Documents 24-44
Saudi Arabian Announcement Regarding Non-Renewal of Dhahran Airfield Agreement after April, 1962
On March 16, Radio Mecca announced that King Saud had ordered Ambassador Heath to be informed that the Dhahran Airfield Agreement would not be renewed when it expires in April, 1962. The text of the broadcast is enclosed.
/2/ The announcement followed three days of discussions between the Ambassador and the Saudi Foreign Minister, during which the Saudis first sought United States concurrence in a proposed public statement abrogating the Agreement, but subsequently reduced their proposal to announcing non-renewal after April, 1962./3/ A few hours before the broadcast, the American Embassy at Jidda reported the Foreign Minister's assurance that any announcement would be deferred until the evening of March 18 to enable a joint statement to be prepared. The Departments of State and Defense were developing such a joint statement when the Saudis acted unilaterally. In an effort to soften the adverse impact of the Saudi announcement, the Department of State immediately issued a background press release in the evening of March 16. A copy is enclosed./4/ /2/Attached but not printed. /3/Documentation on the U.S.-Saudi negotiations preceding Saudi Arabia's announcement concerning the Dhahran Airbase is in Department of State, Central File 611.86A7. /4/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 700-701. King Saud's precipitate action reflects the shaky internal position of his recently formed Government. In this connection, the Saudi Arabian Ambassador, at his request, called on the Under Secretary on the afternoon of March 18 to convey an urgent message from the King explaining that the rapid Saudi action had been made necessary to quiet his opponents both inside and outside Saudi Arabia. The King also instructed the Ambassador to reassure the United States that the strong relations between our two countries were not affected by the announcement and would in fact be even more soundly based in the future because of it. The Under Secretary told the Ambassador that, while it was regrettable that the announcement had come so abruptly which had precluded the development of a joint statement on the subject, the United States reciprocated the hope that its close relations with Saudi Arabia would continue to flourish. A telegram has since been received from Jidda indicating that the King was pleased with the tenor of the Department of State's press release on the subject.The United States has sought continually to stress in pertinent public statements that the Dhahran Airfield belongs to Saudi Arabia and that the United States does not have a "base" there. Nevertheless, the very presence of United States military personnel in Saudi Arabia, even though unarmed, has long disturbed Saudi and Arab nationalists. The Saudis have been keenly conscious of their vulnerability to Arab nationalist attacks for being host to foreign military forces. Alleged United States lack of sympathy for Arab views on the Arab-Israel problem and Algeria have also been seized upon by Arab nationalists to apply pressure on the Saudi Arabian Government to terminate United States operational facilities at Dhahran. It had been recognized for some time, therefore, that prospects for renewal of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement were doubtful, and in December, 1960, the then Prime Minister, Crown Prince Faisal, had in fact informally proposed voluntary United States relinquishment of our Dhahran Airfield privileges. The proposal lapsed with the advent of the King's Government a few weeks later.
The Dhahran Airfield has been used primarily as a Military Air Transport Service terminal, but also represents a potential post-strike field in being. There are at present 1,332 American airmen stationed at Dhahran and 10 transport aircraft. Some months ago, the Department of Defense advised the Department of State that, if possible, the Dhahran Airfield Agreement should be renewed in 1962 to provide for additional facilities, but that suitable alternatives were already under study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff should the Saudis not wish to renew the Agreement. More difficult, however, is the potential effect of the Saudi action on our military base complex elsewhere and especially in Libya.
A summary of United States arrangements with Saudi Arabia concerning the Dhahran Airfield is enclosed.
/5/ /5/Attached but not printed. W.J. Stoessel/6/ /6/Stoessel signed for Battle above Battle's typed signature.25. Editorial Note
On March 22, 1961, Secretary Rusk reported to his staff meeting, according to the minutes of the meeting, "that Eric Johnston has suggested that he return to Jordan to help ease the tension building up as a result of the Israeli plans to divert the Jordan waters. Mr. Labouisse felt that this (Johnston's return) would not be helpful. Mr. Labouisse will talk with Mr. Jones further on this subject and then will speak to Johnston about it." (Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147)
A memorandum from Evan M. Wilson of the Policy Planning Council to McGhee on "Israeli Plans for Jordan Waters," dated March 30, indicates: "As you may know, Johnston saw the Secretary a few days ago and apparently suggested that he be sent out again to try to get agreement on the Unified Plan. I gather the Secretary did not make any definite reply, but NEA is reluctant to send Johnston because of presumed Arab opposition (I am told Harry Labouisse shares this view)." (Ibid., PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Chron File--E.M. Wilson) No record of Secretary Rusk's meeting with Johnston has been found
26. Memorandum of Conversation
This meeting was held in Ambassador Harriman's office at 11:00 a.m. on March 27. It was attended by:
Ambassador Harriman
G. Lewis Jones (NEA)
Phillips Talbot (NEA Consultant)
John W. Bowling (Iranian Desk Officer, GTI)
L. Dean Brown (EUR)
George C. McGhee (S/P)
Evan M. Wilson (S/P)
Ambassador Harriman said that he had been greatly impressed by the progress which he had noted in Tehran after an absence of about ten years. The people looked better, the governmental administration was improved although there is still corruption, and the Iranians were doing better planning. The Shah was convinced that Iran's future lay only with the West and that it could not adopt a neutral position like Afghanistan without eventual Communist take-over. The major economic problem at the moment was due to lack of control of program expenditures. The private sector had gone ahead more rapidly than expected which produced a foreign exchange deficit. Some $40 million of cash support was needed to tide them over until their Third Plan starts, otherwise the development program would have to be cut back.
In reply to a question from Mr. McGhee, Ambassador Harriman said that he had not felt that there was an immediate prospect of a crisis in Iran. There are, however, a number of serious internal problems which require political, social and economic reforms. We cannot compel the Shah to undertake these reforms but Mr. Harriman believes that if we exert our influence progress can be made.
Ambassador Harriman thought that we should make up our minds as to the kind of aid, economic and military, that we will supply to Iran and then sit down and discuss these plans frankly with the Shah.
/2/ Clearly we would not be able to give the Shah everything he wants but if we can give him reasonable confidence in our nuclear support and some modern equipment even with reduced forces, he could be reasonably satisfied. We should be able to convince him that he should concentrate more on his economic and social problems. Even if we are going to cut our military aid or defense support, we should tell the Shah so frankly. The Shah believes Iran should have a larger share of the world oil market, particularly as compared to Kuwait. /2/On March 19, Harriman had offered these comments on Iran: "Shah is at the moment our only hope of stability with pro-West policy. Neutrality in Iran would mean Communist takeover." Harriman expressed his belief that the "Shah should be supported, dealt with frankly, and not treated as an unwanted stepchild. But he must be encouraged and pressed in social progress in all fields, much of which he himself favors, and development of democratic institutions which he said he planned to do on local level and more cautiously on national." (Telegram 1584 from Karachi; ibid., Central Files, 123-Harriman, W. Averell) Ambassador Harriman expressed confidence that Iran has the resources and manpower to break through the modernization barrier. The Shah is more mature and confident than he was ten years ago but he feels left alone and needs encouragement. He does not have many good people around him whom he can trust. Ayub's recent visit to Tehran had an excellent effect on the Shah.With respect to a possible reduction of tensions between Iran and the Soviet Union, Mr. Harriman thought that we should not oppose it so long as it does not go too far. A pledge of no foreign missile bases would be acceptable but the Shah said he would not make a commitment not to have any foreign bases on Iranian soil nor would he sign a non-aggression pact with the USSR. The latter would result in Iran's being forced out of CENTO.
Mr. Harriman thought we should work closely with the Iranian planners and should encourage them in such fields as land reforms, improved tax collection and stamping out corruption, and also in establishing the right kind of effective fiscal controls. Under-employment is a problem which should be dealt with and the encouragement of reforms should be handled firmly but not aggressively. When Ambassador Julius Holmes arrives in Washington, Mr. Harriman would like to discuss these problems with him.
27. Memorandum From the Vice Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Morgan) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, March 27, 1961. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Iran, 3/21/61- 3/31/61. Secret. SUBJECT
Iran
I attach one copy each of two papers on Iran, prepared by the Department's Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, which Mr. McGhee suggests be discussed at lunch Tuesday, March 28.
/2/ /2/No record of the meeting has been found. The first of these papers, dated February 11, 1961, is a discussion of the internal situation in Iran, while the second, dated March 20, 1961, addresses itself to the problem of the urban middle class.I am distributing additional copies of these papers to the persons indicated below.
/3/ /3/William Bundy in DOD/ISA and Robert Amory and Richard Bissell in CIA. GAM
Attachment 1
Present Position of the Shah
The elections now being concluded have been a test of the Shah's ability to control a difficult political situation through his prestige and the utilization of his security forces. The elections were largely rigged, and diverse opposition political forces have not been able to force their cancellation, despite several minor riots in Tehran and a few disturbances in other parts of the nation. There were no deaths in Tehran. The possibility, however, of a combination of circumstances in the future leading a combination of opposition political elements and disaffected members of the security forces toward an attempt to overthrow the regime cannot be discounted, and will probably increase over the long run if present political trends continue.
The Shah has been ruling through the security forces, which have been loyal to him personally, and through an alliance with a part of the traditionalist elements of Iranian society. He would like to enlist the support and enthusiasm of the restive urban middle-class and intellectual classes, but he cannot forget that under Mosadeq they attempted to unseat him, and he realizes the danger that they would raise popular and demagogic emotions against him if they were to be given footholds within the government.
At the present time, communist influence in the main opposition groupings appears to be limited--such influence as exists will probably increase slowly. The communists by themselves pose no direct threat to the regime, and are unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future. Their primary potential lies in the infiltration of opposition groups. This potential is accentuated by the absence of first-class political leadership or a unifying political issue among groups opposed to the present regime.
Opposition Groups and Leaders
(a) The Mosadeqists. The most dynamic and powerful opposition to the regime is represented by the heirs to the Mosadeq political tradition. This group, which is parallel to similar groups in most countries of the non-Western world, consists of the great majority of those urban elements who are caught between a traditional culture which they have rejected and a Western tradition which they cannot wholly accept. They are prone to xenophobia, to demagoguery, and to searching for scapegoats, and are personally frustrated and unhappy. Most of them dislike the British, the Russians, the traditional Iranian elite, and are increasingly distrustful of the United States. They tend to believe that the present regime is hopelessly inefficient and corrupt, that it is dominated by the military and security chiefs, and that it serves the interests of the West rather than the interests of the nation. Their influence over the urban masses is great, and is expanding with the spread of literacy, modern communications, and those economic and cultural processes which weaken the traditional culture.
