Documents 145-165
United Nations Debate on the Arab Refugee Problem/2/ /2/The decision to send a memorandum to the President on this subject resulted from a discussion held on November 21 among Talbot, Cleveland, Plimpton, and other Department officials on U.S. tactics during the forthcoming U.N. debate on the Palestinian refugee question. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., NEA/NE Files: Lot 64 D 73, Palestine Refugees) See Supplement, the compilation on the Arab-Israeli dispute. The United Nations Special Political Committee debate on the Palestine Arab refugees is scheduled to begin shortly after November 27. We have done considerable spadework to persuade both Arabs and Israelis of the wisdom of avoiding an acrimonious debate like that of last spring. Nevertheless, the debate promises to be a rough affair, with the United States getting at least as many brickbats as thanks for our efforts. The Arabs will probably press for several proposals designed to embarrass and hurt Israel, including appointment of a United Nations custodian of former Arab properties in Israel, reconstitution of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC), appointment of a Commission to inquire into the status of the Arab minority in Israel, and official recognition of a delegation of Palestinian Arabs who have come to New York for the coming debate. On its side, Israel is preparing itself for vigorous counterattack. Armed with a Ben-Gurion statement and Government-sponsored Knesset motion openly contradictory to United Nations resolutions which would permit some refugee repatriation,/3/ Israel will probably attempt to float for tactical purposes a resolution calling for direct Arab-Israel peace negotiations. We do not regard any of these possible proposals as helpful in terms of a practical advance on the refugee problem. /3/See footnote 2, Document 139. You will recall our sponsorship earlier this fall of the PCC's appointment of Dr. Joseph E. Johnson (Carnegie Endowment) as Special Representative to undertake an exploratory mission to the Middle East on the refugee problem. Dr. Johnson reports three basic conclusions: (1) there is a very guarded willingness on the part of both Arab and Israeli leaders to consider some gradual step-by-step process towards solution of the refugee problem, (2) the Special Representative function should be continued for about one more year to permit more thorough examination of the possibilities of a step-by-step solution, and (3) it will be necessary even under the most optimistic assumptions to continue international assistance to the refugees for at least a decade./4/ /4/Johnson submitted his report on November 24; see Document 140. Our objectives at the General Assembly are clear-cut. In terms of a resolution, we will seek support for two main elements of Dr. Johnson's findings: (1) the continuation for one year of the unobtrusive diplomatic effort already initiated by the PCC (i.e., the Special Representative), and (2) assent to a limited extension of the mandate of the United Nations refugee relief agency (UNRWA) now scheduled to expire on June 30, 1963. We believe this path offers the best hope for progress in an admittedly unpromising situation. We intend to press resolutely for our two proposals. Our general posture will be to examine other proposals from any quarter with an eye to their probable effect on the advancement of the PCC effort. This may entail opposition to Israeli as well as Arab initiatives, but we are anxious to avoid a role that would identify us as the special pleader for the partisan considerations of either side. Only thus can we hope to fortify our position as an objective party seeking constructive action in the interests of the refugees and area stability.
Our proposed positions on the proposals which may be introduced by the Arabs and Israelis, respectively, are as follows:
U.N. Custodian of Former Refugee Properties in Israel: We are opposed to this proposal, which is impractical, has dangerous implications for the future of Israel, and is based upon erroneous legal assumptions. We will vote against the proposal if necessary. We do not believe the complicated legal issues involved can properly be resolved by a body such as the SPC or UNGA. Privately, we regard the ICJ as an appropriate institution to which such legally contentious issues can be referred, and would not oppose such referral if it is urged by others.
Israel-Sponsored Motion for Direct Arab-Israel Negotiations: Since there is not the slightest prospect of the Arabs agreeing to sit down with the Israelis, we think this proposal could offer no practical result in advancing the interests of the refugees or a solution of the problem. (We recognize, however, that its introduction later as a counter to equally unhelpful Arab proposals might serve our interests. This would be the case if, by opposing it as well as Arab proposals, we could enhance our posture as a non-partisan supporter of progress along realistic lines.) For the foregoing reasons, we propose to vote against the Israeli proposal if necessary.
PCC Reconstitution: The PCC is now made up of France, Turkey, and the United States, a composition with which the Israelis are satisfied and the Arabs suspicious. While ultimately some benefit might derive from the addition of a few responsible neutrals less open to accusations of pro-Israel bias, efforts at this session to reconstitute the PCC would not be helpful to that body's current initiative, and might raise the specter of application of the Soviet "troika" principle in a Near Eastern context. We have made this clear to all concerned but are prepared to re-examine our position should broad support for the proposal develop. However, we consider it unlikely to be pressed seriously by the Arabs.
Inquiry into Status of Arabs in Israel: Israel representatives have tentatively indicated Israel might welcome a United Nations inquiry into the situation of Israel's Arab population. A greater probability, in our view, is that Israel would counter such an Arab proposal, if made, by demanding a parallel investigation into the status of Jews in the Arab countries. Should this issue arise, we would decide our position in the light of the tactical situation then prevailing.
"Palestine Arab Delegation": As in previous years, our position remains that membership of any Palestinian group should be heard by the SPC as individuals only and not officially recognized as "The" delegation representing all Palestine Arabs. This helps preclude an "Algerianization" of the Palestine problem. Should a proposal that the SPC hear "The Palestine Arab Delegation", as such, be pressed to a vote, we would vote negatively.
/5/ /5/On December 6 in circular telegram 1072, the Department sent additional guidance relating to the U.S. positions described in this memorandum to certain Near Eastern, North African, and European posts. (Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/12-661) See Supplement, the compilation on the Arab-Israeli dispute. Dean Rusk/6/ /6/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.146. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, November 30, 1961. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/11-3061. Confidential. Drafted by Palmer (IO/UNP) on December 14 and approved in S on December 24. A November 27 memorandum from Meyer to Rusk indicates that Meir requested this meeting with Rusk to discuss the forthcoming U.N. debate on UNRWA. (Ibid., 033.84A11/11-2761) A November 30 briefing memorandum from Cleveland and Talbot for Rusk is ibid., 325.84/11-3061. An additional briefing memorandum from Cleveland to Rusk of November 30 provided a proposed rejoinder for possible Israeli complaints about U.S. support for the inclusion of the United Arab Republic in the list of participants in the 20-Nation Disarmament Forum. (Ibid., 033.84A11/11-3061) SUBJECT
Palestine Refugee Item at the 16th United Nations General Assembly
PARTICIPANTS
Foreign Minister Meir of Israel
Ambassador Avraham Harman, Embassy of Israel
Minister Mordechai Gazit, Embassy of Israel
The Secretary
IO--Assistant Secretary Cleveland
NEA--Assistant Secretary Talbot
UNP--Stephen E. Palmer Jr.
The Foreign Minister apologized for taking time from the Secretary's busy schedule, but said that consultations seemed indicated on matters which Israel deemed vital. The Secretary replied that he was always happy to see the Foreign Minister.
Mrs. Meir stated that, in Israel's view, there were four major issues with respect to the General Assembly's current consideration of the Palestine refugee item. It was her understanding that the United States and Israel had identical positions on three of these issues; namely, those concerning "The Palestine Arab Delegation," the Arab property custodian proposal, and reconstitution of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. On the fourth issue, that of strategy and tactics in the Special Political Committee, there seemed to be differences of opinion.
The Foreign Minister described how the proposal calling for direct negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors was initiated. The idea stemmed from visits to Israel by several presidents of African countries. They had expressed concern about the lack of international understanding of Israel's position on the Palestine refugee question, and they had indicated a desire to do something about this situation. Recently Senator Humphrey had suggested that Israel put forward a positive proposal of its own, rather than merely to react negatively to Arab proposals. Even without any support from the United States, the "peace negotiations" draft resolution favored by Israel already had about 26 supporters.
/2/ Mrs. Meir asked the Secretary if he could not see a positive element, at least in the tactical sense, in there being on the table a "constructive" draft as a counter to "destructive" Arab proposals. She expressed understanding of the U.S. position which favored the continuation of the PCC-Johnson initiative, but maintained that the tabling of a resolution calling for negotiations would help rather than hinder the attainment of the United States objective in the General Assembly. It would be useful in demonstrating considerable Afro-Asian support for a moderate approach. For the Afro-Asian countries which were not ill-disposed towards Israel, it would be much easier to support a positive resolution than merely to oppose Arab demands./2/The possible draft resolution called for direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states. A similar draft resolution, sponsored by 14 nations, most of them from Africa, was defeated by the Special Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly on December 19. (U.N. doc. A/SPC/L.80/Rev. 1 and Corr. 1) Additional documentation is in Department of State, Central File 321.1.
The Secretary remarked that if it were possible, he would prefer there be no debate this year on the Palestine refugee problem. There had been too much talk on this issue in the public forum. However, as usual, a debate appeared inevitable. We would be happy if this Assembly's consideration resulted in no resolution, for none was needed. Our position was motivated by a desire to insure adequate resources for the refugees and to move forward on this problem as much as possible. We considered the Johnson approach to be the best one in the circumstances.
Noting that "The Palestine Arab Delegation" had bitterly attacked Dr. Johnson's report, Mrs. Meir stated that her Delegation would not speak against the Johnson effort. Given the Arab attitude, there was no hope whatsoever for a moderate debate. Would it not be better to have something on the table from both sides? The Secretary wondered if the negotiations proposal favored by Israel would have any practical result. Mrs. Meir said that even if it were not voted on, or if voted on and defeated, it probably would not have been a fruitless exercise. She recalled that the Arabs and other elements in the General Assembly had been pounding away on the theme of negotiations to solve various disputes; for example, those between the Netherlands and Indonesia and between Austria and Italy. Israel was not requesting active U.S. support for the proposed resolution. It was asking that the United States Delegation to the United Nations be instructed to inform other delegations that the U.S. did not oppose the floating of the negotiations proposal, and, moreover, considered it to be of tactical utility.
The Secretary observed that our problem was not so much with the content of the Israeli proposal. However, there were two or three Arab proposals which the U.S. must oppose. Our opposition to these would result in considerable oratorical blood-letting. This sort of situation created problems in our relations with other states; such was the case last spring. The Secretary reiterated that currently our major effort was directed towards the continuation of the Johnson Mission.
Mrs. Meir said that even if the United States did not particularly want a resolution, the Arabs certainly would press for custodianship and probably other unacceptable proposals, so why should there not be on the table something constructive from the other side? She expressed willingness, if the United States so advised, to ask Israel's friends to defer tabling their resolution until after the Arab resolution was tabled. Mr. Cleveland noted that while the proposed Israeli resolution might have some value as an element of tactical balance, its value to the United States would lie in our not being for it. The Foreign Minister said that she would be pleased if, when asked about the negotiations proposal by such delegations as the Norwegian or Swedish, USUN indicated understanding of its tactical advantage. However, if the United States were to indicate a negative position on the proposal, the extremist Arab demands might win Assembly approval, for other delegations would conclude that the U.S. was no longer concerned about Israel's basic interests in the United Nations context. She stated that if such Arab proposals as custodianship or a radical overhaul of the PCC were endorsed by the Assembly, this would bring to an end all of Israel's attempts to cooperate with the PCC.
