Documents 66-97
Iraqi Claim to Kuwait
In response to an urgent telephone request from Mr. Blackiston we are forwarding a brief account of the background of Iraq's assertion of sovereignty over Kuwait.
Qasim Announcement
Prime Minister Qasim of Iraq in a press conference June 25 asserted old Iraqi claims to Kuwaiti territory and offered to "liberate" the inhabitants of Kuwait. The statement as read over Baghdad Radio referred to Kuwait several times as "an indivisible part of Iraq" and asserted, ". . . it is the Iraqi Republic and no one else which signs agreements for Kuwait." He further announced the intent to issue a Republican Decree appointing the Shaykh of Kuwait qa' immaqam (district or sub-provincial governor) under the Iraqi province of Basra. Qasim's move was obviously in response to the termination on June 19 of an Anglo-Kuwaiti treaty,
/2/ and the assumption by the Shaykh of the full conduct of Kuwaiti foreign affairs. Qasim's message to the Kuwaiti ruler on that occasion was grudging to the point of rudeness. Kuwaitis, although annoyed by the Iraqi attitude, have publicly ignored the incident. The UK promptly reaffirmed its continued readiness to assist Kuwait on request, by force if necessary./3/ /2/On June 19, the Ruler of Kuwait and the U.K. Political Resident, Persian Gulf, Sir William Luce, signed letters terminating the Anglo-Kuwaiti Treaty of 1899, thereby providing for Kuwaiti independence. For text, see Exchange of Notes Regarding Relations Between the United Kingdom and Kuwait, 19th June 1961, British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 166, pp. 112-113. /3/On June 26, the Iraqi Government issued a note to the Diplomatic Corps in Baghdad conveying a memorandum summarizing Iraq's position with regard to the U.K.-Kuwaiti agreement of June 19, which the Iraqi Government considered to be contrary to its assertion that "Kuwait was and still is an indivisible part of Iraq." The text of the note and the attached memorandum, delivered to the Embassy in Baghdad, were transmitted to the Department in despatch 1260 from Baghdad, June 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 686D.87/6-2761) Background of Kuwait Ruling HouseAncestors of the al-Subah family, the ruling dynasty of Kuwait, emigrated from central Saudi Arabia (Najd province) in the 17th century and first settled at Umm Qasr (now the site of a proposed Iraqi port development, access to which has been at issue for some time between Iraq and Kuwait). Driven from this location by the Turks, the family established itself at Kuwait in the 18th century. From then until World War I, these minor rulers shifted allegiance according to the exigencies of local dynastic wars and pressures by larger powers.
In the later years of the 18th century, the family and town were under Persian suzerainty, and Kuwait rivalled Basra as a port for the interior of Mesopotamia up to Damascus. However, in 1829 the then ruler had to acknowledge the suzerainty of Turkey and pay tribute to the Ottoman Porte. In return for a subsidy, the Kuwaiti navy protected the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab in the name of the Porte. In 1869-70, the Kuwaiti Ruler joined energetic Turkish Sultan Midhat Pasha in a military campaign into Arabia that conquered al-Hasa province, which, for a time, was governed from Basra as the Turkish province of Najd. Thereafter, the Shaykh of Kuwait formally accepted the Turkish definition of his position and was accepted by the Porte as de jure ruler of Kuwait.
British Interest and Kuwaiti Independence
By 1897, the then Shaykh of Kuwait was paying little attention to his nominal superiors in Basra. At this time, Kuwait was being considered as the terminus of the proposed Berlin-Baghdad Railway. The UK, which had not formally accepted the Ottoman right to speak for Kuwait, therefore interested itself, and the English Resident at Bushire, Col. Meade, was authorized by London to contact the Shaykh of Kuwait directly. The Shaykh was interested not only in asserting his independence vis-?-vis Turkey, but also in British help with the perennial skirmishing going on since 1895 between himself and the Rashidi family, head of the powerful Shammar tribe in Saudi Arabia, and later with their conqueror, King Abdul Aziz Ibn Sa'ud.
On January 23, 1899, therefore, the Kuwaiti Shaykh agreed not to let or cede any part of his territory to other governments or subjects of governments other than England, and to receive no representatives of foreign powers without British authorization. In return, the Shaykh received an annual subsidy and British and Indian protection as needed against the Wahhabi incursions from Saudi Arabia. This is the treaty just denounced by the Iraqi government.
/4/ From 1903, a British Political Resident was established in Kuwait; a second treaty with the UK was signed in 1907. /4/Agreement between Great Britain and Kuwait providing for non-cession of territory within the Sheikdom, 23rd January 1899; for text, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 166, pp. 112-113. On July 29, 1913, agreement was reached between the UK and Turkey, by which the boundaries of Kuwait were defined, and its status was established as that of an autonomous qadha (sub-province). At the same time, the treaty relationship with the UK was confirmed by Turkey, and Turkish representation was to be permitted at Kuwait. The outbreak of World War I prevented ratification of this instrument. Instead, England declared Kuwait to be an independent kingdom under British protection. On December 26, 1915, King Ibn Sa'ud concluded an agreement with the Shaykh and the UK by which the Kuwait-Saudi boundaries were defined (they have never been demarcated), and any Saudi claims to the territory of Kuwait were conceded.Previous Iraqi Claims to Kuwait
During the First World War and subsequent British Mandate over Iraq, Iraqi relations with Kuwait were not a problem. After Iraq achieved independence in 1932, however, anti-British Iraqi nationalists occasionally agitated an Iraqi claim to the territory of Kuwait based on the old Ottoman jurisdiction. In 1937, Iraq extended its protection to Kuwait in a minor row with Saudi Arabia. In 1938, Iraq's second ruler, the young King Ghazi, loudly demanded annexation of Kuwait and broadcast Iraq's claims on Baghdad radio. In that year, the Iraqi government invited Kuwaiti students to study in Baghdad at the Iraqi government's expense, a move which drew both Kuwaiti and British objections. Early in 1939, when a legislative council in Kuwait was preparing a new constitution which was being so drafted as to guarantee the continuance of special British treaty rights, anti-British riots broke out in Kuwait objecting to the constitution and demanding, among other things, union with Iraq. The disturbance was short-lived, although serious enough to require application of emergency law in Kuwait. Baghdad press and radio, as well as the nationalist Arab Office in Damascus, backed the Kuwaiti dissidents, and there were rumors of Iraqi complicity in rousing the demonstrations. The furor quieted somewhat following the death of King Ghazi in an automobile accident in April 1939.
Thereafter, the Iraqi government tacitly accepted the status quo. For the last several years of the monarchy, the government of Nuri al-Sa'id was at pains to court good relations with the Kuwaiti ruling family, welcomed its members' frequent visits to relatives and properties in the Basra area, and discussed off-and-on the provision to Kuwait of sweet water from the Shatt al-Arab.
However, in 1958, following the uniting of Iraq and Jordan in the short-lived Arab Union, Nuri al-Sa'id again revived the claim. This was not a forceful public assertion, but rather a series of quiet diplomatic d?marches in an attempt to persuade the Kuwaiti Ruler and the UK of the desirability of Kuwaiti adherence to the new Union. Nuri had in mind popularizing the Union with the Iraqi public through the acquisition of Kuwaiti wealth to offset the budgetary drain of Jordan, and at the same time hoped to create a psychology of momentum toward joining the Baghdad-based rather than the Cairo-Damascus union. Neither the Kuwaitis nor the UK evinced any interest, and the suggestion did not receive a great deal of publicity at the time. It was still being advanced by the Iraqi monarchy up to the time of the July 1958 revolution.
The Qasim regime is therefore advancing an old Iraqi claim, but one that has not in the past received much support from other Arab states and has had no recognition from the world at large. Aside from Qasim's extreme sensitivity to any manifestation of continued foreign presence in the Arab area, he is probably motivated by his current irritation with the UK over the stalled renegotiation of the IPC concession.
/5/ Qasim probably also sees in this a potentially popular issue at a time when popular enthusiasm for his regime is waning at home./6/ /5/Documentation is in Department of State, Central File 887.2553. /6/A handwritten note on the source text, presumably by Charlotte Morehouse, reads: "In my 4 years, there was never any deep Iraqi feeling re Kuwait--as there was for example on such issues as Palestine or anti-UK issues."67. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Kuwait/1/ Washington, June 27, 1961, 8:38 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 686D.87/6-2661. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Eilts; cleared in draft by Strong, Kerley, Ludlow, Murnighan, Bevans, Wallner, and Stora; and approved by Talbot who initialed for Rusk. Repeated to London, Baghdad, and USUN. 257. Contel 216./2/ Qasim claim to Kuwait is basically inter-Arab controversy and there is clearly some value keeping it that context. Dept sees no advantage gratuitous USG entry into lists which might only (a) shift focus of problem (b) be detrimental to recent favorable trend in Iraq and (c) goad Qasim to new intemperance which will exacerbate problem. In any case we understand Kuwatis are in close touch with UK which is advising them how handle matter./3/ /2Telegram 216, June 26, reported that the Ruler of Kuwait had asked urgently to receive both a public and private U.S. reaction to Iraq's claim to Kuwait and that the Ruler would apparently like a statement from a high U.S. Government official supporting Kuwait's independence in the context of Qasim's threat. (Ibid.) /3/On June 26, according to the record of the meeting, Talbot told the Secretary's staff meeting that "the British will take primary responsibility for dealing with the problem of Iraq's claim to Kuwait and that he expects Kuwait to seek UN membership this fall without special urging from the US." (Ibid., Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147) In response Kuwaiti request you may tell Kuwait Secretariat orally that USG sees no need comment on Iraqi PriMin statement. As far as Kuwait is concerned, USG recognition of Kuwait as a sovereign state evident from establishment Consulate in 1950, conclusion visa agreement directly with Kuwait in 1960,/4/ and USG support of Kuwaiti admission to UNESCO, UPU and other international bodies. US as depositary International Civil Aviation Convention has accepted adherence Kuwait as "State associated with them (Members of UN)." As indicated Secretary's message to Ruler June 19, USG has enjoyed cordial relations with Kuwait and expects these continue. You may add that USG would of course support Kuwaiti application membership in UN. /4/Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of nonimmigrant passport visas; exchange of notes at Kuwait December 11 and 27, 1960, entered into force on December 27, 1960, and operative on January 26, 1961. (11 UST 2650) We would prefer avoiding USG public statement on matter but if questioned by press, appropriate Dept spokesman will speak along above lines. We believe British clearly willing and able advise Kuwaitis re handling problem and USG advice neither necessary nor desirable as of now. In general however we incline to view problem likely subside soonest if Kuwaiti reaction to Qasim statement though firm remains dignified, calm and low key.
Above generally consistent with Baghdad's 914 rpt Kuwait 38
/5/ which just received. /5/In telegram 914, June 27, the Embassy in Baghdad advised against issuing a U.S. Government statement at this time, as Qasim would publicly interpret it as further evidence of an "imperialist plot" against Kuwait. (Department of State, Central Files, 686D.87/6-2761) Rusk
68. National Intelligence Estimate
Washington, June 27, 1961.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff." All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except for the Atomic Energy Commission representative and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.The Problem
To estimate the outlook for Arab nationalism generally and to assess the problems and prospects of Nasser and the UAR in particular.