The primary political manifestation of this group is the National Front and a smaller companion body known as the National Resistance Movement. A very recent and burgeoning element in these organizations arises from college and secondary school students. The established, though loosely organized, leadership of these movements consists of moderate-minded colleagues of Mosadeq, exemplified by Alayar Saleh and Karim Sanjabi, Ministers under Mosadeq. These men are still in part the heirs of the old Iranian constitutionalist movement, believing in the forms of democracy and fearing the communists as much as they fear "imperialism". They tend to be idealistic and impractical. They have great popular respect and prestige in the larger cities of Iran. The draft platform of the Front is neutralist, democratic, and socialist. They are not opposed to the institution of the monarchy.
There are increasing indications that these older leaders are losing their former tight control over the loyalties of their followers, and that younger, more radical, and more demagogic leaders are emerging, particularly in the new student movement, who regard the moderate leadership of the Front as ineffective, timid, and old. These newer leadership elements are much more prone to violent action, are more anti-United States, and are relatively vulnerable to communist penetration. They are encouraged and agitated by a powerful all-wave Soviet radio propaganda barrage which identifies the Shah with the United States, with militarism, and with corruption, and which urges the overthrow of his regime by violence.
(b) Rightist Opposition. While the Shah has found it easier to deal with the traditional elements of society than with the emergent urban groups, and while most landlords, many tribal leaders, senior bureaucrats, and large merchants are relatively content with the regime, the Shah does face serious rightist and reactionary opposition from the vested traditional elements which governed Iran before the advent of Reza Shah and during the 1941-1951 era. They consider the Shah to be a blundering upstart and would like to shove him aside in favor of the traditional ruling group. This group is concentrated among the feudal landlords, the religious leaders, and some discontented tribal leaders. Their power is in rural areas, religious cities such as Qom, and among the more ignorant elements in the provincial urban centers. They lack good leadership and do not pose a serious threat to the regime, since they fear the Mosadeqists more than they fear the Shah. One group of dissident tribal leaders is inclined to Mosadeqists.
There are two small but more positive rightist opposition groups. One consists of some very xenophobic religious leaders in the cities who once cooperated with Mosadeq but who split with him later, and who tend to cooperate now with Amini or Baqai (see below). These religious fanatics are given to assassination as a means of political expression. Ali Amini leads a very loose group, recently penetrated and weakened by the Shah, which has looked forward to a union between moderate Mosadeqists and moderate conservatives under a Shah with reduced powers (the Shah is now the dictator of Iran for all practical purposes). Amini has considerable prestige among conservatives, including some high-ranking officers of the security forces.
(c) The Guardians of Freedom. A third opposition element, much less important than the other two, is a tightly-knit but small urban group, mostly from the workers and extreme lower classes, held together by the personal magnetism and ability of Mazafer Baqai, who is probably the best practical political tactician in Iran, with a proven unlimited capacity for demagoguery. Baqai has some fascist tendencies, and has connections with like-minded Army colonels. He broke with Mosadeq, and is hence anathema to the more moderate followers of the National Front, but his political acumen makes him attractive to the students and other younger groups. He has a bad personal reputation, and is a seeker after power, pure and simple, with no political principles whatsoever. He respects but fears the communists.
Pro-Westernism and Neutralism
The Shah and his supporters, both military and civilian, are strongly pro-Western at present. The majority of the Mosadeqists hate the United Kingdom but are still not overtly hostile toward the United States and Germany. This group resents Iran's openly pro-Western foreign policy and military alignment, however, and there is a growing tendency, particularly among the younger and more radical elements, to identify the United States with the Shah and with the security forces and to hold the United States responsible for the Shah's misdeeds and mistakes, real and alleged. The general tendency of opinion among these groups is neutralist along "Indian" lines, with a strong admixture of the traditional Iranian distrust and fear of Russia. Leaders of the traditional elite are divided between a minority favoring formal Iranian alignment with the West and a majority favoring the traditional Iranian policy of playing off big powers against each other and avoiding commitments to any large power, while extracting the maximum in aid from all sides.
Iran's formal alignment with the West is popularly regarded as the Shah's personal venture, and he is judged by its consequences.
Rural Problems
Many peasants automatically follow their landlords in all political matters, particularly if the landlord is by long tradition accepted or admired by his peasants. Aside from this, the political attitude of most peasants is favorable to the Shah, whom they regard with an unconscious and semi-religious veneration. If they disapprove, and they often do, of the actions of specific government officials, they tend to ascribe such actions to the existence of "bad people" around the Shah, and feel that if he only knew the facts, he would change the situation to the peasants' benefit. By virtue of this blind rural following, the Shah probably could win three-fourths or more of the votes in Iran in an absolutely fair plebiscite. Unfortunately, the peasantry has no tradition of political action and no knowledge of or interest in current broad political problems. It is the object, not the subject, of political activity, and can be expected to accept with fatalistic submission the decisions emanating from Tehran.
The regime has sponsored and supported legislation toward community development activities, toward the gradual breakup of large landed estates, and toward the sale of government land to the cultivators. The Shah has for years been distributing his own large estates to the cultivators. Progress in land distribution is slow, primarily because distribution cannot be effected without serious reductions in production until adequate resources are available for the high capitalization and maintenance costs inherent in most Iranian agriculture which requires extensive credit, technical, and cooperative facilities. New regulations, based on the 1960 Land Distribution Act, for landlord-tenant relationships are now in process. In general, the Iranian Government acts on the premise that the maintenance of production takes precedence over politico-social advantages, although it recognizes the latter factor. A rapidly improving agricultural education and extension service is in operation. The next development plan, to cost a billion dollars (a portion of which is expected to come from foreign sources) and to operate from 1963 to 1968, lays heavy emphasis on agricultural improvement, as against the current plan's emphasis on infrastructure and industry.
Mechanization, improved communications, and basic social forces, including population increase, are throwing increasing numbers of the peasantry into the cities as laborers. These migrants tend to lose their traditional political and social inertia after a few years, and come to some extent under the influence of urban opposition elements.
The Security Forces
The security forces of Iran, including the Army, are relatively non-institutionalized. Peasant conscripts do as they are told, and in the officer class can be seen a spectrum of the elements and forces of contemporary urban society, with an admixture of (a) personal loyalty to the Shah in the sense that an American ward heeler is loyal to a political boss, and (b) a small but growing professionalism concentrating on the techniques of the military.
The Army exists in part, as it did under the Shah's father, as a tool of personal power for the ruler. The Shah devotes an inordinate amount of his time and energy to military matters, and is almost obsessed with increasing its size and obtaining the most modern military equipment. The fulfillment of these ambitions was probably the primary purpose which he had in mind when he formally aligned Iran with the West. With the physical power of the Army solidly behind him, the Shah could probably remain in power indefinitely, playing his traditionalist and Mosadeqist enemies off against one another. The Shah very cleverly plays off individuals and groups in the military against one another in order to prevent the rise of key personalities who could possibly take the machine away from him.
The loyalty of the security forces remains doubtful, however. The Chief of Army Intelligence in 1958 was caught at plotting with moderate conservative opposition leaders and has just emerged from jail. Several key conservative generals have in the past approached the United States and the United Kingdom for help in plots to overthrow the Shah with some civilian help. It is probable that "nationalist" sentiment of the Mosadeq type is widespread and is increasing among that majority of junior officers who have urban middle class backgrounds. There is, however, no single key military figure and no philosophy of government peculiar to the military which could be posed as an alternative to the present Shah-Army key ruling element. A purely military and conservative successor regime would have little hope for a long life, since the military as it exists is disliked and distrusted by opposition elements even more than is the Shah.
Underlying Factors
Under the Shah, Iran has made considerable progress in economic development, in social welfare, and in internal security and administrative efficiency. This progress has, however, taken place without participation in the government by the main opposition groups. To some extent, the Shah's isolation from these groups has been due to his unwillingness to ride demagogic issues appealing to the lower popular passions--he could even now, for instance, rally popular support behind himself by launching a self-defeating demagogic campaign against the Oil Consortium, against minority racial and religious groups, or against Iraq or the United Kingdom on territorial issues. To an equal extent, however, it has been due to his unwillingness to listen to critical advice, to his unwillingness to share power, and to his near-obsession with military affairs.
With the confidence and support of the Mosadeqists, the Shah could easily control his rightist opposition. The converse, however, is not true. The force and power of the urban semi-Westernized elements continue to grow at the expense of other elements of society. Unless and until the Shah can come to terms with them and bring them, or part of them, into the process of policy making, he faces a remorseless and slowly increasing pressure, which will become sharper and more dangerous to the West as moderate leadership elements are displaced by the radicals. It seems unlikely, however, that the Shah can capture the loyalty of this element without abandoning the military as his internal political base, without giving up much of his power, without abandoning his openly pro-Western foreign alignment, and without taking steps inimical to internal security and to practical economic development. He is unlikely to be willing to pay such a price.
Another very important element is the Shah's alternative with regard to foreign policy. The Shah, though highly intelligent, is emotionally insecure, and shares with other Iranians a deep suspicion that the West may abandon him in the course of d?tente with the USSR or by supporting his internal opposition. The recent change of administration in Washington has heightened his anxieties. He is bitterly disappointed with the quantity of United States military aid in terms of money and hardware; Two other factors of the internal political situation often mentioned as important are corruption and the suppression of civil liberties. The former has always been a feature of Iranian administrations, and, though the Shah himself is honest, many of his family and entourage are not. Such dishonesty is not a major factor in the economic situation, and is probably decreasing slowly. It is normal for any political attack in Iran to be accompanied by charges of corruption.
There is a limited press censorship in Iran, and arrests and temporary deportations are rather common measures to avert political disorders. Freedom of assembly is often limited, but there is great freedom of speech. Iran is far from being a "police state" in the ordinary sense of the word.
What Can the United States Do?
It is often suggested that the United States, using its aid programs as leverage, could issue orders to the Shah which would by their implementation result in political tranquillity. It has been suggested that some of these "reform" measures would be the ending of corruption, the establishment of genuine democratic institutions, the downgrading of the military, further land reform, and the sharing of power with Mosadeqist leaders.
These suggestions presuppose that the Shah is a creature of the United States and the United Kingdom, a common misconception in Iran. Any United States ultimatums or even heavy-handed hints would be regarded by the Shah as an intolerable interference in his affairs and would probably result in corresponding moves on his part toward the USSR and neutralism.
Granted that this difficulty could be overcome, it is evident that the suggested "reform" measures are not simple matters. Corruption in our sense is a part of the Iranian culture, often associated with family ties, and the Shah relies on traditional elements of society in his government. Civil servants will probably continue to accept bribes unless they are able to afford a European standard of living on their salaries alone. This would entail an unacceptable gap in living standards between them and the mass of the population. Free elections to the Parliament today would result in a Majlis controlled by reactionary landlords and the clergy, with a vociferous and demagogic Mosadeqist minority from the big cities. Iranian politics would be polarized to the point of civil war. The restriction of suffrage to literates would result in a Mosadeqist majority, but there is no indication that a Mosadeqist government, representing perhaps fifteen percent of the population, would represent the submerged rural masses even as well as the present government does. In any case, this kind of freedom would be tantamount to asking the Shah to abdicate, and would entail a foreign policy shift away from the United States.
Hasty and sweeping land reforms without careful preparation and heavy expenses would disrupt rural society, turn most landlords into bitter personal enemies of the Shah, result in immediate hardship to the peasants, retard mechanization and soil conservation, and decrease agricultural production. Urban opposition groups would be pleased, not because of any solicitude for the peasantry, but because of the discomfiture of the landlords.
The admission of Mosadeqist leaders to the government, while the most promising of the suggested reforms, would mean a reduction of the Shah's powers, an eventual reduction of the role of the military, and a danger of cutting the moderate Mosadeqists off from their followings. The Shah would regard such a suggestion as proof positive that the United States had turned against him.
Another broad and basic suggestion for United States policy would be to increase its support of the Shah. To satisfy His Majesty, this would have to involve very heavy expenses in military, as well as financial assistance, would identify the United States even more with the Shah's authoritarian regime, and would accentuate rather than solve the basic political dilemma.
Still another suggestion involves United States and United Kingdom support to a conservative military group, perhaps with ties to the moderate Amini conservatives, to take over power by a coup. The resulting successor regime, without charismatic and practical leadership not in sight today, would have all the Shah's problems without the tremendous stabilizing force represented by the monarchical institution, and would solve nothing.
The most forthright and extreme suggestion involves Western support to a hypothetical Mosadeqist-oriented coup, with support from junior officers. While the resulting regime would not be strongly anti-United States and would have popular urban support, it would entail the following probable awesome disadvantages, which would accrue at an early date should such a regime remain in power:
(a) The breakup of CENTO,
(b) The withdrawal of the United States military mission from Iran,
(c) The abandonment of the current economic stabilization program,
(d) Undetermined moves to extract more money from the Oil Consortium,
(e) A great blow to the global prestige of the United States,
(f) Opportunity for communist infiltration into the regime,
(g) The loss of Iran's friendly United Nations vote,
(h) Neutralism as a positive policy, probably midway between the Nehru and Kassem models,
(i) The acceptance of Soviet economic, and possibly of military, aid.
These probable short-range costs would have to be balanced against the long-range advantages of a more popularly based regime in Iran. The cost does not appear to be worth the advantages, but a proper appreciation of the choice could only be made in the light of global national security considerations.
It would appear preferable that the United States would be best advised to continue its present policy of reassurance to the Shah of United States sympathy and support, along with persistent but delicate inferences by our Ambassador to the effect that the Shah should devote his attention to his internal political problems rather than to foreign and military affairs. We would also continue our policy of monitoring the Shah's dealings with the USSR, pointing out Soviet traps, depreciating the effect of Soviet propaganda, and warning him of Soviet intentions. We should continue to provide him with reasonable economic and military assistance, and, in the context of more general changes in our mutual security mechanisms, reduce the delays and contradictions in our assistance programs which tend to irritate and demoralize him.
The implementation of this program will require, as it has in the past, the greatest possible delicacy on the part of our Ambassador in handling his personal relationship with the Shah.
We should, of course, continue to be on the alert for the rise of competent and creative alternate leadership, in or out of the military, which might allow a reconsideration of our alternatives. This latter, along with the requirement that we do what we can to support moderate as against extreme opposition leadership, is very difficult in Iran, since Embassy contacts with the important Mosadeqist opposition elements have met and will continue to meet with violent objections from the Shah. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has done, and will continue to do, whatever it can along this line, but all such contacts run a risk of alienating the Shah.
At the present moment, we could hearten the Shah and reduce the possibility of his dealing with the Soviets by
(a) Making an immediate decision as to Defense Support for Iran in FY 1962, preferably in the scheduled amount of $20 million,
(b) Informing the Shah now of this figure so that he can count on it in his upcoming annual budget, which begins March 21, 1961, and
(c) Modifying procedures and regulations in order that the sum can be made available by this fall, halfway through the Iranian budget year.
It might be noted that the JCS has recently indicated that it desires to "assist" the Shah by United States adherence to CENTO, stationing atomic weapons in Iran, and similar measures. Unless such strengthening of CENTO were accompanied by greatly increased military assistance to Iran, it would be of only temporary effect, or even counterproductive, as regards preserving the Shah's pro-Western orientation, and it would not affect the internal political situation to the advantage of United States interests and objectives.
Attachment 2
Definition
A meaningful definition of the Iranian urban middle class must be sociological and historical, not primarily economic. The urban middle class constitutes that element of Iranian society in which there are present two cultures, two value systems, the traditional and the Western. Those elements of society in which the traditional value systems are overwhelmingly predominant are excluded, i.e., the peasantry, both in the countryside and recently arrived in the large cities, most landlords, older religious leaders, and the great majority of small merchants and artisans outside the capital. Similarly excluded is the very small minority of thoroughly Westernized individuals, in high levels of society, who are really strangers in their own society.
The political middle class must be identified with the process of cultural clash. We may for the purposes of this paper attempt a rough breakdown of the urban middle class as follows:
(a) The upper middle class.
Its mark is primarily money. It includes industrialists, contractors, richer merchants who have shed the limits of the bazaar mentality, senior officials and professors, and other top professional types. Iranian society is and always has been relatively mobile, and this class includes individuals who have risen from below and others who have dropped down into it from the traditional elite.
(b) The middle middle class.
It is typified by junior civil servants, bazaar merchants, students, engineers, teachers, and journalists, who are products of the local universities and secondary schools.
(c) The lower middle class.
It is typified by clerks, skilled workers, taxi drivers, and that portion of the urban proletariat which has been cut adrift by long city residence from the thought patterns of the traditional society. It appears to be extending itself downward with the erosion of the traditional structure of society. There is a small increment of individuals who drop into it from the middle middle class. It is literate but otherwise poorly educated.
The key to the entire class lies in the middle group. Most of the upper group is "in" at the present time; is economically satisfied, feels itself participating in and adjusted to the status quo to some extent, and, while ready to support any stable regime which would not disturb its position, is at least passively content with things as they are. From this relatively sophisticated group, however, particularly among the younger elements with foreign educations, is drawn much of the political leadership for which the key middle group is crying. The lower middle class is restive and dissatisfied, and by virtue of its numbers will form the mass of effective street demonstrations, but depends on the groups above it to provide the political and social channels for the expression of its discontent. The comments below will be concentrated on the key middle group.
Psychological Characteristics
It is well known that individuals the world over tend to rationalize political behavior which stems from deep emotional needs. This is particularly true with regard to extremist views aimed at radical changes in an existing society. To take at face value the rationalizations of an Iranian middle class leader is as unrewarding as to accept the rationalizations of anti-Semites, Negro-haters, or communists in the United States. Some understanding of the psychological background of such individuals is necessary in order to be able to understand them and to predict their behavior.
The political reactions of the key elements of the Iranian middle class find their psychological roots in the fact that these people are partly Westernized and partly attached to their traditional culture. The result is an inability to adjust to society, and an inability to find security. Thus, if a student tries to "date" a girl, and to choose his own wife, one side of his "super-ego" tells him that he is behaving atrociously; if he asks his parents to find him a wife and does not expect to become acquainted with her until after the marriage, the other side says he is behaving atrociously. He is continually frustrated, unhappy, and unable to achieve adjustment to, and security within, his society.
At the same time, he is oppressed by feelings of inferiority. He has lost the deft understanding which enables one to fit into the traditional society in its small middle niches; he is unable to sense the nuances which allow for security through sycophancy, flattery, and the manipulation of chains of influence. He is likewise, with only a few exceptions, quite incompetent by Western standards. There is enough of the traditional culture in him that he is not able to work for the sake of the results, and to view a task as separate from considerations of personal prestige and status.He is not willing to accept now the old idea of status, self-fulfillment, and success resting upon traditional values, nor can he adjust to the ideally Western concept of rewarding an individual strictly according to how he performs. Too often, he tends to accept the basic idea of rewards based on membership in an autocratic group, but wishes to substitute for the badges of the traditional autocracy what he conceives as the badge of Western autocracy--"educational qualifications". He feels, understandably enough, that he should, by virtue of formal educational qualifications, be allowed to attain the security and status of an informal autocracy. The traditionalist element of society refuses to recognize this claim, holding rather that "qualifications" are based on traditional values; the Westerner laughs at him and tells him that performance, continual performance against competition, is the only standard by which status can be achieved.
Our typical member of the urban middle class now becomes desperate. He becomes anxious and then angry. He cannot, as a normal human being, admit of his inadequacy to meet either system, much less the confused mixture of both which confronts him. He suspects that he is being persecuted and plotted against, and develops aggressive desires for revenge against "the system".
These desires are channelled, naturally, against both of the structures which form the underpinnings of his society. He applies Western standards against the traditional element of his society, and finds it wanting. He applies traditional standards in a critique of the Western element in his society, and naturally finds it wanting, too. It is a short step from these judgments to an uncritical aggressive desire for revenge, and for a final justification of himself by punishing and humiliating the two figures who seemingly mock at his plight, the self-assured member of the traditional upper class and the self-assured Westerner.
Good and Evil
There are certain key concepts of the world which are born and bred into Iranians which unfortunately tend to sharpen the terrible psychological dilemma outlined above. They are rooted in Iranian history, and can be traced back to Zoroastrianism and picked up again in the Iranian interpretation of Shi'a Islam.
Persians tend to believe in the all-pervasive presence of a powerful force of evil in the world. All actions, all motives, are divisible into good and evil. It is probable at any time in history that the forces of evil control the world, while the good man, like the hidden Imam, is forced to hide and remain inconspicuous, to lie and pretend if need be, until the moment arrives for battle. Thus, most Persians cannot ascribe political actions with which they disagree to error, or to grant good intentions to the author of such actions. The term "political compromise" cannot be translated into colloquial Persian without a connotation of "sell-out".