The Secretary remarked that he would not wish other delegations to draw the inference, from comments USUN might make regarding the Israeli proposal, that the United States might vote in favor of it. He stressed that it was much more important to insure that custodianship was not approved, and the United States would appraise the various tactical alternatives with this in mind. In response to the Secretary's inquiry, Mrs. Meir speculated that the custodianship proposal might be approved again by the SPC, but that two-thirds approval in Plenary was probably not as likely.
The Foreign Minister noted that something which Ambassador Plimpton had suggested earlier in the day in New York had worried her considerably. She said the Ambassador had proposed that Israel try to prove that property abandoned by Arab refugees and taken over by the state had, in fact, been condemned by the Israeli Government for "public use" in accordance with the 1947 Partition Resolution. Going back to the question of possible resolutions, the Secretary said there were two considerations. One was the matter of our attitude towards the introduction of resolutions on this item at this session, and the second was the matter of our position regarding such resolutions as might be introduced. Mrs. Meir held that the effect of a U.S. stance of disfavor vis-?-vis both the prospective Arab and Israeli proposals would be to weaken the tactical value of the Israeli proposal. Certainly U.S. opposition to custodianship was not going to deter the Arabs from introducing that proposition. The Secretary said that it appeared better to him for the United States to take the position that it did not like either the Arab or the Israeli proposals. Of course, we could not very well ask the Israelis to put in their resolution so that we could vote against something besides Arab proposals.
With further regard to the Johnson Mission, Mrs. Meir stated flatly that Israel believed nothing would come of this endeavor. The reason was simply that the Arabs would not cooperate in any constructive approach. The Arabs did not wish to have progress made on the refugee problem except in a manner that would harm Israel. Israel was continuing to go along with the Johnson approach only because the United States felt so strongly about it.
Ambassador Harman noted that in 1952 the United States supported a resolution calling for direct negotiations between the Arabs and Israel. The Secretary said that we must all try to keep our eye on the big problem; to keep trying to make tiny steps towards a solution. In this context we must try to keep as much fever as possible out of the UN consideration of the problem. If the United States were to oppose Arab proposals, and then vote in favor of an Israeli proposal, the fever would be augmented. On the face of it, he said, who could oppose a call for negotiations? Mrs. Meir asked how the U.S. could conceivably vote against such a proposal. The Secretary reiterated that inasmuch as we were opposing some things the Arabs want, it would needlessly add to the anger in this situation if we voted for an Israeli resolution. Mr. Talbot noted that the Israeli proposal might appear to be a logical challenge to the Arab position, but asked if it would serve to advance the problem. The Foreign Minister said that the Arabs had already secured too much support for the proposition that peace was a good thing except in the Near East. She speculated that even if Dr. Johnson were to secure from King Hussein, for instance, a promise to cooperate, the King would not dare publicly so to indicate. The Johnson approach and all of the other quiet efforts designed to achieve "underground understandings" would have no effect as long as the above ground realities of Arab politics remained as they were. The refugees were above ground, not underground, and the Arab leaders apparently feel they cannot politically afford to compromise on this issue.
Reverting again to Mrs. Meir's request, the Secretary emphasized that he was extremely reluctant to open the possibility of any misunderstanding by other delegations regarding our attitude towards any resolution that would render more difficult the job that had to be done after the debate. He noted that the very debate might torpedo the Johnson Mission. The Foreign Minister's request was not something to which an automatic answer should be given. The Secretary said that we would like to consider it overnight.
PARTICIPANTS Following a discussion of the arrest of French officials and citizens in the U.A.R. (summarized Deptel 3158) Mr. Talbot indicated he would communicate this information to interested U.S. Government officials.
In a subsequent conversation the Ambassador admonished Mr. Barrow to endeavor to prevent anyone from creating the impression that the U.A.R. is unstable. He said that the U.S. Government could be sure that the present Government of the U.A.R. would be in existence for a long time to come, but even if it were not, the U.A.R. had been and would continue to be a country of utmost geopolitical importance. He therefore felt it was in the U.S.'s own best interests to take advantage of the opportunity being offered, irrespective of its attitude toward the present U.A.R. Government.
I. Background
As Embassy aware, we seized with unanswered request by UAR for consideration multi-year PL 480 sales agreement including wheat and other commodities. Multi-year program request from Israel also pending. Under present circumstances we believe UAR multi-year agreement, if undertaken, should precede any other in NE area. UAR's present efforts execute coordinated plan appear qualify it as possible candidate for multi-year sales arrangement under general criteria announced by U.S. In interest of stabilizing relations with UAR we should not turn down their request without having very sound, comprehensible reasons for doing so.
We recognize that in making long term commitment of this nature some short term bargaining power might be lost but consider that multi-year PL 480 arrangement could provide basis for greater confidence for conduct relations and reinforce existing favorable trends.
We had hoped development of stabilization program for UAR through consultation with IMF might provide appropriate setting for negotiation satisfactory PL 480 arrangement. It now appears unlikely that anything will develop this connection in near future.
Recent indications of willingness of UAR officials, including Vice President Boghdady (Embassy Despatch 220 November 1), II. Approach to Nasser
In introducing subject with Nasser, you may wish note with satisfaction improvement in US-UAR relations that has attended expanded economic cooperation of past three years and confirm our sympathy for UAR's sound economic development. You may recall that we were asked conclude single-year arrangement to meet UAR's urgent requirements for wheat and other commodities pending study of possibility of multi-year program and we agreed. You may wish point out that to date only limited number of longer term arrangements made, such as that with India in which significant contribution to India's third five-year plan and other essential economic considerations were identified. Establishment of Agency for International Development emphasizes and affirms our interest in using our available resources including food to support well designed and executed programs of economic development. You should stress we prepared in principle work out multi-year arrangement with UAR but have only most general understanding as to extent such major undertaking on our part, amounting perhaps to several hundred million dollars, would be justified on economic grounds. You would propose, therefore, that arrangements be made for technically qualified representatives of both governments explore matter in detail as basis for possible subsequent negotiation of multi-year arrangement. This connection you might wish indicate in general terms such relevant questions as (1) specific economic development projects to which Egyptian pound proceeds would be allocated, and (2) projections over next several years of foreign exchange shortfall occasioned by economic development spending. As necessary should be made clear that in proposing this review U.S. does not seek inject itself into or interfere with UAR policy and planning processes. Rather we seek identify what manner and what extent our food resources will support UAR's own development effort. May be useful mention that in other connections UAR officials have indicated interest in technical cooperation with respect planning and we of course desire be helpful as possible in this area. In conclusion you might indicate to Nasser that, if this procedure meets his approval, we would be prepared commence these exploratory discussions immediately.
If Nasser refers to need for other assistance or possibility of support through consortium, you may point out exploration of economic development problems as they relate to need for long term food programs would help clarify situation with respect other ways in which U.S. could assist UAR development program.
III. Framework of Proposed Discussions
In talking with other senior UARG officials you may wish point out additionally we envisage discussions which will develop rationale and demonstration of manner in which UAR's economic development planning will be facilitated by long term commitment in contrast possible availability of commodities under agreements which might be made from year to year. This connection detailed projections should be made of consumption and domestic production of commodities and foreign exchange deficits occasioned by development spending. Existing development plans should be reviewed from point of view of variety of factors of which following are intended as illustrative rather than inclusive: (a) Effect of plan on eventual capacity of UAR sustain consumption from own resources; (b) Appropriate allocation Egyptian pound proceeds to economic development projects; (c) Alternative and complementary sources non-inflationary Egyptian pound financing; and (d) Relative roles Food for Peace, including consideration of Title IV programs on ad hoc basis, and other external financing. FYI. We would not envisage extending discussion at this stage to detailed consideration role our project type development lending nor to possible advantages coordination Western assistance through consortium style approach. Developments bearing on UAR interest in consortium approach and readiness consider more extensive stabilization measures should however be reported. End FYI.
147. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, December 1, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.0086B/12-161. Secret. Drafted by Barrow on December 4.
SUBJECT
U.A.R. Requests for Major U.S. Economic Assistance
H.E. Dr. Mostafa Kamel, U.A.R. Ambassador
NEA--Phillips Talbot
NE--John R. Barrow
148. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic
Discussions would also develop information to support country team's recommendations for commodity composition including details relevant to necessary consultations with other suppliers.
Discussion of relationship multi-year program to broader objectives of mutual interest should also be considered, including support such long term assurances would lend to UAR efforts revise its foreign trade policies and reduce economic dependence on Soviet Bloc.
You should also caution UAR officials as appropriate that all PL 480 sales agreements, whether single or multi-year, subject to availability of commodities. Multi-year agreements also include provision for annual review, both amount of Title I commodities and usual marketing situation. Reviews would take into account U.S. stock position and changes in production, consumption, and stocks of other country.
Department should be kept informed by priority telegram as steps taken. Further guidance as to detailed information to be developed in discussions at either policy or technical level will be provided as requested. We plan concentrate substantive discussion and negotiation this subject in Cairo although will be desirable keep UAR Embassy in Washington generally informed of developments.
Rusk
Here, drafted as memo for President, is my case for a new initiative toward Nasser. As you'll see, I feel that now is the time to move, and suggest how.
Am sure Walt at least agrees, particularly in light of his latest chat with Kamel. Phil Talbot may still counsel waiting till January when we'll have a better idea of whether Nasser will still be Mr. Big. However, this is already December, so unless we get decision now we won't be ready then.
What I'm proposing is really little different from State's own thinking. The chief difference is one of style. I'd like to see us give Nasser the impression we're opening a new chapter, using as bait the very substantial aid we're probably going to give him anyway. Otherwise we'll tend to dole out this aid in little packages, without getting as much leverage from it as we might reasonably expect.
Bob K
Attachment
149. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
SUBJECT
A Shift in Policy Toward Nasser
Attached are two State Department papers bearing on what your staff has regarded from the beginning as one of the major foreign policy problems confronting your Administration. The first is in response to NSAM #105 asking what policy we should pursue toward Egypt in the aftermath of the Syrian coup,
/2/ and the other draft State Department policy guidelines toward the UAR./3/ /2/Document 141. /3/Reference is to one of a series of policy guideline papers initially prepared in the Department of State under the overall coordination of the Policy Planning Council, and then circulated to other agencies for comment and revised accordingly. A master set of the drafts and commentaries, organized alphabetically by country, is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 396. In both, State cautiously suggests a somewhat more forthcoming policy towards Nasser--a policy of limited objectives but one which will set us on the path toward a more constructive relationship resembling that of the pre-1955 period, and break the vicious circle of aloofness in US/UAR relations which has persisted since the Aswan Dam fiasco./4/ State stresses, however, the basic conflicts of interest which sharply limit the feasible extent of any rapprochement. Of course, dealing with Nasser partakes of all the problems of dealing with a charismatic neutralist leader whose ambitions and interests in many ways run athwart our own. In particular, the Arab-Israeli vendetta and Nasser's ambitions in Africa and the Near East create special difficulties in our relationship. /4/Reference is to U.S. withdrawal on July 19, 1956, of an earlier offer to explore funding for the construction of an Aswan High Dam. Meanwhile, we are processing a whole series of UAR aid requests of one sort or another, arising largely from UAR's current desperate economic straits: (a) the multi-year PL-480 request; (b) a grain storage project for which a $72 million DLF loan is requested; (c) a request for 350,000 bales of short-staple cotton; (d) a probable request for rice; (e) the Nubian monuments; (f) the insecticide request; and (g) Kamel's recent approach requesting economic planners as preliminary to a US-backed consortium. State would apparently continue to dole these out gradually without any fanfare, as an exercise in quiet diplomacy.However, the time may be ripe for a more positive initiative, aimed in the same direction State proposes and with the same objectives, but designed to optimize the impact on Nasser. The reasons would be as follows:
1. The "aid" requests mentioned above add up to a very substantial total, which if properly packaged and presented to Nasser should amply demonstrate that we really are seeking to open a new chapter in US-Egyptian relations. Why not use it in this manner?
2. Aside from one factor (see below), there has hardly been a better psychological moment for such an approach to Nasser. He is in a chastened mood after the Syrian debacle. This, plus serious domestic economic difficulties and some concern over his internal political position, is leading him to turn more inward, in an effort to revivify the Egyptian revolution. To help him do so would be quite in our interest. And Egypt's near bankruptcy, which has led to his new aid requests, creates a real opportunity.
3. Ambassador Kamel is trying as hard as he can to sell us on seizing it, and claims to have Nasser's backing. It is hard to separate out how much this is based on Kamel's own desire to promote a rapprochement, but his arguments are not to be ignored. Kamel's latest approach to Walt Rostow for planners and consortium aid is the most forthcoming yet.
4. Nasser himself seems to look on the new Administration as potentially more favorable toward him than the old. Your exchange of letters has been helpful, and US caution in the Syrian crisis has gained us credit.
5. Meanwhile Soviet/UAR relations are uneasy, with obvious divergencies over Syria and Iraq, creating an opportunity we can exploit. Nasser has already reoriented his policy to a significant extent: (a) he has put the Israeli issue on ice, at least for the moment; (b) he has apparently decided to rely primarily on the West for new development aid if he can; and (c) he has been shifting Egyptian cotton trade back toward Western markets after some unhappy experiences with the USSR. Moscow's veto of Kuwait's UN application is merely the latest indication of divergent Soviet and UAR aims. Both realize this, but Moscow is making new aid offers in an effort to keep Cairo from moving even farther away. Nasser will feel compelled to accept them if he has no other recourse.
On the other hand, Nasser's current domestic difficulties may make it premature to attempt a major approach to him now. Who knows, he may not survive. This may be the case, though most Arab specialists doubt that he's as shaky as all that. In any case, if Nasser disappeared, he would probably be succeeded by one or another of the new military elite who would be equally susceptible to a more forthcoming U.S. policy. I doubt that withholding greater support from Nasser because of the possibility he may fall is a very useful playing of the odds.
What could we accomplish? As State points out, the best we could achieve from a more forthcoming policy toward Nasser would be a strictly limited marriage of convenience; our interests run sharply athwart each other at too many points. At least in the early phases, moreover, we would be giving a lot more than we would get in return. Nor can we woo Nasser away from being a neutralist and nationalist (any more than Moscow could).
But what we might hope to achieve through a more professedly forthcoming policy is to create a vested interest on his part in better US/UAR relations, which would in itself inhibit him from taking actions which would upset it. Let us remember that Nasser could cause us a lot more trouble if he were actively hostile--in Libya, North Africa, Sudan, Syria, or on Suez transit and ME oil, to mention but a few instances. Thus perhaps our greatest gains would be negative; we would not get a great deal from Nasser, but at least we might restrain him from doing a lot of things we don't like. Finally, let's not forget we also share certain common interests with Nasser--he's as anxious as we are not to see undue Soviet penetration into the Middle East. A more satisfactory relationship would enable us to talk more frankly with him about where we agree as well as disagree.
This immediately brings up the Israeli problem. One cannot propose a new initiative toward Nasser without assessing its likely impact on Israel and its supporters in the US. The Israelis have said they would applaud rather than oppose an effort to turn Nasser's energies inward, but they are not unaware that any strengthening of the UAR may eventually be at their expense. However, any rapprochement which led to increased US influence over Nasser would give us more leverage to restrain him to some extent. Indeed, as part of any new policy initiative, we should make perfectly clear to Nasser our inability to support him against Israel; and, being on a more friendly basis with him, we would be better able to make such noises without generating a sharp reaction. The Arab-Israeli issue is one on which the UAR and US would simply have to agree to disagree.
Finally, what would this initiative cost us if it failed? It would not involve spending much more money on Egypt than I daresay we will spend in one way or another anyway (without getting full benefit from it). And if Nasser rejects our feelers, or if a rapprochement later became unstuck, it's hard to see how we would be much worse off than we were before. Would it precipitate Egypt any further into the arms of the Russians than if we had not tried at all?
What Next?--An Action Program. Since we are already contemplating some very substantial aid to Egypt (especially if we form a consortium), what is needed is to package and present this in a manner which will signal to the Egyptians the New Frontier's desire to be more forthcoming than its predecessor (and also what we might expect from them). Thus the chief ingredient to be added would be a new style and tone in our approach. What we might do is package the several aid projects under consideration in such form as to make them cumulatively impressive, and use them as the basis for a new diplomatic initiative, perhaps along the following lines:1. Prompt feelers to Nasser entourage to find out whether UAR is really interested in closer relations (a logical response to Kamel's overtures). This could be done in such a way as to whet Egyptian appetite, while still committing us to nothing if response were unsatisfactory.
2. If these went well, next step could be a stop-over in Cairo by a senior US official known to have President's ear. If a new tone is our objective, it would be better to start ball rolling this way. Bobby Kennedy or Chester Bowles come to mind; indeed this might be a good assignment for Mr. Bowles (though we would have to reassure UAR beforehand that he still has your confidence). This gambit would raise the level of dialogue a notch further.
3. A visit by Nasser to US in early spring, at which time you and he could have a full tour d'horizon and jointly discuss the new relationship. Nasser would be greatly pleased by such an invitation.
4. If all had gone well, our next major initiative would be to promote a consortium for support of a major Egyptian development effort sparked by a US commitment to contribute a substantial sum.
In sum, I cannot help but feel that a series of moves along these lines over next few months might start things moving in the right direction. They are designed to capitalize on aid we will probably give anyway, and they could be cut off at any point if UAR response was unsuitable to us.
Recommendation. That you discuss these proposals with SecState, with an eye to possible NSC debate and decision on new policy line, or ask us [?] to press with Ball in Sec/State's absence.
/5/ /5/The text of this sentence after the comma was added by hand, apparently by Bundy. R.W. Komer
150. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)
Situation Developing in Iraq
I believe it is timely to call to your attention and to that of other senior officers of the Department the situation that is developing in Iraq. In brief, prior to late June, 1961, there had been signs of a gradual orientation away from the Soviet Bloc, but since the time that Kuwait, which is claimed by Iraq, began to receive international recognition as a state following the new political and security arrangement between Britain and Kuwait on June 19,
/2/ Iraq has moved increasingly toward the Soviet Bloc in the conduct of Iraqi political and economic affairs and in its propaganda position. During this process, until recently, the Iraqi Government gradually increased its repressive measures against domestic communists, to the point that we came to believe that communist ability to threaten the security of the Iraqi state had been neutralized. /2/During a meeting of the U.N. Security Council on November 30, the United States and nine other members of the Security Council voted in favor of a draft resolution, introduced by the United Arab Republic, that contained a Security Council recommendation to the General Assembly that Kuwait be admitted to the United Nations. Kuwait was eventually admitted to the United Nations on May 14, 1963. Now, however, we believe a new phase may have been opened. Perhaps as the tacit price for the recent Soviet veto of Kuwait's application for membership in the UN,/3/ the Iraqi Government in the past two weeks has taken several steps which appear to permit the internal communists to strengthen considerably their internal position. In addition, Iraq has taken the drastic step of expropriating all of the IPC (and affiliates) concessionary areas except for fields now in production./4/ The Iraqi action against IPC was more drastic than we had reason several weeks ago to believe would be the case. Again it would appear that the Iraqi action, while calculated to avoid causing IPC to cease or decrease production, may have been more severe than originally intended in order to compensate the Soviet Union for its veto and in order to attract stronger Soviet support against inevitable IPC and Western pressures. It is, of course, possible that further measures against IPC are being contemplated. /3/The Soviet Union voted against the draft resolution on Kuwait. /4/On December 11, an Iraqi Government decree nullified the exploitation rights of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) and its affiliated companies (Mosul Petroleum and Basra Petroleum) on all .5 percent of the original concessionary area of 172,000 square miles. Negotiations between the Iraqi Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company to revise the concession had begun in August 1958 and were broken off on October 12, 1961, when IPC refused to accede to several Iraqi demands. Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony Mobil owned 23.75 percent of IPC. (Memorandum from Strong to Talbot, December 13; Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 63 D 33, Baghdad; Circular telegram 1129, December 17; ibid., Central Files, 887.2553/12-1761) Additional documentation is ibid., 877.2553. See also Supplement, the compilation on Iraq. The situation in Iraq, therefore, appears to be returning to something like the post-revolutionary period in 1958 and 1959, during which there was great alarm that Iraq was going communist. While in that period there were no issues between Iraq and the West other than the communist threat, now two other issues between Iraq and the West are included in the unhappy equation: (1) Iraq's claim to Kuwait, strongly pressed by Iraq's present leadership and (2) Iraq's unilateral violation of a major Western economic arrangement with Iraq, IPC.As a result of Iraqi action against IPC, we consider it possible the Department will be urged to retaliate against and place other pressures on Iraq. Likewise, as the Iraqi communists regain an important role in Iraq and appear to threaten Iraqi independence, there is likely to develop within the U.S. a strong feeling that we should intervene in Iraqi affairs. It would appear that Iraqi leadership intends to play a game of brinksmanship in its efforts to gain control of Kuwait and to obtain at least part ownership of IPC, utilizing Soviet support and frightening the West by permitting the resurgence of internal communism. That Iraq will use military force against Kuwait cannot be ruled out, although there would appear to be cogent reasons against doing so despite the richness of the prize.
From the Iraqi revolution on July 14, 1958 until the new British arrangement with Kuwait on June 19, 1961 the U.S. followed a policy of patience, tolerance, and scrupulous nonintervention toward Iraq. That policy paid dividends in the form of a gradual improvement in the atmosphere of U.S.-Iraqi relations and there appeared to be a prospect of even more fruitful relations including increased Iraqi importation of U.S. goods and services. However, following our declaration of open support for the independence of Kuwait and our approval of the U.K. military intervention in Kuwait, in both of which we had no suitable alternative, we were informed by the Iraqi Government that we had made a mistake and U.S.-Iraqi relations would suffer. The full ramification of Iraqi intentions is now becoming clear.
Short of direct military intervention, whether by U.S. forces alone or in conjunction with others or by Iraq's neighbors friendly to the West (Turkey, Iran, Jordan and Saudi Arabia), we lack effective means of achieving a reversal in Iraqi policy. While cessation of IPC production would not now appear likely, we believe that, if a decision were made to stop production, it would not necessarily create the desired effect and might well create even greater problems.
While it is clear that we must in due course openly object to the Iraqi move against IPC and must consider whether to endeavor to prevent Iraq from gaining from its unilateral breach of an important contractual obligation, we believe that we must exercise due caution in the manner and intensity of our official resistance to the Iraqi action. Further, we believe we must resist firmly all efforts to force us to undertake intervention of any type in the internal affairs of Iraq unless and until it is clear that the domestic communists stand to gain control of Iraq in absence of such intervention. In the present circumstances, for the U.S. and/or its friends to place severe pressure on Iraq or to intervene ineffectively in Iraq would only serve to increase the likelihood of a situation we do not want: a communist takeover.
We cannot guarantee that Prime Minister Qassim will not prove to be another Castro, though his past actions in reducing the Iraqi communists to relative impotence would justify the conclusion that he is an Iraqi and Arab nationalist and that he does not wish Iraq to fall under external control whether directly or indirectly. We believe, however, that he is capable of playing a serious game of brinksmanship with the Soviets and internal communists in pursuing his great nationalistic objectives.
Our objective is to the best of our ability to avoid pushing Iraq further along its present path and to endeavor to persuade certain of our allies and friends to pursue a similar course. In so doing the Department will be obliged to resist pressures from both within and without the U.S. Government to make statements and undertake actions that would be detrimental to the achievement of our objective. That there is serious risk in this course may be a frequent charge. That there would be serious risk in doing otherwise is our considered opinion.
While Mike is not very sanguine over the prospects of getting anywhere with Nasser, he does not think the domestic political repercussions would be insuperable if we handle them properly. Timing and adequate preparation would be important.
(1) Mike feels strongly that any Nasser visit must be quiet, without undue fanfare. He recalled that the ceremony surrounding King Saud's visit (3) Another essential was that we must be able to point to some concrete accomplishment from the visit, in order to turn aside any Saud-type reaction. It would look like a domestic defeat for the President to have received a neutralist with a record of hostility without being able to demonstrate that we got something out of doing so. Mike felt very strongly about this, and I quite agree that we must be able to show that any new relationship with Nasser is a genuine "two-way street."
(4) Mike wanted advance notice of at least a week before the visit, preferably before it was announced, so that he could lay the necessary groundwork. He thought that if we provided him with a good case, he could soften the adverse impact of the visit through his excellent contacts with leaders of the Jewish community (e.g. the periodic conferences of presidents of major organizations).
(5) Like Dick Donahue, King Saud has recovered from his illness and is recuperating from two eye operations performed earlier this month with the hope of improving his eyesight considerably. While the doctors recommend that the King remain convalescent in the United States another two months after his release from the hospital on or about December 30, the King may wish to return to Saudi Arabia shortly thereafter.
The King has expressed appreciation for your message sent to him at Dhahran in early November when his illness became known and for the flowers you sent to his hospital room. However, he has become somewhat concerned that the United States Government has not paid more attention to him. Word has reached him through others that the speeches of the chief Saudi delegate to the United Nations, Ahmad Shuqairi, and the negative response the King made to your letter to him of June 25 With regard to the King's response to your letter of June 25, the King is said to have informed confidants last week that he did not draft the letter and did not read it carefully upon affixing his signature. The King appeared to be genuinely disturbed to learn that the letter had displeased you. We should add that Saudi Arabia supported us in the "important question" vote on Chinese representation in the United Nations.
We believe that the time is propitious for you to invite the King to Washington. Therefore, we propose:
(1) That you authorize me to designate an official of the Department personally to extend on your behalf an invitation to the King to visit Washington on a day in early January convenient to you.
(2) That you approve the enclosed suggested letter to King Saud (4) That in addition to a private meeting with the King in the forenoon for discussion of subjects of mutual interest, you give a luncheon for the King and his party at the White House. To deter possible early Arab decision unfavorable to Special Rep concept, action addressees requested approach host governments soonest along line suggested below and at highest level required assure effective impact:
1. USG sincerely hopes host governments share its feeling deep satisfaction at temperate atmosphere which prevailed throughout informal Arab-US discussions during recently-concluded GA session. US noted with keen interest Arabs abstained rather than voting against US resolution. US trusts this augurs well for cooperation towards realistic progress, and that Arabs will on reflection not take onus of stymying PCC initiative. Throughout GA session US del adhered firmly to posture of impartiality toward refugee proposals sponsored by others, concentrating instead on concept which we convinced offers best prospect of serving refugees and enhancing area stability. US concept ultimately secured GA approval.
2. PCC will have soon consider most appropriate steps for carrying out GA directives for implementation Para 11, Res. 194 (III). PCC will wish give most careful consideration to variety problems and alternatives including, of course, possible re-appointment PCC Special Representative. US continues believe opportunities offered for quiet diplomacy by latter concept should be explored to fullest as soon as possible.
3. It may, however, be several weeks before PCC can determine precise nature further action to be taken. Thus US will wish in due course discuss with govts concerned possible further PCC activities.
4. In interim USG sincerely hopes host govts may be able give careful consideration further cooperation with Special Rep and that in any case they will refrain from judgments or actions tending foreclose further useful efforts by Special Rep.
You may also draw on following as appropriate: Arabs and many other dels expressed full satisfaction with Johnson personally. However, he has not yet decided accept re-appointment. Arab decision withhold further cooperation would inevitably affect his ultimate decision. US does not regard present PCC membership as sacred but believes that extensive pressure for reconstitution might well require US own resignation, contrary perhaps wishes some Arab leaders who believe US can make useful contribution to amelioration existing Near East problems. Finally you might make your Arab contacts aware that should they scuttle present initiative, US could not be counted on continue energetically seek progress in implementation Para 11.
For Amman: You should seek ascertain definitively whether extreme views of Palestine Arabs on Jordanian del represent considered views HKJ. Only alternative I can see to this dreary prospect is for Kuwait to become genuine concern of other Arab states, and specifically of UAR.
Nasser's reported decision withdraw small UAR contingent following Soviet veto of Kuwaiti UN membership suggests that he may prefer avoid liabilities of further involvement in what is for him messy situation. He can be fairly sure that British will for present keep Kuwait out of Qassim's clutches but will himself be free to castigate them as "Imperialists" for doing so and it is essential in my opinion that Nasser and other Arab leaders be given real incentive to involve themselves in fate of Kuwait. Too much is at stake politically (future shape and coloration of Arab world), economically (combined oil resources of Iraq and Kuwait) and psychologically (another Western "intervention" for Moscow to make hay with) for US and UK to be deterred by handful of avaricious Bedouin Shaikhs. Nasser appears to be key to problem, and it is past time Ruler is told he must find Nasser's price and pay it if he does not want to accept Qassim's commission as Qaimmaqam.
151. Memorandum for the Record
Mike Feldman's Views on Nasser Visit
152. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy
Proposed Meeting Between you and King Saud
153. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/
Washington, December 25, 1961, 3:52 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/12-2561. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Thacher (NEA) and Palmer (IO) on December 24; cleared by Cleveland in substance and by Talbot; and approved by Thacher who initialed for Rusk. Also sent to Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus and repeated to Baghdad, Ankara, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Paris, Khartoum, Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli, London, Taiz, and USUN.
210. Department concerned over indications that in wake GA rejection Arab proposals for PCC reconstitution and "protection refugee interests" in Israel,/2/ Arab governments might reach hasty decision refuse cooperation with possible further mission by PCC Special Representative.
/2/On December 19, the United States submitted a draft resolution to the U.N. General Assembly's Special Political Committee that requested the PCC to intensify its efforts under previous specified General Assembly resolutions concerning the Palestinian refugees and urged member states to increase contributions to UNRWA. A majority of the Special Political Committee adopted the draft resolution with two amendments, proposed by Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Pakistan, that would increase the size of the PCC from three to five members and would request the PCC to take measures to protect the rights, property, and interests of the Palestinian Arab refugees. During the General Assembly vote on December 20, however, the two amendments failed to gain the requisite two-thirds majority and the original U.S. draft resolution was adopted without change as General Assembly Resolution 1725 (XVI). The United States voted against the two amendments.
In general Department satisfied we have come through GA consideration refugee issue without bitter aftermath of kind that followed XV GA debate. In comments to USUN Israelis have expressed mild satisfaction. Arab reaction varied from appreciation US willingness vote against Israel-inspired direct negotiations resolution/3/ to annoyance at GA rejection Arab amendments and particularly at US unwillingness vote for or abstain on these proposals. Several Arab delegates asserted rejection PCC reconstitution in particular would make it difficult if not impossible Arab governments continue consult with PCC Special Rep should Johnson or someone else continue this function. Arabs claim they can have little faith in UN sub-body of which France a member. Arab League SYG Hassouna specially critical in this regard, foresaw little hope for further Arab cooperation with Dr. Johnson or any other special rep.
/3/On December 19, the Special Political Committee rejected a draft resolution, sponsored by the Central African Republic, Chile, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, El Salvador, Gabon, Guatemala, Haiti, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Madagascar, the Netherlands, Niger, Sierra Leone, Upper Volta, and Uruguay, calling among other things for direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, particularly on the Palestinian refugee question. The United States voted against the resolution. The defeated draft resolution was subsequently referred to as the Brazzaville resolution, after its primary sponsor.
Member UAR delegation gave Amb Plimpton rundown Dec. 23 on Arab meeting following GA approval of US resolution./4/ Arab dels agreed their govts should consider in near future question further cooperation with PCC special rep. UAR spokesman said all expressed reservations but Jordanians (whose senior members are themselves refugees) more vehement than others in indicating they would advise their govt not agree meet further with Special Rep. UAR spokesman noted UAR had been outvoted by those who were negatively inclined towards cooperation with present PCC. Several senior delegates, including Hassouna, have already or will proceed their capitals within next few days. However UAR informant did not expect any significant Arab decision before "week or so".
/4/Reported in telegram 2237 from USUN, December 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/12-2361)
Dept is, of course, most anxious take fullest possible advantage modest opportunities offered for quiet diplomacy by Special Representative concept. Johnson has informed us confidentially he believes he can accept re-appointment provided: a) parties indicate positively they want him; b) he will have easy access to FonMins and chiefs of state as required. Other PCC members agreed ad referendum Johnson should be asked continue strive for positive steps forward.
154. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State
/3/An Iraqi decree asserting Iraq's claim to Kuwait, issued in late June 1961, appointed the current Sheikh of Kuwait as "Qaim-Maqam" of the district of Kuwait under the authority of Basra Province. (Memorandum from Blackiston to Strong, June 27; ibid., NEA/NE Files: Lot 63 D 33, Baghdad)
If I read Nasser rightly, more than a crass bribe will be necessary. His pride and prestige will also have to be engaged if he is to stay interested. A device designed to give him both protective responsibility and some measure of claim on funds for development will have to be found. Similarly Jordan will have to be given tangible inducement to maintain political, and particularly military, commitment to preserving Kuwait's independence. Whether such arrangements are best worked out in series of bilateral agreements or whether problem better approached in context of establishment Kuwaiti-financed area develop organization (from which Iraq too could benefit) is question obviously requiring careful study. Ruler of Kuwait must, however, be made to realize that nothing less than major and continuing fin contribution to develop other Arab states (particularly oil have-nots such as Jordan and UAR) will in long run save Kuwait from total absorption by one of its neighbors.
The West can no longer afford present policy of reliance on British military protection, which seems to be most attractive one to greedy, short-sighted Shaikhs. Under circumstances it behooves us to seize initiative while time (now very short) remains.
Jernegan
SUBJECT Intense British concern with their large stake in Kuwait and their apparent determination to pursue a policy of firm response to the slightest indication of aggressive Iraqi intentions, led them in the last few days to order an aircraft carrier and small vessels from Kenya to the Persian Gulf area. The British Air Transport Command has been placed in an alert status. By giving these moves plenty of publicity, the British have sought to exercise a deterrent effect on Prime Minister Qasim of Iraq. The intelligence items on which the British acted did not seem to us to indicate any real danger.
These British steps may well have had the desired effect in impressing the Iraqis. Other results, however, are not so helpful. Iraq has sent a letter of protest to the President of the United Nations Security Council describing the British moves as an "aggressive, imperialistic" exercise in "gunboat policy". Against these advantages and pressures Qasim must measure the strong possibility of a military defeat at British hands and possible open hostilities with the Arab League. Regarding the latter, Qasim may feel that "Arab will not fight Arab" and that there is little real determination behind the League's intention to defend Kuwait, particularly in view of the recent withdrawal of UAR troops there. Qasim must also be aware that he probably could not occupy Kuwait without seriously disrupting the entire structure of oil production, sales and royalty payments which make Kuwait a valuable prize. Qasim may be playing a cat and mouse game with the British, hoping to wear them (and the UK treasury) down by a series of scare gestures which will make it increasingly clear to the rest of the world and the Arabs in particular that Kuwait is, after all, only a British colony.
The British have indicated they will not further intensify at present their precautionary measures with regard to Kuwait.
I propose to discuss with the British Embassy here some of the considerations set out above and we have asked our Embassies in Kuwait and London to discover the extent to which the British are encouraging the Kuwaitis to maintain Arab League support. 1. British troop landings in Kuwait prior to an actual Iraqi attack. In view of the adverse political effects of British military moves, we are prepared to express to the British our views should we feel there is a sharp cleavage between our estimate of the imminence of an attack and theirs. Should there be, however, a preponderance of events indicating aggressive Iraqi moves are pending we should be prepared to act favorably on possible British requests of the type we received last summer, i.e., assistance in obtaining permission for overflights of Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. We should be prepared to reaffirm publicly, if it would seem helpful, our acceptance of Kuwait as an independent, sovereign nation. While British determination to defend Kuwait must be clear at all times, we believe that a positive US affirmation of an intention to participate in this defense would be unnecessary and would probably strengthen Iraq's case for greater Soviet assistance and weaken Kuwait's posture as an independent Arab country. Thus we should refrain from public military gestures, such as the dispatch of naval vessels in support of the British position. Given substantial evidence of an Iraqi intention to attack, we should be prepared to support fully Security Council consideration of Iraq's aggressive position.
2. Actual hostilities between British and Arab League forces on one side and the Iraqis on the other. In this case we would, of course, identify ourselves publicly with the British and Arab League efforts to protect Kuwait's sovereignty. We should be prepared to consider British requests for logistic support, perhaps in supply of air transport or weapons. We have developed in planning talks in London some understanding as to the possibilities for limited US assistance in these circumstances. We should be prepared to make known to the Soviets our intention to support the British to the fullest extent but only if there should be unmistakable signs of major Soviet intervention on the side of Iraq.
Suggest we pass Baghdad 286 (attached) to President. 2. Kassim seems determined to push IPC to the wall. Both US and UK embassies believe IPC must continue production because to cease would have violent repercussions and might lead Kassim to grab Kuwait or throw himself into Russian arms.
3. Meanwhile Kassim keeps beating Kuwait drum. He is on to a good thing here, both as a diversion from his domestic failures and as an opportunistic gamble. If he can add Kuwait production (largest in ME) to that of IPC, he'll have stranglehold on ME oil. Sovs would have much to gain if Kassim took over Kuwait. So Soviet veto of Kuwait UN application and Kassim's subsequent release of Commies from jail make me suspect a deal. UK is obviously worried about a coup de main; Iraq might strike before Kuwait defense forces can be built up. Both place little reliance on present Arab League contingents (1100 Saudis, 900 Jordanians, 140 Sudanese).
155. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (McGhee)
United States Responses to Tension Regarding Kuwait
156. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
[1 paragraph (4-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
However, our tendency has been to sit back and regard IPC, Kuwait and even Iraq as UK baby. But we own 23.75% of IPC Walt and I here, and now Jernegan in Baghdad, have been plugging theme Kuwait's independence can only be assured if Ruler uses his fantastic oil revenues to buy support from other Arab leaders, particularly Nasser and Jordanians, perhaps through some Arab development scheme. Only in this way will he be able to create any vested Arab interest in preserving this anachronistic place.
Jernegan's blast may stir State out of its usual "wait and see" stance. Meanwhile, I've been urging on Phil Talbot and Walt some anticipatory planning. But an indication of Presidential interest would help to get things moving. How about the attached? In response to an inquiry from your office regarding the status of the Title I PL-480 cotton request from the United Arab Republic, I am able to report that it is under consideration among the agencies concerned. The Department believes it is politically important to respond favorably if at all possible. However, the Egyptian request comes at a time when a serious problem of availability has already arisen in connection with earlier requests for cotton from a number of countries, some of them heavily dependent for many years on United States assistance in securing cotton.
Because of heavy crop losses from the severe leaf worm infestation of its current cotton crop, the United Arab Republic has requested 350,000 bales of United States Upland cotton of 1 to 1-1/8 inch in length under Title I of PL-480 to meet a shortage of cotton needed for the production of mass-consumption textiles. The United Arab Republic would continue to export its long and extra-long staple cotton but has given assurances that it (1) would refrain from exporting its own medium staple during the current year (other than deliveries on sales made before the extent of the crop damage was understood) and (2) would not export yarn or textiles produced from the PL-480 cotton.
There is no question that the United Arab Republic's economy has suffered a severe loss from the leaf worm infestation. About 35% of the cotton crop was destroyed. Export prospects are down sharply and the loss in export earnings alone is expected to exceed $100 million. In addition, the availability of cotton varieties for local consumption is substantially reduced, posing the alternative of diverting more expensive longer staples from export markets, or causing consumption of textiles by the mass of the people to be reduced. The United Arab Republic's weak foreign exchange position does not permit it a third alternative of purchasing medium staple cotton from abroad.
Although the request is for 350,000 bales, we consider this excessive in relation to domestic needs and believe a much lower figure would be more appropriate; i.e. in the range of 50,000 to 100,000 bales. Anything much less than 100,000 bales might be politically unacceptable to the United Arab Republic, while a larger amount might stimulate export pressures. We would expect to include in any agreement with the United Arab Republic on PL-480 cotton appropriate limitations on exports of raw cotton and cotton yarns and textiles.
We have already informed the U.A.R. that the quantity of cotton presently available for Title I programming is entirely committed and that it has not been possible since mid-October to consider additional requests. We have urgent unfilled requirements involving a total of 376,500 bales for Korea, the Republic of China, Morocco, Ethiopia and Bolivia, where for the past several years we have been supplying cotton under Section 402 of the Mutual Security Act. Although the requests of these countries must receive first priority attention, there are also compelling foreign policy reasons for giving favorable consideration to the requests of such other countries as Viet Nam and India, as well as the United Arab Republic, provided normal Title I program criteria are met.
In view of the foregoing, the Department of State is pressing for a review of the over-all question of cotton availability from existing stocks for PL-480 programming during this fiscal year and has recently sent a letter to the Department of Agriculture (a copy of which is enclosed) It may also be of interest that the Department has just received a diplomatic note from the Peruvian Embassy objecting to the possible sale of PL-480 cotton to the United Arab Republic. The Peruvian Government's concern is that such a sale would enable the United Arab Republic to export larger quantities of cotton. Peru is sensitive about our PL-480 cotton sales in general but in the case of the United Arab Republic the sensitivity is sharpened by the fact that the two countries export similar types of cotton.
This status report brings out various factors and problems which must be considered in the United Arab Republic's request for Title I cotton, but we hope that, if Title I availability permits, a cotton program for the United Arab Republic can be developed which will be acceptable to all parties concerned.
M.L. Manfull
157. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
United Arab Republic Request for PL-480 Sale of Cotton
158. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State/1/
Beirut, January 8, 1962, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/1-862. Top Secret; [distribution indicator not declassified].
659. With the arrest of Abdullah Saade and other PPS leaders,/2/ Lebanese authorities are likely to learn from interrogations that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] had continuing relationships with PPS since 1958. Hopefully interrogators would also acquire sufficient background evidence of coup attempt of 31 December to reach their own conclusion that US Government in no way involved. While we cannot predict what action Government of Lebanon might take in response to evidence [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as may come to light, there is some basis for hope that GOL would explore matter discreetly with Embassy prior to any public charges.
/2/At dawn on December 31, members of the Syrian National Party (PPS) staged an attempted coup against the Lebanese Government. The Lebanese Army and security forces promptly suppressed it. Reports from the Embassy in Beirut and other posts in the region concerning the coup are ibid., 783A.00.
There is always possibility that an irresponsible official such as Kamal Jumblatt/3/ (who appears to be exploiting present situation to settle scores with PPS and its friends) may give publicity to USG connections with PPS, or without GOL sanction. This might be as part of GOL attempt to divert attention from current Lebanese feelings that arrests, interrogations, and investigations are excessively harsh. If USG connections with PPS are publicized, widespread allegations against British involvement in coup may help blunt impact of charges relating to Americans.
/3/Hereditary Druze chieftain and Lebanese Minister of State for the Interior and Planning Services.
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] I [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] opposed to taking any special defensive initiative in advance of any GOL inquiry or in advance of any press reports of USG and PPS associations. Such initiative is only likely to be interpreted as admission of guilt or cover-up for actual involvement in coup. Meanwhile my response to Takla's probing (Embtel 651)/4/ may have effect of forestalling GOL suspicions of USG.
/4/Meyer reported in telegram 651 from Beirut, January 6, that when Lebanese Foreign Minister Takla referred to recent developments in Lebanon, Meyer had assured him that the United States had no advance indications of the recent coup attempt and that the United States believed that the internal politics of Middle Eastern states and interstate relationships were matters for decision of the people of the area and that there was no change in the traditional U.S. disposition to be a friend of Lebanon. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.83A/1-662)
[1 paragraph (7-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
Meyer
In explanation of this proposed program I enclose the following:
1. Over-all rationale;
2. Explanatory memorandum on message from you to President Nasser and text of message on economic cooperation;
3. Memorandum seeking your good offices to secure the services of Dr. Edward Mason of Harvard University for a two-week exploratory economic mission to the United Arab Republic; and
4. Memorandum suggesting an invitation to President Nasser to visit this country.
I should be grateful for your consideration and, if you deem appropriate, approval of each of these individual steps.
Dean Rusk
159. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy
Action Program for the United Arab Republic/2/
/2/On January 23, Kaysen forwarded the action plan to President Kennedy together with a commentary on it by Robert Komer dated January 15 (Document 163), and Komer's memorandum for the record of December 20, 1961 (Document 151). (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, United Arab Republic, Nasser Visit)
Following reconsideration of the key position of the United Arab Republic in the Near East and Africa and in light of urgent requests for various forms of aid put forward by the U.A.R. Ambassador here, we are proposing a program of coordinated steps in our relations with this important country. Our objective would be to encourage orderly economic development in the United Arab Republic with beneficial consequence for Near East area stability, and to provide significant Western alternatives to U.A.R. economic, and possibly political, dependence on the Soviet Bloc. We propose no sweeping commitments to the U.A.R. at the outset and, prior to initiating each step, we would review carefully the nature and extent of U.A.R. responses to previous steps.
Enclosure 1
SUBJECT
Action Program for the United Arab Republic: Rationale and Recommendations
Background
The United Arab Republic's severe economic plight and its fear of over-involvement with the U.S.S.R. have led to initiatives to secure more comprehensive U.S. economic assistance. It is clear we have come to another crossroads in our relations with the Nasser regime, similar perhaps to those that confronted us on the arms question in 1955, on the High Aswan Dam in 1956 and on the initial request for wheat under PL-480 in 1958. Our purpose is again being tested and how we respond may set the pattern of our relations with the U.A.R. for a considerable time to come. Ironically, we are again in a situation where either a positive or a negative response is fraught with possible dangers. In proposing this program we are aware that the United Arab Republic's present political posture, its antagonism toward France and the United Kingdom, its seizures of private industry and other property, its attacks on other Arab leaders, its continued (but currently non-activist) hostility toward Israel and its dealings with the Soviet Bloc create an atmosphere which in the short-term inhibits the development of mutual confidence between us. It is not in our interest to condone these policies or to bail the U.A.R. out of the difficulties in which it finds itself. Our purposes are principally long-term.
In the light of our earlier experiences and to achieve our broad objectives in the Near East, and despite the unhappy policies currently pursued by the U.A.R, we believe a cautiously positive response is indicated. Thus, we have sought to devise a step-by-step plan of action, evaluating results achieved and the over-all atmosphere of our relations before embarking on each successive stage. Our plan is not rigid; its steps can be altered to fit circumstances as we proceed. An essential element is the avoidance of irrevocable commitments.
Our general policy toward the U.A.R. has been set forth in a memorandum to Mr. Bundy of November 16, 1961.
/4/ The action program here proposed is consistent with the earlier policy statement. /4/Document 141. ObjectivesAn important underlying motive is our desire to capitalize on the opportunity to work in a backward but key geopolitical country which has already adopted many of the reforms sought in the Alliance for Progress. In this context, long-term objectives must be separated from short-term tactical considerations. We do not, of course, seek or expect specific political commitments in return for expanded U.S. interest and assistance. However, by responding to urgent U.A.R. requests we can reasonably expect:
1. Further important strengthening in the fabric of U.S.-U.A.R. relations resulting in:
2. A greater over-all U.A.R-.U.S. involvement carrying with it a tacit and restraining influence on U.A.R. policies in matters of direct significance to the U.S.
3. Prevention of excessive U.A.R. dependence on the Soviet Bloc with the risk of growing U.A.R. responsiveness to Soviet pressures.
4. Creation of a deterrent to radical behavior on Nasser's part, both internally and abroad.
There are concrete indications that the U.A.R. seeks consciously to follow political policies that will enhance its prospects for securing U.S. aid. Nasser's consistently forthright attacks on communism, and on the Soviets when they overreach themselves, is one such indication. His relatively helpful stance at the recent Belgrade Conference is another. During the recent United Nations General Assembly debate on Palestine refugees U.A.R. representatives were a restraining influence on Arab extremism. U.A.R. policy in the Congo has recently veered away from direct intervention in favor of the Soviet-oriented forces of Antoine Gizenga and a disposition to eliminate the cleavage between the Casablanca and Monrovia powers has recently been indicated. While Nasser publicly inveighs against "reactionary" rulers, at the same time he emphasizes to his people the necessity of concentrating on internal U.A.R. development.
We can hope our assistance may exert a subtle influence on the U.A.R. internal political structure. Since the Syrian revolt there is evidence that Nasser has been sharing some of his power with former members of the RCC, some of whom, such as Baghdadi and Muhyiddin, lean to the West whereas others lean to the Soviets. The U.A.R. Ambassador has informed us that current U.A.R. requests originated with Baghdadi, the economic czar. The latter's position will be strengthened to the extent he succeeds in obtaining Western assistance.
On the other side of the ledger we have to recognize that Nasser is not reliable and that his cooperation can only be insured as long as he thinks the stakes are high enough to justify it. Even then unforeseen developments, for example the "Cleopatra" incident, can quickly destroy the good work of many months. Nasser is presently addicted, perhaps incurably, to a radical type of socialism which is inimical to our concepts of free enterprise. Senator Humphrey believes, on the basis of his recent interview with Nasser, that more exposure to American business methods might tend to moderate Nasser's doctrinaire attitudes. Ambassador Badeau believes that the pragmatic necessity of making his economic program work will temper some of these views. This remains to be seen.
Nasser's current obsession over security, his arbitrary arrests and sequestrations and his handling of the French espionage case are not to be condoned. There is a systematic program against foreign minorities who are disliked because of their past dominance of Egyptian business and commerce. Aid for the U.A.R.--the enemy of Israel and a leading neutral--is not easy to sell to Congress and the U.S. public. In our economic aid we must proceed cautiously to avoid bailing the regime out of the economic consequences of the recent wholesale nationalization and expropriation. U.S. aid must not, of course, be used to enable the U.A.R. to purchase arms from the Soviet Bloc.
Conclusions
On balance we believe we should seize the opportunity presented us for constructive, long-term action. If we hesitate or stall such an opportunity may not soon occur again.
Plan of Action
Aside from maintaining current programs of assistance, we have in mind these inter-related steps, namely:
1. Conclude a multi-year PL-480 agreement (with a provision for annual review) indicating our decision to open negotiations by a message from you to Nasser. We would anticipate our PL-480 aid to continue at about the current level of $120 million annually. Conclusion of this agreement would be contingent on U.A.R. cooperation in providing access to pertinent information to justify it.
2. Offering to send an economic consultant with respect to possible economic planning assistance or other forms of economic cooperation.
3. An invitation to Nasser for a formal state visit in the spring or fall of 1962 depending upon your political judgment as to which time would be most suitable.
In addition, we should keep in mind the need for a financial stabilization program. If the U.A.R. is willing to accept a new IMF mission and will undertake to implement its recommendations, the IMF may, during the spring of 1962, undertake to work out a stabilization program of $150 million or more, of which upward of $75 million would have to come from non-IMF sources including the United States.
Other steps such as dispatch of a permanent U.S. Government, private or international economic planning mission, participation in an IMF-financed stabilization program and concerting with the IBRD and/or other nations in an organized lending program are dependent upon what emerges from the crucible of exploratory talks, a Kennedy-Nasser confrontation, and on the ability of the U.A.R. to demonstrate to the IBRD and other donors its eligibility for such an arrangement. With the exception of possible participation in an IMF-sponsored stabilization program, no new U.S. aid would go to the U.A.R. until the end of Calendar Year 1962 at the earliest.
We believe the multi-year agreement is (a) a means of reaping a political dividend without raising the level of the aid we are able to provide on an annual basis; (b) a modest partial response to the U.A.R.'s appeal for closer economic cooperation; (c) genuinely of value to the U.A.R. planning effort; and (d) from the standpoint of the needs of the Egyptian people, completely justifiable in terms of the basic concepts of the Food for Peace program. We believe it should be concluded prior to an agreement with Israel, for which the Israelis are pressing.
We believe the proposed exploratory talks by an economic consultant are desirable (a) as an indication that we take the U.A.R. professions of a desire to cooperate seriously; (b) as a means for testing U.A.R. intentions; and (c) in order to come to grips with the problems involved in a more comprehensive economic association, should it at some later time appear desirable.
We believe the Nasser visit is desirable (a) to provide an opportunity for a personal confrontation with you; (b) to educate Nasser about the U.S. and the West generally (he has never visited a Western country except for his 1960 United Nations General Assembly appearance); and (c) to overcome his sense of ostracism which we believe has adversely affected his attitude toward the U.S.
We are mindful of the possibility of these steps appearing to be an endorsement of the Nasser regime, but believe the U.A.R. itself will seek to play down any public suggestion of closer ties with the U.S. Any concrete development, such as actual signature of the multi-year agreement or announcement of a Nasser visit would presumably not take place for some months yet, hopefully after the current dust kicked up by Nasser's internal measures has settled. And there is reason to hope that taking these steps might cause him to settle the dust faster than he otherwise might. We are not in a position to judge the effects of domestic U.S. reaction and we are mindful that, from a foreign policy standpoint, there are calculated risks involved. We nevertheless feel that action on these lines would be desirable in considering all circumstances.
Enclosure 2
SUBJECT
Proposed Letter to President Nasser on Economic Cooperation with the United Arab Republic
We have had a number of appeals by the United Arab Republic Ambassador, acting, he asserts, on instructions from President Nasser, for closer cooperation with the United States in the economic field. These approaches have been set in a clearly identifiable political context.
On the basis of these requests we called Ambassador Badeau back to Washington and worked out with him a step-by-step program designed to strengthen our position in the United Arab Republic, each step to be carefully reviewed prior to its being undertaken.
Ambassador Badeau agreed that an appropriate beginning would be to offer Nasser exploratory conversations looking to conclusion of the three-year Public Law 480 food sales program urgently requested by the United Arab Republic. It was also agreed the Ambassador would discuss the possibility of your appointing a special consultant on economic planning to join with Ambassador Badeau in preliminary talks aimed at delineating such areas of economic planning assistance and economic cooperation as might be practicable and constructive in terms of United States-United Arab Republic interests. In a separate paper we will propose Dr. Edward Mason of Harvard University as the candidate for this task. The Agency for International Development has suggested that it might be well to obtain Dr. Mason's approval in principle to undertake the task before the message is sent since it is difficult to obtain the services of consultants of the caliber required.
In order to strengthen our Ambassador's position in the United Arab Republic, to lend added weight to this approach, and as an opportunity to further develop your relationship with President Nasser, we propose that you authorize Ambassador Badeau to deliver to President Nasser the letter embodied in the attached draft telegram.
Your approval of the proposed message to President Nasser is requested.
Enclosure
Pursuant your consultations in the Department and to instructions Department telegram 736,
/7/ you authorized seek interview and present following written message to President Nasser from President Kennedy: /7/Document 148. His ExcellencyGamal Abdel Nasser,
President of the United Arab Republic.
"Dear Mr. President:
"I have asked Ambassador Badeau, who has been consulting in Washington on matters affecting relations between our two countries, to speak to you on my behalf on a subject which has been much in our thoughts lately, namely the form and content of our economic assistance program in the United Arab Republic. Recognizing the importance of economic cooperation to improved living standards, the fostering of political stability and as a factor in promoting good relations between us, we have constantly sought to give sympathetic attention to the needs of your country.
"Recently your Ambassador in Washington has discussed with a number of United States officials possible means for developing the United States contribution to the United Arab Republic's programs for economic planning and economic growth. We asked Ambassador Badeau to return to Washington to aid us in understanding the objectives you have in mind. A number of possibilities were reviewed.
"It is a matter of great personal satisfaction to me that we have now instructed Ambassador Badeau to inform you that he is authorized to commence detailed discussions with your Government regarding conclusion of a multi-year agreement for sales of food grains to the Government of the United Arab Republic by the Government of the United States. It is my deep hope that the negotiation and implementation of such an agreement will engender an exchange of information and ideas beneficial to concepts of cooperation between our two countries.
"I am aware of the interest of your Government in further intensive study of the problems of economic planning, economic development and trade. Should you wish to explore these matters in further detail with us, I should be happy to seek the services of a well-qualified consultant in economic planning to join with Ambassador Badeau in discussing them with you and appropriate members of your Government.
