Attached are two State Department papers bearing on what your staff has regarded from the beginning as one of the major foreign policy problems confronting your Administration. The first is in response to NSAM #105 asking what policy we should pursue toward Egypt in the aftermath of the Syrian coup,/2/ and the other draft State Department policy guidelines toward the UAR./3/

/2/Document 141.

/3/Reference is to one of a series of policy guideline papers initially prepared in the Department of State under the overall coordination of the Policy Planning Council, and then circulated to other agencies for comment and revised accordingly. A master set of the drafts and commentaries, organized alphabetically by country, is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 396.

In both, State cautiously suggests a somewhat more forthcoming policy towards Nasser--a policy of limited objectives but one which will set us on the path toward a more constructive relationship resembling that of the pre-1955 period, and break the vicious circle of aloofness in US/UAR relations which has persisted since the Aswan Dam fiasco./4/ State stresses, however, the basic conflicts of interest which sharply limit the feasible extent of any rapprochement. Of course, dealing with Nasser partakes of all the problems of dealing with a charismatic neutralist leader whose ambitions and interests in many ways run athwart our own. In particular, the Arab-Israeli vendetta and Nasser's ambitions in Africa and the Near East create special difficulties in our relationship.

/4/Reference is to U.S. withdrawal on July 19, 1956, of an earlier offer to explore funding for the construction of an Aswan High Dam.

Meanwhile, we are processing a whole series of UAR aid requests of one sort or another, arising largely from UAR's current desperate economic straits: (a) the multi-year PL-480 request; (b) a grain storage project for which a $72 million DLF loan is requested; (c) a request for 350,000 bales of short-staple cotton; (d) a probable request for rice; (e) the Nubian monuments; (f) the insecticide request; and (g) Kamel's recent approach requesting economic planners as preliminary to a US-backed consortium. State would apparently continue to dole these out gradually without any fanfare, as an exercise in quiet diplomacy.

However, the time may be ripe for a more positive initiative, aimed in the same direction State proposes and with the same objectives, but designed to optimize the impact on Nasser. The reasons would be as follows:

1. The "aid" requests mentioned above add up to a very substantial total, which if properly packaged and presented to Nasser should amply demonstrate that we really are seeking to open a new chapter in US-Egyptian relations. Why not use it in this manner?

2. Aside from one factor (see below), there has hardly been a better psychological moment for such an approach to Nasser. He is in a chastened mood after the Syrian debacle. This, plus serious domestic economic difficulties and some concern over his internal political position, is leading him to turn more inward, in an effort to revivify the Egyptian revolution. To help him do so would be quite in our interest. And Egypt's near bankruptcy, which has led to his new aid requests, creates a real opportunity.

3. Ambassador Kamel is trying as hard as he can to sell us on seizing it, and claims to have Nasser's backing. It is hard to separate out how much this is based on Kamel's own desire to promote a rapprochement, but his arguments are not to be ignored. Kamel's latest approach to Walt Rostow for planners and consortium aid is the most forthcoming yet.

4. Nasser himself seems to look on the new Administration as potentially more favorable toward him than the old. Your exchange of letters has been helpful, and US caution in the Syrian crisis has gained us credit.

5. Meanwhile Soviet/UAR relations are uneasy, with obvious divergencies over Syria and Iraq, creating an opportunity we can exploit. Nasser has already reoriented his policy to a significant extent: (a) he has put the Israeli issue on ice, at least for the moment; (b) he has apparently decided to rely primarily on the West for new development aid if he can; and (c) he has been shifting Egyptian cotton trade back toward Western markets after some unhappy experiences with the USSR. Moscow's veto of Kuwait's UN application is merely the latest indication of divergent Soviet and UAR aims. Both realize this, but Moscow is making new aid offers in an effort to keep Cairo from moving even farther away. Nasser will feel compelled to accept them if he has no other recourse.

On the other hand, Nasser's current domestic difficulties may make it premature to attempt a major approach to him now. Who knows, he may not survive. This may be the case, though most Arab specialists doubt that he's as shaky as all that. In any case, if Nasser disappeared, he would probably be succeeded by one or another of the new military elite who would be equally susceptible to a more forthcoming U.S. policy. I doubt that withholding greater support from Nasser because of the possibility he may fall is a very useful playing of the odds.

What could we accomplish? As State points out, the best we could achieve from a more forthcoming policy toward Nasser would be a strictly limited marriage of convenience; our interests run sharply athwart each other at too many points. At least in the early phases, moreover, we would be giving a lot more than we would get in return. Nor can we woo Nasser away from being a neutralist and nationalist (any more than Moscow could).

But what we might hope to achieve through a more professedly forthcoming policy is to create a vested interest on his part in better US/UAR relations, which would in itself inhibit him from taking actions which would upset it. Let us remember that Nasser could cause us a lot more trouble if he were actively hostile--in Libya, North Africa, Sudan, Syria, or on Suez transit and ME oil, to mention but a few instances. Thus perhaps our greatest gains would be negative; we would not get a great deal from Nasser, but at least we might restrain him from doing a lot of things we don't like. Finally, let's not forget we also share certain common interests with Nasser--he's as anxious as we are not to see undue Soviet penetration into the Middle East. A more satisfactory relationship would enable us to talk more frankly with him about where we agree as well as disagree.

This immediately brings up the Israeli problem. One cannot propose a new initiative toward Nasser without assessing its likely impact on Israel and its supporters in the US. The Israelis have said they would applaud rather than oppose an effort to turn Nasser's energies inward, but they are not unaware that any strengthening of the UAR may eventually be at their expense. However, any rapprochement which led to increased US influence over Nasser would give us more leverage to restrain him to some extent. Indeed, as part of any new policy initiative, we should make perfectly clear to Nasser our inability to support him against Israel; and, being on a more friendly basis with him, we would be better able to make such noises without generating a sharp reaction. The Arab-Israeli issue is one on which the UAR and US would simply have to agree to disagree.

Finally, what would this initiative cost us if it failed? It would not involve spending much more money on Egypt than I daresay we will spend in one way or another anyway (without getting full benefit from it). And if Nasser rejects our feelers, or if a rapprochement later became unstuck, it's hard to see how we would be much worse off than we were before. Would it precipitate Egypt any further into the arms of the Russians than if we had not tried at all?