Two results follow from this--first, since the forces of evil are strong and organized, actions by others which one disapproves are not isolated, they are linked together in a mesh of intertwining conspiracies with an overall evil motive behind them. Second, public and private morality are inextricably confused--no politician with a reprehensible private life can be other than evil in his public actions, and no saintly man can be really wrong in his public life.
As a corollary of the above, Persians tend to follow blindly a man who has convinced them that he is on the side of right, without examining political issues critically. Since members of the urban middle class have deep aggressive drives against the traditional ruling class and the Westerner, it is natural to associate a saintly leader with opposition to these two forces. All the ingredients are present for what we would call demagogic politics directed against them as scapegoats and as evil forces.
Foreigners
Persians, and especially the urban middle class, have, from historical experience and from their own peculiarities, evolved an amazing political mythology whereby almost all political developments are viewed in terms of foreign influence, usually selfish and malignant. Most such influence has been ascribed to the Russians and the British; practically every national leader was in the past characterized as "pro-British" or "pro-Russian". Since German and U.S. power was far away and supposedly disinterested, members of the urban middle class for a long time tended to describe themselves as "pro-German" or "pro-American". Nowadays, with the U.S. obviously in the Shah's graces, the term "pro-American" is taking on the evil overtone which "pro-British" has had; the Germans are out of the picture.
There is a deep residue of hatred and distrust of Russia in Iran, but communism has its attractions. This attraction for the urban middle class is based primarily on (a) the communist opposition to the existing scheme of things, and (b) a hope that communism really means that the "educationally qualified" urban middle class displaces the traditional autocracy and thereafter enjoys status, security, and justification. However, even the most angry and frustrated Persian tends to draw back in alarm when he suspects that a Russian lurks behind the fair mask of communism.
Economics
Let us set aside immediately the common conception that the urban middle class is primarily concerned with national economic development. Nothing interests it less. It would like an aristocratic standard of living, but it channels this desire primarily through the idea of stepping into the seats of the traditional ruling class and the high-living Westerners resident in Iran. It has repeatedly shown its almost total lack of concern for the peasantry and even for the urban proletariat, except insofar as it can turn these groups against the traditional ruling class and the West. It is noteworthy that the consumption levels of the urban middle class have been rising sharply over the past eight years, while its political discontent has been rising even more sharply.
Members of the class, with Western tastes whetted by an addiction to movie-going, often bemoan the absence of "a decent standard of living" for themselves. This "decent standard" is measured in Western terms. Its provision, in a society still desperately poor, would obviously result in a profound increase in the gap between the educated and the uneducated, and therefore of "social injustice".
This class has, over the past ten years, shown itself to be ready at any time to put almost all other factors ahead of economic development for the nation. They have opposed infrastructure development and have instead demanded relatively non-productive amenities such as hospitals, colleges, asphalt streets, and urban water and sewage systems. They have been particularly opposed to any development involving foreign contractors or suppliers, which they feel is by definition somewhat nefarious.
It is important to note, however, that an expanding economy and a high rate of investment, particularly in the private sector, provide (a) attractive outlets for the energies of the more intelligent and better-educated members of the class, and (b) obviate the dangers of mass urban unemployment. They do not effectively modify political and psychological attitudes, but they dilute the readiness of the urban population to take drastic action along the lines indicated by these attitudes.
Political Aspirations
Most members of the class look back on the Mosadeq era with undisguised nostalgia. We are thus not operating in a vacuum when we attempt to determine the results of a political change or changes in which power would come into the hands of this group.
In 1957, one urban middle class group indicated in a public manifesto that it was willing to live with CENTO and with the Consortium Agreement. We must note, however, that the leader of this particular group is probably the most moderate of all potential leaders of the class, and that he and his followers admitted openly that the promise represented the stiff price which they are willing to pay for American "support" in a bid for power. In practice, it seems highly unlikely that any leader would be able to hold to such a position for long. His rivals would make life intolerable for him by accusing him of being a stooge of the West. It is almost a certainty that any government responsive to the urban middle class would as a minimum be forced to withdraw from CENTO and initiate some kind of squeeze on the Consortium, at least to the extent that it could prove to its followers that it was hostile to Western interests. Similarly, in the international arena, such a government would be forced to display its opposition to Western interests in the Arab world, the Congo, the Far East, and other trouble spots, and to extend sympathy to urban middle class leaders in those areas who are now opposing the West.
It is highly probable that, as another minimum, the U.S. military mission to Iran would be invited to leave. The Army is highly unpopular with the urban middle class, and to retain any position whatever in society, the Army itself would have to acquiesce in good grace.
The urban middle class has historically had no interest in or knowledge of financial realities. The degree of financial stability which has been maintained recently would almost certainly go overboard. One cannot imagine school teachers agreeing to postpone wage demands, for example, in view of esoteric and complicated financial factors, nor a government responsive to the urban middle class refusing to embark on a highly desirable hospital-building program because there was not enough money in the kitty. After all, as in the Mosadeq era, the printing press is always available.
Democracy in the Western sense means nothing to the urban middle class. It is probable that the oft-proposed measure to disenfranchise the illiterate classes would be brought up again and adopted, if there were any desire to utilize a freely-elected assembly.
The urban middle class complains bitterly about corruption in the government, but shows little interest in reducing corruption at low levels. Rather, it sympathizes with low-level officials in trouble for this reason, and insists that nothing can be done to remedy the basic problem until high-level corruption, involving the traditional upper class and foreigners, is eliminated. Almost all members of the upper class and most foreigners are believed to be guilty of corruption, unless they are openly sympathetic to the Mosadeqist groups. It seems quite likely that this middle class concern over corruption is actually a rationalization of its deeper emotional antipathies, and its justification in terms of the actual situation is coincidental.
The traditional upper classes, and the upper strata of the upper middle class as well, would probably be victimized in one way or another, ranging from confiscatory taxation to hanging. These policies would naturally quickly dry up the sources of capital formation for the private sector of the economy. Economic enterprise would turn toward the statist road, primarily because it is in the bureaucracy that the urban middle class is closest to having a vehicle through which it can institutionalize status and security for itself.
Political Realities
The aspirations described above do not constitute a prediction of the future. They represent the existing political raw material provided by the urban middle class. When one considers that they are inchoate, contradictory, and emotional in essence, it is obvious that they will be shaped by leadership. They cannot be disregarded. They are growing and spreading every day at an accelerating rate, upward into the younger sons of the aristocracy and downward into the proletariat, pushed by increasing urbanization. Their spread can only be stopped by stopping the process of culture clash, and that is impossible in the world of today.
There is no discernible competent leadership in the urban middle class at present. Should its incompetent leadership of today be catapulted into power, it is likely that a process of confused demagoguery would ensue, which would result in uncoordinated moves in the direction of the various negative aspirations listed above and increase potential for the communists, who obviously by virtue of their program and organization, would have a good chance of eventually filling the vacuum if they have learned to stop bowing publicly in the direction of the hated Russians.
The Iranian military does not offer potential leadership which could deal with these aspirations and satisfy them. Most junior officers share the prejudices of the middle class families from which they sprang; senior officers are roundly hated as members of the traditional aristocracy.
Traditional leaders--clergy, landlords, and the really big merchants--offer little hope of providing competent leadership, and are blind to the threat which the urban middle class represents. It might conceivably still be possible to "bypass" the urban middle class by providing a dynamic to the inert traditional-minded peasantry and proletariat, perhaps based on a regeneration of Shi'a Islam with new values adjustable to semi-Western values and to modern techniques of production and organization. But there is no sign of the gigantic creativity which would be necessary for such a reversal of the current historical trend.
There is one potential leader who has the necessary ability, personality, and talent, and whose political capital is not yet quite exhausted. That is the Shah himself. The Shah would still be capable, if he could only see the truth, of taking steps like the following which might allow him to seize and mold middle class aspirations.
(a) Channelling current resentments against Ministers rather than against himself.
(b) Dumping his family, or most of it, in Europe.
(c) Abstaining from state visits abroad and discouraging state visits to Iran.
(d) Reducing his military forces gradually to a small, tough force of infantry and artillery capable of internal security and guerrilla activities.
(e) Removing gradually most U.S. advisers from the Iranian Government except those few engaged in health, education, and welfare work in the field.
(f) Publicly excoriating the traditional ruling class for a lack of social responsibility.
(g) Withdrawing from his openly pro-Western international posture with as little damage as possible to Free World morale and to his own prestige.
(h) Ostentatiously reducing his personal standard of living, and the pomp and panoply of his life.
(i) Proceeding loudly with at least a token land distribution program against the big landlords.
(j) Making menacing gestures against the Oil Consortium and "extracting" concessions from it, in such a way as to make it appear that the Consortium was reluctantly bowing to his power and determination.
(k) Making public scapegoats of scores of "corrupt" high officials, whether or not the "corruption" could be proved.
(l) Appointing respected moderate Mosadeqists to positions such as those of Minister of Finance and Head of the Plan Organization, where they could assume responsibilities without being able to reverse policy.
(m) Making public all details of the operations of the Pahlavi Foundation, and appointing as its supervisors a few moderate Mosadeqists.
(n) Employing his personality to make constant personal contact with the members of the middle class.
The foregoing items are not intended to be a comprehensive program of action for the Shah. They are rather examples of actions which would have a positive effect on relations between the Shah and the class under discussion, and as indications of the types of action and gesture by the Shah to which the class would respond. Many of them would be demagogic in nature and would be hard for the West to swallow. But it is still possible that the Shah could turn the trick. He has the brains, the personality, and the cunning to do it.
United States Policy
Elements of U.S. policy which are presently open and which would serve to protect U.S. interests against the dangers represented by the rise of the urban middle class in Iran are as follows:
(a) Inducing the Shah to turn his political talents and his attention, as a matter of priority over military and foreign affairs, to the broad task of winning the confidence of the urban middle class by providing them with a sense of participation in, and identification with, his regime.
(b) Providing economic assistance to Iran sufficient to prevent economic and financial collapse, maintain a high rate of economic growth in both the public and private sectors, and provide for the continuing provision of a reasonable amount of relatively non-productive urban amenities.
(c) Watching political developments carefully with a view to the identification and analysis of effective and responsible alternative political leaders who might, as a last resort, be available to replace the Shah should he fail completely as a political leader.
On March 27 you inquired regarding the status of the promised invitation for American experts to visit quietly the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona. Deputy Under Secretary Roger Jones promised to provide you with a reply. This invitation was first promised to us by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion on January 4 through Ambassador Reid. The Department believes that Harman is probably right regarding the unlikelihood of the Israelis issuing an invitation prior to April 10, although our latest d?marche to Harman using your name is likely to be helpful to this end.
We believe that Ben-Gurion fully intends to issue the invitation. Part of his difficulty is (a) that, having given his word, he does not like to be pushed by the United States, and (b) he is personally in the greatest internal political difficulty of his career. He probably feels that his problems may be compounded if his enemies have something new to pin on him arising out of his handling of the Dimona reactor affair. It is for the latter reason that when the visit takes place it should be a quiet one regarding which there should be no United States publicity.
Chester Bowles III. Iran:
In response to an earlier request by the Chiefs, Mr. Bowles asked Mr. Jones to report on current conditions in Iran.
Mr. Jones observed that the situation in Iran could never really be called good. Iran was somewhat like an individual who was consistently subject to a low grade chronic fever. Each time you took a new look at the patient there was no clear evidence of a crisis but sometimes the temperature was down a little, sometimes it was up a little. Mr. Jones noted that the Shah had been concerned that the new Administration might withdraw the support that had earlier been given to him by the U.S. President Kennedy's letter and the recent visit of Ambassador Harriman had helped considerably to abate his fears.
In analyzing the February elections, Mr. Jones commented that the urban centers appeared to be free of communist infiltration; the opposition had been split by the student community and the followers of Mosadeq; the opposition appeared to have made gains in the student community but not in other areas; and the security forces were surprisingly efficient in dealing with election disturbances. In commenting on the security forces, Mr. Jones stated that there does not appear to be any significant rebel groupings in the security forces who are ready to cast their lot with the civilian opposition.
Mr. Jones noted that the Shah had lost some prestige following the election but had regained his position by firing four unpopular security chiefs and replacing them with men who were free of charges of corruption and brutality. In his concluding observation Mr. Jones remarked that the Shah continues to have a long range problem with the opposition, particularly the students and the Mosadeq followers. The Shah could become popular with those groups if he were to detach himself from the United States. He has, however, not shown any signs of wavering. In addition he has adhered to the highly unpopular economic stabilization program which is necessary if he is to deal adequately with his economic problems.
General Lemnitzer expressed his concern as to whether we will be able to continue our present military aid programs. As a result of the Shah's last visit we had agreed to an accelerated program for Iran which we cannot continue under the proposed 1962 military assistance program.
Mr. Bundy observed that under the 1962 program Iran will be cut in terms of new programs but that he thought the expenditure and delivery level in 1962 would remain roughly the same. There was a serious problem with regard to the Defense Support Program which was on dead-center. In previous years we had given the Shah assurances on the Defense Support level by this time but we have not done so this year.
General Lemnitzer thought that the proposed program reductions for Iran would soon become apparent to the Shah.
Mr. Bowles remarked that one of the first things we should do is determine what part of the military aid program is required for military purposes and what is for political purposes. With regard to the latter we might be able to meet this purpose by assuring the Shah of long term economic aid in lieu of military aid. General Lemnitzer observed that the Shah is very sensitive about the military program and in General Lemnitzer's opinion our programs are clearly military and geared to the increased forces. Mr. McGhee observed that we have to face up to the fact that we will not be able to meet the 1958 commitment under the present $1.6 billion program for 1962. Ambassador Holmes will have to tackle this problem as soon as he arrives. It may be possible through other types of economic aid to pick up part of the Iranian budget which would free up funds to offset reductions in our DS levels.
[Here follows 1/2-page of discussion of item IV.]
1. The regional members of the CENTO alliance will doubtless be looking to the forthcoming meetings of the Military Committee (April 24-25) and Ministerial Council (April 27-29) for indications of basic changes, if any, in the USG's approach to its association with CENTO. Their interest in this regard--but we doubt their expectations--may be heightened by the unusually long interval since the last meetings of these two bodies and by the fact that the April meetings will be the first significant CENTO meetings, in addition to the Council Deputies, to convene since the new U.S. Administration took office.
2. The regional members will be looking to the Military Committee in particular to see whether our views on CENTO military organizational arrangements have altered. Possibly they may also look to that meeting and to the Ministerial Council Session for signs as to whether the United States regards any differently the question of membership in CENTO. We believe, however, they have already come to accept without significant contention our non-adherence to the Baghdad Pact document. As our positions on both the command structure and membership questions are based principally on policy considerations of a political nature, such substantive discussion of these considerations as is required with the regional members in the forthcoming meetings would more properly take place at the Ministerial Council Session than at the Military Committee meeting.
3. The course of events at the Military Committee meeting might be made smoother if we informally indicate to the regional members in advance of that meeting, without entering into substantive discussion, that the U.S. approach to the membership and command structure questions has not undergone basic change. Accordingly, you are requested to take the opportunity, preferably during the course of a discussion devoted primarily to related matters, to indicate orally to your host Government that the U.S. Delegations to the Military and Ministerial meetings will not reflect basically changed positions on either the membership or command structure questions.
5. FYI. As regards the question of CENTO military organizational arrangements, it is expected that our delegations at the forthcoming meetings will be instructed as follows:
(a) The United States continues to believe that elaborate CENTO military organizational arrangements, providing for an executive authority to implement planning and including the designation of a supreme commander, would be undesirable at this time for political reasons.
(b) In the U.S. view, CENTO's military organizational arrangements should continue along present lines, consistent with the immediate and primary purpose of formulating plans. In reviewing the current arrangements, however, it would be appropriate for CENTO to consider the extent to which these arrangements may follow lines consonant with their eventual evolution into a command-type organization, should need arise for such command under changed circumstances.
(c) The United States also continues to support planning for a command structure, including a supreme commander, to be available on a standby basis for eventual use whenever it is agreed on a governmental level that such arrangements are both militarily required and politically acceptable.
(d) With regard to the review to be made of the current military arrangements which became effective in January 1960, i.e., establishment of the Permanent Military Deputies Group (PMDG) and reorganization of the Combined Military Planning Staff (CMPS), in the U.S. view there has been insufficient experience as yet to pass upon the continued validity of these arrangements. Should the member states feel strongly, however, that the PMDG ought to be revised or disbanded at a relatively early date, the United States will show an open mind toward new organizational proposals which are in keeping with (a) and (b) above.
(e) Should the member states request at the forthcoming meetings that the United States continue to provide the Chief of Staff of the CMPS, the United States is prepared to extend its incumbency in this position, provided CENTO's military organizational arrangements are to continue along the lines put into effect in January 1960. The extension would be for another tour of duty, not a permanent undertaking. If, on the other hand, the Chief of Staff position is to assume additional prominence as the result of changes in the current organizational arrangements, such as elevation of the rank of that position vis-?-vis the PMDG or elimination of the PMDG, the United States would have reservations to continue filling the chief officer position of CENTO's international planning staff. (Note: The regional members have already suggested that the United States provide the Chief of Staff on a permanent basis.) End FYI.
6. The Department has already spoken with the British Embassy here along the above lines (see Memorandum of Conversation of March 29, 1961, Denis Greenhill-G. Lewis Jones, Subject: "CENTO Military Organization").
28. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Bowles to President Kennedy
Dimona Reactor in Israel
29. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting/1/
Washington, March 31, 1961, 11:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328. Top Secret.
[Here follow 8 pages that include a list of 32 persons present (including among others General Lemnitzer, Admiral Burke, and General LeMay from the Department of Defense; Bowles, Lewis Jones, and McGhee from the Department of State; Rostow from the White House; General Cabell from the Central Intelligence Agency; William Bundy from the Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs); an index; and discussion of items I and II.]
30. Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey
/2/Not printed. (Ibid., 378.75/3-2961)
Rusk
PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Harman said that he had come in under instructions to convey an invitation for an American to visit the Dimona reactor site during the week of May 15. The Israeli Government wished the visit to be secret since any publicity could have a most undesirable effect.
Mr. Farley said that the handling of the visit had been given a good deal of thought on the U.S. side. Our concept had been that, on the pattern of U.S. technical consultations with other countries engaged in reactor development, a pair of U.S. reactor experts with competence in planning and design of heavy water reactors might go to Israel for discussions with the Israeli scientists and engineers engaged in the project. Such discussions might well be very useful to the Israeli technicians. The discussions would give an opportunity in a most natural way for an incidental visit to the reactor site. The United States did not wish publicity and would want to handle the trip quietly, but to label it "secret" and make extreme efforts to avoid any knowledge of the visit might be counter-productive.
Ambassador Harman emphasized the importance his government attached to the visit not becoming known either before or after the event. He recognized the possibility of a leak and thought the public line suggested by Mr. Farley might be the proper one in that case.
Mr. Jones said that the United States had always thought of a quiet visit. There was a good deal of Congressional interest, however, which might lead to the Department being asked whether any American had visited the site. He asked whether arrangements were also being made for others to go to the site, such as British or Swedish experts, pointing out that a special United States-Israel relationship might be desirable. Ambassador Harman said that the invitation to the United States was in discharge of the specific promise by Ben-Gurion that he would invite someone from the United States.
It was agreed that Mr. Farley should advise the Ambassador directly as to the names of the visitor or visitors whom the United States wished to suggest and as to the acceptability of the time proposed. PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Harman informed the Secretary that Prime Minister Ben-Gurion hopes to have an early opportunity to talk with the President to discuss and clarify a number of subjects of current importance to Israel, including security questions and Israel's atomic energy program. According to the Ambassador, the Prime Minister could make the visit as early as the week of April 23. He has had the possibility of such a visit in mind for some time, but has delayed suggesting it because of his awareness of the heavy demands on the President.
The Secretary said he would try to find an opportunity to discuss the proposal with the President, pointing out, however, that at least until the end of the first week of June the President's schedule is virtually filled. With reference to Ambassador Harman's suggestion that the visit might be as early as the week of April 23, the Secretary observed that the atmosphere might not be completely favorable for a meeting so soon after the Security Council's expression of disapproval of Israel's parade to be held April 20. Ambassador Harman said that this would not be of concern to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, who would be content if arrangements and circumstances of the visit were decided according to the President's wishes.
During my brief stopover at Dhahran when returning from the SEATO Conference, Dean Rusk 1. Subject of UNGA item which being discussed in Special Political Committee is "The Report of Director of UNRWA".
31. Memorandum of Conversation
U.S. Visit to Dimona Reactor Site
Avraham Harman, Ambassador of Israel
G. Lewis Jones, NEA
Philip J. Farley, S/AE
32. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 13, 1961, 3:31-3:58 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.84A11/4-1361. Secret. Drafted by Hamilton on April 17 and approved in S on May 18. The time is taken from Secretary Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) The source text is labeled "Part I of III." Jones forwarded two briefing memoranda to Rusk in preparation for this meeting. (Ibid., 033.84A11/4-1161)
SUBJECT
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's Request for an Appointment with the President
The Secretary
Ambassador Avraham Harman of Israel
Mordechai Gazit, Minister, Embassy of Israel
NEA--Assistant Secretary G. Lewis Jones
NEA/NE--William L. Hamilton
33. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy
King Saud's Personal Greetings and Suggested Reply
34. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Near Eastern and North African Posts/1/
Washington, April 15, 1961, 5:05 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/4-1561. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted by Meyer; cleared by Ludlow, Palmer, Eilts (NEA/NE), and Cargo (IO/UNP); and approved by Meyer who signed for Rusk. Sent to Khartoum, Amman, Cairo, Beirut, Baghdad, Jidda, Tripoli, Rabat, Tunis, Damascus, Jerusalem, and Dhahran and repeated to London, Paris, Ankara, Karachi, Tehran, Tel Aviv, and USUN.
1592. Since it appears show-down re UNRWA item at UNGA will probably occur early week of April 17, it may be useful review developments to date and USG attitude.
2. In 1959, UNGA passed Resolution 1456/3/ extending UNRWA mandate three years and providing for a review of UNRWA program at end of two years, i.e., XVIth session UNGA this coming autumn.
/3/Adopted December 9, 1959; U.N. doc. A/4354. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 1044-1046.
3. However, Arabs insist UNRWA has widespread political ramifications. Hence Arab speeches tend to range from dawn of Arab-Israel problem to continuing criticism of USG for its friendliness toward Israel.
4. At Arab League meeting at Shtaura last August, decision was made to establish Palestine "personality" or "entity" with implication of Algerian-type movement designed ultimately to eliminate Israel. While longer range plans include military organization and Palestine government, Arabs apparently plan take steps gradually. At last fall's UNGA meeting, Arab UN delegates promoted concept of UN custodian for Arab properties left in Israel apparently as suitable first post-Shtaura gambit. They obviously encouraged by new composition of UN, believing that through mutual back-scratching tactics they can parlay Afro-Asian and Soviet bloc votes into series of votes progressively hostile to Israel. Upset by Nkrumah's opening speech which urged Near East states to be "realistic" and implied Arabs should agree to Arab-Israel settlement, all Arab delegates engaged in lengthy harangues rehashing whole Palestine problem to "educate" new delegations.
5. Since USG and other contributing countries resisted custodian gambit, no resolution was achieved at fall session and whole matter was deferred to current resumed session. Apparently persuaded they have sufficient votes to press custodian proposal, Arab delegates after numerous friendly negotiating sessions with US and other contributing country reps finally decided to part ways and seek approval their controversial proposal. They succeeded in obtaining co-sponsorship by five Moslem countries, i.e., Afghanistan, Malaya, Indonesia, Pakistan and Somalia.
6. USG position has consistently been that no resolution is necessary since 1959 resolution authorized UNRWA operations for three-year period. However, in effort to be responsive, USG and contributors indicated they would agree to resolution not going beyond standard resolution of previous years. Arabs insisted on reference to custodian proposal in one form or another, finally offering "mild" proposal to effect UNGA would in fall give consideration to "establishment of machinery" for protecting Arabs' property rights. Although negotiations continued most friendly, USG insisted nothing new or substantive should be introduced and sought to offer counter-language to effect that UNGA should next fall consider steps in interests "general welfare of refugees". This unacceptable to Arabs, who promptly had five Moslem powers table their resolution with custodian concept and USG subsequently tabled its amendments seeking to generalize Arab resolution. In Parliamentary ploy Iraq and Libya then proposed sub-amendments which in effect reinserted Arab concepts into US amendments. This is status as show-down approaches.
7. USG believes custodian concept involves all sorts of complications, including legality of interfering in a sovereign country's right to jurisdiction over property under its control. Cf. Egypt's assertion of this right is case of Suez. Egypt refused outside custodianship for Canal and it doubtful if Arabs would agree to custodian for Jewish properties left in Arab countries. FYI. It certain Israel will reject such a proposal. End FYI.
8. USG bases its position not on merits or demerits of custodian proposal, but rather on propriety and wisdom of introducing an extraneous and controversial issue of this type at this time. Our contention is that Resolution 1456 provided for general review in autumn UNGA and that Arab insistence in raising controversial issue is an obvious provocation at precise time when Arab representatives have repeatedly been telling new US administration that present tranquility in Near East should be preserved and no disturbing initiatives undertaken.
9. Thus in our view issue is not custodian proposal but question of tranquility in New East. If Arabs choose by this method to upset present calm, they must hold themselves responsible. They aware USG support re refugee rights as in Para 11, Res. 194. Rusk
On April 17, 1961, Deputy Special Counsel to the President Myer Feldman telephoned Secretary Rusk about the proposed meeting between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ben Gurion. According to the memorandum of conversation, "The Sec returned the call and F said he met with the Pres this afternoon with a man from NY named Abe Feinberg. The Sec thinks he knows him. F said he just returned from Israel and met with Ben Gurion and Meir and they raised with him what the Amb raised with the Sec--that is the possibility of a meeting between the Pres and BG. The Pres acting on the Sec's advice was reluctant but Feinberg said they apparently regard it as extremely urgent. The Pres said he would be in NY on the 27th--he won't make any announcements of any kind or commitments and assumes no one will--but if BG happens to be there and he is going to be here at Feinberg's invitation he will see him the morning of the 28th. The Pres wanted it checked with the Sec. The Sec said all right under those circumstances. The problem was the parade. F said no announcement here or by us--they just happen to be there and meet quietly. F will report to the Pres." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
On April 20, Talbot told Bowles that people in his bureau were upset over the cumulative effect the visit might have on the Arab world. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; ibid., Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147) On April 21, Bowles told Feldman that he had been convinced that the visit should not take place. Feldman responded, according to notes of the conversation: "The difficulty in getting out of this now is that the President has already said okay and plans have been started in New York. Mr. Ben-Gurion was notified of the President's decision through unofficial channels." (Ibid.) On April 24, Feldman telephoned Rusk from the President's office to say that the meeting would take place in New York on May 30. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) Meyer informed Harman of the decision on April 24. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Central Files, 884A.1901/5-1661)
On April 18 the Arab draft resolution sponsored by five Moslem countries was approved by the Special Political Committee by a vote of 47 in favor, 19 against, and 20 abstentions. As approved, this draft resolution contained several changes which were included among amendments which we had proposed. However, the resolution still contains two paragraphs, one preambular and one operative, which refer to the "property rights", as interpreted by the Arabs, of the Palestine refugees. The pertinent operative paragraph reads:
Recommends to the General Assembly that at its sixteenth session primary consideration be given to the future welfare of the refugees themselves including the means of safeguarding their property rights.
The United States voted against the two paragraphs on the property question and against the resolution as a whole because we believe that the introduction of the Arab concept that the Palestine refugees have specific, ongoing title to property left behind would immeasurably complicate the already difficult problem of working towards a solution of this refugee question. Assembly approval of this concept, even in the apparently innocuous phraseology the Arabs are now proposing, would serve to stimulate later Arab demands for the appointment of a UN custodian in Israel to receive past and current incomes from properties once owned by the refugees.
In order that there be a positive alternative for those delegations who did not wish to endorse the Arab property concept, we introduced in Committee our own resolution which noted that the Palestine refugee problem as a whole would be reviewed at the 16th GA and which, on the strong recommendation of our delegation, contained the following operative paragraph:
Believes that in its consideration of this item at the 16th session, careful consideration should be given to the future welfare of the refugees themselves, including the safeguarding of their rights as set forth in Resolution 194, paragraph 11.
We have fair reason to hope that in plenary a blocking third will be marshalled against the two undesirable property paragraphs in the Arab resolution. If these paragraphs are deleted, we intend to vote for the resolution; if not, we shall vote against. After the Committee vote, we sent a circular to a number of Embassies, requesting that representations be made to secure support for our position on this property question in plenary.
Arab spokesmen and news media are very worked up about our opposition to their ongoing title property concept. We believe that to accommodate ourselves to Arab extremism on this matter now would seriously compromise our ability to assist the parties in finding an eventual solution, and that therefore we must stand firm on our position. Ankara, April 28, 1961, 2:15 p.m.
35. Editorial Note
36. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Acting Secretary of State Bowles
Status of UNRWA (Palestine Refugees) Item at the General Assembly/2/
/2/Documentation on the U.S. position on this U.N. General Assembly item is ibid., 325.84.
I thought you might wish to have the following summary report on where the Palestine refugee item stands.
37. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
US/MC/1
Ankara, Turkey, April 27-28, 1961
SUBJECT
Courtesy Call on the Iranian Foreign Minister
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary
Mr. Talbot
Ambassador Wailes
Iran
Hosein Qods-Nakhai, Iranian Foreign Minister
The Secretary made a courtesy call on the Iranian Foreign Minister at 2:15 today. He was accompanied by Asst. Secretary Talbot and Ambassador Wailes.
After a brief exchange of greetings, the Foreign Minister launched into a long disorganized discourse on the problems the Iranian Government was having with its students, particularly those overseas. He implied that many, if not most, of the students were Communist or Communist-influenced. Later he seemed to take the view that they were spoiled children of the rich with little to do but have a good time and that when their college days were over they would return to normalcy. He then dwelt at some length on the effects of Soviet propaganda on these students, particularly through the medium of Nasser and the UAR. In this connection, he pointed out that there were a number of Egyptian teachers spreading Communism to the Iranian students, particularly in Europe. Furthermore, within the next year a book would be published by Egyptian scholars with local editions in various countries condemning the Shah and the present regime in Iran.
Changing the subject, the Secretary pointed out that in his review of the Iranian situation he had noted that about every six months the Iranian Government and the Shah had asked for assurances of United States backing. He asked frankly what the Minister felt was the cause of these requests. The Minister indicated in his opinion cause number one was the American press, which from time to time had unfriendly and unduly critical articles on the Iranian regime. These had their effect on the Iranian people and the Shah, making them doubt the full backing of the United States. Another reason which he gave was the continued Russian propaganda blasts against Iran which had an unsettling effect on the people. The third reason, which he mentioned briefly, dealt with our aid program and its insufficiency.
The Secretary than inquired whether in view of this unrest of students, etc., as described by the Foreign Minister, Iran's greatest needs weren't in the field of economic and social progress rather than military. The Minister agreed in part but also emphasized Iran's fears of military aggression from neighboring countries, particularly Afghanistan and Iraq, with the more remote possibility of a future danger from Nasserism spreading through the Middle East.