"Let me reiterate, Mr. President, my sustained interest in strengthening relations between our countries and my hope for continued close official and personal contacts between our peoples and governments. Ambassador Badeau, who has my fullest confidence, is prepared to convey to me whatever thoughts you may have on any of the foregoing subjects.
"Sincerely yours, John F. Kennedy"
Enclosure 3
SUBJECT
Recommending that you Request Dr. Edward Mason to Undertake Exploratory Mission to the United Arab Republic
I refer to the memorandum on the subject of economic cooperation with the United Arab Republic.
The United Arab Republic Ambassador has had conversations with Dr. Rostow (then of the White House staff), Assistant Secretary Talbot and Mr. Eugene Black of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development regarding the United Arab Republic's desire for high-level planning assistance in its economic development. The Ambassador later indicated that a United States planning mission of two to six persons would be desirable, emphasizing, however, that the quality of the planners would be more important than the quantity and that it was important to have only individuals of the most outstanding qualifications.
Ambassador Badeau, who has been here on consultation, believes that the present Egyptian concept of the role of such planners, their access to information pertinent to their work, and their terms of reference may leave something to be desired. He urged that as a preliminary step an eminent planning consultant go to the United Arab Republic in early February, or if more convenient in January, to discuss with United Arab Republic officials and ultimately with President Nasser the United Arab Republic's economic development plan, the problem areas in the United Arab Republic planning and economy, the role that a United States planning group might play, the prerequisites for effective collaboration with the United States in the economic field, and the facts of life about a consortium approach to the United Arab Republic problem. He would also make recommendations to us.
The name of Dr. Edward Mason of Harvard, who is well known to you, has been proposed by Dr. Rostow as an excellent choice for such a mission, which need not last more than two weeks. It is believed, however, on the basis of several recent rejections by Dr. Mason of consulting assignments, that he would accept only if asked to do so by you. Moreover his prestige and influence would be greatly enhanced if it were made known to the United Arab Republic that he is your personal choice for this task.
I should be most grateful therefore if you could ask Dr. Mason, who can be reached by telephone at University 8-7600 in Cambridge or by mail at Littauer, Harvard University, to undertake this mission. If he accepts, the Department would, of course, provide an appropriate briefing prior to his departure.
Enclosure 4
SUBJECT
Recommendation for a Visit by President Nasser of the United Arab Republic in the Spring of 1962
An invitation to President Nasser of the U.A.R. to visit the U.S. has been frequently discussed within the government through the years. Rumors have appeared in the press and hints have been thrown out to Nasser by various visitors, latterly Senator Humphrey, that such an invitation might soon be forthcoming. Nasser himself is believed keenly aware that throughout his tenure he has been "passed over" in the ranks of chiefs of state visiting this country. We think it desirable that we reach a decision soon regarding an invitation for a state visit. In this connection there are a number of favorable and unfavorable factors which I itemize as follows:
I. Favorable Factors
A. Consonant with his denunciation of Soviet nuclear testing and generally moderate stance at the Belgrade Conference, Nasser appears to be moving toward a more truly neutral position, has loosened his ties with the Soviet Bloc and is currently demonstrating a desire for stronger relations with the U.S.
B. We believe that our friendly, personal relationship with him nurtured through correspondence, through Mrs. Kennedy's recent attendance at the Tutankhamon exhibit and by other means, has had a considerable influence in accelerating this trend and that a personal confrontation would present an opportunity to persuade Nasser to pursue more constructive policies.
C. The U.A.R. appears to be adhering steadfastly to its suggestion that the Palestine question be "put in the ice box" as a source of controversy between us. The U.A.R. delegate was more helpful than any other Arab representative at the United Nations General Assembly debate on Palestine.
D. Ambassador Badeau believes Nasser's position in the U.A.R. is secure for the time being and that despite our disagreement with certain radical aspects of U.A.R. policy a Nasser-type revolution is closer to Arab aspirations than, for example, the rightist trend in Syria. Some of Nasser's social goals conform to the spirit of the Alliance for Progress.
E. Nasser would have an opportunity to gain first-hand knowledge of our society in its various aspects, knowledge which he is utterly lacking. His more radical ideas of how to achieve his social goals might be moderated by exposure to American methods.
F. A confrontation would provide an opportunity for a dialogue on such matters as the desirability of U.A.R. concentration on internal development; finding common ground for our respective policies in Africa; discussing the U.A.R.'s role in the Arab world; promoting the theme that the non-aligned nations should avoid positions designed to erode Western strength if they expect to stay free of Soviet domination; quietly fostering U.A.R. cooperation, or at least non-opposition, to the Johnson mission; and exploring the possibility of an informal arms limitation arrangement between the U.A.R. and Israel.
II. Unfavorable Factors
A. An invitation to the President or Prime Minister of Israel might be a political necessity to offset the invitation to Nasser.
B. The Syrian revolt has dealt a blow, though apparently not a vital one, to Nasser's prestige and position.
C. Internally Nasser is pressing a brand of socialism which, despite certain beneficial aspects, has been generally inimical to the interests of private enterprise and may set a bad example for the Eastern Arabs.
D. The U.A.R. is currently undergoing a wave of "security hysteria" which has led to arrests of individuals formerly associated with the Farouk regime, sequestrations of property of the wealthy class and a general atmosphere of fear and malaise among propertied elements.
E. French opposition to any friendly overtures toward Nasser is likely to be vehement in view of the French spy trials.
F. These factors are likely to arouse considerable criticism of an invitation to Nasser both domestically and abroad.
On balance we are inclined to believe that the favorable factors which may bring long-term benefits, outweigh the unfavorable factors, many of which we believe to be short-term.
In view of the domestic criticism that is certain to be aroused by the visit, we believe it is essential to avoid conflict with the 1962 Congressional election campaign and tentatively have been thinking of an invitation in February (after the conclusion of the French spy trials) for a visit in April, 1962. This would depend upon your judgment as to the latest time in the spring that the visit could take place without complicating the domestic political situation. Alternatively the visit might occur after the elections in November. As the timing of an invitation and of the visit itself must be coordinated with other moves, it would be helpful if you would inform the Department of your views.
160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon
Foregoing discussed with Spears of UK Embassy here in thought might be useful for you inform Lebanese listeners US had consulted UK which associates itself fully with your remarks. Spears stated UK Ambassador had long relaxed talk with Chehab who appeared need no convincing of UK non-involvement and who showed no signs tension or unease. However, Spears could perceive no objection UK association with approaches and suggested since UK Ambassador had authority make such decision question be solved on spot. Message in this vein sent UK Embassy Beirut ninth. You may therefore wish concert with British colleague.
Department aware fact you have not yet presented credentials creates special problem.
/5/ /5/Ambassador Armin H. Meyer was appointed Ambassador to Lebanon on October 27, 1961, during a recess of the U.S. Senate, and did not present his credentials to the Lebanese Government until January 12. Rusk
161. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State
1074. Cordial unhurried conference with Nasser today/2/ covered general range USA-UAR direct relations on basis that after first year new administration half year my own service here comprehensive review situation appropriate.
/2/Telegram 831 to Cairo, January 10, transmitted suggestions for Ambassador Badeau's forthcoming conversation with Nasser. (Ibid., 611.86B/1-862)
Led off my recapitulation USA policy as (1) cultivation mutual interests with sympathetic concern UAR development within framework USA national commitments and interests as witness AID program; (2) frank statement US viewpoint and use quiet diplomacy as witness US approach to Syrian recognition and French spy case inquiries; (3) continuation relations through vagaries current events as witness steady progress AID program through difficult events recent months.
Then reviewed current US aid under categories indicating that total aid FY 1962 nearly double last year and informing President status outstanding requests. Stated that probably unable meet cotton request and doubtful on rice request.
On my inquiry as to how President saw economic situation and relation US aid to it, Nasser took off on detailed exposition of lack of progress in rural economy and urgency accelerating agricultural productivity. He noted that IMF recommended twenty-five percent cutback development plan but claimed this impossible because predicted population increase necessitated expansion employment opportunities. Then stated that PL 480 type assistance essential some years to come and expressed appreciation for foreign currency saving US aid engenders. Failing spontaneous mention planning I reported tenor my conversation with Ambassador Kamel in Washington. Nasser responded by saying he thought Baghdadi In closing President stated that he thought relations with USA showed steady improvement and contrasted current mild newspaper treatment with hostility shown year ago.
Comment: Nasser showed obvious and continued sensitivity to Western and Arab criticism of Arab socialism to which he ascribed political motives rather than economic judgment. Impressed me as feeling hemmed in by unfriendly and hostile surrounding forces against which he is determined to fight back vigorously. While evincing enthusiasm for his economic program difficult to evoke diffusion of detailed economic problems except in context of outside political pressure and hostility. Apparent to me that Nasser's basic concern is political survival of regime which he links indissolubly with Arab socialism with secondary attention to inherent economic problem.
Badeau
1. To date no credible evidence has been produced by GOL, at least publicly, implicating any foreign power. It highly doubtful that any foreign power was involved.
2. Coup attempt probably was mounted by very small coterie of dissident junior army officers and certain elements in PPS. In this unholy alliance each faction probably expected much more help from the other than actually developed or was possible. They may also have counted on sympathies of other "outs" such as Chamounists.
3. Given widespread popularity and respect which Chehab still commands in Lebanon, coup attempt was so foolhardy and surprising many Lebanese leaped to conclusion it would not have been mounted without foreign backing. This conclusion: A) is, of course, sop for anything that goes wrong in an Arab country; and B) was facilitated by fact that following secession of Syria from UAR there has been much talk of some sort of fertile crescent arrangement, a concept commonly believed here to be the goal of King Hussein and British.
4. Enemies of PPS such as GOL Interior Minister Jumblatt through press and public pronouncements fanned flames of suspicion of foreign involvement. Communists have also been jubilantly exploiting situation. Peak was reached when prominent newspaper L'Orient printed report that GOL was on verge of registering complaint before UN Security Council. Two powers most frequently mentioned as being implicated were Britain and Jordan.
5. Karame and other GOL officials publicly stated L'Orient report "premature." British Embassy publicly repudiated Jumblatt's allegations re movement of British ships by noting no British warship within 500 miles.
6. Presumably at this stage GOL Foreign Ministry probably in order to protect itself within government circles sent messages its diplomats asking for any evidence of foreign involvement. While query probably not based on any real grounds for believing such involvement occurred several Lebanese diplomats abroad apparently excitedly took it to mean that GOL in Beirut believes stories.
7. Although suspicions by no means erased from Lebanese public mind and concern re possible British involvement no doubt still lurks in minds of numerous GOL officials, there has been during past few days less public mention re foreign involvement. Most GOL spokesmen and press now saying conclusions re this matter must obviously await results of interrogations, including that of Captain Khayralla, one of junior officer Gebel leaders who captured two days ago. Intense internal security measures continuing in Beirut area.
162. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State
8. At present time most GOL officials with whom we have been in contact including Chehab and Takla give appearance of being relatively relaxed on foreign involvement question. A conjecture often heard is that probably no foreign governments themselves involved but undoubtedly some nationals of certain neighboring countries were privy to coup plans, e.g. Syrians, Jordanians, Iraqis or Palestinians. Referring to report that 90 Turkish "Commandos" were picked up by police while trying to infiltrate Lebanon's northern border, Emile Boustani in conversation with Assistant Secretary Coombs and me last evening made inevitable suggestion that Israel may have been behind whole plot.
9. In our private conversations when suggestions have been made re possible USG involvement, we have: A) categorically rejected that USG interferes in Lebanon's internal affairs; B) shown how ridiculous such allegations are by asking what conceivable gain would accrue to US from upset of President Chehab's highly respected government; and C) noted that such allegations benefit only those who seek to undermine Lebanon's independence, e.g. Communists.
UK Ambassador concurs with all of foregoing.
Meyer
I recommend that you approve attached State proposals for a new initiative vis-?-vis Egypt. They are the end-product of a "reappraisal of relations with Nasser" begun with your blessing as a planning project last February.
In essence, State calls for a cautiously positive response to the recent UAR overtures for greater aid. It has been refined since attached was written to include: (a) telling UAR we agree to a multi-year PL-480 agreement; (b) then sending Ed Mason for a quick planning consultation (your personal intercession seems needed to get Ed); (c) sending Bowles to Cairo 13-15 February for a tour d'horizon designed to smell the air; and finally (d) depending largely on results of these preliminaries, an invite for a State visit in April or December. Instead of attached letter to Nasser on economic cooperation, State is now proposing a note from you announcing Bowles visit, partly in order to reassure Nasser that Bowles has your full confidence. Our aim would be to encourage UAR turn inward toward economic development as its primary goal, and to provide Nasser with more of a Western alternative to excessive dependence on the Bloc. His current economic difficulties are such that if we don't help him he may be forced to turn even more to Bloc. Greater reliance on the US would also have some restraining influence on UAR policies by creating a vested interest on Nasser's part in good relations with the US.
All realize that there are as many risks as well as opportunities in this course. At best we can only expect to pull Nasser back toward a more neutral position, and deter him from leaning too far left again. This will only be assured if he thinks the stakes are high enough. Even so, he'll still buy arms from Bloc because we can't supply him, and our aid will indirectly help him to do so. Moreover, Nasser's interests run athwart ours at so many points that periodic frictions are inevitable. But the new policy is based on long-term rather than short-run calculations--that, despite the inevitability of further ups and downs in US-Egyptian relations, it is in our long-term interest to encourage Egypt to steer a moderate neutralist course.
To protect ourselves, State favors a deliberately cautious and step-by-step approach, without too many commitments (at least in early stages) from which it would later be difficult to withdraw. Actually State would just use aid we'd probably give anyway as trade goods for a political approach.
There are three aspects of State proposals which you might wish to discuss with State:
1. Timing and Style. How we treat the volatile and sensitive Nasser will be just as important as what we give him. Our aim is to take advantage of advent of new Administration to get across to him that we want to let bygones be bygones and re-establish a relationship of mutual confidence more like that before 1955. State paper is weak on all-important niceties required to this end; it is based largely on giving more dough. Bowles visit will help (if staged right) but you will probably have to bear the main burden of another venture in personal diplomacy. This argues for a Nasser visit early rather than late, while Nasser still uncertain and impressionable in the aftermath of Syria. Also any number of things could happen between April and December to upset a later visit. On the other hand, Nasser is anxious for a visit and might be on his good behavior if we kept him dangling. State needs your decision on timing before Bowles visit.
2. Can we make this exercise more of a two-way street? State rightly emphasizes the longer-term potential in a gradual US/UAR rapprochement, but shies away from any short-term efforts to get some better behavior out of Nasser. While recognizing dangers of scaring him off prematurely, I hope both Bowles and state visits will be occasion for a frank effort to educate Nasser, and to get if possible some reciprocal gestures (e.g., moderation of anti-US propaganda) to which we can point as justifying new course.
3. Domestic US Reaction. Mike Feldman regards such gestures as quite important to enable us to defend what will appear to many as an endorsement of Nasser regime. April or December timing is to put Nasser visit either before or after 1962 campaign season. He also emphasizes the importance of parallel gestures toward Israel. You will want Mike's own views, but he seems to regard domestic problem as manageable if above conditions are met. I'd argue that increased US leverage with Egypt would help over long term in resolving Arab-Israel dispute (indeed Israelis have hinted that it would help if we could turn Nasser inward).
But we have to worry about other reactions too. France will be most unhappy, and even UK and Turkey may need convincing. Such anti-Nasser clients as Jordanians and Saudis will also need a lot of reassuring as our plans become clearer.
Finally, let's recognize that, even though we're not giving UAR any more at the outset than some PL-480 and DLF projects we've planned to anyway, we'll have to get in a lot deeper if the new approach bears fruit. State rightly prefers to avoid further commitments till we see UAR reaction, but the above will be far from satisfying UAR needs. Some $75 million might be needed to help out an IMF stabilization program, and to send a planner will confirm our interest in a development consortium of the sort UAR Ambassador has already discussed with Walt Rostow. It is just as well to let these goodies dangle in the background, however.
In sum, we should try this major experiment in the new Administration's policy of being more sensible toward the neutralists--recognizing the many pitfalls (we must avoid another Aswan Dam fiasco) and aware that it will be quite expensive without many quick returns, but counting on long-range results.
Bob Komer
We suggest that if possible you have two discussions with Nasser, the first being a tour d'horizon of our mutual interests and problems in light of the world situation, and the second being an attempt to reach common conclusions.
Between the two conversations you might have talks with such people as Baghdadi, Mohieddin, Ali Sabri Your meetings with Nasser might be an appropriate occasion to discuss frankly the question of a state visit.
Inasmuch as we are trying to build up Ambassador Badeau's position, we would suggest he accompany you on your meetings.
Bearing in mind that Nasser is highly susceptible to flattery (so long as it seems genuine) but also highly sensitive to criticism, we suggest the tenor of your remarks be such as to draw him toward what we hope he will do and avoid any direct implication that we're telling him what he should not do.
For that reason, we would suggest avoiding direct discussion of his nationalization and sequestration measures, his handling of the French espionage case, his antagonistic propaganda against the U.K. or other of his more radical policies.
Attached, along with a draft text of a letter from President Kennedy to President Nasser regarding your visit
163. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy
Action Program for the UAR
164. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to the President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs (Bowles)
Proposed Discussion with President Nasser
Attachment
1. The World Situation: To the extent possible give Nasser the impression he's being given an "inside" briefing of our tactics in dealing with crises such as Berlin, Laos, Viet-Nam. Emphasize basic weaknesses of the Communist system and basic strengths of the Western position.
2. Neutralism: Discuss background of our post-Belgrade policy toward Yugoslavia, our decisions on Goa, the Volta Dam project in Ghana and what we think the proper role of the neutrals should be. Encourage statesmanship on Nasser's part as a neutralist. Stress our acceptance of neutralism and its basic inacceptability to the USSR.
3. Africa: Note with satisfaction our differences on the Congo seem to be dissolving. Welcome closer relations between Casablanca and Monrovia powers.
4. The Middle East: Stress nothing basically incompatible between US and UAR goals. We just as interested as UAR in social progress. UAR has great opportunity to lead by example. There are many roads to social progress. Hope UAR will consider borrowing what is good from the West as well as from others. US recognizes key importance of UAR to stability of area and would strongly oppose any attempt encircle or isolate UAR. We cannot guarantee our Allies always see things our way, but we do propose to pursue our course.
5. US-UAR Relations: We would like to get back to 1952-55 era of mutual confidence. As young men of courage and determination, Kennedy and Nasser between them should be able mark out areas of mutual interest and defend them against assault by forces seeking divide us. It is essential to prevent extraneous issues from complicating our relations. We should judge each other by our actual deeds and not by what the rumor-mongers may say we're doing.
6. Nasser Visit: Discuss frankly the question of a state visit.
7. Israel and the Zionists: Subscribe to UAR view that Palestine question be "kept in the refrigerator" and stress virtues of quiet discussion and cooperation with Johnson mission. Discuss frankly the problems created for us by the Zionists and necessity to convince them that closer US-UAR relations need not ipso facto prejudice Israel's security.
8. Conclusion: Stress our conviction that with determination, patience, courage and understanding US and UAR can work together toward mutually-desired goals of political stability, economic and social progress, cultural exchange and avoidance of Communist infiltration or Soviet domination in the Middle East and Africa.
165. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State
1. Personal situation: President, who seemed relaxed and in good spirits, stressed he had taken office only reluctantly. He is not attached to job, although he is very much devoted to Lebanese independence. In this respect, he mentioned that when he heard plotters were coming to get him he ordered guards not to fire, not wanting to be cause of bloodshed. This was first time guards had disobeyed his orders.
2. Communist tactics: Communists have taken advantage of every crisis in mid-East since Arab-Israel war and were attempting likewise to make most of recent disturbance by sending delegations and messages of congratulations to President. Fortunately mass of well wishers was such that Communists went almost unnoticed. Expressing extreme repugnance for communism, Chehab said confidentially he found even shaking hands with Soviet Ambassador distasteful.
3. Foreign involvement in plot: President stated on this subject he could as yet neither say "yes" nor "no". Although he would personally prefer to give negative response, any reply will have to await results investigation. Government has particularly been checking frequent recent travels to other countries by "certain persons".
4. Lebanon's orientation: When I mentioned Karame had stressed at outset our talk yesterday (Embtel 688)
/2/ Lebanon non-aligned, Chehab laughingly declared Karame merely being "protocolaire". He repeatedly emphasized Lebanon's pro-West orientation despite fact that for tactical political purposes GOL professes neutrality. In this connection he cited Takla's good work at Belgrade and at Arab League meetings. /2/Not printed. (Ibid., 611.83A/1-1562) 5. AID: President stressed his interest in fostering economic development throughout Lebanon and indicated GOL might ask US for "a few technicians" and perhaps some small loans, these particularly in connection with projects studied earlier by US AID missions.During discussion I handed Chehab informal paper
/3/ stressing US friendship for Lebanon and admiration for his leadership, pointing out accusation of Western complicity obviously being exploited by those who wish divide us, recalling our past support for Lebanon and reaffirming our intention to pursue like policy in future. President said there had been speculation re US attitude toward plot because US looms so large in Lebanese mind that people could not imagine US would not take some stand. Seen in this perspective, our very silence to some Lebanese seemed strange. President suggested I discuss with Takla possibility some type of declaration re US position which however, would not give grounds for criticism by inimical elements. I will of course discuss this with Takla. My own feeling remains, however, as indicated Embtel 683,/4/ that such a statement would not serve useful purpose at this time and I suspect Takla will agree. /3/The text of the note, as transmitted to the Department of State in airgram A-139, January 23, reads as follows: "1. The United States remains Lebanon's true friend. 2. Accusations of Western complicity in the recent coup attempt are obviously being exploited by those who are interested in alienating Lebanon from its most steadfast friends. 3. Lebanon's friends, who have never failed Lebanon in past times of distress, have every intention of continuing to support Lebanon in the future. 4. The United States, which has admired President Chehab's firm and statesmanlike leadership, continues to have every faith in that leadership." (Ibid., 611.83A/1-2362) /4/Not printed. (Ibid., 611.83A/1-1562) Re point six, I indicated in my understanding that termination technical assistance program did not rule out occasional US assistance for certain specific projects of limited nature./5/ /5/Foreign Minister Takla pressed more strongly for a public statement of U.S. assurances toward Lebanon during a conversation with Meyer on January 18. (Telegram 699 from Beirut; ibid., 611.83A/1-1862) MeyerThe Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein.