Docs 1-29
Eastern Europe Region
1. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Hungary. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.
Washington, February 3, 1961.
SUBJECT
Letter from Cardinal Mindszenty
The enclosed letter of January 12, 1961,/1/ addressed to you by Cardinal Joseph Mindszenty has been forwarded to the Department by the Charge d'Affaires of our Legation in Budapest. In his letter the Cardinal expresses his gratitude for the refuge which the United States has afforded him within the Legation, appeals to you to decide whether to continue or to terminate that refuge, and sets forth his personal views on a number of political matters affecting Hungary.
/1/Not printed.
The situation of the Cardinal, who has remained in refuge within the premises of the Legation since November 4, 1956, is extremely delicate and constitutes an unusual exception to the established policy of the United States not to grant asylum in our diplomatic missions. In its treatment of this special situation, the Department has considered it very important to avoid any action which, by imparting a political rather than a purely humanitarian character to the refuge we have afforded the Cardinal, might cause embarrassment to the United States Government, prejudice the continued safe refuge of the Cardinal, and make the Legation's position more difficult. In the light of these considerations, the Department has adhered firmly to the policy that it will not permit the Cardinal to use the Legation as a base for either political or ecclesiastical activities, to give interviews, or to engage in correspondence with persons outside the United States Government. The only exception to this policy is that the Department is prepared to transmit brief oral or unsealed written communications between the Cardinal and the Vatican which are not of a political or ecclesiastical nature but relate rather to the Cardinal's position of refuge in the Legation or to his personal spiritual problems and state of mind with reference to his situation of refuge. Our policy, as stated above, has been made clear to both the Vatican and the Cardinal. We are convinced that continued adherence to this policy is in the best interests not only of the United States but also of the Cardinal himself.
Our established procedure for acknowledging the occasional communications which the Cardinal has addressed to the President has been for the Department to instruct the Charge d'Affaires merely to inform the Cardinal orally that his message has been received in the White House. In a few instances, where the contents warranted, a variation of this procedure has been to instruct the Charge d'Affaires to inform the Cardinal that his message has been received by the President (or in the White House) and to add a word of appreciation or other brief reassurance. This procedure has served the judicious purpose of avoiding any direct and personal involvement of the President in correspondence with the Cardinal and, thus, of precluding embarrassments that might eventually arise from substantive written replies to the Cardinal's comments on sensitive political matters.
This Government's position regarding the duration of Cardinal Mindszenty's present refuge has been that it will continue to afford him refuge within the premises of the Legation so long as consideration for his personal safety and freedom requires such an arrangement. The Cardinal has been informed of this position on several occasions. In October 1958, at the Vatican's express request and with the Cardinal's reluctant acquiescence, the United States quietly made a formal request to the Hungarian Government through the American Legation that Cardinal Mindszenty be permitted to leave Hungary under assurances of safe conduct and proceed to Rome to participate in the election of the new Pope. This request was flatly rejected.
It is recommended, in accordance with the policy and procedure outlined above, that you authorize the Department to instruct our Charge d'Affaires at Budapest to inform the Cardinal orally that (1) you have received with appreciation his letter of January 12; (2) you understand fully his situation; and (3) you wish to reaffirm previous assurances that the hospitality of the American Legation in Budapest remains available to him and that this Government will continue to afford him refuge in the Legation so long as consideration for his personal safety and freedom requires such an arrangement.
If you approve the above recommendation, appropriate instructions will be sent to our Charge d'Affaires.
Dean Rusk/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
2. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.49/4 - 461. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.
Prague, April 4, 1961, 2 p.m.
325. Camsky, subject Dean's March 31 letter to Tims,/1/ is fourth case past six months of CSSR secret police whittling away veteran local employees, indicating systematic pattern. Heretofore we have laboriously absorbed loss using American ceiling complement. This cannot be done in case of language instructor; good teacher essential to long-range aims of Embassy. Moreover, next logical targets salami tactics are library assistants and publications procurement clerk who have access local circles now impossible for Americans. Replacement theoretically possible but loss present personnel would seriously impair efficiency and morale of Embassy, increase risk planned incident. Furthermore, if Camsky case should actually come off as described, receiving large-scale publicity treatment, adverse effect on development relations and on implementation our own aims in CSSR might be considerable; this is probably conjecture of instigators though we do not know how highly they are placed or how their actions are reconcilable with such actions Foreign Ministry as proposal cultural exchange.
/1/Not found.
I feel strongly we must make clear to governing CSSR personalities that harassment our employees can also have adverse effect on CSSR national interests rather than having no adverse effect whatever as heretofore. US action now might protect remaining local employees, forestall further development Camsky case.
Believe therefore we should make demarche based Kadainkova case, which is only overtone, making it stand for situation all local employees. Believe also essential that action be taken rapidly if at all before police make irrevocable move Camsky gambit; deadline may come tomorrow. Therefore recommend Department either authorize me see Hajek or that Department will call in Ruzek. After general exchange on status mutual relations, progress economic negotiations, et cetera (it preferable in interests of locals that employee issue not be sole subject of discussion) would mention Kadainkova note of March 28 (text, pouched Somerlatte April 1, merely summarizes my oral interventions, asks final favorable response), express hope for positive reply and then state that we did not believe that US Government would desire take final steps toward conclusion economic agreement, lifting personnel ceiling or reopening of Consulates, until clear assurances received that operations Embassy Prague will not be impeded through difficulties with local employees who have infringed no CSSR law and whose services satisfactory to us. We must reserve right to insist that law-abiding employees of Embassy should not be harassed or interfered with by Czech authorities in any way because of Embassy employment; we consider Mrs. Kadainkora's case to stand for all local employees. If further details asked for would remark that participants aware facts of life in CSSR society and for that reason do not propose go further than state our problems in Prague not figments of imagination.
Because it overt, possibility of using Kadainkova case in combination with Czech interest in economic agreements and increase of personnel presents what may be our last handhold to limit police operations and get some understanding on this point; if not used field will continue open. With present circumscribed access for Americans and unimpeded police operations against both American and local Embassy personnel, an economic agreement, lifting of personnel ceiling and opening of Consulates would be of dubious value to US./2/
/2/In telegram 277 to Prague, April 5, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to avoid linking economic issues with harassment of U.S. employees and instructed the Ambassador to stress the deleterious effects of harassment on the normalization of U.S.-Czech relations. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.49/4 - 461) In telegram 333 from Prague, April 7, Ravndal reported he had made a demarche to the Foreign Office as instructed that afternoon and that Vice Foreign Minister Hajek ``got the point." (Ibid., 611.49/4 - 761)
Ravndal
3. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.69/4 - 1761. Confidential. Drafted by Spear and approved in S on May 3.
Washington, April 17, 1961.
SUBJECT
Bulgarian Minister's Courtesy Call on the Secretary
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Dr. Peter G. Voutov, Bulgarian Minister
EE--Mr. Moncrieff J. Spear
After exchanging greetings, Dr. Voutov said that he wished to review US-Bulgarian relations briefly. He then cited a number of Bulgarian initiatives as evidence of their good will in improving relations; these included the negotiations for the resumption of relations,/1/ the financial claims discussions and proposals for a cultural agreement. In addition, Dr. Voutov reported that the Bulgarians had established a trade mission here and were seeking to expand commercial relations. He also suggested that we should review our consular convention (sic) and up-date it. Although the Bulgarians had undertaken all these steps, unfortunately relations had not all gone smoothly.
/1/The United States and Bulgaria agreed to a resumption of diplomatic relations on March 24, 1959. The United States had severed relations in February 1950. For text of the Department of State statement on the resumption of relations, see Department of State Bulletin, December 14, 1959, p. 866.
Claims Negotiations. Dr. Voutov then related his efforts to resolve the impasse in the financial claims negotiations in discussions with Mr. Kohler and reviewed the amounts involved in the claims discussions. He said that he had advised his Government of the $3.1 million value of the vested Bulgarian assets as well as testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee/2/ indicating that the value of these assets should cover US claims against Bulgaria. Because of this, Dr. Voutov commented, he had been surprised when the negotiations were suspended and his Government had complained that it had been given a false impression.
/2/Apparently the reference is to 1959 hearings to amend the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949. For text of these hearings, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, International Claims Settlement Act. Hearings. May 29, 1959, Washington, 1959.
US-Bulgarian Trade. Dr. Voutov next observed that until Bulgaria was granted most-favored-nation (MFN) status there could be no real expansion of US-Bulgarian trade. A ``platonic" declaration on trade expansion was of no use. He handed the Secretary an aide-memoire (a copy of which he had left with the Secretary of Commerce)/3/ spelling out the difference which MFN status would make to Bulgarian trade and added that while US-Bulgarian trade had historically been on the order of $1 million annually in each direction, if Bulgaria were granted MFN treatment it could buy goods worth $10 million annually, while US imports from Bulgaria would total $6 - 7 million. Dr. Voutov also mentioned that the Bulgarians would be requesting permission to open a trade office in New York.
/3/Not found with the source text.
Cultural Relations. The Minister then listed the various US performing artists who had appeared in Bulgaria during the last year and said that the Bulgarians were ready to start discussions for the conclusion of an agreement on cultural exchanges.
Irritants in US-Bulgarian Relations. Noting that he was rather discouraged by certain recent developments, Dr. Voutov referred to an article on the training of guerrilla forces (US News and World Report, March 13, 1961 with a photo of a class at Ft. Bragg studying Bulgarian military phrases). He commented that such schools did not help US-Bulgarian relations. The Bulgarians had no plans to overthrow the US Government and the US ``shouldn't do so either." He also referred to press articles about a report on similar activities by General Trudeau. Dr. Voutov said that he had been instructed by his Government to raise this matter and added that Sofia had asked whether there was any connection between the appearance of these articles and the suspension of the financial claims negotiations.
The Minister also made reference to statements in the Greek press denying that the development of US-Bulgarian relations prejudiced US-Greek relations.
Status of Missions. Finally, Dr. Voutov noted that the elevation of the US and Bulgarian missions to the status of embassies had been foreseen in the agreement on the resumption of relations. Although he had subsequently raised this question on a number of occasions, he had had no answer and, frankly, he felt that legations were an anachronism.
The Secretary's Reply. The Secretary welcomed a chance to meet Dr. Voutov and hoped that they would have an opportunity for another talk when they were not so rushed. He continued that in our relations it was necessary to leave aside points of difference and try to discover common interests. This didn't mean we should hide the fact that there were far-reaching differences in our positions, as for example in our views of the press, its role and how it should be handled. We shouldn't minimize these differences. We took a very serious view of the December 1960 Moscow communique of the Communist Parties./4/ However, assuming these points of difference, we must nevertheless try to find points for improvement of our relations. The trend of history was too uncertain, despite the Communists' philosophy, for us not to seek such improvement by trying to remove unnecessary irritants in our relations.
/4/For text, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, December 28, 1960, pp. 3 - 9, and January 4, 1961, pp. 3 - 8.
Turning to the specific points which Dr. Voutov had raised, the Secretary noted that expansion of US-Bulgarian trade involved a number of legislative problems for us, as well as the broader differences between state and private trading. Because of his background as head of the Rockefeller Foundation, the Secretary had a keen interest in international exchanges, and we were anxious to explore the possibilities in this field. We were prepared to start discussions on cultural exchanges and also hoped for a resumption of the financial negotiations. With regard to the status of our missions, the Secretary said that we were seriously considering this matter and that he was inclined to agree that legations were an anachronism. On the other hand, this was not just a bilateral problem for us. The Secretary concluded by saying that he would review with his colleagues the points which Dr. Voutov had raised and hoped that they would have an opportunity for another talk.
4. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.49/7 - 2661. Confidential; Limit Distribution.
Prague, July 26, 1961, 5 p.m.
39. Paid courtesy call on Foreign Minister this morning accompanied by DCM./1/ During 50-minute conversation following subjects touched on appear of sufficient interest to report.
/1/President Kennedy had appointed Edward T. Wailes as Ambassador on July 14.
1. General relations--David said these not good. Number problems existed but he believed these could be resolved on basis recognition status quo, mutual respect for sovereignty, coexistence leading to peace on planet. Possible I would not like social system here, but realities should be recognized. He did not interestingly enough mention Berlin, disarmament or any other multilateral issue.
2. Economic negotiations--David agreed we were very close to agreement, but then remarked that both countries had lived without agreement since negotiations began in 1955, implying matter not of basic importance. To my comment agreement would be in interest both countries, he remarked he hoped remaining gap in principles of settlement could be closed shortly in order that delegations two countries could work out final language.
3. Trade--David said Czechoslovakia - US trade showed a rising tendency, but was still not satisfactory either in quantity or composition. He referred to US tariffs and controls, which he said were obstacles to improvement trade relations. He agreed Czechoslovakia exports to US twice or more than imports from US but insisted US controls responsible for keeping level low. He did not however specifically mention MFN or strategic controls.
4. Cultural exchanges--I mentioned this subject as one where progress appeared possible and referred to our proposal for October visit Santa Fe opera. David did not react to Santa Fe suggestion, but commented scientific exchanges not going too badly. Dukla Soccer Team was example of good exchange in sports, and indicated other possibilities could be developed in cultural exchanges.
5. Trade fair--He then cited trade fairs as useful field for development, and remarked he considered US country of highly developed technology. He emphasized industrial character of Brno Fair, describing it as world showplace advanced engineering. Implication was clear he hoped US would participate with sophisticated engineering items.
6. Czechoslovakian Chancery Washington--David asked how I found Chancery here in Prague and when I replied that both Chancery and residence were fine buildings, he remarked construction Czecho-slovakian Chancery Washington beset by many difficulties. I referred briefly to zoning regulations, Fine Arts Commission and said Department had approached local authorities in District behalf Czecho-slovakian Embassy. It was my impression major problems had been worked out.
In addition above, I made usual statement about desire improve relations and find solution common problems in spirit mutual helpfulness. David said he and his Ministry would do all they could toward that end and would be of help when necessary with other organs of government.
His manner throughout interview was cool and reserved except at end when he described fishing and hunting possibilities here. I am told this is his usual manner with US officials here, and geniality reserved for representatives Communist and uncommitted countries.
As Dillon and I see it most interesting conclusions to be drawn from talk are these:
(1) Czechoslovakians do not expect any really significant changes in relations with US.
(2) They do however have certain policy aims of which most important probably are (A) US recognition that regime is legitimate and here to stay. This would imply in their minds US abandonment propaganda directed at people here, although naturally under their concept coexistence they would feel free wage ideological war against US wherever possible; (B) increased exports to US to supply badly needed free currency; (C) greater access to US science and technology for use in their own industries, both to make them most competitive and to save research and development costs.
At conclusion of talk David informed me credentials ceremony would take place July 28, 10 a.m./2/
/2/Wailes reported on this meeting in telegram 42 from Prague, July 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.49/7 - 2861) Ravndal left post on May 6.
Wailes
5. Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.49/10 - 1461. Confidential. Drafted by Segall, cleared by Tims and Moot, and approved by Vedeler.
Washington, October 27, 1961, 8:33 p.m.
A - 15. Ref: Prague's A - 85 of October 14, 1961./1/
/1/Not printed. (Ibid.)
Department agrees that Embassy should make an oral protest if the Czechs reinstitute the type of aggressive surveillance and harassment described in the airgram under reference. The Department should be notified as soon as possible after a new period of intensified harassment is instituted by the Czechs, and this notification should include the Embassy's judgment of the probable causes behind the action, a brief survey of the methods used, and the Embassy's opinion whether a protest should be made. The Department would then be in a position to judge the value of lodging a similar protest with the Czech Embassy.
The Department does not believe it would be either useful or practicable to threaten reciprocity as a means of compelling the Czechs to desist from harassment. Assuming that a future period of harassment will not go beyond the limits encountered in the past, we believe that any oral protest we make should follow the lines of the third paragraph of A - 85 and the protests made by Ambassador Allison in May and August 1959 (Embtels 100 of August 24, 545 of May 7, 541 of May 6, 549 of May 11, and Deptels 81 of August 21 and 85 of August 22, 1959)./2/
/2/In telegram 100, Allison reported on his protest against Czech harassment of U.S. Embassy employees. (Ibid., 121.49/8 - 2459) Telegram 545 detailed a conversation at the Czech Foreign Office on the same subject. (Ibid., 611.49/5 - 759) Telegram 541 outlined the contents of a letter of protest delivered to Czech authorities. (Ibid., 611.49/5 - 659) In telegram 549, the Embassy reported that the Czechs had ceased surveillance of U.S. personnel. (Ibid., 611.49/5 - 1159) In telegram 81, the Department of State informed the Embassy that it believed that the Czechs had manufactured an incident to justify harassment of U.S. officials in Prague. (Ibid., 121.49/8 - 1959) Telegram 85 reported on U.S. demarches with Czech officials in Washington over harassment. (Ibid., 121.49/8 - 2259)
For future reference the Embassy is requested to forward all available details of the British and French protests referred to in A - 85./3/
/3/No further documentation on this issue has been found.
Rusk
6. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Confidential. Approved by the White House on December 20.
Washington, December 12, 1961.
SUBJECT
Presentation of Credentials by new Rumanian Minister
PARTICIPANTS
The President of the United States
Mr. Petre Balaceanu, Rumanian Minister
Mr. Angier Biddle Duke, Chief of Protocol
Mr. Richard H. Davis, Deputy Asst. Secretary, EUR
The President received the new Rumanian Minister at 12:10 today for presentation of credentials. After a preliminary exchange of amenities, the President noted the economic background of the Minister and in response to a question about Rumanian exports, there ensued a brief exposition by the Minister of Rumania's trade with the United States and Western Europe.
The President remarked that we were, of course, interested in trade development but noted that when there is political harmony, trade increases. Unfortunately, existing political tensions were not particularly favorable for the growth of trade. Our controls on strategic goods affected only a small proportion of possible trade and, moreover, many goods which we would not export could be obtained elsewhere. However, as long as controls were part of the law of the land and political tensions particularly in regard to Berlin were high, prospects were not so favorable. He hoped that this would change if it were possible to get a Berlin settlement.
The President asked the Minister whether the Common Market would affect Rumanian trade. The Minister replied that they were not particularly worried about this.
In conclusion, the Minister promised he would devote his best efforts to improve trade with the United States and hoped thereby to contribute to better relations.
7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.494/1 - 2962. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Katz, cleared in EE, and approved by Vedeler.
Washington, February 1, 1962, 10:15 a.m.
290. Embtel 306./1/ Agree trade question of basic importance to Czechs. We have always considered proposed agreement essentially designed settle claims and other outstanding bilateral issues but have indicated that resolution these problems would contribute improved atmosphere more conducive expanded trade relations.
/1/Telegram 306, January 29, offered the Ambassador's views on negotiating strategy on trade and related issues. (Ibid., 611.4941/1 - 2962)
Trade problem not so much matter bilateral US-Czech relations as reflection general international situation. Offer trade office and statement indicates our willingness take certain steps within limits imposed by general situation to improve bilateral trade relations. We willing confirm commitment re trade office and statement but are unwilling incorporate trade article in agreement as Czechs insist.
Reasoning third paragraph Embtel 293/2/ in response Czech reference 1959 draft is sound. Czechs rejected our offer which now superseded by pattern set in Rumanian and Polish agreements. We see no reason single out Czechs for special treatment, particularly since claims settlements with Rumanians and Poles more favorable than that envisaged in Czech agreement. We desire also keep Article 1 of ``Principles"/3/ out of agreement in view Czech effort use every conceivable peg in argument for MFN.
/2/Telegram 293, January 19, reported on U.S.-Czech discussions on a trade agreement. (Ibid., 611.494/1 - 1962)
/3/A statement of principles regarding the settlement of claims and other economic problems was signed in Prague by Ambassador Wailes and David on December 8, 1961.
We have never considered that every article in ``Principles" would be included in final agreement or that ``Principles" so intended. Our argumentation keep reference to Treasury's 655/4/ out of text of articles might be used illustrate this point.
/4/Not found.
Suggest working sessions continue on other problems while issue Czech demand for inclusion reference trade office and statement in agreement left for Ambassador - Hajek discussion on side. If in your judgment other questions can be resolved (army crown account, claims, etc.) you may find advantageous opportunity mention that along with Aide-Memoire confirming commitments Article 1 of ``Principles" to issue trade statement and permit establishment commercial section of Embassy in NY (trade office) we prepared adjust phrase ``desiring . . . countries" in preamble US draft to read ``desiring to resolve certain questions pertaining to mutual economic relations and to effect a settlement of outstanding financial issues between the two countries."/5/ While we would like agreement concluded nearest future fail see how we can go beyond this in attempting meet Czech position.
/5/Ellipsis in the source text.
Rusk
8. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.494/2 - 262. Confidential.
Prague, February 2, 1962, 6 p.m.
312. Hajek sent for me at 3:30 pm today and said he wished discuss frankly and seriously his concern re lack progress economic agreement negotiations. He said that feeling was current here among members of government that perhaps we did not want agreement or improvement in relations. Re alleged lack desire conclude agreement he referred my mentioning to him that Czech Embassy Washington been talking with press (Embassy telegram 298)./1/ He checked into matter and finds Embassy was approached by press because of Olsen article New York Times and been quite noncommittal in what it told press other than negotiations had been going on for some years and involved steel mill and settlement certain claims. Hajek said that our raising this matter made him wonder whether we trying cast blame on Czech Embassy as excuse for getting out of agreement.
/1/Telegram 298, January 24, reads: ``I spoke Hajek yesterday evening. He expressed surprise agreed Czech actions inappropriate. Indicated would wire Embassy instructions." (Ibid., 611.494/1 - 2462)
Re doubts about our desire improve relations Hajek referred to speech by Ambassador Stevenson to Bnai Brith as published in Herald Tribune January 15 in which Ambassador reportedly showed unfriendly attitude toward Czechs along with Cuba and North Vietnam. He also mentioned very briefly speech by Ambassador Merchant in Canada which referred to Moscow's domination over Czechs.
After foregoing Hajek turned to question of inclusion in agreement of article covering trade statement and office. Said his government could not accept anything less than what we had agreed to in Principles which made commitment whereas he considered aide-memoire only meeting this point halfway at most. I gave him substance Department telegram 290/2/ relating this particular subject and he said he frankly was not convinced by our views and would have to stand on Principles. I assured him of our good faith in wishing proceed with negotiations and pointed out that we unfortunately also had some doubts regarding their point of view in respect inclusion new language on debt claims in claims article. He said that only additions they wished to make were caused by fact we were limiting our original views as expressed in Principles and they had to meet these limitations by additional phraseology on their part.
/2/Document 7.
Conversation ended by Hajek stating they were in no hurry rush through agreement, that they would not be pressured into accepting changes from Principles and he hoped we could sit down next week on basis of Principles and work out something satisfactory.
As it now stands, problem is that Czechs insist that agreement on trade office and statement have some status and force as economic agreement itself. Department on other hand opposes inclusion trade point in economic agreement. Hajek has however not indicated that Czechs insist on inclusion trade point in economic agreement. In interest advancing negotiations therefore suggest Department examine possibility of exchange of notes or of separate agreement signed by both sides limited to trade article and annex contained in Statement of Principles.
Wailes
9. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Hungarian Desk Files: Lot 75 D 45, Refuge for Cardinal Mindszenty. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Vedeler.
Washington, February 13, 1962.
SUBJECT
Letter from Cardinal Mindszenty Regarding His Situation of Refuge
PARTICIPANTS
Monsignor Egidio Vagnozzi, Apostolic Delegate
EE--Harold C. Vedeler
WE--August Velletri
Upon authorization of the Acting Secretary an informal meeting was arranged with Monsignor Egidio Vagnozzi, Apostolic Delegate, for the purpose of leaving with him a communication from Cardinal Mindszenty for transmission to the Holy See.
Mr. Vedeler said that we had called to bring a copy of a letter from His Eminence Josef Cardinal Mindszenty./1/ The background of this communication was a statement of Gyula Kallai, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Hungarian regime, at a press conference concerning the status of Cardinal Mindszenty. The Deputy Foreign Minister had been asked at this conference on December 4 by a correspondent whether the Government of Hungary would discuss the Cardinal's future and on what basis the problem might be settled. The reply was that the Hungarian Government was prepared to discuss the matter only in connection with any US-Hungarian negotiations on the improvement of relations between the two countries. The Cardinal had learned of this statement and had prepared a letter to Secretary Rusk in which he expressed his views concerning his situation of refuge. The Cardinal had asked that a copy of the letter be brought to the attention of the Apostolic Delegate so that his views could be made known to the Holy See.
/1/Not printed.
Mr. Vedeler then outlined briefly the following substance of the letter. The Cardinal had discussed three possibilities of change in his status: (1) freedom and resumption of ecclesiastical functions in Hungary; (2) release under conditions imposed by the regime which would include the taking of an oath of loyalty to the regime; and (3) departure from Hungary and resignation of his functions. All of these alternatives were excluded by the Cardinal who indicated he did not seek a change in his status under the existing circumstances. Principal reasons for his stand were the imprisonment suffered by Bishops in Hungary, by many members of the clergy and by thousands of the faithful; the deportation of Hungarians and the lot of their families; the damages to the Church caused by the regime and the interference in religious affairs in Hungary. The Cardinal also made the point that the Hungarian regime in any event had no serious intentions in his case and was only using his name as a decoy. He mentioned further that the Primate in Hungary could not be used as a counter or for barter purposes even when the end might be desirable. The letter thus gave as a whole a clear indication that the Cardinal considered the only course open to him for the present was to remain in refuge in the Legation.
The Apostolic Delegate suggested that there was a fourth alternative which the Cardinal had not mentioned. This was for him to depart from Hungary to establish residence abroad without giving up his ecclesiastical functions although not exercising them in practice. The Apostolic Delegate's belief, however, was that the best course was for the Cardinal to remain in Hungary in the existing situation since he was needed there as a source of inspiration and encouragement to the Hungarian people. In response to a question Monsignor Vagnozzi indicated that he believed the Holy See preferred this course. He said that the continuation of this situation depended to be sure on the attitude of the US toward the Cardinal's refuge in the Legation. He recognized that this presented some problems for the US and asked about the attitude of the US concerning its willingness for the Cardinal to remain.
Mr. Vedeler replied that he was authorized by the Department to say: (1) it was agreeable to the US for the Cardinal to continue his refuge in the Legation in the present circumstances; (2) the present time and situation were in our view not favorable for the US to take any initiative which would have the purpose of resolving the problem of the Cardinal's refuge; and (3) we believed that any efforts of this nature should be deferred until developments in US-Hungarian relations would open up a prospect of success for such efforts. Mr. Vedeler then passed a copy of the attached letter from Cardinal Mindszenty to the Apostolic Delegate on a confidential basis. In accepting the communication Monsignor Vagnozzi said that he would send it to the Holy See and if there were any reply he would communicate with us.
There was some discussion thereafter of the health of Cardinal Mindszenty at the present time. Mr. Vedeler said that the Cardinal was in reasonably good health in view of his age and his present circumstances. The US had arranged for visits of doctors from time to time for examination of his health and there had been no serious problem so far. If the Cardinal became ill so that he required continuing medical attention a problem would arise and we hoped that this might be avoided so long as the Cardinal remained in the Legation.
With this the visit came to a conclusion and the Apostolic Delegate thanked us for coming.
10. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Garthoff, cleared by Kohler, and approved in S on March 21. The meeting was held at the U.S. Mission. Rusk and Manescu were in Geneva to attend the 18-nation U.N. disarmament conference.
SecDel MC/37 Geneva, March 20, 1962, 3 p.m.
PARTICIPANTS
United States The Secretary of State Mr. William C. Foster Mr. Foy D. Kohler Mr. Raymond L. Garthoff Rumania Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu Vice Foreign Minister George Macovescu
SUBJECT
General Exchange of Views
1. On March 20 the Secretary met, at his invitation, with Foreign Minister Manescu and Vice Foreign Minister Macovescu at the U.S. Mission for forty-five minutes. General expressions of hope for improved relations between the US and Rumania were exchanged. At the close of session, the Secretary expressed the hope that it would be possible to proceed with the consular arrangements under discussion, to which the Foreign Minister heartily agreed, adding also the question of increased trade.
2. On disarmament, the Secretary stated the meetings to date had not been very encouraging, but that he has some hope. Manescu said he was glad to hear this, that he hoped the Conference would be fruitful. There was no discussion of regional disarmament (Manescu, in his speech that same morning, had reaffirmed Rumanian interest in a nuclear free Balkan zone), nor of any other disarmament problem.
3. In general East-West relations, Manescu mentioned as an irritant in US-Rumanian relations ``Captive Nations Week" in the United States. The Secretary responded that we have no desire to interfere in any other countries' internal institutions, including whatever the Russians want or even whatever they will tolerate, but that there were periodic congresses of communist states and communist parties proclaiming their dedication to communizing the world, and that ``Captive Nations Week" was nothing in comparison. But we do care about what threats are placed on others. There are, he noted, no major problems in US - USSR bilateral relations--but we were not indifferent to the fate of others.
4. The Secretary noted that the US was not prepared to place trust in Moscow, nor did we expect Moscow to place trust in us. We favored reciprocal arrangements which would avert the necessity for having to rely on trust. The Secretary noted that we cannot start fresh each day on questions of trust, and we could not forget the past sixteen years. In 1946 the US had virtually disarmed--we had not a single combat-ready ground division or air group. We had tried to get real international control over all atomic energy, though we then had a monopoly. But we have had to rearm and quadruple our defense expenditures because of the whole series of crises which have filled the docket of the UN over these sixteen years. Moscow had made a serious tactical error; if it had not stimulated crisis after crisis, the American people would have been disarmed and isolationist in a decade.
5. The Secretary said that we don't hold Bucharest responsible for all Bloc policies. We know there are broad differences between us not within Bucharest's control. Manescu inquired what these differences were. The Secretary replied: Berlin and Southeast Asia, to mention two ``little problems." Manescu commented that we should not attribute to Moscow views to which they ascribe; that they (the Rumanians) also held such views on Berlin, for example, and that they were after all part of the socialist bloc. This was a fact that should be recognized after sixteen years. Also, that Rumania had twice this century suffered from Germany.
6. On Berlin, the Secretary noted that the arguments raised were circular: we should leave Berlin because the war was long over, and East Germany was a ``fact." But West Berlin and Western presence there was also a fact. Just as one cannot argue that East Berlin has been settled and only West Berlin can be discussed, so one cannot argue that East Germany is a fact and that West Berlin is not. Manescu noted the geographical status of West Berlin as an exclave in East Germany. The Secretary remarked that geographical facts should not be mistaken for political ones.
7. The Secretary emphasized: the West is in West Berlin, and has access to it, and intends to remain. It's as simple as that. If this is fully understood, many other things will fall into place. If not, I would hate to predict the future. Manescu was visibly impressed by this statement. He noted that the talks between Ambassador Thompson and Foreign Minister Gromyko seem to have not succeeded, but they need not be the end. The Secretary agreed and stressed the importance of major adversaries remaining in contact on the points of difference between them. Manescu inquired how long we thought Western occupation troops would need to remain in Berlin. The Secretary declared that they would remain as long as necessary to prevent World War III. Manescu said a peace treaty was necessary. The Secretary stated that a treaty ending the last war was less important than any action which would threaten to precipitate a new war. There was another possible solution: an all German peace treaty. Manescu said this was a new idea; the Secretary remarked it was a very old one. The Secretary said we should not be accused of procrastination; the Soviets had proposed certain things three years ago, we had proposed others, and while we have not agreed to theirs, they likewise have not agreed to ours. Neither should be said to be stalling more than the other. Moreover, if one asks us to hurry, we must ask: hurry to what?
8. The meeting was in a friendly, if not quite relaxed, atmosphere. Foreign Minister Manescu remarked immediately after the meeting to one of the US participants, with evident sincerity, that he had found the meeting very interesting and very helpful.
11. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.49/3 - 2362. Confidential. Drafted by Garthoff, cleared by Kohler, and approved in S on March 23. The meeting was held at the Palais des Nations.
SecDel MC/42 Geneva, March 22, 1962, 10:45 a.m.
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary
Mr. Foy D. Kohler
Mr. Raymond L. Garthoff
Czechoslovakia
Mr. Vaclav David, Foreign Minister
Mr. Jiri Hajek, Vice Minister
Interpreter
SUBJECT
U.S.-Czechoslovak Relations and Berlin
The Czechs were cold, unyielding, and the most firm parrot of the Soviet line on Berlin and Germany of all Satellite representatives here. Disarmament was not discussed. The meeting was held on March 22 at the Palais lounge, on the initiative of the Secretary, and lasted about one hour.
The Secretary hoped that we could improve our relations, which both agreed had not been very good. David suggested in a very wooden way that perhaps we could expand our cultural and technical exchanges, etc. The Secretary noted that larger issues impinge on U.S.-Czech relations, such as the Moscow - Prague relationship, the Berlin issue, and Czech-Cuban relations. On the last of these, we and other governments in the Western hemisphere were aware of Czech shipments of arms, and illicit Cuban transshipment to other countries. These issues affected our policy, and also sometimes affected public congressional debates in ways not reflecting policy.
David stated that he had understood our present negotiations on a bilateral agreement did not require congressional ratification. The Secretary explained that that understanding was correct, that we were negotiating an executive agreement and he had not meant to imply that ratification by the Senate would be required. He was speaking, the Secretary said, about public policy debate which would doubtless attend publicity on such an agreement, and such debate would be affected by the prevailing political climate.
On Berlin, David stated that there was no need for the issue to arise or have any influence on the U.S.-Czech relations. The Czechs had suffered from German aggression, were for liquidation of the remnants of World War II on the basis of the existence of the two German states, who were neighbors of Czechoslovakia. The Secretary noted that West Berlin and Western presence and access thereto was as much a fact as anything in Germany. The Secretary stated that the West was in West Berlin, had access to Berlin, and would leave only by its consent, which would not be given under present circumstances. David rejoined that the Soviet proposals for a Berlin settlement and for a German peace treaty were just and were supported by Czechoslovakia. The occupation regime, he stated, must be ended.
On Cuba, David replied that Czechoslovakia had relations with states of various political systems, and had relations with Cuba on the basis of equality and mutual noninterference in internal affairs. (David started to make a comment on the question of arms, but changed his mind and with Hajek's concurrence in an aside consultation David dropped the subject, so that it was not translated and did not enter the conversation.)/1/
/1/In an informal meeting on March 16, Rusk had warned David that continued aid for Cuba's illegal activities would seriously harm U.S.-Czechoslovak relations. (Ibid., 611.494/3 - 1762)
The Secretary referred to the previous conversation of Mr. Kohler and Mr. Hajek on the question of current bilateral negotiations for an agreement (reported Secto 76)/2/ and asked if there were any points requiring further exchange of views. David, and then Hajek, addressed this point, insisting that the U.S. was departing from the agreed principles initialled on December 8. Hajek said that some differences were minor and could be explained as differences in interpretation, but that two were substantial. One was the question of inclusion of trade provisions in the general agreement so as to give them equal value (standing). The second point was an alleged U.S. narrowing of the scope of the agreed principles by our present definition of the claims to be covered. The Secretary said we were not deviating from the December agreed principles as we saw them. There was no conclusive agreement on the proposal for an exchange of letters on the trade provisions. On the question of claims, the Czech position was uncompromising.
/2/Secto 76, March 21, reported on a Kohler - Hajek luncheon meeting dealing with the Berlin crisis and bilateral issues. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2060)
The Secretary proposed, and it was agreed, that the negotiators should continue to work out the agreement in full. The Secretary noted, however, that final conclusion of the agreement would depend upon the general climate at the time. The Secretary and David agreed that the agreement could be, in terms of disarmament language, a ``first stage" in improvement of U.S.-Czech relations.
12. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.494/3 - 3162. Confidential.
Prague, March 31, 1962, 4 p.m.
400. Czech response March 29 (Embassy telegram 396)/1/ to our March 12 presentation confirms view (Embassy telegram 336, February 14)/2/ that it will be impossible reach agreement with Czechs unless we make concession on trade, at least to position outlined Department telegram 364./3/ Also confirms my opinion that second minimum Czech requirement is claims article which follows principles of settlement using language ``nationalized or affected by other Czech measures".
/1/Not printed. (Ibid., 611.494/3 - 2962)
/2/Not printed. (Ibid., 611.494/2 - 1462)
/3/Dated March 10. (Ibid.)
Geneva conversations (which connected economic agreement with Berlin, Cuban issues) indicate that US not prepared finally conclude agreement even on our own previously proffered terms. (Department will recall that on instruction (Department telegram 349)/4/ Embassy had few days prior Geneva talks expressed readiness conclude agreement immediately.) Our present negotiating position thus understandably weaker, for Czechs now have no impelling grounds adjust their position for sake of gold or other benefits they would receive if agreement were to enter into effect near future.
/4/Telegram 349, March 23, outlined final U.S. requirements for conclusion of a trade agreement. (Ibid., 611.494/3 - 2362)
Nevertheless I would suggest one further effort be made move negotiations forward but only if Department prepared make concessions outlined above. I make this recommendation because (1) we cannot be certain that Czechs unwilling initial agreement without signing unless we do try; (2) if we make one further effort meet their position and negotiations break, onus will be more on them than at present and we will have sacrificed nothing of substance; (3) we may thus be able salvage agreed portions of agreement as starting point future negotiations; (4) increasing UK pressure applied not only in TGC but at high Foreign Ministry level may in time force us to release Czech gold independently outside of agreement, whereupon we would lose our leverage to achieve settlement.
Suggest therefore I be authorized approach Czechs, advance as our final position: (1) Text of letter exchange on trade contained Department telegram 364; (2) text claims article incorporating language conforming principles settlement (March 15 draft).
Under altered negotiating circumstances I cannot be overly hopeful this position will result in Czech agreement to text but for reasons stated believe it worth try. In event Department unable approve final position stated preceding paragraph or Czechs refuse accept it if advanced, believe suspension negotiations only course./5/
/5/In telegram 387 to Prague, April 14, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to seek an exchange of letters as a substitute for a trade article in the body of a U.S.-Czech agreement, but insisted on maintaining the U.S. position on claims. (Ibid., 611.494/4 - 1462)
Wailes
13. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Hungarian Desk Files: Lot 75 D 45, Refuge for Cardinal Mindszenty. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Vedeler.
Washington, May 2, 1962.
SUBJECT
Situation of Cardinal Mindszenty
PARTICIPANTS
Monsignor Egidio Vagnozzi, Apostolic Delegate
EE--Harold C. Vedeler
WE--August Velletri
At the request of the Apostolic Delegate the Department's representatives called on him this morning to receive a message from the Vatican concerning the communication from Cardinal Mindszenty (a letter to Secretary Rusk which the Cardinal had requested be made known to the Apostolic Delegate), copy of which was given Monsignor Vagnozzi on February 13 for transmission to the Holy See./1/
/1/See Document 9.
The Apostolic Delegate said that the Cardinal's letter had been sent to Rome and a response to his (the Apostolic Delegate's) report had now been received. Cardinal Cicognani had discussed the matter with the Pope, who agreed that in the present circumstances it is best for Cardinal Mindszenty to remain in his situation of refuge in our Legation. The Pope and Cardinal Cicognani also believed that the existing conditions were not suitable for undertaking efforts to solve the problem of the Cardinal's refuge. They were pleased to have word (conveyed by the Department's representatives at our previous meeting on February 13) that the Cardinal's health was reasonably good for his situation. They expressed their appreciation for the Department's willingness to have Cardinal Mindszenty continue his refuge in the Legation and for the care and attention given him by our Mission at Budapest.
After communicating this message Monsignor Vagnozzi added that Vatican circles considered that under present conditions it was desirable for the Cardinal to remain in Hungary as the spiritual leader of the Hungarian people and that his departure from the country now might have a depressing effect on the spirit of the people.
In connection with this subject Monsignor Vagnozzi referred to concern in Vatican circles about the possible visit by the Secretary General of the United Nations to Hungary in response to the invitation extended by the Hungarian regime. He mentioned a report that U Thant was going to Czechoslovakia, Poland and ``another country", possibly the Soviet Union. Mr. Vedeler said we understood that the Secretary General was planning a trip to Europe this year during which he would visit a number of countries including the Soviet Union. We did not know whether he was going to visit Hungary.
As the meeting came to a close Mr. Vedeler expressed the Department's appreciation for the message conveyed by the Apostolic Delegate and said that he would make a record of it which would be brought to the attention of the higher officers concerned in the Department.
14. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Official Use Only. Drafted by Andrews and approved in S on September 17.
Washington, September 11, 1962, noon.
SUBJECT
Farewell Call by the Bulgarian Minister--Reference to Claims Issue
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Dr. Peter G. Voutov, Bulgarian Minister
Nicholas G. Andrews, EE
Dr. Voutov began by referring to his eight years of diplomatic service in Washington and in New York at the United Nations and by expressing his deep gratitude for what the Secretary and his deputies had done for him and for the Bulgarian mission. He noted that the last three years had been particularly important because a start was made toward repairing the damage in US-Bulgarian relations. Dr. Voutov said he conceived that his primary task had been to find the best way to develop relations. In looking back, he believed that, although many things still had to be done, relations had been normalized by the exchange of diplomatic missions, by the resolution of some consular problems and the initiation of cultural exchanges and trade. Bulgarians had been happy to have American singers, professors, sportsmen and tourists visit their country. While we were still at the beginning stage of our relations, this was not a bad beginning. With good will, both sides could do more in promoting an active attitude toward relations and in finding a basis for mutual understanding. Both big countries and small could contribute to better relations, each going its own way and respecting the way of others. In his fifteen years of diplomatic service, more than half had been spent in the US. This period had been a kind of school for him and he expected, in whatever his future position might be, to do his best to help his Government in the consideration of its policies towards the US.
The Bulgarian Minister mentioned the recent graduation of his daughter, Svetlana, from Woodrow Wilson High School. She had just competed with 400 other Bulgarian and foreign students for one of the fifty available places in Sofia University and had come out first. Thus, at sixteen and a half years of age, she would be the youngest student in the University. In answer to a question, Dr. Voutov said that his son, who had been at Brightwood School, spoke Bulgarian badly, putting Bulgarian endings on English words.
Dr. Voutov stated that he wished to mention the most important element affecting the development of relations--namely, the question of a financial settlement. He noted that negotiating delegations had met for several months before negotiations were suspended and that informal conversations had been held since that time. The amount of the claims was on the verge of agreement when the difference in the positions of the two Governments reached only $200,000. At the last moment, he said, a new figure for the value of Bulgarian assets was given because the Office of Alien Property had erred in its evaluation of Bulgarian blocked and vested assets and the US asked for $550,000 cash above the value of Bulgarian vested assets. Dr. Voutov assured the Secretary that Bulgaria wished to settle the claims issue but not at any price. He appealed to the Department and to the Secretary personally to do everything possible to settle this problem. In Bulgaria, the Government was prepared to give something above the value of vested assets but questioned what Bulgaria would receive in return. Dr. Voutov said that he knew about the most-favored-nation problem. An attempt was being made to trade in small quantities, as the Department of Commerce proposed, but even this was difficult. The Bulgarian trade mission was sitting in Washington instead of New York because the question of a trade office in New York was tied up with the claims settlement. Trade would help provide Bulgaria with foreign currency to pay off the claims. A cultural exchanges program also required foreign currency. Concluding, Dr. Voutov emphasized that both sides must make an effort to settle this problem of claims.
The Secretary replied that he would review the claims problem.
The Secretary said that, by way of a personal remark, he felt the Bulgarian Minister, as an individual, had tried his best, within the limited possibilities of the policies of the US and Bulgarian Governments and the larger questions in which they were involved, to improve relations between our two countries and the US appreciated this.
The Secretary noted that there were no issues between the American and Bulgarian peoples. Historic ties of friendship existed between them. Furthermore, Bulgaria's internal social system was its own affair and did not constitute an obstacle to good relations. However, there were some limitations of an overriding nature which the international scene imposed on both countries and which affected bilateral relations. These limitations necessarily placed obstacles and difficulties in the way of our relations. Nevertheless, the US would like to improve its bilateral relations with Bulgaria to the extent that these overriding international problems permit. This means that there are certain things which each side must be aware of. Dr. Voutov, he presumed, was familiar with the role of Congress in foreign affairs. We must have patience, persistence and good will in order to improve bilateral relations. The US has no hostility toward Bulgaria but the international problems in which Bulgaria is necessarily involved are of very much concern to the US.
In conclusion, the Secretary told Dr. Voutov that he had made a contribution to improved relations. He hoped Dr. Voutov was leaving the US with a sense of satisfaction and expressed his personal regard and that of his colleagues for Dr. Voutov.
Dr. Voutov replied he had always met with understanding in the Department.
The Secretary mentioned he had been most disturbed last year over the street attacks on members of Dr. Voutov's staff. He said he could well understand how the affair could be regarded in the Bulgarian view as something other than a coincidence. He had been distressed that these incidents had raised questions which had not been in our minds.
Dr. Voutov replied that those far away (in Bulgaria) could not understand the affair or how it was possible.
15. Telegram From the Department of State to the Legation in Hungary
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 764.00/10 - 2062. Secret; Priority; No Foreign; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McKisson and approved by Davis. Repeated to London.
Washington, October 20, 1962, 2:22 p.m.
160. In hour-long meeting Hungarian Charge d'Affaires October 20 Davis presented on oral and confidential basis US position as outlined Deptel 150 rptd London 2178./1/
/1/Telegram 150, October 17, outlined U.S. views on the ``progressive" steps needed to proceed to a normalization of U.S.-Hungarian relations. (Ibid., 764.00/10 - 1762)
Radvanyi, who gave fullest attention presentation and evinced friendly attitude, said he would immediately report details his Government and hoped he would be able make early reply. Davis emphasized latter connection that if Hungarian Government should not find it convenient make official reply, our Legation in Budapest, as well as Department here, would be able judge whether or not actions were taken which would constitute reasonable basis for resolving UN problem and opening way for normalization bilateral relations.
In course discussion, Radvanyi stressed efforts being made by Hungarian Government create better atmosphere and cited intention Hungarian university, on or about October 22, award honorary doctorate to Dr. Theodore Karman, eminent American physician now visiting Hungary. He said American Charge d'Affaires would be invited to ceremony as gesture good will. Department believes you should attend if invited.
Memcon being pouched.
Rusk
16. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.69/12 - 1062. Confidential. Prepared by Anderson on December 10 during a visit to Washington for consultations. A notation on the source text reads: ``typed in the Department."
Sofia, November 28, 1962.
SUBJECT
Conversation with Prime Minister Todor Zhivkov
I paid a protocol call on Prime Minister Todor Zhivkov on November 28, 1962, having requested an appointment prior to my departure for consultations in Washington. The Prime Minister received me very cordially, and our conversation was animated and extended, lasting fifty minutes. Also present were Deputy Foreign Minister Angelov, Foreign Ministry interpreter Gerasimov who did all the interpreting and Cultural Officer Bloomfield.
Mr. Zhivkov began by thanking me for my visit and apologizing for his lack of diplomatic experience. He said that his background had been entirely political, and that since this is his first government post/1/ he has little knowledge of diplomacy and protocol. He added that inasmuch as my background is also mainly political we should be able to understand each other.
/1/Zhivkov was elected Prime Minister by the Bulgarian National Assembly on November 19.
The Prime Minister referred to his visit to the US in 1960,/2/ saying that he had enjoyed it greatly and that the State Department had been most helpful to him. He said that he had become good friends with the policemen who had protected him (of whom he had seen more than anyone else). He had been grateful for his tour of various industrial plants, cities, etc. in the US. He said he had been able to see everything he wanted.
/2/Zhivkov was a member of the Bulgarian Delegation to the 15th session of the U.N. General Assembly in New York September - December 1960. 1 2
There were other preliminary niceties, while a waiter served us with Slivova and Turkish coffee. The Prime Minister told a rather indelicate story about a peasant from his home village, and I noted that the Foreign Office interpreter hesitated slightly before repeating a somewhat vulgar ``peasant" remark.
Bulgarian Government Shakeup
After the usual toasts, I asked the Prime Minister to interpret for me the sweeping changes in the Bulgarian Government which had just occurred.
Mr. Zhivkov began by saying that all these changes had been fully reported and explained in the press, and that the meaning of events was precisely that which had been publicized. (I am inclined to think that the fact that Zhivkov stressed that ``all" had been published means the opposite.) He said that Prime Minister Yugov and Tsankov had been ousted because of (1) Crimes against the State. (2) Undermining Central Committee policies. (3) Hindering democratization of the Country. (4) Yugov pursuing ``careerist" tendencies. Zhivkov maintained that these were the only reasons for Yugov's ouster. I felt that he stressed this a little too much, and was overly anxious for me to believe that there were no other factors behind Yugov's dismissal. He said that Yugov had failed to carry out the directives of the Party, and therefore he had to go, just the same as he, Zhivkov, would have to take his hat and go if he failed to carry out the Party's orders. However, he added laughingly that he did not wish to leave the office he had just assumed and therefore he intended to carry out the Party's directives.
Mr. Zhivkov went on to say that the many other changes in the Government were necessitated not because of political factors, but because of the need to bring new, young blood into the Government and also to carry out the Party plans for more scientific and technical development. The Prime Minister noted the presence of several academicians in the new Government, and remarked also that the Party's new plans require that experts be placed in charge. Mr. Zhivkov pointed particularly to new Foreign Minister Bashev, stating that he is well qualified with a background in ideological training and that he speaks four languages. He said that Former Foreign Minister Lukanov and also the former Minister of Transport Dimitrov, for example, were not dismissed because of any failures or wrongdoings (such as Yugov's and Tsankov's) but only because of poor health and overly-long tenure. He added that most of the former officials would be retained in the Government, but given lesser jobs.
The Prime Minister stressed the need for Governmental reorganization, and mentioned in particular that the Foreign Office will be reorganized.
Since he had emphasized Governmental plans, I asked him if this meant that the Government would assume a greater role than the Party in directing the affairs of the country. He said not at all, simply that the Government will have to carry out the policies and plans of the Party. He repeated that if he, as Prime Minister, did not carry out Party orders then he would be thrown out, the same as Yugov had been. (I believe that Mr. Zhivkov repeated this idea at least three times which makes me think that he is somewhat uneasy over the way in which he has reached the Premiership. Perhaps it is also a case of ``uneasy is the head that wears the crown".) Yesterday it was Yugov, today it is Zhivkov, and tomorrow--?
Bulgarian Internal and Foreign Policy
I then asked the Prime Minister what would be the principal changes one could expect in the internal and external policies of the new government. His reply as regards internal policies followed the same lines he had already mentioned, greater scientific and technical development carrying out the 20-year Plan etc. He was not specific, and did not mention agriculture. He referred briefly to the need to develop transportation and industry, but dwelt mostly on generalities about carrying out the Party's directives and the 20-year Plan which had all been published, he said.
Then Mr. Zhivkov turned to the question of foreign policy which, he said, would continue to follow the same lines of peaceful coexistence and friendship with all nations. He said: ``We are even trying to improve relations with Turkey, which is an ally of the US. While the Ottoman Turkey oppressed Bulgaria for 500 years, we do not hold this against the present Turkish Government, with which we want good relations." Although Mr. Zhivkov spoke for several minutes about Bulgaria's continuing to adhere to ``peaceful coexistence" policies, he did not mention the Soviet Union (or Yugoslavia) at this point, nor indeed throughout the entire conversation.
Relations with the United States
I asked the Prime Minister how the new Government's foreign policy might affect Bulgaria's relations with the United States. He began by replying emphatically that he wants to improve relations with the US, in particular in the economic and political spheres.
As for political relations with the US, the Prime Minister said that the first problem is that Bulgaria is a small, poor nation and the US is a great, rich one. He said that Bulgaria is sensitive about being ignored or treated as if it were not important. He said that Bulgaria has felt that the US had not regarded Bulgaria with the principle of equality which even small nations deserve. He declared that in spite of our ideological differences the US had nothing to fear from Bulgaria, and that Bulgaria is not going to try to bolshevize the US. He added that neither is Bulgaria afraid of the US and it does not feel that we will be able to exert much influence on it. He said that I had been in this country several months now and must be aware of the feelings of the people. (This was apparently a veiled reference to Bulgarian-Soviet attachments, implying that the people heartily support the Soviet Union.)
Zhivkov then went on to say that economic relations are the most important of all, and that up until now there has been practically no trade with the US. He said that Bulgaria's export potentialities to the US would be, at best, ``but a drop in the sea" to a big country like the US, and he could not understand why there could not be more trade between the two countries.
I replied that this would be difficult to develop, but not impossible. I pointed out that the U.S. produces great surpluses of tobacco and foods, which might be the very things Bulgaria would like to sell to us. His response was almost pleading, ``But it surely should be possible for Bulgaria to sell some canned foods and attar of roses oil!"
The Prime Minister then introduced the subject of the financial claims negotiations which he said he understands have been an obstacle in improving relations with the U.S. He declared that this problem must be settled now, and that so far as Bulgaria is concerned this should not be difficult. No amount of money is too great to pay for the improvement of relations between the U.S. and Bulgaria, he said, whether it is $350,000 or $10 million! Even for Bulgaria, which is a poor country, no amount is too great for improving our relations. Mr. Zhivkov looked directly at Minister Angelov, laughed and said, ``Perhaps I will get into trouble with the Foreign Office diplomats, but this is what I think! The next time you and I meet to discuss these questions, we should not have any Foreign Office official present, only our interpreters."
Later on he again said, ``You can go to the Protocol Section for the routine things, but when you really want to discuss something serious and worthwhile and of some importance, then come directly to me. We can talk it over. If you want to talk to me as a friend on any kind of subject, then I will be only too happy to see you any time and we will be able to reach a decision."
Finally the Prime Minister mentioned that cultural relations should be improved too but that he does not view them as of the same importance as economic and political. He made a reference to Bulgaria's inability to finance an American ``ensemble" in exchange for the Kutev Ensemble's forthcoming tour of the U.S., adding that the ``principle of reciprocity" must be observed. (Apparently Mr. Zhivkov was not well informed on this question.) He clearly does not attach much importance to cultural relations.
In my response to the Prime Minister's various points I emphasized my belief that the development of relations between the U.S. and Bulgaria must proceed in all 3 areas--political, economic and cultural--which are interrelated. I referred to our country's traditional and firm belief in the sovereignty and independence of small nations, whose rights we would continue to respect. I said that it was true that relations had not been good between Bulgaria and the U.S., but that this was due first of all to world political factors beyond his control or mine. I also pointed out that geographically Bulgaria is remote from the U.S. and that people in the U.S. simply have not known much about Bulgaria. Now the possibilities for communications are improving, I said, and we should take advantage of this period.
As for the financial claims issue, I said I heartily agree with him that this problem should be settled forthwith, and that I was delighted to hear him say that it should not be difficult to conclude an agreement. I said that it had seemed most unfortunate that U.S.-Bulgarian relations had been static, simply because of a difference of a few hundred thousand dollars. I hoped that we could settle this issue at once and move on to more constructive relations.
I stated my belief that cultural relations are important and have a bearing on political and economic development, since people must get to know each other better if trade and political understanding are to increase.
Just before concluding our discussion, I asked the Prime Minister whether a new Bulgarian Minister to the U.S. has been chosen yet. He replied that due to the pressures of the Party Congress there had not been time to select a new candidate, but he assured me there will be a good man named soon.
The Prime Minister asked me to convey his greetings to President Kennedy, for whom he expressed high regard and respect, and to inform President Kennedy of Bulgaria's desire for better economic and political relations with the U.S.
Mr. Zhivkov also asked me to visit him upon my return from the U.S. and added that he would always be at my disposal. He expressed the hope that we could settle many problems, and work together to improve relations between Bulgaria and the U.S.
Personal Observations and Comments
Mr. Zhivkov has an unassuming manner, at first impressing one as a quiet man. However, he is also talkative and laughs robustly and often. He may affect a Khrushchevian style in his deliberate attempt to be hearty, and at times play the buffoon. He wagged his finger at me to emphasize a point, a mannerism to which I believe Khrushchev is given.
Mr. Zhivkov spoke proudly of his peasant origins and his native village, which is famous for slivova and slivova-drinking. His manners are a bit crude, although he was courteous and most cordial to me.
I believe that a certain rapport was established between us. Mr. Zhivkov's personality is quite different than Yugov's, who impressed me as a hard, cruel, cold and ruthless man. Zhivkov, by contrast, is capable of acting in an affable, flexible manner. He does not convey an impression of great strength or intelligence. One would judge him to be a ``follower" rather than a ``leader", which may be significant in view of his devotion to Khrushchev and the Soviet line.
I was struck by Zhivkov's frequent references to his own inexperience, ``poor abilities" and ``incapable qualities". Either he must have deep feelings of inferiority, or else the opposite belief in his superiority which he tries to conceal by frequent self-denigrations. Whatever the case, his manner and bearings are those of a modest man.
Whether Zhivkov's emphatic assertions of his willingness to settle the claims issue now at whatever the cost represent a genuine determination on his part, I cannot be sure. He appeared to mean what he said, but only time will tell. I believe that we should soon test his intentions.
I also believe that Zhivkov's emphasis on Bulgaria's sensitivity and desire to be treated ``as an equal" and not to be ignored, offer some possibilities for the U.S. which I hope to exploit.
Eugenie Anderson/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
American Minister
17. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.49/12 - 3162. Confidential; Priority.
Prague, December 31, 1962, 2 p.m.
372. Made initial call of one hour on Foreign Minister David December 29, accompanied by Fleischer./1/
/1/President Kennedy nominated Outerbridge Horsey as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia on November 14. Ambassador Wailes left post on October 22.
After brief small talk, David went into substance, describing state of relations in standard terms. He made no mention of Budway or other U.S. citizens detained in CSSR./2/ He seemed surprisingly well informed on detail and tone throughout was correct, with implications of cordiality no doubt customary on such occasions and not necessarily having real significance.
/2/Czech officials arrested Robert Roy Budway on charges of espionage on July 31 and held him incommunicado. The United States officially denied the spying charge and protested the denial to Budway of access to U.S. representatives. After Czechoslovakia failed to respond to a series of U.S. demarches, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs George C. McGhee called in Czech Ambassador Popov on November 26 and informed him that the United States would take a series of retaliatory measures, including suspension of economic talks, if the issue was not satisfactorily resolved within one month. (Memorandum from Davis to Bowles, December 3; Department of State, Central Files, 611.49/2 - 362) Budway was subsequently released.
He said there had been some improvement in relations during 1962, citing somewhat increased expansion cultural and scientific exchanges and, with specific respect to trade, cited approvingly U.S. participation for first time in Brno fair this past year, which could lead to constructive results.
David dwelt at some length on negotiations to conclude property and financial agreement. Recalled these been underway since 1955; each of my predecessors had expressed hope upon arrival that they could be concluded and agreement signed. He referred specifically to signing of ``principles" year ago; progress had been made subsequently but none recently. Stated only few matters unresolved and expressed belief that with goodwill they could be resolved. Indicated such resolution and conclusion of agreement highly desirable and ``could be big help" in achieving improvement general relations.
David went into considerable detail in discussing cultural exchanges past year which he said was marked by ``certain improvements". Cited specifically U.S. participation Karlovy Vary Film Festival and Czech participation San Francisco Film Festival.
Without mentioning specific case, David said there had also been exchange of artists. (He indicated number of U.S. artists had performed Czechoslovakia although we know only of Loren Maazel during 1962.) David also said ``agreement had been reached on post-graduate exchange." (We will follow up to determine just what he referred to.) He also spoke of general scientific exchanges, including technical literature, and cited increased number invitations to U.S. to participate international scientific conferences in CSSR. David also stressed exchanges in field of sports, citing ice hockey and soccer, international figure skating competition, Czech parachutists to Boston and Dukla soccer team to U.S.
In general, he said, there have been some positive steps but relations still are not satisfactory. He advocated efforts to ``liquidate outstanding problems and then especially to expand trade". On trade, he said that U.S. unfortunately placed hindrances in way of expansion, e.g. through tariffs.
David concluded his presentation with general statement that CSSR desires good relations with all states, including USA. However, he said there must be certain prerequisites and declared that ``if Ambassador wishes to contribute to achieve these, he will have our cooperation". Only specific point he mentioned this connection was need for respect for normal precepts of intercourse between states, concept which I later reciprocated.
Responding, I expressed appreciation David raised business matters immediately, instead of confining first call to mere courtesies. My government and I personally fully shared desire see improvement relations but unfortunately there was important and serious problem which we should solve in order make progress possible. Referred to large number American citizens visiting CSSR annually, stating that for most part visits proceeded normally. We welcomed them because they helped contribute to increased general understanding between our peoples. However, unfortunately there had been cases in past and some presently where American citizens had violated CSSR law, or were said have violated it, including cases where such violation most likely innocent through lack knowledge law. Cited as specific current example case of Robert Roy Budway but added several other citizens presently in prison or detained, including Raymond Hareld./3/ In latter case we not informed of his exact situation because we not been able see him, but we wished to do so.
/3/A U.S. Army deserter who sought asylum in Czechoslovakia on August 2.
I expressed appreciation for courteous and helpful assistance we received recently in Budway case from President of Pilsen Court and defense attorney. While we did not have all facts in case and had not formally been given statement of charges, from our understanding of facts it seemed that any violation of Czech law by Budway had not been serious, although he may been imprudent. He had been sentenced four years in prison and we understood he intended appeal sentence. We of course did not wish inject ourselves improperly on judicial side, but I hoped judicial processes would be completed quickly as possible and that they would result in reduction Budway's sentence. I expressed hope it would be possible, if any sentence remained, that President Novotny--if he had power to do so, which I believed was case--would commute sentence to time already served. I hoped we could later discuss general question of difficulties encountered by Americans and find ways to minimize recurrences. I felt confident we could then make prog-ress in improvement general relations, although here I believed it would have to be in small steps in different fields, progressively leading to more significant changes. (I purposely made no comment on his initial reference to property and financial negotiations.)
Commenting on my statements on difficulties encountered by U.S. citizens visiting Czechoslovakia, and on Budway case in particular, David said Budway was serving his sentence now. He said he did not know status of appeal but, if he appealed, outcome would depend on Supreme Court. He added outcome would also depend on his behavior.
David then said, referring to my comment on problems of U.S. citizens having difficulty with law in CSSR, that ``so far as it could influence U.S. citizens, it would be good if U.S. Government advised them to respect and observe laws of CSSR." He clearly indicated desire have American (and other) tourists visit CSSR, stating CSSR wanted them inform themselves about country. If they came without hostility, they would have no difficulties. Speaking of American citizens in jail in CSSR, David twice said there had been number of instances in past of good will on Czech side in releasing Americans before sentence served out (this was presumably reference to Shaver and Zastera cases, but it was said with such emphasis that it may imply intention to commute Budway's sentence when judicial processes completed). David added ``it also is necessary that the other side show good will to improve relations." (Note: This had been standard comment in similar circumstances in past, but he may have been implying that premature issuance of our threatened travel warning would complicate matters.)
After I presented usual copies of letters and note asking date be fixed for credentials, he said this would be 9:00 a.m. January 3./4/
/4/Horsey presented his credentials on January 3. He reported on his meeting with President Novotny in telegram 379, January 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.49/1 - 363)
Horsey
18. Airgram From the Legation in Bulgaria to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL Bul - US. Confidential. Drafted by Anderson. Repeated to Belgrade.
Sofia, February 9, 1963.
A - 248. Subject: Memorandum of Conversation--Prime Minister Todor Zhivkov.
Date: February 6, 1963
Place: Office of the Prime Minister
Participants:
Prime Minister Todor Zhivkov
Mr. Ivan Peynirdzhiev, Foreign Office Interpreter
Deputy Prime Minister Petur Voutov
American Minister Eugenie Anderson
Mr. Alex Bloomfield, Second Secretary of Legation
The Prime Minister welcomed me and asked about my visit to the States. After my reply, Zhivkov remarked about the weather here, observing that, while the floods are serious at present, he believes there will be a better crop this year. He said there is an old Bulgarian saying, ``The deeper the snow, the thicker the bread".
Zhivkov asked me about the weather in the United States. When I confirmed that we, too, have had very cold weather, adding, ``It's been terribly cold all around the world", Zhivkov laughed and said, ``Yes, the weather has been cold, but the international climate has been improving."
After exchanging these pleasantries, I said I was bringing the Prime Minister personal greetings from the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy.
Before going on, I asked Zhivkov to tell me about his recent travels; that I was interested in hearing his reactions to developments in East Germany and Yugoslavia. The following points were made:
East Germany
Economic relations are more important than political. East Germany occupies second place in Bulgarian foreign trade, and accounts for 12 - 13 percent of the Bulgarian total. He declared that he was impressed with the ``stable economy" of East Germany. He lavished such praise on ``The Wall" that I took sharp issue with him, and he then agreed with me that we should work against walls between peoples and countries.
Yugoslavia
Zhivkov seemed a little embarrassed as he began to speak about Yugoslavia. He mentioned the difference between Party and Government cooperation, and clearly stated that there are, and will remain, ideological differences between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia as indicated in the Resolution at the Bulgarian Eighth Party Congress.
However, he went on, ``We are neighboring countries. We are both Socialist countries. We are all of Slavic origin and the same blood. For these reasons we are trying to improve relations."
The Prime Minister said there have been improvements in some fields, such as border questions, trade, cultural, and trade unions. But he was not specific. He added, rather defensively, that this improvement should not have a bearing on Yugoslav relations with other countries. No one should expect ``miracles" to have been accomplished at his meeting with Tito. There remained the problem of disagreement with Yugoslav ``revisionist" policies. Zhivkov added that the ideological differences should not prevent closer cooperation between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.
I responded that I was glad to hear of this attitude, which should mean that Bulgaria and the U.S. also could improve their relations. I said that my Government had had a chance to review its position and was anxious to settle the problems of the past so that we could move ahead to positive steps towards the improvement of the relations between Bulgaria and the U.S.
I added that I hoped the Bulgarian Government had also reviewed its position.
Financial Claims
I then raised the question of the financial claims, stating that we wish to resume talks. I asked him if Bulgaria was ready to put forward a new proposal.
In reply, the Prime Minister said that he was not informed on all the details but, as far as he knew, an agreement had almost been reached between the two governments. However, the United States Government almost doubled the amount shortly before the agreement was to be concluded. He asked whether, in the light of this, there was any guarantee that if we reached an agreement now, the U.S. Government would not again increase the amount of their claims.
I replied that, as Minister of the United States, I could assure him that, if an agreement were reached here in Sofia which was approved by the State Department, this agreement would be implemented and carried out by the U.S. Government.
Zhivkov then stated for his part he would instruct Deputy Foreign Minister Voutov, and that I could instruct any Legation officer, to carry on discussion on claims. He emphasized that the Bulgarian Government is willing to settle this question.
I added that I hoped agreement on a lump sum cash payment could be reached easily, and that technical talks concluding the agreement then could be worked out in a few months.
I reminded the Prime Minister of his remark before my departure for the United States to the effect that the normalization of relations with the United States would be worth a great deal to Bulgaria, whether it cost Bulgaria $350,000 or $10 million. Zhivkov laughingly confirmed this previously stated remark and repeated that it should not be difficult to reach an agreement.
El Al Claims/1/
/1/Reference is to the shooting down of an El Al airliner by the Bulgarian Air Force on July 27, 1955.
I then said that there is another outstanding question, the El Al claims. At this point, Deputy Foreign Minister Voutov intervened before Zhivkov could reply. Voutov said that this question was already settled; that the Bulgarian Government had deposited a check in an American bank which would satisfy the claims presented by the lawyers of the victims' heirs; that Mr. Davis and Mr. Vedeler had approved the settlement; and that he (Voutov) had a written statement of acceptance by the lawyers.
I asked for clarification, stating that I did not believe the question had been settled yet. The Prime Minister broke in to minimize the importance of the dispute. He said that this will be clarified, that there was no problem. He added that the Bulgarian Government views this accident not only from the financial, but also from the humanitarian point of view, and that Bulgaria is willing to meet fully all just claims. He suggested that Minister Voutov and I discuss the problem later./2/
/2/Anderson and Voutov discussed these issues in a February 18 meeting. A memorandum of their conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, POL Bul-US.
Citizenship Cases
I also mentioned that there is another question to be solved before we can fully normalize our relations. This is a citizenship question, but that, in view of the recent signs that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is making some progress in the Bonev and Dorset cases, I would not go into this matter today. The Prime Minister did not reply and appeared to be uninformed.
Future Developments in U.S.-Bulgarian Relations
The Prime Minister said that, in his view, all of these questions could be solved very easily, without problems; but that the real question is: What will follow the settlement of these problems?
I replied that I had had several conversations in Washington with, among others, President Kennedy, the Secretary of State, and other officials in the Department of State and that we envisage several practical steps which could be taken after the settlement of the outstanding problems, such as:
a. The establishment of a Bulgarian trade office in New York.
b. Raising the status of our Missions to Embassies here and in Washington.
c. A cultural exchange program.
It was obvious that these answers did not fully satisfy Mr. Zhivkov and that he had something else on his mind.
I went on to explain that, while there is objection on the part of certain Congressmen to repealing the bar to giving certain countries Most Favored Nation status, President Kennedy intends to request Congress to leave to his discretion the application of any repeal where he thinks it would be in the best interests of the United States. I added that, of course, it is not possible at the present time to predict what will develop in the future regarding Bulgaria. However, I said, President Kennedy had assured me of his interest in developing trade relations with Bulgaria and other Eastern European countries.
Zhivkov's Criticism of U.S. Policy
The Prime Minister said that the Bulgarian people are realistic and they see that the Department of State's policy towards Bulgaria was not ``realistic" for the past four years. The Department's attitude would not be realistic in the future, either, if it expects any changes in the Bulgarian political system. ``Even if I," he said, ``would like to be instrumental in such changes, I would be deprived of power immediately."
Replying to my request for clarification of what he meant by ``unrealistic", Zhivkov stated that, although Bulgaria is a small country, it is in the center of the Balkan Peninsula and that the Balkan problems cannot be solved only with the help of Greece and Turkey, and without Bulgaria.
For the past four years, he continued, there has been no improvement in relations between United States and Bulgaria. Smilingly, he said, he did not know whether Minister Voutov is to be blamed for this, or whether my predecessor was at fault; that my predecessor had done absolutely nothing here; that it was as if he were not present in Bulgaria. At this point, I said I did not think that he should criticize my predecessor who represented the United States, as I am doing, and that Minister Page is a countryman of mine.
I said that I am not only the Minister of the United States, but also a personal representative and friend of the President of my country. I assured the Prime Minister that I was willing to cooperate with him and suggested that, rather than dwelling on the past, we should make a new start in relations between our two countries by the two of us working together.
Zhivkov replied that he does not wish to dwell on the past, but to learn from it.
Trade Proposal
The Prime Minister then said that Bulgaria is very much interested in developing trade with the United States. If favorable terms can be arranged, he said, Bulgaria is desirous now of purchasing from the U.S. one or two chemical factories. Bulgaria has already received three offers from other countries, one being very favorable, he said, implying that Bulgaria is not dependent on the United States for purchasing chemical works, since it is able to obtain them from other countries, such as West Germany, France and even Japan.
He said that, if there should be any difficulties in selling such chemical factories directly to Bulgaria, this could be overcome through an un-named third country. I did not reply to this extraordinary suggestion. Indeed, Zhivkov rushed on to the next subject, not appearing much interested in whether or not I responded.
Press Attacks on President Kennedy
Zhivkov then raised the subject of my informal discussion with Voutov on January 31 (Legtel 322)/3/ in which I had expressed my displeasure over derogatory cartoons and press attacks on President Kennedy.
/3/Dated February 1. (Ibid., Edu 7)
I reiterated that the attacks against the United States Government, and even President Kennedy, which appear in the press, and caricatures of the President which are displayed certainly do not contribute to the improvement of relations between our two countries. I said that I, as personal representative of the President, consider such attacks and pictures as personally offensive. I added that President Kennedy is devoted to peace and wishes Bulgaria no harm, only good.
The Prime Minister pointed out that our two countries live under different systems and that, also, the American press is critical of Communist regimes.
I explained that the American press is not controlled by our Government and, furthermore, what I had in mind is not the criticism of ideologies, or systems, but concrete attacks against the U.S. Government, and even the head of our Government.
``The American press," I added, ``has not been critical of you, Mr. Prime Minister. On the contrary, I have read in the American press some very complimentary remarks about you."
The Prime Minister then said that he agreed with me; that he is not now aware of concrete facts to which I have referred but he deplores them. He assured me that, today, he would issue appropriate instructions that such attacks should not be repeated.
Then Zhivkov added that, shortly after his appointment as Prime Minister, personal derogatory remarks about him had appeared in some ``Western press", not naming the exact source. He said he had thought of asking the Foreign Office to call the Chief of Mission of that particular country here in Sofia and to draw his attention to these press remarks, but since these attacks had soon stopped he thought action would no longer be justified.
Our meeting, which lasted for one hour and fifteen minutes, ended on a cordial note. Toasts were exchanged to the further development of better relations between our two countries, with the Prime Minister adding his hope that considerable progress will be achieved before our next meeting. As I was leaving the room, I admired the bouquet of roses on the table. Minister Voutov selected the nicest one and handed it to Zhivkov who presented it to me.
Comments
I had the impression that Zhivkov was less buoyant than at the time of our first meeting./4/ Probably his first two months as Prime Minister have been a strain, in spite of his allegations that things have been going well here. Zhivkov also may have felt less confident in my presence when confronted with specific issues, than on the occasion of our first meeting when he could confine himself to generalities.
/4/See Document 16.
I was struck again, as during our first visit, by Zhivkov's reference to Bulgaria being a small country, and his repeated complaint that Bulgaria has felt ignored by the U.S. I was surprised that he stated so clearly that Bulgaria has no choice over its Soviet alignment.
I noted that Minister Voutov took a harder position than Zhivkov whenever the former entered the conversation. I also observed that Voutov's smile frequently turned into a smirk, and felt that he was trying to impress me and the Prime Minister that he will be a tough bargainer. However, I believe that Voutov has a great deal at stake in reaching agreement with the U.S. now and that Zhivkov has committed himself to do so.
Eugenie Anderson
19. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 12 - 1 Bul-US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Davis and approved by the White House on June 4. The meeting was held at the White House.
Washington, June 1, 1963, 11:15 - 11:35 a.m.
SUBJECT
Presentation of Credentials
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The President
Mr. Angier Biddle Duke, Chief of
Protocol
Mr. William J. Tonesk, Deputy Chief
of Protocol
Mr. Richard H. Davis, Deputy
Assistant Secretary, EUR
Bulgaria
Mr. Lyubomir Dimitrov Popov,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of Bulgaria to the
United States
The President began by asking the new Bulgarian Minister, Lyubomir Dimitrov Popov, what were the principal problems in US-Bulgarian relations. The Minister responded by saying ``trade", pointing out lack of MFN which made the difference on duties very high. For instance, Bulgarian tobacco had to pay a duty of 35 compared to a competitor with MFN who paid only 12. In response to the President's question, the Minister said Bulgaria was interested in buying engineering products, particularly manufacturing plants. The Minister said they were encouraged by the recent agreement in principle to complete a financial claims settlement and hoped that with the establishment of a Trade Office in New York some progress could be made in developing US-Bulgarian trade.
The President commented that the Minister was undoubtedly familiar with the Congressional action taken last year in denying MFN to Poland and Yugoslavia. The President expressed the opinion that it was unlikely that in the present state of international relations the Congress would consider restoring MFN to those countries who do not now enjoy it.
In a brief discussion of economic relationships in the Bloc, the Minister said that Bulgaria's foreign trade with the Western nations is about 20% of the total whereas with the USSR it is 50%; a great portion of Bulgaria's exports consisted of agricultural products, especially tomatoes and grapes. The USSR represented a vast market for Bulgaria, although his country was still relatively under-developed.
The President asked the Minister how long he had been a Communist. Mr. Popov replied that his father had been killed as a Communist in 1923 in an anti-Fascist revolt in Bulgaria and that he had been brought up as a Communist. Bulgaria had by tradition and history had close relations with Moscow. The Russians had liberated Bulgaria from five centuries' rule under the Turks. Marxist Socialism had always had a strong appeal in Bulgaria and Dimitrov had been the Bulgarian hero of the workers movement.
The President asked if the Chinese were active in Eastern Europe and why the present situation existed in Albania. The Minister replied that the Albanians had a young and immature leadership; their relations with Greece were bad and indeed a state of war still theoretically existed. Albania feels itself surrounded by enemies. These, in his opinion, were the principal reasons for the Albanian position.
The President then asked about the Sino-Soviet dispute and whether its origins lay in ideology or in history. The Minister replied he really did not understand the present situation and did not know much about it. He expressed the personal opinion that the rift reflected ``nationalism", the isolation of China and the size of its population.
The Minister then briefly sketched the history of the Bulgarian Communist Party under the leadership of Dimitrov, using this to conclude that Western political leaders erred in the view that the Communists were always monolithic; there had always been disputes and disagreements in the Communist movement.
The discussion was terminated with the President wishing the Minister well in his mission in Washington.
20. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL Rum - US. Confidential. Drafted by Crawford and approved in M on August 10. The meeting was held in Harriman's office.
Washington, August 8, 1963, 1 p.m.
SUBJECT
Rumanian-American Relations
PARTICIPANTS
W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Mircea Malita, Rumanian Deputy Foreign Minister
Petre Balaceanu, Rumanian Minister
Nicolae Bucur, First Secretary, Rumanian Legation
William A. Crawford, American Minister to Bucharest
Harold C. Vedeler--EE
Following the ceremony at which Mr. Malita signed on behalf of the Rumanian Government the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty/1/ the above group met in Governor Harriman's office for luncheon. Deputy Foreign Minister Malita and Minister Crawford had arrived from Bucharest the previous evening. Apart from congratulations and general comments on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as a first step toward improved general relations, the following points emerged in the luncheon discussion:
/1/For text of the Test Ban Treaty, see Department of State Bulletin, August 12, 1963, pp. 239 - 240.
1. Rumanian Position at Moscow Summit Meeting on June 26 - 28 on CEMA. In response to Governor Harriman's question in this regard, Mr. Malita made a guarded presentation, noting that Rumania clearly intends to pursue its established course of building up its industry, and that the Summit meeting confirmed that no decisions can be taken by CEMA without unanimous approval of all members and that nothing can be done there contrary to the desires and interests of any individual member.
2. Signs of Independence from Moscow. Governor Harriman referred to newspaper reports here over recent months of evidence of a more independent Rumanian position and spirit vis-a-vis Moscow both with regard to CEMA and to Sino-Soviet differences, and noted that the Rumanians had returned their Ambassador to Albania, contrary to the action of other Bloc countries. He said that these signs of an independent spirit met with an approving reaction on the part of the American people and that in this atmosphere it might be possible to be more receptive to Rumanian requests for more trade and to Rumanian needs for industrial installations to which Mr. Gheorghiu-Dej had referred in his recent talk with Agriculture Secretary Freeman./2/
/2/Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman visited Romania August 3 - 5. The Legation reported on his activities in airgram A - 41 from Bucharest, August 8. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 - 1 Rum)
3. Trade and Industrial Installations. Mr. Malita and Minister Balaceanu spoke at some length on this point, emphasizing the importance which the Rumanian Government attaches not only to increased trade with the United States but to ``some signs" of response on our part to their requests to purchase industrial installations. They emphasized that Mr. Gheorghiu-Dej had made clear to Secretary Freeman that this was their basic concern and had several times requested Secretary Freeman to convey to President Kennedy the Rumanian desire for some positive action in this sense, and particularly with regard to two synthetic rubber plants, one a polybutadiene and the other an isoprene installation. Both of these had been included in the $100 million shopping list Minister Balaceanu had presented the United States Government in the spring of 1962, and it was still hoped that they could be provided. They would only be intended for wholly peaceful uses, and if licenses could be granted the Rumanian people would feel greatly encouraged. Mr. Malita observed that more than half of the 10 installations on their original shopping list for which licenses were not forthcoming last year were meanwhile contracted for by West European firms, and he cited as one example a tire factory supplied by the UK. Mr. Malita and Mr. Balaceanu also expressed the Rumanian desire to increase exports to the US through assistance of MFN if possible. If this were not possible, Mr. Balaceanu hoped that some favorable tariff arrangements might be made for a limited number of products they would particularly like to export to the US.
Governor Harriman repeated that the Rumanian show of independence toward Moscow created a better atmosphere for considering improved economic relations and that Mr. Gheorghiu-Dej's proposals would be carefully studied. He warned that action on such matters may take time but assured Mr. Malita that he would look further into the entire question. As for the desired industrial installations, there were really two aspects of the subject, those of licensing and financing. Minister Crawford explained some aspects of the Rumanian financing procedures in comparable deals with Western European firms which have sold Rumania some $350 - $400 million worth of industrial installations over the past three years. Mr. Malita made the personal suggestion that a US-Rumanian joint study group on trade expansion might be usefully set up at this juncture. Governor Harriman expressed interest in the idea but was noncommittal.
Mr. Malita said that he planned to extend his stay here by several days and Minister Balaceanu would like to have Minister Crawford and Mr. Vedeler for a stag dinner on August 12 to pursue matters further.
21. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 W Eur-E Eur. Secret. Drafted by Vedeler, cleared by Davis and Thompson, and approved by Harriman. Repeated to London, Sofia, Bucharest, and Budapest.
Washington, September 25, 1963, 3:22 p.m.
1495. Deptel 1378./1/ Following is position to take in consultation with UK and France on question of raising Western Legations in EE to Embassy status.
/1/Telegram 1378, September 18, reported the French desire to discuss the elevation of diplomatic representation in Hungary. (Ibid.)
Since Hungary special case for US we not in position at this time to consider raising status of our mission at Budapest. US has special problems in its relations with Hungary which will require some time to solve or to make definite progress towards solution before question of elevating mission of practical significance. In any event we anticipate that it would be necessary after solution of some of these problems and as reflection of progress in regularization of relations to send Minister to Budapest before elevating mission. Thus US may be obliged to hold back on this step in Hungary when other Western governments are preparing to go ahead. If they agree time is favorable for doing so, US cannot ask them to wait for US action.
US prepared to elevate missions at Bucharest and Sofia at appropriate time. We think it advisable as means reinforce the importance and effect of action in Eastern Europe for US, UK and France to move about the same time in raising status of missions in Rumania and Bulgaria.
Apart from factor of international atmosphere which now appears favorable for this step believe two principal considerations relevant in determining time of such action: (1) progress in solution of bilateral problems and in expansion of bilateral relations; and (2) extent to which EE country asserting more independent position toward Soviet Union. On these bases missions at Bucharest should be elevated before those at Sofia and US expects to take this step first at Bucharest. It is hoped UK and France might agree.
Nevertheless we are not ready to move yet at Bucharest. Consider it necessary before this step taken at either Bucharest or Sofia to make further progress in solution of outstanding bilateral problems. These include problems of dual nationals, separated families, accommodations (chancery buildings at Bucharest and Sofia, residence site of CM and housing at Sofia) and consular convention. We expect to make progress in solution these problems at Bucharest as our economic relations with Rumania develop over the next months. We cannot forecast any definite schedule of progress but would hope to be in position possibly within a year to arrange with Rumanians mutual elevation of missions. The step with Sofia would come some time thereafter.
We propose that the three governments consult in the future with a view to acting in concert concerning the rank of their missions at Bucharest and Sofia. The subject should also be raised in NATO at a time considered appropriate by the three governments so that the NATO countries generally might move together in elevating their Legations in Rumania and Bulgaria
Ball
22. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL Bul-US. Confidential. Drafted by Baker on October 1 and approved in S on October 4. The meeting was held at the U.S. Mission. The source text is labeled ``Part I of II." Part II, a separate memorandum of conversation on Greek-Bulgarian relations, is not printed.
SecDel/MC/79 New York, September 30, 1963, noon.
SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE EIGHTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September 1963
SUBJECT
U.S.-Bulgarian Relations--Trade, Citizenship
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson
John A. Baker, Jr., USUN
Bulgaria
Mr. Ivan Khristov Bashev, Foreign
Minister
Amb. Milko Tarabanov, Bulgarian
Permanent Representative to UN
Mr. Lyubomir Popov, Bulgarian
Minister to the United States
Interpreter
Following the opening amenities, the Secretary made reference to the recent steps made toward the improvement of U.S.-Bulgarian relations and expressed the U.S. desire to work for further improvements.
In response to this, Foreign Minister Bashev expressed his agreement but noted that in regard to the recently concluded Claims Agreement/1/ the Bulgarian Government had made quite a few concessions which they felt were justified by the desire to improve U.S.-Bulgarian relations in the future. Bashev made favorable reference to the joint declaration made at the time when the Claims Agreement was completed. He expressed regret, however, that he could not describe present U.S.-Bulgarian commercial relations as satisfactory. He noted Bulgarian readiness to buy a number of U.S. products, mentioning factories for cigarettes and artificial fibers, plus cotton, grain, fodder and paper. He said, however, that Bulgaria wants the same price conditions as other countries, needs more expeditious action on U.S. export licenses, needs better tariff treatment on its exports, and wants credit arrangements similar to those available from West Germany, France, Italy and Japan.
/1/For text of the U.S.-Bulgarian agreement and accompanying declarations, see Department of State Bulletin, July 22, 1963, pp. 138 - 141.
The Secretary replied by enumerating the various problems which impede development of U.S.-Bulgarian trade relations noting U.S. legislation on strategic goods, extension of credit, and most-favored nation treatment, on which latter question favorable Congressional action towards Eastern European countries other than Yugoslavia and Poland is not likely this year. The Secretary expressed hope that some steps could be undertaken on the problems within the purview of the Executive Branch and mentioned a review of export licensing policy, a desire to examine more closely what Bulgarian products can be marketed in the United States, and the need to reach agreement on trade practices such as those involving patents and copyrights and dumping. He observed that in an improving international atmosphere involving U.S.-Bulgarian relations as well, American consumers would be more receptive to Bulgarian products and American businessmen more anxious to sell to Bulgaria. He also observed that greater travel would contribute to improving this atmosphere and observed that the United States is interested in having more Bulgarian tourists as well as seeing more Americans travel to Bulgaria. He said that the conclusion of an agreement on travel of dual nationals similar to that recently concluded between the United States and Czechoslovakia would encourage more Americans of Bulgarian origin to travel to Bulgaria.
Bashev, commenting on the Secretary's remarks, observed that there would be no problem of dumping from Bulgaria and that his country was a signatory of the international agreement on patents and copyrights. He welcomed the Secretary's suggestion that some steps to improve trade could be pursued even prior to any changes in U.S. legislation and stated that he would like to be able to say to his government that a decision had been reached to start negotiations soon on this matter.
The Secretary replied that for reasons of timing in relations with the committees of Congress, the United States would prefer to have a preliminary stage of discussions and examination of the trade problem before entering into a stage of actual negotiations.
Bashev agreed to this approach and then commented on the question of tourism, noting that Bulgarian tourism to the United States was obstructed by the lack of a direct air route and the shortage of hard currency which the Bulgarian Government could afford to earmark for tourism.
The Secretary replied that, although we were desirous of an increase of Bulgarian tourism to the United States, we recognized that there would be an imbalance in tourism but that this would perhaps help Bulgaria to acquire currency with which to cover its imports from the United States.
Bashev replied that the question of dual citizenship could easily be resolved on the basis of a treaty and that Bulgaria had no problem in this connection.
The Secretary concluded by mentioning he expected shortly there would be some important decision on the question of sale of U.S. grain to the Eastern European countries and that he hoped to be in touch with the Minister when this decision was reached. He noted that the sale of grain would be a good point to begin the exchange of U.S.-Bulgarian trade since the American public has a more receptive attitude toward trade in food commodities with the socialist countries than it does with trade in some other commodities.
23. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Carle and approved in S on October 27. The source text is labeled ``Part 2 of 2 parts." A memorandum of the part of the conversation on East-West relations is ibid.
Washington, October 21, 1963.
SUBJECT
US-Rumanian Relations
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The Secretary
Richard H. Davis, EUR
Harold C. Vedeler, EE
Jack M. Carle, EE
Rumanian
Corneliu Manescu, Minister of
Foreign Affairs
Mircea Malita, Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs
Petre Balaceanu, Minister to the U.S.
Stefan Nastusescu, Private Secretary
to Mr. Manescu (Interpreter)
Following discussion of some of the broader problems in East-West relations, the conversation turned to US-Rumanian bilateral relations. The Secretary expressed the hope that we could find points at which our relations could develop. He said that we were exploring trade possibilities at present and had already taken certain administrative actions in this connection. Mr. Manescu replied that he did not wish to give the appearance of hurrying things but would like to express the views of his government as to specific ways in which our relations could be improved.
1. Removal of Travel Restrictions. Mr. Manescu said that ``the game had been interrupted by the U.S., and the ball was now in your hands". The Secretary said he accepted the fact that the ball was in our court and hoped we could furnish our answer soon to their recent note on this subject. He also hoped that the Rumanians would have a sophisticated understanding of the position we must take on travel, which is greatly influenced by the fact that the US constitutes the great heartland of NATO defensive strength.
2. Raising the Level of Diplomatic Missions. Mr. Manescu thought that it would contribute to the extension of our relations to raise the level of our respective missions. He understood it was necessary for us to ``take into account other countries--your friends, as well as our friends". The Secretary replied that we had no fixed views on this matter and did not exclude the possibility of raising the level of our missions. We were giving active consideration to the question. He also indicated that any action we might take would not be subject to the veto of our allies.
3. Economic Relations. Mr. Manescu pointed out that certain difficulties with regard to Rumania's desire to broaden its trade relations with the US still existed. Referring specifically to the recent approval of an export license submitted by a US firm in connection with the Galati Metallurgical Combine, the Secretary said that there were some steps which we could take administratively. Other steps would require legislative action, however, and he could offer no encouragement in that regard in the near future. He agreed there was room for improvement of our trade relations and expressed the desire for progress in this field. Mr. Manescu indicated that he was informed of the Galati decision and commented that it was a very welcome step.
4. Rumanian Trade Delegation. Mr. Manescu reminded the Secretary that an approach had been made concerning a visit to the US of a Rumanian trade delegation. His government believed such a visit would be useful and was interested in knowing if the delegation could come. The Secretary said he assumed Mr. Manescu was referring to the proposal for a visit by a delegation headed by Mr. Gaston-Marin, which Mr. Manescu agreed was correct. The Secretary stated that we hoped to accept this proposal after necessary preparations for discussions with Mr. Gaston-Marin had been made.
In conclusion, the Secretary and Mr. Manescu expressed mutual satisfaction with the exchange of views and improvement of communication between the two governments, which had resulted from this meeting, as well as their two previous conversations in New York.
Note: Conversation was conducted through an interpreter furnished by the Rumanian side.
24. Telegram From the Legation in Bulgaria to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL Bul-US. Confidential. Repeated to Vienna, Ottawa, and Munich.
Sofia, November 8, 1963, 7 p.m.
281. Vienna for SPO for information only; not for release. Munich for EAS for information only; not for release. Department pass USIA. I called on Prime Minister Todor Zhivkov November 8 at my request. I began by saying that, in view recent developments such as partial test ban treaty and President Kennedy's decision re possible wheat sales to Soviet Union and East European countries,/1/ I believe atmosphere is favorable for continuing to work at improving US-Bulgarian relations. I then presented four problems, three of which Legation has taken up repeatedly through Foreign Ministry and other agencies without success:
/1/For text of President Kennedy's statement on wheat sales to the Soviet Union, see Department of State Bulletin, October 28, 1963, pp. 660 - 661.
(1) Citizenship problems.
(2) Housing for Legation staff.
(3) Free access to American Legation for visitors, without interference by militia.
(4) Jamming of Voice of America.
Zhivkov responded by agreeing we should continue to work at improving relations and expressed satisfaction over progress made during past year.
He said he was unable give immediate answers today but assured me he would consider all problems. He mentioned especially questions involving American citizens and dual-nationals.
Zhivkov also said he would look into diplomatic apartment [house] and possibly direct more workers be assigned in order expedite its completion.
Re free access to American Legation, he said he was sorry if militia had prevented anyone from visiting Legation, adding that ``this is not their function".
Re VOA, Zhivkov said if VOA broadcasts to Bulgaria are ``objective," Bulgaria will cease jamming; if broadcasts are not ``objective," Bulgaria will continue jamming regardless of what Soviet Union may do. Zhivkov admitted his latest information re content VOA was almost one year old.
I then asked Zhivkov for his evaluation present Bulgarian political and economic situation. Contrary to reports of some American newsmen and radio, he said, there is no economic crisis. He denied there is any ``system of bread rationing" in Bulgaria, adding bread problem has been solved for this year.
Zhivkov added, however, there is a wheat shortage in Bulgaria due to bad crops this year and also to Bulgarian policy allocating major agricultural production resources to vegetables, fruits, and cotton. He said Bulgaria will need to import 500,000 tons of wheat and 300,000 tons of fodder annually for ten years (Leg. A - 139)./2/
/2/Airgram A - 139, October 28, forwarded a memorandum of conversation between Anderson and Minister of Foreign Trade Budinov. (Department of State, Central Files, FT 1 - 1 Bul-US)
Zhivkov evaded my indirect question as to whether he had been to Moscow recently (Legation's A - 154)./3/
/3/Airgram A - 154, November 6, reported on Bulgarian officials' visits to the Soviet Union. (Ibid., POL 15 - 1 Bul)
Our hour and a half conversation was on amicable basis. Pouching verbatim text conversation.
Comment: I have impression that contrary to recent diplomatic rumors (Legation's A - 141)/4/ Todor Zhivkov feels secure in position. While he clearly wants to minimize economic difficulties, he acted confident that they will be overcome. Further comment will follow./5/
/4/Airgram A - 141, October 28, speculated on possible changes in the Bulgarian leadership and their implications. (Ibid., POL 15 - 1 Bul)
/5/Anderson provided further detail on her meeting with Zhivkov in airgram A - 175 from Sofia, November 16. (Ibid., POL Bul-US)
Zhivkov said Bulgaria hopes to buy wheat from US but that it will not be able to do unless it gets longer credit terms than Soviet Union may receive. He stressed Bulgaria's need for long-term credit and elimination of ``discriminatory" tariff treatment.
Anderson
25. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 - 1 Czech-US. Confidential. Drafted by Dennis and approved by the White House on November 15.
Washington, November 13, 1963, 10 a.m.
SUBJECT
The Czechoslovak Ambassador Presents His Credentials
PARTICIPANTS
The President
Dr. Karel Duda, Czechoslovak Ambassador
Mr. Angier Biddle Duke, Chief of Protocol
Mr. John M. Dennis, Officer in Charge of Czechoslovak Affairs
The President welcomed Ambassador Duda to Washington and thanked him for the cordiality shown Secretary Hodges during his visit to Czechoslovakia./1/ He asked the Ambassador what he thought were the major matters of interest between the United States and Czechoslovakia. Dr. Duda said his Government desires to maintain good relations with the US and he believes there are possibilities to further relations, especially in the fields of culture, science and trade. The principal difficulties in the Czechoslovak view concern:
/1/Secretary of Commerce Luther H. Hodges visited Czechoslovakia September 8 - 9.
1. The settlement of the economic-financial negotiations.
2. Increased trade, which Czechoslovakia foresees as being possible once prerequisites are established to enable it to export more to the United States and in turn to import more from this country.
3. The need for the United States to register positive moves toward Czechoslovakia to correspond with what it believes are positive steps it has taken toward improving bilateral relations.
However, to be frank, the Ambassador had to point out that the travel restrictions imposed on November 12 were, in his Government's view, a step backward and suggested a period in our relations which he had believed was a thing of the past./2/
/2/For texts of the November 12 statement outlining travel restrictions on East European diplomats, the U.S. notes to individual countries, and a list of U.S. counties closed to travel, see Department of State Bulletin, December 2, 1963, pp. 860 - 863.
The President referred to the severe limitations on travel in the Soviet Union and said the United States is concerned that so much has been invested in its security that it was now necessary to establish travel controls. These are essential to our standard of security. They are not a harassment of Czechoslovak officials and are not directed against Czechoslovakia. They are not a political act but are simple security measures. He understood the Ambassador's concern and said we do not wish to maintain these measures as a permanent thing. Dr. Duda replied that the problem here is that measures of this sort are followed by corresponding measures which tend to complicate relations.
On the question of trade, the President agreed that it would be difficult to expect Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European countries to buy more in the United States unless they were at the same time able to sell more here. He then referred to the limitations regarding MFN and to the recent Senatorial discussions concerning this subject. The President said he would be glad to see this situation changed and trade be kept out of the political arena. However, he believes that if relations improve, and he hopes they will, this problem may be solved.
He was aware, the President said, that Czechoslovakia has taken certain steps to improve relations. He believes it useful to all to maintain normal relations. He hoped, therefore, that our relations would improve further during the course of Dr. Duda's assignment. Certainly, he said, the desire to improve relations is as strong as it has been for a long time. However, the President added, the recent Soviet arrest of Professor Barghoorn/3/ makes it difficult for the United States. Temperatures tend to rise over incidents of this nature, but, he continued, we must persist in our efforts to attain normal relations.
/3/On November 12, the Soviet Union announced the arrest of Professor Frederick C. Barghoorn 2 weeks previously on charges of espionage. Following a personal intervention by President Kennedy, Barghoorn was released on November 16 and expelled from the Soviet Union.
With respect to his own country, Dr. Duda said problems existed but he believes the situation there is improving. He noted that Czechoslovakia has concluded a contract to purchase grain in Canada and a Czechoslovak official is currently in New York negotiating the purchase of corn, rice and 250,000 tons of wheat.
The President said he hoped the grain purchases go along well and asked the Ambassador to come back anytime.
26. Telegram From the Department of State to the Legation in Romania
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 Rum. Confidential. Drafted by Carle, cleared in S/S, and approved by Harriman.
Washington, November 27, 1963, 7:04 p.m.
288. Legtel 411./1/ Gaston-Marin paid fifty-minute call on Governor Harriman November 26 and discussed three specific problems RPR economic relations with US:
/1/Telegram 411, November 26, suggested high-level treatment for Gaston-Marin. (Ibid.)
1. Rumanians desired import industrial installations from US in such fields as chemicals, rubber, power, metallurgy, electro-technology, cellulose, food products. Although now buying some of these products elsewhere in West, RPR wanted to achieve balanced commercial relations with other nations. Hoped obtain equally good or better equipment than that now being purchased in Western Europe.
2. In order pay for such imports directly or indirectly, RPR needed to export to US and hoped determine goods which would be of interest to US. RPR realizes this is difficult since US could not absorb all potential categories Rumanian exports and high US tariffs created problem.
3. Referred obliquely to problem of credit terms by remarking RPR presently obtaining good terms in WE and noted tendency toward further easing of terms.
Gaston-Marin said RPR hopes in further talks to establish a framework of understanding on these points.
Harriman replied in substance that we were planning invite Gaston-Marin for discussion these topics but that we not yet ready make definite policy commitments. US has recently issued certain export licenses as indication of a degree of liberalization of export control policy in response to RPR assertions self-interest. Referred specifically to Galati decision. Could not comment at this time on large number of US industrial installations RPR desires purchase from US. Since US does not engage in state trading, RPR would have to explore its export possibilities through private firms. Re credit terms, referred to pending Mundt bill which would pose difficulties if passed but which Administration hoped would be defeated as it since then has been.
Harriman emphasized in general discussion that US objective was to encourage Rumanian development for benefit of Rumanian people. Although US did not desire RPR to have other than friendly relations with its neighbor USSR, past US-Rumanian difficulties in large measure attributable to feeling in US that Rumania subject to Moscow dictates. US also desired insure that equipment and technology exported to Rumania would not be made available to USSR. Gaston-Marin replied that Governor had not seen Rumania since 1946 and much had since been accomplished to the benefit of Rumanian people. In addition, state policy of Rumania is to honor strictly all commitments made re protection of patents and industrial information.
At Harriman's suggestion, arrangements now being made for further talks today without commitments with officials State and Commerce Departments concerned with economic and export control matters. Gaston-Marin scheduled depart morning November 28. Memcon follows./2/
/2/Not found.
Rusk
27. Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL Hung-US. Limited Official Use.
Budapest, December 13, 1963, 1 p.m.
370. We believe Hungarian success in parleying Western legations to embassies here calls for stocktaking on what we may now expect from Hungarians ourselves.
This is what our diplomatic colleagues tell us here. Around time Greeks raised their legation this summer Hungarians approached Belgians. Brussels responded affirmatively and now announcement expected shortly. Hungarians reportedly maneuvered timing of Belgian announcement over several months in order encourage recent British action. At about time British action appeared likely, Hungarians approached French. French action now expected December 17. Meanwhile, Hungarians have approached Italians and suggested to Austrians that property negotiations might be facilitated by Austria raising its legation. Hungarians also indicated to American press representative that level official Hungarian response to Kennedy death/1/ here was pitched to level US-Hungarian relations.
/1/President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas, on November 22.
While this successful maneuvering of Hungarians does West little credit at least some Western missions here were ripe for such approaches. In contrast to ourselves, most of them did not have outstanding problems requiring solution before taking such action. Some did not want to be held back by our special problems and some felt that we have been unnecessarily slow in getting at our problems.
We may be sure GOH has sensed this and may feel that action of other Western powers will tend to isolate us in our posture toward Hungary. They are likely to seek exploit this difference and use it to bring pressure on us to give Hungary the stamp of respectability that other Western powers now giving. GOH probably was much, if not more, interested in acquiring that stamp of respectability as solving problems.
In such situation GOH should not be allowed to hang on us responsibility for not moving effectively toward solution our outstanding problems. Rightly or wrongly, as UN issue has receded, problem of Cardinal, about which everyone here speaks in hushed tones, has emerged within last year in minds Hungarians and diplomatic community as central US-Hungarian problem, solution of which could lead to progress in other areas. This unfortunately tends obscure constructive steps on which GOH gives us little credit, that we have taken in UN, on wheat, and elsewhere. We very much need avoid this and stress positive side what we are doing vis-a-vis Hungary. Information media can play key role in this. Indoctrination our allies and neutrals may also be called for.
Jones
28. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL Hung-US. Confidential. Drafted by Squire and approved in M on December 20.
Washington, December 14, 1963.
SUBJECT
US-Hungarian Relations
PARTICIPANTS
United States
Governor Harriman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Mr. Harold C. Vedeler, Director, Office of EE Affairs
Mr. Frederick M. Chapin, Office of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Mr. Christopher A. Squire, OIC Hungarian Affairs
Hungary
Peter Mod, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Janos Radvanyi, Charge d'Affaires a.i., Hungarian Legation
At his own request, Hungarian First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Peter Mod, accompanied by Charge Janos Radvanyi, called on Under Secretary Harriman on December 14. Mr. Mod is returning to Hungary on December 17 at the close of the 18th UNGA session, where he has been head of the Hungarian Delegation to the GA. He stated that he wished to take advantage of a ``courtesy call" before his departure to continue discussions that had begun with Governor Harriman at the time of President Kennedy's funeral but which had been interrupted when Mod had to return to New York./1/
/1/No record of these discussions has been found.
After initial amenities, Mr. Mod said that he would like to take the opportunity, now that he was in Washington, to talk further with Governor Harriman about relations between Hungary and the United States. Although he did not know in detail the daily matters of concern between the two countries, he knew the general feeling in the Foreign Ministry. Relations between Hungary and the US, he continued, had recently developed in a good way. The relation of the two countries' UN delegations were more normal. During the recent visit to the US of the Hungarian First Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Janos Hont, Hungary saw with some satisfaction the good will towards that visit on the part of the US Administration and its helpful attitude. In the matter of the wheat and corn purchases, the US Government also gave evidence of helpfulness and good will.
On Hungary's part, continued Mr. Mod, there had also been signs of improvement. Travel restrictions had been abolished in Hungary. He had recently noted with pleasure that the US Charge had called on the Hungarian Foreign Minister in Budapest./2/ The atmosphere, Mr. Mod felt, in regard to US-Hungarian relations was better than at any time in the last few years, and it was his personal feeling that this atmosphere now made it appropriate to talk about the development of US-Hungarian relations.
/2/On December 5, Jones delivered a message stating President Johnson's intention to follow the policies of the Kennedy administration. Jones reported on the meeting in telegram 351 from Budapest, December 5. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 - 1 US-Kennedy)
Governor Harriman noted that the US Charge in Budapest had been talking over, with the Hungarian Foreign Office, various matters which the US thought would assist in the improvement of US-Hungarian relations. Certain useful steps had already been taken, Governor Harriman continued, but other further steps remain to be taken. These steps, which the US Charge was authorized to discuss with the Hungarian Foreign Office, were the same ones outlined to Charge Radvanyi in Washington on October 20, 1962/3/ by Deputy Assistant Secretary Davis. The subjects include the problem of dual nationals, the separation of families, and the ability of American citizens to see their families in Hungary. While there had been a decided improvement in travel to and from Hungary recently, certain members of the families of American citizens still remain in Hungary separated from their relatives. There was also the question of the size of the US mission in Budapest and the restrictions on its personnel. Other problems were the claims relating to US Government property in Budapest, as well as the post-war claims of private American citizens which have already been settled in most Eastern European countries.
/3/See Document 15.
Governor Harriman added that he had told Mr. Kadar in Moscow/4/ that, although it was not directly a bilateral issue, the question of Cardinal Mindszenty would be an important one in the improvement of US-Hungarian relations. A problem that the Hungarian Government wanted settled, on the other hand, related to Hungary's desire to sell meat to the US so that Hungary might expand its trade. This involved inspection procedures to satisfy US sanitary standards. The US had rather strict rules on the standards of meat production, which applied all over the world, not just to Hungary. The US had worked this problem out with Poland, and some progress, Governor Harriman understood, had been made in this matter with Hungary. The major point was that certain steps should be taken: the specific steps should be discussed in Budapest with the US charge.
/4/Harriman's July 15 - 25 visit to the Soviet Union concluded with an agreement on the text of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. No record of this conversation has been found.
The subject of claims, said Governor Harriman, had not yet been under active discussion between the US and Hungary. The US had property in Hungary which it wanted to rehabilitate, but first the Hungarian squatters who presently occupied the premises must be moved out. To make these properties available to the US the cooperation of the Hungarian authorities was necessary. The US felt that these foregoing points were very important and action should be taken on them if relations between the two countries were to make progress. Mr. Mod agreed that certain points were very important.
The US, continued Governor Harriman, had watched and was watching with interest various liberalization steps that Hungary had taken, including the general amnesty of March 1963. This was encouraging to the US. The US was of course interested in the development of US-Hungarian relations, and Mr. Mod could repeat to his Ministry in Budapest that the American charge in Budapest was fully authorized to discuss these matters. Governor Harriman concluded that the question of Cardinal Mindszenty had come up quite informally in Moscow in his discussions with Premier Kadar (during the negotiating and signing of the Partial Test Ban Agreement).
Mr. Mod said that as in Governor Harriman's discussions with Premier Kadar, the position of the Hungarian Government with regard to Cardinal Mindszenty was clear. The problem of Cardinal Mindszenty, as well as other Church-State matters, was the subject of negotiations between Hungary and the Vatican. These negotiations were proceeding in a good atmosphere, and he thought that some time in the near future the problem of the Cardinal, as well as the other Church-State problems, would be settled.
As to the normalization of relations between the US and Hungary, Mr. Mod continued, the questions connected with the person of the Cardinal could be settled. All pending questions could be settled by direct negotiations, even the question of claims, if approached within the framework of the general problem of commercial and economic relations between the US and Hungary. Mr. Mod said he felt it necessary for the US and Hungary to sit down and talk over the claims problem. As to diplomatic relations, Mr. Mod noted that the US must surely be aware that all its allies in Western Europe were raising their missions in Budapest to the level of embassies. It seemed to him, said Mr. Mod, that the US was not in accord with the general diplomatic situation in Budapest, because the diplomatic establishment maintained by the US was of third rank, being headed not by an Ambassador or Minister but by a charge. In conclusion, Mr. Mod doubted that this situation was very satisfactory even for the US.
Governor Harriman pointed out that the US had its own special problems with Hungary, some of which he had just mentioned. Additionally, in its relations with Hungary the US had historically been influenced by the especially friendly feelings of the American people for the Hungarian people. So many Hungarians had emigrated to the US, there was perhaps a more personal feeling for the welfare of the Hungarian people in the US than in other Western countries for historical and other reasons. The first problem that had to be solved, Governor Harriman said, was the normalization of US-Hungarian relations. The raising of the US Legation in Budapest to an Embassy must remain a matter for future developments. Governor Harriman pointed out that the US had legations in Bulgaria and Rumania, and embassies in Poland and Czechoslovakia. US relations with Poland had improved steadily, and the US has done a great deal for Poland, particularly with regard to supplying food. It was necessary only to refer to the case of Poland to understand how relations between the other Eastern European governments could be developed with the US, if those countries were of a mind to do so. To develop such a relationship required give, as well as take, on the part of the Hungarian Government. The US was glad to note the prog-ress that Hungary had made, continued Governor Harriman, but further steps still needed to be taken by that Government. The US was certainly interested in contributing to the improvement of US-Hungarian relations, and Governor Harriman added that he was very glad for the opportunity to talk over the matter of relations with Mr. Mod. Mr. Mod added that Hungary, too, was interested in better relations and was prepared to discuss the subject.
Mr. Vedeler said that the basic points on which the US feels improvement of relations with Hungary depends were still those outlined to charge Radvanyi on October 20, 1962 by Deputy Assistant Secretary Davis. Both in Budapest and Washington, discussions between the two Governments on this subject had followed the outlines of the October 20 discussion. These points were embodied in a ``talking paper", a copy of which was informally provided Mr. Radvanyi at the time of that discussion.
Governor Harriman asked Mr. Mod if there had been anything in the recent UNGA Session which had seemed of special importance to Mr. Mod at the time. Mr. Mod answered that the most important fact was the absence of the Hungarian question from the agenda of the 18th GA session. Governor Harriman said that Mr. Mod had undoubtedly noticed the US position on that question, and the fact that the US has decided to move ahead. He added that he thought Mr. Mod should tell the Foreign Ministry why the US asked more of Hungary. The American people had strong feelings for the Hungarian people. America was made up of people from all countries in East and West Europe. As Ambassador to Moscow during World War II, Governor Harriman said he had addressed himself more to the subject of the future status of Poland than to any other subject: Poland was a symbol to the American people. The US also had special feelings for the people of Hungary, which reflected the way the US people felt towards US relations with Eastern Europe.
Mr. Mod said that the Hungarian Government knew the obstacles in the way of bettering relations, and he thought that these obstacles were now largely removed.
Governor Harriman mentioned that US relations with Yugoslavia were of a special nature, a fact stemming basically from Yugoslavia's independence of outside domination. Ever since the time of President Wilson, the US had been particularly strong for the self-determination and independence of peoples from outside domination. It appeared to be a policy on the part of the Kremlin to favor more self-determination in Eastern Europe. On this question Chairman Khrushchev had recently said that when the child grows, he becomes harder to control. President Kennedy in his speech at American University on June 10, 1963,/5/ had very important things to say on this subject. Chairman Khrushchev has called it the best speech since the time of President Roosevelt. The speech had been very fundamental, and very frank, and Governor Harriman hoped that we would go down the road to which President Kennedy had pointed at that time. Mr. Mod said he was convinced that this speech had been understood correctly all over the world, and that what he was talking about, namely the improvement of US-Hungarian relations, was in line with that speech.
/5/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 459 - 464.
The meeting then closed. Mr. Mod agreed to Governor Harriman's proposal that the press be informed merely that Mr. Mod had paid a courtesy call, and discussions of mutual interest which had been broached at the time of President Kennedy's funeral were continued during this second meeting.
29. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 25 - 3 Bul. Limited Official Use. Drafted by White on December 31.
Washington, December 27, 1963.
SUBJECT
Protest Against Mob Attack on US Legation in Sofia/1/
/1/At about 11 a.m. Sofia time on December 27, a crowd of about 3,000 persons protesting alleged U.S. involvement with an accused Bulgarian ``spy" demonstrated at the U.S. Legation, breaking windows and overturning a number of automobiles. The Legation immediately protested the lack of police protection to the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry.
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
EUR--Mr. Richard H. Davis, Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
EE--Mr. Merrill A. White, Bulgarian Desk Officer
Bulgarian
Lyubomir Popov, Minister, Bulgarian Embassy
Mr. Davis opened the conversation saying he imagined Minister Popov knew, either from his own sources or from the radio, what the subject was to be. Mr. Davis continued saying he was under instructions to protest strongly the mob attack on our Legation in Sofia and the failure to provide prompt and adequate police protection. We hold the Bulgarian Government fully responsible and will expect either restoration or compensation for the damaged property, both government and privately-owned. Mr. Davis mentioned he was also surprised at the delay in bringing up militia reinforcements, particularly since he understood that the militiaman at the entrance to the Legation had a telephone at his disposal.
Continuing, Mr. Davis said that we expect the Bulgarian authorities will take immediate and effective action to assure the safety of the lives of official American personnel and the security of US property. We object also to the fact there was nearly a six-hour delay in the arrangement of an appointment for our charge to see an appropriate official of the Foreign Office./2/ We expect that Minister Popov will communicate this protest to his Government as quickly as possible.
/2/After meeting with lower level Foreign Office officials on December 27, charge Richard Johnson conveyed an oral protest over the incident to Foreign Minister Chernev on December 28. Johnson reported on their meeting in telegram 395 from Sofia, December 28. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 25 - 3 Bul)
Mr. Davis also reminded Minister Popov of the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Resumption of Diplomatic Relations signed by Minister Popov's predecessor, Dr. Voutov, and read a portion of this memorandum:
``. . . members of the staffs of the diplomatic missions of each country who are nationals of the sending country shall enjoy in the territory of the other the privileges and immunities derived from generally recognized international law and practice."/3/
/3/Ellipsis in the source text.
Mr. Davis concluded saying that such occurrences could only have damaging effects on US-Bulgarian relations. Minister Popov briefly replied saying he had been informed that the demonstration was spontaneous and had been brought under control as soon as the Bulgarian authorities were aware of it. He said the occurrence was unfortunate and that he had every wish to keep our relations moving forward. When he again described the demonstration as spontaneous, Mr. Davis reminded him that he had used no adjective to modify the word demonstration. Apparently very anxious to leave a rather embarrassing subject, Minister Popov concluded saying that he would relay our protest immediately to his Government. Before leaving, Minister Popov then asked a technical question concerning the MFN provision in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963.
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