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Foreign Relations,
1961-1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961-1962 Released by the Office of the Historian Documents 66-97 66. Memorandum From Robert B. Elwood of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Strong)/1/
Washington, June 26, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 686D.87/6-2661. Unclassified. Drafted by Morehouse. Elwood was the Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for the Middle East.
SUBJECT In response to an urgent telephone request from Mr. Blackiston we are forwarding a brief account of the background of Iraq's assertion of sovereignty over Kuwait.
Qasim Announcement
Prime Minister Qasim of Iraq in a press conference June 25 asserted old Iraqi claims to Kuwaiti territory and offered to "liberate" the inhabitants of Kuwait. The statement as read over Baghdad Radio referred to Kuwait several times as "an indivisible part of Iraq" and asserted, ". . . it is the Iraqi Republic and no one else which signs agreements for Kuwait." He further announced the intent to issue a Republican Decree appointing the Shaykh of Kuwait qa' immaqam (district or sub-provincial governor) under the Iraqi province of Basra. Qasim's move was obviously in response to the termination on June 19 of an Anglo-Kuwaiti treaty, Ancestors of the al-Subah family, the ruling dynasty of Kuwait, emigrated from central Saudi Arabia (Najd province) in the 17th century and first settled at Umm Qasr (now the site of a proposed Iraqi port development, access to which has been at issue for some time between Iraq and Kuwait). Driven from this location by the Turks, the family established itself at Kuwait in the 18th century. From then until World War I, these minor rulers shifted allegiance according to the exigencies of local dynastic wars and pressures by larger powers.
In the later years of the 18th century, the family and town were under Persian suzerainty, and Kuwait rivalled Basra as a port for the interior of Mesopotamia up to Damascus. However, in 1829 the then ruler had to acknowledge the suzerainty of Turkey and pay tribute to the Ottoman Porte. In return for a subsidy, the Kuwaiti navy protected the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab in the name of the Porte. In 1869-70, the Kuwaiti Ruler joined energetic Turkish Sultan Midhat Pasha in a military campaign into Arabia that conquered al-Hasa province, which, for a time, was governed from Basra as the Turkish province of Najd. Thereafter, the Shaykh of Kuwait formally accepted the Turkish definition of his position and was accepted by the Porte as de jure ruler of Kuwait.
British Interest and Kuwaiti Independence
By 1897, the then Shaykh of Kuwait was paying little attention to his nominal superiors in Basra. At this time, Kuwait was being considered as the terminus of the proposed Berlin-Baghdad Railway. The UK, which had not formally accepted the Ottoman right to speak for Kuwait, therefore interested itself, and the English Resident at Bushire, Col. Meade, was authorized by London to contact the Shaykh of Kuwait directly. The Shaykh was interested not only in asserting his independence vis-à-vis Turkey, but also in British help with the perennial skirmishing going on since 1895 between himself and the Rashidi family, head of the powerful Shammar tribe in Saudi Arabia, and later with their conqueror, King Abdul Aziz Ibn Sa'ud.
On January 23, 1899, therefore, the Kuwaiti Shaykh agreed not to let or cede any part of his territory to other governments or subjects of governments other than England, and to receive no representatives of foreign powers without British authorization. In return, the Shaykh received an annual subsidy and British and Indian protection as needed against the Wahhabi incursions from Saudi Arabia. This is the treaty just denounced by the Iraqi government. Previous Iraqi Claims to Kuwait
During the First World War and subsequent British Mandate over Iraq, Iraqi relations with Kuwait were not a problem. After Iraq achieved independence in 1932, however, anti-British Iraqi nationalists occasionally agitated an Iraqi claim to the territory of Kuwait based on the old Ottoman jurisdiction. In 1937, Iraq extended its protection to Kuwait in a minor row with Saudi Arabia. In 1938, Iraq's second ruler, the young King Ghazi, loudly demanded annexation of Kuwait and broadcast Iraq's claims on Baghdad radio. In that year, the Iraqi government invited Kuwaiti students to study in Baghdad at the Iraqi government's expense, a move which drew both Kuwaiti and British objections. Early in 1939, when a legislative council in Kuwait was preparing a new constitution which was being so drafted as to guarantee the continuance of special British treaty rights, anti-British riots broke out in Kuwait objecting to the constitution and demanding, among other things, union with Iraq. The disturbance was short-lived, although serious enough to require application of emergency law in Kuwait. Baghdad press and radio, as well as the nationalist Arab Office in Damascus, backed the Kuwaiti dissidents, and there were rumors of Iraqi complicity in rousing the demonstrations. The furor quieted somewhat following the death of King Ghazi in an automobile accident in April 1939.
Thereafter, the Iraqi government tacitly accepted the status quo. For the last several years of the monarchy, the government of Nuri al-Sa'id was at pains to court good relations with the Kuwaiti ruling family, welcomed its members' frequent visits to relatives and properties in the Basra area, and discussed off-and-on the provision to Kuwait of sweet water from the Shatt al-Arab.