What Next?--An Action Program. Since we are already contemplating some very substantial aid to Egypt (especially if we form a consortium), what is needed is to package and present this in a manner which will signal to the Egyptians the New Frontier's desire to be more forthcoming than its predecessor (and also what we might expect from them). Thus the chief ingredient to be added would be a new style and tone in our approach. What we might do is package the several aid projects under consideration in such form as to make them cumulatively impressive, and use them as the basis for a new diplomatic initiative, perhaps along the following lines:

1. Prompt feelers to Nasser entourage to find out whether UAR is really interested in closer relations (a logical response to Kamel's overtures). This could be done in such a way as to whet Egyptian appetite, while still committing us to nothing if response were unsatisfactory.

2. If these went well, next step could be a stop-over in Cairo by a senior US official known to have President's ear. If a new tone is our objective, it would be better to start ball rolling this way. Bobby Kennedy or Chester Bowles come to mind; indeed this might be a good assignment for Mr. Bowles (though we would have to reassure UAR beforehand that he still has your confidence). This gambit would raise the level of dialogue a notch further.

3. A visit by Nasser to US in early spring, at which time you and he could have a full tour d'horizon and jointly discuss the new relationship. Nasser would be greatly pleased by such an invitation.

4. If all had gone well, our next major initiative would be to promote a consortium for support of a major Egyptian development effort sparked by a US commitment to contribute a substantial sum.

In sum, I cannot help but feel that a series of moves along these lines over next few months might start things moving in the right direction. They are designed to capitalize on aid we will probably give anyway, and they could be cut off at any point if UAR response was unsuitable to us.

Recommendation. That you discuss these proposals with SecState, with an eye to possible NSC debate and decision on new policy line, or ask us [?] to press with Ball in Sec/State's absence./5/

/5/The text of this sentence after the comma was added by hand, apparently by Bundy.

R.W. Komer

150. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/

Washington, December 18, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.00/12-1861. Secret. Drafted by Strong on December 15 and concurred in by Glidden (INR). Copies were sent to McGhee (M), Rostow (S/P), and Hilsman (INR). Sent to Bundy at the National Security Council on February 15, 1962, under cover of a memorandum from Battle that reads: "In response to Mr. Komer's oral request, I enclose a copy of a memorandum entitled 'Situation Developing in Iraq' sent by the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs to the Under Secretary of State on December 18, 1961. The situation described therein is essentially unchanged and our views remain the same." (Ibid., 787.00/2-1562)

SUBJECT
Situation Developing in Iraq

I believe it is timely to call to your attention and to that of other senior officers of the Department the situation that is developing in Iraq. In brief, prior to late June, 1961, there had been signs of a gradual orientation away from the Soviet Bloc, but since the time that Kuwait, which is claimed by Iraq, began to receive international recognition as a state following the new political and security arrangement between Britain and Kuwait on June 19,/2/ Iraq has moved increasingly toward the Soviet Bloc in the conduct of Iraqi political and economic affairs and in its propaganda position. During this process, until recently, the Iraqi Government gradually increased its repressive measures against domestic communists, to the point that we came to believe that communist ability to threaten the security of the Iraqi state had been neutralized.

/2/During a meeting of the U.N. Security Council on November 30, the United States and nine other members of the Security Council voted in favor of a draft resolution, introduced by the United Arab Republic, that contained a Security Council recommendation to the General Assembly that Kuwait be admitted to the United Nations. Kuwait was eventually admitted to the United Nations on May 14, 1963.

Now, however, we believe a new phase may have been opened. Perhaps as the tacit price for the recent Soviet veto of Kuwait's application for membership in the UN,/3/ the Iraqi Government in the past two weeks has taken several steps which appear to permit the internal communists to strengthen considerably their internal position. In addition, Iraq has taken the drastic step of expropriating all of the IPC (and affiliates) concessionary areas except for fields now in production./4/ The Iraqi action against IPC was more drastic than we had reason several weeks ago to believe would be the case. Again it would appear that the Iraqi action, while calculated to avoid causing IPC to cease or decrease production, may have been more severe than originally intended in order to compensate the Soviet Union for its veto and in order to attract stronger Soviet support against inevitable IPC and Western pressures. It is, of course, possible that further measures against IPC are being contemplated.

/3/The Soviet Union voted against the draft resolution on Kuwait.

/4/On December 11, an Iraqi Government decree nullified the exploitation rights of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) and its affiliated companies (Mosul Petroleum and Basra Petroleum) on all .5 percent of the original concessionary area of 172,000 square miles. Negotiations between the Iraqi Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company to revise the concession had begun in August 1958 and were broken off on October 12, 1961, when IPC refused to accede to several Iraqi demands. Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony Mobil owned 23.75 percent of IPC. (Memorandum from Strong to Talbot, December 13; Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 63 D 33, Baghdad; Circular telegram 1129, December 17; ibid., Central Files, 887.2553/12-1761) Additional documentation is ibid., 877.2553. See also Supplement, the compilation on Iraq.

The situation in Iraq, therefore, appears to be returning to something like the post-revolutionary period in 1958 and 1959, during which there was great alarm that Iraq was going communist. While in that period there were no issues between Iraq and the West other than the communist threat, now two other issues between Iraq and the West are included in the unhappy equation: (1) Iraq's claim to Kuwait, strongly pressed by Iraq's present leadership and (2) Iraq's unilateral violation of a major Western economic arrangement with Iraq, IPC.

As a result of Iraqi action against IPC, we consider it possible the Department will be urged to retaliate against and place other pressures on Iraq. Likewise, as the Iraqi communists regain an important role in Iraq and appear to threaten Iraqi independence, there is likely to develop within the U.S. a strong feeling that we should intervene in Iraqi affairs. It would appear that Iraqi leadership intends to play a game of brinksmanship in its efforts to gain control of Kuwait and to obtain at least part ownership of IPC, utilizing Soviet support and frightening the West by permitting the resurgence of internal communism. That Iraq will use military force against Kuwait cannot be ruled out, although there would appear to be cogent reasons against doing so despite the richness of the prize.

From the Iraqi revolution on July 14, 1958 until the new British arrangement with Kuwait on June 19, 1961 the U.S. followed a policy of patience, tolerance, and scrupulous nonintervention toward Iraq. That policy paid dividends in the form of a gradual improvement in the atmosphere of U.S.-Iraqi relations and there appeared to be a prospect of even more fruitful relations including increased Iraqi importation of U.S. goods and services. However, following our declaration of open support for the independence of Kuwait and our approval of the U.K. military intervention in Kuwait, in both of which we had no suitable alternative, we were informed by the Iraqi Government that we had made a mistake and U.S.-Iraqi relations would suffer. The full ramification of Iraqi intentions is now becoming clear.

Short of direct military intervention, whether by U.S. forces alone or in conjunction with others or by Iraq's neighbors friendly to the West (Turkey, Iran, Jordan and Saudi Arabia), we lack effective means of achieving a reversal in Iraqi policy. While cessation of IPC production would not now appear likely, we believe that, if a decision were made to stop production, it would not necessarily create the desired effect and might well create even greater problems.

While it is clear that we must in due course openly object to the Iraqi move against IPC and must consider whether to endeavor to prevent Iraq from gaining from its unilateral breach of an important contractual obligation, we believe that we must exercise due caution in the manner and intensity of our official resistance to the Iraqi action. Further, we believe we must resist firmly all efforts to force us to undertake intervention of any type in the internal affairs of Iraq unless and until it is clear that the domestic communists stand to gain control of Iraq in absence of such intervention. In the present circumstances, for the U.S. and/or its friends to place severe pressure on Iraq or to intervene ineffectively in Iraq would only serve to increase the likelihood of a situation we do not want: a communist takeover.

We cannot guarantee that Prime Minister Qassim will not prove to be another Castro, though his past actions in reducing the Iraqi communists to relative impotence would justify the conclusion that he is an Iraqi and Arab nationalist and that he does not wish Iraq to fall under external control whether directly or indirectly. We believe, however, that he is capable of playing a serious game of brinksmanship with the Soviets and internal communists in pursuing his great nationalistic objectives.

Our objective is to the best of our ability to avoid pushing Iraq further along its present path and to endeavor to persuade certain of our allies and friends to pursue a similar course. In so doing the Department will be obliged to resist pressures from both within and without the U.S. Government to make statements and undertake actions that would be detrimental to the achievement of our objective. That there is serious risk in this course may be a frequent charge. That there would be serious risk in doing otherwise is our considered opinion.

151. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, December 20, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, Vol. II. Secret. Drafted by Komer and distributed to McGeorge Bundy and Kaysen.

SUBJECT
Mike Feldman's Views on Nasser Visit

While Mike is not very sanguine over the prospects of getting anywhere with Nasser, he does not think the domestic political repercussions would be insuperable if we handle them properly. Timing and adequate preparation would be important.

(1) Mike feels strongly that any Nasser visit must be quiet, without undue fanfare. He recalled that the ceremony surrounding King Saud's visit/2/ had really hurt the Eisenhower Administration with the Jewish community in the US without producing much of anything. Our reception of Nasser should be businesslike and in low key.

/2/Reference is to the visit of King Saud of Saudi Arabia to the United States January 30-February 8, 1957. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, pp. 413-486, and vol. XVII, pp. 101-105.

(2) He agreed that proper timing in an election year was vital. A Nasser visit on March or early April (I described State's timing) would probably be early enough before the campaign season, provided the other conditions he suggested were met. He agreed that a visit in December, after the elections, might be somewhat better from the domestic standpoint but did not seem to think that such postponement was overriding.

(3) Another essential was that we must be able to point to some concrete accomplishment from the visit, in order to turn aside any Saud-type reaction. It would look like a domestic defeat for the President to have received a neutralist with a record of hostility without being able to demonstrate that we got something out of doing so. Mike felt very strongly about this, and I quite agree that we must be able to show that any new relationship with Nasser is a genuine "two-way street."

(4) Mike wanted advance notice of at least a week before the visit, preferably before it was announced, so that he could lay the necessary groundwork. He thought that if we provided him with a good case, he could soften the adverse impact of the visit through his excellent contacts with leaders of the Jewish community (e.g. the periodic conferences of presidents of major organizations).

(5) Like Dick Donahue,/3/ he did not seem greatly concerned about any adverse impact on the trade or aid bill votes. In his opinion such difficulty as arose would come more from sensitive amendments to the aid bill in particular, e.g. denying aid to any country which did not allow freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal.

/3/Richard K. Donahue, Staff Assistant to the President for Congressional Liaison.

I described State's tentative timetable of moves in the Nasser gambit as worked out with Badeau/4/--acceptance in principle of multi-year PL-480 in December, sending out a planner in January, invitation in February for a visit in late March or early April, and then if all went well possible US participation in a consortium. He emphasized the importance of parallel gestures toward Israel and the political necessity that we get something for what we gave. I renewed my promise to keep Mike clued and to make sure that he got advance notice if the visit jelled.

/4/On December 19, Komer wrote a brief memorandum to Dungan that reads: "We are leaning on State on all of these Egyptian matters. Indeed, they and we are actively considering packaging them and other items in a major new policy initiative toward Egypt, culminating in a Nasser visit. I no longer have any reason to accuse State of being dilatory. As for Badeau, we have ironed out any differences on tactics on timing between him and the Department." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, United Arab Republic, 11/61-12/61) Ambassador Badeau was in the Department of State for consultations December 16-19. Documentation is in Department of State, Central File 123-Badeau, John S. See also Supplement, the compilation on the United Arab Republic.

Bob K

152. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, December 23, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786A.11/12-2361. Secret. Drafted by Seelye (NEA/NE) on December 20. Talbot proposed that this memorandum be sent to President Kennedy in a December 21 memorandum to Secretary Rusk. Talbot's memorandum also suggested that Secretary Rusk designate a Department officer to extend the President's invitation personally to the King, still in the hospital in Boston. As soon as the King was able to leave the hospital, the President should send a plane to bring him to Washington for an interview and a White House luncheon, after which the plane would return the King to Boston. (Ibid., 786A.11/12-2161)

SUBJECT
Proposed Meeting Between you and King Saud

King Saud has recovered from his illness and is recuperating from two eye operations performed earlier this month with the hope of improving his eyesight considerably. While the doctors recommend that the King remain convalescent in the United States another two months after his release from the hospital on or about December 30, the King may wish to return to Saudi Arabia shortly thereafter.

The King has expressed appreciation for your message sent to him at Dhahran in early November when his illness became known and for the flowers you sent to his hospital room. However, he has become somewhat concerned that the United States Government has not paid more attention to him. Word has reached him through others that the speeches of the chief Saudi delegate to the United Nations, Ahmad Shuqairi, and the negative response the King made to your letter to him of June 25/2/ may have had something to do with this.

/2/Reference is to King Saud's reply of June 25 to President Kennedy's May 11 letter. See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 81.

According to confidants of the King, he served notice to Shuqairi four or five months ago that he would tolerate no more anti-American speeches on his part at the United Nations. The King is reported to have said that if it is true that Shuqairi has not heeded his instruction, he will dismiss him. The King has reportedly requested translations be made of Shuqairi's recent speeches in order to determine for himself.

With regard to the King's response to your letter of June 25, the King is said to have informed confidants last week that he did not draft the letter and did not read it carefully upon affixing his signature. The King appeared to be genuinely disturbed to learn that the letter had displeased you. We should add that Saudi Arabia supported us in the "important question" vote on Chinese representation in the United Nations.

We believe that the time is propitious for you to invite the King to Washington. Therefore, we propose:

(1) That you authorize me to designate an official of the Department personally to extend on your behalf an invitation to the King to visit Washington on a day in early January convenient to you.

(2) That you approve the enclosed suggested letter to King Saud/3/ extending such an invitation and expressing pleasure at the King's recovery, to be delivered by the Department emissary.

/3/Attached but not printed. A copy of the final signed letter, dated December 23, is in Department of State, Central Files, 786A.11/12-2361. In the letter, President Kennedy expressed gratification for the King's successful recovery from his recent illness and for the successful operation on his eyes. The President expressed regret that he had been unable to entertain the King at his home in Hyannis Port and that the pressure of affairs had prevented him from visiting the King in the hospital. He then extended the invitation for the King to visit Washington in order to meet with him and attend a White House luncheon on a mutually convenient date, and offered to send his personal airplane to transport the King and his party.

(3) That your personal plane transport the King and selected members of his party to Washington and back to Boston the same day.

(4) That in addition to a private meeting with the King in the forenoon for discussion of subjects of mutual interest, you give a luncheon for the King and his party at the White House./4/

/4/A marginal handwritten notation on this memorandum and on the Department of State copy of President Kennedy's letter indicates that Talbot handcarried a copy of the letter to Boston for delivery to the King and that the signed original of the letter was handcarried to the King the next week. In a December 31 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Battle reported that after Talbot delivered the letter to King Saud, Saudi Ambassador Khayyal emphasized repeatedly the King's hope, which he had expressed privately, that President Kennedy would visit him in the hospital while he was convalescing in Boston. The Ambassador explained that it was customary in the Arab world that such a call be paid. In response, U.S. officials made clear that pressure of work and the illness of the President's father prevented him from paying such a call and that, in any case, such a visit did not conform with usual U.S. protocol practices. (Ibid., 786A.11/12-3161)

Dean Rusk/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that indicates Ball signed the original for Rusk.

153. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/

Washington, December 25, 1961, 3:52 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/12-2561. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Thacher (NEA) and Palmer (IO) on December 24; cleared by Cleveland in substance and by Talbot; and approved by Thacher who initialed for Rusk. Also sent to Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus and repeated to Baghdad, Ankara, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Paris, Khartoum, Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli, London, Taiz, and USUN.

210. Department concerned over indications that in wake GA rejection Arab proposals for PCC reconstitution and "protection refugee interests" in Israel,/2/ Arab governments might reach hasty decision refuse cooperation with possible further mission by PCC Special Representative.

/2/On December 19, the United States submitted a draft resolution to the U.N. General Assembly's Special Political Committee that requested the PCC to intensify its efforts under previous specified General Assembly resolutions concerning the Palestinian refugees and urged member states to increase contributions to UNRWA. A majority of the Special Political Committee adopted the draft resolution with two amendments, proposed by Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Pakistan, that would increase the size of the PCC from three to five members and would request the PCC to take measures to protect the rights, property, and interests of the Palestinian Arab refugees. During the General Assembly vote on December 20, however, the two amendments failed to gain the requisite two-thirds majority and the original U.S. draft resolution was adopted without change as General Assembly Resolution 1725 (XVI). The United States voted against the two amendments.

In general Department satisfied we have come through GA consideration refugee issue without bitter aftermath of kind that followed XV GA debate. In comments to USUN Israelis have expressed mild satisfaction. Arab reaction varied from appreciation US willingness vote against Israel-inspired direct negotiations resolution/3/ to annoyance at GA rejection Arab amendments and particularly at US unwillingness vote for or abstain on these proposals. Several Arab delegates asserted rejection PCC reconstitution in particular would make it difficult if not impossible Arab governments continue consult with PCC Special Rep should Johnson or someone else continue this function. Arabs claim they can have little faith in UN sub-body of which France a member. Arab League SYG Hassouna specially critical in this regard, foresaw little hope for further Arab cooperation with Dr. Johnson or any other special rep.

/3/On December 19, the Special Political Committee rejected a draft resolution, sponsored by the Central African Republic, Chile, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, El Salvador, Gabon, Guatemala, Haiti, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Madagascar, the Netherlands, Niger, Sierra Leone, Upper Volta, and Uruguay, calling among other things for direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, particularly on the Palestinian refugee question. The United States voted against the resolution. The defeated draft resolution was subsequently referred to as the Brazzaville resolution, after its primary sponsor.

Member UAR delegation gave Amb Plimpton rundown Dec. 23 on Arab meeting following GA approval of US resolution./4/ Arab dels agreed their govts should consider in near future question further cooperation with PCC special rep. UAR spokesman said all expressed reservations but Jordanians (whose senior members are themselves refugees) more vehement than others in indicating they would advise their govt not agree meet further with Special Rep. UAR spokesman noted UAR had been outvoted by those who were negatively inclined towards cooperation with present PCC. Several senior delegates, including Hassouna, have already or will proceed their capitals within next few days. However UAR informant did not expect any significant Arab decision before "week or so".

/4/Reported in telegram 2237 from USUN, December 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/12-2361)

Dept is, of course, most anxious take fullest possible advantage modest opportunities offered for quiet diplomacy by Special Representative concept. Johnson has informed us confidentially he believes he can accept re-appointment provided: a) parties indicate positively they want him; b) he will have easy access to FonMins and chiefs of state as required. Other PCC members agreed ad referendum Johnson should be asked continue strive for positive steps forward.

To deter possible early Arab decision unfavorable to Special Rep concept, action addressees requested approach host governments soonest along line suggested below and at highest level required assure effective impact:

1. USG sincerely hopes host governments share its feeling deep satisfaction at temperate atmosphere which prevailed throughout informal Arab-US discussions during recently-concluded GA session. US noted with keen interest Arabs abstained rather than voting against US resolution. US trusts this augurs well for cooperation towards realistic progress, and that Arabs will on reflection not take onus of stymying PCC initiative. Throughout GA session US del adhered firmly to posture of impartiality toward refugee proposals sponsored by others, concentrating instead on concept which we convinced offers best prospect of serving refugees and enhancing area stability. US concept ultimately secured GA approval.

2. PCC will have soon consider most appropriate steps for carrying out GA directives for implementation Para 11, Res. 194 (III). PCC will wish give most careful consideration to variety problems and alternatives including, of course, possible re-appointment PCC Special Representative. US continues believe opportunities offered for quiet diplomacy by latter concept should be explored to fullest as soon as possible.

3. It may, however, be several weeks before PCC can determine precise nature further action to be taken. Thus US will wish in due course discuss with govts concerned possible further PCC activities.

4. In interim USG sincerely hopes host govts may be able give careful consideration further cooperation with Special Rep and that in any case they will refrain from judgments or actions tending foreclose further useful efforts by Special Rep.

You may also draw on following as appropriate: Arabs and many other dels expressed full satisfaction with Johnson personally. However, he has not yet decided accept re-appointment. Arab decision withhold further cooperation would inevitably affect his ultimate decision. US does not regard present PCC membership as sacred but believes that extensive pressure for reconstitution might well require US own resignation, contrary perhaps wishes some Arab leaders who believe US can make useful contribution to amelioration existing Near East problems. Finally you might make your Arab contacts aware that should they scuttle present initiative, US could not be counted on continue energetically seek progress in implementation Para 11.

For Amman: You should seek ascertain definitively whether extreme views of Palestine Arabs on Jordanian del represent considered views HKJ./5/

/5/On December 27, King Hussein told Ambassador Macomber that he was unaware of the views being taken by the Palestinian-Jordanian delegation and would look into them. (Telegram 288 from Amman, December 28; ibid., 325.84/12-2861)

Rusk

154. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State/1/

Baghdad, December 28, 1961, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86D/12-2861. Secret; Priority. Also sent to Kuwait and Moscow and repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Khartoum, London, and Basra.

286. It appears to me that in leaving initiative to Qassim we are in grave danger being drawn into costly and politically disastrous situation over Kuwait. As Department aware I have on several occasions during last few months (most recently in Embassy despatch 425 December 2)/2/ expressed conviction that status quo cannot long be maintained in Kuwait in face of unrelenting Iraqi pressure. Reliance on British military protection can be no more than desperate last resort. From military, financial and political viewpoints British themselves can hardly view prospect of renewed occupation of Shaikhdom with other than concern. Thought of British troops fighting Arabs on Arab soil with moral and political (if not military) support of US particularly disturbs me as I am sure Afro-Asian world will fail to appreciate distinction which we so clearly see between Kuwait and Goa.

/2/Not printed. (Ibid., 611.862/12-261)

Even another precautionary landing of British forces would play right into hands of Qassim (not to mention Soviets) who would trumpet this as new "proof" of "bogus" nature Kuwaiti independence. Reentry of British would also be politically retrograde step which would make mystery [mockery?] of concept of Arab League responsibility for protection Kuwait and would place Jordanians and Saudis in even more invidious position than they now occupy. Qassim moreover would be taken off hook of his own making and saved from loss of face in delaying promised action under such circumstances. But how long would British keep garrison in Kuwait, or how often could they afford to send the fire brigade for Qassim's false alarms?

Only alternative I can see to this dreary prospect is for Kuwait to become genuine concern of other Arab states, and specifically of UAR.

Nasser's reported decision withdraw small UAR contingent following Soviet veto of Kuwaiti UN membership suggests that he may prefer avoid liabilities of further involvement in what is for him messy situation. He can be fairly sure that British will for present keep Kuwait out of Qassim's clutches but will himself be free to castigate them as "Imperialists" for doing so and it is essential in my opinion that Nasser and other Arab leaders be given real incentive to involve themselves in fate of Kuwait. Too much is at stake politically (future shape and coloration of Arab world), economically (combined oil resources of Iraq and Kuwait) and psychologically (another Western "intervention" for Moscow to make hay with) for US and UK to be deterred by handful of avaricious Bedouin Shaikhs. Nasser appears to be key to problem, and it is past time Ruler is told he must find Nasser's price and pay it if he does not want to accept Qassim's commission as Qaimmaqam./3/

/3/An Iraqi decree asserting Iraq's claim to Kuwait, issued in late June 1961, appointed the current Sheikh of Kuwait as "Qaim-Maqam" of the district of Kuwait under the authority of Basra Province. (Memorandum from Blackiston to Strong, June 27; ibid., NEA/NE Files: Lot 63 D 33, Baghdad)

If I read Nasser rightly, more than a crass bribe will be necessary. His pride and prestige will also have to be engaged if he is to stay interested. A device designed to give him both protective responsibility and some measure of claim on funds for development will have to be found. Similarly Jordan will have to be given tangible inducement to maintain political, and particularly military, commitment to preserving Kuwait's independence. Whether such arrangements are best worked out in series of bilateral agreements or whether problem better approached in context of establishment Kuwaiti-financed area develop organization (from which Iraq too could benefit) is question obviously requiring careful study. Ruler of Kuwait must, however, be made to realize that nothing less than major and continuing fin contribution to develop other Arab states (particularly oil have-nots such as Jordan and UAR) will in long run save Kuwait from total absorption by one of its neighbors.

The West can no longer afford present policy of reliance on British military protection, which seems to be most attractive one to greedy, short-sighted Shaikhs. Under circumstances it behooves us to seize initiative while time (now very short) remains.

Jernegan

155. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (McGhee)/1/

Washington, December 29, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786D.00/12-2961. Secret. Drafted by Thacher (NEA/NE). A previous memorandum from Thacher to Talbot of December 27 that discussed the situation in Kuwait and U.S. options is ibid., NEA/NE Files: Lot 63 D 33, Kuwait.

SUBJECT
United States Responses to Tension Regarding Kuwait

Intense British concern with their large stake in Kuwait and their apparent determination to pursue a policy of firm response to the slightest indication of aggressive Iraqi intentions, led them in the last few days to order an aircraft carrier and small vessels from Kenya to the Persian Gulf area. The British Air Transport Command has been placed in an alert status. By giving these moves plenty of publicity, the British have sought to exercise a deterrent effect on Prime Minister Qasim of Iraq. The intelligence items on which the British acted did not seem to us to indicate any real danger.

These British steps may well have had the desired effect in impressing the Iraqis. Other results, however, are not so helpful. Iraq has sent a letter of protest to the President of the United Nations Security Council describing the British moves as an "aggressive, imperialistic" exercise in "gunboat policy"./2/ We have unconfirmed reports of a statement from the Arab League, currently supposed to be the guardian of Kuwait's security, criticizing the British moves. Unconfirmed press stories report UAR-Iraq "secret talks" aimed at "resolving their differences over Kuwait". Whether or not these reports prove true, they underline the fact that the recent British actions tend to erode the principal political bulwark to Kuwait's security, namely, Arab League support for Kuwait's independence. Arab League intentions have been demonstrated by the stationing in Kuwait of some 2,000 troops, principally of the Jordanian and Saudi armies. UAR support for the Arab League position on Kuwait has shown some sign of weakening with the UAR's recent withdrawal of its 150-man contingent.

/2/December 28, 1961; U.N. doc. S/5043.

We are inclined to believe that it would be extremely difficult for Qasim to launch a surprise attack on Kuwait. However, in public statements he has committed himself over and over again to the "recovery of Kuwait" and there is no doubt that a successful quick conquest would greatly strengthen his hand in the uneasy internal situation he now faces. He may be tempted also by the impunity with which India seized Goa.

Against these advantages and pressures Qasim must measure the strong possibility of a military defeat at British hands and possible open hostilities with the Arab League. Regarding the latter, Qasim may feel that "Arab will not fight Arab" and that there is little real determination behind the League's intention to defend Kuwait, particularly in view of the recent withdrawal of UAR troops there. Qasim must also be aware that he probably could not occupy Kuwait without seriously disrupting the entire structure of oil production, sales and royalty payments which make Kuwait a valuable prize. Qasim may be playing a cat and mouse game with the British, hoping to wear them (and the UK treasury) down by a series of scare gestures which will make it increasingly clear to the rest of the world and the Arabs in particular that Kuwait is, after all, only a British colony.

The British have indicated they will not further intensify at present their precautionary measures with regard to Kuwait.

I propose to discuss with the British Embassy here some of the considerations set out above and we have asked our Embassies in Kuwait and London to discover the extent to which the British are encouraging the Kuwaitis to maintain Arab League support./3/ Some renewed gesture of UAR interest would be particularly helpful although possibilities for this seem lessened by Nasser's recent bitter attacks on other "reactionary regimes" in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. We have suggested that our Ambassador in Jidda seek an assessment from the Saudi Arabian Government of the present temper of Arab League attitudes toward Kuwait./4/

/3/Telegram 366 to Kuwait and 3482 to London, December 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 786D.022/12-28621)

/4/Telegram 366 to Kuwait was repeated to Jidda as telegram 206.

Two other contingencies might, however, have to be dealt with with regard to Kuwait and we would propose to handle them as set out below:

1. British troop landings in Kuwait prior to an actual Iraqi attack. In view of the adverse political effects of British military moves, we are prepared to express to the British our views should we feel there is a sharp cleavage between our estimate of the imminence of an attack and theirs. Should there be, however, a preponderance of events indicating aggressive Iraqi moves are pending we should be prepared to act favorably on possible British requests of the type we received last summer, i.e., assistance in obtaining permission for overflights of Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. We should be prepared to reaffirm publicly, if it would seem helpful, our acceptance of Kuwait as an independent, sovereign nation. While British determination to defend Kuwait must be clear at all times, we believe that a positive US affirmation of an intention to participate in this defense would be unnecessary and would probably strengthen Iraq's case for greater Soviet assistance and weaken Kuwait's posture as an independent Arab country. Thus we should refrain from public military gestures, such as the dispatch of naval vessels in support of the British position. Given substantial evidence of an Iraqi intention to attack, we should be prepared to support fully Security Council consideration of Iraq's aggressive position.

2. Actual hostilities between British and Arab League forces on one side and the Iraqis on the other. In this case we would, of course, identify ourselves publicly with the British and Arab League efforts to protect Kuwait's sovereignty. We should be prepared to consider British requests for logistic support, perhaps in supply of air transport or weapons. We have developed in planning talks in London some understanding as to the possibilities for limited US assistance in these circumstances. We should be prepared to make known to the Soviets our intention to support the British to the fullest extent but only if there should be unmistakable signs of major Soviet intervention on the side of Iraq.

156. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, December 29, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, Vol. II. Secret.

McGB:

Suggest we pass Baghdad 286 (attached) to President./2/ Jernegan is dead right that "in leaving initiative to Kassim, we are in grave danger of being drawn into political disaster over Kuwait." Other potentially serious problems also loom on the horizon.

/2/Document 154.

1. Iraqi internal instability. All observers agree that Kassim is increasingly isolated; only his control over security forces and a delicate balancing act keep him in power. His regime has been a disappointment to all segments of Iraq opinion, even Communists. Rumors of nationalist coup are recurrent, and best guesses around town are that one might occur at any time. If it does, we face problem of attitude to take toward new regime--I'd say we should be quite forthcoming in effort to counteract Soviet influence and get Iraq back on more neutral keel.

2. Kassim seems determined to push IPC to the wall. Both US and UK embassies believe IPC must continue production because to cease would have violent repercussions and might lead Kassim to grab Kuwait or throw himself into Russian arms.

3. Meanwhile Kassim keeps beating Kuwait drum. He is on to a good thing here, both as a diversion from his domestic failures and as an opportunistic gamble. If he can add Kuwait production (largest in ME) to that of IPC, he'll have stranglehold on ME oil. Sovs would have much to gain if Kassim took over Kuwait. So Soviet veto of Kuwait UN application and Kassim's subsequent release of Commies from jail make me suspect a deal. UK is obviously worried about a coup de main; Iraq might strike before Kuwait defense forces can be built up. Both place little reliance on present Arab League contingents (1100 Saudis, 900 Jordanians, 140 Sudanese).

[1 paragraph (4-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

However, our tendency has been to sit back and regard IPC, Kuwait and even Iraq as UK baby. But we own 23.75% of IPC/3/ and Gulf has 50% of Kuwait Oil Company. Moreover, what happens in Iraq will directly affect events in Syria and Iran, not to mention Jordan, the UAR and Saudi Arabia. British tried originally to play ball with Kassim, but I gather they are disillusioned with his fanatical unpredictability.

/3/Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony Mobil owned 23.75 percent of the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Nasser may hold key to resolving these problems, but his current position is equivocal. In the past he backed a number of plots against Kassim. Also he stands to lose if Kuwait oil disappears into Iraqi's maw instead of his coffers. However, after initially backing Kuwait against Iraq he's now withdrawn his contingent in the sheikhdom.

Walt and I here, and now Jernegan in Baghdad, have been plugging theme Kuwait's independence can only be assured if Ruler uses his fantastic oil revenues to buy support from other Arab leaders, particularly Nasser and Jordanians, perhaps through some Arab development scheme. Only in this way will he be able to create any vested Arab interest in preserving this anachronistic place.

Jernegan's blast may stir State out of its usual "wait and see" stance. Meanwhile, I've been urging on Phil Talbot and Walt some anticipatory planning. But an indication of Presidential interest would help to get things moving. How about the attached?/4/

/4/On December 30, Bundy asked the White House Situation Room to pass to General Clifton for President Kennedy at his residence in Palm Beach, Florida, telegram 286 from Baghdad and the following note from Bundy: "Jernegan's message seems persuasive to Komer and me, and with your approval I would like to press State Dept for action in this direction, using your interest as a stick. I would add that Dept should of course lay out a plan for action in cooperation with British if possible, but our own interests, oil and other, are very directly involved." (White House telegram CAP 5491-61, December 30, and attached note from Bundy to Situation Room; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Kuwait, 8/61-5/62)

Bob Komer

157. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, January 2, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, United Arab Republic, 1/62-2/61. Confidential.

SUBJECT
United Arab Republic Request for PL-480 Sale of Cotton

In response to an inquiry from your office regarding the status of the Title I PL-480 cotton request from the United Arab Republic, I am able to report that it is under consideration among the agencies concerned. The Department believes it is politically important to respond favorably if at all possible. However, the Egyptian request comes at a time when a serious problem of availability has already arisen in connection with earlier requests for cotton from a number of countries, some of them heavily dependent for many years on United States assistance in securing cotton.

Because of heavy crop losses from the severe leaf worm infestation of its current cotton crop, the United Arab Republic has requested 350,000 bales of United States Upland cotton of 1 to 1-1/8 inch in length under Title I of PL-480 to meet a shortage of cotton needed for the production of mass-consumption textiles. The United Arab Republic would continue to export its long and extra-long staple cotton but has given assurances that it (1) would refrain from exporting its own medium staple during the current year (other than deliveries on sales made before the extent of the crop damage was understood) and (2) would not export yarn or textiles produced from the PL-480 cotton.

There is no question that the United Arab Republic's economy has suffered a severe loss from the leaf worm infestation. About 35% of the cotton crop was destroyed. Export prospects are down sharply and the loss in export earnings alone is expected to exceed $100 million. In addition, the availability of cotton varieties for local consumption is substantially reduced, posing the alternative of diverting more expensive longer staples from export markets, or causing consumption of textiles by the mass of the people to be reduced. The United Arab Republic's weak foreign exchange position does not permit it a third alternative of purchasing medium staple cotton from abroad.

Although the request is for 350,000 bales, we consider this excessive in relation to domestic needs and believe a much lower figure would be more appropriate; i.e. in the range of 50,000 to 100,000 bales. Anything much less than 100,000 bales might be politically unacceptable to the United Arab Republic, while a larger amount might stimulate export pressures. We would expect to include in any agreement with the United Arab Republic on PL-480 cotton appropriate limitations on exports of raw cotton and cotton yarns and textiles.

We have already informed the U.A.R. that the quantity of cotton presently available for Title I programming is entirely committed and that it has not been possible since mid-October to consider additional requests. We have urgent unfilled requirements involving a total of 376,500 bales for Korea, the Republic of China, Morocco, Ethiopia and Bolivia, where for the past several years we have been supplying cotton under Section 402 of the Mutual Security Act. Although the requests of these countries must receive first priority attention, there are also compelling foreign policy reasons for giving favorable consideration to the requests of such other countries as Viet Nam and India, as well as the United Arab Republic, provided normal Title I program criteria are met.

In view of the foregoing, the Department of State is pressing for a review of the over-all question of cotton availability from existing stocks for PL-480 programming during this fiscal year and has recently sent a letter to the Department of Agriculture (a copy of which is enclosed)/2/ in this regard.

/2/The attached letter, from Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Edwin Martin to Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for Marketing and Foreign Agriculture Duncan, dated December 20, 1961, noted that there had been a number of requests for cotton under Title I of P.L. 480 that exceeded Department of Agriculture October 1961 estimates of available surplus cotton, and indicated that the most urgent requirements were for South Korea, the Republic of China, Ethiopia, Morocco, and Bolivia. The letter also advised that special consideration should be given to making cotton available to South Vietnam, India, and the United Arab Republic.

Our consideration of a cotton program for the United Arab Republic has come to the attention of the press, particularly the New York Times. A correspondent from this newspaper has raised the relevance of such a program to an unconfirmed report he has received that the United Arab Republic is about to barter cotton for two new wings of Soviet jet aircraft. We have no confirmation of this reported barter which has been denied by the United Arab Republic Embassy here. The United Arab Republic has since mid-1961 been severely restricting its cotton exports to the Soviet Bloc and hopes to reorient at least 60% of its exports to Western countries.

It may also be of interest that the Department has just received a diplomatic note from the Peruvian Embassy objecting to the possible sale of PL-480 cotton to the United Arab Republic. The Peruvian Government's concern is that such a sale would enable the United Arab Republic to export larger quantities of cotton. Peru is sensitive about our PL-480 cotton sales in general but in the case of the United Arab Republic the sensitivity is sharpened by the fact that the two countries export similar types of cotton.

This status report brings out various factors and problems which must be considered in the United Arab Republic's request for Title I cotton, but we hope that, if Title I availability permits, a cotton program for the United Arab Republic can be developed which will be acceptable to all parties concerned.

M.L. Manfull/3/

/3/Manfull signed for Battle above Battle's typed signature.

158. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State/1/

Beirut, January 8, 1962, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/1-862. Top Secret; [distribution indicator not declassified].

659. With the arrest of Abdullah Saade and other PPS leaders,/2/ Lebanese authorities are likely to learn from interrogations that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] had continuing relationships with PPS since 1958. Hopefully interrogators would also acquire sufficient background evidence of coup attempt of 31 December to reach their own conclusion that US Government in no way involved. While we cannot predict what action Government of Lebanon might take in response to evidence [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as may come to light, there is some basis for hope that GOL would explore matter discreetly with Embassy prior to any public charges.

/2/At dawn on December 31, members of the Syrian National Party (PPS) staged an attempted coup against the Lebanese Government. The Lebanese Army and security forces promptly suppressed it. Reports from the Embassy in Beirut and other posts in the region concerning the coup are ibid., 783A.00.

There is always possibility that an irresponsible official such as Kamal Jumblatt/3/ (who appears to be exploiting present situation to settle scores with PPS and its friends) may give publicity to USG connections with PPS, or without GOL sanction. This might be as part of GOL attempt to divert attention from current Lebanese feelings that arrests, interrogations, and investigations are excessively harsh. If USG connections with PPS are publicized, widespread allegations against British involvement in coup may help blunt impact of charges relating to Americans.

/3/Hereditary Druze chieftain and Lebanese Minister of State for the Interior and Planning Services.

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] I [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] opposed to taking any special defensive initiative in advance of any GOL inquiry or in advance of any press reports of USG and PPS associations. Such initiative is only likely to be interpreted as admission of guilt or cover-up for actual involvement in coup. Meanwhile my response to Takla's probing (Embtel 651)/4/ may have effect of forestalling GOL suspicions of USG.

/4/Meyer reported in telegram 651 from Beirut, January 6, that when Lebanese Foreign Minister Takla referred to recent developments in Lebanon, Meyer had assured him that the United States had no advance indications of the recent coup attempt and that the United States believed that the internal politics of Middle Eastern states and interstate relationships were matters for decision of the people of the area and that there was no change in the traditional U.S. disposition to be a friend of Lebanon. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.83A/1-662)

[1 paragraph (7-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Meyer

159. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, January 10, 1962.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/1-1062. Secret. Drafted by Barrow (NEA/NE) and Thacher (NEA/NE) on January 5 and concurred in by Gaud (AID) in draft, Martin (E) in draft, and Rostow (S/P) in substance. Talbot transmitted this memorandum to Secretary Rusk for his signature through McGhee (M) and Johnson (G) who initialed the transmittal memorandum. A handwritten note on the source text by Brubeck, dated January 29, reads: "GWB talked to Pres on weekend re Nasser visit and has NEA proposed memo to Pres re visit. Action rests w/GWB." A January 3 memorandum from Talbot to McGhee contains an additional rationale for the action plan printed here. (Ibid., NEA/NE Files: Lot 66 D 218, UAR POL UAR-US)

SUBJECT
Action Program for the United Arab Republic/2/

/2/On January 23, Kaysen forwarded the action plan to President Kennedy together with a commentary on it by Robert Komer dated January 15 (Document 163), and Komer's memorandum for the record of December 20, 1961 (Document 151). (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, United Arab Republic, Nasser Visit)

Following reconsideration of the key position of the United Arab Republic in the Near East and Africa and in light of urgent requests for various forms of aid put forward by the U.A.R. Ambassador here, we are proposing a program of coordinated steps in our relations with this important country. Our objective would be to encourage orderly economic development in the United Arab Republic with beneficial consequence for Near East area stability, and to provide significant Western alternatives to U.A.R. economic, and possibly political, dependence on the Soviet Bloc. We propose no sweeping commitments to the U.A.R. at the outset and, prior to initiating each step, we would review carefully the nature and extent of U.A.R. responses to previous steps.

In explanation of this proposed program I enclose the following:

1. Over-all rationale;

2. Explanatory memorandum on message from you to President Nasser and text of message on economic cooperation;

3. Memorandum seeking your good offices to secure the services of Dr. Edward Mason of Harvard University for a two-week exploratory economic mission to the United Arab Republic; and

4. Memorandum suggesting an invitation to President Nasser to visit this country.

I should be grateful for your consideration and, if you deem appropriate, approval of each of these individual steps.

Dean Rusk/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.

Enclosure 1