1. Militant nationalism will continue to be the most dynamic force in Arab political affairs, and Nasser is very likely to remain its foremost leader and symbol for the foreseeable future. The long-term outlook for the conservative and Western-aligned regimes is bleak. Despite important differences between competing brands of Arab nationalism, the significant ones all reflect desires for independence and neutralism, social and economic reform and varying degrees of Arab unity. (Paras. 10-11, 13, 29)
2. We do not believe that the appeal of Arab unity, strong as it is to most Arab nationalists, will overcome the host of divisive and particularist interests which work against the creation of a union of Arab states. Nasser probably now appreciates the practical obstacles involved in seeking to establish such a union. He is likely to settle for more limited means of trying to assert paramountcy. (Paras. 28, 30, 36-38)
3. The UAR will make strong efforts to achieve progress in economic development, but neither the Egyptian nor Syrian region is likely to attain significant economic growth without substantial and continued foreign aid. (Paras. 15, 20-35)
4. Nasser will probably continue to work for consolidation of unity between the Egyptian and Syrian regions through a fairly pragmatic combination of authoritarian control and tactical concessions to Syrian sensibilities. In most respects, such consolidation involves a high degree of Egyptian domination of Syria. We believe that Nasser has a good chance of avoiding a breakup of the union. However, striking successes are unlikely, and serious setbacks remain constantly possible. (Paras. 14-24)
5. Nasser's control of the UAR--as well as his position in the Arab world generally--will be helped by Arab fear and hatred of Israel. Israel's nuclear potential and Israeli plans to divert Jordan waters will intensify Arab apprehensions. The UAR has the only Arab armed forces with any significant potential against Israel, which gives Nasser a unique claim to Arab leadership. (Paras. 19, 37-38)
6. This claim is further buttressed by Nasser's accepted position as the leading exponent of Arab reformism, and by his demonstrated readiness to assume leadership in defending Arab nationalism against communism. Despite his dependence on the Bloc, he is not neutral in the conflict between Arab nationalism and communism. (Paras. 10-11, 19, 46-50)
7. It is highly unlikely that Nasser will abandon his broad foreign policy of "positive neutralism." He has a basic belief that either of the great power blocs, if given free rein, would move to dominate or destroy him; he believes that neither can get free rein because of the determination of the other to prevent it. He will thus seek to avoid both total dependence on, and total alienation from, the Bloc as well as the West. Although in practice this strategy leads him to side more often with the Bloc than with the West, he has shown himself ready to respond vigorously to Soviet attacks. (Paras. 48-51)
8. It is probable that with the passage of time the inherent incompatibility between ultimate Soviet ambitions in the Middle East and the aspirations of Nasser and the Arab nationalists to preserve and strengthen their independent position will become increasingly manifest. If the Soviets should decide to abandon support of the Nasser regime in favor of increasingly heavy-handed pressure and subversion, the result would probably be a fundamental breach between Nasser and the USSR. However, such a breach may not come for years. (Para. 52)
9. Nasser's efforts to play a leading role among neutralists and Afro-Asians confront him with complex problems. Almost all African leaders, for example, are unwilling to see him play a dominant role on that continent. Moreover, matters like the forthcoming conference of nonaligned states and the future structure of the UN involve him in conflicting pressures from the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the neutralists. (Paras. 41-42, 45, 53)
[Here follows the 8-page Discussion section. See Supplement, the United Arab Republic compilation.]
69. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara
Washington, June 28, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Iran 000.1--1961. Top Secret. SUBJECTMilitary Advice Pursuant to US Policy Towards Iran (U)
1. Reference is made to the memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 29 May 1961,
/2/ subject as above, in which the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested on specific aspects of the new "US Policy Toward Iran" as set forth in National Security Council Action 2427./3/ /2/Not printed. (Ibid.) /3/Document 51. 2. In your examination of political-military implications of NSC Action 2427 with the Department of State, it is recommended that you consider the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as summarized below and as supplemented in the Appendix hereto:/4/ /4/Not printed. a. The strategic importance of Iran to the United States and her allies, especially NATO, cannot be overemphasized. However, the United States does not have sufficient military assets to station permanently significant additional forces in Iran or adjacent areas and meet current worldwide security commitments.b. Temporary deployment of "show of force" or "token" forces additional to forces permanently deployed to the area is feasible. Pre-positioning of some material and equipment in the general area will assist in the attainment of a more rapid reaction to an emergency and will assist in support of temporary deployments. However, inherent delays in obtaining clearances for transit of forces and timely availability of base facilities could restrict immediate actions to temporary deployments of naval forces to international waters adjacent to Iran.
c. Periodic dispatching of US forces on an exercise or maneuver basis to Iran, preferably in coordination with CENTO, is desirable and feasible.
d. Further detailed identification (earmarking) of existing US units allocated for possible deployment to Iran in current contingency plans is militarily impractical.
e. It is militarily undesirable to inform the Iranian Government more specifically of US unilateral plans for military action in support of Iran.
f. Current military plans provide for the possible use of US forces in excess of two divisions in Iran, with either conventional or nuclear capability, or both; therefore, preparation of additional plans for illustrative purposes as a basis for identifying key military and political considerations appears unnecessary.
g. The decision to deploy sizeable forces to the Middle East area to assist Iran against a Soviet attack must consider the possibility of the conflict escalating into general war and the effect of the decision on US general war posture. It is envisaged that in general war defense of the Middle East area would be undertaken primarily by indigenous forces. Within present military strategy, it is not contemplated that sizeable US combat forces will be deployed to the Middle East area, at least initially. Many advantages would accrue to the area from the Allied strategic offensive.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L. L. Lemnitzer As you know, last time that our two Governments were preparing military movements in the area, after the Iraqi revolution in July 1958, Foster Dulles and Selwyn Lloyd were in the closest touch about the action which we might take separately or together. Caccia will no doubt discuss all this with you and give you our information. We have an absolute obligation to help the Ruler if Kuwait is attacked and, as this is an area the security of which is of immense importance to both of us, I hope we could act with the closest cooperation.
What a world it is! PARTICIPANTS The President received us as a group and queried each Ambassador Designate for his views with respect to the area to which he was accredited. When my turn came, he asked me about the crisis over Kuwait, asking whether it was true that the Saudi Arabian Government was moving troops toward that area. When I responded that this was confirmed, he asked whether or not it was the intention of the Saudi Arabian Government to forestall Iraq by taking over Kuwait. I said no; I believed the object of the Saudi move was to defend Kuwait's independence against the Iraqi threat.
In response to a query as to how serious the threat was, I said that Sir Humphrey Trevelyan had advised London that the U.K. should be prepared to move troops in the direction of Kuwait to defend it, indicating Sir Humphrey's fear that the Iraqi Government might make a quick military move. The President said this tallied with information he had received this morning. He asked whether any other Arab countries were taking a position on Kuwait's side, as was Saudi Arabia. I said yes, the U.A.R. had come out flatfooted for Kuwait's independence. To his question whether there were any Arab countries that might support Iraq in its claims, I said that I could think of none likely to do so. He asked about the U.S.S.R. I said that it had not expressed itself. I was not quite so sure about the position of Iran--possibly Ambassador Wailes might have a comment--inasmuch as Iran had claims on Bahrain; and if Persian Gulf shaikhdoms were going to break loose from their traditional association with the U.K., in a sense it became "open season" for larger neighboring powers to assert such claims that they might have. Ambassador Wailes made no comment on this point.
The President turned to converse with the remaining Ambassadors in turn, then concluded the meeting by commenting on the centralized responsibilities of U.S. Ambassadors abroad, referring to the letter which he had written with regard to their proper role as coordinators of all American activities within their jurisdictions. He then instructed me to convey the following message to Assistant Secretary Talbot: That Mr. Talbot inform him of the decision which might be made with respect to the USMTM in Saudi Arabia before such decision was final.
As we shook hands on my departure, I said that I intended, if he agreed, to convey his personal regards to the King of Saudi Arabia and to the King of the Yemen. He nodded assent and remarked he had recently met one of the Saudi princes in the hospital.
3. Naturally we hope that things will not come to this pass, and it may be that the influence of the Arab Governments and of other friendly countries will restrain Qasim. We are sending an immediate message to the Arab Governments of the area and to those of India, Pakistan and Turkey asking them to use any influence they have to restrain Qasim. As we have no relations with Saudi Arabia, would you please urge King Saud to throw his weight in also in favour of restraint?
The Record of Actions for the 486th meeting of the National Security Council on June 29, 1961, "noted the President's approval of the Secretary of State's recommendation that the U.S. give full political and logistic support, if required, to the United Kingdom in connection with certain actions it is taking to forestall any Iraq attempt to take over Kuwait by force." (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
Rusk sent the following message to Lord Home following the meeting: "Thank you for your messages of yesterday and today. Your thinking coincides with ours. We understand the depth of your obligation, we agree that the independence of Kuwait must not be destroyed by force and we are prepared to render the full political support you request. We are communicating with Saud and we are considering the Security Council angle. While Qasim is, to say the least, unpredictable, we are hopeful that given time to work political forces among the Arabs will dissuade Qasim from committing himself to an unfortunate course of action with unpredictable consequences. We shall be very happy to keep in close touch with you on this." (Transmitted in telegram 6138 to London, June 29; ibid., Central Files, 686D.87/6-2961)
The attached Conclusions of NIE 36-61: Nasser and the Future of Arab Nationalism Here is the case for our attempting to stay in the game with Nasser, not trying to outbid the Soviets, not deluding ourselves with any idea that we can bring him into the Western camp but merely that we must live with him and he must live with us. Ergo, are there not areas where we can cooperate, thus providing him confidence in Western support if he runs afoul eventually of the Soviets?
As you have pointed out, one of the key things we have to offer is assistance in economic development. In turn, however, we must let Nasser know that we expect a compensatory quid pro quo in a less antagonistic policy on his part. A rapprochement along these lines may take years and involve numerous zigs and zags. Only time, for example, is likely to make the Arabs willing to live with Israel. But the many pitfalls which lie ahead are no excuse for not deciding now whether to move in the direction of a long-term policy of this sort.
Bob K.
Subsequent to announcement June 19 UK-Kuwait exchange letters which redefines UK-Kuwait relationship and abrogates 1899 Agreement, Iraq Prime Minister dispatched message to Ruler of Kuwait which omitted reference Kuwait independence and raised question legality Kuwait's existence separate from Iraq. In press conference June 25 Qasim denounced UK-Kuwait relationship and asserted Kuwait part of Iraq since Sheikhdom had been illegally separated in Ottoman times from Province of Basra. Iraqi claim embodied in memorandum circulated to foreign governments.
Reactions to Qasim's statements have included expression deep concern from Saudi Arabia where Cabinet has met in emergency session and King dispatched Chief of Staff General al-Tassan to Kuwait for consultation with Kuwait leaders. Statement by King Saud affirmed Kuwait and Saudi Arabia "as one country" and he has sent message to other Arab heads state urging support Kuwait's independence. UAR Minister of State reflected UARG concern in statement June 25 deploring situation that has arisen and upholding principle of Arab unity. In Baghdad idea of Kuwait's absorption long popular but politically conscious Iraqis and Qasim's many detractors probably view his posture as risky and perhaps absurd. At same time danger exists he may be committed to choice between eventual resort to force or heavy loss of prestige. Officially Iraqi Foreign Minister has assured us Iraq has no intention using force. In Kuwait, Ruler enjoying full popular support in his professed determination preserve Kuwait's independence.
In past 24 hours there have been rumors of threatening Iraqi troop movements. While these not confirmed, British now deeply concerned and feel obliged take steps preparatory meeting their obligations to Kuwait. British spokesman has now admitted publicly Britain taking precautionary steps. British vessels and military equipment moving to Persian Gulf area, although British anxious to limit insofar as possible knowledge these movements.
US and UK in close consultation. US continues hope Arab states may play leading role in deterring Iraqis. Both UAR and Saudi Arabia obviously concerned prospect Iraqi absorption Kuwait and possible pre-emption Kuwaiti oil income, now approximately $400 million per annum. Consequently we have requested our Charge Jidda to consult immediately with King Saud and our Charge Cairo seek elucidation GUAR views at high level. Rusk
(1) Ruler of Kuwait has asked for UK military support.
(2) In response, UK making extensive deployments and by tomorrow expects to have forces in Kuwait or nearby capable of handling any Iraq move. "The Secretary-General of the United Nations is being informed.
"H.M.G. earnestly hope that the necessity to make use of its force will not arise. It is intended that it should be withdrawn as soon as the Ruler considers that the threat to the independence of Kuwait is over." (Telegram 2 from London, July 1; Department of State, Central Files, 686D.87/7-161)
Mountbatten told Admiral Smith UK proposes to inform UN Security Council when first troops go ashore. Utmost secrecy requested prior public announcement.
CINCNELM staff contacts indicate UK planners foresee no request for U.S. support initially, but a possible request for air logistic support in latter phases.
CINCNELM reaffirms previous recommendation that U.S. make no military deployment until assistance requested by UK.
Note: Additional deployment details available if desired tomorrow.
4. In the latter case, the presence in the area of "Solant Amity" 6. It emerged from the discussion this morning that the most useful help which the U.S. Navy could give us at the present moment would be if the U.S. destroyer at Bahrain (the other is believed to be at Aden) could proceed to the north of the gulf and make a reconnaissance to see whether there are any signs of Iraqi maritime activities. The reason for this is that there are twelve motor torpedo boats, some with partly Russian crews, at Basra at the moment and reports of Iraqi troops being sent to Fao which may indicate the intention of the Iraqis to embark on some maritime adventure. Our own naval forces in the area are still rather thin and reconnaissance by the U.S. destroyer could be of great help--particularly if at the same time the second destroyer were to be moved round to Bahrain from Aden. Unless you see objection please mention this matter to Mr. Rusk and suggest that if the U.S. authorities were agreeable, the U.S. naval authorities on the spot should discuss the matter with flag officer Middle East at Bahrain.
