Docs 189-246
189. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10 - 1661. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved by the White House on November 2. The meeting was held at the White House. In February 1961, the Finnish Government indicated its desire for a Kekkonen visit to the United States to coincide with an already planned visit to Canada. (Memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Seppala, February 23; ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) Ambassador Gufler presented an invitation to Kekkonen on April 15.
Washington, October 16, 1961, 3:30 p.m.
PARTICIPANTS
The United States
The President
The Secretary of State
Bernard A. Gufler, Ambassador to Finland
Arthur Schlesinger, Spec. Asst. to Pres.
Wm. R. Tyler, Act. Asst. Sec., EUR
Finland
President Urho Kekkonen
Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen
Richard R. Seppala, Ambassador of Finland
Max Jakobson, Chief of the Press Bureau
The Secretary of State opened the meeting by outlining the Berlin problem as it stands today. He said that while there had been talks with Gromyko there was as yet no blue sky to be seen. Khrushchev was continuing to call into question our vital interests on which we could not yield. The Secretary said that if Khrushchev were to continue to press on these vital points, then we were all in for trouble.
President Kekkonen said he had the opportunity of hearing Soviet views on Berlin since January 1959, when he talked with Khrushchev. Since then, he said, he had met Khrushchev again once and had talks with President Brezhnev./1/ He had tried to find some evidence of change in the Soviet attitude, but in vain, which was no surprise to him.
/1/Soviet Premier Khrushchev visited Finland September 2 - 4, 1960, and Kekkonen visited the Soviet Union November 21 - 24, 1960.
The Secretary said there had been some clarification on two procedural, not substantive, points: (a) the Soviets had indicated they were prepared to consider a four-power agreement on access which would not require negotiations with the GDR; (b) they had said there was no ``fatal" date for signing a peace treaty.
President Kekkonen said that Brezhnev had also told him that the Soviets were not prisoners of their own timetable, if there were to be real negotiations which were not merely a pretext for further delay. President Kekkonen said he had the impression that the Western Powers have not taken the Berlin problem as seriously as they should have since 1959, because Khrushchev had given up his first six-month ultimatum. He said that West Berlin, as such, was not of great importance, but that it was the German question as a whole which was involved. He said he had gained the strong impression, from what Brezhnev said about the Germans, that the Soviets in fact do fear Germany very much, though they don't use the word ``fear", and that they are apprehensive about the Germans unleashing another war.
President Kennedy, who joined the conversation at this point, summarized the importance of the German question for the West. He said we had done all we could to integrate the Federal Republic into the rest of Europe, and whatever the outcome of the present crisis, Germany's ties to the West must not be impaired. On no account should West Germany be neutralized. Thus, said the President, West Berlin was not the sole issue.
President Kekkonen said it was easy for Finland to understand the US point of view in this matter. If the West were to give up its position in West Berlin, the result, in so far as Germany was concerned, might well be along the lines mentioned by President Kennedy. He said he had tried to find out from Brezhnev what advantage a separate peace treaty held for the Soviet Union, in view of the fact that it was not possible for it to apply to the whole of Germany. Brezhnev said that one could not be sure, but that he thought there was a 50% to 60% chance that after a separate peace treaty had been concluded, conditions would be clarified in such a way as to lead toward the consolidation of Germany. President Kekkonen had then pointed out that the West considered access to Berlin vitally important. Brezhnev had said that the Soviet Union was prepared to guarantee access but that the Ulbricht regime would have to be associated with such a guarantee, since the GDR was a sovereign state.
The President pointed out the very great difficulties that lay in the way of recognizing or dealing with the GDR, due to the fact that the Germans would then feel that the prospects of reunification had been fatally impaired. He said our hope was that it might be possible to reach an agreement with the Soviets under which our rights would be unimpaired.
President Kekkonen referred to the difficulties of relations with Eastern Europe. He recalled that President Eisenhower, at the start of his administration, had spoken of liberation of Eastern European countries. However, Germany could not be reunified by force.
President Kennedy said we could not recognize the GDR. To do so would provoke a very strong adverse German reaction. This could be seen from the effect of the creation of the wall in Berlin on German opinion. He said we did not want a revival of nationalism in Germany. Germany should not be allowed to become isolated, for this would lead to the destruction of freedom in Europe. He said he hoped that the Soviets would be prepared to reserve our rights to access in any agreement, otherwise there might be war.
President Kekkonen said the Soviets always use the argument that the West doesn't really want the reunification of Germany. President Kennedy said this might be largely true in the case of individual countries, but that it was not the point. He said that Germany was now divided, and that this was a fact. The Soviets were taking an unnecessary risk in trying to force us to associate ourselves formally with them in proclaiming this. To do so would bring about the end of NATO and of the European Community, and this would mean the end of freedom in Europe. We were of the opinion that a strong Europe was of great help to Finland and that if the West collapsed this would be very harmful to Finland's own interests.
President Kekkonen said he had been passing on to the President what he had been told from the Soviet side because he thought this would be of interest to us. Brezhnev had told him at the conclusion of their talk that when the Soviets had signed a peace treaty with the GDR, the Allies would have to reach an agreement with Ulbricht, otherwise, should they try to pass, the Soviets would shoot down their planes as they did the U - 2.
President Kennedy said we had every intention of upholding our rights. If the Soviets were to follow the course just described, this would mean war. This issue was not like the Laotian problem, for example. It was at the heart of our vital interests, and we could not give way, for if we did, Europe would be gone.
President Kekkonen noted that both sides had remained exactly on the positions they had taken at the start, and that there had been no move forward by either side.
President Kennedy referred to his talk with Gromyko,/2/ who had used the phrase ``respect of the sovereignty of the GDR." He had not defined this further, but this should be looked into to see what it meant. The wall in Berlin had worked to the advantage of the GDR since it had put an end to the flow of refugees. What was needed now was some leadership from the West Germans. This should come from the new government which they were about to form, so that the Germans should themselves accept and share the responsibility of new terms for an agreement, without being able to claim that they had been let down by their Allies.
/2/For the memorandum of the President's conversation with Gromyko on October 6, see vol. XIV, pp. 468 - 480.
President Kekkonen said that time was short. He referred to a maxim by Clausewitz to the effect that when there is an issue between one power and a group of Allies, the single power has the advantage because it can decide by itself which concessions it is prepared to make.
President Kennedy said we were not prepared to grant concessions, in return for which we would merely be given that which we already enjoy, i.e., our rights. Otherwise we would be giving away such things as the Oder - Neisse territories, and the ties of the West with Berlin; and then Soviet pressures would start all over again. This would not be a bargain. As the Secretary of State had said to Gromyko, we would be buying the same horse twice. The problem was a difficult one because of the peculiarities of the location of Berlin, but we had to stay there and we hoped the Russians knew it.
President Kekkonen said that a foreign newspaperman, who had interviewed him, had blamed him for Khrushchev having become more recalcitrant. He added that, as an outsider, he thought the situation was a terribly difficult one. The question was how could progress be made.
President Kennedy said that if the Soviet Union would agree to take steps which would improve our rights, we would see on what points we could meet them. He hoped that the Soviets would see this and would agree to reserving Allied rights under any new peace treaty they signed instead of turning them over to Ulbricht. President Kekkonen observed that the Soviets could not fail to go ahead and sign a peace treaty. President Kennedy agreed, but said the point was whether the Soviets would reserve our rights in so doing.
President Kekkonen said the Soviets frequently defend their position in terms of international law, referring to the sovereign right of nations and to the precedent of the peace treaty with Japan.
President Kennedy refuted both arguments, saying that the Soviets had no right to give parts of Germany sovereignty. With regard to Japan, the case was entirely different. Japan was not divided and had its own government. If Germany and Japan were to be overrun, the road would lie open to the Soviets and this we could not permit.
President Kekkonen said he felt he was in an awkward position because he had been relating what he had heard the Soviets say and it might be thought that this represented his own views, which was not the case. President Kennedy reassured him. He added that he wished to stress the necessity of the United States meeting its commitments, otherwise it would mean the destruction of NATO and create a dangerous situation for the whole Free World.
President Kekkonen said it was interesting that the United States also believes that the Soviet Union will in any case sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR. The question was: What happens afterwards?
Turning to the subject of Soviet resumption of nuclear testing, President Kekkonen said he had told Brezhnev of the bad effect throughout the world which this had created, and had asked him why the Soviet Union had resumed tests. Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union knew that this was an unpopular thing to do but that it had been considered necessary, and that 30% of the tests (the 13th had just taken place at the time) had now been carried out. President Kekkonen said he had the impression that the resumption of tests had a connection with the German problem. When he had seen him in 1960, Khrushchev seemed self-assured and conscious of Soviet power. President Kekkonen said he had the impression that the Russians suffer from an inferiority complex and feel they are not always treated in a manner appropriate to their power and their importance.
President Kennedy said that in his talks with Khrushchev he had sensed two contradictory feelings and attitudes on his part: first, a feeling of not being quite sure of himself, and, second, a feeling of great superiority. It was difficult to balance these two.
President Kekkonen mentioned that the Soviets had been at pain to impress Finnish politicians visiting Russia with the improvement in their conditions of living, and often asked their visitors to see for themselves whether their homes were really as described by the West.
President Kennedy asked President Kekkonen how he saw the future of Finnish relations with the Soviet Union. President Kekkonen said that the economic relationship with the Soviet Union was stable. Exports to, and imports from the Soviet Union were balanced at about 15% of Finland's total trade. This figure had been made possible by a five-year trade agreement.
The President asked what the effect would be on Finland if the UK joined the EEC. President Kekkonen said that Finland had been satisfied by the terms of her relationship to EFTA, but that if the EFTA countries were to join the EEC, this would create a very difficult situation for Finland. The problem appeared to be insoluble--Finland would have to compete with her competitors on intolerable terms. 35% of Finland's exports now go to the Common Market countries. In order to meet the competitive terms of the Common Market, Finland would have to resort to measures which would lower her standard of living.
President Kennedy asked if Finland was in a position where she could sign the Rome treaty now. President Kekkonen did not reply directly, but referred to difficult political conditions. He said the Soviets had not exerted pressures on Finland.
President Kennedy asked whether the Soviet Union was satisfied with the present form of government in Finland or would they prefer a Communist regime. President Kekkonen said he thought the Soviets were satisfied, and that their primary consideration was one of security.
President Kennedy listed the reasons for United States support of the Common Market. He said that it would cost us something in our trade, but would be a stabilizing force for Germany and for Europe if the UK were to join it. He felt sure that the countries involved would recognize the special problems of other countries, for example, Switzerland and Sweden.
President Kekkonen said that there was, of course, a great variety of interests involved, and that Finland would have to look after her own. Finland faced the problem of coming to terms both with the Common Market and with the Soviet Union--``That is our Berlin", he said.
President Kennedy referred to Finland's most-favored-nation agreement with the Soviet Union, which had posed a problem for GATT. He said this would be compounded if the UK joined the Common Market.
President Kekkonen said he hoped the objections which had been formulated to the terms of Finland's agreement with the Soviet Union were more formal than substantial. President Kennedy reiterated the unhappiness which granting MFN treatment to the Soviet Union had created in the United States and said he hoped President Kekkonen would make use of this in resisting any attempts at encroachment by the Soviet Union.
Turning to the conduct by the Soviet Union of atmospheric nuclear tests, President Kennedy said that it was obvious that they had been preparing them over many months, during which conversations had been going on in Geneva, between the West and the Soviet Union. Being a free society, it was not possible for us to test without inspection, whereas the Soviet Union could. We now faced the situation where the Soviet Union might complete their current series of tests and then call for an unpoliced moratorium on all tests. The President said that the requirements of our security determined that we could not accept this, nor would we go back again to negotiations under a self-imposed ban on testing.
President Kekkonen described Finland's position today as a happy one compared with what it was in 1944. He referred to the agreement reached at Yalta that countries that were neighbors of the Soviet Union should have governments friendly to the Soviet Union.
President Kennedy recalled the Soviet pressures on Finland in 1958, which the Finns referred to as ``frosty night". He asked what the pressures were which the Soviets had applied and what caused them to raise these pressures.
President Kekkonen said that during his visit to Leningrad in 1959 he had asked Khrushchev the same question. Khrushchev had said that Finland and the Soviet Union had a common border of 1300 kilometers and thus there was a substantial element of security in their relationship. Khrushchev had said that certain members of the then Finnish Government had been doing things which impaired this element of security. President Kekkonen said that Finland had complete freedom to decide what government it should have, and that the Soviet Union had made no demands on Finland. However, Finland must take the Soviet position and attitude into account even when she disagrees with the Soviet Union. This was a difficult position for Finland, which, before 1940, had always been fully armed to defend itself against the Soviet Union.
President Kennedy inquired what methods the Soviet Union had used to express its displeasure with Finland.
President Kekkonen said that they had recalled the Soviet Ambassador, who had left without saying ``good-bye" to the President. Also they had caused trade difficulties. While Finland could have gone on this basis for some months, this would merely have made matters worse economically. Finland's internal political problems were inevitably related to foreign policy considerations.
President Kennedy asked how President Kekkonen saw the evolution of Communist policies in the next decade.
President Kekkonen said that he thought in 30 years time, the capitalist system would gradually be transformed by various modifications and restrictions, and that the Communist system would be progressively liberalized, to a point where both systems would be so close to each other that it would be difficult to know what to quarrel about.
President Kennedy observed that the problem was how to survive until then. He said he thought that we had witnessed an increasing strength of nationalist sentiment since 1945 and that this would prevent a major change in balance of power in the world, if we could prevent problems of the Berlin type from exploding. He said that Central Europe was a vital area, and that the Soviet Union should not push us too hard in such areas.
President Kekkonen said he thought the economic systems of East and West were getting closer to each other but that Soviet support and exploitation of nationalist sentiment in areas such as Africa had the effect of increasing Soviet political strength.
President Kennedy said he felt it was important to support and encourage national sentiment in Africa, even though this occasionally brought us into conflict with some of our European Allies.
President Kekkonen said that so long as countries like South Africa and Portugal pursue their present policies, this conferred a great advantage on the Soviet Union.
President Kennedy said that the problem was a very difficult one. For example, the Azores Base Agreement, which was coming up for renegotiation soon, was of very great importance to the United States, and this had to be borne in mind with regard to Portugal.
President Kekkonen said that Egypt herself would not be able to do as much for the Soviet cause in Africa as does Angola. He had become aware during the war how strongly United States policy had worked against colonialism, and he thought this was a wise policy.
President Kennedy said he felt it was important that the Soviet Union should distinguish between areas of secondary importance and those of primary importance. Even though Finland has problems, he hopes that she would realize that the object of United States policy with regard to Berlin was to keep Europe free, and that although Finland could not herself do much about it, she could understand that her fate was bound up with the outcome of the issue.
President Kekkonen said that Finland had a special position with regard to the Berlin problem. The Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Aid of 1948/3/ contains a clause whereby Finland was committed to accept Soviet aid, if necessary, in order to repel any attack directed against the Soviet Union across Finnish territory, from Germany or from any powers allied with Germany.
/3/For text of this treaty, see 48 UNTS 149.
President Kennedy pointed out this clause was not relevant to the situation with regard to Berlin.
President Kekkonen agreed, but said that, as in the field of trade, we did not want to ``anticipate events" (as rendered by the interpreter--in the context the probable meaning is ``provoke" rather than ``anticipate"). He said that it was an interesting political situation.
President Kennedy said that the risks and the dangers were equal for all. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were in very great danger. Finland could perhaps be said to be in less danger than we were.
President Kekkonen said that in 1939 the Soviets had asked for a strip of territory in East Finland in order to safeguard the security of Leningrad. This showed the Soviet Union's concern for its security. He said that both great powers carried enormous responsibility and that he prayed for success of the efforts to find a solution.
The President outlined the various steps which the United States has taken in order to create conditions of peace in the world. However, in areas which were of vital interest to the freedom of the West and the security of the United States, our stake must be recognized by the Soviet Union.
President Kekkonen observed that it was a great pity that the problem of Berlin had been created at the end of the war. Otherwise, he said, the possibilities of stabilization of the situation in Europe would have been greater.
President Kennedy agreed and said that the circumstances of access to Berlin posed considerable difficulties.
President Kekkonen said that the Soviets have declared their plans openly and have committed themselves to them.
President Kennedy said that it was perfectly possible for the Soviets to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR which would meet their commitment and would reserve our rights. Khrushchev could do this if he wanted to.
President Kekkonen said that possibly one way out would be for the United Nations to play a role in the solution. He had mentioned this to Brezhnev, who had agreed.
President Kennedy said that when the wall had been built in Berlin, we had not interfered because we recognized that this was a matter of vital Soviet interest. The Soviets had the power, if they so wished, to sign a separate peace treaty, and to limit their objectives. He agreed that certain United Nations offices could be set up in West Berlin, if this would help to bring about a solution, but that we would not accept Soviet troops.
President Kekkonen said that Brezhnev had used the phrase: ``If the West have ingenious proposals, the Soviet Union would always be prepared to consider them".
President Kennedy said we were fully conscious of the danger of the situation and were anxious to find a solution.
President Kekkonen said there was at least some hope in the fact that the Soviets had stressed that they were not prisoners of time.
President Kennedy said he hoped that Khrushchev was sufficiently interested in the race of production with the United States, which we thought we would win in spite of his claim, to give us all the time in which to decide the outcome. President Kennedy then asked if there was anything which President Kekkonen thought the United States could do to help Finland.
President Kekkonen said there were no concrete issues or proposals between us. He appreciated the sympathy and understanding of the United States. He was going to say in his speech at the Press Club on the following day that it was very flattering to Finland to be front-page news.
President Kennedy said that he knew that trade was a most important field for Finland.
President Kekkonen said that Finland was a capital-hungry country and when Finland accepts credits and loans from others, the Finnish sense of honor requires that these be repaid. As for Finland's internal problems, he would also ask for understanding with regard to them too. Finland's wishes were modest; she was not asking for dollars. She wishes to maintain good relations with the United States and thought that the best way to do this was not to take aid from the United States.
The President raised the point of certain limiting language in the aid bill with regard to investment guarantees and asked whether there was anything we could do to prevent its working against Finland.
Ambassador Seppala then pointed out that the agreement with Finland involving investment guarantees had been signed just before the amendment to the bill had been introduced.
The President said we would look into the possibility of working something out on this point.
President Kekkonen said that Finland was considering floating a $10,000,000 bond issue in New York. He said that Finland also had plans to increase the capacity of her wood industry by at least 40% and that this project was being financed largely by Finnish capital. Finland was also receiving some supplementary credits from the World Bank to the extent of $25,000,000.
President Kennedy turned once again to the question of why President Kekkonen thought the Soviets had not used pressure to overthrow a free society in Finland on their own border when they have repeatedly gone to such efforts and such lengths to expand throughout the world.
President Kekkonen said he was convinced that for the Soviets the decisive factor was their security interest. So long as the Soviet Union was satisfied that there was no danger from, or through, Finland, the relationship between the two countries would be stable. However, as soon as the Soviets felt that they might be threatened from that quarter, they reacted.
President Kennedy observed that with regard to Finland, the Soviets seemed to be following a purely nationalist rather than ideological line.
President Kekkonen said that the case of Finland was a special one which Finland herself could not always understand. Ideological factors did not play a major role. For example, the Soviets ignore the Finnish Communist Party and treat it contemptuously. Certain Finnish Communist leaders had recently gone to the Soviet Union and had talks with Suslov which had not gone well, and had made them very unhappy.
In conclusion, President Kekkonen expressed his appreciation of this opportunity for a talk with President Kennedy, who told him he was looking forward to seeing him again on the following afternoon./4/
The meeting adjourned at 5:45 p.m.
/4/Presidents Kennedy and Kekkonen met privately at the White House at 5:10 p.m. on October 17 for cocktails prior to a formal State dinner hosted by President Kekkonen at the Finnish Embassy. No record of this meeting has been found. For text of the joint communique following their meetings, see Department of State Bulletin, November 6, 1961, p. 761.
190. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11 - 161. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Moscow.
Helsinki, November 1, 1961, 6 p.m.
189. Called this morning on Hallama, Acting Secretary General of Foreign Office, who is in effect acting Foreign Minister in absence Karjalainen. (I had tried without success see Hallama yesterday.) Hallama gave me the following information:
Gromyko delivered his note to the Finnish Ambassador in Moscow on Monday, saying it could be released to press Tuesday or Wednesday./1/ Hallama asked that release be postponed until Kekkonen's return, Finnish Ambassador Moscow failed reach Gromyko. Hallama heard quite by chance through Stockholm that Soviets were releasing note Monday night. He had to release information here regarding note at a time when Finnish Foreign Office had only hastily made translation of note.
/1/The text of the Soviet note was forwarded to the Department of State in telegram 182 from Helsinki, October 31. (Ibid., 660E.61/10 - 3161) For text of the U.S. statement on this note, see Department of State Bulletin, November 20, 1961, p. 866.
Hallama has not had time think out implications note but believes it motivated by something more than mere desire accomplishment Soviet aims in Finland. He thinks it part of over-all efforts Soviet Union now making. He notes that except for some criticism of elements in Finland that are not friendly to Soviet Union (this criticism has been made often before and Finns take its inclusion in note lightly) note contains no strictures against Finland or its government and concentrates its main attacks on Germany, its NATO Allies with special attention to Scandinavia. Hallama does not think that Soviets now mean to push for an occupation of Finland or even for bases in Finland. He thinks that if something drastic with regard Finland had been intended it would have been done suddenly when note was presented and points out that note sets no deadline.
Hallama thinks Finland should go slowly and play for time while showing enough activity to give Soviets feeling that matter not being taken lightly. He advised President Kekkonen by telephone not to return immediately but to carry on planned program./2/ In Hallama's opinion speeding up of return of Foreign Minister, who will arrive Helsinki five this afternoon, is enough evidence for Soviets feel Finland taking matter seriously. Hallama added that he met yesterday with Cabinet to present translation of text not then available and that matter is being reported today to Parliamentary committees.
/2/Kekkonen was in Los Angeles, the final stop on his visit to the United States.
Hallama is convinced that Finland cannot refuse invitation enter into conversations with Soviets or it must do so within framework of "policy of friendliness". He added that when 1948 Treaty was concluded President Passikivi had said that Article Two would present difficulties of interpretation that would cause problems if consultation were ever demanded. Hallama believes however that accepting invitation consult does not constitute automatic admission contentions of Soviet note. Finns will insist that their territory is not menaced and that Soviet Union is not menaced through Finnish territory. They cannot however deny that war tension exists elsewhere.
Hallama will advise President not to go with Finnish delegation to Moscow but to send Foreign Minister and not to include any military men in delegation. Hallama believes that President should at least ini-tially in no way enter directly into negotiations.
Finland has been in consultation with other Nordic States and has asked them in their reactions to the Soviet contentions, which it hoped would be prompt and to the point, not to say anything with regard to Finland until Finnish Government had itself made public statement. Hallama expressed gratification with cooperation received this matter. He made particular mention of excellent statement by Swedish Government.
Finland realizes that it will have to handle its problem with Soviet Union alone and can hope for sympathy but cannot count on material assistance from outside.
Gufler
191. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11 - 161. Secret. Drafted by Christensen.
Washington, November 1, 1961.
SUBJECT
The Finnish Situation
PARTICIPANTS
Mr. T. Brimelow, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. J. B. Denson, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. W. C. Burdett, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. M. C. Rewinkel, Acting Director, BNA
Mr. K. Christensen, Officer in Charge, Northern Europe, BNA
Mr. Brimelow called at his own request. He presented a paper on contingency planning on Finland,/1/ but said that he had come primarily to discuss the Finnish situation. Mr. Burdett gave him the substance of Deptel 2384 to London,/2/ and in addition stated that we were sending a message to Paris about a possible NATO response to the allegations made by the Soviets in their note to the Finns./3/
/1/Not found.
/2/Telegram 2384, October 13, provided the Department of State's analysis that the Soviet note was part of a wider campaign of psychological pressure and outlined U.S. plans for a political and propaganda response. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10 - 1361)
/3/In Topol 669 to Paris, November 1, the Department of State outlined its proposal for NATO action to counter the Soviet propaganda offensive, stressing its view that Finland should not be specifically mentioned. (Ibid., 375/11 - 161)
Emphasizing that he was speaking personally, Mr. Brimelow said he gives some credence to reported leaks through Poland to the effect that the Soviets intend to stage a series of crises. He suggested that the Soviets are endeavoring to orchestrate increasing tension, one element of which is to demonstrate a stronger conventional war posture by making troop movements through satellites. He considers this important, and said that the Soviets may wish to move troops into Finland as part of this effort which is designed to bring about negotiations on Berlin. Continuing in this vein, Mr. Brimelow suggested that the Soviet note to Finland plays on Scandinavian nerves already frayed by fallout fears, and takes into account lingering Scandinavian doubts and worries regarding Germans. Mr. Brimelow suggested that even though Finland may not agree on the alleged threat from the West, the Russians would say that nevertheless they (the Soviets) consider the threat real and accordingly need certain facilities in Finland. (Mr. Brimelow was inclined to think, however, that the Soviets have not made up their minds on how far to go.) Mr. Brimelow suggested that Khrushchev could reason that, in order to establish the credibility of his own deterrent vis-a-vis the build up of Western conventional forces, he could not leave Leningrad undefended. Thus, if one considers there may not be a nuclear war, it would make sense for Khrushchev, in further orchestration of tension, to move troops into Finland. Soviet emphasis on West German militarization, continued Mr. Brimelow, illustrates that the rearmament of the FRG is taken seriously by the Soviets.
