output grew, agriculture would be a problem for some time.
Erhard asked two questions. First, how strong was the embourgeoisement of the Soviet people; and second, how deep were the differences between the Soviets and Communist China.
On the first point, Thompson said he thought this had gone very far indeed. He gave as examples the inability of the government to suppress the artists and poets whom they had criticized, the toleration by Khrushchev of jazz to the point of his appearance at an American concert, and the great interest of the ordinary citizen in Western dress. Nonetheless, the Communist Party and not the people ran the country, and the influence on policy of these changes in attitudes was not clear. On the second question, Thompson said that Soviet-Chinese conflict was irreconcilable, as long as the present leadership ruled in the two countries. The immediate question was how far the struggle would go in the Communist Parties all over the world; whether there would be an open break within these parties and their front organizations. As far as state relations between the Soviets and Chinese went, he did not expect a formal break, although continued frontier fighting conceivably could lead even to this.
Erhard inquired whether we had any specific intelligence on military movements on the frontier.
Thompson said we had some reports of military reinforcements on both sides and some rumors of fighting. It was possible that fighting could take place without our knowing about it.
Chancellor Erhard closed the conversation by observing that he would not be bored in Washington and that there would be plenty to talk about and do.
The discussion lasted about an hour and a half.
McGhee
241. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, November 14, 1963, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2339. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bonn and Paris.
1653. Paris for USRO. I believe Embassy Bonn's 1650 and 1756 to Department/2/ place Adenauer-Erhard proposals re possibility of using trade with Soviets to obtain political concessions in proper perspective. While there is a significant degree of Soviet dependence on trade with West which can be exploited by purposeful use of trade to obtain indirect political benefits, I feel that idea of utilizing trade deals to wrest political concessions of major importance from Soviets is entirely false concept. We would delude ourselves if we expected that Soviets would sacrifice what they regard as vital political or security considerations for economic aid, regardless of how difficult their economic situation may appear to be.
/2/Dated November 2 and 9 respectively, both telegrams developed the theme that the Soviet Union was dependent on the West for various goods and also needed Western financing to develop key areas of its economy. (Ibid.)
While thus disagreeing with underlying concept, I believe it might well be useful to encourage Germans to consult in NATO regarding their proposals. If this is done, it would be essential in my view to attempt to concentrate discussions on credit problem, which is becoming increasingly serious and urgent (cf Embassy telegram 1652)./3/
/3/Telegram 1652, November 14, outlined the credits that had been extended to the Soviet Union, breaking them down country by country. (Ibid., FN 11-1 USSR)
I was glad to note from Bonn's 1783/4/ that Erhard highlighted credit problem in his meeting with Under Secretary and apparently backed away from his concept of using trade to obtain political concessions from Soviets.
/4/Document 240.
Kohler
242. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, November 26, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Drafted and initialed by Creel and approved in U on December 3 and in the White House on January 8, 1964. The meeting was held in the White House.
SUBJECT
German-US Relations
PARTICIPANTS
Germans
Federal President Heinrich Luebke
Chancellor Ludwig Erhard
Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder/2/
/2/Luebke, Erhard, and Schroeder visited Washington for President Kennedy's funeral. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas on November 22.
Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein
Herr Weber, Interpreter
Americans
The President
Under Secretary George W. Ball
Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler, EUR
Mr. Robert C. Creel, Director, GER
Mr. Arnold Lissance, Interpreter
Following a brief meeting in the President's office, where the President presented to Chancellor Erhard on behalf of the late President Kennedy a large gilded silver cigar box (which had been procured originally in anticipation of Chancellor Erhard's scheduled official visit), the meeting adjourned to the Cabinet Room for further discussions.
President Luebke said the German delegation was extremely grateful for this opportunity to meet with President Johnson. It was obviously impossible under the circumstances to have the full exchange of views which had been contemplated when the Erhard visit was scheduled, but he wished to mention briefly a few German national problems. First, we had to recognize that there were indications there might be some new attacks on the communications lines between the Federal Republic and Berlin, and this situation would bear watching. There were several other pending problems which had already been discussed,/3/ and there was no need to repeat the German position here. It would be important for the German people to be reassured that the US attitude on all these matters remained unchanged. Luebke was convinced personally that our two governments were agreed on fundamentals and that there were no basic problems between us.
/3/A memorandum of the conversation at the Department of State at 2:30 p.m. on European integration is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
The President said he heartily concurred with this view. He wanted at the outset to express his appreciation to the German delegation for honoring us with their presence on this occasion. He was glad that the President, the Chancellor and others could be with us in this sad hour to show their respect for our late President.
President Luebke replied that it was entirely understandable that the Germans should wish to express their sympathy. The Germans had received so much support from the US that they wished to stand together with us in this tragic hour. The reason the Germans had been able to build up their country again was largely due to American help. They wished to continue to work together with us. He mentioned in particular the matter of aid to underdeveloped countries.
The President said this attitude was very much appreciated.
Chancellor Erhard commented that he had already been scheduled to be here with Foreign Minister Schroeder, although under entirely different circumstances. The German objective had been to redefine and strengthen the relationship between our two countries following Erhard's taking over the chancellorship. It would have been a good time to do so after his visit with de Gaulle in Paris. There were common problems facing us he had wished to discuss--the Atlantic Alliance, European integration and the Kennedy Round, among others. Now, after the tragic death of President Kennedy, he felt there was a need to give new impetus to all the objectives we shared together. We should avoid the impression there was any kind of hiatus. He was therefore anxious to have these talks as soon as possible, maybe in early January. After that he would have to go to London on an official visit. He reiterated there was a real need to give a new impulse to Atlantic cooperation and to show the peoples of Europe that there would be no interruption in the progress toward our objectives.
The President replied that we were anxious to reschedule the Erhard visit as soon as possible. He would ask the State Department to look over the schedule and see what specific dates could be worked out. Since Erhard had been scheduled to be here right now, the President would want him to be the first, or at least one of the first on the list. Meanwhile, there were many decisions which had to be made by the new American Government. He was going before a joint session of the Congress tomorrow morning and developments in Congress might have some effect on his own schedule. But he agreed that the visit should take place and take place soon. He was fully aware of the value of our relations with the Federal Republic. We appreciated the Federal Republic's support in the causes of Atlantic partnership and European unity. We shared a number of things in common. For example, his own mother's family had come to America from Germany in 1848. Both he and Erhard were starting new administrations.
Erhard replied that he was aware that President Johnson knew Germany. He had gone to Berlin at an historic hour after the Wall was erected in August, 1961. He was happy to hear that the President was of German ancestry and commented that 1848 was the year the best Germans had left Germany for the US. He felt the transition we were now undergoing both in Germany and in the US should be a smooth one. We had a basic identity of viewpoint, and Germany had the fullest confidence both in the US and in President Johnson personally.
The President replied it was comforting to hear these sentiments. There were several points he wished to make: We were determined to preserve our rights in Berlin; as he had himself said in Berlin, we intended to stay there./4/ We would keep the military forces in Europe necessary to meet our commitments. We supported the right of the German people to self-determination. The President looked forward to working together with the new Chancellor and the German people. He also looked to Erhard as a famous economist and a leading advocate of expansion of world trade to make the coming trade negotiations a success. President Kennedy had "put everything on the line" for the Trade Expansion Act. The President considered TEA as one of the outstanding achievements of the Kennedy Administration in the search for world peace. While he did not want to relieve Mr. Ball of his responsibility as our expert in this field, the President would also look to Chancellor Erhard to help make these talks next spring successful. He had just himself returned from the Benelux countries and knew that everyone there was very concerned over the outcome of the Kennedy Round. Erhard should know that if possible President Johnson felt even stronger on this subject than had President Kennedy. It was imperative to have a flow of goods if we were to have a flow of understanding.
/4/add "as long as our presence was required." [Footnote in the source text added at a later time.]
Erhard replied that on the German side they would do their best to make the Kennedy Round a success. They were aware of the need of the peoples of Europe and America to feel that they formed a unity, quite apart from military or political considerations, in their everyday life. Erhard recalled that he had been with President Kennedy when the trade expansion bill had been sent to the Hill and that he had also been there when the bill had been passed. He therefore had a personal interest in the success of the Act. It would not be easy within the EEC to negotiate the agricultural problem, which had a definite relationship to the Kennedy Round. The matter of grain prices was a particularly difficult problem. President Luebke, Foreign Minister Schroeder and he were all agreed that they must move ahead in Germany on these matters and that changes would be needed. He was happy to learn that President Johnson attached such importance to this problem. While in Paris he had also discussed the question of disparities with de Gaulle, who wanted to eliminate this problem. Erhard felt that it was not possible to settle these problems individually and in isolation, but that they should all be considered together.
The President commented that other common ground he shared with the Germans was that there was a large German population in Texas and that the American Ambassador to Germany was from Texas. In connection with agricultural problems he recalled an incident recently in Texas where large quantities of chicken salad had been bought by the Governor with funds which were not authorized. The ensuing difficulties had had a very divisive effect in Texas and the injuries from the chicken salad case were still with us. He looked to Chancellor Erhard to see to it that a few little chickens would not cause similar enduring difficulties between the US and Germany.
Mr. Ball commented that he hoped we could finally settle this problem.
The President then inquired as to what time in January or early February might be best for an Erhard visit. He pointed out we would be faced with a number of problems in early January--Congress would be reconvening, there was the State of the Union message, the Budget message, and so on.
Mr. Ball asked when Erhard was going to London. Erhard replied January 15-16, adding that it would be highly desirable if he could visit here before going to London.
The President said we were anxious to settle this point in accordance with the Chancellor's wishes and asked Mr. Ball to try within the next few days to work out a date.
Erhard asked what he should say to the press after the meeting should they inquire about this point.
Mr. Ball suggested he state that it had been agreed the visit should be rescheduled at the earliest possible time. He could indicate that this meant as soon as possible after January 1. We would try to work this out within the next day or so.
President Luebke said another factor in favor of early January was that later in the month they would be holding a big agricultural fair (Green Week) in Berlin. There would be many agricultural experts there and it would be good if some of the agricultural problems could be worked out prior to the meeting.
Erhard said that from the standpoint of "atmosphere" it would be highly desirable if it could be made absolutely clear that there would be continuity of US policy. It was also important to demonstrate that personal contact had been established between the two administrations.
Mr. Ball said he could give complete assurances regarding the continuity of US policy and our desire to continue to work very closely with the Germans toward our common objectives.
The President said he wished to stress that he had been a part of the Kennedy Administration and had personally taken part in shaping its policy. He was deeply committed to its objectives. On the Erhard visit the Chancellor could say to the press that we regretted the tragic circumstances requiring the postponement of the visit and that we would reschedule it shortly after January 1.
The President asked if there were any further comments. President Luebke said there was one additional item on his mind. He had recently come back from a trip to Iran, Indonesia, Japan and the Philippines. He had been particularly struck by the problems in Indonesia, a country of 100 million people but in very poor shape economically. It was this latter factor which tended to push the government and people of Indonesia toward Moscow. He was convinced it was necessary for all of us in the free world to hold Indonesia. He believed Sukarno had no personal tendency toward Moscow and would go in that direction only if there were no alternative. He himself had not particularly wanted to go to Indonesia to start with but had asked the British and Americans for advice. Both had said he should go, and he was glad he had done so. He wanted to stress that Sukarno was ready to establish closer ties with the West than with the East bloc. He felt that the decision of the US Senate on foreign aid was a factor of great importance in this picture. He therefore hoped the President would give his personal attention to this problem.
