Documents 122-144
2. There are contingency plans for supporting Iran "against internal strife or attack from other Middle East countries--up to two divisions plus with commensurate air and naval forces." But these don't meet our problem.
Obviously new plans are urgently needed. And we do not need to make the policy decisions (as State memorandum suggests), before embarking on such planning, because only after initial feasibility studies are prepared will we know whether effective U.S. counter moves are feasible.
Ergo, ISA is requesting JCS to do pronto such a feasibility study on nuclear or non-nuclear support of Iran (I gave two-week deadline).
/3/ /3/On October 7, Secretary of Defense McNamara requested the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare "a study of the capability of the United States, in light of worldwide commitments, to conduct a limited war against the Soviet Union in Iran, with and without the use of nuclear weapons." On October 20, Lemnitzer forwarded to McNamara the JCS Study on Contingency Planning for Iran (JCSM-741-61). Both documents are in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Iran 000.1--1961. See Supplement, the compilation on Iran. We also have working group of Iran TF studying a range of actions designed to deter Soviets from moving in the first place (see last para. of State memo)./4/ Will continue pushing forward on both mentioned above. /4/Document 121. Bob Komer
123. National Intelligence Estimate
Washington, October 5, 1961.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files. [classification marking not declassified] According to a note on the cover sheet: "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the AEC." All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.The Problem
To assess the outlook for Israel over the next two or three years.
1. The recent elections in Israel did not produce any significant change in the political situation. While the socialist Mapai party, dominated by Ben Gurion, lost a few seats in the parliament, it will remain the key political element over the next few years. We foresee no change in the pattern of its forming coalitions with lesser parties to govern the country. Nor do we foresee any significant diminution of Ben Gurion's power so long as he remains active. His death would precipitate a contest for power in the Mapai party, but we believe the main lines of Israeli domestic and foreign policy would remain essentially unchanged. (Paras. 9-13)
2. Israel's economy continues to grow at an impressive rate, but its substantial adverse trade balance will continue to keep Israel heavily dependent on private and governmental aid from abroad. The sharp diminution of West Germany's reparations and restitution payments over the next few years will probably cause some cutback in investment and development, in spite of Israeli efforts to increase the contributions of world Jewry and to attract foreign industrial investment. (Paras. 15-17)
3. There has been no improvement in Arab-Israeli relations. Sporadic border incidents are likely. Israel's plans to divert substantial amounts of Jordan waters to the Negev and the Israeli nuclear program will continue to cause much apprehension among Arab leaders, and could lead to forceful action. If the breakup of the UAR following the 28 September revolution in Syria does not lead to turmoil on Israel's borders, we foresee no significant immediate impact on Israel. We believe, however, that Israel will be able to maintain its military superiority over its Arab neighbors--a superiority which the Arabs recognize and which inhibits deliberate attack on Israel. Moreover, reluctance to provoke great power reactions inhibits Israel's undertaking preventive war. Primarily for these reasons, we consider the chances of a third round of major hostilities to be less than even. (Paras. 27, 33-35)
4. [13 lines of source text not declassified]
5. Israel's foreign policy will remain based principally on its need for strong support from the West, particularly the US and France. With two and a half million Jews in the USSR, Israel will endeavor to keep its relations with the USSR at least correct. It will attempt to preserve good relations with non-Arab Middle Eastern countries, e.g., Turkey and Iran. Israel will pursue an active program of aid to certain African and Asian countries and will seek US cooperation in this field. (Paras. 38-41, 43-44)
[Here follow 7-1/2 pages of the Discussion section. See Supplement, the compilation on Israel.]
124. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy
Recognition of the New Syrian Government, Establishment of an Embassy, and Designation of a Charg? d'Affaires ad interim
The new government in Syria has requested the recognition of the United States. We are confident that it meets the standard requirements for recognition; it is in firm control of the country, has widespread popular support, and has announced its intention to fulfill Syria's international obligations.
/2/ Although the United Arab Republic has requested that recognition by the United States be delayed, there have been indications in the past two days of increasing flexibility on the part of the United Arab Republic. In a speech on October 5, President Nasser declared that he had instructed the representative of the United Arab Republic at the United Nations not to oppose Syrian membership in the United Nations/3/ and that he would not oppose Syrian acceptance by the Arab League, but the United Arab Republic would not recognize Syria until "a free Syrian will" had expressed itself. The way to recognition of Syria by Arab states and others may, therefore, have been opened. We have informed the United Arab Republic that we desire to consult with it prior to granting recognition to Syria, and we would wish to do so in the relatively near future. /2/These criteria were listed in a memorandum from Legal Adviser Chayes to Talbot, October 5. (Ibid.: Lot 62 D 29, Recognition of S.A.R.) See Supplement, the compilation on Syria. /3/A memorandum from Secretary Rusk to President Kennedy, sent on October 6, discussed the various aspects of the problem of Syrian membership in the United Nations. (Department of State, Central Files, 786B.00/10-661) See Supplement, the compilation on Syria. While we believe that in deference to the desirability of preserving an acceptable state of relations with the United Arab Republic, we should not hasten under present circumstances to recognize Syria, we desire stand-by authorization to proceed with recognition (a) should the Soviet Union modify its cautious posture and extend recognition, or (b) whenever other Arab states have recognized, or (c) whenever the Department finds that it is in the interest of the United States to grant recognition and that it can be done without serious strain on our relations with the United Arab Republic.Therefore, we recommend (1) that you grant stand-by authority for the extension of de jure recognition to the Government of Syria, (2) that you authorize the Department to establish an Embassy at Damascus concurrently with the extension of de jure recognition, and (3) that you authorize the Department to designate Consul General Ridgway B. Knight as Charg? d'Affaires ad interim at such time as an Embassy is established.
/4/ /4/A note attached to the source text from Manfull to Korn, dated October 9, indicates that Bromley Smith conveyed to Meyer on October 7 President Kennedy's approval of the recommendations contained in the last paragraph of this memorandum. He also requested that the Department of State inform the White House before definitive recognition measures were taken. Also, during the evening of October 7 in Cairo, Ambassador Badeau delivered President Kennedy's recognition message to Nasser, who expressed appreciation for being informed, for canceling the Sixth Fleet visit to Beirut, and for the judicious U.S. approach to the recognition question. (Telegram 661 from Cairo, October 7; Department of State, Central Files, 786B.00/10-761) See Supplement, the compilation on Syria. The U.S. recognition note was delivered to the Syrian Government on October 10. (Telegram 165 from Damascus, October 10; Department of State, Central Files, 783.02/10-1061) Dean Rusk/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.125. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant and Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy and Rostow)
Washington, October 10, 1961.
[Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, Vol. II. Top Secret. Portions of this 2-page document on U.S. policy toward Syria were released too late to be included in this volume. The declassified text will be included in the Supplement, the compilation on Syria.]
126. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations
As long as present Arab moderation continues Dept believes threats re possible cessation of UNRWA should be avoided. At same time, it is too early categorically to commit USG to UNRWA's extension. In any case, before this done full approval must be obtained from various interested parties within USG.
Tentatively, Dept believes best tactic would be for Johnson tell Arabs that he would be prepared press USG to agree appropriate extension of UNRWA if they would support longer range mandate for a special representative, would sincerely cooperate with him, and would not press controversial issues in GA which could prejudice atmosphere conducive to constructive progress on this question.
As regards PCC report scheduled be released fifteenth, we are satisfied that present language should go long way deny either party basis for contentious statements. We will wish consider carefully whether a further PCC report will be desirable just prior opening of GA debate. Any final judgment on this matter must be deferred pending completion present phase Johnson mission and reaction of parties. Assuming that Johnson's findings are received reasonably and favorably by parties concerned, there may be advantage to following up this report with second PCC report which would contain recommendations for continuation of Special Representative on long-term basis, and call for continuation of international assistance to Arab refugees (without specifying UNRWA).
If we can proceed on this basis, we may perhaps be able this year to achieve reasonably non-contentious and non-recriminatory debate with action moving along above lines. This will depend, of course on whether all-out campaign for such concepts as custodianship can be avoided.
Re Syrian factor, Dept understands SAR being informed by appropriate UN authorities of Johnson's mission and his availability for discussion. Unless Kuzbari on own initiative requests Johnson come to Damascus Dept prefers his contacts be made with SAR reps at UN.
In its contacts with Johnson, USUN should continue make clear to Johnson Dept's deep appreciation for his good work to date and express hope that his proven talents will continue to be available for this challenging task.
Ball
127. Report by the Chairman of the Iran Task Force (Talbot)
Mr. Bundy's memorandum of August 7, 1961,/2/ reflected the President's concern as to whether the United States was doing all that it could or should in pursuit of the policies laid down in the original Task Force report on Iran. Since receipt of this memorandum, the Task Force has met a number of times. Ambassador Holmes has returned for consultation to participate actively in the Task Force's work. There has been a full and free exchange of opinions and analyses, not only of the present situation but of possible courses of action. /2/Document 94.
It has emerged from the Task Force's deliberations that there is no significant divergence of opinion as regards United States objectives vis-?-vis Iran. To prevent Soviet domination of Iran must be our immediate and overriding objective. This requires the continuance in power of a pro-Western regime, for the ultimate alternative is a weak neutralist government which could not withstand Soviet pressures and maintain Iran's independence. Maintenance of the pro-Western regime has been achieved and is not immediately endangered. Prime Minister Amini has succeeded in overcoming a near-crisis situation and thus continuing Iran's pro-Western policy. He has, however, been unable fully to pursue his program of vigorous reform measures designed to lead to a more permanent resolution of the political weaknesses of Iran.
He has had to take into account the necessity of retaining the confidence and support of his somewhat reluctant monarch. He has been faced with political pressures from the fanatical Mosadeqist opposition, and the sniping of ambitious and discontented conservative leaders. The implementation of the economic stabilization program has intensified these difficulties by infringing the interests of various special groups. The basic inadequacy of the administrative tools available to him, which can be improved only slowly, have further limited his freedom to action.
The first Task Force report stressed that the United States must actively and vigorously, albeit discreetly, press for political, economic, social and institutional reforms in Iran which will provide the indispensable foundation for true and lasting political-economic development. It is generally agreed that the Third Development Plan scheduled to begin in September 1962 must be the primary vehicle to initiate the fundamental political and economic progress needed in Iran. It is equally agreed that the intervening period will be one of critical importance in laying the necessary foundation for the implementation of this third Five-Year Plan.
I have found a consensus within the Task Force that additional United States resources will be required to enable the Amini Government, or a like-minded successor, to surmount the political and economic difficulties which it will face between now and the initiation of the Third Development Plan.
We have agreed with the Agency for International Development on the general levels of United States financial resources required for this purpose, and action is going forward to make them available through appropriate means and at the necessary times. The Ambassador, with the advice and assistance of the Country Team, has worked out a Military Assistance Plan for FY 1962-67 which he believes to be militarily and economically consonant with basic United States interests and through which we can hope to maintain our influence with the Shah and hence be in a position to attain our objectives. The plan is currently being studied by State and Defense in the context of a review of our over-all MAP policies.