However, in 1958, following the uniting of Iraq and Jordan in the short-lived Arab Union, Nuri al-Sa'id again revived the claim. This was not a forceful public assertion, but rather a series of quiet diplomatic démarches in an attempt to persuade the Kuwaiti Ruler and the UK of the desirability of Kuwaiti adherence to the new Union. Nuri had in mind popularizing the Union with the Iraqi public through the acquisition of Kuwaiti wealth to offset the budgetary drain of Jordan, and at the same time hoped to create a psychology of momentum toward joining the Baghdad-based rather than the Cairo-Damascus union. Neither the Kuwaitis nor the UK evinced any interest, and the suggestion did not receive a great deal of publicity at the time. It was still being advanced by the Iraqi monarchy up to the time of the July 1958 revolution.
The Qasim regime is therefore advancing an old Iraqi claim, but one that has not in the past received much support from other Arab states and has had no recognition from the world at large. Aside from Qasim's extreme sensitivity to any manifestation of continued foreign presence in the Arab area, he is probably motivated by his current irritation with the UK over the stalled renegotiation of the IPC concession. Above generally consistent with Baghdad's 914 rpt Kuwait 38 Washington, June 27, 1961.
The Problem 2. We do not believe that the appeal of Arab unity, strong as it is to most Arab nationalists, will overcome the host of divisive and particularist interests which work against the creation of a union of Arab states. Nasser probably now appreciates the practical obstacles involved in seeking to establish such a union. He is likely to settle for more limited means of trying to assert paramountcy. (Paras. 28, 30, 36-38)
3. The UAR will make strong efforts to achieve progress in economic development, but neither the Egyptian nor Syrian region is likely to attain significant economic growth without substantial and continued foreign aid. (Paras. 15, 20-35)
4. Nasser will probably continue to work for consolidation of unity between the Egyptian and Syrian regions through a fairly pragmatic combination of authoritarian control and tactical concessions to Syrian sensibilities. In most respects, such consolidation involves a high degree of Egyptian domination of Syria. We believe that Nasser has a good chance of avoiding a breakup of the union. However, striking successes are unlikely, and serious setbacks remain constantly possible. (Paras. 14-24)
5. Nasser's control of the UAR--as well as his position in the Arab world generally--will be helped by Arab fear and hatred of Israel. Israel's nuclear potential and Israeli plans to divert Jordan waters will intensify Arab apprehensions. The UAR has the only Arab armed forces with any significant potential against Israel, which gives Nasser a unique claim to Arab leadership. (Paras. 19, 37-38)
6. This claim is further buttressed by Nasser's accepted position as the leading exponent of Arab reformism, and by his demonstrated readiness to assume leadership in defending Arab nationalism against communism. Despite his dependence on the Bloc, he is not neutral in the conflict between Arab nationalism and communism. (Paras. 10-11, 19, 46-50)
7. It is highly unlikely that Nasser will abandon his broad foreign policy of "positive neutralism." He has a basic belief that either of the great power blocs, if given free rein, would move to dominate or destroy him; he believes that neither can get free rein because of the determination of the other to prevent it. He will thus seek to avoid both total dependence on, and total alienation from, the Bloc as well as the West. Although in practice this strategy leads him to side more often with the Bloc than with the West, he has shown himself ready to respond vigorously to Soviet attacks. (Paras. 48-51)
8. It is probable that with the passage of time the inherent incompatibility between ultimate Soviet ambitions in the Middle East and the aspirations of Nasser and the Arab nationalists to preserve and strengthen their independent position will become increasingly manifest. If the Soviets should decide to abandon support of the Nasser regime in favor of increasingly heavy-handed pressure and subversion, the result would probably be a fundamental breach between Nasser and the USSR. However, such a breach may not come for years. (Para. 52)
9. Nasser's efforts to play a leading role among neutralists and Afro-Asians confront him with complex problems. Almost all African leaders, for example, are unwilling to see him play a dominant role on that continent. Moreover, matters like the forthcoming conference of nonaligned states and the future structure of the UN involve him in conflicting pressures from the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the neutralists. (Paras. 41-42, 45, 53)
[Here follows the 8-page Discussion section. See Supplement, the United Arab Republic compilation.]
Washington, June 28, 1961.
1. Reference is made to the memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 29 May 1961, b. Temporary deployment of "show of force" or "token" forces additional to forces permanently deployed to the area is feasible. Pre-positioning of some material and equipment in the general area will assist in the attainment of a more rapid reaction to an emergency and will assist in support of temporary deployments. However, inherent delays in obtaining clearances for transit of forces and timely availability of base facilities could restrict immediate actions to temporary deployments of naval forces to international waters adjacent to Iran.
c. Periodic dispatching of US forces on an exercise or maneuver basis to Iran, preferably in coordination with CENTO, is desirable and feasible.
d. Further detailed identification (earmarking) of existing US units allocated for possible deployment to Iran in current contingency plans is militarily impractical.
e. It is militarily undesirable to inform the Iranian Government more specifically of US unilateral plans for military action in support of Iran.
f. Current military plans provide for the possible use of US forces in excess of two divisions in Iran, with either conventional or nuclear capability, or both; therefore, preparation of additional plans for illustrative purposes as a basis for identifying key military and political considerations appears unnecessary.
g. The decision to deploy sizeable forces to the Middle East area to assist Iran against a Soviet attack must consider the possibility of the conflict escalating into general war and the effect of the decision on US general war posture. It is envisaged that in general war defense of the Middle East area would be undertaken primarily by indigenous forces. Within present military strategy, it is not contemplated that sizeable US combat forces will be deployed to the Middle East area, at least initially. Many advantages would accrue to the area from the Allied strategic offensive. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L. L. Lemnitzer As you know, last time that our two Governments were preparing military movements in the area, after the Iraqi revolution in July 1958, Foster Dulles and Selwyn Lloyd were in the closest touch about the action which we might take separately or together. Caccia will no doubt discuss all this with you and give you our information. We have an absolute obligation to help the Ruler if Kuwait is attacked and, as this is an area the security of which is of immense importance to both of us, I hope we could act with the closest cooperation.
What a world it is! PARTICIPANTS The President received us as a group and queried each Ambassador Designate for his views with respect to the area to which he was accredited. When my turn came, he asked me about the crisis over Kuwait, asking whether it was true that the Saudi Arabian Government was moving troops toward that area. When I responded that this was confirmed, he asked whether or not it was the intention of the Saudi Arabian Government to forestall Iraq by taking over Kuwait. I said no; I believed the object of the Saudi move was to defend Kuwait's independence against the Iraqi threat.
In response to a query as to how serious the threat was, I said that Sir Humphrey Trevelyan had advised London that the U.K. should be prepared to move troops in the direction of Kuwait to defend it, indicating Sir Humphrey's fear that the Iraqi Government might make a quick military move. The President said this tallied with information he had received this morning. He asked whether any other Arab countries were taking a position on Kuwait's side, as was Saudi Arabia. I said yes, the U.A.R. had come out flatfooted for Kuwait's independence. To his question whether there were any Arab countries that might support Iraq in its claims, I said that I could think of none likely to do so. He asked about the U.S.S.R. I said that it had not expressed itself. I was not quite so sure about the position of Iran--possibly Ambassador Wailes might have a comment--inasmuch as Iran had claims on Bahrain; and if Persian Gulf shaikhdoms were going to break loose from their traditional association with the U.K., in a sense it became "open season" for larger neighboring powers to assert such claims that they might have. Ambassador Wailes made no comment on this point.
The President turned to converse with the remaining Ambassadors in turn, then concluded the meeting by commenting on the centralized responsibilities of U.S. Ambassadors abroad, referring to the letter which he had written with regard to their proper role as coordinators of all American activities within their jurisdictions. He then instructed me to convey the following message to Assistant Secretary Talbot: That Mr. Talbot inform him of the decision which might be made with respect to the USMTM in Saudi Arabia before such decision was final.
As we shook hands on my departure, I said that I intended, if he agreed, to convey his personal regards to the King of Saudi Arabia and to the King of the Yemen. He nodded assent and remarked he had recently met one of the Saudi princes in the hospital.
3. Naturally we hope that things will not come to this pass, and it may be that the influence of the Arab Governments and of other friendly countries will restrain Qasim. We are sending an immediate message to the Arab Governments of the area and to those of India, Pakistan and Turkey asking them to use any influence they have to restrain Qasim. As we have no relations with Saudi Arabia, would you please urge King Saud to throw his weight in also in favour of restraint?
The Record of Actions for the 486th meeting of the National Security Council on June 29, 1961, "noted the President's approval of the Secretary of State's recommendation that the U.S. give full political and logistic support, if required, to the United Kingdom in connection with certain actions it is taking to forestall any Iraq attempt to take over Kuwait by force." (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
Rusk sent the following message to Lord Home following the meeting: "Thank you for your messages of yesterday and today. Your thinking coincides with ours. We understand the depth of your obligation, we agree that the independence of Kuwait must not be destroyed by force and we are prepared to render the full political support you request. We are communicating with Saud and we are considering the Security Council angle. While Qasim is, to say the least, unpredictable, we are hopeful that given time to work political forces among the Arabs will dissuade Qasim from committing himself to an unfortunate course of action with unpredictable consequences. We shall be very happy to keep in close touch with you on this." (Transmitted in telegram 6138 to London, June 29; ibid., Central Files, 686D.87/6-2961)
The attached Conclusions of NIE 36-61: Nasser and the Future of Arab Nationalism Here is the case for our attempting to stay in the game with Nasser, not trying to outbid the Soviets, not deluding ourselves with any idea that we can bring him into the Western camp but merely that we must live with him and he must live with us. Ergo, are there not areas where we can cooperate, thus providing him confidence in Western support if he runs afoul eventually of the Soviets?
As you have pointed out, one of the key things we have to offer is assistance in economic development. In turn, however, we must let Nasser know that we expect a compensatory quid pro quo in a less antagonistic policy on his part. A rapprochement along these lines may take years and involve numerous zigs and zags. Only time, for example, is likely to make the Arabs willing to live with Israel. But the many pitfalls which lie ahead are no excuse for not deciding now whether to move in the direction of a long-term policy of this sort.
Bob K.
Subsequent to announcement June 19 UK-Kuwait exchange letters which redefines UK-Kuwait relationship and abrogates 1899 Agreement, Iraq Prime Minister dispatched message to Ruler of Kuwait which omitted reference Kuwait independence and raised question legality Kuwait's existence separate from Iraq. In press conference June 25 Qasim denounced UK-Kuwait relationship and asserted Kuwait part of Iraq since Sheikhdom had been illegally separated in Ottoman times from Province of Basra. Iraqi claim embodied in memorandum circulated to foreign governments.
Reactions to Qasim's statements have included expression deep concern from Saudi Arabia where Cabinet has met in emergency session and King dispatched Chief of Staff General al-Tassan to Kuwait for consultation with Kuwait leaders. Statement by King Saud affirmed Kuwait and Saudi Arabia "as one country" and he has sent message to other Arab heads state urging support Kuwait's independence. UAR Minister of State reflected UARG concern in statement June 25 deploring situation that has arisen and upholding principle of Arab unity. In Baghdad idea of Kuwait's absorption long popular but politically conscious Iraqis and Qasim's many detractors probably view his posture as risky and perhaps absurd. At same time danger exists he may be committed to choice between eventual resort to force or heavy loss of prestige. Officially Iraqi Foreign Minister has assured us Iraq has no intention using force. In Kuwait, Ruler enjoying full popular support in his professed determination preserve Kuwait's independence.
In past 24 hours there have been rumors of threatening Iraqi troop movements. While these not confirmed, British now deeply concerned and feel obliged take steps preparatory meeting their obligations to Kuwait. British spokesman has now admitted publicly Britain taking precautionary steps. British vessels and military equipment moving to Persian Gulf area, although British anxious to limit insofar as possible knowledge these movements.
US and UK in close consultation. US continues hope Arab states may play leading role in deterring Iraqis. Both UAR and Saudi Arabia obviously concerned prospect Iraqi absorption Kuwait and possible pre-emption Kuwaiti oil income, now approximately $400 million per annum. Consequently we have requested our Charge Jidda to consult immediately with King Saud and our Charge Cairo seek elucidation GUAR views at high level. Rusk
(1) Ruler of Kuwait has asked for UK military support.
(2) In response, UK making extensive deployments and by tomorrow expects to have forces in Kuwait or nearby capable of handling any Iraq move. "The Secretary-General of the United Nations is being informed.
"H.M.G. earnestly hope that the necessity to make use of its force will not arise. It is intended that it should be withdrawn as soon as the Ruler considers that the threat to the independence of Kuwait is over." (Telegram 2 from London, July 1; Department of State, Central Files, 686D.87/7-161)
Mountbatten told Admiral Smith UK proposes to inform UN Security Council when first troops go ashore. Utmost secrecy requested prior public announcement.
CINCNELM staff contacts indicate UK planners foresee no request for U.S. support initially, but a possible request for air logistic support in latter phases.
CINCNELM reaffirms previous recommendation that U.S. make no military deployment until assistance requested by UK.
Note: Additional deployment details available if desired tomorrow.
4. In the latter case, the presence in the area of "Solant Amity" 6. It emerged from the discussion this morning that the most useful help which the U.S. Navy could give us at the present moment would be if the U.S. destroyer at Bahrain (the other is believed to be at Aden) could proceed to the north of the gulf and make a reconnaissance to see whether there are any signs of Iraqi maritime activities. The reason for this is that there are twelve motor torpedo boats, some with partly Russian crews, at Basra at the moment and reports of Iraqi troops being sent to Fao which may indicate the intention of the Iraqis to embark on some maritime adventure. Our own naval forces in the area are still rather thin and reconnaissance by the U.S. destroyer could be of great help--particularly if at the same time the second destroyer were to be moved round to Bahrain from Aden. Unless you see objection please mention this matter to Mr. Rusk and suggest that if the U.S. authorities were agreeable, the U.S. naval authorities on the spot should discuss the matter with flag officer Middle East at Bahrain.
After receipt of the message from Lord Home (Document 77), at 5 p.m. on July 2, 1961, Washington time, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Burke directed a 24-hour delay on any new orders for the Solant Amity forces and specifically ordered no patrol or other commitment for any U.S. ships. (Operations/Military Policy Matters, J-3/J-5 Directorates, July 3; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Kuwait, 6/61-7/61) At 12:52 p.m. on July 3, Secretary Rusk told British Ambassador Caccia over the telephone that in view of the British military buildup and developments in the area, the United States was inclined to disengage U.S. forces headed for Kuwait. At 2:20 p.m. that day, Rusk told Deputy Defense Secretary Gilpatric during a telephone conversation that chances were high that the United States would suggest to the British that the United States stand down Solant Amity because of the British military buildup and Iraqi statements regarding a peaceful settlement. At 4:02 p.m., Caccia thanked Rusk over the telephone for all the United States had done and said that because of the improved situation the United Kingdom no longer considered it necessary for Solant Amity to continue toward Bahrain. At 4:19 p.m., Rusk telephoned Clifton to inform President Kennedy that Solant Amity had been turned around in full coordination with the British Government. (Memoranda of telephone conversations; Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
PARTICIPANTS The Secretary asked Ambassador Caccia about the situation in Kuwait. The Ambassador said the UK has an interest in leaving Kuwait as soon as the Ruler of Kuwait feels that he is safe. He said it was going to be difficult to find a means of creating a secure situation permitting withdrawal, at any rate before the Iraq national holiday (July 14). Ambassador Alphand suggested the possibility that Kassim might nationalize the IPC. Ambassador Caccia expressed appreciation for United States support in the UN on the Kuwait issue.
Between July 2 and 7, 1961, the U.N. Security Council met to consider a July 1 Kuwaiti complaint to the Security Council that Iraq was threatening Kuwait's territorial independence and an Iraqi complaint delivered on July 2 that the United Kingdom posed an armed threat to Iraq's independence and security. After a discussion of the issues involved, the United Kingdom on July 6 submitted a draft resolution that called upon all states to respect Kuwait's independence and territorial integrity, urged that all concerned work for peace and tranquility in the area, and agreed to keep the situation under review. The United Arab Republic objected to the United Kingdom's draft on the basis that it did not provide for the withdrawal of British forces, and consequently submitted its own draft resolution urging that the question be solved by peaceful means and calling for an immediate withdrawal of British forces from Kuwait.
On July 7, the Council voted 7 in favor, 1 opposed, with 3 abstentions on the U.K. draft resolution. Because the negative vote came from the Soviet Union, a permanent member of the Security Council, the draft resolution failed of adoption. The Council then voted on the draft of the United Arab Republic, 3 in favor, 0 against, with 8 abstentions. This draft resolution also failed of adoption because it did not obtain the required 7 affirmative votes. The United States voted in favor of the United Kingdom's draft resolution and abstained on that of the United Arab Republic.
During the discussion, the U.S. Representative affirmed that the United States regarded Kuwait as a sovereign independent state and supported Kuwait's desire to remain free and independent. Documentation relating to U.S. involvement in the Security Council debate, including instructions sent to the Mission to the United Nations, negotiations relating to the draft resolutions, and texts of U.S. statements are in Department of State, Central Files 786D.00, 786D.022, and 686D.87. See also Supplement, the compilation on Kuwait.
PARTICIPANTS The Saudi Ambassador reminded the President that they had met on two previous occasions, at a hospital in New York when Prince Faisal was a patient and then in the Senate after Mr. Kennedy had made a speech favoring negotiations for Algerian independence. The President recalled both occasions and commented he had been particularly grateful for the Saudi King's message after his Algerian speech as one of the few really cordial responses to what had not been a very popular speech here.
Referring to other aspects of relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States the President said he understood that the Ambassador had been informed of United States' readiness to fulfill the conditions of the agreement for sale of United States military equipment to Saudi Arabia. Mr. Talbot confirmed that the Ambassador had met with the Secretary yesterday When the President saw the Saudi Arabian Ambassador on Friday, July 7, the Ambassador asked about availabilities of various items of military equipment included in two recently submitted Saudi Arabian arms purchase requests. The President told the Ambassador that we would try to give him an answer before the Ambassador leaves on July 11.
Secretary Rusk had earlier told the Ambassador that the United States was prepared to sell to Saudi Arabia, in accordance with the 1957 Dhahran Airfield arrangements, those items on the Saudi Arabian arms purchase lists which were consistent with the jointly developed force goals plan for Saudi Arabia known as the "1380 Plan" and subject to availabilities. Following the President's discussion with the Ambassador, the Department of State discussed the lists further with appropriate officers of the Department of Defense. A message was subsequently sent to the Chief of the United States Military Training Mission in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, requesting his determination on the compatibility of the items included in the Saudi Arabian lists with the Tables of Organization and Equipment of the "1380 Plan." Such a determination is necessary in order to allow the Department of Defense to process the lists. A reply is now being awaited.
A preliminary examination of the lists by Departments of State and Defense officials suggests that most of the land forces equipment included thereon is compatible with the "1380 Plan." The Plan is vague with respect to Air Force equipment, however, and there is some question whether the F-100's and the B-57's which the Saudi Arabians wish to purchase may be regarded as compatible. The views of the Chief of the United States Military Training Mission have also been sought on this matter.
The Department of Defense was unable to state which items on the lists are in fact available, and indicated that the lists would have to be sent to the respective military services which would in turn determine availabilities. The Department of Defense estimated that it may take from six weeks to six months to determine definitively which items on the very extensive Saudi Arabian arms purchase lists are available and to send the customary Letters of Offer to the Saudi Arabian Embassy. Deliveries will vary with the equipment, but it is estimated they will take a minimum of eight months and in some cases longer.
Assistant Secretary Talbot has today conveyed this information to the Saudi Arabian Ambassador. Department officers observed Iraq most unlikely agree to UN observers on its territory, Soviets and possibly UAR might support Iraqi objection, and if this element included in eventual proposal to SC it would probably be regarded as "gimmick" designed insure defeat UN presence plan.
Other possibilities canvassed by Dean were replacement of UK forces by a strong UN contingent or a political settlement, neither of which seemed practicable to him. According to Dean, London has not yet reacted to his proposals.
Dean considers Cairo may be key to Kuwait problem. Question is whether UK can get UAR agreement to satisfactory arrangement. British intend reduce forces in Kuwait substantially but still uncertain to what level. Dean of personal opinion retention of small symbolic force would be adequate but he uncertain of London's view.
Your comments welcome.
FYI. Apparent from conversation that UK concerned at political, military and financial problems created by move into Kuwait and anxious find way out, at same time retaining freedom of action to protect Kuwaiti independence in future. We have been quietly encouraging UN presence idea. USG continues full political support to UK on this issue, but desires avoid sharing responsibility as well as role of go-between with Arabs (except Saudi Arabia) on behalf of UK. End FYI.
Rusk
Referring at the outset to the current tenor of Arab public comment on refugees, excerpts from some of the most vitriolic and unyielding of which she had listed on a piece of paper and handed me, Mrs. Meir took the line that in the circumstances the Israelis did not anticipate that any gesture or initiative they might be prepared to take at this time would elicit any useful Arab response. Mrs. Meir went on to say that she had hoped that the President's letters to the Arab leaders and the latters' response might reveal some reason to anticipate Arab cooperation on this problem and that in that event or if we were in a position on the basis of other information to tell the Israelis that we had reason to divine some movement in the Arab position then Israel would be disposed to be helpful. In its absence the Israelis are reluctant at the moment to envisage any step which would only be rebuffed in this matter which is of such vital security concern to Israel.
There followed a long exposition of the steps Israel feels it has already taken in the past to solve the refugee problem notably that she originally permitted some 40,000 Arabs to return to Israel in 1949, that she has subsequently made an offer to accept another large number in the context of a peace settlement and finally that despite the absence of such a settlement and the fact that the Arabs still consider themselves at war the Israelis have released to the refugees a number of blocked financial accounts. Emphasizing Israel's critical defense position and the security aspects of the admission of any appreciable number of refugees, Mrs. Meir noted that the Arab population here now amounts to some 12 per cent of the total. She also professed to be apprehensive that the return flow of refugees could not effectively be stopped at any given figure and that pressures would arise to increase any number agreed upon. She made a major point of the uncertainties involved in the phrase "free choice" which she said Israel is being urged to offer the refugees. She was unable to accept the theory that any choice could really be free in the absence of a change in the Arab point of view which in her opinion meant in the absence of a peace settlement. She appreciated that the President in his conversation with Ben-Gurion had been fully cognizant of the necessity to safeguard Israel's security but could not see how that could be accomplished.
I argued along line of the Department's thinking emphasizing the psychological contribution of some initiative at an appropriate time to demonstrate again Israel's reasonableness on this issue with a view to the coming General Assembly and more generally to improve Israel's image in this respect world-wide. I similarly confirmed our concern for Israel's security problem and the fact that we are fully conscious that any steps taken should not prejudice Israel's justifiable security apprehensions.
The essence of Mrs. Meir's thought and that of her colleagues did not emerge from the matter of argumentation with complete clarity. However, she seemed to me to place major store by the necessity for Israel of having a complete scenario as to where an initiative would lead in the end before Israel would consider embarking on such a course. She was deaf to suggestions that a small step might lead in a desirable direction and could be safe-guarded against damaging Israel's position in the absence of Arab responsiveness. She reverted as a basic concept to the theory that the correct procedure is still to endeavor to negotiate a peace settlement as a whole after which or as a part of which the refugee problem would solve itself. She repeatedly reiterated Israel's willingness to sit down at the conference table with Arabs which she felt is sufficiently demonstrative of Israel's good will.
I appreciate that this conversation probably served little to advance us in the desirable direction of this problem and I do not believe that the attitude expressed can be described as encouraging, perhaps [garble] because it is my understanding that the cabinet had considered the problem at length the day before and the Foreign Minister's thinking no doubt reflects the government's current view. However, as indicated previously I think it unrealistic to anticipate any important progress until after the elections and I am consequently not particularly surprised at the views expressed on this occasion. Pursuant to our conversation on July 10, 2. Tranquility Urged. Partly in an effort to forestall United States initiatives, Arab representatives in their contacts with officials of the new administration urged that the relative tranquility which has prevailed in the Near East during the past two or three years should be preserved. Israeli representatives made similar recommendations, based largely on the fact that under conditions of calm Israel has been making tremendous economic strides. For our part, we were preoccupied with the Congo, Cuba and Laos. We thus happily concurred in not stirring up the Near East.
3. Disquieting Developments. In March and April three developments disturbed Arabs:
a. Loan to Israel. At a Presidential press conference on March 15 it was announced that Israel was receiving a $25,000,000 Eximbank line of credit. c. UNRWA Debate. Inconsistent with their exhortations to us not to take any initiatives, the Arabs sought at the General Assembly this spring to inject a highly controversial concept in a UN resolution concerning the Arab refugees, i.e. the establishment of a UN custodian for Arab properties left in Israel. Arab representatives obviously wished to make a test case of their voting strength in the expanded General Assembly. Had they succeeded a whole series of anti-Israel moves could be expected. Despite our urgings that new controversial elements should be deferred to the general review of the refugee problem scheduled at the General Assembly this fall, the Arabs pressed for a vote. They did not achieve the required two-thirds UNGA majority. Their defeat was naturally, and with good reason, attributed to United States opposition.
b. UNGA Wrangling. The more than one million Arab refugees are being cared for by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). Inevitably the annual discussion of the UNRWA report at UNGA results in Arab-Israel wrangling, as it did this past spring. Inevitably too the United States is a scapegoat. Ambassador Stevenson was particularly concerned this spring when Arab displeasure produced anti-American votes on major issues such as Cuba.
c. XVIth UNGA. Pursuant to a resolution of two years ago, the UNGA will this fall review the whole refugee problem with a view to deciding on the future of UNRWA. Progress on the refugee problem before this fall's debate would assist greatly in reducing acrimony.
d. Reconstitution of PCC. Unless some progress is made on the refugee problem, it is almost a foregone conclusion that the Arabs will seek to promote a reconstitution of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. Some Arab spokesmen are advocating reconstitution along "troika" lines. By the very nature of things a Commission less friendly to Israel is apt to recommend proposals unpleasant to Israel and difficult for us.
e. Congress. In the absence of progress toward a solution of the refugee problem, Congress is apt to curtail funds for UNRWA which depends on us for 70 per cent of its governmental contributions. The collapse of UNRWA could easily result in political turmoil in the Near East, including perhaps an upheaval in Jordan. This would be to the detriment of United States interests and to the benefit of Soviet interests.
f. Domestic Expectations. Inasmuch as Israel's many friends in this country were expecting specific action by the new administration, the approach to the Arab refugee problem could be cited as a step toward tackling the key obstacle to an Arab-Israel settlement.
5. Ben Gurion Complication. It was at a critical juncture that President Ben Gurion decided to visit the United States. The Department feared the visit would clinch Arab suspicions that the new administration was pro-Israeli. Our effectiveness would accordingly be limited in dealing with the Arab world. More specifically, the Arabs would suspect any approach to the refugee problem to be the product of alleged collusion with Israel on the part of the new administration. For these reasons the Department opposed the timing of the Ben Gurion visit. When it was decided that the visit would take place, the Department hoped to convert a potential minus into a plus, e.g. your speaking to Ben Gurion about Israel's cooperation with the refugee approach.
6. The Letters. It was at this point that the Department, after obtaining the concurrence of our posts abroad, proposed the letters to Arab leaders. As suggested in a covering memorandum to you dated May 6, b. To make clear our impartiality in Arab-Israel matters,
c. To demonstrate our support for the PCC refugee approach, and
d. To cushion the effects of the Ben Gurion visit.
7. Arab Reactions. Because of deep Arab bitterness over Palestine and because Arab leaders would assume that replies to your letters would eventually be published, it was not unexpected that the Arab responses would feature restatement of Arab grievances against Israel. It was significant, however, that in general the public reaction in the Arab countries was mild and moderate, obviously in accordance with government wishes. Furthermore, we have reports that at a conference of Arab Foreign Ministers in Cairo it was decided that: a) propaganda replies would be sent, but b) the Arabs would see what the PCC approach had to offer. While varying in tone and in content, Arab responses to date bear out these reports.
8. Iraq's Qassim. Among President Qassim's eccentricities is his attitude toward Israel. A veteran of the Palestine war, he is reported to have shown a visitor as long as two years ago a medal which he has had struck for bestowal on future Iraqi heroes recovering Palestine from the Israelis. With regard to your letter, he has indicated publicly that no reply was requested and none will be sent. He obviously realizes that accepting the PCC approach implies an Arab willingness to coexist with Israel. Fortunately, he is alone thus far in taking this totally uncooperative position.
9. Jordan's Hussein. In his lengthy and rambling reply King Hussein condemns both Communism and what the Arabs describe as the Palestine "injustice". 13. Israeli Reactions. Just prior to President Ben Gurion's arrival we informed Ambassador Harman of the gist of your letters to the Arab leaders. a. US Policy. You have placed clearly on the record the desire of this government to maintain friendly and fruitful relations with the Arab states. While because of their sensitivities and suspicions, they were bound to emphasize their views concerning Palestine, there can be little doubt that they inwardly welcome the broad outline of our policies as set forth in your letter. Moreover, it will be possible for us at all times in the future to indicate that early in your administration the hand of friendship was extended to the Arabs.
c. Refugee Approach. Had your letters not been sent, it is likely that the Ben Gurion visit would have wrecked all chances for success of the PCC refugee approach. There is general agreement that prospects are slim at best and only limited progress may be achieved. By showing that the United States is prepared to back efforts along lines which include Arab hopes for some repatriation, the United States places on the Arab leaders the onus for the lack of progress. Unless they act responsibly, their position in future UN debates will be awkward.
d. Cushion. There is no doubt your letters helped to forestall a major Arab uproar over the Ben Gurion visit. When the Israeli Prime Minister came here a year ago, the press in the Middle East was extremely hostile to the United States and Arab diplomats came to the Department en bloc to voice their concern that his visit would impair Arab-US relations. In large part because of your letters, the Ben Gurion visit passed this year with almost unbelievably mild reactions in the Near East and without damage to basic US-Arab relationships.
15. Whither? We see no need for further exchanges with the Arab leaders at this time. In view of the harshness of King Saud's letter, you and we have already spoken rather sternly to the Saudi Ambassador. Assistant Secretary Talbot on July 10 Dean Rusk
On July 14, 1961, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Armin Meyer transmitted to Myer Feldman a list of "Incentives for Movement on the Palestine Refugee Problem," under cover of a transmittal note that reads: "Pursuant to our telephone conversation of July 14, I hope the attached list of incentives, from the Israeli standpoint, will be helpful to you and to the President in persuading Israel's friends of the importance of making progress on the Arab refugee problem." (Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/7-1861)
The list reads as follows:
"1. Dispose of issue re which Israel is most vulnerable to criticism.
"2. Solution of refugee problem is sine qua non for Israel's acceptance in Middle East.
"3. Eliminate annual hassle at UNGA, detrimental to Israel (and U.S.).
"4. Ward off reconstitution of PCC (troika or otherwise unfavorable).
"5. Forestall series of increasingly anti-Israel moves at UNGA (cf. Algeria).
"6. Forestall, specifically, acrimonious debate at forthcoming XVI UNGA.
"7. Dramatize Israel's peace protestations.
"8. Improve Israel's international image especially vis-à-vis Afro-Asian states.
"9. Take edge off atomic reactor, rocket and Jordan water issues.
"10. Reduce Near East tension and hopefully arms burden.
"11. Avoid area turmoil if UNRWA collapses.
"12. Place onus of failure on Arabs.
"13. Show cooperation with new U.S. administration.
"14. Take advantage of U.S. willingness to finance refugee solution."
A copy of the list was also transmitted to McGeorge Bundy under cover of a July 18 memorandum from Battle. (Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/7-1861)
Others present were:
G--Mr. Johnson In a brief introduction, Mr. Talbot identified the principal elements in the Rationale, including the strategic role of the Near East, the emotional drive toward Arab unity, the problems of orderly economic and social development in a feudal society in transition, etc. He warned that the present calm of the Near East was more apparent than real, since within the next two years Israel will have the capacity to draw Jordan waters, its technical advance will further disturb the Arabs and the refugee problem will call for major review.
The more important points raised in the wide ranging discussion that followed were these:
(1) Our bargaining power with the Arabs is increasing as world supplies of oil are growing and alternative sources of fuel develop. But this will pose serious problems of readjustment within the Arab states and in our future relations with them.
(2) Although the continuing tribal and quasi-feudal social structure in the Near East differentiates it from Latin America, it cannot be ruled out that soon we will have to develop a policy less exclusively concerned with government and more designed to identify us with popular demands.
(3) The paragraphs concerning the use of force (5) The anomalous position of Israel was commented upon, a country receiving DLF and other forms of assistance even though its per capita income is higher than that of many parts of Europe. Disparities in income within the area as between Israel and Jordan or the oil-producing states and the UAR were important sources of regional tensions. It was suggested that regional economic organization might help reduce these disparities. Pressure may have to be put on Israel to cause her to act in a responsible way. We should bear in mind that the freedom of action of the USG is not as limited by the supporters of Israel in this country as we sometimes think and we should act accordingly.
(6) Arab neutralism was seen as a short run nuisance but a long run asset, with much flexibility within it which might be utilized to our advantage.
On July 20, 1961, the Arab League Council passed a Saudi-proposed resolution on Kuwait. Its principal points include: (a) Kuwait will ask for the withdrawal of British troops as soon as possible, (b) Iraq should undertake not to use force in connection with Kuwait, (c) any Kuwait desire to unite or federate with Arab League member states should be supported, (d) welcoming Kuwait's membership in the Arab League and (e) promising Arab states' support for Kuwait's application for UN membership, and (f) stating that the Arab League will take "practical assistance" to safeguard Kuwait's independence. The Iraqi delegate stalked out of the Arab League meeting when Kuwait was admitted. There is no indication, however, that Iraq will withdraw permanently from the League, although it may keep its participation in suspense for a time. With respect to the "practical assistance" cited above, Secretary General Hassouna is reportedly planning to explore this matter and will shortly visit Arab capitals with a view to ascertaining the possibility of obtaining Arab troop contingents to replace the British troops in Kuwait. Thus, the search for an "Arab solution" to the Kuwait problem appears to be progressing satisfactorily. Such a solution should provide the British with a convenient peg on which to hang troop withdrawal. While Kuwaiti membership in the Arab League has not caused Iraq to drop its claim and is not likely to do so, it should prevent any overt action by Iraq.
The foregoing developments are in line with the view expressed by the American Consul in Kuwait (Kuwait's 26) You may wish to explore the foregoing with the British (Greenhill) in the next few days. |