After receipt of the message from Lord Home (Document 77), at 5 p.m. on July 2, 1961, Washington time, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Burke directed a 24-hour delay on any new orders for the Solant Amity forces and specifically ordered no patrol or other commitment for any U.S. ships. (Operations/Military Policy Matters, J-3/J-5 Directorates, July 3; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Kuwait, 6/61-7/61) At 12:52 p.m. on July 3, Secretary Rusk told British Ambassador Caccia over the telephone that in view of the British military buildup and developments in the area, the United States was inclined to disengage U.S. forces headed for Kuwait. At 2:20 p.m. that day, Rusk told Deputy Defense Secretary Gilpatric during a telephone conversation that chances were high that the United States would suggest to the British that the United States stand down Solant Amity because of the British military buildup and Iraqi statements regarding a peaceful settlement. At 4:02 p.m., Caccia thanked Rusk over the telephone for all the United States had done and said that because of the improved situation the United Kingdom no longer considered it necessary for Solant Amity to continue toward Bahrain. At 4:19 p.m., Rusk telephoned Clifton to inform President Kennedy that Solant Amity had been turned around in full coordination with the British Government. (Memoranda of telephone conversations; Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
PARTICIPANTS The Secretary asked Ambassador Caccia about the situation in Kuwait. The Ambassador said the UK has an interest in leaving Kuwait as soon as the Ruler of Kuwait feels that he is safe. He said it was going to be difficult to find a means of creating a secure situation permitting withdrawal, at any rate before the Iraq national holiday (July 14). Ambassador Alphand suggested the possibility that Kassim might nationalize the IPC. Ambassador Caccia expressed appreciation for United States support in the UN on the Kuwait issue.
Between July 2 and 7, 1961, the U.N. Security Council met to consider a July 1 Kuwaiti complaint to the Security Council that Iraq was threatening Kuwait's territorial independence and an Iraqi complaint delivered on July 2 that the United Kingdom posed an armed threat to Iraq's independence and security. After a discussion of the issues involved, the United Kingdom on July 6 submitted a draft resolution that called upon all states to respect Kuwait's independence and territorial integrity, urged that all concerned work for peace and tranquility in the area, and agreed to keep the situation under review. The United Arab Republic objected to the United Kingdom's draft on the basis that it did not provide for the withdrawal of British forces, and consequently submitted its own draft resolution urging that the question be solved by peaceful means and calling for an immediate withdrawal of British forces from Kuwait.
On July 7, the Council voted 7 in favor, 1 opposed, with 3 abstentions on the U.K. draft resolution. Because the negative vote came from the Soviet Union, a permanent member of the Security Council, the draft resolution failed of adoption. The Council then voted on the draft of the United Arab Republic, 3 in favor, 0 against, with 8 abstentions. This draft resolution also failed of adoption because it did not obtain the required 7 affirmative votes. The United States voted in favor of the United Kingdom's draft resolution and abstained on that of the United Arab Republic.
During the discussion, the U.S. Representative affirmed that the United States regarded Kuwait as a sovereign independent state and supported Kuwait's desire to remain free and independent. Documentation relating to U.S. involvement in the Security Council debate, including instructions sent to the Mission to the United Nations, negotiations relating to the draft resolutions, and texts of U.S. statements are in Department of State, Central Files 786D.00, 786D.022, and 686D.87. See also Supplement, the compilation on Kuwait.
PARTICIPANTS The Saudi Ambassador reminded the President that they had met on two previous occasions, at a hospital in New York when Prince Faisal was a patient and then in the Senate after Mr. Kennedy had made a speech favoring negotiations for Algerian independence. The President recalled both occasions and commented he had been particularly grateful for the Saudi King's message after his Algerian speech as one of the few really cordial responses to what had not been a very popular speech here.
Referring to other aspects of relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States the President said he understood that the Ambassador had been informed of United States' readiness to fulfill the conditions of the agreement for sale of United States military equipment to Saudi Arabia. Mr. Talbot confirmed that the Ambassador had met with the Secretary yesterday When the President saw the Saudi Arabian Ambassador on Friday, July 7, the Ambassador asked about availabilities of various items of military equipment included in two recently submitted Saudi Arabian arms purchase requests. The President told the Ambassador that we would try to give him an answer before the Ambassador leaves on July 11.
Secretary Rusk had earlier told the Ambassador that the United States was prepared to sell to Saudi Arabia, in accordance with the 1957 Dhahran Airfield arrangements, those items on the Saudi Arabian arms purchase lists which were consistent with the jointly developed force goals plan for Saudi Arabia known as the "1380 Plan" and subject to availabilities. Following the President's discussion with the Ambassador, the Department of State discussed the lists further with appropriate officers of the Department of Defense. A message was subsequently sent to the Chief of the United States Military Training Mission in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, requesting his determination on the compatibility of the items included in the Saudi Arabian lists with the Tables of Organization and Equipment of the "1380 Plan." Such a determination is necessary in order to allow the Department of Defense to process the lists. A reply is now being awaited.
A preliminary examination of the lists by Departments of State and Defense officials suggests that most of the land forces equipment included thereon is compatible with the "1380 Plan." The Plan is vague with respect to Air Force equipment, however, and there is some question whether the F-100's and the B-57's which the Saudi Arabians wish to purchase may be regarded as compatible. The views of the Chief of the United States Military Training Mission have also been sought on this matter.
The Department of Defense was unable to state which items on the lists are in fact available, and indicated that the lists would have to be sent to the respective military services which would in turn determine availabilities. The Department of Defense estimated that it may take from six weeks to six months to determine definitively which items on the very extensive Saudi Arabian arms purchase lists are available and to send the customary Letters of Offer to the Saudi Arabian Embassy. Deliveries will vary with the equipment, but it is estimated they will take a minimum of eight months and in some cases longer.
Assistant Secretary Talbot has today conveyed this information to the Saudi Arabian Ambassador.
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/5/Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.
70. Message From Foreign Secretary Home to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
London, June 28, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Officials Correspondence with Secretary Rusk vol. 2. Top Secret. Transmitted under cover of a note from Lord Hood, Minister of the British Embassy, to Secretary Rusk.
I have not communicated with you before about the Kuwait crisis because we had been hoping to get some clearer indications of whether an Iraqi military move is likely. Kassem is so nearly mad that military action cannot be excluded, but we have no evidence that preparations are taking place.
71. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 29, 1961, 11:55 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786D.022/6-2961. Secret. Drafted by Hart. The time of the meeting is from the President's Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library)
SUBJECT
Ambassador Hart's Call on the President
The President
The Honorable John M. Cabot, Ambassador to Brazil
The Honorable Mercer Cook, Ambassador Designate to Niger
The Honorable Parker T. Hart, Ambassador Designate to Saudi Arabia
The Honorable Philip M. Kaiser, Ambassador Designate to Senegal and Islamic Republic of Mauritania
The Honorable John J. Muccio, Ambassador to Guatemala
The Honorable Edward T. Wailes, Ambassador Designate to Czechoslovakia
72. Message From Foreign Secretary Home to Secretary of State Rusk
73. Editorial Note
74. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)
75. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Consular and Diplomatic Posts
76. Message From the National Security Council Executive Secretary (Smith) to the President's Military Aide (Clifton)
77. Message From Foreign Secretary Home to Secretary of State Rusk
78. Editorial Note
79. Memorandum of Conversation
Kuwait
The Secretary of State
Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
Herve Alphand, French Ambassador
Lord Hood, Minister of British Embassy
Pierre Pelen, Counselor of French Embassy
Denis Greenhill, Counselor of British Embassy
Jean-Claude Winckler, Counselor of French Embassy
Wiliam R. Tyler, Acting Assistant Secretary
80. Editorial Note
81. Memorandum of Conversation
Meeting between the President and the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia
The President
His Excellency Sheikh Abdullah Al-Khayyal, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia
NEA--Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot
Major Badawi, Military Attach?, Embassy of Saudi Arabia
82. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Status of Saudi Arabian Arms Purchase Request
83. Memorandum From President Kennedy to His Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, July 10, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Palestine, Refugees, Vol. I, 4/61-11/61. No classification marking.
I want a report from the State Department, I asked Secretary Rusk about this, on whose idea it was for me to send the letters to the Middle Eastern Arab leaders./2/ The reaction has been so sour I would like to know whose idea it was, what they hoped to accomplish and what they think we have now accomplished.
/2/See Document 42.
JFK
84. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
Department officers observed Iraq most unlikely agree to UN observers on its territory, Soviets and possibly UAR might support Iraqi objection, and if this element included in eventual proposal to SC it would probably be regarded as "gimmick" designed insure defeat UN presence plan.
Other possibilities canvassed by Dean were replacement of UK forces by a strong UN contingent or a political settlement, neither of which seemed practicable to him. According to Dean, London has not yet reacted to his proposals.
Dean considers Cairo may be key to Kuwait problem. Question is whether UK can get UAR agreement to satisfactory arrangement. British intend reduce forces in Kuwait substantially but still uncertain to what level. Dean of personal opinion retention of small symbolic force would be adequate but he uncertain of London's view.
Your comments welcome.
FYI. Apparent from conversation that UK concerned at political, military and financial problems created by move into Kuwait and anxious find way out, at same time retaining freedom of action to protect Kuwaiti independence in future. We have been quietly encouraging UN presence idea. USG continues full political support to UK on this issue, but desires avoid sharing responsibility as well as role of go-between with Arabs (except Saudi Arabia) on behalf of UK. End FYI.
Rusk
Referring at the outset to the current tenor of Arab public comment on refugees, excerpts from some of the most vitriolic and unyielding of which she had listed on a piece of paper and handed me, Mrs. Meir took the line that in the circumstances the Israelis did not anticipate that any gesture or initiative they might be prepared to take at this time would elicit any useful Arab response. Mrs. Meir went on to say that she had hoped that the President's letters to the Arab leaders and the latters' response might reveal some reason to anticipate Arab cooperation on this problem and that in that event or if we were in a position on the basis of other information to tell the Israelis that we had reason to divine some movement in the Arab position then Israel would be disposed to be helpful. In its absence the Israelis are reluctant at the moment to envisage any step which would only be rebuffed in this matter which is of such vital security concern to Israel.
There followed a long exposition of the steps Israel feels it has already taken in the past to solve the refugee problem notably that she originally permitted some 40,000 Arabs to return to Israel in 1949, that she has subsequently made an offer to accept another large number in the context of a peace settlement and finally that despite the absence of such a settlement and the fact that the Arabs still consider themselves at war the Israelis have released to the refugees a number of blocked financial accounts. Emphasizing Israel's critical defense position and the security aspects of the admission of any appreciable number of refugees, Mrs. Meir noted that the Arab population here now amounts to some 12 per cent of the total. She also professed to be apprehensive that the return flow of refugees could not effectively be stopped at any given figure and that pressures would arise to increase any number agreed upon. She made a major point of the uncertainties involved in the phrase "free choice" which she said Israel is being urged to offer the refugees. She was unable to accept the theory that any choice could really be free in the absence of a change in the Arab point of view which in her opinion meant in the absence of a peace settlement. She appreciated that the President in his conversation with Ben-Gurion had been fully cognizant of the necessity to safeguard Israel's security but could not see how that could be accomplished.
I argued along line of the Department's thinking emphasizing the psychological contribution of some initiative at an appropriate time to demonstrate again Israel's reasonableness on this issue with a view to the coming General Assembly and more generally to improve Israel's image in this respect world-wide. I similarly confirmed our concern for Israel's security problem and the fact that we are fully conscious that any steps taken should not prejudice Israel's justifiable security apprehensions.
The essence of Mrs. Meir's thought and that of her colleagues did not emerge from the matter of argumentation with complete clarity. However, she seemed to me to place major store by the necessity for Israel of having a complete scenario as to where an initiative would lead in the end before Israel would consider embarking on such a course. She was deaf to suggestions that a small step might lead in a desirable direction and could be safe-guarded against damaging Israel's position in the absence of Arab responsiveness. She reverted as a basic concept to the theory that the correct procedure is still to endeavor to negotiate a peace settlement as a whole after which or as a part of which the refugee problem would solve itself. She repeatedly reiterated Israel's willingness to sit down at the conference table with Arabs which she felt is sufficiently demonstrative of Israel's good will.