A great deal of the Task Force's efforts have been devoted to discussing alternative means to ensure that the introduction of these resources best accomplishes United States objectives, not only our immediate aim of maintaining a pro-Western government but our longer-term goal of laying the political and economic groundwork for the successful implementation of the Third Plan. Basically, two schools of thought emerge: One advocates an openly activist role for the United States; this would involve the tying of United States aid to formal and perhaps public commitments on the part of Iran to perform certain actions designed to correct specific deficiencies and weaknesses in the political and economic fabric of Iranian society. The countervailing view holds that the same objectives, given the complexities and fragility of Iranian society, would be better accomplished by the private and discreet exercise of United States influence and pressure.
As Chairman of the Task Force, I have carefully considered all of the arguments presented by the members of the Task Force, and have carefully weighed the potential implications of each against the realities of the Iranian scene as presented by our Ambassador, the other members of the Country Team, and our own Iranian experts. I have consulted closely with the Secretary and my other colleagues in the Department. I have concluded that the risks to the maintenance of a pro-Western regime in Iran posed by insisting upon formal and overt United States conditions for the giving of aid are greater than we could prudently accept. Either approach is fully consistent, in my opinion, with the philosophy of the new aid program. However, the first, by seeking the long-term objective through too direct an approach, runs too great a risk of upsetting the delicate balance which Prime Minister Amini has succeeded in creating and maintaining. Given the framework within which the Iranian Government must operate, counter-pressures would be produced which could easily result in the loss of Iran to the West.In my opinion, the correct course for the United States to follow under the present circumstance is to move towards its goals by combining vigorous but discreet political and economic advice with the minimum economic assistance essential to enable the Amini Government, or a like-minded successor, to survive and to move forward. The judicious and vigorous application of encouragement, support and pressure through multiple channels can be effectively directed to influencing those areas where progress is realizable at any given moment rather than relying on formal assurances or promises which may prove to be empty. In this context, United States or international assistance will be utilized to stimulate self-help moves on the part of the Iranian regime. Influence exerted in this way can be far more effective than open threats that we will cut off aid to Iran.
As Iran moves towards the implementation of the Third Plan, we will wish to draw in multilateral influences which can be brought to bear through an international consortium of lenders. We hope by then there will have been enough progress to permit the more overt exercise of outside influence, perhaps to the point of establishing some public contract arrangement with the Iranian Government in return for the major international assistance which will then become necessary. In the interim, our influence in the direction of helping Iran move from the present delicate stage to a position of readiness to enter upon the Third Plan can best be brought to bear quietly. Now we must act unilaterally and discreetly.
Ambassador Holmes fully concurs in this course of action, and believes that the additional instruments of pressure and influence which we have worked out with the AID, and which he has requested in the field of Military Assistance, will be the best means to make further progress toward our objectives.
Set forth as Annex "A" are the basic elements of the action program which the Ambassador has pursued in consequence of the Iran Task Force recommendations of May, and which he proposes to intensify during the period between now and the end of the Second Development Plan. In doing so he proposes specifically to address himself to the goals set forth in Annex "B".
This memorandum is in response to Mr. Bundy's memorandum of August 7, 1961.
Phillips Talbot
Annex A
Pursuant to the Iran Task Force Recommendations approved by the President on May 16, 1961,/3/ and under the direction of Ambassador Holmes, the following progress has been made as a result of the continual encouragement, support, and pressure exerted by the United States Government through all its various instruments: /3/For the Recommendations section of the Task Force report, see Document 51. The draft of the complete Task Force report, dated May 15, is in the Supplement, the compilation on Iran. 1. Reversal of Trend Toward Disunification
The new government has survived all the early challenges to its power. It has halted a twenty-year trend to disunification and is actively laying the groundwork for meaningful political, social, and economic advance. The guidance, support and pressure of the United States have been an indispensable element in these developments. What remains is to reverse long-term divisive trends and lay the foundations for a new political synthesis.
2. Movement of Shah Toward Constitutional Role
Although the Shah continues to exercise direct control over defense, he has come to share with the Prime Minister control over foreign affairs, the internal security functions of the Ministry of Interior and the secret police, and in all other fields of policy-making and administration has gone along with the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister exercises more freedom of action than has any of his predecessors since Mosadeq, although he has frequently admitted to the Ambassador that the Shah sometimes acquiesces only with reluctance. Largely as a result of United States representations the Shah has withdrawn publicly and privately from the politically exposed position which he has occupied for many years.
3. Expansion of Base of Political Support
When Amini took office, he was threatened with isolation and early collapse through the loss of the Shah's support, as well as the opposition of the military and urban mob. Amini is not a charismatic leader, but he has not only gained the support of the Shah, but has averted the danger of a military coup and has earned the cautious cooperation of the conservative and landowning elites. Although the Prime Minister is under continuous attack from some ambitious conservative leaders and some prominent business men who have been hurt by austerity programs, there is little unity in this opposition.
4. Fragmentation of National Front
In spite of the antipathy of the Imperial Court and the Army toward groups sympathetic to the ideas of former Prime Minister Mosadeq, with our encouragement the Prime Minister has made repeated personal efforts to enlist the support, or at least the toleration, of this embittered opposition grouping. However, the Mosadeqist leadership is still unwilling to settle for anything less than a controlling voice in the government, implying almost certainly a neutralist foreign policy, the exile of the Shah, and the denunciation of the 1954 Consortium Oil Agreement. In the light of this attitude, Amini has firmly but gently prevented this group from extending its organization or from organizing public demonstrations. It is still hostile and dangerous, particularly among students, but its top leaders have admitted that it is increasingly subject to internal quarrels, that its loose organization is falling apart, and that it has been unable to come up with concrete political or economic programs.
5. Reduction of Iranian Military Establishment
The size and expenditure levels of the Iranian military establishment have been held constant for the first time in a decade, and the trend toward increasing size and expense has been halted. For the first time in more than a decade, more senior officers are being retired than are being promoted, and a scheduled plan to weed out the incompetent top officers of the military establishment is well under way.
6. Maintenance of Pro-West Posture
In the face of a massive subversive Soviet propaganda campaign and recent Soviet threats, the Shah and the Prime Minister have continued to stand firm and to defy the USSR, despite the absence of strong support for Iran's present pro-Western alignment from any important Iranian power element other than the Army. Iran has behaved sensibly and helpfully in the delicate Kurdish, Kuwaiti, and Afghan-Pakistan crises.
7. Popularization of Government
The Prime Minister, unlike his predecessors, and despite the strain on his physique, is daily mingling with and speaking to groups of laborers, bazaar merchants, farmers, and students, attempting to convince them of his interest in their welfare and of the wisdom of the government's policies. This technique has probably been the reason for his success in holding off demands for wage increases, credit, and governmental expenditures which would otherwise have wrecked the difficult program of economic stabilization and austerity. Public trials of corrupt high officials have begun, strictly within the law, and the incidence of corruption in high levels of the administration has dropped very sharply. Through the press and radio, the Third Plan frame has been presented to the public for discussion and comment. A sensible though modest land distribution program of private estates has begun, and a major drive against illiteracy has been launched. With the assistance of PL 480 resources, winter relief programs for the unemployed are being worked out.
8. Adjustments in the Stabilization Program
Embassy and USOM have recognized the need for adjustments in the stabilization program given the current situation affecting the economy. Joint discussions with GOI officials have identified the elements of a revised stabilization program including: (a) revision of the credit ceiling, (b) a tightening of administrative controls in the banking system, and (c) establishment of priorities in the extension of further credit. There is informal agreement with IMF representation on both the need for and elements of a revision of the stabilization program. A letter from the IMF has been sent to the GOI (October 4) offering to consult formally on a revision of the program and preparatory discussions by United States representatives in Iran indicate that the GOI will invite further IMF review and consultation.
9. Establishment of Consolidated Budget and Budget Review Process
Following intensive consultations with United States officials, the Prime Minister has ordered the establishment of a consolidated budget and an improved budget review process. Plans to this effect have been completed by the Harvard Group and are now before the Cabinet. Separate interdepartmental working groups in the Iranian Government are preparing (a) a consolidated budget call and format for the Iranian fiscal year 1341 (March 1961-March 1963) which includes both the development and operating budgets of GOI agencies, (b) institutional changes for improved budget and fiscal controls, (c) forward projections of revenue prospects, and (d) new tax measures which could be immediately implemented. United States representatives in Tehran have made it absolutely clear that Iran must achieve a balanced operating budget for 1341 in order to accommodate to the early planned phase-out of emergency United States budgetary support.
10. Financial Planning
United States and Iranian officials have reviewed in detail the financial requirements and resources of the GOI to meet obligations for current on-going activities. The result of this review has pared GOI claims for external assistance for both the operating and development budgets from $130 million to a hard core requirement of $40 million ($15 million for the 1340 budget and $25 million for completion of Second Plan financing). Provision of this assistance is required if current progress affecting social and economic reforms is to be sustained.
In this field the United States has also pressed the GOI to review its external debt to determine whether consolidation and re-negotiation of short-term creditor claims is possible. We expect to move forward on this issue in concert with the IMF and the IBRD.
11. Implementation of Measures Essential to Completing the Second Plan and Launching the Third Plan
General areas requiring special preparatory action by the GOI in order to effectively mount the Third Development Plan have been jointly reviewed by Iran and United States representatives in Tehran. These areas were also reviewed with the IBRD in Washington during July 1961 by an Iran delegation with United States observer participation. In line with this exercise more specific prerequisite measures are now in preparation including: (a) identification of special statutory changes and authorizations which will be required, (b) analysis of the components of the Second Plan which will carry over into the Third Plan period, (c) new project development, including initiation of special surveys, (d) new institutional devices required to initiate Third Plan programs, and (e) review of the implementation potential of line ministries for executing new programs including prerequisite criteria affecting central program and fiscal control which have to be met prior to phased transfers of such responsibilities to line ministries. The Harvard Advisory Group is playing a major role in the implementation of these measures. A further review of progress of required Third Plan measures is already scheduled with an IBRD team prior to the end of this calendar year.
12. Contingency Planning for Economic Distress
Loss of confidence as a result of recent political disturbances had adversely affected levels of private economic activity with resulting slack in investment and employment. Part of this adjustment is healthy in eliminating wasteful speculative activities. However, restoration of private confidence is an essential element of forward economic and political progress. Interim measures addressed to this problem and now underway include: (a) initiation of labor intensive projects in the rural sector utilizing Food for Peace under a Title II, Section 202 program, (b) continuing joint review and appraisal of unemployment levels, and (c) interagency development of emergency labor intensive projects to be implemented in case of need for further special actions. The proposed revision of stabilization objectives also addresses this problem.
13. Long-Range Problems
Although the accomplishments of the past five months represent effective progress, the long-range problems of Iran remain deeply rooted and their resolution may require generations to achieve fully.
Annex B
Having helped the Amini Government to avert early dangers, the United States will now press toward the following long-range goals, the achievement of which will strengthen Iran against communist pressures.
1. The maintenance of an Iranian regime friendly to the West.
(a) Maintenance of the Shah's faith in his own mission and in the value of his pro-Western and anti-communist orientation.
(b) Withdrawal of the Shah from an exposed position of public responsibility for actions of the administration.
(c) Progressive delegation by the Shah to capable Prime Ministers of authority formerly wielded directly by him.
(d) Withdrawal of the Shah's family, private estates, and entourage from entanglements with private business activities.
(e) Dilution of the Shah's extreme distrust of independent political leaders and of his vulnerability to sycophancy.
(f) Direction of the Shah's attention away from technical military matters and toward important internal social and economic problems.
2. Bolstering the Iranian will and ability to resist Soviet pressures.
(a) Maintenance of a firm and non-provocative attitude toward the USSR.
(b) Reduction of neutralist sentiment.
(c) Continuation of internal security and increased respect for minority rights.
(d) Continuation of Iranian membership in CENTO.
(e) Settlement of outstanding disputes with neighboring non-communist states.
3. Broadening the political base of the Iranian government, halting disunifying trends, and developing channels of political articulation outside the existing elites and would-be elites.
(a) Inclusion of moderates of all types in the policy levels of the administration.
(b) Recognition of labor as an independent and respectable political force.
(c) Practical and non-destructive progress toward the distribution of landed estates to the peasantry, peasant education, and regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship.
(d) Governmental appeals for support directly to non-elite groups.
(e) Massive adult education campaigns.
(f) Strict prosecution of high officials guilty of corruption.
(g) Improvement of the standards of the civil service and the judiciary.
4. Developing the Iranian economy.
(a) Completion of the essential elements of the Second Plan.
(b) Implementation of a sensible Third Plan, financed by an international consortium, and directly supported by United States technical assistance.
(c) Enforcement of the Economic Stabilization Program, appropriately modified.
(d) Improved control and direction of government finances and private banking and credit.
(e) Revision of the tax and tax collection apparatus toward increased revenues and the promotion of social justice.
(f) Continued reliance on private enterprise as a major part of the development effort.
(g) Improvement of relations with Western oil interests and the maximization of oil revenues.
5. Improving the capability and popular acceptability of the Iranian military establishment.
(a) Reduction of the size and the local currency costs of the Iranian military establishment.
(b) Improvement of its morale and efficiency through MAP.
(c) Elimination of surplus and inefficient senior officers.
(d) Continued and expanded civil action and public relations programs.
(e) Expansion of vocational training within the armed forces.
6. The transformation of the urban middle class into a constructive force.
(a) Awareness on the part of its leaders that they and the Shah share the same basic goals.
(b) Willingness to share in responsibility for governmental policies which they cannot completely control.
(c) Appreciation of the practical difficulties of government.
(d) Greater awareness of the communist threat.
(e) Dilution of the tendency toward xenophobia.
128. National Security Action Memorandum No. 105
The Secretary of State
SUBJECT
Policy Toward Egypt and Syria
The President is greatly interested in what policy we should pursue, in the post-coup situation, toward both Egypt and the new Syrian regime. Is the at least temporary loss Nasser has sustained likely to lead him to turn his energies more inward and to create opportunities for bettering US-Egyptian relations via US development assistance?
With respect to Syria, what policy does the Department of State propose that we pursue toward the new regime? What is our estimate of its staying power? Should we undertake any special measures to encourage its apparent pro-Western tendencies or would such measures be likely to be counter-productive?
A report, and if indicated a program of action, is requested by October 30, 1961.
/2/ /2/On November 3, in a status report to Bundy and Rostow covering several subjects, Komer explained that the response to NSAM No. 105 was still pending, while other agencies cleared the Department of State paper. Komer also noted: "I am convinced that recent events may present us with the best opportunity since 1954 for a limited marriage of convenience with the guy who I think is still, and will remain, the Mister Big of the Arab World. If we can help turn Nasser inward, and get back on a friendly basis with him, it may not buy us much but it will certainly save us from a peck of trouble that he can otherwise stir up for us." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, 11/61-12/61) McGeorge Bundy
129. Editorial Note
In telegram 318 from Tehran, October 17, 1961, Ambassador Holmes warned that recent developments in Iran might seriously affect Prime Minister Amini's tenure in office. Holmes called the Department's urgent attention to despatch 186 sent via pouch on October 16, which contained his analysis and recommendations as to what the United States should do. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.88/10-1861)
On October 21, Acting Assistant Secretary Armin Meyer forwarded despatch 186 to Secretary Rusk and called the Secretary's attention, in particular, to the summary and Recommendations A, B, and C. Meyer noted that Holmes' proposal was in line with current policy guidance toward Iran as set forth in the May 19 Task Force Recommendations. He added: "Holmes has consistently displayed caution with respect to United States actions which might involve the United States too deeply in domestic Iranian political problems. His analysis and recommendations undoubtedly reflect a serious situation requiring early United States action." Meyer also submitted the text of draft instructions to Tehran, which the Secretary approved. (Ibid., NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 67)
The summary of despatch 186 from Tehran reads as follows:
"Summary. This despatch summarizes key developments of approximately the past two weeks on the subject of the relationship of the Shah and the Prime Minister, sets forth the Embassy's analysis, and makes recommendations as to the course of action that should be followed. Briefly, we believe that the Shah may be succumbing to the temptation to undermine the Prime Minister's position, that the Shah is seriously considering the assumption of personal rule, and that the Shah may be about to give in to pressures for elections in the near future, not because he wants elections per se but because he considers this a means of curbing or even of getting rid of Dr. Amini. I recommend that I be authorized to advise the Shah against assuming personal rule at this time, to speak to him in a negative sense with respect to holding national elections in the near future, and to make clear that we desire the present government to continue to be given the opportunity to carry out its program."
Sections I-IV of the despatch describe recent developments and contain the Embassy's assessment of the situation. Section V contains the following recommendations:
"A. That I be authorized to tell the Shah that our Government does not believe that he should assume personal control at the present time.
"It seems to me that this is the easiest of the courses to knock down because it can be done by a combination of objective analysis and flattery: to wit: because the Shah is the bedrock of the Iranian political system, he and the institution he represents should not be risked except in extremis; the present situation is not desperate enough by any means to warrant such a risk. If he assumes power in a less-than-emergency situation, he would have no place to retreat if his rule was not crowned by marked and continuing success from then on.
"B. I recommend that I also be authorized to speak to the Shah in a negative sense with respect to his idea of holding elections in the near future.
"There are several dangers in such a recommendation. First, the United States might well be publicly labeled as opposing elections. I suggest that the answer to this is that we are already credited with being against elections and it would not be immeasurably more difficult to deny the actuality than the rumor.
"Secondly, the Shah can always seem to accept our advice and then make our recommended course impossible of achievement. This is the most difficult criticism of our recommendation to answer because it is the most likely outcome. We nevertheless believe that an attempt should be made to turn him from all three courses and concurrently encourage him to support Dr. Amini. We cannot see that the interests of the United States would be any worse off than if we did not try. Nor do we believe, whatever the probabilities, that success is inevitably impossible.
"I recognize that even if our advice were sincerely followed by the Shah there would still be some continuous clamor for elections, the most difficult source to handle being the University. The answer to that comes in two parts. First, we believe that the University will continue to be a trouble spot regardless of the probable courses of any government. Secondly, if the objective political situation in Iran--as opposed to the situation which those who want to get rid of Amini pretend to see--worsens because of increased pressure for elections or the failure of Dr. Amini's program, we will have to reassess the situation and perhaps come to a quite different conclusion than we have reached today.
"Finally, it is our assessment that the Shah's preferred course is clearly the assumption of personal rule and that he probably has no great desire to hold elections in the near future except as a means of getting rid of Dr. Amini.
"My idea would be simply to tell the Shah that in our opinion a time of economic crisis is not the most propitious for holding elections and we believe it would be preferable to delay any announcement of elections for a period of perhaps at least six months. At the same time, as a means both of driving home this point and probing the Shah's thoughts on the matter, it might be a good idea to confront him with a number of questions, some of which are set forth below:
"1. What is it precisely in the situation which seems to demand a radical change? What, particularly, has changed since Your Majesty said he did not see the necessity for holding elections for 1-1/2 or 2 years?
"2. In Your Majesty's third alternative, what exactly do you mean by 'free elections?' Is it possible at this juncture of Iranian political development to hold elections without any government interference?
"3. In the event of elections, what are Your Majesty's thoughts with respect to the fate of several dozen National Front candidates? (We have in mind here, for one thing, that if elections are going to be held, it would be better for the security position of the country were most National Front candidates elected rather than if they were prohibited from being elected.)
"4. What sort of political situation does Your Majesty foresee in Iran following controlled elections? (Why would one expect any improvement over the situation after the last two elections?)
"5. What does Your Majesty think of the suggestion, which I understand was made by the Pakistani Ambassador, that education in the meaning of modern electoral processes begins on the village level?
"6. In the event that elections are held, does Your Majesty have a candidate in mind for Prime Minister who would presumably do a better job than Dr. Amini in the circumstances that would then prevail?
"7. What is foreseen as the role of the Melliyun and Mardom parties during the election, in the organization of the Parliament, and in the selection of a Prime Minister?
"C. That, additionally, I be authorized to convey to the Shah that my Government currently has under consideration economic and military aid plans for Iran but that both initial and continuing decisions with respect to the magnitude of this aid will naturally be influenced by the degree of conviction in the United States Government that there will continue to be a government in Iran capable and determined to make effective use of this aid, while at the same time continuing the reform program so ably started by Prime Minister Amini." (Ibid., Central Files, 611.88/10-1661)
The instructions to Ambassador Holmes, approved by Secretary Rusk on October 21, were transmitted to Tehran that same day in telegram 277. The text reads as follows:
"Department concurs your analysis. In accordance current policy, you authorized approach Shah along lines you recommend. Suggest you inform British Ambassador soonest. Department will coordinate with British Embassy Washington. Parallel approach by UK useful but not essential; possible divergence in UK and US attitudes, however, would be extremely undesirable." (Ibid., 611.88/10-2161)
General Issues:
1. U.S. Position vis-?-vis the Shah. The draft paper, and much of the Task Force discussion of it, raises a serious question whether we are in fact receding from the Task Force conclusion of last May that "we, ourselves, can no longer afford to rely so heavily on the Shah." The position taken at that time, which was considered by the NSC and the President in adopting the new policy recommended by the Task Force, was based on a realistic appraisal of the Shah's inability or unwillingness to provide the leadership required for progress which is crucial to U.S. interests in Iran. At best he will only acquiesce--under pressure--to rapid and fundamental reform; and his strategy for maintaining his power and the base on which the power rests will undoubtedly remain in conflict with objectives that the U.S. must seek in Iran over time.
It has been recognized by all members of the Task Force, throughout our work beginning in May, that the Shah is still the center of power in the present Iranian regime. It was also understood that the Shah did not especially like Amini and that U.S. efforts to bolster Amini and his program would have to swim upstream insofar as the Shah was concerned. It was with this understanding of the problem that the Task Force, and the U.S. Government under the new policy, determined that the outlook in Iran required us to "take vigorous action to assist [Amini] Long experience in dealing with the Shah and his historical manner of directing the dialogue toward every type of real and imagined problem except the lack of development and reform, suggests that we are unlikely to achieve our objectives in Iran unless our own internal policy considerations stay focused sharply on the question of what we can and must do rather than what we cannot do. We must still look, of course, to our Ambassador and his country team for judicious adaptation of the necessary actions to the situation as it evolves on the ground in Iran. No one can fail to recognize that their job is an especially difficult and delicate one in Iran, which cannot always proceed with the same degree of clarity and directness which should characterize the basic policy guidance from which they work. Recognizing the severe difficulties we face in dealing with the problems in Iran, the thrust of our own policy statements should focus heavily on our striving to make what is possible correspond to what is desired, rather than vice versa.
It is in this light that I am uneasy about the heavy emphasis of the current paper on the primacy of the Shah in determining our approach to Iran.
2. Characterization of Present Situation. The October 9 report does not clearly characterize for the President our current assessment of the situation in Iran. However, it implies that there has been a reversal of the downward trend of political and economic developments which prompted the first Task Force report. It is difficult to discern such a reversal or the beginning of any real upward trend in the current situation which merits an additional tranche of emergency economic aid without additional actions called for on the part of the Iranian Government.
I believe that any report to the President should be quite explicit on our current assessment of the situation. Bob Komer and I suggested in our paper of October 3 b. Extreme deterioration of the political situation has been stemmed by the Amini regime, and possibilities of a right-wing coup as well as a National Front takeover have been successfully averted, unless new economic crises give the whole picture another turn for the worse.
c. Amini, contrary to expectations, does not now show the bright promise of rapidly and dramatically launching programs which will mobilize the forces necessary to achieve decisive economic recovery and the clear beginnings of a new political synthesis.
d. There are, however, possibilities for improvement in both the economic and political situations; these will probably require: (1) more energetic and deliberate actions on the part of the Amini regime, and, as a means thereto, (2) a more active program of advice, assistance and overt activity by the U.S. in Iran.
It is in the context of this assessment of the situation that a report on action taken and proposals for future steps by the U.S. should, in my opinion, be presented to the President.
3. General approach of the U.S. in the immediate future. The proposal which Bob Komer and I have made reflects in essence a judgment that a change in the tactics of providing further economic aid would be consistent with the requirements in Iran and with the thrust of our existing policy.
Given the apparent need of the Amini government for assistance (financial and political) in overcoming some of its critical weaknesses, we have asserted that it would be desirable to place the next tranche of economic assistance on a basis which will give the maximum push to the fundamental economic actions which must be pursued soon. This would mean bringing other sources of aid into the picture at this stage and placing some open and explicit conditions of an economic nature on whatever assistance we provide. It means also a stepped-up effort in the political field. We urge, in essence, a package action program which would require vigorous U.S. leadership to succeed.
The revision of the Stabilization Program is viewed as a prime vehicle for economic aspects of this "package" approach.
The proposal to dramatize this approach--to make it overt--and to make it multi-national was intended to underscore the seriousness which we wanted the Iranian Government and other countries to attach to U.S. expressions of interest and to the assistance rendered. We are concerned about the possibility of falling back to a "bail-out" approach, which might buy a few more months of time in a manner which sacrifices a crucial opportunity for pushing ahead on the fundamental problems.
The high-level team visit to Iran is not necessarily indispensable to this new approach. While it was our impression from the information at our disposal that such a course might be desirable, there is no real reason why the necessary actions cannot be taken under the leadership of Ambassador Holmes and the country team. The important thing, in our view, is to develop and vigorously pursue a program of joint action in which the efforts of the U.S., Iran and other parties concerned come to grips with the basic problems underlying the recurring crises.
As was mentioned in the last Task Force meeting, the country team is clearly expected to initiate proposals for policy action and to evaluate the risks of alternative actions. The decision, however, as to the degree of risk to take is a function of evaluation and determination by the Chairman of the Task Force, and ultimately by the President. Therefore, an action program which calls for imposing conditions on the Iranian Government as a requisite to additional financial assistance, and the promulgation and urging of a political action program involving some uncertainties as to efficacy and risks vis-?-vis the Shah, could appropriately be recommended by the Task Force on the basis of a real need for such action.
Specific Comments:
The characterization of the action program underway, while it reflects progress, indicates that this action will be continued on the basis of "persistent discreet political and economic advice with the minimum economic assistance essential to enable the Government to survive and move forward."
No one can argue convincingly against using discretion in the manner in which we seek to achieve our basic objectives in Iran--it is like arguing against sin. On the other hand, discretion need not rule out placing some difficult but legitimate conditions on continued economic assistance; and it need not rule out coupling these actions with explicit advice and overt assistance in the political area to the extent this is acceptable to the Amini regime, which must still be characterized as the "best, even the last, opportunity for a moderate evolution in Iran."
The action strategy proposed should not merely consist, as pages 11 and 12 of the draft report indicate, of a middle ground between hypothetical extreme situations. The extremes to be avoided, as they are described on these pages, appear to me to be "straw men." (This applies particularly to the last full paragraph, which so substantially over-characterizes what has been proposed that it loses most of its value as a part of the analysis.)
Therefore, with regard to the Immediate Requirements part of the paper, I would suggest a substitution of this with the economic and political action programs in our memorandum of October 3, deleting, however, the proposal to send a special AID/IBRD/IMF team to Iran and substituting therefor a proposal that the country team, in concert with an IMF team and in coordination with the IBRD, institute the program delineated under that paragraph.
I would further revise the recommendations to provide $40 millon of grant and loan aid to include a proposal to the effect that the Iranian Government be urged to explore (with U.S Government support) the possibility of further interim assistance from the West Germans, the UK, and the oil companies preparatory to the inauguration of the Third Plan.
The above comments would call for a significant recasting of the draft report (which I hope will occur whether or not you accept all of the specific proposals we have set forth or embrace the reorientation to country team activities that we propose).
Kenneth R. Hansen
On October 19, 1961, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Meyer sent through Chairman of the Policy Planning Council McGhee a memorandum to Secretary of State Rusk recommending that the Secretary seek President Kennedy's approval for extending an invitation to Nasser to visit the United States the following spring. A memorandum from Francis E. Meloy of McGhee's staff to H. Earle Russell in NEA, dated October 23, indicates that NEA subsequently withdrew the memorandum and that Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Johnson remained opposed to extending an invitation to Nasser at that time, preferring instead to issue an invitation early in 1962 for a visit shortly thereafter. (Department of State, Central Files, 786B.11/10-1961)
On October 26, Komer sent Humphrey's memorandum to President Kennedy with a note indicating that it was "worth your reading." Komer also advised: "The time has come for us to make a gesture toward Nasser designed to reassure him that we are not really sitting back and chortling over his discomfiture in Syria. Despite this, Nasser remains the most powerful leader in the Arab world. Moreover, disillusionment over Syria may lead him to turn inward and try to make a success of 'revolution in one country', while relaxing his efforts to achieve tight political union among the Arabs. Both developments would be to our interest." Komer also recommended that the best gesture would be to invite Nasser to visit the United States the following spring. He noted that the Department of State was on the verge of making such a recommendation. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, United Arab Republic, 7/61-10/61)
A memorandum from Strong to Talbot, dated October 31, that discusses developments during Talbot's absence from the Department of State indicates: "We pulled back our memo on the invitation to Nasser, but Senator Humphrey has recommended an immediate invitation. Alex Johnson still thinks an invitation for a visit next March should not be made until January." (Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 63 D 33, Chron. Asst Secretary NEA Correspondence)
Discussion:
You will recall the controversy last fall resulting from the discovery that Israel, aided by France, had been secretly engaged in the construction of a nuclear power reactor at Dimona. You will recall, also, that our concern led us to arrange, through diplomatic channels, for an unpublicized visit to the new reactor by two eminent American scientists. They reported that, for the time being at least, the reactor seemed designed for the peaceful purposes the Israelis claimed for it. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] While placing reliance in the assurances of the Israel Government as to its present peaceful intentions regarding use of the Dimona reactor, we cannot ignore this possibility.
Should Israel contemplate weapons manufacture, one inhibiting factor, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would be its lack of weapons designs. Such designs, if available, might be obtained from the French. However, there are indications of some cooling in French-Israel relations. Indicative of this are unevaluated reports that French technicians have been instructed by their government to suspend work on the Dimona reactor. It is conceivable, therefore, that the Israelis might seek to acquire weapons designs from sources in this country.
As a matter of well-considered policy, we remain opposed to acquisition by Israel of a nuclear weapons capability. To this end, and as a follow-up to the secret visit made by our own scientists, we are considering means of arranging an open visit to Dimona by "neutral" scientists. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion assured President Kennedy he agreed to this when the two met in May. Mr. Meyer, NEA Mr. Meyer distributed copies of a telegram worked out that day between NEA and AID staffs which authorized Ambassador Holmes to inform the GOI of FY 1962 U.S. supporting assistance and development lending. He explained that changes in this telegram would require valuable time, and that he hoped the telegram could be sent with a minimum of changes. Nevertheless, he wanted to obtain the comments and assistance of the Task Force before sending the message. Mr. Meyer stated that NEA would convey these points to Ambassador Holmes in separate telegrams or other communications.
Mr. Hansen asked if the $5 million mentioned in the original Task Force report is still being held in reserve, and Mr. Miklos replied that the $5 million is a part of the present aid tranche.
Mr. Hansen also predicted that it would be extremely difficult if not impossible for DLF to find suitable areas in the Second Plan for the extension of project loans, and suggested that perhaps some other and more practical basis for development lending in Iran could be found.
Mr. Miklos agreed, but said that a general program loan was most difficult, and that AID wants to try once more to find acceptable projects.
Mr. Hansen remarked that this telegram should be cleared through the 15/50 procedure. Mr. Miklos said that AID did not believe it required such procedure, but that he would mention it once again to AID officials.
Mr. Hansen suggested that the telegram be amended to provide that as a condition precedent to the extension of the contemplated assist-ance, the GOI be required to work out a revised stabilization program with the IMF within two months.
After some discussion, Mr. Meyer promised to make reference to the stabilization program in an amendment to the text of the telegram conveying information as to our FY 1962 assistance.
Mr. Hansen asked whether our supporting assistance was tied to the Iranian military budget. Mr. Miklos replied that it was in response to the Prime Minister's request, which was non-military.
Shah then raised question of elections saying that free elections in the Western sense out of question at present time in Iran with no responsible political parties and no real parliamentary tradition. The results would be irresponsible Majlis composed of self-seeking politicians, many dangerously inclined toward neutralism. The choice then lay between elections of the traditional Iranian Govt or rule by decree without Parliament for two or three years while reforms went forward. He asked our advice as to which of these choices would be the wiser and what our governments' attitude would be toward them. Harrison and I both replied that in our judgment, which we believed would be shared by our governments, government without a Parliament for two or three years would be preferable to another rigged election provided that economic and social reforms were energetically pursued during the two or three year period.
Harrison and I both came down hard on dangers of personal rule and advantages to sovereign of having responsible Prime Minister and Cabinet. Harrison spoke emphatically on ministerial responsibility and Shah's need for protection from public criticism of necessary but unpalatable acts of government. I seconded these remarks by citing fact that much of criticism of present Prime Minister came from those who disliked his austere economic measures and that Amini served Shah well as a lightning rod. He was obviously impressed by my statement that he should keep himself and his final power in reserve in order to meet any real emergency that might result from subversive acts directed from the outside.
In response to a question the Shah said that his idea of a "team" was in fact a Prime Minister and Cabinet with his full backing. He then spoke of Amini saying that he would not object to latter continuing as Prime Minister provided he was willing to develop an integrated Cabinet and to work wholeheartedly with Shah in carrying out latter's program of reform and progress. He said that he did not dislike Amini although latter was weak in some respects, talked too much and acted too little. On the other hand, he praised Prime Minister's attitude on foreign affairs particularly as he was completely opposed to neutralism. He felt also that Amini had made progress in economic-fiscal front but that in these matters he had high competency. I reminded Shah of extremely bad economic and financial situation which Amini had found on coming to power, that he had taken stringent measures to stop runaway inflation, etc. I said that to achieve economic and fiscal order water had to be squeezed out of the economy, a balanced and consolidated budget established looking toward a firm base for the financing of the Third Plan which should hold real promise for Iran. I said that in my recent visit to Washington I had recommended economic aid which was geared to Amini's program in an effort to assist in achieving this good base for the Third Plan. The Shah agreed that Amini's economic and fiscal program was necessary and would not be abandoned. He expressed concern as to continuing economic stagnation during the winter with resulting unemployment and possibility of unrest. Harrison replied that in his view the situation was not as dark as Shah described and suggested that those persons who had talked to him in this regard had emphasized unfavorable factors for their own purposes. The Shah agreed.
I asked whether or not Shah had spoken to Amini in the sense he was then speaking to us and he replied that he had done so only in general terms. That he had told the Prime Minister that he would have to make a decision during this week as to whether elections would be held now or whether there would be government without Parliament for two or three years. He then wondered whether he should speak to Amini in specific terms concerning his plans now or wait and make his decision in the spring after the next budget is completed. This was not a direct request for our opinion and we offered none.
The audience concluded with the Shah stating that he presumed we would like to consult our governments concerning their attitude with respect to elections. We replied that we naturally wished to report our conversation and would do so at once. The Shah said that if the governments had any other views or observations than those which we had expressed, he would like to have them before the end of this Persian week which will be November second. I should therefore like to have a confirmation of the opinion I expressed concerning elections by November first. I should not convey an official approval of USG to the Shah but would simply telephone the Minister of Court saying that I had no need to see Shah again on matter we had discussed Saturday. Harrison is making the same recommendation. Harrison and I agree that we made all of the points included in our instructions either directly or indirectly and we believe with substantial effect.
I had another conversation alone of about one and a half hours Sunday morning with the Shah resulting from my original request for an audience. This consisted of general discussions of the visit to France, De Gaulle's attitude, Soviet acts, etc., which was followed by another strong plea for additional military material to modernize Iran's armed forces. I told the Shah that this was under consideration in Washington, that the appropriations available for military assistance were less than expected, that the demands were very great and that work was in progress to determine the wisest allocation in view of the many requirements around the world. I said that I did not expect to have an indication of the results of these allocations before last week November.
The Shah returned to our conversation of Saturday saying that he had been thinking it over and that he probably would speak to Amini in the specific terms concerning his plans within the week. He added that he did not see why Amini would not accept. He then said, half to himself, that of course there are others who could do the job and looked up quickly adding "but not a military man." In response to my question, the Shah said that if he decided now to have a government without Parliament for a two or three year period, he would make a public statement to this effect and that he was confident that he could stop agitation for early elections.
The Shah is a complicated man, full of changing moods and uncertainties. I am unable to predict what course he will follow but I am convinced that what Harrison and I had to say to him will make him approach his decision in a more thoughtful and careful manner than that he has exhibited in recent conversations.
Holmes
B. There appears to be no necessity for public announcement by Shah at this time on elections and there could be considerable danger in such a course. Raising this explosive issue could damage stability so far achieved.
C. U.S. has supported Amini program and believes Shah should continue support Amini and not assume direct responsibility for govt actions. There appear to be no essential differences between Amini's aims and what is known of Shah's program. We wish avoid any impression that U.S. believes modification Shah's relation to Amini Cabinet which inevitably weakens role of PriMin is necessary or desirable.
In event you seek another audience with Shah you could state you hope soon to inform PriMin re additional U.S. economic assistance and that this assistance predicated continuation present GOI program. As you deem desirable you might draw further on authorization contained in Deptel 286. Bowles
Barbour
As the first Departmental visitor to the reconstructed Syrian Arab Republic I was given the full treatment in Damascus. Some symbolic meaning was read into the choice of the State Guest House which for three years was Nasser's home in Damascus and which had never before been used to entertain foreigners, as the locale for the luncheon given me by the Minister of Finance.
From the US point of view, the new Syrian regime, if it demonstrates staying power, represents a promising opportunity. The Ministers call this the first liberal revolution among the Arabs. They point out rapidly that it is not reactionary, but for the first time offers Arabs an opportunity for vigorous social advance under non-totalitarian conditions. Themselves surprised at their speedy success, the leaders of the coup are now trying to create a government that Syria will accept as better than Nasser's combination of bright promises and a tight rein. They want to relax some of his stringent measures without awakening fears among workers and farmers that gains made under Nasser will now be lost. This is what involves them in such measures as denationalization or compensation for businesses that are to remain nationalized, 25% shares of corporate profits to be distributed among workers and (hopefully) currency convertibility.
I got no indication of current relations between the army and the civilian Cabinet. The Cabinet itself looks technically strong and politically weak. It needs to resist efforts by land owners and businessmen to pull it far to the right. Kuzbari is aware of this and a long-range threat from the left. The Cabinet meets practically daily, from late afternoon or early evening frequently until midnight. So far it has been moving in generally sound directions. I think we should approve its decision to keep Communists in jail, to widen its political base through early non-partisan elections, and to restore financial order out of the remains of Nasser's policies.
The Prime Minister told me in almost so many words that he wants Syria to be neutral--on our side. He cannot immediately strike down the major economic and military relations with Bloc countries developed during the UAR period. He knows the Bloc is eager to maintain these relations, and that the US cannot easily replace the Bloc as a market for Syrian cotton or as a provider of military equipment. Nevertheless, Kuzbari claims to want closer political and economic relations with the US than Syria has permitted in the past. His Ministers have already asked us about an aid agreement, which of course Syria never previously was willing to negotiate.
Partly as a protection against efforts by Nasser to infiltrate and subvert his regime, Kuzbari wants good relations with his Arab neighbors. Arab nationalism must still be a strong talking point. Having broken [with] the UAR the coup leaders talk vigorously of a wider Arab unity based on "brotherhood and equality rather than on domination." Kuzbari believes Syria can develop good relations with several Arab countries, especially since Nasser's predominance has been reduced. I came away feeling that the survival and stability of the Kuzbari regime (or something like it) are strongly in the U.S. interest. It exists and its failure will doubtless be followed by something more extreme. It professes public and political values that are closer than either Nasser's or Hussein's to our general posture. If it succeeds, it could provide a rallying point for liberal--as contrasted to extreme--Arab politics. With Jordan, Lebanon and possibly even Iraq and Kuwait it might form a fraternal grouping resulting in greater security and peace in the Fertile Crescent area. At best, a successful Kuzbari regime could shift the balance in the Near East a little more in our direction.
If it is to survive effectively, the Kuzbari regime probably needs various kinds of political and economic support. Straight aid is not the only answer. I believe we should go to work intensively to discover ways in which we can help the Kuzbari effort and can encourage others to help as well. This will involve several difficult questions. More than any other, I am concerned about what we should do when--as it soon must--the Syrian armed forces begin to feel the pinch of shortages of spare parts. Considering all of our other commitments and involvements in the region, we need to calculate carefully how far and in what ways we and our friends can get involved with the Syrian military. Would one way be for us to help the regime meet its public safety needs by a broadly conceived program of assistance to police and gendarmerie forces? The main thing is for us to be ready with a program that is sufficiently flexible in political and economic support, so that we can respond quickly when the plea for assistance comes. Harrison made previously agreed statement that two governments had been consulting on matters raised Shah October 28, 2. Difficult for governments to express views concerning timing of elections, particularly to appear to endorse long suspension of electoral process.
3. Governments would approach any decision made by Shah with sympathy.
4. Expressed belief that any criticism of delay in holding elections would to some extent be offset by progress seen to be made in intervening period with development and reform.
I added suggestion that any public announcement that elections would be postponed for a long period might endanger stability. Shah agreed with this statement. He then thanked us and said that reply of our governments was an intelligent one; that he wanted it clearly understood that he had no intention to seek sharing of responsibility; that he felt our association sufficiently close for friendly consultation but that decision to be taken would be his alone.
Shah then repeated arguments against hold "free" elections now, adding a new point in that the so-called opposition and those clamoring for immediate elections were almost without exception in favor of neutralism or nonalignment. He felt that in some cases this represented sincere conviction but that in most it would be a rallying cry in an electoral campaign. Harrison and I believe this assessment to be substantially correct.
The Shah then returned to his concept of a "plan and a team" making it very clear that his idea of a team was a Prime Minister and a Cabinet with whom he would work out the details of a broad plan of development and reform and that Ministers would be enjoined to select dedicated and honest staffs to assist them. He said that in the absence of a Parliament his was the only real constitutional power and that it would be necessary to promulgate laws by decree which would be subject to eventual ratification by a Majlis. It would be his intent that when circumstances made it possible to hold elections, a principal issue would be ratification of acts of the interregnum. In response to questioning he agreed that new laws would be prepared by the government and would then be promulgated by the sovereign. At this point Harrison and I again pointed out the dangers of the Shah's involvement in day to day operations of the government and his need for a Prime Minister and Cabinet who would assume responsibility vis-?-vis public. The Shah agreed to this and said that it would require a Prime Minister with courage to take this responsibility. We pointed out that the present Prime Minister had demonstrated his willingness and capacity to fill this role and the Shah agreed.
130. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Hansen) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot)
Comments on Task Force report: Iran (October 9, 1961)/2/
/2/Reference is to a draft of the Task Force report circulated at the Task Force meeting on October 9. A copy is ibid., NEA/GTI Files: Lot 66 D 173, Task Force on Iran. The final Task Force report, dated October 14 and approved by Secretary Rusk but not sent to the President is printed as Document 127.
As I promised at our last Task Force meeting, the following are comments on the draft report.
131. Editorial Note
132. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Meyer) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)
Israel's Atomic Energy Program: Considerations of U.S. Security
133. Informal Summary Record of the Iran Task Force Meeting
Mr. Kerr, E
Mr. Costanza, Treasury
Mr. Hansen, BOB
Mr. Komer, White House
[1 line of source text not declassified]
Mr. Gatewood, INR
Mr. Miner, GTI
Mr. Marcy, GTI
Mr. Bowling, GTI
Mr. Miklos, GTI
134. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
135. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran
136. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State
137. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Strong)
Syria
138. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/
Tehran, November 5, 1961, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.88/11-561. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London.
356. Harrison and I had two hour discussion with Shah evening of November 4th.
The Shah stated that failure to hold elections was, in fact, a violation of the constitution and that the present situation is illegal and that as long as this was so, a vigorous effort should be made to get on with reforms and improve the condition of the country, without the handicap of an interfering and unproductive Majlis. He felt that a change should be made without delay as it was dangerous to allow the present situation to continue thru the winter. I emphasized the need for the present economic and fiscal program to go forward looking toward a balanced and consolidated budget and the establishment of a good economic base for the Third Plan. The Shah agreed and said that more should be done to produce an imaginative and popular program which would improve public morale and help get through the next few difficult months. He thought action should be taken without delay to begin a real campaign for improvement with a reconstituted government or a new one. He did not feel that the intervening months between now and the spring should be wasted. The Shah expressed the view that once it was publicly known that he was personally engaged in broad and genuine reform, agitation for elections would dampen down. In response to questions he appeared confident that he could persuade many of those now clamoring for elections to be silent.
At this point Shah reverted to his concept of a plan and, although it was in similar general terms as he expressed a week ago, he added a few scattered details. One element would be the creation of commissions in every ministry to purge its administration of undesirable elements, saying that even if no dishonesty could be proved, these elements could be dismissed with payment of two or three years salary in lieu of pension rights. This would require a new law and extra temporary expense but it would eventually prove to be an economy. He said that the land reform law would have to be amended and that provision should be made that workers remaining on the properties of landlords must have their status converted from peasants to that of agricultural employees with rights equivalent to industrial workers. The educatorial system should be revamped and fees should be charged at the university level for those able to pay while scholarships should be provided for promising students with no means. The situation had to be changed which permits a student to receive a diploma that he has not earned and which he thinks entitles him to a high government position.
The Shah said that he would talk with the Prime Minister about his intentions but did not indicate whether or not he would offer Doctor Amini the opportunity to remain in office. He did not mention any other persons whom he might be considering as Prime Minister. I asked him how soon he expected to take action and he replied within the week.
I think it is clear that the Shah has definitely made up his mind to postpone elections indefinitely and to sponsor a new program of reform which he hopes would be imaginative and dynamic with an appeal to the public. I am unable to tell whether or not he will keep Doctor Amini in office provided that the latter is willing, or whether he expects to appoint an entirely new government. Harrison agrees with this assessment and we both are inclined to think that the chances of Amini continuing are somewhat less than we thought a week ago. We both feel that we have made all of the points contained in our instructions and that the Shah understands very clearly our views and those of our governments. I feel that I have used every means in Doctor Amini's favor that I could appropriately employ without going so far as to tell the Shah whom he should have as Prime Minister. Harrison has been very helpful in this and has gone even farther in support of Amini and his program than I had expected he would. PARTICIPANTS Mr. Talbot told the Ambassador that the Department is apprehensive about the effect on the Arab refugee problem which may result from Foreign Minister Meir's address to the Israel Knesset and the Knesset's resolution rejecting the principle of Arab repatriation. Ambassador Harman said his Government is deeply concerned with the apparent evolution in the status of the Palestine Arab delegation, which seems to be uniting diverse elements that the Arab states are prepared to sponsor as one group for the Political Committee debate. He emphasized that last year a somewhat smaller group had been presented as "a" Palestine refugee delegation; this year's version is described as "The" Palestine Arab delegation. He implied that Israel fears the United States is according the group more recognition than in previous years. If this trend is encouraged, he declared, he sees little chance for a quiet debate in a minor key, which he understands is a United States aspiration.
Mr. Talbot said he shares Israel's fears that prospects of a quiet discussion are diminishing, observing he is not certain he knows either Arab or Israel intentions. The Knesset resolution and the Ambassador's own remarks suggest a hardening of the Israel position. Moreover, both the PCC and its Special Representative see evidence that Israel is less flexible than earlier hoped. He recalled Ambassador Harman's often repeated desire for eschewing a "numbers game" approach to the question of Arab repatriation, commenting he thinks Israel's categorical rejection of the concept of return is a "numbers game" of a different variety.
Ambassador Harman said study of Mrs. Meir's speech convinces him that it was no more than a summation of her public position as expressed in the past. He cautioned against reading too much into the Prime Minister's remarks to the President. Mr. Talbot would recall the Prime Minister expressed a great deal of skepticism about the steps proposed by the United States, but had added if the United States felt obliged to go ahead Israel would be as receptive as possible.
139. Memorandum of Conversation
Israel Position Re Arab Refugees
Ambassador Avraham Harman of Israel
Mr. Mordechai Gazit, Minister, Embassy of Israel
Mr. Shaul Bar-Haim, First Secretary, Embassy of Israel
NEA--Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot
NEA/NE--William L. Hamilton
Ambassador Harman said that Shukairy's/5/ inscription as first speaker in the debate is not a hopeful augury for moderate consideration of the problem. He reported that Mrs. Meir is arriving in New York on November 19, hoping that the debate will have been completed in its major aspects by the first week of December, inasmuch as she goes to Tanganyika for its Independence Day on December 9. He concluded by saying that he hopes to see Mr. Talbot again at an early time to discuss other elements of the problem, including the status of the Palestinian "delegates"; and Israel's belief that a positive resolution might be the best way to counter undesirable Arab proposals. He referred to the African suggestion of a resolution calling for direct confrontation of the principals.
/5/Ahmad Shukairy, Saudi Arabian Representative to the United Nations.
On November 15, 1961, in New York, PCC Special Representative Joseph Johnson submitted his draft report for comment to the U.N. Delegations of Israel and the concerned Arab states. The first two sections of the draft report dealt with Johnson's terms of reference and described conversations held during his September visit to the Middle East and subsequently in New York. A third section entitled "findings and conclusions" indicated that the mission had been limited to the exploration of possibilities for progress on the refugee problem; noted that despite appearances of intransigence and bellicosity, statesmen on both sides wanted peace and expressed a willingness, with much reservation and skepticism, to consider a step-by-step process for progress; and concluded that although there was no prospect for an early resolution of the Palestinian refugee question, careful consideration should be given to the appointment of a Special Representative to serve until the autumn of 1962 to determine whether progress could be made through a step-by-step approach. Circular telegram 970, November 20, contains a summary description of the draft report. (Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/11-2061)
On November 20 and 21, Johnson met with a committee composed of representatives from the United Arab Republic, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan to receive their comments on his draft report. The Arab comments were highly unfavorable, particularly in regard to the historical section, which the Arabs claimed had a strong Israeli bias. After reflection, Johnson decided to alter his report by substantially reducing the historical section. (Telegram 1712 from USUN, November 20; ibid., 321.1/11-2061) Israel then launched a vigorous high-level effort to force Johnson to return to the original text, but he refused. (Circular telegram 1004, November 25; ibid., 325.84/11-2561) Although PCC members Turkey and France objected to the alteration, the U.S. Representative noted that the changes did not affect the report's conclusions. (Telegram 1759 from USUN, November 22; ibid., 325.84/11-2261)
On November 24, the PCC transmitted the report to the U.N. Secretariat under cover of a letter stating that PCC members wished to avoid passing judgment on the report's historical sections but warmly endorsed the report's conclusions. For text of the transmittal letter and Johnson's report, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, volume I, Agenda Item 25, U.N. document A/4921 and Add.1. For additional documentation on this subject, see Supplement, the compilation on the Arab-Israeli dispute.
REFERENCE I. United States Policy Toward the United Arab Republic
Our approach rests on four basic assumptions that appear valid at present, namely, (1) Nasser is firmly enough established to retain power in the U.A.R. for the time being; (2) were Nasser to be overthrown soon (he is more vulnerable now than in the past several years) the government which would emerge might well be less stable and more troublesome for us; (3) despite the blow to his prestige from the loss of Syria, continuation of Nasser's considerable political influence in the Middle East and Afro-Asian world generally is shown by the caution of the governments in those areas in recognizing the new Syrian regime and in appointing ambassadors thereto; and (4) the leadership in the U.A.R. is striving to strengthen its ties with the West.
Given these assumptions, and given the undoubted geo-political importance of the U.A.R., it appears obvious that we must continue to do business with Nasser and the U.A.R. and make the best of it. The virtues and vices of Nasser, nine years after the Egyptian revolution, are well known. One virtue, the ability to profit from experience, taken in conjunction with the fact of the importance of Nasser and the U.A.R, would appear to justify an effort on our part over the next few years to endeavor to restore our relations with Nasser and the U.A.R. to something resembling the pre-1955 period and to concentrate the attention of Nasser and the U.A.R. more generally on internal development.
While we are not enchanted by what Nasser appears to have in mind with regard to both internal and external affairs, the current psychological setting would appear to be more favorable than at any time since Suez for sympathetic attention to the U.A.R.'s aid requirements. Nasser's pride and prestige have suffered a blow in the defection of Syria; the United States not only failed to "kick him when he was down" but treated him with utmost consideration; by adopting publicly a statesmanlike attitude during the Syrian crisis, Nasser has recouped some of his prestige; a promising personal relationship between President Kennedy and Nasser has been developed through exchanges of letters; Nasser appears to desire to devote more attention and effort to internal development (and to securing his rule); the U.A.R. has taken effective measures to promote economic development and is publicly committed thereto; and U.S. assistance along with that of other Western countries is needed for the implementation of U.A.R. development plans.
Although circumstances do seem relatively propitious in some respects, there are certain factors that buttress our belief, based on hard experience, that our approach to assistance to the U.A.R. must be undertaken with utmost care. Not only are there our support of Israel, a deep-seated Egyptian suspicion of our objectives and motives, and serious divergences of U.S. and U.A.R. policies, action and attitudes in Africa, in Latin America, and in the Middle East itself which periodically lead to strains in our relations, but also there are emerging the clear lines of the type of state Nasser is trying to establish in Egypt as well as the nature of the political base he is seeking to create, and his intention to abet the creation of similar states and similar power bases in the other Arab states (except, perhaps, Iraq where these already exist to a considerable degree). By the economic decrees of July 23 We also think it would be incorrect to assume that the energies of Nasser and the U.A.R. will be devoted entirely to internal affairs. While Nasser may reduce his activity in Africa and in world-wide neutralist circles, he is unable to abandon or even slacken in his self-assigned mission of leading and uniting all Arabs. Into his October 16 speech on elimination of "reactionaries"
140. Editorial Note
141. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
United States Policy Toward the United Arab Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic
National Security Action Memorandum Number 105 of October 16, 1961
In addition to the negotiation of a multi-year PL-480 agreement with provision for annual review, selective DLF and Export-Import Bank financing and possibly a new approach to a stabilization program under IMF guidance, all of which we believe appropriate in the circumstances, perhaps the only slight hope we have for turning Nasser and the U.A.R. in the direction we wish them to go is personal diplomacy by President Kennedy. In the next few weeks we may recommend to the President that in the absence of seriously adverse public relations factors an invitation for a state visit be issued to Nasser very early in the new year, the visit to occur no later than early in March 1962. At that time the President could bring to bear his great prestige and persuasiveness with a view to heightening Nasser's sense of statesmanship and bringing new perspective to his approach to domestic development.
In putting forward briefly our views and our proposals above, we consider that certain additional cautionary remarks are required. For more than three years we have conducted our affairs with the U.A.R. largely on the basis of "quiet diplomacy", seeking to avoid violent pendular swings in the state of our relations, to emphasize those areas in which a satisfactory relationship is possible and to avoid public controversy when we disagree. The fact that we may undertake to expand economic assistance and to tighten our bonds will not lead the U.A.R. to lessen its fundamental hostility toward Israel nor to adopt positions satisfactory to the U.S. on issues on which our interests diverge. Further, it is essential in working out with the U.A.R. any given program that Egyptian officials understand clearly at the outset the obligations they must assume and the limits of the assistance within which we must work. In negotiating programs with the U.A.R. and in implementing them, we must not seek to push too far too fast. A step by careful step approach is called for. For years to come we expect the U.S. to bear most of the obligations while giving the barest minimum in return. We must not expect from the U.A.R. more than its circumstances permit, we must have infinite patience, we must not fluctuate frequently in our policy and actions, and we must be prepared to deal in a steady, consistent and understanding manner with the U.A.R. despite the provocations we may be called upon to endure. To do so will require a maturity and a constancy that will test our statesmanship and the political sophistication of our public.
II. Estimate of the Staying Power of the Present Syrian Government and Implications for United States Policy Toward Syria
In respect of the question regarding the staying power of the present Syrian regime there is enclosed a study prepared by the Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research entitled "The Outlook for Stability in Syria". 1. Israel: While the Israelis to date have shown commendable restraint in order to avoid creating complications for the new Syrian regime and recently for the first time in several years are reported to have used the ISMAC in connection with a border problem, Israel has always regarded Syria as dangerously intransigent and the Israel-Syrian frontier has been the scene of literally thousands of incidents in the past thirteen years. We must be alert to any problems that appear to be developing along that border and be prepared to encourage Israel to continue indefinitely its recent restraint and its renewed participation in ISMAC.
2. U.A.R.: At present probably the most important external influence playing on Syria, the U.A.R. hopefully will eventually be able to accept a modus vivendi with Syria although some modification of the present Syrian regime to include elements friendly to the U.A.R. might be necessary. Indirectly our policy toward the U.A.R. is designed to contribute to such an effect and we believe that pressures from other Arabs will push the U.A.R. in this direction as may an ultimately less anti-Nasser and anti-U.A.R. policy on the part of the Syrian regime itself. We would seek quietly to encourage Syria in this direction.
3. Turkey: Should Turkey contemplate exerting pressure on Syria or interfering in internal Syrian affairs we would wish to dissuade her.
4. Britain and France: We believe it is possible to reach agreement with the U.K. on our approach to the problem of Syria. France, however, undoubtedly will again wish to conduct largely a unilateral policy toward Syria. To the best of our ability we shall seek to encourage constructiveness in such a role as France may wish to play in Syria. Economically France continues to maintain a mutually beneficial relationship with Syria despite absence of formal official relations. It is not impossible that the French will find it in their interest to meet at least a portion of Syrian arms requirements, reducing Syrian dependence on the Soviet Bloc in this respect.
5. Saudi Arabia: Given Saudi rivalry with both the U.A.R. and Iraq as well as the sensitivity of our own relationship with Saudi Arabia, it is doubtful that we are in a position to bring much weight to bear on Saudi policy. However, we probably can assume that in general Saudi activity in Syria will be less detrimental to our interest than that of others.
6. Iraq and Jordan: Both of these states have a more natural attraction for Syria than does Egypt other than the factors of the person of Nasser and Egyptian military power as an element of security against Israel. Both Jordan and Iraq are believed to wish to work out eventually a closer association with Syria, and many Syrians believe that Syria should seek such a relationship with Iraq and Jordan. While such a development, roughly the Fertile Crescent, would probably be in our interest in tending to create a better equilibrium in the Arab world and to concentrate the energies of the three states for some time on the development of institutions and operational frameworks, we believe that its stimuli must come from within and that over-pressure in this direction would be counter-productive not only in creating a negative reaction within the three states but also in creating a serious strain on our relations with the U.A.R. In our view the U.S. should in no way oppose such a development and upon occasion should in an extremely discreet manner let it so be known in proper quarters.
7. U.S. Relations with Syria: The principal limitations on U.S. policy vis-?-vis Syria are: (a) the close association of the U.S. with Israel in the popular Syrian mind, (b) our inability for domestic political reasons and long-standing area considerations to engage in the sale of significant quantities or types of arms to Syria, (c) our need to avoid antagonizing Nasser seriously, and (d) our earlier role in Syria. Within these limits we wish to find ways of effectively supporting the present ruling elements politically and economically; of undercutting the Soviet Bloc and the domestic Communists; and of maintaining a relationship with other significant non-Communist elements that will permit us to work with them satisfactorily should they take control of Syria.
Given the peculiar characteristics of Syria and its position in the Middle East, we believe that our policy must be conducted with utmost skill, circumspection and understanding of the Syrian scene and of the influences working on it. Apart from measures outlined above we propose (not necessarily all-inclusively):
A. Political: In the near future we should appoint an ambassador who is thoroughly familiar with Syria. We should favor resumption of an active Syrian role in U.N. organs. We should encourage other Western and certain Latin American countries to establish representation in Syria. Selected Syrian political figures should be invited to the U.S. and Western European countries should be encouraged to issue such invitations. Other forms of educational and cultural exchange should be encouraged. As appropriate, Syrian leaders should be assured that the U.S. continues to be prepared to prevent aggression in the area. Carefully selected anti-Communist intelligence and propaganda should be disseminated by appropriate means. Efforts should be made to direct Syrian arms requests to Western European countries and to encourage those countries to satisfy such requests within reason (we believe that ultimately the direction from which arms are supplied to Syria will influence significantly the political stability and political orientation of Syria.) We would seek an adequate but unostentatious presence in Syria, limiting our personnel to the extent compatible with requirements. Any form of intervention in internal Syrian politics would be avoided. We firmly believe that Syria, given half a chance, will prove both willing and able to prevent Communist domination if Western nations conduct a sound overt policy even though Syria may at times appear to be approaching the brink. Further, we believe that Western intervention in Syrian internal affairs would in fact only serve to strengthen the internal Communists as well as Soviet Bloc influence. We should avoid seeking to identify Syria with the West and equally should avoid public squabbles with Syria.
B. Economic: Syrians already have discussed certain training and technical assistance needs with our Embassy in Damascus and are also discussing at least three loans with the DLF. While recognizing that these proposals require careful evaluation, we are giving urgent and sympathetic attention to them. Resolution of the problem of a legal basis for U.S. operations in Syria is being expedited in order to permit determination of feasibility of proposed assistance projects. We wish to be as responsive as possible to Syrian requests. In so doing we shall endeavor to support what is essentially a conservative, free enterprise system. We are meeting promptly Syrian requests for surplus foodstuffs under PL-480. In the development category we are prepared within reason to act favorably on sound and properly documented projects. If necessary we shall examine our own means and encourage the IMF, other friendly nations and commercial banks to cooperate in assisting the Syrians to meet short-term requirements for a stabilization program and restoration of a free currency. We shall seek actively to promote trade between the U.S. and Syria, and we shall propose U.S. participation in the next Damascus Fair. Discreetly we have encouraged Tapline to meet the Syrian request for an early settlement with Syria, which involves a lump-sum payment of probably something over $8 million by Tapline.
In summary, Syria must be dealt with with the same delicacy as the U.A.R. Too close an identification of Syria with the West must be avoided yet a clear and beneficial political and economic interest in Syria must be shown by the West. Western pressures on Syria and interference in Syrian internal affairs must be avoided. Since achieving independence in 1945 the Syrians have been unable to rationalize their internal affairs and we cannot do for them what they are unable to do for themselves. Means must be found to satisfy such arms requirements as the Syrian Army may have, and, if necessary, Israel must be encouraged to treat Syria with kid gloves. While we seek to sustain the present ruling elements we must avoid prejudicing satisfactory relations with other significant non-Communist groups who may succeed to power.
(This paper has been circulated in draft to Defense, Treasury and CIA. On date of submission no response had been received from Defense. CIA has indicated informally that it cannot accept exclusion of covert political operations.)
L.D. Battle
142. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, November 21, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office File, Staff Memoranda, Feldman, Myer. No classification marking.
At our meeting two weeks ago you asked that I furnish you with information regarding the level of assistance to Israel and the use of ICA funds by Israel.
Excluding Export-Import Bank loans, U.S. economic aid to Israel during the past four years has been as follows:
1958--63.5 million
1959--50.8 million
1960--65.1 million
1961--59.4 million (of which 10 million was actually received in fiscal 1962)
This aid was made up of special assistance, P.L. 480, and Development Loan funds. In addition, Export-Import Bank loans, made at irregular intervals, have averaged 12.5 million per year in recent years.
Since special assistance is no longer available, economic aid to Israel during 1962 must take the form of P.L. 480 aid, Development Loan type funds, and Export-Import Bank loans. The Israeli government has indicated that it would prefer to have its Export-Import Bank loans considered solely on their merits as bankable transactions for the assistance of American industries, rather than as assistance to Israel, and therefore excluded from any computation of aid.
The State Department is planning to recommend for 1962 about the same level of aid to Israel as it has received in the past--between 60 and 65 million dollars. It would, however, make up this sum by including P.L. 480 shipments of 26 million, Export-Import Bank loans of approximately 20 million, and only 15 to 20 million in Development Loans. Israel is very disappointed. It does not consider the Export-Import loans as aid of the same nature as the other assistance. Moreover, it argues that Secretary Dillon, under the previous Administration, promised a level of aid 30 million dollars higher than previously advanced to Israel in order to compensate for lack of military assistance. (You will remember that Prime Minister Ben Gurion raised this matter at his meeting with you.) Israel requests 25 to 27 million of P.L. 480 assistance and 35 to 40 million of Development Loans to equal the assistance it received in prior years (excluding the 10 million it received early in July under a continuing resolution which it regards as part of its fiscal 1961 aid). In addition, it has asked for 30 million promised by Secretary Dillon, making a total of about 90 million dollars, for fiscal 1962.
I recommend that Israel receive assistance equal to that of prior years, based on its own computations. That means, basically, that it should get Development Loans of 35 to 40 million dollars in fiscal 1962.
/2/The reference to CIA is apparently a typographical error. We have long recognized that there are benefits to the United States in loans from Israel to the developing nations. Israel has developed the following programs:
1) It trains African and Asian leaders in Israel. There are ten permanent centers for trainees in Israel.
2) It sends Israeli experts and advisors to interested nations. In the first 10 months of 1961, 205 Israeli experts were sent to Africa and Asia, 6 to Latin America. It now has a current request for 65 more.
3) It organizes teams of training facilities in interested nations to train their people. It is currently making preparations to create five centers for training capable of handling 500 trainees in five West African countries.
4) It establishes joint enterprises for training purposes. One joint construction company established by Israel in which the West African company employs about 5,000 local personnel with a total Israeli force of 50 people. Israel now has some form of technical assistance in 52 countries.
Advantages to the United States are as follows:
1) It is much cheaper. It costs approximately $800.00 a month to pay for the living expenses, travel, and books of one trainee in Israel, and approximately $550.00 a month to send one Israeli expert abroad. American costs are double.
2) Israel, because it is a small country, can often be more effective.
3) Israel has a mixed population of which 50% are of Asian or African origin and all are of recent pioneering tradition. This has proved very helpful in orienting the foreign nations properly.
Requests from Israel:
Israel has requested 5 million dollars per year. If she receives this she can continue her present level of operations and possibly expand it into Latin America where she is very anxious to undertake similar measures.
Two recent projects furnish an interesting illustration of how she operates:
1) Central African Republic
In the summer of 1961, Mr. Ehud Avriel, Deputy Director General of the Israel Ministry for Foreign Affairs, visited Bangui for discussions with President David Dako. At that time President Dako had been regarded as veering strongly toward the Soviet Bloc because of (1) his conflict with the French on a number of issues, and (2) the fact that his country had been visited by many delegations from Soviet Bloc countries. The situation was of particular concern in the light of the Central African Republic's important strategic position between Chad and the Congo. As a result of their discussions, President Dako asked for 15 advisors from Israel, together with 57 Central African Republic trainees to serve as supervisors of the various government programs. In addition, he asked for three people from Israel to serve as personal advisors to himself and nine people to serve as regional development officials. Although without funds, Mr. Avriel considered this so important a break-through, he committed Israel to furnish these people.
In the course of the conversations between the two men, President Dako said his country faced three choices:
1) He could turn to the Soviet-Chinese Bloc, but was sure he would end up under heavy domination by them;
2) He could rely on the Western powers, but he felt that these countries were interested in the maintenance of the existing social structure and this would not permit him sufficient scope for his revolutionary needs;
3) He could base himself on the Israeli model because Israel was a small country without a colonialistic past and with an original social structure.
2) Tanganyika
Between January and October 1961, 91 Tanganyikans were brought to Israel to participate in various projects. Among these were people designated to serve as permanent Secretaries of Ministries and in other similar posts. In October, immediately after his return from Great Britain, Prime Minister Julius Nyerere met with Mr. Avriel. The Prime Minister was discouraged and frustrated. He had been unsuccessful in Great Britain in his search for assistance and talked about turning to Moscow and Peking.
He revealed his intention to create in Tanganyika a revolutionary youth movement that would develop his country in the way China and the Soviet Union had been developed.
Mr. Avriel succeeded in pointing out that Tanganyika was less in need of a leadership that could mouth revolutionary phraseology than it was in the need of a trained youth that could put to use a spirit of dedication. Following the conversations Israel sent to Tanganyika the Director of a rural training institute to help establish a youth leadership and training center. In addition, there are now the following other projects: A joint construction company, a 2-man medical mission, 2 experts to organize the Independence Day Celebration to be held on December 9, 1961, a public health officer to be in charge of public health of the city of Dar-es-Salaam, an advisor to the Minister of Commerce, an advisor for agriculture planning, and an expert in fishing.
Similar stories are available for Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar, and Nyasaland./3/
/3/The notes of a telephone conversation on December 26 between Secretary of State Rusk and the AID Administrator, Fowler Hamilton, read as follows: "The Sec returned the call. Re aid to Israel: H gathers from Feldman that the Pres has decided unless there is some crushing reason against he wants to see that Israel gets as much as under the previous Administration. H has had a long session going over the economics of it and had a session with Talbot and Gaud and he can't see anything adverse politically if it were done. Unless the Sec feels otherwise they should go ahead. The Sec said yes--particularly when Nasser is making the noises he is." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
Myer Feldman/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Problem
You raised orally with me recently the question of Israel's security against Arab attack in light of continuing acquisitions of advanced equipment by the UAR.
Conclusions
In NEA there is frequent consideration of this problem. For a combination of reasons we believe (a) that for some time to come, if not indefinitely, Israel can expect to enjoy relatively good security despite the hostility and gradually increasing strength of her neighbors; and (b) there is no good reason for the United States to change its arms policy toward Israel. Our reasoning follows:
Discussion
A. Military Capabilities
We understand that last spring Defense reviewed Israel's situation thoroughly from a military viewpoint and concluded that, while UAR (then including Syrian) capabilities have increased relatively in recent years, there is still a considerable Israeli advantage over-all and that acquisition of "Mirage" aircraft by Israel should give Israel a clear edge in the air. Informal advice from the Pentagon assures us that there have been no developments since then that would alter this assessment, nor does the Pentagon support the Israeli assertion that in certain categories of ground equipment the combined Egyptian and Syrian forces outnumber them. In terms of leadership, morale, organization, training, logistics, maintenance and intelligence the Israelis enjoy clear superiority. There is no sign of an abnormal arms buildup.
B. Resources
While the national resources of the Arab neighbors of Israel are greater in total than those of Israel, several factors favor Israel: mobilization capability, massive financial and material support from abroad, a modern industrial base, scientific know how, skilled manpower, and a reasonably satisfied population.
C. Political and Psychological
1. Arab fear of Israel is deep-seated and can be overcome only by a wolf pack approach, wherein all Eastern Arab forces are united, gain courage from being united, and believe they are vastly superior to Israeli forces.
2. The deep internal Arab cleavages have been bared to the world twice recently in the Kuwaiti and Syrian crises. The likelihood that all Eastern Arab forces will in the near future unite under one command and operate according to one master plan is too remote to discuss seriously. The split-up of the Egyptian-Syrian union enhances Israeli security. Lebanon and Jordan have no intention of engaging in another round with Israel, and Syria will be slow again to divest itself of command of its own Army. The UAR alone cannot possibly cope with Israel; and Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Yemen are incapable of bringing effective military force against Israel.
3. The Arabs know and openly admit that, if they were to launch a major attack against Israel, the West would intervene. Where the West would stop in such intervention the Arabs could not be sure, for they do not trust the West. So long as the West maintains a military capability of intervening rapidly in force in the Near East and is known to be disposed to use it if necessary, Israel is protected by an external factor. Israel refuses to admit this, claiming to fear a surprise air assault.
4. In the 13-1/2 years since hostilities occurred in 1948 between Arabs and Jews, there has not been a major Arab military action against Israel. Whereas perhaps a large majority of Arabs would like to destroy Israel by military means, they show no early intention (not to mention capability) of trying to do so despite Israeli claims that the Arabs plan a major attack in 1963. No Arab leader can run the risk of sustaining serious military defeat, nor is the domestic situation of any Arab state so desperate as to drive it to foreign aggression. We simply cannot accept the Israeli thesis.
5. The UAR needs too much economic assistance for too long a time from the West to undertake a major attack on Israel, except under the most severe provocation.
6. For many months no competent observer has reported trends indicating a drift toward hostilities.
7. Israel has adequate sources of weapons other than the United States, including Israel's own rapidly developing armaments industry.
Concerns
In dealing with the Arab-Israel conflict we have two main concerns:
1. That Israel not come to feel politically isolated and/or in grave military jeopardy, lest she be tempted to engage in pre-emptive military attack against the UAR or Syria, or both. Hence our need to give adequate heed to Israel's political interests and particularly to her requests for economic aid.
2. That the Arabs not come to feel so threatened by Israel (nuclear weapons capability along with guided or ballistic missiles) that they launch in desperation a combined arms attack on Israel. Hence our need to assure ourselves and others regarding the Israel atomic energy program.
He first made a number of general points.
1. The U.S. must not take the neutralists too seriously or let their position on world issues annoy us. It is a major asset of this Administration that it is believed to be prepared to help the neutralists maintain their independence, despite disagreements on some world issues; and this asset should not be lost. In particular, he hoped that we would not break off our connection with Tito who, on balance, is a major Free World asset. U.S.-Yugoslav relations are taken as a touchstone of U.S. policy by some of the neutralists.
2. Arab-Israeli relations in the Middle East are quiet; in his view they should be left alone for a time. The possibilities of a more basic settlement will gradually emerge as domestic progress is made by all parties. There is no inclination on the part of Cairo to exacerbate the situation.
3. The U.S. should try to bring the Arab states together on a constructive basis; but if that is not possible, it should avoid setting the Arabs at each others throats--a situation which only leaves openings for Moscow to exploit.
4. We should try to concert our policies with our major Western European allies. When they conduct policies which are not in consonance with our own, Cairo argues that either the U.S. is incapable of asserting leadership within the Free World or we are being devious in letting our friends do our dirty work.
5. He then turned to U.S.-Egyptian economic relations. He said that he thought it was crucial to the future stability of Egypt and to U.S.-Egyptian relations to expand systematically our economic cooperation. There are three items in particular on which he is most anxious for a prompt U.S response:
a. Long-term PL 480 assistance;
b. The DLF loans for grain storage and distribution;
c. Extremely urgent, a U.S. loan of short-staple cotton to cover the major gap in this year's cotton harvest, so that long-staple cotton may be exported and the domestic demand for cotton goods by the peasantry may be met.
In the longer run we might want to envisage a systematic exchange of long-staple for short-staple cotton.
6. We then talked about the possibility of moving towards a consortium arrangement through the IBRD, which would organize Western assistance behind the Egyptian 5-year plan. He said that he understood that my observations were merely personal and exploratory; and that on his own authority he would try to elicit a reaction from Cairo. I emphasized that the crucial element in any consortium arrangement was the organization of a domestic program that was persuasive to the major lending countries and to such institutions as the IBRD, citing Indian, Pakistani, and Nigerian experience.
7. He emphasized several times that the policy of the Egyptian government was not merely independent but actively anti-Communist: in Egypt; in the Middle East; and in Africa. Despite possible differences on some issues, there was an ample area of common political interest between the U.S. and Egypt to justify a closer working relation.
WR
143. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, November 22, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 63 D 33, Chron. Memo to Secretary or Under Secretary. Secret. Drafted by Strong on November 21.
SUBJECT
Israel's Military Security
144. Memorandum of Conversation Between the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) and the United Arab Republic Ambassador (Kamel)
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