The President replied that he was aware of this problem and appreciated President Luebke's interest. He assured him that his views would be taken into account.
In conclusion, President Luebke said he had been gratified to hear what had been said about the continuity of US policy. He wanted to thank the President for these statements.
243. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, December 3, 1963.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides File, Bundy, Chron. No classification marking.
The British have been having some high-level bilateral exchanges with the Soviets, on the relation between a non-aggression pact and the Berlin-Germany problem, and it is time now for us to weigh in with them. Here is the situation and Rusk's recommendation, in which I concur:
The Germans have violently opposed a non-aggression pact which did not bring real improvement in Berlin or Germany. Khrushchev has now suggested to Douglas Home that a non-aggression pact might be accompanied by a unilateral Soviet declaration opposing the use of such force for such problems as Germany and West Berlin.
This is not nearly enough for the Germans or for us, and the UK has suggested that they might propose an amendment which would require the Soviet Union to state that it would refrain from any unilateral action affecting the situation in Berlin or Western access to that city.
We think this is not good enough, plainly because it would be regarded as weakness in Germany and because British bargaining in particular arouses suspicion on the Continent.
So our plan is to tell the British that we prefer to have them fend off this Soviet ploy (which is all it seems to be right now) but that if they insist on going forward, they ought to check directly with the French and the Germans, rather than to put the matter in the North Atlantic Council.
I have watched this one carefully, because the Department tends to be more rigid on these matters than President Kennedy wanted, but in this case their recommendation seems right. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
McG. B./2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
244. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, December 11, 1963, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 36 GER. Confidential. Repeated to Berlin, Paris, London, and Moscow.
2086. Reference: Embtels 2064 and 2079./2/
/2/Telegram 2064, December 9, summarized a briefing by Carstens of officials from the three Allied Embassies on the events leading to the discussion between East and West Germans on the Berlin Christmas passes. (Ibid.) Telegram 2079, December 10, reported on oil discussions between the two Germanies. (Ibid., FT 4 E GER-W GER) On December 10, in response to telegram 2064, the Department of State informed the Embassy in Bonn that it welcomed the developments leading to visits to East Berlin by West Berliners. (Telegram 1688; ibid., POL 36 GER)
1) Joint German Bonn and Berlin decision to treat with GDR state reps if necessary in order to settle Christmas pass issue involves fairly significant new departure. It is in fact a potential "quantum jump", from which extensive consequences could flow aside from those connected with mere pass issue alone.
2) As noted reftel 2064 we do not consider that primary Allied interests are involved in choice of level for negotiating pass question, but that these interests are mainly engaged by form, location and mode of operation of pass offices in West Berlin. Our option to pass on this will presumably satisfy our requirements.
3) For Germans, however, level of negotiation is matter of principle which affects more issues than pass question. It has always been possible that Germans (as well as Allies) might achieve numerous specific gains re access and freedom of travel if they were willing to deal with state authorities designated by GDR. In past FRG has invariably declined to do so except through IZT and certain technical channels, which have largely been limited to post, rail and waterways, i.e., to areas where something like all-German regimens still exist. Germans seem to maintain rationale for pass talks that only "technical contacts" are still involved. Although this may satisfy public, it does not alter transaction.
Basic fact is that Erhard and Brandt have sanctioned type of approach which, if modified, could go long way toward satisfying substance as well as form of GDR demands on other outstanding past questions, such as (a) FRG 1962 credit offer (which involved access to East Sector for West Berliners), (b) intra-Berlin mail and (c) Hof Bridge.
4) In part decision about passes seems to reflect Mende's new influence (Embtel 2079) and perhaps more pragmatic than legalistic mentality of Erhard. Brandt's influence is major underlying factor. CDU Deputy Gradl last week commented to EmbOffs that CDU had absorbed lesson of Feb Berlin elections, which seemed to amount to popular endorsement for Brandt's initiatives toward East without fuss about formalities. Present move seems to involve some Bonn coordination with Brandt and following of his lead as occurred last summer on Waltersdorfer Chaussee crossing point. Pattern seems on way to establishing itself.
5) So long as formal Allied competence is unaffected, to which we must always be alert, there seems to be no call for us to define German interest in dealings with GDR. Indeed in past we have foreseen conceivable advantages in some such dealings, although Germans have always balked at idea.
6) East Germans could spoil pass opportunity by excessive inflexibility, but with care they could achieve optically attractive gains as well as maneuver FRG into position of negotiating disadvantage. GDR, for instance, could offer to prolong pass issuing indefinitely as pressure on FRG to make greater concessions on oil prices, or as basis for demanding partial fulfillment of credit offer. FRG willingness to talk on passes might harden GDR resolve to press for more state-to-state contacts.
7) In sum, new turns could lead to changes in conduct of FRG-GDR relations, and channels used. Downgrading of IZT Treuhandstelle (Leopold) may be first result, and this is bound to lead to proliferation of channels. New approach could settle some problems, and create others by projecting entire new dimension of relationships.
8) Such development need not per se be disadvantageous, but it could pose associated problems for Allies:
a) We would have to be particularly alert that results do not infringe on our primary Allied authority in Berlin;
b) There could be increased difficulties in coordinating and keeping ourselves informed;
c) We would have to guard against German Bonn-Berlin cooperation developing into internal axis of decision-making which could prejudice capability of Allied representatives in Berlin to influence and, when necessary, control actions of Berlin government.
McGhee
245. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
US/MC/11 Paris
December 15, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 Berlin. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Ausland and approved in S on October 26. The Foreign Ministers were in Paris for the NATO Ministerial Meeting December 16-18. A summary of this conversation was transmitted in Secto 13 from Paris, December 16. (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
Quadripartite Working Dinner
PARTICIPANTS
(See last page)/2/
/2/Not printed. Secretary Rusk, Foreign Ministers Couve de Murville and Schroeder, and Foreign Secretary Butler were each accompanied by three officials.
BERLIN AND GERMANY
Foreign Minister Schroeder opened the discussion by saying that he would like to discuss Berlin and Germany. He said that the Soviets had made it clear that they are not prepared to include Berlin and Germany in a detente. Recent incidents on the autobahn and statements by Gromyko in the UN made this clear. The Soviet Union instead demanded a peace treaty and a free West Berlin. The aim of the Soviet Union was to separate Germany from the Alliance. Recently Pankow (the headquarters of the East German regime) was increasing its agitation. An example was the question of Christmas passes. This apparently is the beginning of a ten point plan. The East Germans have not made clear what the other points are but the passes are a beginning which are supposed to run over ten points.
Schroeder then turned to the points under discussion between the East and West. He noted that all considered the Khrushchev proposal for a declaration on Berlin in connection with a nonaggression arrangement unsatisfactory. The Federal Republic believed that a nonaggression arrangement should be the end of a process not the beginning. Schroeder said he did not want to go into detail about the question of observation posts. He did wish to note, however, that Soviet opposition to the MLF in connection with nondiffusion is instructive. Germany believes that any further comments on nondiffusion should only be made after an MLF has been achieved. Schroeder then said he wanted to raise the question of whether there is a requirement for a Western initiative on Germany. He then reviewed the history of the revised Peace Plan in the Ambassadorial Group and the general contents of the revised Peace Plan. Schroeder then referred to the proposal on Germany prepared by the Kuratorium on Indivisible Germany./3/ Schroeder said he did not want to commit himself to any or all of this proposal at this time but would like to introduce it for discussion. He felt we should at least prepare a Western initiative in the event it should be necessary to offset an initiative from the East.
/3/On June 23 the Kuratorium "Unteilbares Deutschland" had sent President Kennedy a memorandum on the future of German unity. For text, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1963, pp. 428-430. On September 15 Executive President of the Kuratorium Wilhelm Schuetz issued an 8-point program for German unity. For text, see ibid., pp. 709-710. The proposals were subsequently distributed to the three Western Foreign Ministers during the U.N. General Assembly session in New York in October.
Couve de Murville said that as he understood it, Mr. Schroeder wanted in effect to prepare a new peace plan which presented the case for the unification of Germany.
Schroeder again reviewed the history of this question. He said it had been discussed last year at the working dinner in Paris, that the Ambassadorial Group had sought to reach agreement on a revised Peace Plan but were not successful. In August the Germans raised the question again.
Couve said that Schroeder's remark raised three questions: is it a good idea to have a new peace plan; should such a peace plan stress East-West German contacts or Four-Power responsibility; and finally what would we do with the peace plan when it was finished? He said he found no harm in preparing a new peace plan and was agreeable to the Ambassadorial Group working on it.
Secretary Rusk remarked that he found Schroeder's suggestion attractive. He felt that the West is not sufficiently active in presenting our solution to the German question. He did not know whether we would make any progress but we should do preparatory work. Any study should examine the question of German reunification and European security. Economic concessions might contribute to a powerful package. Conceivably we might offer a package which would engage Soviet interests. The Secretary said that we have two objectives: German unification and to get the 22 divisions out of East Germany. It was possible that the Ambassadorial Group might be able to prepare a fresh approach. He welcomed, therefore, the German proposal.
Butler said we have previously been studying the peripheral issues. These questions were becoming tedious. He remarked he had only handled them two months and was already tired of them. In his reply to Khrushchev the British Prime Minister will take care of the question of the MLF and will make it clear that the Soviet position is completely unsatisfactory. There was, however, some possibility of progress on observation posts, although there was the unacceptable link to troop withdrawal. With regard to a nonaggression arrangement, the reply will say nothing but that the British are discussing the subject with their Allies. It looked therefore as though it would be difficult to make progress with peripheral issues, with the possible exception of observation posts, at Geneva. Butler said it was agreeable with him for the Ambassadorial Group to examine the German proposals. He then asked Mr. Schroeder what economic inducements he had in mind.
Schroeder referred, in reply, to proposals for an increase in swing (or credit) within the context of the Interzonal Trade Agreement. The East Germans are however sensitive to political conditions. Perhaps if economic concessions were advanced within a Four-Power group, the Soviet interests could be mobilized.
The Secretary then asked if Mr. Schroeder was quite certain that if a secret ballot were held in East Germany, the East Germans would vote for reunification. Schroeder said this was the risk the West Germans must run if they believe in self-determination. They are however confident that the results would be favorable. This was the reason the Soviets opposed a plebiscite.
The Secretary said that Khrushchev had said that in 1953 Malenkov and Beria had wanted to get rid of East Germany. We should now look to see if there are factors more important to the Soviets than 17 million Germans. If a few people in the Soviet hierarchy had wanted to get rid of East Germany, there might be more now.
Schroeder remarked that in a trade agreement with the East the satellites have accepted their application to Berlin, although this is not liked by the Soviets or the GDR.
The Secretary suggested that Schroeder present his proposal to the Ambassadorial Group.
Butler asked when this might happen.
Schroeder said it was hard to say. We must prepare against the possibility that the Soviets might take some initiative and we would need to counter it. Or the Soviets might leave some opening in which we would consider it desirable to take an initiative.
The Secretary stressed that it was important that there be no press speculation on this, but that the work proceed quickly in the Ambassadorial Group. Butler said it would spoil the effect if there were press speculation.
Schroeder said that a number of new ideas were coming from German parliamentary circles. The group known as Indivisible Germany represents a group of leading West Germans. It was necessary to be able to say that their proposals were being submitted to the Ambassadorial Group, which has the problem of Germany under constant review. It would, however, not be necessary to give any more details. He agreed there would be no reference to the discussion this evening, but he would say we are referring any proposals to the Ambassadorial Group.
The Secretary asked when public pressure was likely to arise.
Schroeder replied it existed already. The Bundestag debate on the Test Ban Treaty might raise the question of a West German initiative. The cabinet had taken no decision but Mr. Schroeder thought the treaty would not come up for debate before March.
The Secretary concluded the discussion of this subject by saying that the four Foreign Ministers had agreed to examining the German proposals after Christmas.
CHRISTMAS PASSES
Carstens began the discussion by reviewing the history of the Christmas pass question. The Secretary said that he hoped that some arrangement could be worked out regarding Christmas passes on humanitarian grounds. With regard to the question of channels of communication, he asked if there were any alternatives such as the Red Cross or the Commandants. Carstens said that the various alternatives had been considered but for various reasons dismissed. Krapf raised the question of how to handle this with the press. The Secretary suggested saying that it had been agreed that it would be desirable on humanitarian grounds to work out an arrangement and that it was hoped the East would not place political obstacles in the way.
Schroeder said that this question of visiting families had arisen on the two previous Christmases. The East chose Christmas to make their proposals in order to bring pressure to bear on the West Berliners. He thought the East German press conference had been a shrewd move. If we accepted Eastern terms we would weaken the West's position. On the other hand, it would not appear there was much we could do.
The Secretary then asked if some technical agencies could handle the passes and thus avoid political issues. Schroeder said the other side was prepared to use postal personnel. The decisive point is whether there will be an agreement between the West Berlin Government and the East German regime. Carstens added that the East wanted Brandt or his representative with full powers to sign.
Couve said that no matter how the agreement was reached it would tend to weaken the position of West Berlin. There was then some discussion of the various levels at which an agreement might be concluded.
The Secretary said that if the agreement failed, there might be serious tensions in West Berlin and this was of concern to the occupation powers. Schroeder said that the West Berliners had often been disappointed. The Secretary concluded the discussion by saying he hoped we would hear more of the pass issue in the coming days and that something could be worked out without loss of morale in West Berlin.
Butler said he would like to see placed in the NATO communiqu? a non-aggression statement and wondered if Schroeder had any objection to this. Schroeder said that the British formula emphasized Germany too much but might be acceptable if it were shortened and move general. Butler remarked they might shorten it two or three sentences. Schroeder said it shouldn't make reference to the UN. Couve said he had not yet seen the British draft but noted that each year reference was made to the effect that NATO was defensive. Lord Hood concluded the discussion by saying that the British would come up with a new and shorter draft.
246. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
US/MC/7 London
December 18, 1963, 8-10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 FR (PA). Secret. Drafted by Lampson and approved in S on December 24. The meeting was held at 1 Carleton Gardens. Rusk stopped in London December 18-19 following the NATO Ministerial Meeting.
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Tyler
Mr. Schaetzel
Minister Jones
Mr. Lampson
United Kingdom
Foreign Secretary Butler
Mr. Peter Thomas
Sir Harold Caccia
Mr. Duncan Wilson
Lord Hood
Mr. Henderson
SUBJECT
Germany and Berlin
Butler directed the discussion to the problems of Germany and Berlin. he said he had reached the conclusion that the peripheral questions (observation posts, NAP, non-dissemination agreement etc.) if treated in isolation were so obdurate that it was necessary to think through again the possibility of making some progress in solving the central problems.
Rusk replied that the quadripartite dinner in Paris/2/ had produced a new sense of initiative on the German side--a new willingness to look with a more open mind at the possibility of developing a comprehensive Western position on Germany-Berlin. Schroeder showed a new approach, a new mobility or at least a disposition to move on the German problem if possible. An example of a new and more flexible mood in Germany was a paper prepared by Unteilbares Deutschland./3/ This had emphasized the possibility of converting economic advantages for Eastern Europe into political concessions for the West. Although the US was sceptical about the extent to which this was possible German ideas were worth exploring. But in dealing with German reunification one must limit oneself to the reunification of the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. West Germany had tried to keep open the possibility of including territory east of the Oder-Neisse line but this was unrealistic. Hitler had closed that door. Also in thinking in terms of proposals for German reunification one must bear in mind the elements of interest to the USSR. Such a settlement if negotiated on satisfactory terms would free the USSR from two burdens: (1) the fear of German revanchism; and (2) the need to keep 22 Soviet divisions stationed abroad. He personally favored asking the ambassadorial group to go back to the drawing board taking German proposals as the basis for its work and examining any package proposal in the light of what would make it worth while to the USSR to give up 17 million Germans. This is particularly opportune time for such a review because in the present international atmosphere the USSR may throw at us sweeping proposals to which we must be prepared to make counter proposals. We should encourage the Germans to come forward with the initial proposals and see whether we can build on them if we need to. We should aim at a comprehensive approach including political, military, economic and humanitarian elements. There were numerous possibilities--for example the possibility of examining various formulas for a Mixed Commission comprising the 4 occupying powers and the East and West Germans.
/2/See Document 245.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 245.
Tyler summarized his conversation with German officials in Paris on this general subject./4/ The German Government seemed to be ready to present a fuller and more complete plan in the near future--probably in early January (between the 10th and 15th) after the Erhard visit to the US. Their general thinking seemed to be running along the lines of the proposals of Unteilbares Deutschland. But although Schroeder was glad to have the general support of this influential body he did not want to seem to take over the plans without modification. He wanted the German proposal to bear the stamp of the Foreign Office and to give the Schuetz proposals a sharper edge. The Foreign Office was not enthusiastic about all features of the Schuetz plan. They were not convinced that the Four Power Commission should be authorized to work on a peace treaty. They wished to think more carefully about the implications of East and West Germans being associated with the Commission and measure very carefully the consequences of such an arrangement on the standing of East and West Germany. But they did consider there were certain measures which could be taken immediately: such as (1) establishment of a commission for humanitarian measures; (2) a commission for political amnesty; (3) a commission for freedom of movement and (4) a commission for economic concessions. The Germans had been greatly interested in the East German hint that the agreement on Christmas passes was the first of ten steps the GDR would propose. The German FO thought that the next steps might involve greater movement of persons, broadening of categories, extension of time limits, etc. But the East German negotiator Wendt had not spelt out what he had in mind. All this had made the West Germans believe that the time may come in the not too distant future when the East Germans may come up with what has the appearance of a big offer, although it will probably include elements which will enhance the standing of the DDR. The higher level in the German Foreign Office believes pressures are building up on the East German regime which they cannot ignore. The existence of the Wall is having an adverse effect on the standing of East Germany in the eyes of other Eastern European countries. The rigidity of the Ulbricht regime is embarrassing and is making East Germany vulnerable. Even the USSR is becoming critical of it. This island of Stalinism on the western edge of the Soviet world which is becoming more moderate stands out like a sore thumb. Within East Germany itself this situation is creating difficulties. The rank and file of party workers are finding it difficult to explain the policies of the Ulbricht regime compared to what is happening in a country like Czechoslovakia. Even the Russians reportedly told Ulbricht that he should look more human. An illustration of the contrast between East Germany and the rest of Eastern Europe is the relaxation of travel measures in Czechoslovakia. East and West Germans are now flocking to Prague to meet. Another example of the new spirit is the campaign of highly placed Czech officials to encourage West Germans to spend their vacation in Eastern Europe.
/4/A memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 GER.
In commenting on the new flexibility in the German Federal Republic Rusk said that the FDP and SPD favored Schroeder's policy of mobility and offset to some extent the rigid wing of the CDU. This new German Government was somewhat less rigid on some of the perennial problems. We should be prepared to encourage the Germans to explore possibilities and give them their head. He had the impression that Schroeder at Paris progressed beyond the German August proposals./5/
/5/See footnote 1, Document 212.
Peter Thomas (British Minister of State) said he could not see that Schroeder had really gone beyond the 1959 Peace Plan except for the introduction of economic inducements. He agreed that the situation would be changed if the Germans agreed to recognize the Oder-Neisse line and the present Czech border. The fears of Poland and Czechoslovakia were real and if they were reassured this would introduce a new and significant element into the East-West equation. Mr. Rusk pointed out that when proposals were made for an East German-West German plebiscite--as was made in the German proposals--this was on the basis of the FedRep and the GDR. This strengthened the idea that we were not talking about the territory east of the Oder-Neisse line. He added that the fact that Mikoyan had argued that Schroeder's pressing for the MLF indicated German revanchist ambitions against Poland and Czechoslovakia showed that these fears existed in the USSR as well as in Poland and Czechoslovakia. German renunciation of these frontiers as part of a package would give a Western peace plan a new sweep. Thomas admitted this would make a difference.
Rusk said when Schroeder in November had emphasized reunification, Rusk had pointed out to him this emphasis would have the result of smoking out the West on the question of what was to be reunified. He added that there seemed to be new possibilities opening up. The fact that Poland and Czechoslovakia showed greater independence and possibly exercised greater influence in the Communist system might make a difference.
Butler said that if the Germans wished to make an initiative they would have to give their proposals more scope. He had been disappointed in his talk with Erhard in Bonn to find that Erhard was thinking in terms of economic initiatives towards the Eastern satellites and of increasing interzonal trade but not of economic inducements for Russia. He was not optimistic about getting Ulbricht to move. He described him as a marmoset of Khrushchev's. Schroeder was much more forthcoming at the NATO quadrilateral conversation than he was when Butler talked to him in Bonn. He must have held back to save his ammunition for the quadripartite talks. Possibly he had been encouraged by the effects of greater German trade with Eastern Europe. The Berlin Christmas pass development had shown that the German Government could not turn down humanitarian opportunities on purely theoretical grounds. (It was estimated that between 400,000 and 750,000 might cross the Wall at Christmas. Tyler said the Commandants were considering security implications that might arise from this development.)
Hood asked what was the American thinking about how all this tied in with disarmament. Rusk said one had to think in alternate terms--in terms of two possible tracks which might be followed. A German plebiscite might result in unification or in the acceptance of division. Which of these courses was chosen would determine how other factors would be handled. There were possibilities for disarmament which must be examined. There were possibilities of reductions of forces and of guarantees against concentrations of forces and surprise attack. Rusk also expressed the view that Germans may go on to think of possibilities of economic arrangements to be extended to the USSR as an inducement for a German settlement.
Tyler emphasized the danger of putting forward proposals which might cast doubt on the idea of an all-German government. The Western Allies had always insisted that a German settlement must be negotiated by a free all-German Government. This was essential to the German position. The West must make it absolutely clear to the Soviet Government that this point is non-negotiable. Unless this position is maintained the whole German support would crumble. Schroeder so far had maintained that the renunciation of the Oder-Neisse line could only be made by a Pan-German Government. Butler said Schroeder had made this clear to him. Hood said the traditional position to which the West was pledged in the 1954 and other agreements was that German boundaries must be determined at a peace conference.
Wilson (British) doubted that an offer about the Oder-Neisse line would be very impressive since the West had renounced the use of force. Caccia replied that this point may seem like a fly-blown card to us but it did not look that way to Poles and Czechs. They would attach great importance to this. Rusk suggested that Poles and Czechs might put pressure on the USSR. Furthermore they might welcome an agreement which would get them out of the present target system within which they now fell.
Ambassador Bruce commented an Oder-Neisse line offer would have been much more impressive if it had been made some years ago. Our bargaining power deriving from this point is now less. We should also be fully aware of the political implications of this issue. There were a large number of ?migr?s in Germany from the eastern territories. The Chancellor had neutralized this vote by his policy of western development which had made it possible to absorb these groups but if there was a depression they would reemerge as a political force of formidable proportions. They would be among the first to feel the effects of unemployment. They would be quick to protest that their prescriptive rights had been sold down the river. If this question were treated in isolation it would be difficult and German politicians would be leery of it. If it formed part of an attractive comprehensive package which seemed to have a good chance of being achieved the situation would be quite different.
It was the consensus of the evening discussion that the FedRep should be encouraged to submit proposals on Germany and Berlin for study by the ambassadorial group.
247. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, December 24, 1963.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides Files, Bundy, Chron. Secret. Another memorandum from Bundy dated December 27, containing talking points for Erhard's visit, is published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 471A.
RE
East-West Negotiations and the Erhard Visit
The background papers (Part III, Tabs A, B and C, of the big book)/2/ give you the standard U.S. position. They fudge very sharp differences of judgment and opinion within the Department of State, but in the main they do give you the Rusk/Ball line. But you should know that Tommy Thompson, who is subtle, and Averell Harriman, who is blunt, both think the time is ripe for a much more forthcoming negotiating position. Thompson thinks the Germans could and would join with us; Harriman thinks they should be forced to. Thompson may influence Rusk before Friday's briefing session./3/
/2/A set of the background papers for the Erhard visit is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2353-2355.
/3/No record of the briefing session on December 27 has been found.
My own belief is this meeting you will not wish to give Erhard either the rigid feeling of the Rusk/Ball position or the sense of insistence on movement that they might get from Harriman (or from Senator Pell). What you want is to lay a basis for serious work in the future on these views. For this purpose what the Chancellor needs to know from you--preferably in a private meeting--is that:
1. You have no intention whatever of using German interests to make a bargain with Khrushchev over Erhard's head;
2. You have great confidence in the basic strength and bargaining position of the West;
3. You do believe that over the long pull we should be constantly examining the kind of bargain we want in order to improve the position of the people of East Germany and the city of Berlin. This is a matter of simple justice and also one of reducing dangers to world peace.
In this connection you could well praise Erhard for the Christmas agreement on the Wall, and suggest a reference to it in the Communiqu?. (This will help put Erhard on the side of "porosity," if he agrees.)
4. You understand this problem in deeply political terms and would like very much to have a solid understanding of Erhard's political assessment both with respect to German opinion and with respect to the German-Soviet relations. In particular you are interested in his view of the ways and means of bargaining with the Soviets on these central issues.
I think this last point is essential. In the end this is an issue for Heads of Government, and if you and Erhard have confidence in each other on fundamentals, you can safely turn to the experts for plans in every different sharp and flat. The file cases are full of them.
And on this basis you could safely refer the matter to further expert analysis of the sort which Schroeder has proposed and which Rusk has accepted for our side. Indeed Schroeder's proposal is one we welcome, although there is always a danger that the Germans will go rigid on us.
McG. B./4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
248. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
LBJ Ranch, Texas, December 28, 1963, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2354. Secret; Exdis. The source text bears no drafting information, but it was approved by the White House on January 14, 1964. The Chancellor visited the Texas White House December 28-29.
SUBJECT
US-German Relations (Part 1 of 9 Parts)/2/
/2/Parts 2, 4, and 5 are printed as Documents 249, 250, and 251. Parts 3 (European economic problems) and 6-9 (German defense budget, German assistance to less-developed countries, offset payments, and Cuba) are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2354.
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The President
Arnold Lissance (Interpreter)
Germany
The Chancellor
Hermann Kusterer (Interpreter)
After an exchange of pleasantries and some discussion of local history, the President told the Chancellor of the close relationship which the American people felt for the German people, and added that he was especially pleased this meeting could take place so early in both their administrations.
The Chancellor was grateful for the personal privilege of meeting with the President in this private atmosphere. He noted, too, there were no serious problems between the US and Germany.
The President said the US wanted to draw the curtain over the past, work side by side, and try to live peacefully together with the other peoples of this planet. This was a major challenge. Despite the great progress in the physical sciences, comparable progress had not been made in political science, in the science of people learning to live peacefully together.
The President reminded the Chancellor that US commitments to the Federal Republic and Berlin were far reaching. He then went on to say he considered the Chancellor one of the ablest world leaders and therefore looked to the Chancellor for suggestions for improving the Atlantic partnership and reducing East-West tensions. He especially hoped that during these two days of talks, he and the Chancellor would succeed in pinpointing possible new approaches for dealing with some of the major problems facing both their countries.
At the conclusion of the talk, the President told the Chancellor he felt the conversations had been fruitful and helpful. He reassured the Chancellor of the US trust and confidence in him and promised that he could rely fully on US faith and trust.
The Chancellor said he appreciated this. He hoped their exchanges would always be candid and full. Even though his comments might sometimes not be diplomatic, the President could always be sure they were honest and straightforward.
The President said he preferred this kind of relationship. He, too, did not want to get bogged down in striped pants diplomacy. It was most important that the two of them understand and trust one another and maintain the closest possible working relationship.
249. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
LBJ Ranch, Texas, December 28, 1963, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2354. Secret; Exdis. The source text bears no drafting information, but it was approved by the White House on January 14, 1964.
SUBJECT
De Gaulle and Relations with France (Part 2 of 9 Parts)
PARTICIPANTS
[Here follows the same list as Document 248.]
The Chancellor said that among the most difficult issues facing the Western allies were the questions of European integration and the Atlantic partnership. Unless economic integration was accompanied by some kind of political integration, Europe would remain a collection of separate and different states. In this connection, the Chancellor's greatest concern was President de Gaulle. The Federal Republic was pleased with the reconciliation between the German and French peoples. But the relationship established by Chancellor Adenauer and General de Gaulle--and the Chancellor emphasized that he did not mean to be critical of Chancellor Adenauer--was almost wholly emotional and sentimental and lacked a solid political base. The viewpoints of the two partners were never clearly and candidly stated. This could not continue. Moreover, things were different now. At the recent negotiations in Brussels, for example, the German representatives stood their ground firmly so that General de Gaulle would understand the German view. As far as the Chancellor is concerned, a healthy relationship between states cannot be based wholly on sentiment. Account must be taken of the partners' vital interests and world commitments. And in the case of Germany, there was the special problem of living down a historical past, demonstrating that it had purged itself of moral guilt and that it intended to contribute constructively to the cause of freedom and world peace.
Replying, the President said he personally admired De Gaulle and would try to work with him. He did not think the differences between the US and France were irreconcilable. However, he would welcome any suggestions the Chancellor might have on ways for improving relations between the US and France.
The Chancellor said he did not want to be misunderstood. The German people were happy with the reconciliation with France. European integration would not have been possible if France and Germany did not get together. In fact, in his talks in Paris/2/ the Chancellor reminded President de Gaulle of this as well as the need for strengthening the Atlantic partnership. But De Gaulle obviously looked at the problem differently. He insisted he was a strong supporter of the Western alliance and demonstrated this during the Cuban crisis and the recent Berlin autobahn incidents. But while France was for the Western alliance, it considered NATO less than a perfect instrument. NATO simply was not the French way of doing things. France therefore had to have its own force de frappe. Germany, De Gaulle reassured the Chancellor, had every right to rely on the US for nuclear protection. France, however, wanted to stand on its own two feet. According to De Gaulle, the present defense arrangements were inadequate. Therefore, although remaining faithful to the Western alliance, France had to take measures for its own defense. As for specific proposals to revamp NATO, De Gaulle indicated he had none. The General merely asserted that he did not want to cling to old concepts. (Interestingly enough, in the Chancellor's view, De Gaulle did not even revert to his tripartite directorate proposal.)
/2/Erhard and Schroeder had visited Paris November 21-22.
Describing his reply to De Gaulle, the Chancellor said he told the French President he could support France's view on the force de frappe. He could understand, too, France's desire not to commit forces to NATO. (The Chancellor said he even volunteered the information that the US probably felt the same way.) But the Chancellor said he also told the General that France's attempt to use the veto to prevent military integration through NATO was totally incomprehensible.
The Chancellor suggested the President might take this very same line when he met De Gaulle--a meeting which he felt had to take place sooner or later. It clearly was not possible to talk De Gaulle out of his force de frappe or his determination to keep his national forces out of NATO. However, the Chancellor felt strongly that the President had to make clear to De Gaulle that he would not tolerate obstacles to NATO's development. Such actions are contagious. And the fact is that if France played a more positive role in Europe, the other European partners would perform better.
The Chancellor asserted there was a serious malaise in Europe. Britain was unsure of herself on the eve of new elections. (The Chancellor added that personally and confidentially he would like to see the Conservatives win.) The smaller nations were disgruntled. The Benelux countries felt they were being treated as second-class nations. And the EFTA countries thought they were being discriminated against by the Common Market. This was a matter of concern to the Federal Republic. New life blood was needed for the concept of Europe. However, the Chancellor felt no significant progress was possible until the question of the markets was settled. That was why the Kennedy Round was so important. Europe could not afford to isolate itself. It had to keep its ties with the outside world and maintain close relations with the US. The difficulty was that national interests differed. France seemed to be moving in a protectionist direction. Germany, on the other hand, which has 30 percent of its gross national product tied up in foreign trade, looked to the outside world for its prosperity, and needed an outward-looking policy.
The Chancellor promised to do his part to try to hold the European nations together. But a political underpinning was needed. The Chancellor said he talked with De Gaulle about this, but the General showed no enthusiasm for the subject. However, the Chancellor believes De Gaulle is more favorably inclined to political integration than is apparent. And if this is true, prospects for an Atlantic partnership are probably good. Because of the importance the Chancellor attaches to the problem, he intends to see General de Gaulle again soon; go to London in mid-January; and to Rome at the end of the month.
As for De Gaulle personally, the Chancellor admitted great respect for him. He thought he was reasonable and understanding. When they met in Paris, De Gaulle told the Chancellor that if he were in his place he would follow the same policy toward the US that the Federal Republic was pursuing. He also said he would never force Germany to choose between France and the US.
Having said all this, however, the Chancellor went on to characterize De Gaulle's views and policies as rigid. De Gaulle he said insisted that any aggression from the East, even if only a border incident, had to be countered not with conventional but with nuclear weapons. The General was also adamantly opposed to any discussions with the Soviets on a possible modus vivendi.
The German position, however, the Chancellor assured the President was more like that of the US. The Germans had no illusions about peace breaking out all over or people suddenly embracing one another. But the Germans felt strongly that the likelihood of hot war had to be pushed as far away as possible.
The basic problem with France, the Chancellor went on to say, is that De Gaulle has no faith in NATO. He also overestimates the effectiveness of his force de frappe. He wants France to go her own way and insists France must have enough nuclear weapons to destroy the Soviet Union at once. General De Gaulle is not impressed with the fact that the Soviet Union can destroy France ten times over. His answer is that this really makes no difference, for people can die but once. The Chancellor said he tried to argue this point with De Gaulle but did not think he succeeded in changing the General's views one iota.
The Chancellor said he did not know how well the President knew De Gaulle personally, but it was his impression that De Gaulle was totally inflexible on political questions.
The President replied that he had known De Gaulle since 1960 and had no illusions about his flexibility.
250. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
LBJ Ranch, Texas, December 28, 1963, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2354. Secret; Exdis. The source text bears no drafting information, but it was approved by the White House on January 14, 1964.
SUBJECT
Negotiations with the Soviets (Part 4 of 9 Parts)
PARTICIPANTS
[Here follows the same list as Document 248.]
On the question of East-West relations, the President told the Chancellor that the US wanted to explore all roads to better understanding and specifically look at the possibilities of improving relations with the Soviet Union. The President reassured the Chancellor that the US would negotiate from a position of strength and keep the German Government fully informed of its intentions. In this connection, the President asked the Chancellor whether he had any suggestions on what the US might do, or what the Federal Republic itself could do, to improve East-West relations.
The Chancellor said, as far as Germany was concerned, it made greater sense to talk with Khrushchev than Ulbricht. The latter was nothing more than a Soviet flunkey. But the Chancellor thought the West had to know more than it now did about the strength of the Soviet Union and the extent of its present difficulties. The German Government had the distinct impression that the situation inside the Soviet Union was tense. He admitted this estimate was based on circumstantial evidence. However, it was gleaned from dealings with the Soviet satellites and therefore of more than passing significance.
In this connection, the Chancellor said the Germans were struck by the fact that the satellites now seemed to have greater confidence and a greater degree of independence than before. The Germans translated this to mean that Khrushchev was not in full control in the way that Stalin was or in the way Khrushchev himself was in earlier days.
The Chancellor went on to say that some judgment also had to be made about the current struggle between the Soviet Union and Red China. The Germans doubted this was an ideological struggle. They were inclined to believe that this was a competition for power. And this open rift was not without its military implications. For one of the new facts of life was that the Soviet Union now had to guard its Eastern and Western frontiers.
The Chancellor felt three things had to be borne in mind. First, that modern technology in armaments and industry required vast sums of money and Soviet attempts to fill the Siberian vacuum (bordering on the home of 700 million Chinese) with people and industry, was a vast and difficult undertaking. Second, the progressive adoption of middle-class standards by Soviet society posed new and complicated problems for the Soviet Government. And finally, the need to advance industry, added to already difficult Soviet economic burdens, placed enormous if not impossible demands on the Soviet economic machinery.
It was the German Government's view that the Soviet economy just could not meet all these requirements at the same time. Something had to give. The question was where. If the savings were made in the defense areas, so much the better. This would improve chances for an East-West understanding.
In summary, the Chancellor stressed that although the Germans could not talk with Ulbricht, they might be prepared to work with Khrushchev. For the Soviet leadership in trouble might be interested in accepting material and financial assistance and agree to permit progress in the solution of the German question.
In reply to the President's question as to the amount of financial assistance the Germans had in mind, the Chancellor said the Federal Government's ideas were not quite firm. However, there could not be any long-term credits without major political concessions. Competition among the Western countries for extending credits to the Soviets would help Khrushchev without bringing about any improvement in the East-West situation. Political and economic factors had to be tied together. And the Germans were prepared to make substantial material and financial sacrifices in return for self-determination and improvement in the Berlin and German situations.
Continuing, the Chancellor said that the problem was very difficult for the Germans. They were at loss on how to approach Khrushchev. The Soviet leader was not likely to admit any readiness to enter into a bargain involving an exchange of political concessions for material assistance. The Chancellor thought, however, the US might do some of the probing, talk with the Russians, and indicate that the Germans were prepared to make sacrifices if progress on self-determination were possible. The Chancellor doubted this would work but he thought it ought to be considered, and felt there ought to be further consultation on it.
In his judgment, the Chancellor said the other problems were relatively minor. If some understandings were reached, fine. But he warned against illusions that these would bring about substantive changes in the world situation. On the other hand, he admitted some progress might be possible on major problems if Khrushchev were really under heavy pressure. The Chancellor readily admitted that no one had established how substantial these pressures were, although the German impression was that Khrushchev's present position was distinctly uneasy.
The President agreed that such an assessment ought to be made, and the problem fully considered.
251. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
LBJ Ranch, Texas, December 28, 1963, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2354. Secret; Exdis. The source text bears no drafting information, but it was approved by the White House on January 14, 1964.
SUBJECT
Berlin Christmas Passes (Part 5 of 9 Parts)
PARTICIPANTS
[Here follows the same list as Document 248.]
The President, raising the subject of the arrangements concerning Christmas visits in Berlin, said he was pleased with the project, for it showed flexibility and imagination in dealing with a difficult problem.
The Chancellor, however, did not think the results were all good. In fact, the Federal Government had some second thoughts about these arrangements. Moreover, the Chancellor was somewhat concerned about Soviet Zone plans to enter into new discussions with the Berlin authorities (and excluding the Federal authorities) for extension of these arrangements. Ulbricht was not moved by humanitarian considerations. His aims were political and his eye was clearly on the consolidation of the three-state doctrine, with Berlin being an independent entity. The Chancellor felt strongly that further moves had to be carefully thought out, lest the world get the impression that Berlin's life and security were no longer tied to Bonn and Berlin was leading a political life of its own. This, the Chancellor warned, could have dangerous consequences for the Germans and the Allies. The Chancellor said he was struck by the fact that even though Western motives in reaching these arrangements had been wholly humanitarian, East Bloc comment on the passes made no reference at all to the humanitarian considerations; it only stressed that the agreement was reached by the GDR and the "Berlin Senat." This was a dangerous political matter.
The German Government had not decided yet on how to deal with the next step. A better assessment would have to await more definitive data. But, the Chancellor wanted the President to appreciate the dangerous implications of this development.
252. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
LBJ Ranch, Texas, December 28, 1963, 11:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL E GER-W GER. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Creel and approved in S and U on January 1, 1964. A summary of this conversation was transmitted in Secto 1 from the Ranch, December 29. (Ibid., POL 36 GER) For McGhee's account of the conversation, see
An Ambassador's Account, pp. 129-130.
SUBJECT
The Berlin Christmas Pass Problem and its Relationship to Berlin and All-German Issues. Part One of
Two/2/
/2/A memorandum of Part 2 of the conversation, which included Christian A. Herter, U.S. Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, beginning at 12:40 p.m., is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2354.
PARTICIPANTS
Germans
Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder
State Secretary Ludger Westrick
State Secretary Karl Carstens
Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein
Dr. Horst Osterheld, FRG Foreign Office Adviser to Chancellor
Mr. Weber, Interpreter
US
The Secretary
Ambassador George C. McGhee
Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler, EUR
Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Robert C. Creel, Director, Office of German Affairs
The Secretary suggested that since the President and Chancellor Erhard were meeting in private session,/3/ the other participants might hold a separate meeting.
/3/See Documents 248-251.
The Secretary told Foreign Minister Schroeder he was very happy to see him here and looked forward very much to this opportunity to discuss many things. He thought it would be useful to start with Berlin, where developments were taking a form not entirely predictable. While he was aware that the Foreign Minister had been away from Bonn during a good part of the discussions about Christmas passes, he would be interested in learning how the Foreign Minister saw the situation and what he thought was likely to develop from it, particularly insofar as it might affect the responsibilities of the Three Powers in Berlin.
Foreign Minister Schroeder said he thought it would be useful to have a look at the background to this development. He felt we could learn a good deal from what had happened on the Christmas pass matter. Both Carstens and Westrick had been in Bonn during these developments and they could report more fully. He, himself, had had a couple of concerns--First, that when the FRG had received a letter from Absuch/4/ which reflected no change in the basic GDR position, there should have been the most careful consideration of what results we might expect from our side before making a change in our position. Secondly, there was a danger that we might be exposed to more public pressure than we had expected; it was necessary to weigh the pros and cons of the issue and to determine the extreme limits to which we were prepared to go. This was a matter of continuing importance since he felt we could expect continued pressure from the GDR. The Foreign Minister asked Carstens to review the developments on the Christmas pass issue.
/4/For text of Abusch's December 5 letter, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1963, p. 982.
Carstens said the problem had started with a letter from Abusch, a Deputy Minister of the GDR, to Mayor Brandt on December 5. Abusch had suggested negotiations between the GDR and the Berlin Senat to open East Berlin to West Berliners over the Christmas period. The FRG had discussed the matter with the Senat and expressed the view that the reply to Abusch should be that the existing interzonal trade channels (Leopold-Behrendt) should be utilized for this purpose. A reply in this sense had gone forward from the Senat, but the other side had said it could not continue the talks on this basis and that there must be talks on the GDR/Senat level. The FRG had then agreed that it would be all right for the Senat to inform the other side that some individual would be designated by the Senat to discuss the matter. The reply had come from Wendt, a State Secretary in the GDR Ministry of Cultural Affairs, that on this basis talks could be held, the first in East Berlin, and the second in West Berlin. The Senat designated Korber, a Senatstrat.
Carstens said that all the foregoing had been done in agreement with the FRG except on one point: the FRG had asked Mayor Brandt not to make any reference in this exchange to the authority of the Mayor or the Senat, but this line had not quite been followed. The Senat had sent a message which contained an introductory phrase to the effect that "the Governing Mayor has asked me to tell you this".
Carstens said it had become evident after several discussions that general agreement regarding procedural details for Christmas passes had almost been reached. The Secretary commented that meanwhile the status of the matter had become public knowledge. Westrick said that the GDR had given a press conference on the matter but had made reference to earlier stories in the Western press on the subject.
Carstens said it turned out fairly promptly that what the other side really wanted was a signed agreement, signed in the name of the Berlin Senat. At this point a further discussion was held between the FRG and the Senat. The FRG had said it would be better to avoid any signed agreement but that if this had to happen, it was important that there should at least be no reference in it to the Governing Mayor or the Berlin Senat. Carstens said the object was to play the whole thing down to the question of agreements on the strictly technical level. He was sure the people in Berlin had tried hard to get this point established. But then came the GDR press conference which revealed how far agreement had progressed on the details for Christmas passes; this served to increase public and emotional pressures, particularly since the GDR had said the only missing ingredient was a signed document. At this point Mayor Brandt had agreed that his representative, Korber, should sign a paper indicating he was signing "by order of the Chief of Chancellery of the Berlin Senat, who was in turn acting on the orders of the Governing Mayor". The FRG had been informed of this only after this proposal had been put forward. Carstens said it had been very difficult for the FRG to decide whether to accept or veto the proposal. They had finally decided to accept, because a veto would have destroyed the hopes of a large number of West Berliners.
Carstens said he felt there had been one mistake in the procedure followed--the FRG and the Senat had not coordinated their actions and decisions to a sufficient degree. As concerned the future, he felt it necessary that the FRG agree with the Senat that some individual in Berlin should act as the FRG representative and that decisions would be made only with his consent.
The Secretary asked if the Berlin Commandants had been contacted about this final reply to the GDR. Westrick said the Commandants had issued a statement that they were in agreement with what had been done; the statement had also stressed that nothing had taken place which in any way affected the status of Berlin.
Ambassador McGhee pointed out that while the Commandants had been consulted, this had taken place only after earlier consultations with the FRG. He thought it important that full consultation should take place before any decisive step was taken. Carstens said he agreed completely. He added that the FRG had reports that the GDR had also been acting under some pressure, in the form of representations from Gromyko to Ulbricht. Another point was that the GDR was in a somewhat ridiculous position since, under recent developments, East and West Germans had been able to meet with each other in Prague but not in Berlin.
The Secretary said he wondered why the other side had been willing to accept this startling and dramatic contrast between the treatment given West and East Berliners. He recalled that one West Berliner who had gone into East Berlin with a Christmas pass had commented that it was like visiting a penitentiary. Carstens said he thought there were two factions in the GDR on this issue. One faction had been in favor of granting Christmas passes since it felt this was a device for extracting concessions and an element of recognition for the GDR from the FRG. This faction had obviously prevailed.
The Secretary said he wanted to make two comments:
1. He believed the Federal Republic and West Berlin had an enormous gravitational pull on East Germans and East Berliners. If it were possible to open up and increase contacts, travel and communication between the people on both sides of the line, this would in a sense amount almost to de facto reunification. Admittedly, this was an historical, evolutionary process which would take time.
2. On the other hand, we did not know very clearly just what the East had in mind. We should be particularly careful regarding the responsibilities of the Three Powers in Berlin. If we were to be involved in a crash landing we must also be there for the takeoff. It was most important that the three Commandants be fully consulted. He emphasized that we did not object to these contacts, but it must be made clear at every stage just how the responsibilities of the Three Powers are affected.
Ambassador McGhee commented that the three Commandants were responsible for the security of West Berlin and this matter had presented a number of problems for them of a security nature.
The Secretary said that we were not disposed to raise any formal or hypothetical questions, but that if anything threatened to undermine or erode Allied rights in Berlin this could be dangerous.
Mr. Tyler asked Carstens whether von Eckhardt was not already in Berlin as the FRG representative and whether he could not handle this matter of FRG/Senat consultation. Was Carstens proposing anything different? Carstens said that von Eckhard could handle this "in principle". Schroeder said there might be a question whether von Eckhard would be the right person for this; there was no institutional problem but only a question of the person involved.
At Schroeder's request, Weber read a press ticker item that the Berlin Senat Press Chief, Egon Bahr, had issued a public statement in Berlin to the effect that the FRG and the Senat were united in the hope that further facilities for travel between East and West Berlin could be obtained, but that further steps would be taken only in agreement with all the parties concerned.
Carstens said the FRG did not wish to make public the fact it felt it had been informed too late. He commented that it was very difficult for the people in Berlin, where there were so many emotional pressures, to instruct the negotiators properly. It might be better for the instructions to come from people further away from the scene where the emotional pressures were less.
The Secretary said he had the feeling that over the past five or six years the West Germans and the West Berliners had underestimated the power of the attraction the West had for the East Germans. If contacts could be increased, the East Germans were bound to be attracted even more. The contrast between West and East Germany was very great indeed. He recalled how many East Germans had "voted with their feet". We were, therefore, relaxed about opening up these contacts. But we must remain in close touch on this life-and-death matter. This was probably the principal issue involving war or peace between the East and the West. In any case, he was sympathetic with the efforts of the West Berliners to put holes through the wall in Berlin.
Schroeder said he was not so optimistic as the Secretary on this point. He felt it essential to think through to the final conclusion the consequences of the steps now being taken. While he agreed that the West had a magnetic attraction for the East Germans--after all, this was the basis for their firm hope that if self-determination were granted to the East Germans they would opt for the West--there was still the very serious question of how far we could make use of this factor unless at the same time some of the institutional aspects in East Germany could be changed. If we merely went along the path of accepting all offers from the East to ameliorate conditions, this could work out to the advantage of the other side, since it would serve to make them look more human and increase their attractiveness. There was a danger that this could reach the point where world public opinion would feel it was possible for the West Germans to reach agreement with the other side even though there were no basic changes in the status quo. It was vital that things in the GDR be changed basically; otherwise, world public opinion might force the West Germans to accept the GDR theses of "all Germans around one table", confederation, and the like, even though there was no basic change in the situation. There would be a problem about where we could draw the line without running into trouble with public opinion.
Ambassador McGhee inquired whether this development might not have been a response to the speech made recently in Berlin by Federal Minister Mende. Maybe the original initiative had in effect come from the FRG? Schroeder said he did not think the Mende speech had anything to do with this though Mende perhaps thought differently. The GDR offer was mere repetition of offers which had been made in the past, even as long as two years ago. When he had first heard about the Absuch offer, he had, himself, seen no chance of agreement being reached. He had pointed out to the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee the danger that the GDR would indicate readiness to talk any time about Christmas passes or anything else, but without making any basic concessions, with the risk that public opinion could shift against the FRG if it did not agree to such talks. His first reaction had been that the Absuch letter should be rejected. He had felt that to accept the offer would be a step toward recognition of the East Zone and of West Berlin as an independent entity. But then things had gotten out of hand. He thought it was too early to take such steps. This particular step had been taken as an "unpolitical" step because of Christmas sentiment, but he thought it was a mistake. (He asked Weber to translate for the group the Christmas greetings which had been handed to each West Berliner visiting East Berlin, which was full of propaganda and appealed to West Berliners to support the idea of rapprochement between the two Germanies by negotiations.)
Schroeder said he felt we must think through this concept of the powerful attraction of West Germany and West Berlin for the East Germans. No one had yet been able to develop for him a complete theory as to just what the final result would be from promoting these contacts. It must be explained to him just what changes could be brought about in the East Zone system which would bring reunification closer. Admittedly these steps might improve conditions from the humanitarian standpoint, but he had not yet met anyone who could convince him that going along this path of quasi-recognition would not consolidate the status quo.
The Secretary said we had no particular fixed theory on this. There was in any case no problem with us about recognition. We were more strict on this than other members of the Alliance. He was, himself, impressed with the longing on the part of the East Germans to rejoin their brothers in West Germany. Things were changing in Eastern Europe. it would be a good thing if the people in Eastern Europe could lose their fear of Germany and in particular of a unified Germany. To the extent that they lost these fears this would help remove the obstacles to reunification. Another question was to what extent the East German Army would prove reliable to the Soviets in a crisis. There was in any case movement in the status quo and the question for us all was how we could make use of this movement to our advantage. This sort of question might well be discussed in the Ambassadorial Group.
Schroeder said that the FRG's long-term policies in Eastern Europe reflected the Secretary's thinking, and he agreed this would all take time. But he was concerned that if the Soviets had told the East Zone regime to adopt a different approach the Soviets had not done this in order to help the FRG but rather to help consolidate Ulbricht and his regime. Schroeder said it was difficult for people who had not lived under a totalitarian regime to appreciate its effectiveness. He cited the example of Poland, where 90 per cent of the people were opposed to the regime but where the country was effectively controlled by the 10 per cent representing the armed Communist elite. The same situation prevailed in East Germany. He felt that the basic situation could be changed there only through either a change in the world power situation or through armed intervention. The latter was obviously excluded. He was not, himself, convinced that the internal structure of a Communist regime could be changed by the measures we had been discussing.
At this point, Under Secretary Ball arrived, and the Secretary suggested that we might come back to this issue later and start talking about what had happened in the trade negotiations in Brussels.
Foreign Minister Schroeder agreed we should come back to this point about consultations on Berlin problems and the need to improve the consultative process. Before leaving it, he wished to offer one suggestion. Maybe we should consider that these consultations should be held in Bonn rather than in Berlin. In Bonn there were the three Ambassadors and the Federal Government, and we could get representatives from the Berlin Senat down to Bonn. The present situation was very bad indeed because no one seemed to have a clear idea of just what was happening.
The Secretary agreed that we must have clear procedures, but he would like to think about Schroeder's suggestion before making any definite reply. He commented that there was one further problem. Should the East Germans continue to let West Berliners come into East Berlin regularly and improve conditions in other respects, there could come a time when the GDR might approach the Berlin Senat and suggest that the Senat ask the Allies to reduce their troops in Berlin by 50 per cent and accept Swedes and other neutrals in their place. This would put us in a bad position. We had run the risk of war in the past in order to resist just such proposals.
Schroeder said there still was a question as to whether Berlin should be permitted to make all-German policies. This could be dangerous not only for the Allied governments but would be contrary to the policies of the Federal Government.
Mr. Tyler said he wished to point out that Allied rights in Berlin rested on occupation rights dating back to 1945, and that we should be careful about undermining the authority of the Berlin Commandants by shifting the focus of discussions of this nature to Bonn.
Ambassador McGhee said we should think in terms of what price should be paid in exchange for gaining improvements in the Berlin situation. Schroeder said this was precisely the point he was trying to make. What we needed to do was to think through the consequences of the first step which had now been taken. It was difficult to predict where this might end. What we needed was an overall strategy concept rather than pursuing the matter on the basis of the "optimism of dilettantes".
The Secretary stressed the need to have full discussion of these problems with Mayor Brandt. It was absolutely necessary that we proceed only with the complete unity of everyone on our own side. We would harm our own cause greatly if developments should take a turn which would lead the West Berlin population to disapprove of Western policies. He said he wished to say in complete confidence that he felt there was only one circumstance which could remove US forces from Berlin--this would be if the West Berliners should say that we do not want your forces here. US public opinion would then be a controlling factor. We must all be together, including Mayor Brandt.
Schroeder commented that the viewpoints in Berlin seemed to differ now more than in former years. Mayor Brandt, for example, was trying to mediate the situation, but there were others in Berlin who had reproached the FRG for not being strict enough about this matter of Christmas passes. This showed how much more complicated the situation in Berlin had become.
At this point Governor Herter arrived, and the Secretary suggested that the meeting now turn its attention to the "dismal science" of the economic problems raised by the matters covered in the recent Brussels agreement.
253. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
LBJ Ranch, Texas, December 28, 1963, 3:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 149. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Finn, approved by the White House on January 8, 1964, and by S and U on January 17.
SUBJECT
East-West Relations (Part 5 of 5)/2/
/2/Part 1 on the Kennedy Round is printed in vol. XIII, Document 89. Parts 2-4, which summarized the discussion on European political unity, the MLF, and aid to less-developed countries, are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2354.
PARTICIPANTS
[Here follows a lengthy list of participants. President Johnson was accompanied by Secretary Rusk and 10 other officials; Chancellor Erhard by Foreign Minister Schroeder and 12 others.]
President Johnson said that he would like to ask the Chancellor about East-West relations. Does the Chancellor feel that we are doing enough to find solutions to the problems dividing the world?
Chancellor Erhard replied that first of all he believes it is important not to think only in terms of what the West might do. It is necessary also to look at the position of the East and its responses to Western offers. Responses from the East have not so far been encouraging. There have been many Western suggestions but few encouraging responses. It is true that a test ban agreement was reached, and this reduced the threat of a hot war. But there has not been a favorable response in other areas, as for example on observation posts.
The Chancellor said that our views would be more meaningful if we had a more exact evaluation of the Russian position, if we knew how deep the trouble is in the Soviet Union. The Chancellor said that the FRG would discuss this subject in the Ambassadorial Group.
The President said that he interpreted the Chancellor's remarks as indicating the view that the Soviets may be in pretty serious trouble. The Chancellor said that he thinks they are, but that he doubted the Soviets have reached a stage of being willing to change their policies in any visible way. The Soviets remain concerned about their prestige, as dictatorships are more than democracies.
The Chancellor said that he was favorable to the proposed wheat sales to the Soviet Union. He does not believe this is a point on which the West should be tough. The Chancellor noted that the German people would have starved in the period after World War II had it not been for US aid.
The President asked whether the FRG was not selling flour to the Soviet Union. The Chancellor said this was true.
The Chancellor commented that he felt the recent autobahn incidents had been no accident. The Chancellor then reiterated his view that we should not always be thinking in terms of what we should do; we should also look at the attitude of the other side.
The Chancellor commented that sometimes these subjects can get hot. The Christmas pass issue has dynamite in it even though it looks harmless. The East Germans and Soviets are pressing their three-state theory. The question is arising as to who speaks for Berlin. The FRG position up to now has been that the Berlin Senat and the Federal Government will jointly carry out discussions and any arrangements entered into.
The meeting ended at 5:15 p.m.
254. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
LBJ Ranch, Texas, December 29, 1963, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2354. Secret; Exdis. The source text bears no drafting information, but it was approved by the White House on January 14, 1964.
SUBJECT
Germany and East-West Negotiations (Part 2 of 2 Parts)/2/
/2/Part 1, a 7-line memorandum of conversation about relations with Communist China, is ibid.
PARTICIPANTS
Germany
The Chancellor
Hermann Kusterer, Interpreter
United States
The President
McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President
Arnold Lissance, Interpreter
Returning to the subject of East-West relations, the President told the Chancellor he was under no illusions as to what might be accomplished with the Soviets. Nevertheless, if imaginations were put to work, somehow and some way ideas might emerge which promised hope.
The Chancellor assured the President that the Federal Government was not opposed to a relaxation of tensions. Germany could not afford to take such a position. It was incumbent upon everyone, and especially for the Germans, to see what could be done to make war impossible. And the Germans, for their part, would try to make constructive contributions to this end.
The President said he found this encouraging and was indeed pleased with the leadership Chancellor Erhard was giving Germany.
The President emphasized that the West must lead from strength; and that the US was prepared to do its part. This year, the US was thinking in terms of a $50 billion defense budget and the German defense budget of DM 20 billion was an important element in the overall western defense posture.
The Chancellor said the Federal Republic would do all it could to avoid the dangers of war. However, it was impossible for the Federal Government to approach Khrushchev directly. He wondered therefore whether the US might be willing to make the necessary approaches to Khrushchev, making it clear that the US could not renounce the principle of self-determination. The Chancellor suggested Khrushchev might also be told Germany was prepared to make real sacrifices to this end. The Federal Republic was not only ready to extend credits; it was prepared to make other kinds of substantive contributions.
The Chancellor then asked whether the President might be willing to explore with Khrushchev possible solutions to some of the urgent problems in Europe. In this connection, the Chancellor mentioned that six or seven years ago as Minister of Economics he received an invitation to visit the Soviet Union. But this invitation was no longer valid now that he was Chancellor. However, this was no reason for not communicating. In fact, the Chancellor thought the Western powers ought to continue to explore with the Soviets possible points of agreement and attempt to determine whether economics might not buy political solutions.
The President said he had no illusions about Khrushchev. Moreover, he had no intention of meeting with him unless and until such a meeting could produce concrete, positive results. By the same token, he was prepared to go anywhere and talk with anyone if something useful could be accomplished.
The US, the President continued, had a $50 billion defense budget and its combat strength had increased considerably during the past three years. This was an important element in the equation. The US always had to lead from strength and be prepared to defend itself.
The President said one of his principal concerns, however, was that there seemed to be a dearth of new ideas for relieving international tensions. A considerable amount of planning had been done in the State Department and elsewhere. But the end result always seemed to be that we would have to travel along until we slid into war. Perhaps the Chancellor had ideas on how we might make things just a little easier for ourselves by making Soviet aggression less likely. For if there is no relaxation, there could suddenly be a situation where "Khrushchev goes for our jugular."
The Chancellor thought things were going very rapidly and clearly we had to think in different categories than we did fifteen years ago. Some good might come out of all this movement, but he, the Chancellor, thought it necessary to remain hard-headed. The Soviets seemed to be having real difficulties, and if the West had a better idea of what was going on in the Soviet Union, it might be better prepared to deal with the Kremlin. The Chancellor mentioned that Secretary Rusk had told him that such studies were now under way and that the conclusions would be made available to the Chancellor. This would certainly help in making the necessary political judgments.
The President agreed, but added that as soon as the study was finished and more precise information available, minds and resources had to be applied to see what might be done. It was especially important to do so while Khrushchev was still weak, for it would be a great mistake to wait until the Soviets recovered.
The President said what disturbed him a great deal was that the West seemed to be getting all the wrong headlines. Wheat sales and the test ban agreement were not looked upon as the Western powers' will for peace. The Soviets seemed to get the major credit for these developments even though Khrushchev did not do more about peace than we have done and are doing. While we must stay strong, we also must remain reasonable. One of the things that troubled him over the past six or seven years was Chancellor Adenauer's numerous warnings to the President to "be careful" and "not trust Khrushchev." The fact was that he did not trust Khrushchev. But by the same token he did not think the Western powers could remain insensitive to world opinion and he thought it would be a great mistake if the West refused to consider moves toward peace.
The Chancellor said he talked about this often with Adenauer. But Adenauer always insisted that Khrushchev was isolated in a fortress under siege and therefore the only alternative was to starve him out. Erhard said he never accepted this view. On the contrary, it was his view that it is dangerous to push dictators into a corner. This was bound to produce irrational reactions, and the Germans probably knew more about this than any other people since they lived with unpredictable dictators and watched them react under pressure.
The Chancellor expressed his personal appreciation for this candid exchange of views. He was pleased that there seemed to be a meeting of the minds and his views of the important problems were not unlike those of the President.
The President reiterated that it was absolutely essential that the US remain strong and not allow itself to be weakened. At the same time, its policy had to be one of live and let live. The President was sure Khrushchev knew he did not have to worry that US bombs would be dropped on him. By the same token, Khrushchev had to understand he would not be permitted to subvert this hemisphere. The US wanted no more Cubas. The US was willing to guarantee Moscow's survival in return for comparable Soviet guarantees for Berlin and New York. Everything was capable of solution if minds were put to work. However, it was not enough to talk peace; something had to be done about it.
In this connection, the President said he again wanted to reaffirm US commitments to Germany. However, Germany does have commitments to the US which it demonstrated by agreeing to a defense budget of DM 20 billion.
The President then reemphasized that areas of agreement had to be found. He hoped to remain in touch with the Chancellor so there would be no lack of understanding on either side, and each would know what the other was doing.
The President then shifted the discussion and said he wanted to make one point absolutely clear since this was a matter of continuous speculation--he had no antipathy for nor was he disappointed by General de Gaulle. He knew the General well. Both he and the General understood the problems between us, and both realized that for the most part they did not lend themselves to simple or easy solutions. However, the President added he was certain that when the chips were down, President de Gaulle would stick by the alliance as he did during the Cuban crisis and on other occasions.
The Chancellor said so many changes were taking place in the world, the German people were in a quandary as to how to react. Would the future course be protectionism and isolation or trade expansion and wider association? In Brussels the Germans put up a strong fight for the Kennedy Round for this is an essential prerequisite to wider world trade. The Chancellor said he would be willing to go to Geneva himself if his presence there would assure this. But the Chancellor also felt the President should know--and he emphasized that he was telling this to him in all frankness--that there was wide speculation that the US intended to loosen its military and political ties with Europe. And if there was to be any success in Geneva, answers had to be given to these unspoken questions to end this harmful kind of speculation.
The President appreciated this comment. He said he wanted to reassure the Chancellor that there need be no doubt about changes in US plans or policies.
(At this point, the President invited Mr. Bundy to join the talks to discuss possible Western approaches to the Soviet Union.)
The President emphasized again that dealings with the Soviets had to be from a position of strength. The Federal Republic had its defense budget of DM 20 billion and the US its budget of $50 billion. The US had a continuing commitment to keep its six divisions in Europe. There was no question in the President's mind but that the West needed a strong, unified Europe tied to a strong America in an unbreakable alliance. However, talk was not enough. Something had to be done about it. Khrushchev was weakened by his difficulties with his Chinese allies and his economic problems at home. But the West did not seem to be taking advantage of the situation. The President felt strongly that it was important for the Western powers to use their imaginations and ingenuity to get what they could and what they had to have. This was the time for the partnership to see what it could do and take the necessary action.
Turning to Mr. Bundy, the President explained that he had asked the Chancellor for his ideas and thoughts for dealing with the East-West situation. He explained that the Chancellor indicated his willingness to make some concessions to the Soviets, perhaps in the form of large loans. However, the Chancellor did not think the Germans could propose this to the Soviets. They preferred to have the US handle this matter with Moscow. The President thought this proposal ought to be carefully considered.
Mr. Bundy explained that as he saw it the problem was to try to find something that could be offered to the Soviets which the Kremlin wanted and which was worth more to them than to the West, in return for which the Western position in Berlin, where the greatest danger to peace now existed, would be strengthened. The West had to look for the kind of proposal that went to the heart of the problem--that relieved the existing political situation in Germany without bringing about the recognition of East Germany. The Federal Republic was not prepared to consider recognition, and neither was the US. Nevertheless, the West had to make clear to the Soviets it was prepared to work toward a settlement. Therefore the US looked to the Chancellor for suggestions for improving the lot of the Germans living in East Germany; strengthening the Western position in Berlin; and in the last analysis providing a clear quid pro quo for the Soviets.
The Chancellor admitted that under Adenauer it was difficult to get such talks started. The German Government agrees that pressures must be put on Khrushchev, but the question is how and where. A better assessment of the Soviet situation would be most helpful. Khrushchev is having problems. He is clearly under pressure on several fronts. He therefore is probably approachable. In this kind of situation, credits could be attractive, and Khrushchev might be interested in such a proposition. Long-term credits from the West, however, depended on a real relaxation of tensions. However, if such a dialogue were undertaken, the US would have to insist upon Soviet acceptance of the principle of self-determination. There would also have to be a phased and synchronized time table to insure the right of the German people to decide their future. Germany was willing to pay the price. It was prepared to offer credits and other kinds of assistance, including help for Soviet industry in Eastern Siberia. But in addition to economic assistance, there had to be a phased program for increasing freedom in East Germany and East Berlin, and leading to free elections. The Chancellor said he realized this was a radical plan. Sometimes, however, such plans were easier to achieve than the conventional ones.
The Chancellor admitted he had no illusions about the ease of getting such a program under way. However, he was sure he could appeal to the German people for the necessary sacrifices. These sacrifices would not only be good for the Germans; they would demonstrate to the world that the Germans' principal interest was reunification and not revanchism. In this connection, the Chancellor said he wanted to add a word of caution--that under no circumstances could such a program be considered reparations. Economic sacrifices of this order had to buy freedom for the German people.
Mr. Bundy said he wanted to reiterate a point made earlier. The President appreciated the difficulty of the German problem. However, there were people in the US who were putting pressure on the President for an early solution. Their argument is that the difficulties being discussed are not really decisive or real; and that in fact there are a number of options open to us. Moreover, they feel Khrushchev needs time and an easing situation if he is to make any counter concessions. At the present time, this kind of development seemed blocked by the Federal Republic's rigid attitude toward East Germany. Ulbricht, these people argue, remains in control because the Soviets have no alternative and West Germany's rigidity on contacts with the Soviet Zone will not facilitate self-determination. They go on to say Khrushchev cannot be bought off. The only way to move toward a German solution is for the Federal Republic's relations to East Germany to develop as they did with Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. Therefore, they conclude the answer to the present impasse is to seek an interim agreement preserving the freedom of Berlin; defuse the access question; and take a more flexible position on the question of relations with East Germany. "That is what people are telling us, Mr. Chancellor. And my question to you, sir, is what shall we answer?"
The Chancellor said he was convinced that any recognition of the Soviet Zone, even only superficial, would mean the final and irrevocable split of Germany. There should be no illusions about this. The two parts of Germany were quite different socially and economically. It was impossible to reconcile them. The Federal Republic was free, democratic and capitalistic. The Soviet Zone was undemocratic, unfree, and communistic. There is no middle ground. If the Communists are permitted a breakthrough, the split will be final. The Chancellor vehemently denied that the West Germans were out of touch with the East Germans. The Federal Republic, for example, is trading with the Soviet Zone; West German credits were offered to improve the lot of the East Germans. There are communications between the two parts of Germany. There were even the Christmas passes. But the fact remains that it was the East Germans who built the wall. East Germans can come to the Federal Republic any time and without passes; West Berliners need passes to enter East Berlin. The West Germans and the West Berliners want to see German life normalized and therefore certain agreements are possible. The Chancellor said he understood the Ambassadorial Group was now looking at possible new initiatives, but it was too early to predict the results. He went on to say that he understood the pressures the President was under to provide answers on how to proceed. But the German Government was not viewing the problem from a narrow point of view. It was taking into consideration not only German needs but also the needs of Germany's friends and allies. Nevertheless, the Chancellor promised to give this matter further thought, but warned against an easy solution, given the history of this complicated problem.
The President said he appreciated this. Nevertheless, he was concerned that inaction could produce disaster. Much therefore depended upon the ideas the West could produce and particularly on what the Germans might come up with.
Concluding, the Chancellor pointed out that the Soviets were signatories to the Potsdam Agreement which committed them to a peace treaty following all-German elections. If such elections were permitted, West Germans were fully prepared to accept comprehensive international controls. One would assume, however, that the Soviet Zone would also submit to such controls. In addition, the Chancellor said, there would have to be free movement of all Germans to permit full campaigning on both sides. The Germans were ready to decide their own destiny, and once that was out of the way, the boundary problems could be resolved. (The Chancellor asked the President to keep this information absolutely confidential.) Germany could and would live in peace with its Eastern neighbors.
255. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
LBJ Ranch, Texas, December 29, 1963, 11:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 Berlin. Secret. Drafted by Creel and approved in S on January 1, 1964.
SUBJECT
Procedure for Consultation on Berlin Problems. Part One of Two/2/
/2/Part 2 is printed as Document 256.
PARTICIPANTS
Germans
Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder
Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein
State Secretary Ludgar Westrick
State Secretary Karl Carstens
Assistant Secretary Franz Krapf
Minister Georg von Lilienfeld
United States
The Secretary
Ambassador George C. McGhee
Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler, EUR
Mr. Robert C. Creel, Director, GER
After the President and the Chancellor had gone into private session,/3/ the Secretary suggested that a small group convene to continue yesterday's discussion of certain Berlin and all-German problems.
/3/See Document 254.
He said he first wanted to say a word about the procedures for consultation on problems in Berlin. He was himself inclined to use procedures now in force, involving the Four-Power Group in Bonn, the Ambassadorial Group in Washington, and existing arrangements for Bonn to keep in close touch with the Commandants and Senat in Berlin.
Carstens said the problem arose from the fact that as concerned contacts between the Commandants and the Senat it was difficult under present procedures for the FRG to be fully in the picture. It was absolutely essential for the FRG to be fully informed at all times. He therefore wished to suggest that the focal point for consultations be in Bonn where there were the three Ambassadors, the FRG and a representative of the Senat. (Note: Klaus Schuetz, Senator for Federal Affairs.) This would insure that the FRG knew what everyone was saying at one time--there had been much difficulty in the past with knowing what had been said here and what had been said there. The FRG was always getting different stories. It was essential that there be one place where the Three Powers, the FRG and the Senat could all sit around one table.
The Secretary said we must be very careful not to diminish in any way the authority of the Commandants in Berlin. Ambassador McGhee stressed the importance of the three Commandants in Berlin meeting frequently as a group. Mr. Tyler pointed out that while there were many types of problems regarding Berlin which might arise, there were some which fell strictly within the competence of the Commandants--particularly those matters affecting the security of Berlin. He thought Carstens' suggestion might create problems in this respect.
Carstens said that his proposed procedure would be limited to those particular contacts and discussions which were already under way in Berlin. As concerned this matter, it was absolutely necessary for the FRG to know who was saying what, and to arrive quickly at the stage where we were all sure we were in full agreement. This could be done only if all those concerned were assembled in one place. He pointed out again that the Berlin Senat had a permanent representative in Bonn and also mentioned the divergent trends in Berlin.
The Secretary observed that if we had this procedure for 5-party consultation differing from existing procedures, there was the possibility we could have five vetoes. This was undesirable. It was essential that the three Commandants in Berlin remain in a position to give instructions to the Berlin Senat.
Ambassador McGhee pointed out that there were even certain aspects of the present problem of passes which were within the sole competence of the Commandants insofar as they might affect the security of Berlin (as, for example, the location of pass offices).
Carstens said his immediate concern was how we should coordinate the matter of the answer to be given to the next initiative from the East. There were indications that such an initiative was already under way. There would be strong pressures to continue the measures which had been started, but we should not let the other side exploit any differences among us. He agreed that we should do nothing to prevent the Commandants from continuing to carry out their existing responsibilities, but he did not feel that what he was proposing would have any such effect.
The Secretary said he was still not clear why the existing machinery was not satisfactory. Mr. Tyler commented that we had always looked to the FRG and the Senat to coordinate between themselves the German position on Berlin matters. Why wasn't the present arrangement adequate for this?
Mr. Bundy observed that, as he understood Carstens' point, the FRG was afraid it would get "whip-sawed" by hearing two different things from two different sources. Carstens said this was right; they had already gone through this several times. He stressed again that what he was proposing would not in any way affect the rights and responsibilities of the Commandants.
The Secretary inquired whether the Senat had good and secure communications with its representative in Bonn. Carstens said this was the case and added that Schuetz was very close to Brandt personally. He said his suggested procedure should be used only in cases where "all four of us agree there should be a conference of five". This was the only way to handle the problem rapidly.
The Secretary said we would consider the matter further and take it up with the French and British.
Mr. Bundy said that if Carstens' suggestion were adopted, we should not let on that this represented any big change. It would be important not to give Moscow the idea there had been any modification in Bonn-Berlin relations. It would also be important not to give the appearance of by-passing the Commandants and making them less visible.
Carstens commented that an alternative procedure might be to bring the FRG into the Senat-Commandant discussions in Berlin. This was not now being done and to do so would in fact represent a real change. But what he was proposing was not in fact a change in existing procedures.
The Secretary concluded the discussions at this point by saying it was agreed that we would look into Carstens' proposal and maybe give it a try.
256. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
LBJ Ranch, Texas, December 29, 1963, 11:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2354. Secret. Drafted by Creel and approved in S on January 1, 1964.
SUBJECT
New German Initiative on Reunification Law. Part Two of Two
PARTICIPANTS
[Here follows the same list as Document 255.]
The Secretary suggested that the meeting turn to consideration of a new initiative on the all-German problem.
Foreign Minister Schroeder said the Germans were preparing a paper on the subject for discussion with the other three governments, which could then be considered by the Ambassadorial Group. The paper would first have to be approved by the Cabinet in Bonn, but he thought it would be ready for submission to other governments by mid-January.
The Secretary recalled our experience in dealing with the Soviets on such occasions as the meetings of the Deputies for the Austrian Peace Treaty, the Palais Rose, etc. He asked whether what Schroeder had in mind was an effort to set up a four-power group with German participation with a broad frame of reference.
Schroeder said he felt there should be no Germans at all in this group. If the FRG were represented, Pankow would also claim the right to participate and we would have a replica of the situation at Geneva in 1959. This the FRG wished to avoid.
The Secretary inquired about the terms of reference--should they be detailed or general. Schroeder said the Germans had in mind possibly five points: a timetable for the transitional period, a plan for reunification and European security, a draft electoral law, a procedure for settling disputes, and a proposal for supervising the conduct of the elections.
The Secretary commented that with such a frame of reference it would be his guess that no meeting with the Soviets would ever take place. Carstens agreed it was difficult to suggest anything acceptable to the other side. He felt our position could remain very flexible. These were merely ideas to try to help make progress.
The Secretary said he felt a distinction should be drawn between broad terms of reference on the one hand for discussions with the Soviets, and on the other the arrangements among themselves (US, UK, France and FRG) which would have to be very detailed. We should be prepared to meet an impasse with the Soviets at the outset, although it might be possible over a period of time to make gradual progress on certain aspects, such as the humanitarian side. Based on our experience with the Austrian Treaty he felt that if any such group were set up it should be prepared to hold at least 300 meetings.
The Secretary said he had a question about the plebiscite. Was Schroeder confident that if a fair plebiscite could be held on the issue of whether the Germans wanted a united or divided Germany, the vote would come out on our side?
Schroeder replied that there would be no point in the Germans talking about self-determination as they had been doing unless they were prepared to go all the way through with it. Carstens said the FRG did not have much doubt on this score. He cited the observations of the London Times' correspondent who had recently visited East Germany and expressed the view that a fair election would result in an overall vote of at least 80 per cent in favor of the West.
The Secretary cited the example of Puerto Rico where our position on this issue was very powerful. If anyone raised the issue of Puerto Rico independence, we could always say "Why don't you ask the Puerto Ricans"? He recalled that the Soviets had frequently said, without really meaning it, that reunification was up to the Germans themselves. Schroeder said that what the Soviets really meant was--ask the Pankow regime. Carstens referred to the formula in the Heads of Government Directive at Geneva in 1955/2/ which called for German reunification by free elections "to be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people" and pointed out that the Soviets had interpreted this phrase in such a way as to block completely any possibility of free elections.
/2/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. V, pp. 527-528.
Mr. Krapf inquired whether consultation should take place first in the capitals or in the Ambassadorial Group. Schroeder said this point had been discussed in Paris among the Foreign Ministers, and he would himself see no objection in having it discussed first in the Ambassadorial Group. The Secretary said this would mean that the first discussion would be very brief since the matter would have to be referred to governments. Schroeder replied that the matter had been discussed with Couve and the other Foreign Ministers in Paris and he had considered Couve's reaction to the idea of a new German initiative very forthcoming. The Secretary commented that this might be one of the fruits of the Franco-German Treaty.
Schroeder commented on the importance of discussing the whole thing among ourselves in great detail before any approach was made to the Soviets. Mr. Tyler stressed the need to hold the matter closely, particularly in view of the fact that the press was already apparently aware that something was up; he cited the recent Gruson story from London on the subject.
The Secretary said he agreed we should put our minds to this in the Ambassadorial Group. There were some aspects of the matter from the standpoint of European security which might be difficult and complicated. For example, how could we assure that German reunification would not upset the existing power balance? He commented that this was the only major issue on which an East-West armed conflict could occur. There would be various other things such as observation posts, non-aggression pacts and the like, which would have to come into the picture.
Ambassador McGhee asked Schroeder what he would think of setting up a link between improvement of access to Berlin--as for example, by an International Access Authority--and a non-aggression pact. This link would be established on the basis that the NAP would become null and void in the event of any new interference with Berlin access which might impel us to use an armed probe.
Schroeder said they had not quite made up their minds on this. He felt it would impose a heavy burden on the Swiss, Swede or whoever might be Chairman of the Access Authority to take decisions involving peace or war. Ambassador McGhee commented that Ambassador Thompson felt the Soviets would not agree to establishing the Access Authority solely in exchange for the NAP. Schroeder added that he felt the Soviets were not prepared to do anything which would exclude the idea of setting up West Berlin as a free city.
The Secretary inquired whether there would be any point in proposing that the Berlin Wall be established on the east frontier of East Berlin. Carstens commented merely that several hundred thousand people would leave East Berlin and not come back. The Secretary made reference to Mayor Brandt's idea about letting East Berliners enter West Berlin freely on the basis of a guarantee that they would not move any further West than West Berlin.
Ambassador McGhee inquired about the possibility of using interzonal trade and credits to arouse expectations on the other side. This could then put the FRG in a position to make demands on the East. Schroeder said he thought this was underestimating the realities in a totalitarian system. Carstens added that the GDR had not yet reacted to the offer of increased credits in IZT, which had been put forward over a year ago.
The meeting then adjourned to proceed to the barbecue at Stonewall.
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