I appreciate that this conversation probably served little to advance us in the desirable direction of this problem and I do not believe that the attitude expressed can be described as encouraging, perhaps [garble] because it is my understanding that the cabinet had considered the problem at length the day before and the Foreign Minister's thinking no doubt reflects the government's current view. However, as indicated previously I think it unrealistic to anticipate any important progress until after the elections and I am consequently not particularly surprised at the views expressed on this occasion. Pursuant to our conversation on July 10, 2. Tranquility Urged. Partly in an effort to forestall United States initiatives, Arab representatives in their contacts with officials of the new administration urged that the relative tranquility which has prevailed in the Near East during the past two or three years should be preserved. Israeli representatives made similar recommendations, based largely on the fact that under conditions of calm Israel has been making tremendous economic strides. For our part, we were preoccupied with the Congo, Cuba and Laos. We thus happily concurred in not stirring up the Near East.
3. Disquieting Developments. In March and April three developments disturbed Arabs:
a. Loan to Israel. At a Presidential press conference on March 15 it was announced that Israel was receiving a $25,000,000 Eximbank line of credit. c. UNRWA Debate. Inconsistent with their exhortations to us not to take any initiatives, the Arabs sought at the General Assembly this spring to inject a highly controversial concept in a UN resolution concerning the Arab refugees, i.e. the establishment of a UN custodian for Arab properties left in Israel. Arab representatives obviously wished to make a test case of their voting strength in the expanded General Assembly. Had they succeeded a whole series of anti-Israel moves could be expected. Despite our urgings that new controversial elements should be deferred to the general review of the refugee problem scheduled at the General Assembly this fall, the Arabs pressed for a vote. They did not achieve the required two-thirds UNGA majority. Their defeat was naturally, and with good reason, attributed to United States opposition.
b. UNGA Wrangling. The more than one million Arab refugees are being cared for by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). Inevitably the annual discussion of the UNRWA report at UNGA results in Arab-Israel wrangling, as it did this past spring. Inevitably too the United States is a scapegoat. Ambassador Stevenson was particularly concerned this spring when Arab displeasure produced anti-American votes on major issues such as Cuba.
c. XVIth UNGA. Pursuant to a resolution of two years ago, the UNGA will this fall review the whole refugee problem with a view to deciding on the future of UNRWA. Progress on the refugee problem before this fall's debate would assist greatly in reducing acrimony.
d. Reconstitution of PCC. Unless some progress is made on the refugee problem, it is almost a foregone conclusion that the Arabs will seek to promote a reconstitution of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. Some Arab spokesmen are advocating reconstitution along "troika" lines. By the very nature of things a Commission less friendly to Israel is apt to recommend proposals unpleasant to Israel and difficult for us.
e. Congress. In the absence of progress toward a solution of the refugee problem, Congress is apt to curtail funds for UNRWA which depends on us for 70 per cent of its governmental contributions. The collapse of UNRWA could easily result in political turmoil in the Near East, including perhaps an upheaval in Jordan. This would be to the detriment of United States interests and to the benefit of Soviet interests.
f. Domestic Expectations. Inasmuch as Israel's many friends in this country were expecting specific action by the new administration, the approach to the Arab refugee problem could be cited as a step toward tackling the key obstacle to an Arab-Israel settlement.
5. Ben Gurion Complication. It was at a critical juncture that President Ben Gurion decided to visit the United States. The Department feared the visit would clinch Arab suspicions that the new administration was pro-Israeli. Our effectiveness would accordingly be limited in dealing with the Arab world. More specifically, the Arabs would suspect any approach to the refugee problem to be the product of alleged collusion with Israel on the part of the new administration. For these reasons the Department opposed the timing of the Ben Gurion visit. When it was decided that the visit would take place, the Department hoped to convert a potential minus into a plus, e.g. your speaking to Ben Gurion about Israel's cooperation with the refugee approach.
6. The Letters. It was at this point that the Department, after obtaining the concurrence of our posts abroad, proposed the letters to Arab leaders. As suggested in a covering memorandum to you dated May 6, b. To make clear our impartiality in Arab-Israel matters,
c. To demonstrate our support for the PCC refugee approach, and
d. To cushion the effects of the Ben Gurion visit.
7. Arab Reactions. Because of deep Arab bitterness over Palestine and because Arab leaders would assume that replies to your letters would eventually be published, it was not unexpected that the Arab responses would feature restatement of Arab grievances against Israel. It was significant, however, that in general the public reaction in the Arab countries was mild and moderate, obviously in accordance with government wishes. Furthermore, we have reports that at a conference of Arab Foreign Ministers in Cairo it was decided that: a) propaganda replies would be sent, but b) the Arabs would see what the PCC approach had to offer. While varying in tone and in content, Arab responses to date bear out these reports.
8. Iraq's Qassim. Among President Qassim's eccentricities is his attitude toward Israel. A veteran of the Palestine war, he is reported to have shown a visitor as long as two years ago a medal which he has had struck for bestowal on future Iraqi heroes recovering Palestine from the Israelis. With regard to your letter, he has indicated publicly that no reply was requested and none will be sent. He obviously realizes that accepting the PCC approach implies an Arab willingness to coexist with Israel. Fortunately, he is alone thus far in taking this totally uncooperative position.
9. Jordan's Hussein. In his lengthy and rambling reply King Hussein condemns both Communism and what the Arabs describe as the Palestine "injustice". 13. Israeli Reactions. Just prior to President Ben Gurion's arrival we informed Ambassador Harman of the gist of your letters to the Arab leaders. a. US Policy. You have placed clearly on the record the desire of this government to maintain friendly and fruitful relations with the Arab states. While because of their sensitivities and suspicions, they were bound to emphasize their views concerning Palestine, there can be little doubt that they inwardly welcome the broad outline of our policies as set forth in your letter. Moreover, it will be possible for us at all times in the future to indicate that early in your administration the hand of friendship was extended to the Arabs.
c. Refugee Approach. Had your letters not been sent, it is likely that the Ben Gurion visit would have wrecked all chances for success of the PCC refugee approach. There is general agreement that prospects are slim at best and only limited progress may be achieved. By showing that the United States is prepared to back efforts along lines which include Arab hopes for some repatriation, the United States places on the Arab leaders the onus for the lack of progress. Unless they act responsibly, their position in future UN debates will be awkward.
d. Cushion. There is no doubt your letters helped to forestall a major Arab uproar over the Ben Gurion visit. When the Israeli Prime Minister came here a year ago, the press in the Middle East was extremely hostile to the United States and Arab diplomats came to the Department en bloc to voice their concern that his visit would impair Arab-US relations. In large part because of your letters, the Ben Gurion visit passed this year with almost unbelievably mild reactions in the Near East and without damage to basic US-Arab relationships.
15. Whither? We see no need for further exchanges with the Arab leaders at this time. In view of the harshness of King Saud's letter, you and we have already spoken rather sternly to the Saudi Ambassador. Assistant Secretary Talbot on July 10 Dean Rusk
On July 14, 1961, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Armin Meyer transmitted to Myer Feldman a list of "Incentives for Movement on the Palestine Refugee Problem," under cover of a transmittal note that reads: "Pursuant to our telephone conversation of July 14, I hope the attached list of incentives, from the Israeli standpoint, will be helpful to you and to the President in persuading Israel's friends of the importance of making progress on the Arab refugee problem." (Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/7-1861)
The list reads as follows:
"1. Dispose of issue re which Israel is most vulnerable to criticism.
"2. Solution of refugee problem is sine qua non for Israel's acceptance in Middle East.
"3. Eliminate annual hassle at UNGA, detrimental to Israel (and U.S.).
"4. Ward off reconstitution of PCC (troika or otherwise unfavorable).
"5. Forestall series of increasingly anti-Israel moves at UNGA (cf. Algeria).
"6. Forestall, specifically, acrimonious debate at forthcoming XVI UNGA.
"7. Dramatize Israel's peace protestations.
"8. Improve Israel's international image especially vis-?-vis Afro-Asian states.
"9. Take edge off atomic reactor, rocket and Jordan water issues.
"10. Reduce Near East tension and hopefully arms burden.
"11. Avoid area turmoil if UNRWA collapses.
"12. Place onus of failure on Arabs.
"13. Show cooperation with new U.S. administration.
"14. Take advantage of U.S. willingness to finance refugee solution."
A copy of the list was also transmitted to McGeorge Bundy under cover of a July 18 memorandum from Battle. (Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/7-1861)
85. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State
86. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy
The Letters to Arab Leaders
87. Editorial Note
88. Memorandum of Conversation
on the Policy Guidelines Paper on the Near East/2/
/2/Regarding the Policy Guidelines series, see Document 13. A copy of the draft guidelines paper under discussion at the July 20 meeting is in Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 67 D 396, Policy Guidelines Near East. It is attached to a transmittal slip from Morgan to Secretary Rusk that indicates that the paper would be discussed at the Policy Planning Council meeting on July 20. The final Policy Guidelines paper for the Near East and a separate memorandum of conversation for this meeting, drafted by Strong, are ibid. The Under Secretary chaired the meeting.
Others present were:
G--Mr. Johnson
NEA--Mr. Talbot
NE--Mr. Strong
ARA--Mr. Braddock
FE--Colonel Brannon
EUR--Mr. Tyler
AF--Mr. Witman
IO--Mr. Jones
L--Mr. Meeker
E--Mr. Martin
S/P--Mr. Morgan
S/P--Mr. Wriggins
In a brief introduction, Mr. Talbot identified the principal elements in the Rationale, including the strategic role of the Near East, the emotional drive toward Arab unity, the problems of orderly economic and social development in a feudal society in transition, etc. He warned that the present calm of the Near East was more apparent than real, since within the next two years Israel will have the capacity to draw Jordan waters, its technical advance will further disturb the Arabs and the refugee problem will call for major review.
The more important points raised in the wide ranging discussion that followed were these:
(1) Our bargaining power with the Arabs is increasing as world supplies of oil are growing and alternative sources of fuel develop. But this will pose serious problems of readjustment within the Arab states and in our future relations with them.
(2) Although the continuing tribal and quasi-feudal social structure in the Near East differentiates it from Latin America, it cannot be ruled out that soon we will have to develop a policy less exclusively concerned with government and more designed to identify us with popular demands.
(3) The paragraphs concerning the use of force
/3/ were criticized as being unnecessarily general and not responsive to the contingency of disruption of Near East states from within. Some comfort was provided by vivid comments concerning the purely indigenous tradition of clandestinity, secretive plotting and Arab mutual infiltration which had developed a certain immunity to exotic Communist forms of the malady. But the Soviet leap frogging strategy, perhaps, deserved more specific reference. /3/Under the section entitled "Military," the draft paper indicated that the United States should "Be prepared to use force or to support the use of force to ensure the independence of each state of the area from the Soviet Bloc." Under the section entitled "Contingency," the paper hypothesized that, in the event of Arab-Israel hostilities, the United States should take a variety of steps including trade and financial embargoes; and, "Should these actions be inadequate to end hostilities promptly, be prepared to take appropriate military actions. Such measures should be carried out through the United Nations, if feasible, although unilateral action by the U.S. or bilateral action with the UK should, if necessary, be initiated." (4) These paragraphs were insufficiently explicit about the unfortunate side effects of using force in the contingencies mentioned.(5) The anomalous position of Israel was commented upon, a country receiving DLF and other forms of assistance even though its per capita income is higher than that of many parts of Europe. Disparities in income within the area as between Israel and Jordan or the oil-producing states and the UAR were important sources of regional tensions. It was suggested that regional economic organization might help reduce these disparities. Pressure may have to be put on Israel to cause her to act in a responsible way. We should bear in mind that the freedom of action of the USG is not as limited by the supporters of Israel in this country as we sometimes think and we should act accordingly.
(6) Arab neutralism was seen as a short run nuisance but a long run asset, with much flexibility within it which might be utilized to our advantage.
89. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Strong) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot)
Status Report on Kuwait Situation
On July 20, 1961, the Arab League Council passed a Saudi-proposed resolution on Kuwait. Its principal points include: (a) Kuwait will ask for the withdrawal of British troops as soon as possible, (b) Iraq should undertake not to use force in connection with Kuwait, (c) any Kuwait desire to unite or federate with Arab League member states should be supported, (d) welcoming Kuwait's membership in the Arab League and (e) promising Arab states' support for Kuwait's application for UN membership, and (f) stating that the Arab League will take "practical assistance" to safeguard Kuwait's independence. The Iraqi delegate stalked out of the Arab League meeting when Kuwait was admitted. There is no indication, however, that Iraq will withdraw permanently from the League, although it may keep its participation in suspense for a time.