Mr. Brimelow suggested that the Soviets may wish to do more than use the Note to the Finns for propaganda purposes. The Note, he believes, may be part of a Soviet build up of tension in the crisis on Berlin, and the Soviets probably feel that in this area they can go far with little danger to themselves. Soviet concern with a German threat may, Mr. Brimelow continued, be emphasized through actions in Finland in order that the Scandinavians will see that pressure on them, including Finland, can be relieved by negotiations on Berlin. The Scandinavians will thus be induced to place increased urgency on negotiations.
In conclusion, Mr. Brimelow indicated that Prime Minister Macmillan has had a longstanding personal interest in Finland.
192. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11 - 361. Confidential. Repeated to Stockholm, Oslo, Copenhagen, Moscow, London, Paris, and Bonn.
Helsinki, November 3, 1961, 3 p.m.
205. Called on Foreign Minister this morning. He thanked me most cordially for warm reception and pleasant hospitality he and President had enjoyed in US. With reference to situation created by Soviet note, he made following remarks:
The Soviet note came as great shock but as more shock than surprise as Finns have feared some Soviet action of this sort./1/
/1/In telegram 207 from Helsinki, November 3, Gufler elaborated on this point, stating that the Finns had feared Soviet invocation of the 1948 treaty ever since the heightening of tensions over Berlin. (Ibid.)
The Finn Government will take several days to formulate its reply to Soviet note. It will have to enter into some sort of discussions with Soviets but does not yet know exactly within what framework these will be conducted.
The Finn Government has no idea at the moment what Soviets intend to demand from it.
Finland does not feel it is menaced by NATO and does not accept the premises of Soviet note. It does not feel it is militarily menaced by West Germany either, but the ``German problem has angles that must be considered in the light of history". The Germans are an active people and there have after all been two world wars.
He talked last night with the President,/2/ who is keeping cool and optimistic. He hopes that President's optimism will be justified. As all observers can see, the Finns are keeping cool and have genuine hope that they can arrive at satisfactory solution.
/2/Gufler Kekkonen was in Los Angeles until November 2 when he returned to Finland.
I remarked that, as he could see from reception Finnish party received in America, the American people have a very genuine liking for Finland and wish it well and that the US wants nothing from Finland but a genuine maintenance of its neutrality. In reply to this remark, he sighed and said with real feeling, ``that is exactly what we want to maintain".
Gufler
193. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11 - 661. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department.
Helsinki, November 6, 1961, 10 p.m.
221. Source mentioned preceding telegram numbered 218/1/ today gave me following information:
/1/In telegram 218, Gufler reported that Hallama had inquired about reported U.S. diplomatic consultations with other Scandinavian states regarding action to take in response to the Soviet note. (Ibid.)
Final decision had not been taken as to how GOF will reply to Soviet note, whether by written note or orally through diplomatic channel. Decision will be taken tomorrow. He favors reply by note. Present draft note is short, does not mention Germany, or acknowledge validity Soviet contentions. He hopes that draft will be accepted and that reply will be by note which can be published and will record Finnish Government's position for benefit other countries and especially of Finnish public. Published note advisable in view rumors to effect that there have been some secret exchanges that are not known to public. If reply is made orally through diplomatic channel, these rumors will tend find even more credence than at present.
Finns under no condition refuse to talk but will send to Moscow only small delegation headed by Foreign Minister and consisting entirely of civilians.
With regard to source's statement that no mention of East Germany would be made in note, I remarked that, speaking without instructions and entirely on a basis of personal opinion, I had wondered why reference to West German rearmament and statement this ``cause for worry on Finland's part" had been made in President's television speech. That seemed rather inconsistent with other statement in this speech that NATO is founded on defensive intents. My informant said he could tell me in very greatest confidence that this reference had been added as an afterthought to speech almost at last minute before it was delivered.
When taking leave I emphasized that my remarks had been merely personal. He stated that his remarks are equally personal and expressed hope I would not communicate anything we had talked about to anyone else in Helsinki, adding that too many people were running around town repeating things and contributing to increased tensions in atmosphere.
It most important that this source be protected.
Gufler
194. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11 - 1661. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to Oslo, Stockholm, Bonn, London, Paris, and Moscow.
Helsinki, November 16, 1961, midnight.
246. Reference: Embtel 244./1/ Helsinki has been full today and yesterday of rumor and conjecture regarding circumstance surrounding announcement Parliamentary elections. Some persons have contended that main initial purpose Soviet action initiated by October 30 note was to insure re-election Kekkonen and taken for granted that arrangements had been made by him with Soviets before he announced elections. This belief found some support attitude local communist leaders and press who immediately express approval elections, probably for primarily tactical effect locally.
/1/Telegram 244, November 16, reported that the situation with regard to Germany and Berlin seemed to be worse. (Ibid.)
Other persons have thought that elections were clever move that would gain time for Finnish Government and have felt that Soviets had enough faith in Kekkonen to approve his action or at least let him appear get away with move.
Wishful thinking has prevented most from facing possibility that Finland might be on way to satellite status though some have expressed such fears.
Until Wuori arrives and reports, no one here can know for sure precisely what Soviets intend or how far and how fast they mean to go. I believe, however, it unlikely that Kekkonen had advance agreement from Soviets for Parliamentary elections. Soviets are notoriously and from their point view rightly distrustful such unpredictable things as free and uncontrolled elections.
Intention behind Soviet action may have included some small element of desire to help re-election Kekkonen, though that difficult believe in view circumstance his re-election considered almost certain. Main intention must be draw Finland closer into Soviet orbit. It hard to see how this process can be begun without being carried on at accelerating speed. Finnish efforts slow or stop process by holding Parliamentary elections may have been futile and to Soviets provocatory action that may be all more irritating to them because it undertaken by person hitherto regarded as inclined take "realistic and understanding view" their attitudes and wishes.
Since Soviet note became known Finnish public on morning October 31 sentiment has swung from deepest depression and conviction that "1939 is here again" to hopes that somehow Kekkonen would save the situation. Reports that Soviets dissatisfied his action and attitudes will send Finnish morale plummeting to bottom.
With borders undefensible by comparison with 1939 and an inadequate military establishment, all Finns convinced there can be no question of repetition of 1939 resistance. All Finns subscribe to Paasikivi line. If this proves insufficient satisfy Soviets, there is in reality nothing for the Finns to do except realize that degree of independence, if any, that Finland will be able maintain depends entirely on the Russians and not on anything they or the most skillful of Finnish leaders can do.
Gufler
195. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11 - 1761. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Moscow.
Helsinki, November 17, 1961, 3 p.m.
248. Saw Hallama this morning. Substance his remarks as follows:
He was greatly disturbed by circumstance that Finnish Embassy Moscow leaked to press news of Wuori's call on Kuznetsov (Embassy's telegram 245)/1/ and that information about call had become known to public with bad results even before it reached Finnish Government. Reading from Moscow's telegraphic report he confirmed information re Kuznetsov remarks given in Embassy telegram 244./2/
/1/Telegram 245, November 16, reported that the Finnish Ambassador had met with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov. (Ibid., 660E.61/11 - 1661)
/2/See footnote 1, Document 194.
He added that Kuznetsov had said that Finnish Delegation must be sent Moscow soon to begin consultations. Wuori asked about meaning of ``soon", at what level the delegation should be and whether it should include military members. Kuznetsov replied that Finnish Government should determine how soon it could send delegation and whether delegation should include military. Without specifying level delegation, Kuznetsov left impression it should be headed by Foreign Minister.
Wuori asked if public report about call would be issued. Kuzne-tsov replied that up to Finnish./3/
/3/A Finnish communique detailing talks with the Soviets was released on November 17. The text of the communique was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 251 from Helsinki, November 17. (Department of State, Central Files, 760E.00/11 - 1761)
President and Foreign Minister both deeply shocked by latest Soviet action. President apparently fears that calling of elections done too hastily. He had apparently already decided before Soviet note do some such thing and grasped at this already prepared action as possibly beneficial in situation created by note.
Soviets had not given advance commitment to calling elections. Only discussion elections in Gromyko - Karjalainen conversations had been following: Karjalainen had said Finnish Government could give guarantee it would maintain present foreign policy up to time of elections. Gromyko had remarked with two elections coming up in Finland, one probably as late as next summer, Soviet Government felt that it was being asked to wait too long for definitive guarantee. Gromyko indicated in no way any desire, however, for speeding up elections.
Hallama feels latest Soviet action should disprove unfair rumors that have had wide circulation particularly in Helsinki that Kekkonen in any way leagued with Soviets or tied to them by some secret agreements. He believes that it is high time for other parties to rally around Kekkonen and for Honka to withdraw his Presidential candidacy.
Finns are faced with disturbing puzzle presented by enigmatic Soviet statement that ``if proper political guarantees are given" military consultations may [be] avoided. As late as yesterday afternoon Hallama made further unsuccessful efforts obtain definition this term from Za-kharov. Zakharov implied that it was up to Finland to define terms and to offer guarantees which Moscow would define as acceptable or unacceptable only after they are offered.
Please protect source.
Gufler
196. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Finland
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11 - 1761. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Cook; cleared by BNA, SOV, and S/S; and approved by Burdett. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Oslo, Stockholm, and Copenhagen.
Washington, November 17, 1961, 9:59 p.m.
163. Early afternoon Nov 17 Finnish Ambassador contacted Dept to relay request to Secretary he had received by telephone from ForMin Karjalainen. Karjalainen had said he understands we wish to be as helpful to Finland as possible in its current difficulties and is very appreciative this attitude. Karjalainen hoped we would not make any strong statement at this juncture. To do so would complicate Finland's efforts to resolve matters. We told Ambassador we did not contemplate issuing any press statement. Report of Secretary's comments on Finnish situation during Press Conference this afternoon by separate cable./1/
/1/For a transcript of Secretary Rusk's November 17 press conference, see Department of State Bulletin, December 4, 1961, p. 924.
Finnish Ambassador Seppala called at Dept later in afternoon. Stated he had talked to Karjalainen by telephone this morning. Said Karjalainen had sounded cheerful and told him he believed Finnish problem with Soviets could still be settled satisfactorily. Ambassador noted that Karjalainen had not yet spoken to Ambassador Wuori who was returning from Moscow. Finnish Ambassador continued that Karjalainen said it seemed to him that Finnish talks with Soviets would have to continue now. ForMin still felt it would be best for Finland to handle situation alone, and that expressions of support from West might make it more difficult for Finns.
Finnish Ambassador was told US watching situation very closely and we would welcome keeping in close touch with both Ambassador and Finnish Government. Pouching MemCon./2/
Rusk
/2/A memorandum of Seppala's conversation with Tyler is in Department of State, Central Files, 760E.00/11 - 1761.
197. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11 - 1761. Confidential; Priority. Received at 10:46 p.m.
Helsinki, November 17, 1961, 11 p.m.
250. Re Deptel 161 November 16./1/ Hope Embassy telegram 246/2/ will at least partly have met Department's needs. Shall send forward additional thoughts and analysis as situation develops.
/1/Telegram 161, November 16, reported that the Department was ``urgently preparing policy paper on Finland" and requested the Embassy's analysis and recommendations. (Ibid., 660E.61/11 - 1661)
/2/Document 194.
Uncertainties as to how situation likely develop make it difficult for US suggest exactly what lines should at moment be set down in policy paper. Suggest extension of deadline for submission this paper be sought unless interim short paper subject to continuing revision can be submitted as temporary stopgap.
Appreciate request for recommendations. Have only one definite one for immediate action, that is, reasoned and solemn refutation by NATO of charges set forth against it in Soviet note of October 30, for by ``Germany and its allies" NATO is most clearly meant and its hesitation to reply to these charges, dishonest and ill-founded though they be, is regarded here as puzzling and of no assistance to Finland. (Embtel 230, 220, 209, and 190)/3/
/3/Telegram 190, November 1, reported that Hallama had suggested that NATO make a ``reasoned refutation" of the Soviet note of October 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11 - 161) In telegram 209, November 3, the Embassy endorsed the Department's views on NATO action. (Ibid., 375/11 - 361) Telegram 220, November 6, reported that Hallama had again stressed the need for a NATO statement. (Ibid., 660E.61/11 - 661) In telegram 230, November 9, Gufler reported that he had explained to Hallama the reasons for NATO reluctance to make any statement. Hallama replied that he believed that initial Finnish contacts with other Nordic states might explain their reluctance to support a NATO declaration. (Ibid., 660E.61/11 - 961)
We consider idea set forth in Department telegram 144/4/ well worthy of pushing. We realize that to accomplish anything this area without giving away sway Finnish source of suggestion, in view Danish-Norwegian conviction that nothing should be done and illusion that statement not wanted by Finns, presents really difficult diplomatic problem that may be insolvable. We hope though that something can be done, all the more so because other Finns including Diet members have suggested issuance of some statement refuting Soviet charges by France, UK, US and West Germany.
/4/Telegram 144, November 1, was transmitted to Paris as Topol 669; see footnote 3, Document 191.
Only other suggestion we can make that might be feasible is that, in connection with NATO or independently by US and if possible by other Western powers, statements be issued that NATO or separately issuing powers have every intention respect independence of Finland and expect other powers also to do so.
Gufler
198. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11 - 2061. Secret (With Top Secret Attachment). Drafted by Burdett.
Washington, November 20, 1961.
SUBJECT
U.S. Policy Towards Finland
The enclosed paper considers what steps the United States should take alone or in cooperation with friendly governments in the face of current Soviet pressures on Finland./1/ The first and most pressing action recommended is a message from you to President Kekkonen. President Kekkonen is meeting Premier Khrushchev in Novosibirsk on November 24 and will be leaving Helsinki on November 22 or November 23. Therefore the message should be transmitted today, November 20.
/1/The enclosures, the paper entitled ``U.S. Policy Towards Finland," a proposed message to President Kekkonen, and a Top Secret Appendix, are not printed.
The conclusion of our study is that the Finnish-Soviet problem should not be treated as an isolated bilateral matter. If we continue to maintain a hands off position the Soviets are likely to achieve a good portion of their objectives, that is, assuring effective control over Finnish policies; weakening the determination of the Scandinavians to stand up to them; and in general an impairment of free world resolve. Thus we believe it is necessary to accept a confrontation with the Soviets in Finland despite all the advantages the USSR possesses in that area. This would involve a readiness to assist Finland in the political, economic and propaganda spheres. We believe the Soviets are unlikely in the Finnish context alone to resort to military force. We would continually make clear that our only purpose is to help Finland follow its chosen path of neutrality and independence.
The message to President Kekkonen is intended to strengthen his internal fortitude prior to his meeting with Khrushchev. While he has shown himself in our view overly pliable in the past in relations with the USSR, there seems to be no alternative but to place reliance in the first instance upon him.
I recommend that you give general approval to the course of action set forth in the attached paper and specifically that you authorize transmission of the message from you to President Kekkonen.
Dean Rusk/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
199. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Finland
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11 - 2061. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Burdett and cleared by Rusk and Bundy. Repeated to London and Moscow.
Washington, November 20, 1961, 10:07 p.m.
167. Ambassador requested deliver message below from President Kennedy to President Kekkonen soonest. Message should be conveyed orally and written communication not left. Approach should be made inconspicuously. We wish to avoid public knowledge that American Ambassador saw President immediately before his departure to meet Khrushchev. Should press learn of your meeting suggest you say only that you called to obtain President Kekkonen's views. You should agree with Kekkonen beforehand on this line to be followed with press in case of queries or leaks.
``On the eve of your departure for Novosibirsk I am sending you this private message so that you may not be in doubt of the position of the United States. It will receive no publicity whatever in my country, for I am mindful of your desire not to be embarrassed by public comments from others which might be misconstrued as infringements on Finnish neutrality.
In our joint communique of October 16 in Washington I expressed American understanding for Finland's policy of neutrality, our firm intention scrupulously to respect that chosen course, and the necessity for all nations to avoid interference in the affairs of Finland. This remains the basis of the relations between the United States and your country.
You will appreciate that our concern in this matter derives not alone from our great interest in the welfare of your country. My Government, and other Western Governments, have accepted Finnish neutrality in all good faith. We have placed on ourselves a solemn obligation to respect that neutrality at all times and in all ways. In our own national interest we have to expect that in turn Finland will in fact be truly neutral.
I realize the doubts and anxieties which you and the Finnish people are now suffering as the memories of 1939 return to you. However, today peace prevails and we have in the United Nations a forum where the strength of world opinion is brought to bear against the employment of force. Furthermore given the close interrelationship of all elements in the present world situation, the overwhelming deterrent power of the Free World, of which the Soviet Union is well aware, provides all nations assurance against resort to arms.
I want to assure you of the readiness of my country to give Finland our political and economic support. We stand ready to extend commercial and economic assistance in the event of economic pressure against Finland designed to secure political compliance. We are prepared, when opportune, to speak out firmly in behalf of Finland's security and independence. We would be willing to carry to the United Nations actions seeming to threaten your country's independence, depriving you of the right to follow your chosen course of neutrality.
I am sure that the unity of all patriotic Finns, irrespective of party, when their country is threatened is a great source of strength underlying Finland's resolve to determine its own destiny."
Report date, hour of delivery. Further instructions follow on US policy.
Rusk
200. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Finland
Washington, November 21, 1961, 8:38 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11 - 2161. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Burdett and Christensen, cleared by Davis, and approved by Johnson. Also sent to Stockholm, Copenhagen, Oslo, and London and repeated to Moscow, Paris, Bonn, and Ottawa.
171. Addressee action posts requested speak to Foreign Office at high level about Finnish situation on following lines modified at posts' discretion to meet local circumstances.
In US view Soviet objectives in exerting pressures on Finland appear to fall in three general spheres: 1) to assure effective control of major internal Finnish policies and actions; 2) to weaken determination Scandinavian countries stand up to Soviets, in particular to reinforce neutral and pacifist sentiments and to increase anti-German feeling and acceptance of belief that FRG is becoming threat to status quo in Scandinavia; 3) to weaken free world resolve and generate increased pressure for negotiations on Berlin by continuation policy of intimidation.
To accomplish its objectives in Finland Soviets are likely use variety of pressures similar to those applied in 1958 ?Frosty Nights.? /1/ These include propaganda, diplomatic moves, economic pressure, play upon divisions between anti-Soviet political parties and in labor movement, and internal agitation and subversion by Finnish Communist Party. One apparent objective is inclusion Communists in Finnish Government. We doubt Soviets would be prepared to use military force in Finnish context alone.
/1/Reference is to the Soviet policy of cutting back its trade with Finland.
201. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11 - 2161. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 8:45 p.m. and passed to the White House. Also sent to Moscow and London.
Helsinki, November 21, 1961, 9 p.m.
266. Re our telegram 265./1/ Following numbered paragraphs give in summary - quotation remarks made by President Kekkonen, when I delivered President Kennedy's message:
/1/Telegram 265, November 21, reported that Gufler had delivered Kennedy's message to Kekkonen who expressed thanks for ``President Kennedy's thoughtfulness and for the inconspicuous way message delivered." Kekkonen also praised Rusk's November 18 press statement as ``helpful." (Ibid.)
1. I am very grateful for this expression of President Kennedy's consideration. I am also appreciative of fact that this is just between us two because if press were to get wind of your message my position in upcoming talk would be seriously damaged.
2. As I said in my speech Sunday, I will leave with grave thoughts. We Finns are concerned about outcome of talks, but I do not personally believe that situation is as serious as President Kennedy thinks. Perhaps some of the press speculation about Finland's difficulties may have influenced him.
3. All Finn actions taken since receipt of note have had one aim in which so far we have not been successful. We want to avoid military discussions according to Article II of the 1948 treaty, because that would be tantamount to agreeing that threat mentioned in note actually exists. That was why we sent Karjalainen to Moscow. We wanted to have civilian rather than military delegation, for latter would have been construed as tacit admission that threat exists. That was why we decided to dissolve Parliament. I figured that in this way we could gain a 3-month breather. That breather lasted only 2 days. Now only remaining alternative is to send me.
4. I hope that I have necessary arguments to use in my discussions with Khrushchev to convince him that it is in interests of Soviet Union to permit Finland to retain its present position. If I can convince him of this and avoid discussions under treaty, then we will have come out on plus side. Worst would be if Khrushchev were to insist that Commies be put into positions of authority here in Finland. I do not think that this is realistic alternative, but in present situation all sorts of ideas go through one's head.
5. If this were to happen, though, and if my policy were to be shown as unacceptable to Soviet Union, then I will not continue in this position. One of most difficult statements I ever have had to make was one in speech November 5 in which I said that if my policy is demonstrably unsuccessful, then I will resign. I have worked for fifteen years on assumption that my policy is right for Finland. If it develops that I have worked in vain, then I am not going to try to hold onto this job by hook or by crook. I would consider it my duty to resign and leave the area if my policy were to fail.
6. Regarding economic assistance offered by President Kennedy, I am grateful for his consideration, but do not believe that such assistance will in fact be required, because I do not expect any economic pressures.
7. My statement regarding Strauss visit to Norway/2/ was part of effort to create favorable basis for negotiations with Khrushchev. I for my part don't care much what Strauss was doing in Norway, but I said what I did in order to create better atmosphere for talks with the Soviets. Number of statements made in my earlier speeches, if taken out of context, would be unsupportable, but I made them with this same motive of creating favorable atmosphere and basis for discussing matters with Soviets.
/2/West German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss visited Norway November 16 - 17.
8. Actually, you know, there is genuine fear in Soviet Union regarding West Germany. They are afraid that if present development continues West Germany will be so strong that it will be able to do what it wishes without worrying about its allies. This is fear they have, and it is only being realistic to acknowledge its existence.
9. Once again, I appreciate discreet way in which President Kennedy's message has been delivered and am particularly grateful for wisdom and restraint shown by US Government in its attitude toward current crisis. Secretary Rusk's recent statement was most helpful.
10. Please convey to President Kennedy my warm personal thanks for his consideration in sending his message.
With reference President Kekkonen's statement regarding West Germany, I remarked that US had not helped form NATO and re-armed West Germany to support any military adventures by West Germany or anyone else in NATO. I added that West Germany was no longer Germany of Hitler either in size or spirit and that it was contained within framework of its Western alliances. I gave my opinion that Soviets know this and that their expressions of fear represent propaganda rather than reality.
I was impressed by real warmth and sincerity with which President Kekkonen expressed thanks for attitude of President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk.
At first glance President Kekkonen looked normal and reasonably cool. He began conversation in controlled, calm manner. When I looked at him more closely, however, I was struck with deterioration his appearance since I saw him at airport when he returned here on November 3. He had obviously lost weight and his skin looked slightly yellow. He looked drawn and heavily burdened with care. As he unfolded his thoughts, particularly when he referred to possible failure policy for which he has worked fifteen years, he revealed strong undercurrent of emotion and some sense of desperation.
He aroused in both me and Youngquist of our Embassy, who served as interpreter, feeling of sympathy for sorely tried man, who though he has made mistakes, is nevertheless trying to do what he believes is best for his country.
President Kekkonen is apparently going on his mission intent on playing as his only card himself and his past record of dealing with Soviets and their leader. It is to be hoped that things go as he expects but in the light of the rebuffs experienced by Finns within past two weeks it appears more likely that he may encounter situation beyond his control.
Gufler
202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Finland
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11 - 2261. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Cook, Beyer, Christensen, and Rewinkel and approved by Burdett. Also sent to Stockholm, Oslo, and Copenhagen and repeated to London, Moscow, Bonn, and Paris.
Washington, November 22, 1961, 9:09 p.m.
177. Paris for Emb and USRO. Nordic Ambassadors called separately today at Dept. request to discuss Finnish situation. Deputy Under Secretary Johnson spoke along lines Deptel 275 to Stockholm,/1/ informing Ambassadors their Foreign Offices also being approached. Reactions of Ambassadors given below.
/1/Printed as telegram 171 to Helsinki, Document 200.
Swedish Ambassador Jarring's reaction was: a) great care must be exercised in any public statements (as GOS is doing) to avoid prejudicing Finland's position; b) Secy Rusk's press conference statement extremely well balanced and widely appreciated in Scandinavia and Finland; c) GOF already knows it could count on Scandinavian and US support; and d) Swedish thought is to leave further course of action to Finnish judgment.
Norwegian Ambassador Koht noted that authoritative comment GON must come from Oslo. On question possible economic support for Finland not sure Norway could help as in sense their two economies were competing ones. Surely there could be no doubt among Finns they had support of their Scandinavian friends. Norway felt that up to this point GOF had stood up quite firmly to Soviets and GON has had feeling Finns themselves could best handle matter. Ambassador Koht confirmed fact Lange had long talk with Gromyko and also seeing Khrushchev in Moscow Dec. 2. Assumed his Foreign Minister would once again put forth well-known Norwegian views on defensive character of NATO.
Danish Ambassador Knuth-Winterfeldt said although he had not received comments from Copenhagen he thought one Soviet objective in Finnish situation was to hinder NATO developments such as formation Baltic Command by frightening Denmark out of participation. Broader objective was to frighten Scan countries generally into compromise on Berlin problem. Quoted Danish UN PermRep to effect Danish Govt decision would remain firm re Baltic Command despite obvious Soviet effort. As to Finland itself he thought Soviets seeking inclusion Communists in key govt posts for purposes working from within to weaken Finnish neutrality policy. He considered objectives of bases in Finland and Finnish signature eventual GDR peace treaty as lesser possibilities. [1 line of source text not declassified] said would inform his govt re US views and suggestions.
Finnish Ambassador Seppala said Finns aware deep American friendship; nevertheless comfort have specific assurances of friendship and assistance. Said his own assessment situation very similar to Department's. However, Soviet demarche of November 16 following Kekkonen's announcement dissolution Parliament suggested Soviets more interested in military than political matters. Seppala asserted there is no political deterioration in Soviet-Finnish relations, and expressed hope problem could be solved. Said Finnish-Soviet trade was only one of many points on which Soviets could bring pressure, and not necessarily the most important. Stated he would report US views Helsinki.
Rusk
203. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11 - 2261. Secret. Received at 10:58 a.m. on November 23. Repeated to London, Bonn, Paris, Oslo, Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Moscow.
Helsinki, November 22, 1961, 9 p.m.
274. Embassy has endeavored on basis information available in Finland assess motives behind present Soviet action against this country. This action might be result mere desire gain control all or part of Finnish territory or at least establish directing influence over policies of Finland. It may look opportune do so while world preoccupied with Berlin, South Asian and other crises synthetically created by Soviets or raised from minor to major scale by their fostering and under shadow of multi-megaton bombs recently exploded. Cynical way in which Soviets showed contempt worldwide public opinion by this latter act augurs ill for Finland.
In order better understand what may be principal Soviet motive, brief look at past history may be revealing. In 1939 Soviets using opportunity created by their then ally Hitler began to move against former Russian imperial possessions, Baltic states and Finland. Finns alone successfully countered this by ``winter war". Following Finnish defeats this war and ``continuation war" Soviets probably found it inexpedient take over Finland completely as they needed their forces elsewhere. At end winter war they distrusted their ally Hitler. At end continuation war they were able use Finnish army against Germans in northern Finland and free Soviet troops for drive into Germany. In second instance Soviets were probably limited, partly too by circumstance that British and other allied nations were co-belligerents and parties to peace treaty.
That they did not subsequently lose their desire take Finland may be assumed from efforts made 1948 to seize it from within by Communist coup d'etat and by nature their continued support Finnish Communist Party. They may have decided that time is ripe at least begin process making good what they failed do in 1939 and 1948.
Following considerations may also have given Soviets motives for action:
Prior October 30 principal topic in this part of world was how can EFTA members and affiliates, including Finland, and other neutrals work out some method of association with augmented Common Market. As one observer has said success already attained and hope for future was ``making even neutral flags blow westward." This must have created concern in Soviet Union which doubtless fears integrated Western Europe both as economic power and ultimately as military one. Since West is standing firm in Berlin, Soviet-Finnish treaty may have seemed next best available instrument for pressure on West in general and Scandinavia in particular and good point departure for terror operation against member Nordic Community and EFTA affiliate.
Gufler
204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375/11 - 2561. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Christensen and Rewinkel, cleared by RA and EUR, and approved by Burdett. Repeated to Helsinki, Oslo, Copenhagen, Stockholm, London, Bonn, and Moscow.
Washington, November 25, 1961, 3 p.m.
Topol 803. Paris also for Emb. References: Topol 800; Polto 700./1/ Ini-tial reading of Kekkonen - Khrushchev communique/2/ (which assume available to posts from press) suggests Kekkonen may have been at least temporarily successful in standing off Soviet demands on Finland for military consultations. However, communique itself leaves threat future military consultations still hanging and should be read in conjunction with press reports of Khrushchev's remarks at luncheon for Kekkonen which indicate Soviet objectives remain unaltered. Soviet deferral of military consultations with Finns does not relieve pressure on Finland and through Finland on Scandinavia. Department therefore continues desire discussion in NAC but would agree to postponement not later than Thursday Nov 30. In meantime you should take opportunity to place onus on Norwegian and Dane PermReps to report to Council on their assessment of communique, knowledge of content Novosibirsk talks and what if any quid pro quo given Soviets by Kekkonen. You may remind them of our previously expressed view they should take lead and say we acquiescing in their suggestions re timing NATO meeting to permit them do so.
/1/In Topol 800 to Paris, November 24, the Department of State instructed the Representative to NATO to impress the seriousness of Soviet actions upon the other member states and seek a common response. (Ibid., 375/11 - 2461) Polto 700 from Paris, November 25, reported views of the NATO Permanent Representatives on holding a special session to discuss developments in Finland. (Ibid., 375/11 - 2561)
/2/For text of the November 25 communique, see The New York Times, November 26, 1961.
Ref FYI paragraph in Topol 800. USRO may wish call attention to Adenauer - Kennedy communique which refutes Soviet charges of aggressive intent by NATO and FRG./3/
/3/For text of the November 22 communique, see Department of State Bulletin, December 11, 1961, pp. 967 - 968.
Rusk
205. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11 - 2861. Secret. Drafted by Cook and approved in G on November 30.
Washington, November 28, 1961.
SUBJECT
Call of Finnish Ambassador to Present His Country's Views on Finnish-Soviet Situation
PARTICIPANTS
Richard R. Seppala, Ambassador of Finland
U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State
Eiler R. Cook, Finnish Desk, BNA
The Finnish Ambassador opened the conversation by immediately stating that they considered the problem to be solved to their entire satisfaction. There had been many interpretations in the press of the results of the Fenno-Soviet talks, and these interpretations had not all been correct. He understood that many journalists are friends of Finland, but their conclusions, however, are not necessarily the right ones.
On the basis of his telephone conversation with Foreign Minister Karjalainen yesterday, Finland considers the problem solved and does not agree with the point of view expressed by many that the whole matter is still hanging over Finland, so to speak. Ambassador Seppala referred specifically to the penultimate paragraph of the Novosibirsk communique where Khrushchev had stated ``that the Soviet Government finds it possible to postpone for the time being the military consultations it had suggested". Despite Khrushchev's use of the word ``postpone", he wished to clarify the Finnish interpretation of this. They interpreted this as meaning that the Soviets of course retained their right to raise this general question again under the 1948 Fenno-Soviet treaty. There could have been no question of the Soviets forever renouncing the right to speak of this matter--therefore Khrushchev's use of the word ``postpone" in the communique.
From the Soviet side there had been no pressure nor were there any secret arrangements or requests. President Kekkonen had stated this clearly in his November 26 speech to the people of Finland following his return from Novosibirsk. The Finnish Ambassador went on to say that his Government feels that this intermezzo has not changed Finland's political situation nor has it changed the policy of neutrality which they so sincerely wish to follow. Ambassador Seppala said that he hoped this would be understood here and in other countries.
The Finnish Ambassador turned briefly to the Fenno-Soviet trade negotiations which had been going on simultaneously. He noted that it was a coincidence that the annual trade negotiations happened to be going on at the same time as the Novosibirsk talks. He stated that these trade negotiations were not at all influenced by the Khrushchev - Kekkonen talks. There had been absolutely no pressure from the Soviets and the trade arrangements were arrived at as before, through normal negotiations. The Ambassador stated that Foreign Minister Karjalainen had told him that the 25 percent increase in Fenno-Soviet trade reported by the press was a slightly high figure, though generally correct. Karjalainen attributed little importance to the ``slight increase". The Finnish Ambassador went on to say that Finland's trade with the Soviet Union varied between 14 percent and 15 percent of the total and has actually diminished in relation to Finland's over-all trade picture. He wished to make it perfectly clear that the 25 percent increase in Fenno-Soviet trade meant in fact a 25 percent increase of 14 percent, and not an increase of 25 percent in the total trade picture. The Ambassador went on to say that the 14 percent size of Finland's trade with the Soviets was useful, in his opinion. The Ambassador referred very briefly to the Saimaa Canal, stating that these negotiations were going along normally also. (Note: This refers to negotiations for possible resumption of Finnish use of this canal which was formerly in Finnish territory before World War II.)
Ambassador Seppala next turned his attention to the resignation of Mr. Honka from the presidential race. Mr. Karjalainen had told the Ambassador that the Finns had known nothing of this in Novosibirsk until the news came over the wires. Mr. Honka had made his own personal decision--admittedly arrived at on the basis of the situation as it existed. Certain Social Democrats had seemed bitter about this, especially as regarded the timing of their candidate's withdrawal from the presidential race. Karjalainen did not know why he timed his resignation when he did actually--the timing was unfortunate.
The Finnish Ambassador next turned to Khrushchev's comments on certain rightist elements in Finland. He admitted that one could interpret this as interference in Finnish internal affairs. He noted that President Kekkonen had also mentioned the matter of rightist elements in his speech to the nation. Ambassador Seppala stated that he was sure we knew who Khrushchev was referring to. Mr. Vaino Tanner, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party, was by no means a radical, or a Nazi, or anything else bad. He recalled the important and patriotic role Mr. Tanner had played during the war years. However, he had come into bad grace--it was too bad but that was a fact. What Finns might think of Mr. Tanner did not matter, it was the opinion of their neighbor that was important. That was the brief background to President Kekkonen's suggestion that certain political leaders step out of the political picture.
The Finnish Ambassador stated that Mr. Karjalainen had told him that there had been no hint whatsoever from the Soviets that they wished to have communists in the Finnish Government.
Mr. Johnson thanked the Ambassador very much for his extremely interesting presentation of the views of his Government. It of course again raised the question what was the whole purpose of the Soviet exercise. Ambassador Seppala answered that the Soviets had used the opening the 1948 treaty with Finland gave them for this move to discuss the threat of war, particularly as it involved Germany. The Finnish Ambassador viewed the note as directed not so much against Finland as in a larger context. Mr. Johnson agreed, adding that it seemed that Finland was being used. The Ambassador agreed. He noted that they had never expected the Soviets to invoke the 1948 treaty until perhaps some actual shooting had started. The fact that the Soviets had chosen to invoke it under these conditions had admittedly come as something of a surprise to the Finnish Government.
The Finnish Ambassador said that as to the communique wording about Finland having to watch the situation in the Northern Europe and Baltic Sea area, he did not believe this was necessarily to the disadvantage of Finland. It could be interpreted that Finland as well as the USSR could have something to say about the situation in the North. The Ambassador again said that they were glad the problem had been settled.
Mr. Johnson said that we were also pleased, of course, but not as pleased as Finland seemed to be. He realized that Finland must certainly be relieved. Ambassador Seppala wondered what we thought of the recent happenings. Mr. Johnson said that we were also of the opinion that the note had certainly not been directed at Finland alone. It was his own reaction that the Soviets had demonstrated that they could crack the whip. Every Finn, politician or citizen, would have this in the back of his mind from now on. The Ambassador agreed, adding that every responsible Finnish statesman would now also have in his mind more than ever the need to get along with the Soviets. He also agreed that something new had been added to Finnish relations with the USSR.
In closing Mr. Johnson once again thanked the Ambassador for his frank presentation and told him that he would see to it that the Secretary and the President heard of this Finnish assessment of the situation, as they were both much interested in Finland. Ambassador Seppala said that he believed his account of the Finnish position to be quite accurate.
206. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375/11 - 2861. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Christensen and Burdett; cleared in draft by BNA, RA, EUR, SOV, and Kohler; and approved by Burdett. Repeated to Helsinki, Oslo, Copenhagen, Stockholm, London, Bonn, and Moscow.
Washington, November 28, 1961, 3:24 p.m.
Topol 814. Paris for Emb and USRO. Deliver Finletter 9:00 am November 29. Topol 800 and 803, Polto Circular 64./1/
/1/Topol 803 is printed as Document 204. Regarding Topol 800, see footnote 1 thereto. Polto circular 64, November 27, reported on the reactions of the Norwegian and Danish Permanent Representatives to the Khrushchev - Kekkonen communique. (Department of State, Central Files, 375/11 - 2761)
Following is additional guidance for NAC discussion Nov 29 on Finland.
You should endeavor dispel belief Novosibirsk talks have eased Finnish problem or altered essentials situation as set forth Topol 775./2/ Sense of euphoria in Finland and idea Kekkonen scored great triumph most disquieting as is feeling of relief apparent in Scandinavia and in some other NATO countries./3/
/2/Topol 775, November 21, authorized transmission to Paris of telegram 266 from Helsinki. (Ibid., 660E.61/11 - 2161) Telegram 266 is printed as Document 201.
/3/In telegram 1621 from Moscow, November 26, the Embassy reported that Hallama had expressed ``satisfaction" with the outcome of talks with Khrushchev. ``He said no specific demands had been made of the Finns and the question of political guarantees was not even raised." (Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11 - 2661)
Favorite Soviet tactic is to exert heavy pressure and present exorbitant demands then settle for something less and claim public applause for reasonableness. Danger to Finland's neutrality and independence is just as great from series of nibbles aimed first at paralyzing Finnish will and ability to resist as from all out effort at immediate satellization.
Finnish people and leaders are not necessarily in best position themselves to assess significance of Soviet moves or steps which must be taken to counteract them. NATO itself should judge facts irrespective of what may be intentions of individual Finns or interpretation they may seek to place on recent events.
Starting with October 30 note Soviets in our opinion have asserted successfully right to exercise large measure control over major internal and external Finnish policies. Finland's freedom to act has been severely restricted. Soviets have:
(a) Ensured reelection President Kekkonen by in effect causing withdrawal of leading opposition candidate.
(b) Demanded withdrawal from political life of Finnish political leaders and other Finnish elements considered by Soviets to be anti-communist (i.e. too pro-Western); a demand reiterated publicly by Kekkonen in Finland.
(c) By their seeming magnanimous treatment of Finland given filip to election prospects of Finnish Communist Party.
(d) Defined, in Kekkonen's words, Finnish neutrality as essential part of Soviet security policy.
(e) Elicited statement from Kekkonen to effect that maintenance of Soviet confidence is not only Finland's responsibility but that loss of that confidence would be ``exclusively" fault of Finns.
(f) Obtained Kekkonen's concurrence that it is Finnish Govt's duty in light future developments to initiate military consultations with Soviets under Article II; onus therefore on Finland to observe and interpret developments in Northern Europe in manner acceptable to Soviets.
We note also that Finland has signed new trade agreement with Soviets providing for 25 percent expansion in trade. If implemented this would serve increase Finnish dependence on Soviets and provide further important lever which Soviets may use for political purposes.
According to Kekkonen - Khrushchev communique and Kekkonen's Nov 26 speech ``relaxation" of Soviet pressure dependent on Finnish performance on matters noted above and ``easing of tensions in Northern Europe". Latter defined to mean reduction in military preparations of Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Warning thus served on Sweden, Norway and Denmark that unless they relax their military posture and attenuate ties with NATO and FRG new Soviet demands on Finland will be made. In sense Finland being used by Soviets as hostage for policies on part of Scandinavian countries deemed ``proper" by Soviets.
Thus NATO should not conclude matter may be left at rest or that Soviets will not resort to further pressures on Finland. Firmness especially on part of Scandinavians essential at this juncture. Appearance of weakness will only encourage Soviets. Would be grave error in our view to regard situation as hopeless (as done by Boyesen, para 6(b) Polto 64). In essential respects situation does not resemble that existing in 1939. We doubt Soviets would be prepared to use military force in Finnish context alone. Given close inter-relationship of all elements in present world situation, overwhelming deterrent power of Free World, of which Soviets well aware, provides all nations assurance against resort to arms. In non-military areas NATO can do much. Efforts will be greatly complicated unless Finns themselves are brought to understand significance of current developments now taking place and are prepared to stand up to Soviets. Thus first task is to strengthen Finnish resolve. We hope Norway, Denmark and through them Sweden will take lead. We should study desirability individual demarches, public statements and use of propaganda themes bringing to world attention what transpiring.
NATO should also prepare itself to move quickly to provide economic and commercial support should Soviets resort to pressure in these fields.
FYI. We concur that as first step USDel to OECD should prepare recommendations as to actions that would be required under various contingencies (Polto 698)./4/ End FYI.
Rusk
/4/Polto 698 from Paris, November 24, had suggested a delay in NATO consideration of the Finnish situation until after the talks between Kekkonen and Lange and Khrushchev. (Ibid., 660E.61/11 - 2461)
207. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11 - 2961. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Moscow, Oslo, Copenhagen, Stockholm, London, Bonn, and Paris.
Helsinki, November 29, 1961, 7 p.m.
303. Paris for USRO. Embassy has endeavored basis communique, speeches and subsequent reactions Finland assess nature and effect Novosibirsk conversations. Soviets appear temporarily have contented themselves demand listed paragraph 1a Embtel 280./1/
/1/Telegram 280, November 24, provided the Embassy's estimate of Soviet objectives at the Novosibirsk meeting. In paragraph 1a, the Embassy suggested that in the political field, the Soviet Union would ``initially" request only reassurances about Finnish foreign policy and a personal commitment from Kekkonen to close ties with the Soviet Union. (Ibid., 600E.61/11 - 2361)
Soviets may think pause useful because:
1. If they drive Kekkonen and his supporters too far too fast they might balk or by being too obviously obedient lose their effectiveness for Soviet purposes.
2. Lull interested countries and circles in free world.
3. Preserve Finland as usable hostage which still in danger being strangled slowly or left alive more in appearance than fact.
Even if Soviets give Finland breather until after Diet elections on February 4 - 5 they have made great gains and have started political developments here that may serve their purposes best without further overt action by them.
Following is Embassy's estimate of give and take and possible consequences conversations:
A. Finland was given some fair words and postponement of military consultations which Soviets completely again demand tomorrow.
B. Soviets received:
1) Kekkonen's firm commitment to concept that Finnish foreign policy and political leadership must always be acceptable to Soviets. He may have to be all more careful now conform this line because he did not come at once to heel after October 30 but first tried gain time.
2) Reduction Finnish presidential election to empty formality amounting Kekkonen's ``reappointment".
3) Public acknowledgement by President Finland that:
a) Soviet note to Finland justified by international tensions;
b) Soviet fear Germany genuine and understandable;
c) Khrushchev great friend Finland but must naturally look after his own country's interests;
d) It great achievement for Finland that Finnish policy recognized by Soviets as integral part of Soviet security system;
e) If Finland's neutrality and independence are lost, it will be Finland's own fault;
f) Finland has duty of standing on watch in Baltic;
g) There must be no criticism of Khrushchev in Finland;
h) Nation's interests require that all those in disagreement with foregoing remain quiet.
C. Possible consequences:
1) Increase apprehensions about disagreements with Soviet Union in any field;
2) Freer field for Finland's communists and increase inhibition against attacking them as agents of Soviets;
3) Decrease general knowledge of what happening because of tendency silence objective public discussion in press and otherwise foreign policy and matters involving Soviet interest;
4) Greater disorganization than ever among anti-communist groups and parties;
5) Anti-communist voter apathy indicated by sense futility and fear that heavy anti-communist vote could produce immediate Soviet reprisals;
6) Communist Diet election gains that could furnish basis demand for inclusion in government.
Despite gloomy situation above outlined there are in Finland active pro-democratic, anti-communist elements that even this soon after Novosibirsk have recovered enough hope and courage continue struggle preserve and reinforce country's will to survive as genuinely neutral independent nation. Their courage gives justification for efforts help on part Finland's friends. These efforts might take form well considered public statements, quiet diplomatic actions designed encourage Finnish will to resist and discreet offers political or economic help at appropriate times.
Gufler
208. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Subgroup Meeting July 20, 1961. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Moscow.
Helsinki, December 2, 1961, 9 p.m.
318. Called on President Kekkonen at his suburban residence and gave him copy of Kennedy - Adzhubei interview in Finnish translation./1/ He showed real gratitude for it. He explained he had tried read it in New York Times but with his limited English had to give it up. Finnish press coverage had been incomplete and fragmentary.
/1/President Kennedy talked with Khrushchev's son-in-law, Izvestia editor Aleksei Adzhubei on November 25. For a transcript of the interview, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 741 - 752.
We spent about one hour, mostly on what took place in his conversations with Khrushchev. Following paragraphs summarize his remarks.
On future Finn-Soviet relations he reiterated previous statements that nothing had changed except that deterioration of world situation is reflected in pressure on Finland. If Berlin crisis for example could be settled amicably, Finland could again perhaps live in peace.
At this point I remarked that the crisis had been created and was being maintained by the Soviets. The President replied that he understands my views and has heard those of the Soviets and that he in turn has his own separate impressions which may or may not be correct.
President Kekkonen intimated that he had been more optimistic about peaceful settlement when he spoke with President Kennedy and was less so now. When I asked him why he was less so now, and whether it was because of something said to him in Soviet Union, he dodged question and returned to praise of thoroughly good [omission in the source text] balanced and reasonable attitude in the interest of a peaceful settlement of international disputes.
In his conversation with Khrushchev, Berlin crisis and Finland were not directly linked, although Khrushchev did repeat practically the same words that Brezhnev used about West Germany and NATO. He added he had already reported these remarks to President Kennedy and to Secretary Rusk.
Next he answered my direct questions about what, if any, commitments had been made. First, he said no political commitments were made with regard to Finnish internal affairs nor did he agree sign separate treaty with Ulbricht regime or recognize it, nor were any these matters even brought up by Soviets.
Second, no military commitments. President Kekkonen's tactical plan was to avoid any sentence with the word military in it. If Khrushchev had mentioned military topic he had planned to change subject.
I asked him about part of communique which charges Finland with standing on watch in Baltic. He replied that this topic was mentioned only in passing by Khrushchev. He was, therefore, surprised when Soviets wanted insert it in communique. Foreign Minister Karjalainen, Ambassador Wuori and Minister Hallama had got together with Soviets write up communique after talks. Minister Karjalainen came to President Kekkonen to ask what should be done. Kekkonen told him if Soviets insisted on proposal, accept it. His reason was that he felt this might imply Soviet acceptance of Finnish interpretation Article 2 of friendship treaty. Finns contend that both parties must agree that threat exists. Secondly, this item which calls for Finland follow events in Baltic now leaves initiative for military consultations up to Finns. President Kekkonen considered this victory, but added he knew there would be wrong interpretations in Scandinavia which, he said, would disappear with time.
No economic matters were discussed.
He speculated on what might have been Soviet motive for sending October 30 note and said that he believes it directed against NATO, Sweden and to lesser extent Finland. If Khrushchev just made a speech or had directed some complaint to NATO, it would have been quickly forgotten. On contrary by directing request for consultations to Finland they had aroused world attention. Article II of the friendship treaty was available for use and they used it with unfortunate results for Finland but Khrushchev does not care about those.
As to Finland's future: Finland must continue to watch situation closely, keep steady nerves and make each move with an eye to next one Soviets may make and trust that its moves are the right ones.
I asked President Kekkonen if he though Communists would be taken into next government. He said he does not think so; but, whether they are or not, depends primarily on the SKDL's relations with other parties; that is, whether other parties will cooperate with them.
I asked him whether the Communists lose votes next Diet elections. He answered no, they have about one-half million votes upon which they can count. These voters stuck with SKDL through Stalin's time and Hungarian revolution, so does not think note from Soviet Union will affect number who turn out at the polls in February. He said Communists have profited from nine months in which Honka was Social Democratic candidate because they were able attack Social Democrats full force for nominating reactionary. Situation is better with Social Democrats now that they have a new candidate.
President was relaxed and friendly but not up to his top physical form as he has just recovered from an illness which struck him immediately after his television and radio speech. He attributed his illness particularly to relaxation of nervous tension thereafter.
Frank Friberg who acted as interpreter and I believe that President endeavored give much better picture situation than he feels is really warranted. We believe his efforts explain and justify inclusion in communique of Finnish watch dog responsibilities are unreal and may be effort shut his eyes to what may well be a major concession to Soviets.
Gufler
209. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Kekkonen and the Ambassador to Finland (Gufler)
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.60E/1 - 562. Confidential. Transmitted as an attachment to a January 5 letter from Gufler to Tyler.
Helsinki, January 2, 1962.
President Kekkonen received me on January 2 and we talked for about fifty minutes. Nothing of much significance emerged, but there were a few points which give useful indications of his thinking.
2. I began by stressing that I was not speaking on instructions but wanted to review the situation with him. For the first ten or fifteen minutes he said little more than his usual line in public, and in describing his conversations with Khrushchev emphasized the hostility the Russians had expressed to certain political circles in Finland. This was a fact of life which he must take into account.
3. I pressed him to say whether he expected the Russians to renew their request for military talks. While admitting that they could do so at any time (next time if they liked without a note), he persistently expressed confidence that the request would not be renewed in the near future at all events. He emphasized the value of the last sentence of the Novosibirsk communique as leaving the initiative with Finland, and he confirmed, when I asked him about the point, that Finland could still contest whether a situation justifying the formal invocation of the 1948 Pact existed. But he admitted that next time, should the Russians really press hard for military consultations, it might prove impossible to avoid them.
4. I asked him whether he was satisfied that the general line of silence and official unconcern taken during November by friendly Western governments had been the best from Finland's point of view. He said he was, instancing something he had said to Mr. Rusk in America to the effect that Finland must be left to deal with her problems alone. He referred also to the Swedish Prime Minister's statement about the maintenance of Swedish neutrality. He knew that Mr. Erlander had been criticized for this statement, and it had been argued that on the contrary Sweden should have said that Soviet action against Finland would lead her to abandon neutrality. But he thought this would have made things worse not better for Finland. I said that while I understood his point of view, if the world at large maintained an indifferent silence the Russians might feel no one would object if they absorbed Finland completely. The President said he was well aware of this consideration.
5. I told the President that all Finland's friends realised the difficulty of her situation and no-one could easily suggest a satisfactory alternative policy. But I assumed that Finnish policy, while concerned not to provoke the Russians, to conciliate them as far as possible and to deserve their confidence, must nevertheless contemplate that there was a certain point beyond which Finland would not be driven without resist-ance. It seemed to me that Finland must be prepared to contemplate the possibility of having a period of bad relations with the Soviet Union. Other countries had had such periods of bad relations and had survived them. The President replied that there was indeed a point beyond which Finland could not go. But he hoped and believed that the Russians would not press them as far as this point.
6. I reminded the President that I had been instructed in November to inform him of my Government's support for Finnish neutrality. For my part, I felt it was essential that the nature of its neutrality should be defined by a neutral government itself and by no-one else. The President said that was indeed so, but the government then had to satisfy itself that those concerned agreed with its definition. I said this seemed to me dangerous. If under pressure from one side neutrality were extended in one direction it might cease to look like neutrality from the other.
7. Turning to internal affairs, I reminded the President that in his New Year speech he had said the country's greatest need was for an effective majority government after the elections. What kind of Government did he think might then be formed? He said he believed the elections would produce a bourgeois majority (i.e. a majority of parties other than Communists, Social-Democrats and Skogists). From his point of view the ideal government after the elections would be one composed of the Agrarians and both the elements into which the Social Democrats were now split. He agreed with me that Social Democratic unity could not be established before the elections. (What he has in mind, presumably, is the possibility that it may be established after the elections by the withdrawal or ousting of the group now in control of the Social-Democratic Party (i.e. Tanner and his associates) and the emergence of a new dominant faction--perhaps led by Paasio, now the Socialist candidate for the presidency--which will be able to heal the breach with the Skogists.) The President added that if such a Government could be formed, then he hoped it would be possible to form a bourgeois coalition (i.e. Agrarians, Conservatives and minor centre parties).
8. I told the President I was glad to hear what he said about a possible future government, as naturally I shared the widespread concern lest the next Finnish Government should include Communists. If it did, then Finland's relations with her Western friends were bound to suffer. And once Communists got into a Government it might not be easy to get them out. Finland had got Communists out of her Government in 1948, but she might not be able to do so again. The President replied with apparent confidence that he did not think it likely there would be Communists in the next Government. He did not expect a Communist success in the elections. And even if they did win a few seats this would not be of real political significance. Anyhow, no other party was ready to collaborate with the Communists, and that alone probably settled the matter.
9. In thanking the President for receiving me I said I hoped that, if difficult times for Finland should return, the Finnish Government would be prepared to take friendly Western governments into its confidence as to its hopes and fears. I felt sure he realised that my Government at all events would treat whatever the Finnish Government told us with discretion. The President replied rather half-heartedly that he would always be glad to let us know about his problems.
210. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/2 - 262. Confidential. Repeated to Helsinki and Stockholm.
Moscow, February 2, 1962, 6 p.m.
2104. Finnish Embassy officers here understandably reluctant reveal details but confirmed agreement signed concerning purchases of Soviet military equipment by mission headed by Defense Minister Bjorkenheim, who departed for Finland February 1. However, Finnish counselor informed us that: No change in policy involved, as Finns in past have purchased Soviet military equipment; new agreement represents draw-down of about one-third of 1959 Soviet credit of 100 million rubles; equipment includes ``some aircraft."
Soviet press, which has not mentioned signature of any agreement, reported Finnish Mission entertained and escorted by Soviet Defense Ministry officials.
Thompson
211. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.60E/2 - 562. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Kohler.
Washington, February 5, 1962.
SUBJECT
Finland
PARTICIPANTS
Richard R. Seppala, Ambassador of Finland
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary
I lunched with the Finnish Ambassador at his invitation.
The Ambassador indicated that he wanted to talk with me about Finnish-Soviet relations on the basis of a personal letter from President Kekkonen and on the President's specific request that he relay these observations to ``his friend Kohler." Following are the highlights of the fairly long communication as related to me by the Ambassador.
(1) President Kekkonen had appreciated Ambassador Gufler's call on him prior to his visit to the USSR, and the US offer of help put forward by the Ambassador. However he had felt it was essential that Finland stand on its own feet and try to solve its own problems.
(2) The President was rather upset that we had told the Swedes about our demarche to him. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
(3) President Kekkonen had made practically a lifetime study of the Soviets and Soviet-Finnish relations. He felt that he knew how to deal with them and was sure that Finland was better off if it handled the problems connected with this relationship alone.
(4) The President was satisfied that the talks with Khrushchev had come out very well for Finland. He wanted the point made that Khrushchev had not insisted on any political changes inside Finland and had not told him to make the statement which he did make in his TV address on his return about other Finnish politicians stepping out of the way.
(5) The President had been made aware of what the defector from the Soviet Embassy in Finland had been saying and it was nonsense.
I replied at some length after expressing appreciation for the President's communication and my conviction as to his sincerity. Following are the main points I made in response to the numbered points above.
(1) I pointed out that we had shown great restraint, even though the Soviet communication to the Finns had contained malicious and distorted statements with respect to NATO to which we would normally have replied forcefully and promptly. We had in fact refrained from doing so. Our offer to help had been a very sincere indication of our interest and concern and our desire to strengthen the Finnish position.
(2) I pointed out that informing the Swedes had seemed most natural to us. The Scandinavians themselves had set the pattern in this respect by their close relationships and we made it a practice to inform them of our moves in their area. Moreover I commented that even if this had become known to the Soviets I found it hard to understand why it would have embarrassed or weakened President Kekkonen's position to have it known to the Soviets that outside powers were interested and concerned.
(3) Continuing this same line I pointed out that in fact a small weak country like Finland was at a considerable disadvantage in negotiatiating with a great power like the Soviet Union not renowned for its restraint. It was dangerous to think that a small power could in fact hold its own in this situation and I would think it would welcome having its hands strengthened.
(4) Repeating that I had great understanding for the difficult situation Finland is in, I said I would again remind the Ambassador of what I had often said to him. We did not object to reasonable accommodation on the part of the Finns to the facts of this situation. However we did beg them not to ``kid themselves." I did not see how it could be denied that with this move the Soviets had in fact interfered in a most serious way in Finland's internal affairs. Moreover President Kekkonen had gone quite a ways in his public statement on his return toward accepting the thesis of the German menace and agreeing to be responsible for keeping his eye on developments in this connection. I then asked the Ambassador how the acute German crisis portrayed in the Soviet note to Finland could be reconciled to Moscow's current flirtation with the Federal Republic and desire to enter direct talks and improve relations--a point which impressed him very much.
The Ambassador said that he would also be speaking to Deputy Under Secretary Johnson on this subject./1/
/1/The Department of State reported on the Seppala - Johnson meeting in telegram 269 to Helsinki, February 8. (Ibid., 660E.61/2 - 862)
Addendum--February 6
I called Ambassador Seppala today to express my pleasure and congratulations on the outcome of the Finnish elections. He indicated that he was also pleased and greatly relieved. He thanked me for the call and for the conversation yesterday.
212. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/2 - 1362. Secret. Also sent to Moscow.
Helsinki, February 13, 1962, 5 p.m.
432. Department also pass Army, Navy, Air, DOD. Reference: Moscow telegram 2178, repeated Helsinki 60./1/ Embassy has following comment regarding information in telegram under reference.
/1/Telegram 2178 from Moscow, February 10, reported on a Finno-Soviet agreement to amend the terms of their 1948 treaty, increasing the size of Finnish military forces and expending remaining Soviet military credits. (Ibid., 660E.61/2 - 1062)
Limitations on Finnish armament contained in 1947 peace treaty/2/ signed by ten allied and associated powers including USSR and UK. Article 22 of peace treaty provides for amendment military provisions by agreement among all signatories or by Finnish agreement with UN Security Council.
/2/For text of the 1947 Treaty of Paris, see 48 UNTS 203.
Evidence suggests Bjorkenheim may well have approached Soviets on question of raising these limitations. Finnish military has long had this objective. This is first time Finnish purchases of Soviet arms negotiated by Cabinet Minister. Moreover, we understand [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that Bjorkenheim explored amendment of peace treaty military provisions prior to his departure for Moscow.
Source may be correct regarding types of equipment to be purchased. No previous indication here, however, Bjorkenheim group intended purchase anti-aircraft guns and radar from Soviets. Finns have, however, previously shown interest in anti-aircraft missiles.
Of $125 million Soviet credit, about 50 percent has been allocated Finnish military. This includes latest $37.5 million allocation. According best available information, approximately $25 million of original $125 million credit remains unallocated and could be made available for additional military or other purchases.
Regarding cable, presume source referring to four-tube coaxial Helsinki - Leningrad cable presently being installed. Embassy has reported extensively on this cable which scheduled for completion 1963. Cable to be used for ordinary communications purposes, according to Finns, but it readily adaptable for military purposes.
This message prepared in consultation with military attaches.
Gufler
213. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Finland
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760E.5/2 - 1462. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Christensen; cleared by BNA, RA, the Bureau of Budget, and Department of Defense; and approved by Burdett.
Washington, February 14, 1962, 10:49 a.m.
272. Deptel 198./1/ Program to make up to $10 million available for possible military assistance to Finland nearing completion. As indicated reftel no Government to Government agreement will be required. Practicable effect would be to enable Finns purchase US equipment (classified equipment on case by case basis) through private channels at discount prices. No offer of assistance would be made. Envisage informing Finnish Military Attache here that US equipment could be made available on terms accommodating to Finland's special requirements. Next step would be up to Finns. Publicity, if any, would occur only from fact private purchases made. Believe program conforms with recommendations Embdes 253./2/
/1/Telegram 198, December 6, 1961, requested the Embassy's comments on a Department of Defense proposal to make $10 million in military assistance available to Finland and on the possibility of a Finnish approach for aid. (Ibid., 760E.5/12 - 661)
/2/Despatch 253, November 27, 1961, provided a military appraisal of Finland. (Ibid., 760E.5/11 - 2761)
Objectives are to strengthen Finnish links with West and bolster morale and Western orientation of Finnish military authorities. Request Embassy comments soonest on merits program in terms these objectives./3/
/3/In telegram 435, February 15, Gufler responded that the proposed program would meet Finnish needs while reinforcing its ``Free World orientation." (Ibid., 760E.5/2 - 1562)
Rusk
214. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760E.5/2 - 1762. Secret. Repeated to London and Moscow.
Helsinki, February 17, 1962, 10 a.m.
441. Reference: Army Attache message C - 11./1/ British Ambassador informed me today that his government had acceded to request presented by President Kekkonen when he visited London last spring that it ``close its eyes to enlargement in size Finnish armed forces above maximum fixed by Paris Peace Treaty". British agreement conditional on Finnish assurance that Soviets are also willing ``close their eyes".
/1/Not found.
British Government has not, however, consented to Kekkonen's other request that it permit ``re-interpretation of treaty to allow Finnish equipment with guided missiles". London felt last May and gives evidence of still feeling that it would be contrary to principle of sanctity of treaties to acquiesce to this request under fiction of ``re-interpretation" of treaty. London apparently believes that for this alteration in treaty Finns should approach all signatories and secure proper legal waiver of conditions.
British Embassy has been requested by Finnish Government consent to visit to London by Bjorkenheim, Finnish Defense Minister, and has been told that he will take up in London re-interpretation of treaty to permit guided missiles to which Soviets have already given their consent during recent Bjorkenheim visit in Moscow. (Soviets have also offered supply missiles.) British Ambassador has forwarded Finnish request with favorable recommendation.
He hopes that London will at least allow visit though it has shown itself reluctant do so. He has no reason at moment to believe London disposed change its attitude re guided missiles though he hopes it will. I believe he may fear that if British consent is withheld, Finns will not bother with lengthy and possibly complicated efforts revise treaty legally with consent all parties but will, with Soviet connivance and even maybe under Soviet pressure, simply ignore it.
Gufler
215. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/2 - 2462. Secret. Repeated to London, Stockholm, and Moscow.
Helsinki, February 24, 1962, 1 p.m.
449. Re Deptel 280./1/ Agree with reasoning of British Ambassador Helsinki. Finnish military is firmly anti-Communist in sentiment. It needs modern arms to make it even defensively effective and to maintain its self-confidence.
/1/Telegram 280 to Helsinki, February 21, reported on discussions with the British Embassy in which the British representatives explained their rationale for reinterpretation of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty with Finland. (Ibid., 660E.611/2 - 2162)
Do not agree with British Ambassador Moscow. Evidence indicates initiative for reinterpretation of treaty arms limitations came from Finns. Finns have long been anxious secure modification arms limitations in order build military establishment which they could convincingly assert has capacity prevent use Finnish territory against USSR without need of Soviet aid envisioned by Finno-Soviet mutual assist-ance treaty. Finns have regarded Soviets as principal obstacle to modification arms limitations and have several times sounded them out on matter. First Soviet resort to mutual assistance treaty in October 30 note increased Finns anxiety and, we believe, shocked them into approaching Soviets again on revision of limitations.
Do not agree Finnish arms build-up would tend suggest Finnish concurrence in Soviet thesis USSR threatened by West Germany via Finland. Finnish effort to clear way for build-up preceded development Soviet thesis. Finland seeking status like that of neutral Sweden which continually developing modern armed force without it being suggested they doing so because of West German threat.
Possible Soviet pressure for incorporation of Finnish and Soviet early warning systems unrelated to modification arms limitations, since early warning systems not covered by peace treaty.
Hope British will permit guided missiles to which Soviets have given consent, but believe it in Finns own interest to approach all treaty signatories to secure proper legal waiver of limitations as British desire President (Embtel 441)./2/ Formal amendment of treaty would help bind Soviets and thus place obstacle in their way should they later desire reverse position or engage in wider reinterpretation feared by British Ambassador Moscow. It would also help establish precedent for consultation with UK and other signatories if Finland desires further modifications.
/2/Document 214.
Gufler
216. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.611/2 - 2462. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and Christensen and cleared by BNA, RA, Kitchen, and the Department of Defense. Repeated to Helsinki, Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Moscow, Paris Topol, Ottawa, and Reykjavik.
Washington, February 24, 1962, 4 p.m.
1473. Deptel 280 to Helsinki rptd 4486 London, 1942 Moscow, 445 Stockhom./1/ According British Embassy HMG prepared to seek agreement in principle of Western cosignatories to formal amendment 1947 Finnish Peace Treaty and to early start in Finnish reequipment with defensive guided weapons in anticipation amendment of Treaty. British state that since Soviets have said they are willing to stretch Treaty provisions, Finns consider they would be open to pressure under 1948 Pact if they did not take steps to modernize their defenses. FonOff satisfied there is real urgency in meeting Finnish request. FonOff requests US views urgently.
/1/See footnote 1, Document 215.
In US view question of amendment Finnish Treaty would seem to affect entire NATO alliance and Sweden. Would Soviets permit Finns acquire non-Soviet guided missile air defense weapons? Weapons systems could be of such sophistication as to require intimate and close relations between Finnish and Soviet military technicians and authorities. Would Soviet control of Finnish air defense system, or joint use of facilities (which cannot be ruled out) be of serious disadvantage to West? What effect would this have on Swedish military posture? Modern air defense system in Finland could be military asset of value to USSR and tempting political objective. It could be argued, particularly in light of Kekkonen's expressions of ``understanding" of Soviet worries over rearmed Finns that Finnish request constitutes tacit recognition that threat from FRG and her allies exists.
We are apprehensive that overall effect amendment of treaty might be to facilitate military satellization of Finland by Soviets.
We would hope FonOff would give long and careful thought to Finnish request and consider whether subject should be discussed in NAC.
London should inform FonOff that we have reservations proposed course of action as indicated above and wish clarification several obscurities before definitive reply can be made. We are studying matter urgently and desire information on following:
1. Reasons for urgency. Difficult to see why FonOff believes necessary make decisions quickly on matter such importance not only to British and ourselves but also to our NATO allies and Sweden. Understand Finnish negotiations with Soviets for arms still continuing; Finnish interest in urgent decision may suggest intent immediately to acquire Soviet guided missile weapons system.
2. Basis for assertion that USSR willing to stretch provisions of Treaty. Has FonOff learned this only from Finns or directly from Soviets?
3. Procedures for amendment of Treaty. Article 22 of Treaty states that military provisions may be modified by agreement between Allied and Associated Powers (US is not signatory) and Finland or by Agreement between UN Security Council and Finland.
4. What would be reaction NATO members, especially Germany and also Sweden?
5. Are Finns relating amendment of treaty and purchase of British equipment, e.g. frigate.
6. Would UK envisage supplying sophisticated weapons, involving security classification?
7. Would UK plan tie-in sale of missiles to sale of other equipment such as radar?
Request views all addressees.
Rusk
217. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.60E1/3 - 762. Top Secret.
Washington, March 7, 1962.
DEAR MR. JOHNSON: The Department of Defense has reviewed your letter of 1 March 1962, and its accompanying enclosure, concerning possible revision of the Finnish Peace Treaty of 1947./1/ Defense views on this general subject are as follows.
/1/Not printed. (Ibid., 033.60E41/2 - 2662)
The basic objective of the United States with respect to Finland continues to be an independent, democratic and Western-oriented Finland as free as possible from vulnerability to Soviet pressures. Soviet domination of Finland could put the USSR in control of advance air defense and early warning positions and additional Naval bases in the Baltic. In addition, such domination would be a heavy blow to Western morale and could weaken the resistance of some other small Free World nations to Soviet Bloc pressures. The continued denial of Finland to the USSR thus is both militarily and psychologically important to the West.
From the military point of view, the acquisition by Finland of guided missile weapons and an early warning radar system is not in the best interest of the United States. The Department of Defense, on the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore recommends that Article 17 of the Finnish Peace Treaty not be interpreted or revised to permit such acquisition by Finland.
Specific answers to the questions raised in your letter, as well as a strategic appraisal of the military importance of Finland, are attached hereto./2/
/2/JCSM - 168 - 62, not printed.
Sincerely yours,
Paul H. Nitze
218. Circular Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.611/3 - 1062. Secret. Drafted by Owen, cleared in draft by Burdett, and approved by Rewinkel. Repeated to Helsinki, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Oslo, Reykjavik, Moscow, Paris Topol, and Ottawa.
Washington, March 10, 1962, 5:18 p.m.
1548. Ref: Deptel 4659 to London./1/ Comments from field re amendment Finnish Peace Treaty were most helpful. Our conclusions set forth in note handed British Embassy March 10 in reply its note March 2/2/ supporting amendment Finnish Peace Treaty.
/1/Telegram 4659, March 2, summarized a March 2 note from the British Embassy urging U.S. support for the sale of missiles to Finland. (Ibid., 660E.611/2 - 2762)
/2/Neither printed. (Ibid., 033.60E41/3 - 262 and 760E.5612/3 - 1062, respectively)
Summary follows:
Subject has undergone serious study within US Government and views of Defense Department and Joint Chiefs have been obtained on military aspects. Central question is whether Finland's independence and freedom action will be enhanced or reduced by action taken on Finnish request acquire modern guided weapons system either through Treaty reinterpretation or amendment. Question also arises whether strategic position USSR will be advanced by readier Soviet access to Finnish early warning system and air defense capabilities. In Department's view either tacit or formal acquiescence in Finnish request could very well weaken Finland's position and offer USSR strategic advantages.
Finnish authorities both political and military assert that if Finland better armed it could be argued Article 2 of 1948 Fenno-Soviet Treaty need not be invoked since Finland would be capable taking care of its own defense and maintaining its neutrality. This viewpoint rests on two premises of dubious validity: first, Soviet motives for note October 30 were of purely military nature, and second that Finnish defenses could be strengthened to point of reassuring Soviets re their allegations of aggressive intent of West Germany and its allies.
There ample evidence that provision such highly sophisticated equipment as presently envisaged would require considerable assist-ance to Finnish military by Soviet technicians. Such system would not only be readily adaptable for joint use but also increase dependence of Finnish armed forces on USSR. Finns would accordingly be forced into closer military relationship with USSR with resulting opportunities for greater Soviet influence over Finnish armed forces.
Opportunities for development useful contacts between British and Finnish military not present to same extent in terms British equipment in which Finns have expressed firm interest. Radar to be purchased by Finns from United Kingdom together with modern air defense weapons from USSR would give Finland beginning of highly sophisticated air defense weapons system control of which would be tempting political and military objective to USSR. USSR would have opportunity extend its air defense system several hundred miles westward to detriment NATO. While Finnish military authorities would probably resist such Soviet endeavors Finnish political leadership would be determining factor. Events since October 30 do not provide grounds for confidence in willingness or ability present Finnish leadership withstand dangerous accommodations with USSR. No assurance modern air defense weapons on Finnish soil would not be used against West.
Possibility Finns may in any case purchase Soviet missiles in breach of Peace Treaty cannot be excluded. However such step in complete disregard views friendly Treaty signators would be drastic and would demonstrate that Finnish independence and national will had already become seriously compromised and weakened. This in itself would justify decision not proceed favorably on Finnish request.
Department therefore believes reinterpretation or revision Peace Treaty would not be in best interest of West and accordingly hopes UK will reexamine matter in light foregoing views.
Full text being pouched.
Ball
219. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760E.56/3 - 2962. Top Secret.
Washington, March 29, 1962.
DEAR ALEX: The Department of State has requested Defense concurrence in the attached draft Presidential Determination/1/ authorizing expenditure of up to $10 million to permit the armed forces of Finland to purchase United States military equipment in FY 1962 at reduced cost.
/1/Not printed.
The Department of Defense considers the provision of limited U.S. military assistance to Finland, including classified equipment on a case-by-case basis, to be militarily desirable. We are concerned, however, that any U.S. military equipment provided to Finland should not be of such a nature that it could be used to any significant extent against the West. Accordingly, all sales should be effected on a case-by-case basis, in light of security classification, availability, and after a careful appraisal of the potential value of the specific item in countering U.S. or Allied war plans.
It is now recommended, however, that the proposed assistance be funded in FY 1963, rather than FY 1962 as originally suggested, since there is little likelihood that any sales could be negotiated and completed before 30 June 1962.
Subject to the foregoing qualifications, the Department of Defense concurs in the draft Presidential Determination, dated 1 March 1962, which has been forwarded to us. A copy is attached for your reference.
Sincerely yours,
Bob
220. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Athens
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760E.5611/5 - 262. Secret. Drafted by Christensen and approved by Burdett. Secretary Rusk was in Athens to attend the NATO Ministerial Meeting May 4 - 6.
Washington, May 2, 1962, 11:55 p.m.
Tosec 31. Ref: Secto 7 from London and Tosec 30./1/ British Embassy note April 16 states US views given careful consideration but HMG nevertheless favors agreeing to Finnish request. Following is summary of long note/2/ which includes certain strategic-technical assertions:
/1/In Secto 7, May 1, Rusk reported that Lord Home wanted to settle the issue of supplying missiles to Finland at the NATO meeting and requested a full briefing on the issue. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2104) Tosec 30 to Athens, May 2, summarized the Department note of March 10. For summary of the note, see Document 218.
/2/The full text of the note is in Department of State, Central Files, 760E.5612/4 - 1662.
UK agrees Soviet control early warning facilities which Finns now have or are acquiring would give Soviet Union certain advantages, but UK also notes that acquisition such radar facilities and fighter aircraft not prohibited by Peace Treaty. Question therefore is to what extent acquisition of surface to air missiles, which are prohibited, would enhance advantages to Russians and disadvantages to NATO. While any increased sophistication of Finnish air defense system must be viewed with concern, UK of opinion that effect of acquisition even in worst case would be comparatively small. Furthermore UK understands Finns plan purchase some missiles from UK, thus providing opportunities for establishment useful contacts between UK and Finnish military which should help counterbalance Soviet-Finnish contacts.
Regarding central political question of preservation Finnish independence, Finnish case is simply that effective defense of Finnish neutrality no longer possible without up to date defensive equipment. Peace Treaty was signed at earlier stage of technological development defensive weapons and includes provision for modifications. If matter came up in UN many other governments might take view it unreasonable for co-signatories refuse modification.
Not possible give definite reply to question whether Finland would ignore a British refusal to agree to reinterpretation or amendment of Peace Treaty. Finns might drop their proposals if British concurrence not given and HMG now understands this is their intention. Political consequences British refusal would be serious. Such decision would seem unreasonable, would lead to loss Finnish confidence in West, and would cause inevitable decline in morale Finnish armed forces. Finnish Govt might however disregard UK refusal particularly in event Soviet pressure for consultation under 1948 Fenno-Soviet Agreement coupled with pressure to integrate Finnish defense system with that of Soviet Union. In UK opinion it would be easier for Finland to reject such demand if Finnish defenses already included some modern equipment and if she retained some confidence in West which would be gravely impaired by British refusal her present request.
Ball
221. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760E.5612/5 - 2262. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Christensen; cleared by Tyler, G/PM, and Bundy; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Helsinki.
Washington, May 22, 1962, 7:18 p.m.
6212. For Ambassador from Secretary. Deliver following personal message from me to Lord Home:
``Dear Alec: As I promised in Athens, I have carefully looked into the difficult question of permitting Finland to acquire guided missile weapons through a revision of the Finnish Peace Treaty.
Although we are not a party to the Treaty, and your Government is the principal Western signatory, I have appreciated the opportunities to exchange thoughts on the subject with you. As you know my initial reaction as expressed to Ambassador Ormsby Gore on March 10 was against a Treaty revision. Now, after a careful reexamination of the subject, I have again concluded that the proposed revision of the Finnish Peace Treaty would be contrary to the best interests of the West. Officials in the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I all take the view that acquisition by Finland of guided missile weapons would be both militarily and politically unwise. The military aspects strongly indicate, in our opinion, that the strategic position of the West would be adversely affected.
I am aware of how delicate a matter of judgment is involved in assessing the political aspects of determining whether the Finns should have these guided missiles. On the basis of all the information we have I am left with no alternative but to conclude that the political results would not be helpful to us. I question, on the basis of the review I have had made, that the acquisition of a modern air defense capability would give the Finns added confidence and political strength to resist encroachments by the Soviet Union. I am not sure but that, on the contrary, this might well give the USSR political as well as military advantages.
If Finland were to acquire such modern weapons the political and military position of our other friends in Northern Europe would be directly affected. I understand that you have not discussed this matter with Norwegian, Danish and Swedish authorities. I recall that President Kekkonen told Mr. Khrushchev at Novosibirsk last November that a further build-up of armed forces in Northern Europe could be avoided if the USSR withdrew its demands on Finland. Mr. Khrushchev thereupon temporarily withdrew his demands.
I am informed that the Bloodhound I and Thunderbird I missiles contain components incorporating United States classified information. I am quite sure that we could not agree to making the classified aspects of these weapons available to Finland.
Let me assure you that, although my conclusions differ from those you have made, I have studied this problem thoroughly and carefully.
Sincerely yours"
Rusk
222. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760E.5612/5 - 2862. Secret. Drafted by Christensen and approved in S on June 4. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Helsinki in telegram 355, May 29. (Ibid.)
Washington, May 28, 1962.
SUBJECT
Finland's Interest in Acquiring Guided Missile Weapons
PARTICIPANTS
Richard R. Seppala, Ambassador of Finland
The Secretary
Mr. Keld Christensen, Officer in Charge, Northern European Affairs, BNA
Ambassador Seppala opened the conversation by reading the text of a memorandum giving the considerations which prompted the Finnish Government to seek a reinterpretation of the Finnish Peace Treaty in order to acquire guided missile weapons (a copy of the memorandum is attached)./1/
/1/Not printed.
Ambassador Seppala commented that Finland had available for military purchases a Soviet credit of some 12 billion Finnmarks, of which only a quarter, or 3 billion Finnmarks, would be used for the purchase of Soviet guided missiles. The Finns would, the Ambassador said, pay the full price, and the quantity of missiles acquired would accordingly be relatively small. The purchase of guided missiles from the USSR was initiated by the Finnish Defense Forces; the Soviets have not tried to sell such weapons to Finland and there has been no collaboration between the Finns and the Soviets in this matter. Missiles would, the Ambassador continued, also be purchased from the United Kingdom, provided funds were allocated in the next budget. The Ambassador said the entire matter was of the greatest importance in order for Finland to be able to defend its own frontiers and its neutrality. Without such weapons, he said, Finland would be a military vacuum in time of war, or during periods threatening wars; such vacuums were invariably filled. The Ambassador expressed the hope that the U.S. Government would take an understanding view of Finland's desires and interests.
The Secretary asked what kind of missiles the Finns were interested in acquiring. Ambassador Seppala replied that it was his understanding that air defense missiles would be purchased from the Soviet Union, and anti-tank missiles from the United Kingdom. However, he repeated that the current budget did not have an allocation for the purchase of British missiles. The Ambassador then went on to explain the origin of the Soviet commercial credit, and the difficulties the Finns had encountered in making use of it.
The Secretary asked Ambassador Seppala at whom the Finns expected to shoot their missiles. Ambassador Seppala explained that it was important for Finland to be able to defend its neutrality so that, under existing treaty arrangements, the Soviets could not say that the Finns could not defend themselves. The Ambassador commented briefly on the 1948 Finnish Treaty with the Soviet Union.
The Secretary then asked if the Ambassador could explain why the Soviets were interested in selling the Finns guided missile weapons. The Ambassador replied that the Soviets had agreed to sell war materials to Finland, but that the Finns had taken the initiative to acquire guided missile weapons. However, it was difficult, he continued, to say what the Soviet motives were. The Ambassador reiterated that it was important for Finland to be able to say that it was able to defend itself and maintain its treaty obligations.
The Secretary said it was difficult to understand, and in his own mind he wondered, why the Soviets would be willing to sell such weapons to Finland unless they were convinced they would be shooting in only one direction. The Ambassador replied that, on behalf of Finland, he could say definitely that Finland would not shoot the weapons unless Finnish soil was molested. He alluded again to Finnish obligations under the 1948 Treaty.
The Secretary asked the Ambassador to comment on whether Finland was as independent and neutral today as at the time of President Kekkonen's visit to the United States last October. The Secretary noted that the Soviet Union had made certain requests of Finland at that time. The Ambassador replied, ``Yes, absolutely." The Ambassador then went on to talk briefly about Finnish-Soviet trade balances, and Finland's need to maintain a posture which was not unfriendly to the USSR. He said, with respect to the Helsinki World Youth Festival/2/ for example, the Finnish Government had been obliged to bend in the direction of Soviet interests; Finnish policy had not, however, changed.
/2/July 29 - August 6.
The Secretary said that when the USSR presented its note to Finland last October the problem seemed to be a matter of great urgency and importance. Yet, after Finnish officials visited the Soviet Union, the public results seemed very meager. Why, the Secretary asked, had the Soviets been willing to settle for so little publicly when the matter had originally seemed so important? Ambassador Seppala replied that the Soviets had achieved their objectives of shaking up the Scandinavians in a matter which was related at the time to the Berlin situation. Finland was an area of maneuver for the Soviets. It is also well to remember, he said, that Finland is bound by treaty arrangements which place very narrow limits on Finnish policy. Kekkonen apparently persuaded Khrushchev to lift his demands on Finland. Admittedly, he said, the affair had helped re-elect Kekkonen President of Finland. It was difficult, he said, to understand Soviet motives.
The Secretary said the Finns were proposing to acquire sophisticated guided weapons from two sides. Such weapons contained highly classified information. As yet such classified information had not crossed the curtain. There was, therefore, the problem of technical security. In addition to this technical problem there was the political question of how all this related to the neutrality of Finland, and why the Soviets would agree unless they were persuaded the weapons would shoot in only one direction.
The Secretary said that we would give thought and study to the Finnish views, and indicated we were consulting with the British in the matter. He thought the revision of the Treaty was a matter of some substance, not only now, but also for the future. He said he had merely been asking questions and not giving any answers.
223. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760E.5/6 - 462. Secret. Repeated to London.
Helsinki, June 4, 1962, midnight.
589. Foreign Minister Merikoski asked me call this afternoon and received me in presence Director of Political Affairs, Max Jakobson. Merikoski remarked that he had just received report Ambassador Seppala's conversation May 28 with Secretary Rusk/1/ regarding Finns desire reinterpret peace treaty to permit modernization their armed forces. He stated that in light Seppala's report he would again like take up matter and proceeded reiterate points put forward by him on May 25 (points 1 to 4 Embassy's telegram 578)./2/
/1/See Document 222.
/2/Telegram 578 from Helsinki, May 25, reported on Jakobson's presentation of the Finnish position on the legality of its effort to obtain missiles. (Department of State, Central Files, 760E.5/5 - 2562)
He placed special emphasis on circumstance that initiative this matter came from Finnish side, pointing out that question had been raised by Finnish President when he visited London in spring of 1961. He contended that degree modernization was unimportant since Finns can afford only minimum number of expensive modern weapons and argued that principal importance would be psychological. He described it as tonic for Finnish armed forces and entire Finnish nation and indicated that Western refusal permit modification would have serious depressing effect on them.
From remarks by Merikoski and Jakobson I have impression that Seppala made full and apparently to them depressing report and that report was essentially in agreement with summary contained Department's telegram 355./3/ In course conversation they expressed concern over length time it was taking Great Britain and its friends make up their minds about Finnish request and asked whether I could indicate any explanation of this circumstance which they found most puzzling.
/3/See the source note, Document 222.
I told them I had no instructions and did not know what ultimate decision on matter might be. After making certain they understood I was merely thinking out loud in effort help them, I expressed opinion that delay might be partly result of bad timing. I reminded them that between initial discussion, when President Kekkonen visited London in spring 1961, and this spring there had occurred the incidents that began with Soviet note of October 30 [and] included President's trip to Novosibirsk. These incidents had demonstrated to world ability of Russians to shake up Finland and had not in eyes of free world strengthened Finnish position, but rather had made evident degree to which Soviets are able disturb normal Finnish life and developments. Although Soviets had not proceeded carry out what free world and Finns themselves admittedly had recognized as possible military threat to Finnish independence, this threat still hung over Finland. Although Finnish Government had apparently thought it necessary, probably in effort reassure Finnish people after shock of October 30, present Novosibirsk as success, it may be merely stay of execution in light these developments timing renewal their request unfortunate. Foreign Minister himself then remarked perhaps matter might have been more effectively pushed some months earlier or some months later.
Without endeavoring counter my opinion that Novosibirsk was not ``success" it has been publicly represented as being, both Merikoski and Jakobson asserted that events following October 30 had made no difference in Finland's policy or in its determination maintain its neutrality and independence. They invited comment and implied that Soviet note and Novosibirsk should have no influence on any decisions regarding Finnish rearmament. I replied that Soviet demonstration of ability shake Finnish nation was fact of foreign policy even though Finland's friends might still be convinced of Finnish desire maintain independence and neutrality. They also asked whether I knew of any actions by their government that might indicate change in Finnish policy. I referred to open change in attitude toward forthcoming Communist Youth Festival indicated by statement by Prime Minister Miettunen (Embassy's telegram 526)./4/ They contended that this change was minor matter that had nothing to do with Novosibirsk, but obviously did not find their own argument very convincing.
/4/Telegram 526, April 12, reported on Gufler's discussion with Karjalainen on the World Youth Festival. (Department of State, Central Files, 800.46/4 - 1262)
In course remarks regarding timing request treaty reinterpretation, Foreign Minister and Jakobson stated that one reason for pressing matter now was desire at time of budgetary difficulty take advantage available Soviet commercial credits that can also be used for weapons purchase. I remarked that British apparently had understanding that British missiles would also be purchased. They said that this understanding was correct.
Despite my frank remarks about October 30 - Novosibirsk period, conversation was cordial and sympathetic in tone. Both Finnish officials (Jakobson later privately) reiterated thanks for frank expressions of opinion. They left impression that they themselves feel timing their case is unfortunate and understand difficulties involved in matter, but, that nonetheless they desperately desire decision in Finland's favor for what they regard as vital political and psychological reasons.
Gufler
224. Memorandum From the Finnish Embassy to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760.E5612/6 - 1462. Secret. A typewritten notation reads: ``Confidential (Finnish Classification)". The memorandum was handed to Secretary Rusk by Ambassador Seppala during a June 14 meeting. A memorandum of their conversation is ibid.
Washington, June 14, 1962.
MEMORANDUM
The President of Finland, with reference to the conversation between the Secretary of State and the Finnish Ambassador on May 28th,/1/ wishes to draw the attention of the Secretary of State to the following:
/1/See Document 222.
1. The Secretary of State, judging by the questions he put to the Ambassador, appeared to assume that Finland might have accepted such commitments or obligations as would limit her independence. This is not the case. No such demands were made by the Soviet Government either at the meeting at Novosibirsk or on any other occasion, and no commitments or agreements, secret or public, have been made on behalf of Finland. The President of the Republic has no powers to enter into agreements without the consent of the Government and the Parliament. Thus no change has taken place in Finland's ability to pursue her policy of neutrality or in her relationships with other powers. The developments since the meeting at Novosibirsk have in fact confirmed this.
2. The initiative taken by the Finnish Government for the purpose of acquiring defensive guided missiles is not a result of the Finnish-Soviet exchanges of last fall in which this matter was not even touched upon. The acquisition of such missiles has been the aim of Finnish military authorities for several years. It may also be recalled that the President of Finland raised this matter in his talks with Prime Minister Macmillan in May 1961.
3. The Secretary of State asked the Ambassador how it could be explained that the Soviet Government, at the end of October last year, considered military consultations with Finland necessary and yet almost a month later agreed to put them off. No definitive reply to this question can be given from the Finnish side. We have no knowledge of how the Soviet Government viewed the European situation in the light of the Berlin crisis at different stages in the course of last fall. The note addressed to Finland on October 30th, 1961, should not, however, be considered as an isolated event. It was only one of several Soviet measures, the necessity of which was explained by the Soviet Government on the grounds of the danger of war created by the Berlin crisis. Similarly the proposal to initiate military consultations with Finland was withdrawn at a time when Soviet policy on the German question appeared to change. The fact that the Soviet Government at the end of November no longer considered military consultations with Finland necessary was thus entirely in line with the development of Soviet policy in general.
4. Naturally the Soviet note to Finland may have had several objectives. It has been suggested that one purpose, perhaps the most important, was to influence the Finnish Presidential election. There is no doubt that the note and the exchanges following it could not fail to have an influence on the course of Finnish politics on the eve of the election. If this was indeed the purpose of the Soviet Government, the intention could not, however, have been to bring about a change in Finnish policy, but rather to prevent any possible change. In any case the result of the Presidential election confirmed the continuity of the conduct of Finland's foreign policy, while the results of the Parliamentary elections made it possible to form a coalition government based on the majority secured by the non-socialist parties in Parliament.
225. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11 - RU/6 - 2562. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bohlen and approved in S on July 3. The meeting was held at the Foreign Ministry.
SET/MC/35 London, June 25, 1962, 11 a.m.
SECRETARY'S EUROPEAN TRIP (June 18 - 28, 1962)
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Bohlen Mr. Kohler (for the beginning)
Great Britain
Lord Home
Sir Harold Caccia
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Mr. Joseph Godber
Mr. Ian Samuel
[Ramsbotham, Mason]/1/
/1/Brackets in the source text.
SUBJECT
Missiles for Finland
Lord Home said the Secretary knew the situation in regard to the Finnish request for anti-aircraft missiles instead of obtaining them from Russia. The Scandinavian countries had indicated that they thought that this was very useful and, in addition, there was a military problem if Finland received them from Russia. He very much hoped that the United States would agree with them on this subject.
The Secretary inquired whether there was any parliamentary reaction to this request. He said the Finnish Ambassador had recently told him that they would not bring up the matter again with the United States and had implied there was no great hurry in its solution. Lord Home said he did not understand since the Finns were telling the British that the delay was intolerable. Mr. Mason said that he had had some evidence which indicated a slight slowing-down of Finnish interest. The Secretary said it might merely be a difference in Ambassadors estimates of the national interest.
The Secretary then inquired as to whether it is conceivable that these rockets would shoot at anybody other than the West. Lord Home admitted that this was the case since if the Russians wished to take action against the Finns, they would not do it in this fashion.
The Secretary then inquired if the British had discussed this with their bomber command, and Lord Home said they had and they agreed that this might give a twenty-minute earlier warning to the Russians in the event of war. Mr. Mason explained that there were three cities that the Finns were trying to defend.
The Secretary again asked against whom. Mr. Mason replied the Finns say against anybody, but did feel that the protection of the cities was better from our point of view than the idea of a belt, which would fit in more with Soviet plans.
The Secretary then inquired whether the Bloodhound and Thunderbolt missiles could be used for training or whether they were too big. Mr. Samuel remarked that he had understood that they were about the same size as Honest Johns and doubted if they were small enough for practice or training, but that he would check into this with the technical people.
Mr. Mason then remarked that they did not feel that these rockets contained any classified information under the 1961 agreement defining basic concepts, and that as far as they could gather, this was completely on Finnish initiative alone, with Soviet permission particularly to use the ruble credits.
Sir Harold Caccia said the political arguments were strongly in favor of supplying missiles from the West, while the military arguments against it were minimal, and that the only problem of Western military defense was that they would be placed on the road to Russia.
The Secretary said if the Finns were not crowding for an immediate decision, he would like to hold off and he would go back to Washington and check further on this matter with our military and also in regard to the nature of the information. He inquired whether or not commercial considerations entered into the British calculations. Mr. Mason said that the commercial effects had not been considered in any British examination of this matter and that in reply to the Finnish Embassy here, it had been said officially that commercial policy was not involved. The only things involved were political and military considerations. The Secretary repeated that our concern was that these missiles could only be fired at us. Mr. Mason stated that the Danes, Norwegians, and the Swedes had all approved this idea. Lord Home agreed that they could hold up, but hoped that our response would come quickly.
The Secretary said he understood that the Finns had not yet voted any funds for the purchase of these rockets, and went on to say that the United States was perhaps more skeptical in regard to Kekkonen's policy than the British. Lord Home said he understood this but felt that since the election there was less ground for suspicion since the elections had gone off quite well.
The Secretary then inquired what were the number of missiles and what was the total cost. Mr. Mason said there were approximately seventy-two missiles in groups of seventeen or eighteen. He said he did not know the exact figure but would check.
The Secretary said another aspect of the matter was that the Finns would pay out quite a lot of money for weapons which would only be useful against aircraft and in a short period of time, with the development of missiles, they would be useless. The Secretary said, however, he would consider it but he did not wish to imply that the result would be automatically favorable. He said we were having a great deal of difficulty with Congress on all matters affecting trade and foreign economics. He said the Executive was trying to maintain flexibility but that only yesterday the Senate, with one dissenting vote--the woman Senator, Mrs. Neuberg--had tightened up the financial export measure./2/ He repeated his willingness to reexamine this measure did not mean any yielding on substance at this time.
/2/S. 3161, a bill extending the Export Control Act of 1949 for 2 years, passed the Senate on a 59 - 1 roll call vote. For text of P.L. 87 - 515, approved July 1, 1962, see 76 Stat. 127.
226. Paper Prepared in the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC SG Meeting, July 20. Secret. Prepared in the Bureau of European Affairs for presentation to the July 20 meeting of the NSC Standing Group. In a July 19 memorandum to the Secretary, attached to the source text, Deputy Under Secretary Johnson endorsed the report's conclusions.
Washington, undated.
The NSC Standing Group discussed and concurred in the proposals made in this paper at its July 20 meeting. The President later read the paper and ``approved in general." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSC SG Meetings May - August 1962)
UNITED STATES POSITION ON REVISING THE FINNISH PEACE TREATY
Problem
To prepare a United States response to a British request that the Finnish Peace Treaty be revised or reinterpreted, as requested by the Finnish Government, to permit Finland to acquire guided missile weapons.
Factors
The Peace Treaty. The Treaty ending the state of war with Finland was entered into by Finland with the USSR (and several Iron Curtain countries) and with the United Kingdom (and several Commonwealth countries). The United States is not a signatory to the Treaty. The Treaty places certain restrictions on the Finnish armed forces in terms of manpower and equipment. The Treaty specifically prohibits Finland from acquiring guided missile weapons.
Early this year the Finnish Government requested British agreement to a reinterpretation of the Treaty to permit Finland to acquire guided missile weapons. The Finns stated that tacit approval of the USSR was indicated by a Soviet willingness to sell such weapons to Finland.
The Finnish Position. The Finnish Government states that it is endeavoring to strengthen its armed forces in order ``to strengthen the basis of Finnish neutrality". It states that it is a generally accepted view that ``a nation aspiring to neutrality must have a convincing capability of effectively protecting by its own efforts the integrity of its territory". The Finnish Government holds that the restrictions of the Treaty prevent Finland from establishing a modern defense. The Finnish Government asserts that at the time the Treaty was written guided missiles were weapons designed exclusively for aggressive purposes; the military restrictions of the Treaty were designed to prevent Finland from acquiring an aggressive war potential. The Finnish Government asserts that as a result of technical progress guided missiles are now indispensable for defense, and without such weapons Finland cannot make her neutrality convincing.
The Finnish armed forces have for long endeavored to acquire more modern and sophisticated weapons. According to the Finnish Foreign Office the acquisition of guided missile weapons is now seen as a method or device to strengthen Finland's position vis-a-vis the USSR. The Finns state that the possession of such weapons will constitute a deterrent against Soviet demands that Article II of the 1948 Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance be applied. This Article, which formed the basis for the Soviet Note to Finland of last October 30, provides for joint military consultations between the two countries when there exists a military threat to the USSR through Finland from Germany and her allies. This Article is a severe restriction on Finland's freedom of action. The Finns now feel that the possession of some guided missile batteries will give them ``grounds", or an ``excuse", to resist future Soviet demands that Article II be implemented.
Finnish Procurement Plans. The Finnish Government has stated publicly that, because of Finland's neutrality, purchases of military equipment for Finland's armed forces must be balanced between the East and West. The Finns have, in the form of an old Ruble credit, about $40 million available for military purchases from the USSR. The Finns have already agreed to purchase aircraft (presumably some MIG 21s), naval engines and guns with part of this sum. In addition they intend to spend some $12.5 million for two to three guided missile batteries of six launchers each.
The Finns have told the British that they are prepared to spend in the United Kingdom some $560,000 for the Vigilant, an anti-tank missile. They have also shown an interest in British surface-to-air guided missiles, the Thunderbird I and Bloodhound I. The Finns have made it clear, however, that no budgetary allocations have as yet been made for such British weapons.
The Finns have already this year purchased about $3 million worth of modern British radar, and a naval training vessel. They are also purchasing anti-aircraft weapons in Switzerland. These items are not prohibited by the Peace Treaty.
British Position. The British Government accepts the Finnish contention that Finland's position vis-a-vis the USSR will be strengthened by the possession of guided missile weapons. The British feel that the Finnish position is reasonable and realistic. Moreover, the British express much concern over the consequences of a refusal of the Finnish request. They fear that the Finnish armed forces, a strong pro-Western element in Finland, may conclude that the West has no confidence in Finland; morale in the Finnish armed forces would thereupon decline to the detriment of the West. The British admit that Finnish purchase of guided weapons from the USSR would involve technical consultations between the Finns and the Soviets; the British feel, however, that this would be compensated for by the establishment of useful contacts between the Finnish and British military.
The British admit that there are some military risks in permitting Finland to have guided weapons. They feel that the overall impact of this would, however, be small; the Finns intend, it is asserted, to ring three or possibly four Finnish cities with guided missile batteries. This would not, in the British view, cause serious problems for the Western bomber forces.
Position of Sweden, Norway and Denmark. The Norwegian, Danish and Swedish Governments all favor, according to the British, allowing the Finns to acquire guided missile weapons. Only the Swedes have officially informed the United States of their position in the matter which is that they perceive no objections to acquiescing in the Finnish request for reasons of Swedish national security. Reports from our Embassies at Oslo and Copenhagen tend to confirm the British assertion with respect to Norway and Denmark.
United States Views. The Department has consistently taken the position that it would not be in the best interests of the West to agree to a Treaty revision or reinterpretation. The problem is a political-military one requiring careful appraisal of a number of complex political and military factors. The Department's position has, accordingly, been based on the views expressed in the Department of Defense on the military aspects of the matter, and on a political assessment made within the Department.
A military study prepared by the Joint Staff concluded that it would not be in the best interests of the West to permit acquisition by Finland of guided missile weapons; this conclusion was based chiefly on the statement that ``there is no way to ensure that these weapons and facilities would not be used against the West". It was also based on the conclusion that Finnish acquisition of such weapons would be interpreted by Sweden and the Northern NATO members as a shift in the balance of power to the USSR. (This has since not proved to be the case.)
Subsequently, however, the Department of Defense, in again reviewing the problem, has revised its position. Although that Department does not withdraw its military analysis, as outlined above, it does now believe that the problem is essentially a political one and that the political considerations involved would appear to be overriding in favor of permitting Finland to acquire guided missile weapons.
The Department of State has for long been concerned with the external policies followed by President Kekkonen. The course of events during the past 6 - 8 months reveals, in the Department's view, an excessive Finnish accommodation to the Soviet Union. This has been demonstrated by the weakness of President Kekkonen's response to the Soviet Note of October 30, the Khrushchev - Kekkonen conversations at Novosibirsk, Kekkonen's dominant role in the formation of a new Finnish Government following elections early this year, and the about-face in the official position of the Finnish Government with respect to the forthcoming Communist World Youth Festival at Helsinki.
The Department has held that, given the military risks, the problem hinges on the amount of confidence that can be placed in the Finnish political leadership. The recent course of Finnish-Soviet relations has not given grounds for much confidence.
Consideration with Respect to British Missiles. The British wish to sell the surface-to-air missiles Thunderbird I and Bloodhound I to Finland beginning in 1964 or 1965. (The Finns have given no definite undertaking with respect to such purchases.) The United States has held that the sale of these missiles to Finland requires the consent of the United States Government because they contain identifiable classified information of United States origin. The British contest this view, asserting that the relevant information has been declassified. This matter is now undergoing study within the United States Government.
The Secretary's Conversation with Lord Home.
Lord Home raised the subject of guided missiles for Finland with the Secretary in London on June 25 following an earlier restatement of United States opposition to acquiescence in the Finnish request. Lord Home put forward the known British views and the Secretary indicated his willingness to re-examine the subject, but emphasized that this did not mean any yielding, at the time, on the substance.
Ambassador Nykopp's Call on General Maxwell Taylor.
Former Finnish Ambassador to the United States Johan Nykopp (now in private business) called on General Taylor on July 3. He made several points: (1) Finland is doing its best to maintain its position between East and West; (2) The Finnish Army is well trained and capable of giving a good account of itself; (3) The Finns feel that the time has come to equip their Army with modern equipment; they do not have in mind expensive sophisticated equipment, but are looking for cheap equipment; (4) In buying equipment, it will be necessary to strike a balance between Russian and Western equipment; (5) If the subject arises, Ambassador Nykopp hoped the United States would adopt an understanding attitude.
Program of United States Military Assistance to Finland.
The President has approved a program authorizing the sale to Finland in fiscal 1963 of military equipment at discount prices (involving a cost to the United States of $10 million). The President waived certain legal requirements with respect to this program, and no government-to-government agreement with Finland is contemplated. Insofar as possible, Finnish purchases in the United States would be carried out privately or on the basis of arrangements worked out directly between the Services. No offer of military aid to Finland will be made. The Finns have not as yet been informed of this program, and when they are they will be told simply that they can purchase military equipment in the United States at prices and under terms they will find attractive.
Comment
The Finnish Government has recently been more forthcoming in explaining what it considers Finland needs for a modern defense capability. The Finns have linked the problem to Article II of the 1948 Finnish-Soviet Treaty (as explained above). Although President Kekkonen has virtually complete control over Finland's external policies, and has shown an excessive accommodation to the interests of the USSR, there are important restraints on him. Among such restraints are the Finnish armed forces which represent an important pro-Western element in the Finnish society and body politic; by diligent effort on the part of Finnish military leaders few Communists are within the officer and NCO ranks. The Finnish armed forces can continue to be a pro-Western influence in Finland of considerable importance. It is noteworthy that the Commanding General of the Finnish armed forces has accepted an invitation to visit the United States next autumn.
It is evident that the Finns will, under presently known plans, be making their major purchases from the USSR. Finnish intentions with respect to purchases from the United Kingdom are most indefinite and vague. Acquiescence in the Finnish request, without more specific Finnish undertakings with respect to purchases from the West, could tend to facilitate Finnish purchases from the USSR. The result could be a one-sided bargain in which Finland may be drawn more closely into a military relationship with the USSR. In the Department's view, it is only prudent to seek to prevent such a one-sided bargain.
Attached is a suggested note to the British/1/ in response to Lord Home's request that we again review the matter. The note proposes that both the United States and the United Kingdom sell to Finland at attractive prices arms not prohibited by the Peace Treaty. While continuing to oppose revision of the Treaty, the note indicates that we would review our position if Finland gave undertakings that it would balance purchases of weapons now prohibited by the Treaty between the East and West.
/1/Not printed. See Document 228.
227. Telegram From the Military attache in Finland to the Department of the Army
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760E.56/7 - 2062. Secret; Noforn. Also sent to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Department of State. The source text is the Department of State copy.
Helsinki, July 20, 1962, 10:30 a.m.
C - 40. DEPTAR for ACSI, COFS USAF for AFCIN 1 - D2, AFCIN - 1Z - A. This is a joint Army, Navy, and Air Force message. State for EUR/BNA and ISA/DOD. (Immediately) Reference OUSARMA Finland msg C - 39./1/
/1/Not found.
1. (S) Finland 350/2/ requested meeting with ARMA to discuss urgent topic. Source stated that he was acting as official spokesman for Chief of Staff, Lt Gen A A Maunula and made following remarks:
/2/Not further identified.
a. Maunula considers it highly undesirable to purchase large quantities of Soviet mil equip for Finnish Army. Hopes that US equipment be made available.
b. Maunula particularly pleased with approach thru mil channels and desires minimum political participation in purchase arrangements.
c. Maunula desires to program purchases from US over extended period so that small numbers of US items can be included in series of supplemental budgets along with other foreign military items without giving impression of large US purchases.
d. Maunula hopes favorable consideration may be given to Finnish request with items procured at lowest possible cost.
If purchases made, Chief of Staff considers it necessary to work out method of documentation in Washington between Finnish and US mil to eliminate possibility of anti-Western critics in Finland using public info on cost and quantity figures for propaganda purposes. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
2. (U) SCP - 1. Msg signed by Drain USARMA, Byrd ALUSNA and Melvia Actg USAIRA.
228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760E.5612/5 - 2762. Secret. Drafted by Christensen, cleared by MC, and approved by Burdett. Repeated to Helsinki, Moscow, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Oslo, Reykjavik, and Paris Topol.
Washington, July 27, 1962, 7:47 p.m.
588. Department today handed Greenhill, Counselor British Embassy, Note on question revising Finnish Peace Treaty./1/ Following is brief summary of Note. (For Helsinki: text is identical to draft note attached to Position Paper/2/ pouched July 20.)
/1/A memorandum of conversation is ibid., 396.1/7 - 2762. After reading the position paper, Greenhill commented that the United States had come ``halfway along the road."
/2/Document 226.
Remains opinion US that revision Finnish Peace Treaty permit Finland acquire guided missiles would result in net military disadvantage for West. Disadvantage not so great however as to make military factor by itself decisive. US also remains of opinion that policies pursued by Kekkonen do not give grounds much confidence that he would be prepared withstand Soviet pressures. Record of events in Finnish-Soviet relations past six to eight months is one of dangerous compromises and accommodations with USSR. There is reason to fear that after Finnish purchase missiles from USSR, Finland may not carry through with purchases from West if Soviets object. Nevertheless US agrees with UK on importance strengthening pro-Western military leadership in Finland. Clearly in our interest avoid giving Finnish military impression they have been deserted by West and argument can be advanced that strengthening Finnish armed forces will make possible rejection future Soviet demands on Finland for consultation under Article II of 1948 Treaty.
US - UK objectives accordingly should be to strengthen Finnish armed forces with Western weapons while guarding against preponderant Finnish purchases from USSR. US prepared to facilitate Finnish purchases from US sources at attractive prices of weapons not prohibited by Peace Treaty. Similiar action by UK would be helpful. Proceeding this fashion would contribute to strengthening Finnish armed forces without disadvantage involved in revising Treaty.
Finnish proposals for revising Treaty (according to Foreign Office memo June 28 to Embassy London) accord disproportionate opportunities to Soviet Bloc. Arrangements are at hand for acquiring missiles from USSR while purchases from UK dependent on future appropriations Finnish Parliament. Specifically US Government wishes to know what undertakings UK has in mind obtaining from Finland to assure, if Treaty revised, that purchases will in fact be roughly balanced between East and West. Unless there are such undertakings from Finnish political as well as military authorities revision of Treaty likely to facilitate purchases from Soviet Bloc.
US Government continues believe its consent required prior to release Bloodhound and Thunderbird missiles to Finland. US prepared however to hold joint consultation at technical level with a view to resolve misunderstandings and differences of opinion.
End summary, full text being pouched.
Department informed Greenhill we would appreciate early reaction to Note since we were getting number of indications that Finns interested in acquiring weapons from US. Greenhill reiterated urgency involved in settling problems connected with Thunderbird and Bloodhound missiles. Department suggested S - DMICC (State - Defense Military Information Control Committee) might meet with its British counterpart to resolve outstanding questions.
Rusk
229. Telegram from the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760E.5612/7 - 3062. Secret. Repeated to London, Moscow, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Oslo, Reykjavik, and Paris.
Helsinki, July 30, 1962, 7 p.m.
41. Embtel 40./1/ Following his call on Merikoski, O'Neill had appointment with Foreign Office Permanent Official Jakobson, who gave him following information, with authorization to pass it on to me. O'Neill requests, however, that discretion be used in handling this background information particularly in view frank discussion views of President Kekkonen.
/1/Telegram 40, July 30, transmitted the text of a Finnish aide-memoire to the British Government that announced Finland's decision to withdraw its application to the Soviet Union for the purchase of guided missiles. (Ibid.)
Action withdrawing application for purchase guided missiles was President's idea and taken on his initiative after consultation with Finnish personalities concerned. President apparently motivated at least in part by concern he feels as result information he has received from Finn representatives abroad regarding reaction in interested free world countries to occurrences surrounding Novosibirsk meeting and by circumstance that this reaction appears have become entangled with question modernization Finnish armed forces. He therefore apparently considers it imprudent pursue matter at least for time being. His outstanding motivations for dropping it now are: (1) wish demonstrate that Finland made request freely and is free to withdraw it, and (2) belief it advisable, in view long delay in bringing matter to satisfactory conclusion, withdraw request in order remove any grounds Russians might feel application gives them press Finland for an answer or for action one way or another about it.
I believe this action will disappoint many elements Finland that want proceed with modernization armed forces from genuine desire increase Finland's ability defend itself and thus strengthen its independent position. Military circles in particular will probably not be satisfied indefinitely with suspension modernization and will likely at some time that may seem feasible to them again press civilians reopen question treaty revision./2/
Gufler
/2/In telegram 53 from Helsinki, August 3, Gufler reported that Jakobson had summoned him to the Foreign Office and repeated the information given to British Embassy officer O'Neill. (Ibid., 760E.5612/8 - 362)
230. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760E.5/8 - 662. Secret. Repeated to London.
Helsinki, August 6, 1962, 6 p.m.
59. Re Deptel 22./1/ Believe it desirable proceed now with implementation program to provide Finland with US military equipment at discount prices. Considerations leading to inception of program (Embtel 435, February 15)/2/ even though Finns not now seeking acquire guided missiles. Important proceed with program to bolster military morale which likely damaged as result President's decision cease efforts acquire guided missiles for present. (Embtels 40, 41, 53)/3/ Program could also lessen dangers involved in possibility that President made decision re missiles in belief West had lost faith in Finland.
/1/Telegram 22, August 1, requested Embassy comment on a program of military assistance to Finland. (Ibid., 760E.5/8 - 162)
/2/See footnote 3, Document 213.
/3/See Document 229 and footnotes 1 and 2 thereto.
Embassy perceives no objection to service-to-service approach. Finns have indicated they prefer negotiations of arms procurement on this basis (Military Attache's joint message C - 40)./4/
/4/Document 227.
Army Attache has today confirmed with Finn military that list of items desired by Finns forwarded to Finnish Military attache Washington July 17 (Military Attache's joint message C - 39)./5/ There no indication Finns contemplate changes in composition this list at present time.
/5/Not found.
Presentation of Finnish list or discussion of list with Finns soon thereafter would provide appropriate opportunity present US program for sale US equipment at discount prices. Military attache concurs this message.
Gufler
231. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760E.5612/8 - 862. Secret; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department.
Helsinki, August 8, 1962, 5 p.m.
69. Reference: Embtel 62./1/ Highly dependable source/2/ with whom I discussed various matters today referred to Finnish decision postponing equipment its armed forces with guided missiles (re Embtel 53)/3/ and said that this action reflected President Kekkonen's unhappiness over Western attitude toward Finland and his desire to demonstrate that he is bound by no secret rearmament agreements with Soviet Union. He feels that he is unreasonably mistrusted in West and that ``good results his American visit seem to have run dry". He is inclined reproach Finnish military with having been over eager modernize and equip themselves with guided missiles and blame them for having pushed matter too fast. From remarks both by this source and another one,/4/ I believe that his mood and decision have apparently been greatly influenced by reports received from Finnish Military attache Washington of attitudes displayed and remarks made in Pentagon.
/1/Telegram 62, August 6, reported that Gufler had received an album documenting Kekkonen's visit to the United States and planned to use the occasion of its delivery to explore Kekkonen's reaction to recent developments. Gufler requested instructions from the Department on whether to follow this suggested approach. (Ibid., 760E.11/8 - 762)
/2/A handwritten note on the source text identifies Hallama as the source.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 229.
/3/A handwritten note on the source text identifies Jakobson as the source.
Both sources have given me impression that President is in somewhat disturbed and unhappy mood and feels badly hurt over what he considers Western misunderstanding of his difficult position and apparent Western failure to believe his repeated assurances that he undertook no secret agreements at Novosibirsk.
Gufler
232. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760E.11/8 - 3162. Confidential.
Helsinki, August 31, 1962, 4 p.m.
105. Called yesterday afternoon on President Kekkonen accompanied by Friberg as interpreter to present him with album of his visit to United States. Also presented framed colored picture sent to US earlier for delivery to him. Kekkonen appeared genuinely pleased, expressed his gratitude and said he would write personal letter to President Kennedy.
After usual amenities about summer activities, I asked President what he thought of present world situation. ``It doesn't look too good", he replied, ``and Berlin is particularly bad." He then mentioned his plans visit Soviet Union with nothing in mind of a political nature ``for vacation" in October, prior to his visit to France. He remarked that right after de Gaulle had extended French invitation, Khrushchev had written him letter dated April 4, renewing earlier oral invitation. Khru-shchev's letter was couched in such terms that Kekkonen assumes he will have chance meet and talk with him. This he believes will be particularly interesting since he will be able pass to de Gaulle his impressions of Khrushchev's current attitudes.
Returning to German question, I remarked that ``Berlin crisis" had been created solely by Soviet Union which could turn it on and off at will and that it was therefore not genuine crisis. I strongly expressed hope that Finland would not change its policy toward Germany or in any way modify its present relationship toward Germany by signing peace treaty with Pankow regime or changing status Finnish relationship with it. I added that present relationship is consistent with Finnish neutrality. President said that he had heard rumors of Soviet pressure on Finland to recognize East Germany. They were simply not true, he affirmed. He added, ``We have done fairly well so far and I hope it will continue. I don't have any reason to doubt that we won't come out all right."
I next took up with President matter Finnish participation in San Juan conference (Embassy telegram 93)/1/ on middle level manpower. I told him that attendance by Minister Pohjala or some other Cabinet member concerned with such matters would be welcomed. I explained that I had discussed the matter with Foreign Office and had provided papers pertinent to conference. The President replied that Foreign Minister Merikoski had spoken to him about conference although he had seen no papers. President promised study matter and talk to his Ministers about it.
/1/Telegram 93, August 21, reported that a Finnish decision to attend the San Juan conference had to await the return of a number of senior officials to Helsinki. (Ibid., 398.06 - SA/8 - 2162)
President raised topic of Finnish trade and said that besides German situation, Finland faces serious difficulties in years ahead on matters of trade but he had noticed that solutions arrived at by Finns had received the support of West. He hoped that support and understanding would continue. I asked whether he was concerned about enlargement of EEC. He said no, Finland was ``following the situation from afar"; Finland will wait see how England, Switzerland, Austria and Sweden make out first. He said that representatives from ``West" had given him to understand that ``our action is only right one" and that policy of wait-and-see is, under the circumstances, wisest. This, he added, is also attitude of industrialists in Finland. He went on say that Finnish industrial expansion was going on rapidly and would continue to increase until 1965. For this reason it is all the more important that Finland assure itself of markets in West. Finland can arrange to build factories itself but needs support of West to insure continuing high level of trade to keep factories operating. He said this with obvious intent underscore that what Finland needs is trade, not just help in building industrial capacity.
When we were discussing summer activities, I mentioned among other trips taken in Finland three day visit to Seppalas Island. President said that he had been ill this summer again with his old trouble, otherwise he had expected visit Seppalas same week-end. He felt illness was his gall bladder although the doctors have not been able to make definite diagnosis. He has been operated on twice but operations do not seem to have helped. He said he was just getting over the effects of his illness. I have heard from another well informed source outside government that he suffers from diabetes and for that reason always travels with physician in attendance. This source said that Kekkonen always suffers health troubles when subjected to strain or worry. Yesterday afternoon he appeared be in fairly good health although he showed his age more than when I last saw him.
On taking leave, I thanked President for receiving me and told him I should like to see him again before long and would especially like see him after his visits to Soviet Union and France. He replied that he would be glad to see me then and added that if at any time I had anything on my mind I could call him. He said that he had hoped to have me at his summer place in Naantali but weather had been so bad that he was afraid to have anyone there this summer. ``Next summer will have to be better", he added jokingly.
Throughout our entire conversation he was most friendly and relaxed and did not even hint at any controversial matters.
Gufler
233. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Finland
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760E.5/8 - 662. Secret. Drafted by Christensen; cleared by G/PM, PRCS, and the Department of Defense; and approved by Burdett. Repeated to London.
Washington, September 8, 1962, 12:54 p.m.
55. Department considering how best proceed with plans to facilitate Finnish purchases in US of weapons not prohibited by Peace Treaty. Purpose of this action essentially to bolster position and determination of Finnish military, as one of the strongest pro-Western elements in Finland, and also to strengthen Finnish will to resist Soviet political and economic pressure. Embassy views requested on following:
1. In view of Finland's public policy of neutrality no military aid type program for Finland is envisaged, no firm offer of military aid would be made, and no military or political commitment involved. It would, therefore, seem preferable to deal directly with the Finns at the Service level, and, in view of the missiles affair, to do so now (Embtel 59)./1/ We would suggest to Finnish military authorities that we are prepared, in event Finns wish to purchase military items, to be accommodating with respect to terms and arrangements which take into account Finland's special geographic and political position. We could inquire about list of military items which we understand Finns interested in buying from US.
/1/Document 230.
2. This action could be taken with the Finnish Military attache in Washington by officials in DOD/ISA. Approach could also be made in Helsinki by Army attache directly with his Finnish military contacts. It might be desirable discuss directly with General Simelius perhaps ini-tially in Helsinki by the Army attache and then during his visit to US in October.
3. It may also be useful for Ambassador to inform Kekkonen (before his visit to USSR) along similar lines either before or after conversation with Simelius. This may, as suggested in Embtel 96,/2/ demonstrate our interest in Finland's future, and while we have not, and do not now, look with favor on recent Finnish actions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union our willingness to make US military equipment available to Finland should serve to convince Kekkonen that he and Finland are not deserted by the West. It may also as suggested by the Embassy give useful opportunity to warn Kekkonen of dangers in placing too much reliance on USSR as source of weapons supply. Kekkonen would be informed that we are discussing subject directly with the Finnish military authorities, and that we are thinking in terms of Service to Service, and insofar as practicable, unpublicized transactions.
Rusk
/2/Telegram 96, August 24, reported that Gufler was seeking to arrange a series of meetings with Kekkonen to counter misimpressions of U.S. policy objectives in Finland. (Department of State, Central Files, 760E.11/8 - 2462)
234. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Finland
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760E.5612/9 - 1462. Secret. Drafted by Christensen; cleared by Burdett, PRCS, BNA, G/PM, and the Department of Defense; and approved by Johnson. Repeated to London.
Washington, September 21, 1962, 5:56 p.m.
68. You should seek appointment with Kekkonen as far in advance his departure as feasible and inform him of our willingness to facilitate Finnish purchase from US sources of arms not prohibited by Peace Treaty. Believe Deptel 55 (as modified by Embtel 130)/1/ contains adequate guidance. You may wish to stress that our proposals formulated in way to avoid any impingement on Finland's neutrality which we recognize and support. Accordingly, no military aid type program is envisaged. Department concurs in soliciting Kekkonen's views on procedures.
/1/Telegram 55 is printed as Document 233. In telegram 130 from Helsinki, September 14, Gufler suggested he approach Kekkonen regarding the offer of U.S. military equipment at a discount. (Department of State, Central Files, 760E.5612/9 - 1462)
Army attache should inform Simelius after you talk with Kekkonen and confine himself to Departmental guidance referred to above. He should state we would be glad discuss subject further with Simelius in Washington.
In event either Kekkonen or Simelius raises subject of guided missiles, and our attitude thereto (Embtel 144)/2/ you and Army attache should state: The US wishes like the Finns to see Finnish neutrality strengthened and as our present offer demonstrates sympathizes with Finland's desire improve its armed forces. However, what we have heard of Finland's plans to acquire sophisticated weapons systems from USSR raises in our minds questions re (a) strategic and tactical thinking behind the proposed purchase and use these particular weapons, (b) the significance for Finland's neutrality of dependence on USSR, and the relationships with USSR which this particular transaction involves. Moreover, from what we know of Finnish procurement plans purchases would be preponderantly from the USSR. Ambassador would welcome and report to Department President's (or Simelius') views.
/2/In telegram 144, September 20, Gufler responded that he welcomed the Department's proposal that he inform Kekkonen of U.S. weapons purchase plans. He also requested guidance on issues of guided missiles and treaty revision. (Ibid., 760E.5612/9 - 2062)
Finnish Military attache here will be advised after Department receives report your conversations.
For Embassy London (Embtel 1180):/3/ You should inform FonOff that we have instructed Ambassador Gufler to see Kekkonen on arms matter early next week.
/3/In telegram 1180 from London, September 20, the Embassy reported that it had been unable to extract any comment from British officials about U.S. plans for supplying the Finns with weapons. (Ibid., 760E.5612/9 - 2062)
Department of Defense concurs.
Rusk
235. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760E.5612/9 - 2962. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London.
Helsinki, September 29, 1962, 9 p.m.
157. Reference: Deptel 68./1/ I called on President Kekkonen at 4 this afternoon and informed him as instructed that we are prepared arrange for Finland purchase US military equipment on favorable terms. I stressed that this was not gift or loan but offer arrange purchase terms and prices which would suit Finland's special circumstances, taking into account need not embarrass or disturb Finland's neutrality. I said I had no specific or detailed proposal present at this stage but was seeking President's comments and advice. I added, that (A) no military aid program for Finland was envisaged, (B) that no offer of military aid would be made and (C) that no political commitments were involved.
/1/Document 234.
President expressed his appreciation for offer. He said that there are large gaps between plans for procurement military equipment and ability Finnish Government realize them and he therefore is grateful for our proposal. Finland is prepared buy weapons from different parts of world in line with its policy of neutrality. He made special point of stressing that in principle Finland has nothing against purchasing military equipment from US.
He said that purchases from Soviet Union were made only because of availability of ruble funds. He took pains explain that ruble loan made to Finland in 1958 was originally intended for industrial and railway equipment. When, however, it was not possible find in Soviet Union equipment that would meet Finnish needs, large surplus remained which Finnish defense forces proposed be used for arms purchases. That is the history, he concluded, and ``under no circumstances would I have sought loan from Soviet Union for purchase of arms."
In regard to manner of proceeding he said that he would take matter up with Finnish Cabinet at earliest possible time. He explained that as first step and before military take over matter, it would be wisest for him to get ``political agreement" by consultations within Finnish Government. After that, he himself or some member of the Cabinet will get in touch with me.
He told me that General Simelius would be informed of content of our talk and that matter could be taken up with Simelius in Washington. He suggested that Simelius might be shown equipment which we are willing sell and perhaps also equipment that Simelius himself asks about.
I asked President whether we might expect some answer from him before Simelius goes to US. He replied that time is so short that it may be difficult and that perhaps it might be better continue our discussion after Simelius returns from his visit to US.
Just before our departure, President said that Finnish Foreign Minister Merikoski, who is now in US at UN, has an appointment see Secretary Rusk on October 7. Subjects which Merikoski will take up, he said, were ``routine and current." He also said that Merikoski had gone to Paris to see his French counterpart to explain the Finnish situation prior to President Kekkonen's visit there in October.
President did not say whether he would inform Merikoski of our offer. We assume that he may, although his use of words ``routine and current" may have been intended to imply the contrary.
Frank Friberg who acted as interpreter and I have impression that President Kekkonen was gratified with our offer. We have additional impressions that:
1. Simelius may do some ``shopping and exploring" in US and this may involve treaty modification and guided missile questions.
2. Extent to which Finns decide take advantage proposal likely depend on what is offered representatives beginning with Simelius and up-to-dateness of material offered in comparison that available elsewhere.
3. It would be unwise pending further information from Kekkonen make any further approach any Finns in Helsinki. Unless instructed to contrary Army attache will not approach Simelius here but leave matter to be taken up with him in Washington.
View President's expected absence on visits to Soviet Union and France and other factors affecting timing as well as possibility that Finns may await report from Simelius after his visit to US believe we cannot expect definitive reply until his return.
Gufler
236. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760E.5612/10 - 762. Secret. Drafted by Davis on October 8 and approved in S on October 11. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Astoria. The source text is labeled ``Part III of V." Separate memoranda of this conversation are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2153.
SecDel/MC/137 New York, October 7, 1962, 11 a.m - noon.
SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September 1962
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary
Richard H. Davis
Finland
Foreign Minister Merikoski
Ambassador Seppala
Mr. Max Jakobson, Director Political Department
SUBJECT
Acquisition of Ground-to-Air Missiles by Finland
Having touched on Finland's policy of neutrality and President Kekkonen's visit last year to the USA, the Foreign Minister said he wished to turn to a more important question which had been the subject of previous discussions. This question was the Finnish plan to acquire defensive air missiles. However, last spring the Finns found their plan to buy anti-aircraft missiles from the USSR using their ruble credit there had raised some doubts in the US. As it became clear to the Finns that linking the question of the reinterpretation of the Peace Treaty to these particular purchases had become a liability to Finland in their foreign relations, the Finnish Government had decided not to go ahead on these purchases. By this decision the Finns wanted to demonstrate that they were not acting under compulsion from any quarter in this matter.
The Foreign Minister continued that the acquisition of anti-aircraft missiles was not so important for purely military reasons. The Finns realize their military potential is not great. From the point of view of creating internal confidence in the Finnish potential to defend themselves, the acquisition of missiles is of considerable value.
The Foreign Minister expressed satisfaction that the Finnish point of view has now been understood by the UK and the USA. He wished to extend to the Secretary his personal appreciation that this matter has been brought to a conclusion. It would now be possible for the Finns to modernize their defense forces in this important respect. The British Government's decision to accept Finnish reinterpretation of the Peace Treaty and the willingness of the US to sell conventional armaments were regarded by the Finnish Govt. as expressions of confidence in its policy of neutrality. The sole purpose of Finnish efforts to modernize and strengthen their defense capacity is to strengthen their security and neutrality.
As to what amount of armaments including ground-to-air missiles the Finns were prepared to purchase, the Foreign Minister stated this would be considered by the Finnish Cabinet after the return of President Kekkonen from his visit to the Soviet Union. He could only say at this time that the Finns are taking into account in deciding on what purchases to make the possible effect on Finnish neutrality. He emphasized that at the moment the Finns had no plans for the purchase of ground-to-air missiles. The British had made certain proposals in the past including the offer of Vigilant anti-tank missiles. These British offers will be considered at the same time the Cabinet meets. He reiterated that though in the past the Finns had planned to buy specific missiles from the USSR, at the moment there were no definite plans.
Turning to the subject of aircraft purchases, the Foreign Minister pointed out that Finland had up to the present time purchased military aircraft from France, Sweden and the UK. The Finns were now negotiating for the purchase of a small number of Soviet aircraft--one squadron of MIG fighters. This type of fighter plane can carry air-to-air missiles but until now the Finns have not negotiated with the Soviets for the purchase of such missiles. This squadron would contain only 15 combat planes though in addition some training planes would be involved.
The Foreign Minister said he had wanted to inform the Secretary in general terms of the Finnish position at this stage on the acquisition of defensive armaments. The Finns regarded it as most important to clarify their position on purchases of armaments. He also wished to refer to the information recently received from Ambassador Gufler by President Kekkonen that the US is willing to sell conventional armaments to Finland. As the President told Ambassador Gufler, the Finns have received this news with the greatest satisfaction. What the Finns may be able to buy from the US will have to be considered carefully when the Cabinet reviews the over-all problem of armament purchases.
The Foreign Minister then referred to the disastrous year which Finland had experienced for its agricultural production and remarked on the great drain on the Finnish budget. However, he thought that some arrangements could be made for purchasing certain armaments in the US.
The Secretary said he wished to emphasize that the primary responsibility in regard to the reinterpretation of the Finnish Peace Treaty rested upon the parties to that Treaty. It was not for the US to reinterpret the Treaty in place of the signatories to the Treaty. However personally the Secretary said he was a little puzzled by the underlying military rationale for the purchase of missiles now being considered by Finland. Missiles were a very expensive business. They require elaborate equipment, complicated radar, high technical skill and training and expensive construction work. For instance, the Secretary cited the limited number of ground-to-air missiles supplied to Cuba by the USSR which we estimate to cost in the neighborhood of $60 million.
Subsequently the Secretary said he would like to make some further observations. He thought careful consideration should be given to the circumstances of Finland's military position in regard to its geographical location and its relation to the continent of Europe. Besides the factor of expense of installing these air defense missiles and the training of personnel, the problem of war in Europe should be seen in terms of a rocket war. Here the Secretary remarked that while we of course hoped there would be no war, if his conversation with the Foreign Minister was to have any reality on the issue of armaments purchases, it must be spoken about in terms of the possibility of war. In the age of rockets manned aircraft were beginning to be obsolete and the Finns might not find any to shoot at with ground-to-air missiles. In his opinion the primary defense of Finland was not to become a target for either side in the event of war. The warring powers would probably be so heavily involved with themselves that these countries which had no targets would be left alone because there would be nothing worth shooting at.
The Secretary said he did not wish to comment further on the expense of acquiring missiles from the Soviet Union since he was not certain the value the Finns put on their ruble credit. But if the Finns plan to spend their own resources for the purchase of missiles, he would counsel them to consider this matter very carefully. Missiles which other countries were willing to supply were in all probability already obsolete--first generation missiles--or otherwise these countries would not be willing to sell them to Finland.
The Secretary reiterated that his comments did not cancel his earlier remark that the question of the reinterpretation of the Peace Treaty was basically an issue for the signatories to the Treaty. However, he thought as a friend to Finland he ought to express his personal puzzlement at the Finnish desire to acquire missiles given Finland's limited resources.
Foreign Minister Merikoski expressed surprise that the Secretary could look so deeply into one of so many countries in the world. He said their ruble credit in the USSR was a commercial credit and therefore it did have value. It was not a gift from the Soviet Union. As he had already remarked, the Finns realize their planned purchase of ground-to-air missiles was not of great value from the military viewpoint. The Finnish idea was to have some kind of air defense which their population supports. Even at that he realized this would not be a completely effective defense. Their main purpose was to strengthen the belief and confidence of the Finnish people in their government's efforts to be able to defend themselves. This project would not run into anything like the cost mentioned by the Secretary in regard to Cuba. They had previously planned to purchase from the USSR only three batteries costing in the neighborhood of $12 million. They had already made a contract in the UK for the necessary radar amounting to approximately four million pounds. The Secretary observed that his remarks had related only to ground-to-air missiles and not to anti-tank missiles or other armaments. He added that if we were sending an official note to Finland, we would not be saying the things said today.
The Foreign Minister commented the Secretary had mentioned the training of personnel for these complex ground-to-air missiles. He wished to note that the question of training of crews had not yet come up with the USSR. The portion of ruble credit allocated for purchases from the USSR of defensive weapons by the Finnish military had already been used up so if there were to be new purchases it would require a new decision by the Finnish Government.
The Secretary observed that training ground crews for missiles requires about twelve to eighteen months. If the purchase of air-to-ground missiles meant that crews would be furnished by the supplying country in the intervening time, this could create embarrassment for Finnish neutrality. For instance in Cuba if their defensive air missiles were to be used in the next year, we would have to assume that they would be serviced by Soviet crews. This question of trained crews could present difficult political problems.
The Foreign Minister asserted that the only current training project concerned the training in the Soviet Union of Finnish air officers for aircraft purchased in the USSR. There would be no Soviet instructors in Finland.
The Secretary remarked that he was glad he was not a member of the Finnish Cabinet and had to participate in decisions on the question of purchasing missiles. This question involved the position of Finland in relation to the total military picture in Europe. If the Finns had a different geographical position, the problems might be different. Referring to the expense of sophisticated weapons, the Secretary observed somewhat laughingly that some officers in the Pentagon have a saying in regard to weapons that ``if it shoots, it's obsolete".
Ambassador Seppala stated that the Finns have an army which needs to be modernized. They could not be armed just with old rifles. Here the psychological element was very important. Small countries can't defend themselves but they need to have the potential to make a ``bang". The Secretary concluded by referring to an African friend who recently had asked for the US to supply his country with supersonic aircraft. He had pointed out to this African friend that the cost of these aircraft would be enough to establish and run two universities. Again the Secretary emphasized that this issue was basically a matter for the signatories to the Peace Treaty.
237. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760E.56/10 - 1562. Secret.
Helsinki, October 15, 1962, 5 p.m.
172. Reference: Deptel 85./1/ Believe it most unlikely Simelius will expect conclude prompt agreement on purchase US military equipment, given limitations placed on his authority by President Kekkonen and budgetary situation. At same time, our offer of discount sales has inevitably affected nature Simelius visit in Finnish eyes. Would be most unfortunate, particularly in our relations with Finnish military, if we not prepared respond to reasonable demonstration of interest in hardware on part Simelius within his limited authority.
/1/Telegram 85, October 12, reported the concern of the Departments of Defense and State that Simelius would expect to reach prompt agreement on military equipment. (Ibid., 760E.5612/10 - 1062)
Circumstance that Kekkonen immediately passed on information regarding our offer to military and did not hold knowledge for himself or restrict it to purely governmental-political circles best evidence we have that he has taken offer seriously and is prepared pursue further. It is, therefore, all the more important not to take any action here in advance Simelius visit that might discourage Finnish military or call into question in their minds seriousness our offer.
Believe Simelius realistic enough to be satisfied with general survey types military items we are prepared to have him see, and will readily appreciate that declassification and related security problems will preclude full disclosure of others at this time.
Gufler
238. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760E.56/10 - 2662. Secret. Drafted by Owen.
Washington, October 26, 1962.
SUBJECT
List of Military Materiel In Which Finnish Armed Forces Are Interested
PARTICIPANTS
Richard R. Seppala, Ambassador of Finland
William C. Burdett, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
William M. Owen, Officer in Charge, Swedish/Finnish Affairs
Ambassador Seppala referred to the British decision in favor of reinterpretation of the Finnish Peace Treaty, to the Secretary's recent conversation with Foreign Minister Merikoski, and to the information conveyed to President Kekkonen by Ambassador Gufler that the United States would be willing to sell military materiel to Finland. Regarding the latter subject, Ambassador Seppala said that General Simelius, Chief of the Finnish Defense Forces, had brought with him on his current trip to the United States a list of military items in which the Finns were interested, and that the list had been presented to General Wheeler, Chief of Staff of the US Army, who was his host. The list was also discussed by General Simelius with General Maxwell Taylor, who had indicated that General Wheeler would be the point of contact in discussions regarding the list. The Ambassador said that he had not been aware of the list beforehand, but that no harm had been done.
Ambassador Seppala then said that he wished to inform the Department of State of the list and to give us exactly the same list. He said that he desired to stress that it was only a tentative list, and that he did not know how orthodox it was, but that it gave some indication of the items in which the Finnish armed forces were interested.
What they would actually purchase, he said, depended on the rather limited Finnish budgetary resources and the decisions yet to be made by the Cabinet or the Defense Council. He recalled that Generals Taylor and Wheeler had observed that on some items there would be no difficulty but that others would have to be studied by the Departments of State and Defense.
Mr. Burdett expressed appreciation to Ambassador Seppala for making the list available. He said that we had anticipated that General Simelius would be informed of this question, and asked how the matter had been left in the Pentagon in terms of the next step. Ambassador Seppala said that as he understood it there was not enough time while General Simelius was in Washington for a thorough study of the list to be made, but that when such a study had been completed Ambassador Seppala or his Military attache would be informed.
Mr. Burdett referred to the Ambassador's earlier comment regarding the treaty reinterpretation question and noted that the Secretary had made certain comments on this matter during his conversation with Foreign Minister Merikoski on October 7. Mr. Burdett said that we have nothing to add on that subject and that the US offer of military equipment had been in our minds for some time and was not related to the other problem.
Ambassador Seppala reiterated that he hoped the list would be handled on a very confidential basis.
A brief discussion of various aspects of the present Cuban situation then followed, with Mr. Burdett providing current information regarding the quarantine and the other regulations regarding shipping to Cuba. Ambassador Seppala commented that the Finns were especially interested in the impact of developments on the Berlin situation.
239. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760E.11/12 - 1462. Secret. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, and Moscow.
Helsinki, December 14, 1962, 11 p.m.
207. Department telegram 96./1/ I called on President Kekkonen this afternoon accompanied by Friberg as interpreter. Told him I was returning to Washington for consultation and volunteered take back any message he might want to convey.
/1/Telegram 96, December 7, suggested that Gufler offer to discuss in Washington during a return for consultations any subjects that might be of interest to Kekkonen and to request any comments Kekkonen might make about his talks with other European leaders. (Ibid., 760E.11/12 - 562)
He thanked me and said he first wanted say as Foreign Minister Merikoski said to Secretary Rusk in November [October]/2/ that he is gratified with direction in which Finnish-American relations have developed.
/2/See Document 236.
Next he turned to topic our last meeting (Embassy telegram 157),/3/ offer of favorable terms for procurement of arms. He has given matter great deal of thought and now believes that, because of Cuban situation, he will have postpone taking advantage of offer. Whenever it is considered, he fears leak will inevitably occur and, if it is considered now, Soviets might interpret US proposal as effort to follow up American success in Cuba by pushing into area close to Soviet Union. Soviets, he explained, are so suspicious that they react to much smaller moves and he is afraid Finland cannot afford take chance right now.
/3/Document 235.
I asked President whether postponement meant that he was still interested in offer. He replied, ``yes, but at time that would present more favorable opportunity." He added that he wanted underscore that his actions were not prompted by anything said by Soviets to him or any other Finnish officials but that his decision was based on his personal weighing of risks and familiarity with Soviets.
President made some general comments about economic situation in Finland, saying it had slowed down but that developments were not too bad. Majority Cabinet had brought political peace in nation except for one question which was presently timely, matter of forest workers pay, which could cause government fall although he believed and hoped difficulties could be ironed out as it would be shame have government fall over such minor issue.
President said had found good deal of sympathy in France particularly on question of trade. De Gaulle had asked him how development of EEC had affected Finnish trade. He answered it had not affected Finnish trade as yet because Finland's biggest competitors, Sweden and Austria, have been in same situation as Finland. De Gaulle promised keep that in mind in future.
Re his Soviet visit President said that he had already fully informed Foy Kohler in Moscow./4/ He went on say, however, that Khrushchev had told him that he did not foresee trouble over Cuba. As to Berlin, Khrushchev had repeated his earlier harshly-worded stand for separate peace on Soviet conditions but had set no time limit. Khrushchev had said Soviets were not ``prisoners of time."
/4/Kohler reported on his talk with Kekkonen in telegram 996 from Moscow, October 17. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.60E/10 - 1762)
President said he had difficult task re Finno-Soviet trade. He had tried without success persuade Khrushchev agree handle payment negotiations separately from trade negotiations. Later on when trade negotiations were held in Finland, Soviets did give in. President explained that it would have been bad for employment in woodworking industry, which is already working at only 75 percent capacity, if some agreement could not have been reached on continued export Finnish forest products to Soviet Union. Soviets have now agreed maintain their imports up to five-year trade agreement level. Finns pressed for more payment in convertible currency in trade with Soviet Union but so far without success. Finns now getting about 9 million rubles in convertible currency but have asked Soviets raise this to 18 million to cover amounts Finns are obliged pay for electrical machinery and other equipment procured outside Finland for installation in icebreakers and other completed products exported to Soviet Union under trade agreement.
President said Khrushchev had made no reference to differences between China and Soviet Union. Kekkonen's personal impression is that matters developing badly. He said that Khrushchev's strong words on China were big surprise to him as, despite fact that differences existed, he did not expect them be brought out so openly. He added it obvious that big changes taking place in Chinese politics. He remarked that Soviets have problem of resisting pressure from China while trying maintain their position in West.
He offered opinion that despite Cuba and China's reaction, Khru-shchev's position had only become stronger, speculations in Western press notwithstanding. Khrushchev's health was good, he added.
In course discussion, President referred to Kissinger ``Nuclear Power and Foreign Policy"./5/ He thought Kissinger's ideas formed basis for much of U.S. strategy and preparedness and termed book very enlightening. He foresees difficulties in NATO countries accepting basis of this strategy, however. Kekkonen's remarks re Rusk - Merikoski conversation gave me favorable opening raise with him Maakansa editorial of 28 September attacking U.S. handling of Cuba, about which Secretary Rusk had spoken to Merikoski (Embassy's A - 330)./6/ I explained that Finnish press is closely read in Department of State and that Maakansa known as organ close to government as is Paasikivi Society's publication Ulkopolitikka (Foreign Policy). I added that article in Maakansa to my knowledge occasioned first protest ever made by us about Finnish newspaper item. President's reaction was very conciliatory. He explained article had appeared while he was away and while chief editor Sorvali was away. As soon as Sorvali returned and learned what had happened, he called Kekkonen to express his regrets and promised convey those regrets to someone he knew in American Embassy. President said, ``and I hope he has done this". (Note: Up to today no expression of regret by Sorvali has been passed on to me.) President deplored incident, said that damaging accidents happen of which this was one and gave assurances it would not happen again.
/5/Reference is to Kissinger's book published by the Council of Foreign Relations in 1957.
/6/Dated October 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 760E.12/10 - 2262)
As to publication Ulkopolitikka, President said he did not consider its articles too dangerous. It contained anti-German articles and other critical opinions similar to those expressed by some organs of British Labor Party but there was nothing really serious in them. Article in Maakansa was in another category, however, which he regrets. Perhaps, he added, this will be good lesson for chief editor, but it unfortunate that accident happened at such bad time.
In closing conversation President asked me convey his personal regards to President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk.
Gufler
240. Paper Prepared in the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Finland. Secret. A cover sheet and table of contents are not printed.
Washington, January 1963.
FINLAND Guidelines of U.S. Policy and Operations
I. Basic Approach
Finland's vulnerability to Soviet political and military power, and its established policies of neutrality shape the form and substance of U.S.-Finnish relations. President Kekkonen's belief that he can best handle Finnish-Soviet relations alone without the support of the Western countries, and his judgment that Finnish independence and security are dependent on a clear policy of friendship for the USSR serve to emphasize the need for delicacy in U.S.-Finnish official exchanges.
Such attributes of Finnish national character as integrity and tenacious courage, when united in common endeavor, give the country its greatest strength. Our policies should seek to direct these genuine Finnish impulses to the purpose of defending Finnish independence and resisting Soviet pressures. We should endeavor to change the chronic Finnish bias to define and interpret Finnish national policies in terms of anticipated reactions of the USSR. To do this we must convince the Finns that the destiny of their country lies with a confident and strong Western community of nations. This involves strengthening and increasing the economic, political and cultural ties which link Finland with the free world. It means that we should encourage greater cooperation between non-Communist Finnish political parties in order to strengthen Finland from within.
As Finland's self-confidence and internal strength grow, and as the Finns show greater determination to stand firm against pressures from the USSR, we should be prepared to give more direct support to the country. For the foreseeable future, however, we should take care to avoid commitments which cannot be sustained, and--insofar as possible--a direct confrontation with the USSR in Finland.
[Here follows Chapter II. Background.]
III. Objectives
1. The maintenance of an independent, democratic, and genuinely neutral Finland.
2. Reduce Finland's vulnerability to economic and political pressures from the USSR.
IV. Lines of Action
A. Internal Political Affairs
1. Continue to assist those democratic parties which are capable of capturing popular support from the Communists.?
2. Use our influence to promote Social Democratic Party unity under non-extremist leadership; encourage the Scandinavian labor parties to use their influence to this end.
3. Use our influence to promote a unified non-Communist labor movement within the framework of the SAJ; continue to encourage the Scandinavian trade union organizations, the ICFTU, the International Trade Union Secretariat (ITS), and the AFL - CIO, to use their influence to this end.
4. Seek to reduce the differences between the non-Communist political leaders.
B. External Political Affairs
5. Endeavor, on appropriate occasions, to persuade President Kekkonen, and other influential Finnish leaders, that
(a) Continued accommodation to the interests of the USSR endangers Finnish independence and impairs Finnish neutrality.
(b) Finnish independence and neutrality can be safeguarded only by firmness against Soviet encroachments.
(c) As the U.S. has, and will maintain, overall military superiority over the Soviet Union, Finnish independence and territorial integrity is not dependent on the favor of the USSR.
(d) Concepts of a neutralized Scandinavia are not in the interests of a free Scandinavia.
(e) Finland is vulnerable to internal subversion by international Communism and should take corrective measures while they are still possible.
6. Stimulate the interest of other Western countries in Finland and encourage those with special ties, such as the UK and especially the Scandinavian countries through such regional organizations as the Nordic Council, to assume greater responsibility for inducing Finland to resist Soviet pressure.
7. Continue the information, educational and cultural exchange programs, and promote high level visits between Finland and the U.S. and other free countries.
8. Support the candidacies of qualified Finns for UN positions.
9. Expand and invigorate ties between Americans of Finnish descent and the Finnish people.
10. In the United Nations, continue to encourage Finland to vote for issues on their merits rather than adhere to a rigid neutrality on all East-West issues.
C. Economic Affairs
11. In cooperation with other Western European countries, actively promote Finnish affiliation with the OECD, and active participation in the IMF, IBRD, and the GATT.
12. Encourage Finnish trade with Western Europe; specifically,
(a) stimulate common Western efforts to reduce the dependence of Finnish export industries on Soviet bloc markets.
(b) take steps in the OECD and elsewhere to avoid discrimination against Finnish exports.
13. Consider providing investment guarantees to Finland on a case by case basis as applications are forthcoming from U.S. investors.
14. Promote U.S.-Finnish trade including such steps as:
(a) periodically sending trade missions to Finland;
(b) participating in Finnish trade fairs;
(c) encouraging Finnish participation in U.S. trade exhibitions.
15. Encourage Finland, insofar as it expresses a need for foreign exchange assistance, to seek the necessary financing from Western European countries or international lending agencies, although the Finns should understand that the U.S. would have no objection to their seeking financing in the New York market or to their filing applications with the Export-Import Bank in accordance with that institution's normal procedures.
D. Military Affairs
16. Make available, through sale at reduced prices, military equipment to the Finnish Armed Forces. All sales will be effected on a case by case basis in the light of security classification and availability.
17. Encourage the exchange of visits between U.S. and Finnish military authorities.
18. Demonstrate the power of the U.S. military establishment, and the achievements of U.S. military sciences.
19. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
20. ``Show the flag" regularly in Finland through visits of Naval vessels, military aircraft, demonstration units, and other military organizations.
21. Encourage the build-up of Finnish Defense Forces to Treaty levels.
[Here follows Chapter V. Contingencies.]
241. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 - 1 Fin. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Moscow, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Oslo, and Reykjavik. Ambassador Gufler left post on April 18. Carl T. Rowan, whom President Kennedy appointed as Ambassador on March 9, presented his credentials on May 21.
Helsinki, May 30, 1963, 11 p.m.
375. In call today on Max Jakobson, Chief of Foreign Office Political Section, I raised question of timing and purpose of Kekkonen speech advocating Scandinavian nuclear-free zone (Embtel 373)./1/ Pointed out that part Finnish press already emphasizing fact that speech came two days after Khrushchev urged nuclear-free zone in Balkans, and in wake of NATO meeting in Ottawa, and that, barring explanation, some might conclude Kekkonen working one side of street while Khrushchev working other. Emphasized that I asserting this frankly and without instructions from Department because Kekkonen had indicated to me that he wanted avoid US public reaction toward Finland similar to that toward Yugoslavia (Embtel 359)./2/
/1/Telegram 373, May 29, reported on Kekkonen's initial public proposal for a Nordic nuclear-free zone. (Ibid., POL 15 - 1 Fin)
/2/Telegram 359, May 21, reported the substance of Rowan's discussions with Kekkonen during the presentation of his credentials. (Ibid., POL 17 - 1 US - Fin)
Jakobson made these points:
1. Kekkonen speech totally unrelated any proposal by Khrushchev. Kekkonen had said for some time Finland must express views this subject and had decided during Yugoslavia visit that should be soon.
2. When reports on Nilsson visit to Soviet Union indicated no test ban agreement in sight, Kekkonen decided he must speak.
3. Kekkonen deliberately waited until after Ottawa conference so no one assume he trying influence Denmark, Norway and weaken NATO. Kekkonen and advisers ``very aware some might think speech indicated collusion with Russians".
4. Said speech given with clear knowledge there would be ``no tangible results."
5. Most important, Jakobson indicated, (this very sensitive) was Kekkonen feeling that he had to make it clear that Finland unwilling ever to be repository nuclear weapons for any power. Clear implication was that Kekkonen foresees possibility that, as reaction to MLF, or new Berlin crisis, Soviets might demand Finland permit stationing Soviet nuclear weapons Finnish soil, thus provoking political crisis similar to and perhaps worse than that of 1961. Kekkonen feels that speech gives Russians ``advance notice."
Whether speech represents nationalistic shrewdness on Kekkonen's part, or whether he softening Scandinavia for what we perceive to be ``Soviet charm offensive," I do not pretend know. But believe it wise at this juncture for us to accept Jakobson explanation at face value, barring evidence contrary.
Jakobson spoke at length about fact Finland ``takes Western friendship for granted" and ``perhaps speaks too much about need for Soviet friendship." He and Kekkonen obviously aware of growing criticism and uneasiness in West. My view that we should show no nervousness, no excess distrust, for period, while giving government chance to explain and show effectiveness its tacks.
It essential source be protected./3/
Rowan
/3/In telegram 233 to Helsinki, June 3, the Department of State replied that it concurred with Rowan's recommendations and noted that the Kekkonen proposal had received a cool reception from the other Scandinavian states, obviating the need for any formal initiative with Finland by the United States. (Ibid., POL 15 - 1 Fin)
242. Letter From Foreign Secretary Home to Secretary of State Rusk
//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret and Personal.
London, July 30, 1963.
MY DEAR DEAN: As you will know, the Prime Minister is making a brief visit to Finland from August 6 to 9. I have been warned by our Ambassador at Helsinki that the Finns may well ask how soon we can supply them with a small quantity--perhaps a dozen--surface-to-air missiles for training purposes. So far as availability in the United Kingdom is concerned, we should be able to supply the Finns with as many second-hand Bloodhound I missiles as they are likely to want some time towards the middle of next year.
You will remember that we talked about the supply of guided weapons to Finland in New York on September 27 last year/1/ and in the aircraft between New York and Washington on September 30 before we lunched at the White House./2/ You said that what concerned you was the danger that the Finns might get large quantities of these weapons and deploy them as a barrage across Finland. I undertook to see what could be done to avoid this danger and said that if we could get satisfactory assurances from the Finns we should wish to go ahead and sell them some weapons. I understood that you might be prepared to see the matter go through on this basis.
/1/Their discussion took place during Home's visit to New York for the U.N. General Assembly. Home informed Rusk that the Finns had again raised the issue of missile sales. The British would insist on a detailed statement of Finnish plans, but planned to go forward with the sale once the information was analyzed. Rusk restated U.S. concerns, but agreed to a reevaluation of the U.S. position after Finland had made its detailed presentation. (Telegram 549 to Helsinki, September 28, 1962; ibid., Central Files, 760E.5612/9 - 2862)
/2/No record of this conversation has been found.
I would not have raised this business with you again in the ordinary way. But I am told that at the technical security talks which were held in Washington in December last and April this year your people maintained that United States agreement was required before the release to third countries of components or weapons of British manufacture but deriving from United States basic concepts even when these concepts had subsequently been published. The Bloodhound I would be affected by this since its fuze derives from United States basic information which has in the meantime been published.
I should say at once that our people disagree with the interpretation of the relevant agreements which your people maintained last December. It was for this reason that we held, throughout our discussions with you last year over the question of Finnish acquisition of guided weapons, that the technical security angle was no obstacle so far as we could see. Nevertheless, we naturally do not want to ignore the position which your people have adopted in deciding what we should say to the Finns when they ask us when we can supply them with guided weapons.
On the other hand, it would, I think, make nonsense of the conditions which, with your views in mind, we attached to our agreement to the Finnish Treaty re-interpretation, if we were now to have to tell the Finns that we could not supply the weapons. Since we asked them to undertake to get at least as many guided weapons from the West as from the East, we would, in effect, be nullifying our agreement in what they would be bound to regard as a very dubious manner.
I am advised, moreover, that the security angle is not really relevant. In the first place, a recent appreciation which we have sent to your people shows that the Russians are already equipped to take counter-measures on the frequencies which you use in fuzes similar to the Bloodhound I fuze. Secondly, as I imagine you will have heard, we have now learnt to our dismay that Colonel Wennerstrom/3/ has passed details of the Bloodhound to the Russians. So even if the Russians had to rely on knowledge of our fuze to work out counter-measures against yours, we should now have to assume that they had obtained this knowledge.
/3/Colonel Stig Wennerstrom, a retired Swedish Air Force officer, was convicted in Stockholm of espionage for the Soviet Union on June 12.
If the Finns do ask us what we can do about guided weapons during our visit there early next month, I should very much like to be able to tell them that we are ready to supply them with refurbished Bloodhound I next year. I hope that you will agree that this is important and I trust that you will be prepared to see the matter through if there should be doubts in any quarter./4/
Yours ever
Alec
/4/Tosec 4 to Secretary Rusk at Moscow, August 8, reported that an interagency committee recommended approving the sale of missiles to Finland provided the missiles were used to defend larger cities. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 - 5 Fin - UK)
243. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 - 5 Fin - USSR. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Moscow, Olso, Stockholm, and Copenhagen.
Helsinki, August 20, 1963, 1 p.m.
100. Pass to DIA. Max Jakobson, Chief of Foreign Office political section, has denied categorically that Finland is about to buy Russian missiles of any type. During discussion after dinner at residence, he disclosed that Finland has given British written guarantee that at least half surface-to-air missiles will be bought from them.
``It is inconceivable that we would break that agreement," he assured me, adding that GOF will not wish negotiate with Russians without reading in [from?] British.
I raised subject by saying I had heard rumors Finland was eager discuss Bloodhound I with Macmillan and wondered if anything decided in wake of his visit. Jakobson replied that Kekkonen had told Macmillan Finland interested, but short of money, so question in abeyance.
I pointed out that money question different with regard Russia and asked state missile negotiations with Soviets.
Jakobson stated categorically that no such negotiations underway.
I replied I pleased to hear this in view of recurring rumors that missiles deal with Soviets imminent. Said I knew GOF aware that one-sided deal would leave some people feeling they had been duped in agreeing to reinterpretation peace treaty.
It then that Jakobson mentioned written guarantees and said I would ``wager your life" on fact Finland not cooking up separate missile deal with Soviets.
(While Embassy knew of pledge to British, this first word we had had of ``written guarantees". Will check this with British colleague in discussion today.)
Discussion with Jakobson [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] investigation both indicate original Air attache report about SA - 3 deal completely wrong. Regret any needless excitement there, but known reliability of source prompted quick reaction here. Either top Finn lied to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Air Force contact, or [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] guilty of terribly sloppy intelligence work.
Rowan
244. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US (Johnson). Confidential. Vice President Johnson visited Finland during a September 2 - 17 trip to the Scandinavian countries.
Helsinki, September 7, 1963, midnight.
163. CODEL Johnson. Vice President accompanied by Ambassador met with President Kekkonen, Prime Minister Karjalainen and Foreign Ministry representatives for over an hour this morning. Embassy view of session well stated by Prime Minister, who told Ambassador at luncheon, ``the talks were most helpful. Most useful. President Kekkonen was delighted."
Following is uncleared memcon subject to amendment upon review:
Finland's relations with the Soviets and the West--after brief discussion of Vice President's program during preceding hours, President Kekkonen stressed his appreciation for President Kennedy's understanding of Finland's foreign policy, expressed during Kekkonen's visit to Washington. He took Vice President's visit as proof of that understanding. Kekkonen pointed out that even though Finnish Government crisis in progress, it did not inhibit foreign or economic policy discussions since in these fields changes of government had no effect.
Vice President stated that Kennedy administration's most stressing objective was search for world peace and that this was basis of President Kennedy's comprehension of Finland's neutrality policy. However, President Kennedy was equally anxious that Finland remain strong in order to defend itself. Vice President stressed US belief that only the strong can be free and independent. Kekkonen agreed with statement but explained that Finland felt question of global war or peace was beyond its competence. Therefore Finland concentrated on building economic strength; it must continue to increase living standards in order that Soviets not overtake it and win Finnish workers to Communist ideology. Unemployment was therefore Finland's gravest danger--particularly among industrial workers, among whom 10,000 unemployed more dangerous than 100,000 foresters or farmers without work.
Vice President reaffirmed President Kennedy's explicit recognition of Finland's right to follow policy of avoiding entangling alliances. He stated that US wanted every country to be as free to choose its policy as in US. Although present post-test ban treaty atmosphere was encouraging, progress depended on continued maintenance of our strength. Vice President promised US would remain strong and cautious in pursuit of peace. In return he asked that Finland continue its efforts to avoid entanglements with either side during any period of more relaxed East-West relations.
President Kekkonen responded that Finland would continue this policy regardless of whether tension in East-West relations lessened. Finland would maintain its independence in either event. In fact Finland's determination was so solid that Finns were surprised when foreign statesmen sought reassurance on this point. Vice President pointed out that under type of pressure characteristic of October Cuban crisis it was not easy to forecast how even most confident individuals might react. Kekkonen replied that if Cuba had led to war, all policies and all resolves would have counted for naught.
Trade and aid problems--President Kekkonen asked Vice President to bring to attention of American Government question of AID competition with Finnish efforts to sell paper mill machinery to Turkey. He explained Finnish grievance that after three years of negotiation, when Turks were ready to agree to sale financed by a 10-year aid loan, AID by offering 20 year credit at lower interest had broken up negotiation. Ambassador Seppala confirmed President's statements.
Kekkonen continued that in another similar case involving Pakistan, Finland feared repetition of this episode.
Ambassador Rowan asserted AID not deliberately trying to undercut Finland. We trying bolster specific sector Turkish economy. Turks had indicated it not really economically desirable take short-term proposal of Finns.
Kekkonen stated Finland could not perceive logic in US urging other developed countries to help LDCs and then wasting its own resources by undercutting aid attempts so inspired. Finland would like to take matter up in Washington through Ambassador Seppala and perhaps by sending special emissary to hold talks with US Government.
Vice President expressed his willingness to set up such meeting. He stated American policy in case of Turkish paper mill was that issue was for Turks to decide. If Turkey preferred to change from an inefficient government paper mill to privately owned one, that was its privilege. However, Vice President said, whichever choice was made there should be opportunity for Finnish bids to be offered. Kekkonen agreed this policy was reasonable. It might be that Turkish mill matter was too far along to be reversed, but he hoped that discussions could avoid future problems. Vice President then reaffirmed American willingness to discuss matter fully in Washington, which Kekkonen agreed to gratefully.
Turning briefly to other trade matters, Kekkonen stated that Finnish trade figures during last two years showed good progress. Vice President jokingly declared that if such successful roving salesman as Kekkonen visited America again, America's balance of payments might be damaged to such degree we would have to seek Finnish aid. Kekkonen interjected humorously that he hoped this would take place. Vice President expressed US intention to send trade mission to Finland in May 1964 and to study possibility of participation in a trade fair in Finland in September 1964.
Kekkonen welcomed this news, pointing out also that during 1961 US share of Finland's trade rose from seventh place to fifth, surpassing France and Netherlands. Vice President noted that last year US imported $60 million worth of Finnish goods and exported $58 million worth. Vice President also noted that trade is great tool of freedom, explaining that this was why liberal trade policy was essential part of American foreign policy. Protectionism was incompatible with these principles, for which President Kennedy had fought so successfully in last year's Trade Expansion Act.
Post test-ban treaty prospects--Vice President then solicited Kekkonen's evaluation of Soviets' attitude since signature of test-ban treaty, paying tribute to Kekkonen's experience with Soviets. Kekkonen expressed his opinion forcefully that treaty indicated considerable change in political atmosphere in USSR. Adzhubei in his visit to Finland earlier in week had confirmed this also. In Kekkonen's opinion, Soviet fear of horrible war had forced them to abandon it as tool of policy.
Pointing out that the sobering effect of the Cuban crisis on both Eastern and Western leaders, the Vice President asked whether it or the crisis in USSR-Chinese Communist relations had contributed to this change. Kekkonen responded that Cuban crisis had brought Soviet leaders to edge of abyss and they saw they could not continue on prior course. Split with Chinese Communists had helped too. Kekkonen believed turn away from military solutions was fundamental change in Soviet attitude.
He quoted Adzhubei as saying Khrushchev had ``turned Soviet policy completely around." Kekkonen was confident Soviets would not use violence against Finland. Therefore, Finland must strengthen its economy to prevent USSR undercutting democracy's appeal with workers. Vice President reminded him that this entailed also watching constantly to avoid becoming dependent on USSR in fuel supply or in any other field. Kekkonen replied that Finland naturally aware of this. He pointed out that Finland's trade with Soviet bloc constituted less than 20 percent of total trade.
Vice President inquired whether Finnish Communist Party was likely to profit from post-test-ban treaty atmosphere. Kekkonen replied to contrary. Many of non-Communist parties expected to gain more. Finnish Communists had not gained prestige from treaty. In fact, because of Soviet-ChiCom split it had great trouble within itself; only recently had pro-ChiCom old guard been defeated and party brought firmly to Soviet side in this dispute. Kekkonen stated that Soviets never deal with Finnish Government through Finnish Party. Finnish Communists resented this treatment and at recent Party rally someone in the rear had shouted accusation that Khrushchev was toying with workers and dealing behind their backs with non-Communists.
As to USSR's next step after treaty, Kekkonen forecast that Soviets would press for agreement on plan to prevent surprise attacks and for Warsaw Pact - NATO non-aggression pact. He added that German question of course remained on agenda. Asked which treaty Soviets would seek first, Kekkonen said that he could not predict, but he believed they were moving steadily toward both and that if satisfactory arrangements were made in these fields, German question could probably be deferred. On other hand if no progress were made German question would become acute.
Questioned by the Vice President about [garble--Sov?] attitude in recent months following Cuban crisis, Kekkonen remarked that Adzhubei had shown great appreciation for President Kennedy. Kekkonen had been surprised at emphasis Adzhubei had given this view. Kekkonen had concluded in view of this circumstance that President Kennedy's untiring and responsible search for world peace had made great contribution and was finding sure response.
Other topics--Vice President commended Ambassador Seppala's services to US-Finnish relations and congratulated Finnish Government on Finland's record in the UN. Vice President expressed deep appreciation for warm welcome given him and his party by Finland's government, people, and press.
Vice President concluded meeting by concisely summarizing topics covered and consensus reached, which Kekkonen accepted fully.
Rowan
245. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Hilliker and approved in S on October 4. The meeting was held at the U.S. Mission. The source text is labeled "Part 1 of 3." Separate memoranda of conversation dealing with Finnish exports and a U.S.-Soviet high energy accelerator are ibid., Central Files, POL Fin-US.
Sec/Del/MC/81 New York, October 2, 1963, 10 a.m.
SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE EIGHTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September 1963
SUBJECT
General (I of III)
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary
Mr. Grant G. Hilliker
Finland
Foreign Minister Merikoski
H.E. Mr. Ralph Enckell, Permanent Representative to UN
Mr. Max Jakobson, Director, Political Affairs, Foreign Ministry
The Foreign Minister opened the conversation by referring to his talk with the Secretary a year earlier concerning the Finnish desire for modification of the Peace Treaty to permit acquisition of missiles./1/ The Finnish Government appreciated the understanding attitude of the USG and of Secretary Rusk personally in helping the matter to satisfactory conclusion, through the purchase of air-to-air missiles from the USSR and anti-tank missiles from the UK.
/1/See Document 236.
The Finnish Government has no present plans for further purchases of this kind, because of its financial difficulties. The Foreign Minister emphasized, however, that the ability to acquire the missiles had a tremendously important effect on morale, and in Finland it was almost more significant than the actual military improvement.
The Secretary noted that we had no objection once we were assured that there were no security problems in the technology being transferred by the UK. The use of its own resources was the business of the Finnish Government, but the Secretary mentioned the possible declining significance of certain kinds of weapons, as manned aircraft give way to missiles. The Foreign Minister said that President Kekkonen had been thinking along similar lines.
After raising two specific subjects (see separate memoranda of conversation)/2/ the Foreign Minister said he wanted to hear the Secretary's views concerning prospects in East-West relations. He had received the impression during his visit to the Soviet Union in August that Gromyko was optimistic and seriously wanted progress in talks with the West.
/2/See the source note above.
The Secretary stated that ``we stand on the leading edge of important events" but there is no certainty of their direction. They could lead toward a long term detente or to a heightening crisis as a result of Moscow - Peking and East-West tensions. We certainly have no detente as long as the hard core problems of Laos, Viet-Nam, Cuba and Berlin persist. We do have a hunting license for a detente and we are prepared to use it, as we think the USSR is also. The question is whether we are each prepared to move forward on the same subjects or whether we might ``occupy each other's rears".
As examples, the Secretary mentioned both multilateral and bilateral areas open to discussion. He noted that the USSR has not said whether a non-aggression pact would apply to Berlin, and that no real basis for rapprochement in Berlin or in Germany has been found, although the atmosphere has improved. Some points, such as observation posts and bombs in orbit, would be of relatively minor significance but might help to maintain momentum.
Among the bilateral subjects for possible US - USSR discussion, the Secretary mentioned trade, although the Soviets do not produce much that we need; a consular agreement, which is now under discussion in Moscow; exchange of commercial air rights; or broadened exchanges in such fields as agriculture, science, medicine, and possibly a joint trip to the moon. The Secretary was dining the same evening with Gromyko and might discuss these as well as Laos, where there is reason to believe the Soviets no longer have decisive influence on the ground, and Cuba where some steady withdrawals of personnel have not eliminated the large number there.
In reply to the Secretary's question whether the recent developments in East-West relations might be the result of long-term or short-term calculation by the Soviets, the Foreign Minister replied that he expected the trend to continue for some time and that his personal hunch was that the Soviet desire for peace is genuine. He contrasted Soviet domestic emphasis on peace with the well-known Chinese Communist position.
The Secretary asked whether the Sino-Soviet split had produced internal repercussions among communist groups in Finland. The Foreign Minister replied that if there were any difficulties previously, the split had not been decisive and the communists in Finland were now completely on the Soviet line. Ambassador Enckell noted that there had been some delay, however, in announcing this allegiance. In reply to the Secretary's question, the Foreign Minister said that Finnish relations with Eastern European countries were developing. He felt that any improvement in the living standard in the Soviet Union would increase desires for personal freedom, tending to alleviate the harshness of the Soviet system both internally and in relation with the smaller Eastern European countries. Nationalism in Eastern Europe was also growing and the Finns were breathing more easily because of these developments.
The Foreign Minister added that Finland did not wish to speculate, in terms of its own policies, on the possible effects of the Sino-Soviet split. The Secretary commented that the Soviets and the Chinese Communists were both capable of sudden reversals of policies. The Foreign Minister repeated that he was unable to fathom the reasons for the extreme Chicom position, whether it was purely ideological or the result of other factors. The Secretary concluded that the FM may have found the reasons in his earlier comment about freedom, that the Chinese Communists might be right from the party point of view, in that their system might not be capable of surviving peaceful coexistence.
246. Memorandum of Conversation
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 Fin. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gordon and initialed by Rowan.
Helsinki, December 13, 1963.
SUBJECT
Discussion with President Kekkonen
PARTICIPANTS
President Kekkonen, Max Jakobson, Director of Political Affairs, Ambassador Carl T. Rowan, and Mr. Glenn Gordon, USIS, Interpreter
President Kekkonen began by saying that his recent trip to Moscow/1/ served to confirm his views as to the attitude of the Soviet Union toward the Johnson Administration--that is, that it would follow the same line as the Kennedy Administration./2/ Kekkonen said he assumed that he was at liberty to tell Khrushchev of his discussion with Ambassador Rowan about the views and attitudes of President Johnson,/3/ and that he did so. Khrushchev reportedly was pleased to have Kekkonen's report, and both Khrushchev and Gromyko emphasized their desire to continue to cooperate with the United States and the West.
/1/Kekkonen visited the Soviet Union November 29 - December 4.
/2/President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas on November 22.
/3/Rowan had discussed the policies of the Johnson administration with Kekkonen on November 27. He reported on these discussions in telegram 302 from Helsinki, November 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US)
Kekkonen said that the first thing that impressed him was Khru- shchev's good physical condition. At Novosibirsk in 1961 Khrushchev had seemed ill and fatigued. During this visit he hunted with great vigor and joked almost incessantly. Kekkonen concluded that Khrushchev apparently will be around awhile. Ambassador Rowan said that this was good to hear in as much as we know of no one on the Soviet scene who is certain to be any more reasonable than Khrushchev.
Kekkonen said he watched closely when Khrushchev was in the midst of Mikoyan, Kosygin, Malinovsky, Kozlov, Podgorny, and Polyansky and concluded that Khrushchev is in ``complete control." He said Khrushchev joked and talked freely, seeming to hold back nothing. He said Khrushchev appeared to be a man completely secure in his position. Kekkonen contrasted earlier visits when Khrushchev talked at length about Molotov and ``the anti-Party group" and felt it necessary to explain at great length his opposition to the Stalinists. This time Khrushchev seemed totally unworried by the anti-Party group.
Kekkonen said that for the first time he felt free to question Khrushchev about Stalin, and that Khrushchev talked very freely and frankly. Khrushchev said that during Stalin's last years the latter was mentally ill and hardly ever left the Kremlin. Khrushchev said that in 1951 he and Mikoyan were on a trip with Stalin when the latter often said, ``I don't trust anyone, not even myself!" Khrushchev said he and Mikoyan later got together and agreed that ``those were not the words of a sane man."
Kekkonen also discussed the Sino-Soviet split with Khrushchev who asserted that there is no real ideological difference, not even on the question of peaceful co-existence. But Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders admitted that they are befuddled by the strangely belligerent tone with which Red China states her position. Kekkonen said Red China troubles the Soviet Union ``and will continue to do so for a long time."
Kekkonen said his talks with Khrushchev were less directed to current burning political issues than was the case in the past, largely because Khrushchev seemed preoccupied with the coming meeting of the Central Committee. Thus, Khrushchev talked at length about Soviet domestic affairs. Khrushchev said the Soviet Union will abandon the Kolkhoz (collective farming system) and move to a state farm system. Khrushchev said that only the ``human factor" prevented him from ordering even more drastic changes.
Ambassador Rowan asked if Khrushchev indicated from what sector of the economy he would divert resources for the economic reform programs he recently announced. Ambassador Rowan explained that he was interested in whether the Soviets might of necessity be less interested in an arms race and perhaps a bit more interested in some meaningful steps toward disarmament and world peace.
Kekkonen said Khrushchev had mentioned the cost of 42 billion rubles over a period of seven years, and had said that if the West refused to grant the credits for the machinery and other items necessary in the Soviet economic program, the program would go forward because the Soviets would divert resources from their own economy. Kekkonen said Khrushchev did not specify which sector of the economy, but that he stated emphatically that the Soviet Union needed peace in which to get its economy in order and to the point where it could compete more effectively with the capitalistic nations. He said Khrushchev placed great emphasis on scientific education.
Ambassador Rowan asked if, in discussing the new Johnson Administration, Khrushchev had mentioned any problem areas where he was particularly concerned, such as Cuba, or Berlin, or if, in discussing the Soviet Union's need for peace, Khrushchev had given any idea as to the areas in which the Soviets were ready to make new steps toward peace.
Kekkonen said Khrushchev had simply indicated that his policy on Berlin had not changed, but had indicated that the Soviet Union was not taking any steps that might precipitate a crisis.
Ambassador Rowan said there was considerable confusion in Scandinavia as to whether Khrushchev planned to visit Finland as part of his Scandinavian tour next year. Kekkonen said Khrushchev will probably visit Finland but not when he visits the other Scandinavian countries. He said that when the other Scandinavian countries indicated next June would be suitable, Finland had offered the same time in the interest of Scandinavian solidarity, but that to visit four countries on the same trip apparently involves too much time to suit Khrushchev.
Kekkonen said he wished he had more to report, but that his journey turned out to be even more of a hunting trip than he had expected. He said there was less political talk than on any of his trips to the Soviet Union.
Kekkonen said that it was interesting to note that his proposal for a Scandinavian nuclear free zone was never mentioned in his talks with Khrushchev and was not even mentioned until the two of them referred to it publicly. He said that both he and Khrushchev apparently felt the matter had been discussed conclusively in the public forum, and that there was no need for them to take it up.
Ambassador Rowan said that he had taken note of Kekkonen's feeling that some circles looked upon him with suspicion for making the proposal. Ambassador Rowan said that his government looked with disfavor upon the proposal, but not because of a belief that Kekkonen had made it with evil intent or because of a desire to do Khrushchev's bidding. There was reason enough for the United States to disfavor the proposal because it is an unnecessary disturbance of the power balance in Northern Europe. ``We can understand and appreciate your making a proposal that you think is in Finland's interest," Ambassador Rowan added, ``just as I am sure that you can understand our reluctance to see any proposal put forward that would affect Norway and Denmark in such a way as to disturb deeply the situation in this part of the world."
Kekkonen switched back to his Moscow discussions, asserting that ``everything seemed to be in order in the Soviet Union" and he found great confidence in the prospect of maintaining peace.
``I began to talk about the new Johnson Administration and about any possible changes in the US posture," Kekkonen chuckled, ``then I discovered that Gromyko had just read the US News and World Report article on which I was basing my assessments."
Ambassador Rowan suggested that under those circumstances President Kekkonen might want to join him in a resolution to give up reading newspapers and magazines. ``You know that they almost wrote me out of Finland while you were away," said the Ambassador. ``Yes," said Kekkonen, ``and it all prompts me to say that there is never smoke unless there is some fire."
The Ambassador replied that he had every expectation that he would spend a quiet winter by the firesides of Finland, for he knew of no plans of President Johnson to call him to Washington, though press speculation may suggest a recall.
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