In commenting on the Iranian political situation the Foreign Minister said in his opinion his country was not ready for democracy as we envisaged it because the Iranian people had no faith in elected members of their Parliament. One highly critical member recently easily captured popular acclaim by just being different and being against the Government. He pointed out that this was a serious problem for the Shah and one which prevented rapid progress toward democratization. In this context he also pointed out that it was because of these uncertainties that at the present time the Government hesitated to invite CENTO headquarters to move to Iran.
The Foreign Minister again referred to the problem of students and pointed out that the British had been of some help through a women's organization which took an interest in keeping the co-eds busy and out of trouble. He wondered whether there weren't some organizations in the United States which could take a similar interest in both men and women students, and thus help the Iranian Government with this major problem.
As a last point in the conversation, the Secretary expressed more or less in question form the idea that the Iranians should build up enthusiasm in their student body and young people with a view toward stimulating serious interest in the welfare of their country and government. The Foreign Minister's reply was fairly noncommittal, but indicated that some steps along this line were being taken. The discussion ended with an earnest but unimpressive plea by the Foreign Minister for more aid and understanding on the part of the United States.
/2/ /2/According to the record of the Secretary's staff meeting on May 1, chaired by Under Secretary of State Bowles, Talbot reported on the CENTO meeting and added that "the Secretary feels that an intensive study of the situation in Iran needs to be made." (Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147)38. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Bowles to President Kennedy/1/ Washington, April 28, 1961. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/4-2861. Secret. Drafted by Meyer. A note on the source text by Manfull reads: "Informed by Mr. Dungan (WH) by phone on 5/4/61 that President had approved." SUBJECT
An Approach to the Arab Refugee Problem
It is our view that for the following reasons a serious attempt should be made to do something about the Arab refugee problem: a) a UN resolution of April 21 directed the Palestine Conciliation Commission (United States, France and Turkey) to undertake action with respect to the Arab refugee problem and report to the General Assembly by October 15; b) unless progress is made the general review of the refugee problem scheduled at the General Assembly this fall is apt to produce repercussions highly detrimental to the interest of Israel, the United States, and peace in the Near East; c) unless some move is made toward resolving this 13-year-old problem, Congress will not be likely to continue appropriating funds (approximately $23,000,000 annually) as the United States contribution (70%) to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA); d) the Arab refugee problem is probably the best key to progress on this entire Arab-Israel problem, including such issues as Suez transit, the Arab League boycott, boundaries, and the status of Jerusalem; and e) during the campaign last fall a pledge was made to initiate action designed to facilitate an Arab-Israel settlement.
The approach which the Department proposes consists of elements recommended by qualified and unbiased observers over the years. Briefly, it offers each refugee the choice of repatriation as a law-abiding citizen of Israel, resettlement via special works projects in an Arab country, or resettlement via United Nations encouragement in a non-Arab country. The approach assumes, and by careful restriction and phasing assures, that only a fraction of the refugees will in fact return to live permanently in Israel. As a first step, a Special Representative under PCC auspices would carry out a "reconnaissance mission" to Israel and the Arab capitals. The Special Representative, probably a non-American, will be selected in consultation with Secretary General Hammarskjold.
The Arab-Israel question in its various aspects has defied solution for 13 years. This effort, if it is to have any chance of success, will require maximum cooperation from all parties directly concerned. The forthcoming visit of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion will afford excellent opportunity for you to bespeak his cooperation. It is important, however, that PCC activity become public knowledge prior to the Ben-Gurion visit, for otherwise Arab leaders are apt to reject the Commission's project with allegations that it was "hatched" by you and the Prime Minister in your talks. It may not prove possible to select an appropriate Special Representative and to have him commence his mission prior to the arrival of Ben-Gurion. In that case there could at least be a meeting or two of the PCC and a subsequent press release or planted story to the effect that the Commission is considering how an impartial approach to the problem might be made and, in this connection, that it is thinking about the selection of an impartial representative to sound out the parties directly concerned.
As you know, the Arabs already tend to view this Administration as pro-Israeli, particularly because of certain recent developments at the United Nations. Because of the important time factor, I would hope you will be able to give us prompt approval to undertake this approach./2/
/2/The points raised in this memorandum were discussed on April 27 at a meeting attended by Meyer, Plimpton, Strong, Eilts, Hamilton, Crawford, Ludlow, Palmer, and others at the Department of State. A memorandum for the record, drafted by Crawford, is ibid., NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 229, Israel-US.
Chester Bowles/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Bowles signed the original.
Discussion:
You will recall that Ambassador Harman submitted to you a memorandum (Tab A) 1. Quiet Diplomacy. We are pleased that the Israelis share our view concerning the many "positive aspects" characterizing the present climate of the Near East. As noted in previous exchanges between us, we agree with the Israeli view that a "frontal and public attack" on major outstanding issues would be likely to boomerang but we would not, of course, be averse to steps which could be effective in advancing an Arab-Israel settlement. We have been gratified to note that under the relatively tranquil conditions prevailing during the past year Israel has continued its phenomenal progress, e.g., exports up 25%, industrial growth up 14% (highest in the world), GNP per capita above that of Netherlands and Italy, foreign exchange reserve up over 65%, and even USG aid up from $60 million to $82 million.
2. Security Assurances. We have serious doubts as to the advantages either for the U.S. or Israel of a bilateral Defense Agreement and we question the advisability of a new public statement on the part of the U.S. Government supporting in explicit terms territorial integrity of the Near East states. We do not believe either our allies or the Soviet Union would join us in such a declaration. Such a statement would, in fact, seem to constitute the kind of broadside effort regarding issues in the area which would carry a greater risk of disturbing the existing calm than it would carry promise of aiding progress towards solutions. The Arabs would interpret such a gesture as an American attempt to coerce them into making peace with Israel and as an abandonment of an impartial attitude on the part of the United States. Existing U.S. ties with Israel, our demonstrated opposition to armed aggression as reflected in the Lebanon crisis and Israel's own military capabilities are significant deterrents to aggressive intent on the part of Israel's neighbors (Tabs A-1 and B-1).
3. Military Aid. With regard to the arms imbalance feared by the Israelis, we continue to believe that steps which would in effect make the United States the arsenal for Israel would heighten tension in the area and would probably lead to a corresponding step-up of Soviet arms to the UAR. Such an intensified arms race with its concomitant economic burdens would be highly detrimental to the countries of the area and dangerous. We are confident that Israel's military needs can best be served: a) by procurement of its heavy and advanced arms from traditional European suppliers; b) by the occasional sale of modest amounts of defensive arms from the United States; c) by accepting our offer for some $15,000,000 worth of advanced electronics equipment (early warning); d) by military training of Israeli officers in the United States at about the present levels; e) by the continued availability to Israel of surplus U.S. mat?riel; and, f) by continued beneficial contacts with our military attach?s in Israel. In this connection, we are gratified by the high regard which our military officers hold for Israel's military prowess and their confidence that the Israel defense forces will more than match Arab military capabilities for the foreseeable future (Tabs A-2 and B-2).
4. Regional Disarmament. The U.S. is very much in sympathy with the Israeli objective for reducing arms burdens in the Near East but we fear that there is at the moment not much hope of finding a basis for agreement for disarmament or agreed upon arms control in the Near East region. We intend, however, to keep this matter under scrutiny. Prospects for any initiatives would, of course, be enhanced by preservation of the existing calm and by a cooperative attitude on the part of all the nations which are supplying significant quantities of arms to the Near East countries (Tabs A-3 and B-3).
5. Arab Refugees. The United States finds the position of the Israel Government on the Palestine refugee problem somewhat disappointing. At the Lausanne Conference in 1949 Israel spoke in terms of the repatriation of a substantial number of refugees--up to 150,000. Thus, it seems that Israel's stance on repatriation has retrogressed considerably. The U.S. remains deeply concerned with the refugee problem. There is mounting Congressional impatience with continuance of massive U.S. financial contributions unrewarded by significant progress towards solution. It is also a subject on which Israel and its friends are extremely vulnerable in the annual debates on the UNRWA item at the UN General Assembly. We do not expect either Israel or the Arabs to sacrifice vital national interest to make progress. However, there is required a willingness on both sides to undertake concessions which seem of significance to the other.
The choice of compensation or repatriation has perennially been endorsed by the UNGA. This principle is supported by the U.S. It is difficult to envision real progress until Israel has found some means for dealing effectively with this concept. In recent years Israel has indicated willingness to compensate the refugees, but has done so in the context of rejecting the principle of repatriation. Lacking this element, the sum impression of the Israel position is that the present unhappy situation should endure for a very long time, with the U.S. continuing to bear the brunt politically and economically. For its part the United States would not view as acceptable any arrangement which would disrupt Israel's economy or prove to be a significant threat to Israel's security (Tabs A-5 and B-5).
6. Palestine Entity. The Arab concept of a "Palestine Entity", with the implied thought of establishment of a "Palestine Government in exile", is regarded by the U.S. as a retrogressive development in Arab-Israel relations. The Arabs so far have been notoriously unable to develop any agreed course of action for implementation of the Palestine entity idea and a frontal attack by the U.S. on the entity concept is only likely to give it more life (Tabs A-4 and B-4).
7. Jordan Waters. The U.S. continues to believe that an internationally agreed unified program along the lines of the Johnston Plan promises the most satisfactory resolution of the Jordan waters problem. Meanwhile, it is imperative in our view that Israel in its water development program abide by the terms of the Johnston Plan. Because of intense Arab antagonism and threats of hostilities when Israel diverts water out of the Jordan basin, we are on a continual alert for possible indications that a unified development plan can be negotiated by one agency or another with the parties directly concerned (Tabs A-7 and B-7).
39. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, May 1, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86B/5-161. Secret. Drafted by Meyer, Thacher, and Palmer on April 25 and concurred in by Haydn Williams (DOD/ISA).
SUBJECT
Suggested Reply to Memorandum of Israeli Ambassador re Arab-Israel Situation
8. Aid to Jordan. The U.S. concurs in the Israeli view that continued stability and economic growth in Jordan are important for stability in the area. Our attitude is reflected in the substantial assistance we annually provide to Jordan.
Recommendation:
That you approve my conveying the foregoing orally to Ambassador Harman. 2. Dept regards progress toward solution refugee problem an important current aim of USG policy because: (a) intolerable that almost one million humans indefinitely lead essentially hopeless and unproductive lives; (b) continuation of impasse is increasingly detrimental to US interests in NE area, and dangerous to area peace; (c) continuation our considerable financial support for refugees can by no means be guaranteed in absence meaningful forward movement, and (d) without real progress (or at very least, clear evidence US has used its influence to secure progress on just and peaceful basis) our ability handle refugee item at UNGA in way not detrimental to US interests will inevitably lessen.
3. First basic hurdle to be cleared is unwillingness both sides realistically endeavor implement Para 11, Res 194 (III) which resolved that refugees be permitted to choose between repatriation or resettlement with compensation for property left behind. Operative Para 1 of Res 1604 (XV), approved by GA April 21 (Depcirtel 1657), 5. After consulting SYG, USUN requested arrange earliest possible meeting PCC to consider nominating SR. If not possible reach informal agreement on SR by May 8, PCC should nonetheless be convened for exploratory discussions on May 9. It may be desirable to issue brief press statement after PCC meeting indicating PCC seeking earnestly undertake approach to refugee problem pursuant to UNGA mandates. For London: Emb requested inform FonOff confidentially USG intentions, ask for UK comments, and express hope UK will provide such subsequent assistance as may be required.
Other addressees should not disclose US plans at this stage.
Rusk
Late in the evening of May 4, 1961, Admiral Burke directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff Duty Officer to see that President Kennedy received immediately the text of a message from Tehran reporting that during a teachers strike in Iran, 50,000 demonstrators had clashed with Iranian Army and security forces and that a nationwide strike sponsored by the National Front was possible. General Clifton read the message at 10:50 p.m., but decided not to waken the President who had retired for the evening. Clifton informed Burke of this, said that if additional vital news came from Iran it would be shown to the President, and promised to show the original message to the President first thing in the morning. According to a memorandum by Clifton written at 11:40 p.m., he also informed Burke that "the President had been worried that things had been happening that he isn't informed about, and that this looked fairly difficult, so he should be kept posted." Clifton's memorandum, the message from Tehran, and a subsequent message reporting which Iranian military units had been put on alert are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Iran, 5/1/61-5/14/61.
The following day, the Embassy in Tehran reported that Prime Minister Jafar Sharif Emami and his Cabinet had resigned. (Telegram 1366 from Tehran; Department of State, Central Files, 788.13/5-561) Later that day in Washington, Iran was discussed at a meeting of the National Security Council. Record of Action No. 2420 taken by the National Security Council at its 483d meeting on May 5 indicates that the National Security Council had: "Agreed that a Task Force should be established under the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs to prepare and circulate a report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the Council on May 19." (Ibid., S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
After the meeting, Rusk sent a note to Talbot that reads: "At the NSC Meeting today the President expressed his concern, which we all share, about the potentially dangerous situation in Iran. He wondered whether we should not pull together a crisis-type task force to concentrate heavily upon it." (Ibid., NEA/GTI Files: Lot 66 D 173, Task Force on Iran)
On May 6, the Embassy in Tehran reported that the Shah had appointed former Iranian Ambassador to the United States and a critic of his regime, Dr. Ali Amini, as Prime Minister and that Amini had reportedly demanded that the Shah accept the following conditions: 1) Amini's right to name all Cabinet ministers except the Minister of War and possibly the Minister of Interior; 2) the dissolution of the Majlis; and 3) the establishment of a special court to handle corruption cases. (Telegram 1366 from Tehran; ibid., Central Files, 788.13/5-661)
On May 8, the Iran Task Force held its first meeting. Talbot served as Chairman with Ambassador Holmes as Deputy. State representatives included: Miner, Bowling, Miklos, Evan Wilson, Hilsman, Elwood, Springsteen, Baxter, Kerr, and Murnighan. William Bundy represented the Defense Department's International Security Affairs Office. Other members were: Maurice Williams from the International Cooperation Administration; Kenneth Hansen, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget; William King from the U.S. Information Agency; John Leddy from the Treasury; and Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff. Names of the Central Intelligence Agency representatives are not included in Department of State files. The two main collections of documentation on the Iran Task Force in Department of State files are the collection kept by the Executive Secretariat in S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC--Position Paper, Iran--1961-1964, and those kept by the Iran Desk in NEA/GTI Files: Lot 66 D 173, Task Force on Iran.
According to the record of the Secretary's staff meeting for May 8, Talbot reported that "the new Task Force on Iran, scheduled to produce a report for the NSC by next week, will hold its first meeting today. He said the new government in Iran is expected to be a stabilizing force and that the Task Force will concentrate on medium-range objectives rather than immediate crises." (Ibid., Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147)
On May 9, the Embassy in Tehran reported that Amini had presented his new Cabinet to the Shah, the Shah had dissolved the Majlis and Senate, and Amini had banned most public meetings and demonstrations and met with teachers to discuss grievances. (Telegrams 1372 and 1374 from Tehran; ibid., Central Files, 788.00/5-961)
As you know, Arab leaders are concerned about the policies of the new United States administration with respect to their part of the world. In their view, the previous Democratic administration under President Truman was strongly partial to Israel. This no doubt has conditioned their interpretation of certain attitudes we have recently been required to take, e.g. during the recent UNRWA debate at the General Assembly.
We feel the time has come to make clear the desire of this administration to deal with Middle Eastern matters on as fair and friendly a basis as possible. Accordingly we are proposing a letter from you to each of the Arab leaders setting forth the broad lines of this administration's policy with respect to the Middle East.
It is our hope that the proposed letters will be helpful in our launching of the new approach to the Arab refugee problem by the Palestine Conciliation Commission. The letters may also be of some help in mitigating Arab repercussions to the forthcoming visit of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to this country. In this connection, it will be important to dispatch the letters as far in advance of Ben-Gurion's May 30 visit as possible.
If you approve the attached draft letter, we shall forward the text via our Embassies to: President Nasser of the United Arab Republic, President Chehab of Lebanon, King Hussein of Jordan, Prime Minister Qassim of Iraq, King Saud of Saudi Arabia, and Imam Ahmed of Yemen. We shall accompany the text with special insertions setting forth what the United States has done and is doing by way of assisting each country. The proposed inserts on a country by country basis are also attached. With regard to the recent United Nations debate concerning UNGA, we have numerous reports that the Arab delegates in New York have misrepresented our attitude to their home governments, principally to avoid the onus for their own lack of success. As a result there are indications that a special meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers may soon be convened with a view to discussing the alleged "new anti-Arab attitude" on the part of the United States. The letter from you should be quite helpful in tempering such Arab discussion. It might in fact lead to some sort of collective Arab response, which would at least have the merit of maintaining contact with the Arab world. It is also conceivable that this exercise could lead to a meeting between you and some Arab spokesman, e.g. Nasser, for the purpose of exchanging views.
We have little doubt that news of these letters will leak to the press, here and in the Near East. We will not recommend publication of the letters, but if the recipients should ask that publication be permitted we would concur.
I hope you will be able to approve this proposal. In our view a move of this type is needed. Arab attitudes toward us at the United Nations and elsewhere have not been helpful and it would be hoped that these letters would reassure Arab leaders of this administration's earnest desire to maintain and enhance friendly and fruitful relations between their countries and ours.
Chester Bowles PARTICIPANTS FYI. A briefing arranged with the above-named officials for Ambassador Barbour Admiral Grantham remarked that it might be difficult to deliver them to the Israelis and continue to decline to make them available to the Pakistanis and the Iranians, both of whom have requested the weapon. Mr. Bundy replied that there are two differences: (1) the Israelis have the technical competence to master their use in very short order, which is not true of the Pakistanis and the Iranians; and (2) the Israel deal would be a sale, whereas our CENTO friends would expect them as gifts.
We discussed the cost of the missile, and I pointed out that the $50 million estimated original cost would fall on the United States one way or another. Furthermore, we are averse in principle to large-scale arms transactions in the Middle East. I pointed out that our largest previous sale to Israel had a ceiling of $1 million.
Mr. Bundy made much of the fact that the "Hawk" is a purely defensive weapon and he was not particularly impressed, as far as I could see, with our arguments that, regardless of its defensive character, it would mean the introduction of an advanced type of weapon technology that all other governments of the Middle East would want immediately in equivalent or more lethal form.
I left the meeting with the conviction that if the President, following his conversation with Ben-Gurion, asked a reassessment of the request for the "Hawk", responsibility for resistance will rest completely with the Department and we shall receive no support from Defense for reasons of national security or classification.
End FYI.
On May 8, 1961, United Arab Republic Ambassador Mostafa Kamel met with President Kennedy from 3:45 to 4:50 p.m. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Books) No memorandum of the conversation has been found either in Department of State files or in the Kennedy Library. Telegram 1970 to Cairo, May 11, contained the following brief account: "President inquired whether number subjects, such as Palestine refugee question, which he was discussing with Kamel might not appropriately be pursued with Ben Gurion." (Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/5-1161) On May 17, Kamel told Department of State officials that, during his conversation with the President, "he had had full opportunity to set forth the concerns of the Arabs, that he had urged that the U.S. make no effort to disturb the status quo in the Middle East, that the President had discussed with him what it would be useful for him to tell Ben Gurion, that he had found the President a man of great breadth and clear understanding, that he had made a full report to Cairo, and that the reaction of Cairo had been most favorable." (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., 611.86B/5-1761)
A briefing memorandum from Secretary Rusk to President Kennedy on May 5 to help the President prepare for the meeting with Kamel is ibid., 601.86B11/5-561. An account of Assistant Secretary of State Talbot's brief discussion with Kennedy prior to the Kennedy-Kamel meeting is in a memorandum for the files by Brewer, May 8. (Ibid., 601.86B11/5-861) For texts, see Supplement, the compilation on the United Arab Republic.
40. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/
Washington, May 4, 1961, 8:14 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/5-461. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Palmer and Crawford, cleared by Meyer and Knox, and approved by Cleveland who initialed for Rusk. Also sent to Ankara, London, and Paris and repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, and Jerusalem.
2183. 1. In accordance decision reached Ambassador Plimpton's consultations in Dept April 27,/2/ plan to undertake serious approach to Palestine refugee problem by UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (PCC) has been submitted to and approved by top level USG.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 38.
41. Editorial Note
42. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Bowles to President Kennedy
Proposed Message to Arab Leaders
43. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, May 8, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 304, Israel Eyes Only 1960/61/62. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hamilton on May 10.
SUBJECT
"Hawks" for Israel
William Bundy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Admiral Grantham
Ambassador-designate Walworth Barbour
Colonel Stanley Harding
NEA/NE--William L. Hamilton
44. Editorial Note
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