With respect to the "practical assistance" cited above, Secretary General Hassouna is reportedly planning to explore this matter and will shortly visit Arab capitals with a view to ascertaining the possibility of obtaining Arab troop contingents to replace the British troops in Kuwait. Thus, the search for an "Arab solution" to the Kuwait problem appears to be progressing satisfactorily. Such a solution should provide the British with a convenient peg on which to hang troop withdrawal. While Kuwaiti membership in the Arab League has not caused Iraq to drop its claim and is not likely to do so, it should prevent any overt action by Iraq.
The foregoing developments are in line with the view expressed by the American Consul in Kuwait (Kuwait's 26) You may wish to explore the foregoing with the British (Greenhill) in the next few days.
90. Paper Prepared for the Iran Task Force/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Department of State, NEA/GTI Files: Lot 66 D 173, Task Force on Iran. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. The paper was transmitted to members of the Iran Task Force under cover of a memorandum from Peyton Kerr, Acting Chairman of the Task Force, that reads: "Enclosed is a status report on the Task Force recommendations which were approved by the NSC on May 19, 1961. Separate memoranda regarding more specific details of the economic situation will be distributed as soon as possible. Discussion and comment on the attached and the forthcoming economic memoranda will be held following the Task Force meeting with Dr. Farman-Farmayan, Deputy Director of Iran's Plan Organization, on August 2 at 4:00 p.m. (per my telephone invitation of August 1)."
For Meeting of the Iran Task Force of August 2, 1961/2/
/2/A memorandum, dated August 4, summarizing the proceedings of the August 2 Task Force meeting is ibid. It contains an account of Dr. Farman-Farmayan's presentation on the economic situation in Iran and a brief description of a discussion among Task Force members of Iran's political situation that took place following Dr. Farman-Farmayan's departure from the meeting. A discussion of Iran's economic situation resulted in the conclusion that the United States would use the $45.5 million figure, or what would be required to complete the Second Plan, in conversations with German officials on economic assistance to Iran. Serious reservations were also expressed regarding the amount of budgetary aid ($36 million) that Iran felt it needed. General
The Amini Government continues to be threatened by strong but relatively inchoate extremist pressures, and, despite the emergency measures taken by the United States in May and June to assist Amini in overcoming his serious economic and financial problems,
/3/ it is clear that further United States assistance is required if the general economic situation does not deteriorate to a point where economic hardship could serve as point of crystallization for a political opposition, probably of the Left, which could pose grave dangers to Free World interests in Iran. The present shape of these economic and financial problems will be the subject for discussion at the Task Force meeting; some details are still open to question as of August 1, and this status report will therefore not go into detail on subjects which will be discussed at the meeting. /3/Documentation on this subject is ibid., Central Files, 788.5-MSP/6-561. See also Supplement, the compilation on Iran. PoliticalThe Amini government continues to maintain itself in power and the Shah continues to support it, although he is unwilling to give up his traditional tight personal control of matters affecting the armed forces. The danger of overt rightist action against the government has receded, but the National Front and other Nationalist opposition groups have intensified their earlier semi-hostile attitude, and the possibility of Amini's effecting a reconciliation with moderate leaders of the middle class opposition has decreased. The National Front is being sternly but not brutally repressed by Amini, while it continues to attempt to stimulate mass demonstrations. Amini and the Shah are firmly resisting neutralist pressures from right and left; communist radio propaganda is actively inciting revolt and condemning Amini as a servant of the Shah and the United States. Amini continues his preparations and actions aimed at corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, and social injustices, but has not been able to capture the imagination of large sectors of the population while at the same time adjusting to the political and legal realities of the situation. The political situation remains critical; we continue to bolster Amini and persuade the Shah to continue his support.
Economic
An Iranian delegation is presenting to the IBRD the first draft of the Third Economic Development Plan (scheduled to begin in September, 1962). The Plan is generally well-conceived, although much detail remains to be filled in; it offers favorable possibilities as the base of a Consortium approach to long-term development in Iran. We are giving all possible encouragement and assistance in the development of this Plan, and are preparing to re-orient our direct technical and economic assistance programs to fit in with the Plan.
The same delegation has discussed in detail the financing gap in the present Second Plan; this gap has been identified as being in the neighborhood of $45 million needed in the form of development loans. We will within a few days be required to make decisions as to the methods by which we can, together with the Federal Republic of Germany, provide the necessary financing. Curtailment of this Plan would throw the Third Plan out of balance, damage the Iranian government politically, and probably result in the cancellation of large Iranian contracts with American concerns.
The Iranian government's budget for the fiscal year, which must, for political reasons, include large sums for teachers' pay raises, is out of balance. It appears inevitable that the Iranian government will soon request a considerable budget grant from the United States in order to avoid breaching its economic stabilization agreement with the IMF and losing drawing rights under that agreement. We have up to now reserved a sum of $5 million for this type of assistance should it be necessary.
Iran's efforts to fight inflation and scale down its economic commitments have resulted in a growing economic depression which affects both the business community and the urban proletariat. The threat of mass urban unemployment is looming larger; we are working on projects involving surplus agricultural commodities which may to some extent ameliorate the resulting dangerous political tensions.Military
Although we have informed the Shah specifically that he cannot expect increases in our military assistance program, he is again pressing our Ambassador for greater assistance in the form of advanced equipment and weapons, and has asked us to "restudy" his military problems and our military assistance program. The inter-agency Military Planning Review now under way may well reach conclusions which will result in the Shah's dissatisfaction being intensified, since there seems little justification for an increase in our MAP to Iran in view of the current political and economic conditions there. We may in future be faced by the Shah with repetitions of his earlier veiled threats to turn to neutralism unless our military aid is greatly increased. Preliminary studies indicate that there is little hope for assuaging the Shah's military ambitions by giving him assurances or by informing him of detailed plans to come to his assistance in case of attack.
/4/See Document 51. 1. "That the U.S. make a major effort to back the new Government in Iran as the best instrument in sight for promoting orderly political, economic and social evolution in Iran, and for averting serious and damaging political developments."
This general recommendation has been the main thrust of our policy toward Iran since the adoption of the Task Force recommendations. All our actions in Iran, economic, political, and military, have been based on this overriding factor.
2. "That to this end the U.S. encourage Amini positively but discreetly in any serious efforts to solve Iran's immediate political and economic problems and to construct a broad political synthesis. This encouragement should be given in such a manner to avoid so far as possible arousing the Shah's active opposition. The U.S. should be prepared to tolerate certain seemingly anti-American actions by Amini which do not really damage any major American interest."
In our Mission's contacts with Iranians, official and unofficial, and in the Department's contacts with Iranian officials in the U.S., no opportunity has been lost to encourage the Prime Minister. Our Ambassador was recently instructed to reiterate our support to Amini. At the same time, in our contacts with the Shah and with the Shah's henchmen, we have made it clear that we assume that the Shah will support the Prime Minister. Thus far, the Shah has done so; at times with bad grace, as when he recently told our Ambassador that he was Amini's sole supporter. However, he continues to accord Amini a degree of freedom unmatched by any Prime Minister since Mosadeq and the early months of the Zahedi regime, although he continues, as was expected, to keep a firm personal hand on matters relating to the security forces and foreign affairs. Amini has not, up to the present, been forced to take the "seemingly anti-American actions" envisaged in the Task Force recommendation. Our Consulate in Isfahan has recently suggested that it may be necessary for the U.S. to indicate publicly its specific support for the Prime Minister as a chosen instrument. We have asked our Embassy to comment on this suggestion; we feel that such a move is unnecessary and would be dangerous in the long run.
3. "That the U.S. should not favor any military coup against the Amini Regime."
The U.S. has not favored any Iranian military coup group. It has gone even further, and, to the extent possible, has informed potential plotters that it does not favor such action, and intends to support the legal government of Prime Minister Amini. It should be noted that at least one major potential coup group appears to be favorably disposed toward the Prime Minister.
4. "That the U.S. reorient its foreign aid program in Iran to put more emphasis on long-range economic development as envisaged in the report of the Presidential Task Force on Foreign Economic Assistance, and in addition:
a. Inform the Government of Iran immediately of our intention to make a cash grant of $15 million payable at an early date, but no later than the beginning of FY 1962.
b. Be prepared to make a $5 million grant of FY 1962 funds to the Government of Iran for general budgetary purposes if, at a later date, the situation in Iran required such action.
c. Modify U.S. executive procedures in order to assure the timely flow of development loan funds."
Reorientation of the U.S. foreign aid program to Iran must of necessity be based on the new and comprehensive Third Development Plan, scheduled to begin in September, 1962. This Plan, in its first draft, is now being presented to the IBRD for study and suggestions. From a preliminary study, the Plan appears to be fairly well drawn, but there are still many areas which require further study and revision. USOM/Iran is already planning for drastic revisions in its organization and programs to implement the necessary reorientation. It should be noted that the Third Plan is based upon a successful completion of the current Second Plan, which is in financial difficulties. Item (a) of the recommendation has been accomplished. We are holding in reserve the sum earmarked in item (b), but recent data indicate that it may be insufficient to meet the needs of the situation we foresee. It was the implementation of item (c) which enabled us, through action by DLF and the Ex-Im Bank, to give vital assistance to Amini in meeting the June crisis in the implementation of the Second Plan, and we expect that this item will also be necessary in the expediting of further economic assistance in the very near future.
5. "That the Departments of State and Defense, as a means of providing more substantial assurance to Iran and in an attempt to reduce Iranian pressure for military assistance, urgently examine:
a. The feasibility and political-military implications of deploying earmarked U.S. forces to locations that would permit more rapid assistance to Iran in the event of Soviet or Soviet-supported attack;
b. The desirability of informing the Government of Iran more specifically of U.S. unilateral plans for military action in Iran's support or of any deployments determined to be feasible."
The Joint Chiefs have examined these suggestions and have prepared a study of them. In general, this study recommends against the possibilities mentioned. State and Defense working level representatives are meeting on this subject next week and will make recommendations to the Chairman of the Task Force. These recommendations will probably be negative in nature. It will be recalled that the Task Force was interested in these ideas primarily as a means of softening the impact on the Shah of U.S. unwillingness to go along with his ambitious military plans. At present, it does not seem likely that this hope can be realized.
6. "That the U.S., while supporting the Monarchy as the symbol of unity and a stabilizing influence in Iran, more actively encourage the Shah to move toward a more constitutional role."
Thus far we have acted on this recommendation by applauding the Shah for his action in giving authority to Amini and keeping himself out of the limelight to the extent that he has done so during the past few months. To go further and more directly toward the core of the problem at this time would probably be counterproductive in that the Shah's suspicions and hostility toward both the U.S. and Amini would be roused, and he could well take action to drop the Prime Minister, who must have the Shah's support at this juncture. Additionally, should the Shah relax his political control over the armed forces at this time, it might touch off a rightist military coup against the Prime Minister. So far, the Shah is doing remarkably well in refraining from interference with the Prime Minister; we intend to postpone further action in implementing this recommendation until such time as Amini enjoys greater political support and the present crisis atmosphere is relaxed.
7. "That the U.S. encourage the formation and growth of broadly based political parties in Iran."
The Task Force envisaged the establishment of broadly-based political parties as an essential element in the remaking of the presently polarized Iranian society. The establishment of such a group or party appears to be a necessary precondition to relatively free national elections in Iran in which the Prime Minister would have any chance of success against the National Front (which is becoming entirely too broadly based) and against the divided forces of the traditional elite. The Prime Minister has so far been too pre-occupied with immediate political and economic problems to devote much attention to the problems of building a political organization. He did mention to a U.S. official that he realized the need and hoped to begin in the near future. We have asked our Embassy for comments as to the desirability of the formation of a centrist party or Front, and for suggestions as to what the U.S. could appropriately do to stimulate and assist such a development.
8. "That the U.S., in keeping before responsible Iranian officials the risks which may be involved in an Iranian rapprochement with the Soviet Union, avoid giving the impression that the continuance of present tensions between Iran and the USSR is a U.S. goal."
This Task Force recommendation was intended as a guide for U.S. action at such a time as the U.S. was in a position to influence Iranian government reactions toward the problem of relations with the Soviet Union. The Amini government has proved itself much less receptive than was its predecessor to Soviet enticements, and Soviet propaganda media have selected Amini himself as a prime target for verification and abuse. The Iranian government has therefore taken a very firm diplomatic stand against the USSR, and no opportunity has arisen to make use of the guidance contained in the Recommendation.
9. "That the U.S. continue for the present to support currently existing Iranian military forces up to the approximate level of 200,000 men. In this connection, we should adhere to those aspects of the 1958 Presidential letter to the Shah stressing the operational proficiency of existing forces but deferring consideration of the activation of additional units."
This stance is reflected in our MAP for FY 1962 as presented to Congress. In addition, we have informed the Shah that the U.S. is not contemplating any assistance program designed to raise significantly the manpower or equipment levels of the Iranian armed forces. The Shah has indicated that he has lowered his sights from the previous goal of 260,000 men to the present level of roughly 200,000. He has not followed through on an earlier "threat" to carry out a major manpower reduction. He has recently renewed to our Ambassador his earlier appeals for more and better equipment, particularly for his Navy and Air Force and has asked that the U.S. restudy his needs. Our own Military Planning Review Committee is now at work on just such a restudy--it is unlikely that the results of the study will be to the Shah's liking. The Shah has carefully protected the military portion of the Iranian budget in the recent Iranian budgetary review, despite the Prime Minister's well-known predisposition to reduce military expenditures. There is no doubt that the Shah's military ambitions are still very important to him, perhaps enough to prompt him to make veiled threats at some time in the future to change Iran's foreign policy alignment unless his desires are met. It is our present disposition to stand firm should he make such threats.
10. "That the Department of State and Defense comprehensively study the potentialities of advancing U.S. interest through CENTO."
This study is ready for distribution to interested agencies. The Joint Chiefs have produced a study. There will be further meetings of State and Defense representatives at the working level, and a recommendation will be made to the Chairman of the Task Force.
Dear Armin: At our NEA Ambassadors' sessions we have spent a good deal of time yesterday and today on the Palestine refugee question. As you can imagine, several of the participants have fairly strong views of the desirability and practicality of different courses of action. Jack Jernegan, for example, feels so skeptical that any concrete result can be achieved from an approach on the refugee question this year and so sure of unfortunate efforts of an unsuccessful effort that he would only very reluctantly support any initiative whatsoever. Several of the others, while recognizing the over-all advantages of some initiative, fear that a U.S. effort will have smaller prospect of success and be potentially more damaging to our interests than an effort under U.N. or other auspices. Nevertheless, the consensus was that we should make a specific effort in the very near future to achieve some advance on the UNRWA and other refugee issues.
Bob Strong and I explained to the group the efforts that you and others have made to date and told of Ambassador Lindt's bowing out after protracted consideration of the invitation to become PCC Special Representative. We also explained Mr. Hammarskjold's evident reluctance to involve U.N. prestige in refugee matters at this time. Against these factors I pointed out the October 15th deadline for a PCC report, and necessity of a debate on UNRWA at the 16th General Assembly, and current Congressional interest in this whole topic.
After lengthy discussion yesterday afternoon had produced the consensus that the U.S. should take some action despite the unfavorable prognosis, I asked a sub-committee consisting of Ambassadors Barbour, Hart and McClintock to draft a proposal for discussion by our full group and reference to the Department. That proposal, presented this afternoon, is attached hereto, You will recognize in the proposal several elements that Ambassador McClintock has suggested more than once. As a rough calculation he put forward UNRWA Director Davis' view that resettlement could be achieved for a gross outlay averaging five thousand dollars per family. This would presumably mean a billion dollars for the total effort, a sum which he says he has mentioned to several visiting Senators (including Gore and McGee) and Representatives without their blanching. Personally, judging from the resettlement costs of refugees in India and Pakistan and from the recollection of one of the Ambassadors that Israel has calculated resettlement costs of 2500 dollars per family, I would suspect the five thousand dollar estimate to be unrealistically high. There is, however, no denying that money--McClintock calls it baksheesh--would be the essential sweetener.
A good many other points came up in the discussion. You will see them noted in the summary being prepared by Bob Strong.
91. Letter From the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State (Meyer)
With best wishes,
Yours sincerely,
Phillips Talbot
92. Paper by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Strong)
Discussion of Refugee Question--Afternoon August 3, 1961
Ambassadors Barbour, Hart and McClintock presented their paper (transmitted to AHM by PT's letter of August 3)./2/ They remarked that personal diplomacy by the President is the only hope for making progress on the refugee problem, their proposal makes it possible to bypass the unfavorable attitude of UNSYG and takes into account the unfavorable situation in the UN, U.S. initiative is essential particularly since the U.S. puts up the bulk of the money, and it is not possible to spell things out in greater detail in advance. /2/Document 91. Talbot referred to a proposal that if Israel were to allow a certain number of Arab refugee families per month to settle in Israel, many would become disillusioned and would leave. (No response from group.)
Wilkins proposed that the IBRD do the Ghab project in Syria and resettle 200,000 refugees there. Hart proposed putting more money into Jordan. Macomber responded that given the emotional nature of the refugee problem King Hussein was unlikely to buck Nasser. He referred to the Alpha project
/3/ which sought to settle the whole Palestine problem but ran into the opposition of Nasser. /3/Reference is to U.S.-U.K. discussions held during 1955 to devise a solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute. Project Alpha culminated in the secret mission of Robert Anderson to Egypt and Israel. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, volumes XIV and XV. Discussion ensued on the cost per family of resettlement, McClintock suggesting $5-7,000 and Wilkins remarking that the Israeli cost per family for resettlement was $2500. Badeau remarked that he did not like the term "one-shot" since creation of a whole new social fabric is required. McClintock agreed with Hare that "baksheesh" was the wrong term since what is involved is compensation, not a gratuity.Wilkins queried what situation we would be in if the project failed or what would be our situation if it succeeded. He suggested that if we succeeded we might be more unpopular with the Arabs but not seriously so. If we fail we may still have put enough pressure on them to vote for some other solution, but in any event we would not be worse off than now.
Hart pointed out that repatriation must be phased, that Israel cannot accept a flood of refugees. We should not start with a fixed number but let it evolve. Barbour concurred, pointing out that the President told Ben-Gurion that the repatriation would be phased.
Jernegan predicted that the scheme won't get off the ground, nor any other. Any approach will result in blasts from Iraq or Saudi Arabia and all the rest of the Arabs will have to fall in line. Badeau inquired whether the plan could be proposed by other auspices and thus be better received. Jernegan said that this at least would save the U.S. from taking all the beating.
Talbot asked whether there was less risk in trying something under any auspices or in doing nothing. Jernegan remarked that he would let the whole thing alone, referring to Hammarskjold's attitude. Barbour declared that the IBRD would not touch the refugee problem because it is too political. McClintock said our name is mud anyhow and we won't be hurt much if we fail. Wilkins agreed.
Badeau asked how this fits in with the Arab proposal for a property custodian. Hart said it works both ways, Jewish property was confiscated outright in both Egypt and Iraq.
Barbour commented that Israel is more likely now than in the past to accept a reasonable solution on the refugee problem without demanding an overall settlement. What Israel seeks now is an advance agreement on safeguards.
Macomber said Jordan will be deeply disappointed if there is no U.S. initiative but the proposal in front of the group would weaken the regime and set us back because of the irrational view that Israel cannot continue to exist, that the existence of Israel is an historical aberration. There could be a very private approach to Hussein which would be acceptable to him if he thought he could get away with it.
Hare stated that the Arabs were humiliated by their defeat by Israel and any solution must be tilted their way so it appears that they have the preponderance of gain. In the proposed plan he does not see a victory for the Arabs. We can't buy our way out but must restore Arab dignity.
Barbour replied that Ben-Gurion would be unlikely to survive politically if he makes a public statement on repatriation even if he has an under-the-table arrangement with us.
Knight suggested that Tito has good relations with both sides and might take on the job. Badeau remarked that Nasser probably wants the refugee problem solved but much depends on the day and the mood in which he finds himself. He inquired whether stability in the refugee camps would be affected if the approach failed. Macomber said there was relief in the camps when it was learned that the "Kennedy 25% plan" was found not be be true. The plan as written up might give the refugees a tool to try to topple the King.
Talbot wondered what effect failure would have on Congress; might result in reduced support to UNRWA. Macomber was of the view that failure would have no bad effect on Congress; at least we would be seen to be trying. Jernegan concurred.
Hart urged that we avoid any appearance that the plan had been hatched with Israel. Any public statement by Israel would lead the Arabs to think it to be a plot. We should appear to buffet Israel into something that appears to give the Arabs a victory.
Macomber noted that the refugees already understand the unpleasantness of living in Israel under Jewish rule.
Talbot summarized as follows: Israel expects an effort but prefers none. Jordan would be disappointed if there were no effort but is unlikely to accept. Nasser may want some sort of settlement but he and Kamel say "put the Israel issue on ice". No other country thinks the refugee problem a threat to world peace but we consider it a serious nuisance. We are under pressure to do something. Congress insists that UNRWA be cleaned up or that we get out of it. A PCC report is due October 15 and a debate is due in the next GA. The issue will continue to plague us. If we could get a process started tensions would be reduced. It would cost us a lot of money over the next several years. Psychology of expecting something to be done is now greater than ever before. The new administration is expected to do something and if it doesn't now it probably won't be done. If we fail no great damage will be done and we shall be better off with Congress. If it is kept secret an approach to Hussein won't hurt him. The Arabs have been hammering for exactly what is being proposed. 1962 is an election year and it will be hard to do anything then. We might try to bring the President and Nasser together this fall. There is unanimity that we should have a try, though Jernegan is very reluctant. Refugees are not a time bomb but Jordan waters and nuclear energy are.
Knight remarked that we must save Arab face. He thinks there will be shooting when water is diverted by Israel. McClintock said it could quickly be found whether there is any "give" in Nasser's position on refugees and if so we could then go to Hussein. Polk remarked that it would leak in Washington, and he inquired whether there was any other possible type of move that had not been discussed.
Wilkins asked whether we can get a commitment from Congressional leaders for money prior to approaching Nasser and Ben-Gurion.
On Jordan waters, McClintock said Israel would be wise to agree to a watermaster now in order to relieve tensions.
Talbot's final remark was that there is no Israeli willingness to reduce immigration. This year Israel will have an excess of 100,000 immigrants over emigrants. We cannot influence the rate, so the longer the refugee question is unsettled the less room there will be in Israel for Arabs.
RC Strong
93. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy
The Deepening Crisis in Iran
Despite its much lower visibility, the continued slide toward chaos in Iran could result in as great a setback as in South Vietnam.
When the Iran Task Force reported to you on May 19, it regarded the newly-formed Amini government as the best, and perhaps the last, chance of averting political chaos and the possible loss of Iran to the West. You approved a program of "vigorous action" by the US to seize the opportunity created by the advent of Amini, which appeared to provide several further months of grace.
We have now used up three of these months, and the Washington consensus is that the situation has gotten worse instead of better. Amini has been trying to carry out a vigorous reform program; as always, however, it is a lot harder to execute than to announce reforms, especially in a gimcrack country like Iran. Amini is saddled with a weak cabinet, a fact he recognizes but is as yet unable or unwilling to alter. Moreover, he has not been able to develop any middle-class political backing of his own. Contrary to most fears, the Shah has to date been surprisingly strong in backing Amini, but he complained the other day that he seemed to be Amini's only supporter. Meanwhile the National Front, a disparate congeries of middle and left politicians, who seem able to unite only on their opposition to Amini (he stole most of their reform program), are seeking to topple him through demonstrations and calls for free elections. Such a slowdown in Amini's momentum is largely inevitable (in one sense he's already accomplished more than all his predecessors since 1953), but it is cause for real concern.What has the US done? By some fast financial footwork approved by you, we bailed Amini out of an immediate cash crisis. But now he faces another budget crisis plus a deficit in the final year of the Second Iranian Development Plan. We are trying to get the Germans, who are interested, to help cover these remaining gaps (then we will both help finance the Third Seven Year Plan, which at first reading looks pretty good).
But these immediate financial bail-out measures only buy us time at best. The modernization of Iranian society will be a long-term process. Even Amini's promising reform program will require four or five years in office to carry out. Amini still looks better than any other moderate leader in sight--and far better than either the right wing military dictatorship or chaotic National Front takeover which are the most likely alternatives if he fails.
Thus the gut problem is still political--how to keep in power a regime which still seems by far the best bet for achieving a "controlled revolution" in Iran. To do so, we must develop an effective political corollary to our economic support. Here we have moved less vigorously than the situation seems to demand. Our reasons for caution are understandable. To press Amini and the Shah too hard may label them as US puppets; worse still, it may lead them to bite back.
But desperate times call for desperate measures. If we are treading the thin edge of potential disaster in Iran (for which Khrushchev sits patiently waiting), we must treat this as a crisis situation, and take crisis measures, as in South Vietnam. At a time when we face crises in Berlin and Southeast Asia, can this Administration afford not to take every step to avert a setback in Iran?
What can we do? Diagnosis is easier than prescription. What is needed most is to push harder on all fronts:
1. Treat Iran as a real crisis situation by using Iran Task Force (on Vietnam model) as an operating mechanism, largely as a means of keeping pressure on State. Request a progress report and revised action program for NSC.
2. Do whatever is necessary to keep Iran afloat financially and to get a real development program going. This is no time for too much haggling.
3. Complement this with a vigorous political action program:
a. Reiterate to Shah that Amini is our man, and that we think he needs all-out support (there are already rumors Shah is considering a replacement).
b. Sell Shah and Amini on glamorizing Third Development Plan as bold new effort to modernize, around which all elements of society should rally.
c. Get Amini to make some other dramatic moves, e.g. bringing some grafters to trial or making at least a token cut in military budget, to refurbish his popular image.
d. Press him to reorganize cabinet, and especially get rid of incompetent Minister of Finance.
e. Urge Amini to start developing a base of political support; offer to subsidize it if necessary.
f. Get UK to join us in all-out backing for Amini. There is reason to believe UK is not sanguine as to his prospects and already coppering its bets.
g. Keep going back at Shah that real threat is internal not external. He should stop bleating to us about more military aid, and instead make token cut in his own military outlays (which take 43% of government budget).
h. Do what we can to help Amini split National Front and get at least its more moderate fringe in his camp.
4. Since the hour is late, start quiet contingency planning against risk that Amini may nevertheless fail. This planning to be on two alternative bases: (a) military regime; (b) how to live with National Front.
There are numerous cogent arguments against the above, as infeasible or counter-productive. And there are real limits to what the US itself can accomplish in dealing with Iranians. But the crucial need is to treat Iran as a crisis problem and to get the necessary momentum into our response. Then, if we lose out, at least it won't be for want of having tried hard enough.
R. W. Komer
94. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk
Iran
The President has expressed renewed concern over the way in which the Amini regime seems to have lost much of its initial momentum and has had little success as yet in developing any kind of a political base.
/2/ Moreover, we apparently face additional financial commitments to meet Iran's recurrent budget difficulties and to make up shortfalls in the second Seven Year Development Plan. He is anxious that we continue to do everything possible to capitalize on the opportunity created by Amini's advent, following up the excellent Iran Task Force program which he approved. If the situation seems to be deteriorating rather than improving, are there any further steps which the US could profitably undertake? /2/A memorandum from Kennedy to McGeorge Bundy of August 7 reads: "Arrange to have a conference on Iran with the Iran Task Force meeting to consider the proposals made to me by Komer in his memorandum to me on August 4th. You might submit Komer's memorandum or an abbreviated form to the responsible people in the State Department and then let's have a meeting to consider it or any proposals they may have." (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Bundy, McGeorge 1961) As a result he is most interested in the Department of State's current thinking. Should we now regard Iran as a full-fledged crisis situation, and give it sustained Task Force treatment, as we are South Vietnam? Are we doing everything necessary to keep Iran afloat financially and to get a promising development program going? Can we, for example, get the Shah and Amini to glamorize the new Third Plan as a bold new effort to modernize Iran, around which all elements of Iranian society should rally? What other means can we suggest to Amini to help generate a political base? How can we influence him to get a more competent cabinet? Is there anything more we can get the Shah to do to help Amini, such as allowing a token cut in the military budget? As to the opposition, is there any way we can help Amini to split the National Front and attach to himself its more moderate elements? Finally, if we are nonetheless dubious as to Amini's prospects, should we step up quiet contingency planning against his fall?The President believes that it would be helpful if the Iran Task Force could prepare by the end of this week a follow-on report assessing what further measures, if any, seem desirable to forestall another Iranian crisis, and be ready to meet with him, if necessary, to consider these steps.
McGeorge Bundy
95. Paper Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5611/8-1461. Secret. A table of contents and summary are not printed. The source text is undated, but a covering memorandum on the copy in Department of Defense files indicates that Lemnitzer sent the paper to McNamara on August 8 with a recommendation that it be sent to the Department of State for comment. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464) The source text was transmitted to the Department of State under cover of a letter of August 14 from Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric to Secretary of State Rusk requesting Department of State consideration of the non-military points being recommended in the paper.ACQUISITION BY ISRAEL OF A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
1. To:
a. Develop a strategic analysis of the impact of the acquisition by Israel of a nuclear weapons capability on the United States and Free World security posture and deployments.
b. Determine actions which should be taken by the United States relative to this capability.
2. There will be no arms control or nuclear weapons control measure established between the present time and the time when Israel could acquire a nuclear capability.
3. Recent information confirms that Israel is engaged in construction of a 26 MW heavy water reactor and supporting facilities in the Negev at Dimona. Israeli officials state that the Dimona installation is to be a national laboratory for atomic research with the primary mission of achieving experience for the future construction of nuclear power stations. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The Dimona site will provide the Israelis with the necessary experience to develop plutonium production capability beginning with the processing of ore and proceeding through the separation of plutonium.
4. Extensive evidence exists that France has supplied plans, materials, equipment, and technical assistance to the Israelis, and is also training Israeli personnel. It is suspected that France will furnish ore probably under safeguards, in addition to the 85 tons which were reported to have been shipped from France to Israel. Israel has no large scale native source of uranium ore, and they have attempted to purchase ore from sources not requiring safeguard provisions. It is reported that an attempt is being made to purchase ore from Argentina. The Israelis have obtained assistance from Norway, including 20 tons of heavy water.
5. [7-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
6. The United Arab Republic (UAR) has a nuclear research program in operation, based on Soviet UAR agreements concluded in 1956. The urge behind the UAR program of atomic research appears to spring from a desire for prestige within the Arab world. The two megawatt Soviet-supplied research reactor now being completed poses no military threat. Since the disclosure of the Israeli reactor site at Dimona, UAR press statements have implied that future UAR development might be of a military nature. However, it does not at this time seem probable that the UAR will be in a position to build or to operate a large reactor either for power or for weapons production, without substantial assistance from foreign experts.
7. General
a. The direct impact of Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons will be felt in the Middle East, specifically the Arab World. The indirect impact will be felt by each of the major world powers; however, these nations will be affected because of their interests in the Middle East, not because of any direct Israeli military threat or military advantage on a global scale.
b. In other words, Israel's military power, with or without nuclear weapons, must be viewed in relation to the basic issue which dominates Israel's foreign policy, i.e., her existence in the Middle East in opposition to the Arab States. Behind this basic issue are deep-seated disputes which do not seem capable of early solution; such as the question of boundaries, Arab refugees, freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba, Jordan River water problem, and the use of the Suez Canal. In 1948 and again in 1956 these disputes resulted in armed conflict with Israel showing a military superiority over her Arab neighbors. The UAR has sought, and is receiving increased military aid from the USSR.
8. Impact on Israel
a. It is not likely that Israel would use nuclear weapons to initiate a war in the Middle East, primarily due to the knowledge that such action would probably bring about severe international reactions, particularly from the United States and the USSR.
b. It may be expected, however, that Israel will use a nuclear capability as a powerful psychological weapon in an attempt to solve her basic problems with the Arab world. Israel may be expected to press its interests more vigorously and be less inclined to give concessions.
9. Impact on the Arab World
a. The acquisition of an Israeli nuclear weapons capability would further aggravate the existing Israel-Arab tensions, and the Arab world may be expected to blame the United States as well as the French for Israeli accomplishments in this field and to condemn the actions as a further manifestation of Western imperialism. Of all the Arab Governments the UAR will feel the most threatened and will probably take the lead in seizing the initiative for the Arab World leadership.
b. Under UAR leadership, the Arabs may impose sanctions against French and possibly US and other Western interests in the area. The transit of the Suez Canal and access to the Middle East oil are two examples of US interests which may be jeopardized. The UAR could exploit this issue in order to achieve a degree of cooperation among the separate Arab States.
c. The USSR would almost certainly not provide nuclear weapons to the UAR, or assistance in developing a capability for the production of fissionable material.
/2/ However, the UAR would be expected to look to the USSR for compensating military aid and political support. It is almost certain that the USSR would accuse the United States of complicity with France in the nuclear arming of Israel and would cite this as new proof of the Colonialist and anti-Arab character of Western policy. /2/SNIE 100-8-60, paragraph 1C. [Footnote in the source text. SNIE 100-8-60, "Implications of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear Weapons Capability", December 9, 1960, is not printed.] 10. Impact on the Soviet Bloca. The USSR will vigorously agitate the issue of a prospective Israeli nuclear capability. It may, for example, increase pressures on the United States and the United Kingdom for an agreement banning nuclear tests or even adopting broader prohibitions in the nuclear weapons field.
On the other hand, to justify a possible USSR desire to merge the test ban issue with the over-all disarmament problem, they may use the Israel nuclear potential as a pretext for discounting the test ban talks. The USSR will probably re-emphasize a former appeal for a nuclear free zone in the Middle East, to include Turkey. It will further exploit the matter to build up neutralist and Western support for its current proposals on general and complete disarmament.
/3/ /3/SNIE 100-8-60, paragraph 15. [Footnote in the source text.] b. Apart from such manipulations, the Soviets will, in fact, be anxious to head off Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons. They are opposed to the spread of nuclear weapons. In addition, they recognize that this development will increase pressures from Communist China for Soviet assistance in achieving nuclear capability, and produce demands from the UAR along the same lines. On this account, it is possible that the Soviets would be led to make concessions in their negotiating position on nuclear testing; they would doubtless also calculate that the United States and the United Kingdom would themselves be under pressure to make concessions. In any event, they will probably make diplomatic approaches to the United States, designed to generate US pressure upon France and Israel./4/ /4/SNIE 100-8-60, paragraph 16. [Footnote in the source text.] 11. Impact on the Free Worlda. Knowledge that Israel is well on the way to becoming a nuclear power is likely to bring greatly increased pressure in the West to check the spread of nuclear armaments. This pressure may be particularly strong from the smaller NATO countries and the neutral nations.
b. However, if Israel develops a demonstrable nuclear weapons capability, certain inhibitions against such development might disappear from small countries whose advanced industrial capacity could support such a development. Sweden, Switzerland and possibly Japan are examples.
c. The reaction of the emerging African nations will be particularly complicated. Disclosure of covert French support to Israel in this enterprise is likely to result in a wave of criticism of France, with such nations as the UAR, Guinea, Mali and Ghana advancing the concept of peaceful African solidarity. On the other hand, Israel's nuclear achievements may enhance its prestige among those African nations that have looked to Israel for technical assistance.
12. Specific Impact on the United States
a. The acquisition of a nuclear capability by Israel would not present a direct military threat against the United States or any US alliance. This acquisition would, however, have a definite and serious impact on US policies toward the Middle East and possibly toward France.
b. Further, this acquisition might tend to complicate any negotiations for a nuclear test ban agreement or other arms control measures, which might be in progress at the time.
c. Specifically, it is to the advantage of the United States to:
(1) Prevent armed conflict among Middle East nations.
(2) Decrease tensions in the Middle East so that solution of basic problems can be attempted through peaceful means.
d. Acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by either Israel or a nation of the Arab world would thus impede progress toward these US objectives. Moreover, if France, as the catalyst in this development, should attain strong influence over Israeli policy, differences between the US and French views within NATO, might be projected into the Middle East.
Israeli Nuclear Capability
13. The United States should initiate the following courses of action toward the Middle East:
a. Attempt by all feasible means, official, quasi-official and private, to convince Israel and France that the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by Israel would be against the best interests of the Free World, the Middle East and of Israel.
b. Pursue this same policy toward the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by the Arab world, particularly the UAR.
c. Attempt by all feasible means to convince Israel that it will be to her greatest benefit to use all available talent and material now assigned to the nuclear program on peaceful nuclear projects that will benefit Israel most in economic-political affairs.
d. Maintain the capability to deploy sufficient force to the Middle East-Mediterranean-North Africa area to persuade both Israel and the Arab nations against the use of force to settle their intra-Middle East problems.
e. Take the initiative, by using all available political and economic means, while maintaining a creditable US military capability, to resolve the sources of tension in the Middle East.
f. [4 lines of source text not declassified]
g. Prepare for the psychological impact on the Middle East and Africa of a nuclear weapons detonation by Israel. The objective should be to prevent Sino-Soviet orientation of the nations of these areas because of this development.
96. Editorial Note
On August 9, 1961, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Meyer sent the following telegram to Secretary Rusk, who was then in Paris attending a NATO Foreign Ministers conference:
"Dept continues to believe PCC-sponsored fact-finding mission to Near East capitals very desirable primarily to improve our posture when Arab refugee problem comes before UNGA this fall. In view shortage time we see no hope for securing services of a neutral Special Representative. Among Americans we consider Joseph Esrey Johnson of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace particularly well qualified. Before approaching him we would appreciate your concurrence and your permission to indicate to him your personal interest in his accepting this assignment. We have in mind a low-key two or three week visit by Special Representative to Near Eastern capitals and a report upon which constructive PCC proposals can be made to forthcoming UNGA." (Tosec 35; Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/8-961)
Rusk approved in principle having a personal message sent to Joseph Johnson. (Memorandum from Swank to Meyer, August 11; ibid., NEA/NE Files: Lot 70 D 229, Refugees, PCC) On August 12, upon Rusk's return to Washington, Meyer sent a memorandum to the Secretary requesting that he telephone his personal friend Joseph Johnson to discuss the assignment. (Ibid.) On August 17, Rusk met with Johnson to express his personal appreciation for Johnson's accepting the assignment. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Central Files, 325.84/8-1761)
Also on August 17, in circular telegram 277, the Department of State informed Near Eastern and selected European posts that Johnson had agreed to accept the assignment as PCC Special Representative and that PCC concurrence was being sought. The Department contemplated that Johnson would "take low key soundings at Foreign Minister level" tentatively beginning in Cairo about August 24, with subsequent visits to Beirut, Amman, and Tel Aviv. (Ibid.) The United Nations announced Johnson's appointment as the Special Representative of the U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine on August 24. (Airgram to Amman and other posts, August 31; ibid., 325.84/8-3161)
The most serious problem the Task Force sees is long-term in the sense that, unless Amini finds the way to acquire broad political support, one or another of Iran's burgeoning problems will sooner or later unseat him. Possible courses of action on the part of the United States to assist him to do so are limited and in a very sensitive area of internal politics.
The Task Force examined at length a series of proposals contained in the aforementioned Departmental study. It was agreed that these proposals be forwarded to our Ambassador in Tehran for comment. Assist-ant Secretary Talbot, the Chairman of the Task Force, fortuitously will be in Tehran from August 20 to August 28. This will provide an opportunity to obtain the considered views of both the Ambassador and Mr. Talbot regarding the current situation and what further might be done.
The Departmental study of possible United States actions which we are sending to Tehran covers a broad spectrum. There is attached a partial list of the principal areas which should be further explored.
In view of the foregoing, this memorandum should be considered as only an interim reply to Mr. Bundy's August 7 memorandum to the Secretary on this subject.
The Task Force is of course prepared to meet with the President at any time to discuss its work. It would suggest, however, that consideration of this possibility be deferred until after the Ambassador's response and Mr. Talbot's personal observations have become available.
Melvin F. Manfull Washington, August 11, 1961.
97. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Iran: Follow-up Measures to Support the Amini Regime/2/
/2/An August 10 draft memorandum for the President with the same subject line, which (according to a handwritten note on it) was "Considered but not used by TF," is ibid., NEA/GTI Files: Lot 66 D 173, Task Force on Iran. A transmittal memorandum attached to it by Komer indicates that Komer prepared the draft memorandum. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Iran, 8/1/61-8/14/61)
The Iran Task Force met August 10/3/ to consider the present position of the Amini regime and such measures as could be taken or accelerated to enhance its position pursuant to the original Task Force recommendations. Active consideration was given to a draft letter from the Department to Ambassador Holmes setting forth a tentative analysis of the present situation, and enclosing a lengthy study prepared in the Department of possible courses of action designed to further our objectives./4/ A copy of the letter is enclosed.
/3/A Summary of Proceedings of the Iran Task Force meeting on August 10, prepared by Bowling, is in Department of State, NEA/GTI Files: Lot 66 D 173, Task Force on Iran.
/4/Entitled "NEA Study of Possible U.S. Action Re the Long-Term Political Situation in Iran," August 10. (Ibid.) See Supplement, the compilation on Iran.
It was the general sense of the Task Force that the Amini regime has not, as might have been hoped, succeeded in capturing the imagination of the general public and progressing toward the development of a new political synthesis. In this respect, therefore, it has lost momentum. However, as set forth in the letter, there appears to be no immediate threat to the regime. Measures designed to maintain economic stability and progress for the immediate future are well under way. Long-range comprehensive economic and social development programs in line with new United States foreign aid concepts are also going forward.
Enclosure 1
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs/6/
/6/The letter was transmitted without change to Ambassador Holmes on August 12. Dear Julius: Iran continues to be the subject of attention and some anxiety at the highest levels both here in the Department and in the White House. Accordingly, the Iran Task Force has been asked to go over and to approve this letter. I am very pleased that Mr. Talbot, the Chairman of the Task Force, will be with you in Iran shortly, and the Task Force hopes that, through full discussions with you, he will be able to bring back with him a more detailed picture of your thinking than we could hope to obtain through correspondence.
We were gratified by the general excellence of the Third Plan frame as presented to the IBRD by Mr. Farman-Farmayan. The reaction of the IBRD is tentatively favorable, and we have every reason to hope that the Third Plan will become the base of a long-range Consortium-type lending approach which will reflect in classic form the basic foreign aid policies of the Administration.
As you have noted, the news from Bonn appears to be surprisingly favorable in connection with the Federal Republic's contribution to the financing of the Second Plan gap, and we believe that we will be able to come through, if it should prove necessary, with development lending to make up some relatively small portion of the gap which the Germans may not be able to cover.
Although our view of the Iranian budgetary problem for 1340 is by no means frozen, we do believe that the GOI has overestimated its deficit by a very large margin. No doubt careful probing of some of the large expenditure increases, such as the increase for the Cereals Department, would reveal areas where cuts could be made without serious economic damage. We are inclined to believe, however, that estimated expenditure levels are generally reasonable and should be accepted at face value.
On the revenue side, however, we are persuaded that the GOI's estimate of customs revenues falls about a billion rials short of what can be reasonably expected. Starting from this point, we visualize a potential budget deficit of $23 million (1.7 billion rials). Assuming (as now appears likely) that the Germans provide a loan of $10 million for NIOC projects and assuming that about $7 or $8 million of such a loan could be used during this Iranian year, the deficit could be reduced to about $15 million. As you know, $13 million of the estimated deficit is to be used to retire public debt so that credit expansion in the private sector can rise beyond the Stabilization Program ceiling of $39 million (3 billion rials).
In view of your recent report (despatch #60, July 26)
/7/ that the public debt was reduced by $45 million in the first quarter of the current Iranian year, it strikes us that the GOI is unduly concerned about its ability to meet this goal. Should we assume, however, that further experience and later information shows that the GOI's concern is justified, we are informed that the IMF would be prepared to consider a revision of the Stabilization Program to permit private credit expansion of $52 million (4 billion rials) without an off-setting reduction in the public debt. In sum, it would appear from the foregoing that Iran should be able to carry out its 1340 budget as now constituted without U.S. budgetary assistance in addition to the $15 million already given. We recognize, however, a strong possibility of future emergency requirements for our earmarked $5 million or even more. /7/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 888.14/7-2661) We would appreciate your comments on the above analysis, along with any further data which may be developed and which would affect our conclusions. Be assured that we and the Iran Task Force feel strongly that we should stand ready, within our resources, to assist Iran in its budgetary problems to the extent that there is real need for such assistance. In view of the above, however, I am sure that you agree that we are acting in the GOI's interest, as well as our own, by waiting to get a clearer view of the problem.At present, we in Washington are more concerned over political factors in the Iranian situation than over current and future economic problems. Many problems may arise in the economic sector but, granted a continuation of the economic competence which the Prime Minister and his advisors have shown and granted the approval of the Administration's foreign-assistance legislation now before the Congress, we believe that the Prime Minister will probably be able to avoid economic catastrophes and that Iran will be able to enjoy that minimum of economic stability and development which will enable the Prime Minister to devote himself to the political and psychological problems which confront him.
Furthermore, it appears to us that the Iranian Government faces no immediate and crucial political crisis involving possible revolution. Rightist anxieties have been quieted, the Shah appears to be continuing his support of the Cabinet, and the National Front and its allies are being quietly but effectively repressed without unnecessary brutality and without bloodshed. There are no indications that the security forces will waver in their loyalty to the regime in the near future, although the long-term elements of dissatisfaction are undoubtedly still at work.
Our primary concern at this time, and the primary purpose of this letter, revolves around the longer-term political outlook. As you recall from your work with the Task Force a few months ago, we have been acutely aware of a growing gap between the burgeoning and largely neo-Mosadeqist elements of the urban middle class and the more traditional and conservative elements of society. We felt, and we still feel, that amelioration of this disunifying trend through the creation of a moderate "bridge" embodying a new and Centrist political synthesis is the most promising (and perhaps the only) alternative to increasing disunity and eventual political collapse. We decided that the Shah, despite his many admirable qualities, had not and probably would not display the political creativity and flexibility needed to overcome this trend. We pinned our hopes on Prime Minister Amini.
Our reading of the political situation in Iran is most disquieting in the light of the points mentioned above. It appears that the Prime Minister has lost a great deal of his early grip on the imagination of the public by failing to carry out expected changes, and that while he has reduced the threat of attack from the Right and from the Shah himself, he is drawing away from, and not toward, the moderate leaders of the urban middle-class, and is, in effect, assuming a posture similar to that of earlier Prime Ministers who have despaired of coming to terms with the urban opposition. He is, of course, technically far more competent than his predecessors. But we suspect that honesty and technical competence alone are not going to result in a solution of Iran's long-term psychological problem in less than a decade, and we feel most strongly that as long as the half-Westernized and strategically placed forces in Iranian politics are implacably hostile to the Government, Amini and the Shah will not have many years before the slow dry rot, which has been spreading for the past six years, will penetrate the security forces to such an extent that the daily survival of the regime will become a matter of conjecture. This process would almost certainly involve an increase in direct Tudeh influence on (if not control of) the organized opposition and would increase potentialities for the Tudeh to operate and expand in the atmosphere of a successor regime.
To judge from his most recent statements, Amini has apparently begun to despair of making any immediate progress in winning over the urban middle-class opposition and is instead planning to repress them as gently as possible while ruling through the bureaucracy, with the Shah and the Army in support, in such a fashion as to demonstrate to the heirs of Mosadeq that his way is better than theirs. It may well be that this decision is the only one open to him; we are not prepared to state categorically that he is taking the wrong tack.
What can Amini do and what can we do--in the way of help or pressure--to escape from this blind alley--if, indeed, the long-term political problem admits of any other approach than to play for time and hope for the best? The attached study examines a number of very tentative suggestions of possible courses of action. I admit that none of them appear to hold much promise of a brilliant solution to Amini's dilemma. I also realize that Amini himself, aiming for the same long-range goals which we envisage for Iran and being personally a political realist, may be presumed to be far more capable than we of judging their applicability and promise. We realize further that Amini's freedom of action is severely limited by economic realities and by the necessity of staying in office from day to day and of retaining at least a minimum of tolerance and support by the Shah and the security forces.
Nevertheless, we are still concerned over the continuing gloomy long-range prospects of the regime, and are eager to receive the Embassy's assessment of what we can do to cope with this most disquieting trend.
Sincerely,
Armin H. Meyer
Enclosure 2
to Long-Term Political Stability
1. Land Reform, including token expropriations and legal regulation of landlord-peasant relations.
2. Anti-Corruption Campaign, including better preparation of cases, speedier action, and more investigations and charges.
3. Tax Reform, including the speedy formulation and announcement of new tax measures based on land valuation.
4. Winter Unemployment Relief, including construction of low-cost housing in Tehran.
5. Broadening the Cabinet, including the bringing in of moderate National Front leaders.
6. More Effective Publicity on Possibilities and Accomplishments of Economic Development, including notably the glamorization of the Third Plan.
7. Organizing Political Support, including notably the formation of a pro-Amini moderate political party.
The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein.