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Foreign Relations,
1961-1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961-1962 Released by the Office of the Historian Documents 166-190 166. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, January 17, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/1-1762. Confidential; Limited Distribution; Noforn. Drafted by Crawford on January 24.
SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Assistant Secretary Talbot asked Dr. Johnson's views on continuing the work of the PCC Special Representative.
Dr. Johnson said he is considerably encouraged as the result of recent informal meetings with Arab delegates in New York who appear to have met on January 15 to determine their common attitude toward continuation of the Special Representative mission. They now believe their governments are disposed to cooperate with the PCC and will not push the issue of PCC reconstitution at this time provided Paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) Dr. Johnson said he can continue as Special Representative for one further year only. If by June or July there are signs this work will have to be carried on beyond next fall, thought should be given to his successor. Additionally, he wishes to have Mr. Moe assigned to him for the coming year, with a title appropriate to his responsibilities. As regards a timetable, several questions arise. When the SR has accepted appointment by the PCC there should be some announcement, for the record, in a very low key. After this announcement there would follow a long period in which hard examination could be given to a series of questions or "studies" directly relating to the SR's second round, to be carried out under the aegis of the PCC, or perhaps the Special Representative himself, with a competent staff including some non-Americans. Dr. Johnson said that after completion of extensive technical studies he looked to a second round to begin about mid-April and last four or five weeks. It is better not to try to predict where the problem will stand at completion of the second round.
Mr. Strong remarked that the seriousness of our intentions can be questioned if the second round is delayed too long. However, if the states of the area know that studies are going on this will help explain the delay.
Dr. Johnson said he has certain broad questions on which he welcomes the Department's comments. These are:
1. How far is the United States prepared to go in providing diplomatic support? In this regard, Mrs. Meir had stated on the first round that Israel is willing to take back some refugees, but must be "the last not the first". It seems obvious that things must be the other way around if progress is to be made, although the difference between a commitment to take back refugees and the act of taking them back can be recognized. Israel will obviously have to be the first country visited on the second round. Presumably, there will have to be strong U.S. support if Mrs. Meir's view is to be altered. Support with the Arab governments will also be necessary, for example, if the SR is to enter refugee camps in safety to obtain indications of refugee attitudes.
Mr. Talbot commented that there has been extensive communication between our Government and both the Arabs and Israelis which illustrates our support of the refugee initiative. This is "as important a piece of business" as we have underway anywhere. The degree of U.S. support provided will, of course, relate to determination of what is required to get on with the job.
2. Dr. Johnson noted there are very important financial considerations in an approach to the refugee problem. There is the estimate of Mr. Jarvis, the PCC property expert, that the value of refugee property as of 1948 was perhaps 200 million sterling. At the most, this might mean minimal payments to as many as 125,000 refugee families (500,000 refugees). The 200 million figure presumably must be adjusted to show some allowance for loss of intangible property (20%), devaluation of the pound since 1948, and the absence of any return from property for 13 years. To the result must be added a minimum figure, perhaps $2,500, to assist each family in resettlement. Finally, funds for area economic development to create necessary jobs must be considered. In all, the financial basis for a meaningful effort to resolve the refugee problem may exceed $1 billion. Obviously, Israel cannot pay all of this, although unofficial statements from Israel diplomats have referred to the possibility of Israel's setting up a compensation fund of $250 million. It will be important for the Special Representative to have an indication of U.S. Government willingness to provide financial support to enable him to say in negotiation that funds to do the job can be counted upon if the parties agree on specific steps toward a solution.
Mr. Talbot agreed that the financial aspect of this problem is one that deserves most careful consideration.
3. Are there U.S. policies elsewhere with which the SR mission conflicts?
Mr. Talbot replied that the SR mission is in itself a cardinal element of U.S. policy in the area.
Dr. Johnson clarified his question by explaining that the pattern of U.S. relations in the Near East would have an influence on the determination as to whether there should be emphasis on making progress in one particular country. Because of the U.S. position in Jordan, it would obviously be easy to start there; Gaza will be the toughest nut to crack.
Mr. Strong commented that there is merit in trying for limited, parallel movement in each country.
4. What is the U.S. view of the "Palestine entity" concept?
Mr. Talbot replied that the Department sees advantage in dealing with existing entities. We hope the SR action will not give impetus to the "Palestine entity" concept.
Dr. Johnson asked for the Department's current evaluation of the strength of the movement. Mr. Strong remarked that the effort to create a Palestine entity is subject to the pull of many different influences. A reconciliation of these is unlikely in the near future.
5. What is the Department's estimate of Nasser's current position and attitudes? Might Nasser be willing to use his good influence in the refugee problem in order to relax tension on a major element of instability in the area and thus be free to concentrate on the internal development of Egypt?
Mr. Strong said this is hard to determine. It would be logical for Nasser to reach such a conclusion, but we cannot be certain that logic will motivate his actions. We are sure that Nasser does not want to see the Arab-Israel issue stirred up at the moment. This is a moderately hopeful factor.
Department officers commented that the formula adopted during Dr. Johnson's first round appeared satisfactory. It is desirable for him to show a willingness to consult, but not to seek consultation in a way to invite rebuff or increase the difficulties of negotiation by expanding the number of negotiating parties. The more this problem can be kept out of the Arab League context the better. Even well-disposed states such as Sudan and Tunisia are unlikely to be willing to take the risk of involving themselves in this problem in a constructive fashion.
7. What is the Department's estimate of the position of the present Syrian Government? Syrian Delegate Rifai had seemed very helpful during the fall Assembly session.
Mr. Strong replied that, while today the Syrian Government is somewhat more subdued and moderate in its actions toward the United States, and we try to encourage the moderate tendency, there is no assurance that Syria will not soon "revert to type".
8. (Mr. Moe) Is it the Department's view that at the recent GA the Arabs feel they suffered a defeat in the sense that they can no longer expect the Afro-Asian states and fellow neutralists to follow blindly whatever path they may take in U.N. debates of the Palestine problem?
Mr. Cleveland asked whether in the long run, if the Arabs feel more isolated, they will be easier or harder to deal with?
Ambassador Plimpton said that, thanks to the African direct peace negotiations resolution, the Arabs certainly realize they will not necessarily find all Afro-Asians in their camp. However, this sense of isolation will probably make them frustratingly harder to deal with.
Parenthetically, Dr. Johnson asked whether it would be wise to have Ambassador Macomber talk to responsible Jordanian officials. The composition of the Jordanian Delegation at the last Assembly was very unsatisfactory in that all delegates save one were refugee leaders. As a result, the Jordanians were time and again the most immoderate and unhelpful.
Mr. Strong commented that the degree to which Jordan can be helpful will depend very much on what the King feels he can or cannot do in terms of public opinion.
9. What does the Department intend to do in terms of conditioning domestic U.S. attitudes?
Department officers commented that the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, and Rabbi Miller and Mr. Label Katz seem disposed to be helpful. Assistant Secretary Cleveland remarked that it might be useful for him to talk to Senator Javits.
10. How much is it feasible to think in terms of resettlement outside the Near East?
Department officers replied that a call for the creation of resettlement opportunities outside the Near East must be a part of any program for progress on this problem. It is unwise to be optimistic in this regard, however, since the same factor which prevents assimilation of the refugee in the Middle East--his lack of skills--makes him unattractive as a prospective immigrant to other countries.
11. What countries other than the members of the Conciliation Commission can be helpful to the Special Representative's mission?
Department officers agreed that The Netherlands, New Zealand, and Canada have all shown a constructive interest in this problem over the years.
PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Harman devoted forty minutes of an hour's conversation to this subject. He protested in very strong terms the Department's practice of informing other governments that in accord with U.N. resolutions the international community refuses to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and that most governments, accordingly, have located their diplomatic missions in Tel Aviv. His remarks complemented objections voiced by Israel Foreign Minister Golda Meir when she summoned Ambassador Walworth Barbour January 12 (cf. Tel Aviv's telegram No. 348) Mr. Talbot replied that, press comments aside, the United States is just as precise with governments in defining positions on other United Nations resolutions. No government, he said, has any difficulty ascertaining U.S. views on any resolution, and this applies to those on freedom of transit.
Ambassador Harman said that the case of Ethiopia had some special characteristics. It had produced two deviations from what Israel had hoped was United States policy. In the first place, U.S. remarks had not been solicited and, in the second, U.S. remarks were not expressed as representing its own reasons for maintaining its Embassy in Tel Aviv but as advice to Ethiopia as to how it should decide.
Mr. Talbot said he could not agree there is any great difference between an expression of U.S. views unsolicited or volunteered. In conversations between officials, a U.S. viewpoint might be expressed in response to an inquiry volunteered for reasons of U.S. interest.
Ambassador Harman rejoined that there is a deep, substantive difference. When the United States volunteers a viewpoint, he said, no responsible government would conclude that it is less than serious, urgent, and important.
To this Mr. Talbot replied that the converse is also true.
Ambassador Harman introduced other subjects which were discussed for a quarter of an hour, but as he prepared to leave he said he wanted to return once more to the Jerusalem issue, saying he would appreciate assurances by Mr. Talbot that when it appeared other countries are considering where to locate their diplomatic missions in Israel, the United States will not volunteer its views, expressing them only if solicited.
Mr. Talbot gave him no encouragement. He said that the problem is a difficult and complex one, and because it has these characteristics he had studied the record of our policy to determine (a) whether our policy had changed since 1952, and (b) on what rationale, if any, would a change be warranted. On a basis of this investigation, he said, he found no evidence of a change or of reason to change. He expressed his general agreement with the position Ambassador Barbour had taken in his conversation with Mrs. Meir.
Specifically: 1. It has surmounted the immediate political crisis which brought it into office and has fought off extremist pressures from all sides. It has retained the Shah's support in domestic matters and has supported his pro-Western foreign policy.
2. It has taken the first steps to reduce inefficiency and corruption within the government; high-level dishonesty has decreased sharply and dozens of former officials are being tried, punished, investigated, or exposed.
3. It has waged an effective but difficult and unpopular fight against inherited problems of inflation and foreign exchange shortages, involving restrictions on imports, bank credit, government spending, and wage increases. It is tooling up for the Third Economic Development Plan, and is widening and accelerating the land reform program.
These are significant, if limited, gains. They have been achieved through the efforts of Amini, the acquiescence or sporadic support of the Shah, and a judicious combination of United States advice, pressure, and financial assistance.
These accomplishments have not, however, cured the underlying malady of the country. Iran remains politically sick and economically disorganized, and a synthesis of moderate political forces is not yet in sight. Despite the Shah's good intentions, patriotism, and intelligence, he remains essentially mystical, vain, and suspicious. As reflected in Annex C some concrete progress has been made but the Shah is either unwilling or unable to take the difficult and, to him, distasteful measures which would enlist the full confidence and enthusiastic support of the majority of his more politically conscious and articulate subjects. At best he can be induced to consent to the efforts of Amini or a like-minded successor. At present the political drives of the Mosadeq-oriented "Nationalists" and their immediate following among the educated and semi-educated are largely destructive and unrealistic, and are directed almost exclusively toward obtaining supreme power as an end in itself. Nor is there in existence or in prospect any effective group which can occupy the middle ground between the Shah on the one hand and the heirs of Mosadeq on the other. With insignificant exceptions the conservative element in Iran is hopelessly short-sighted and is concerned only with its private vested interests. The Iranian military has not produced imaginative political leadership and is not likely to do so.
Although there are variants in between, fundamentally, for the foreseeable future, the United States will continue to be faced with the hard choice between two basic strategies:
1. To support the National Front as the current embodiment of a revolutionary element which will probably sooner or later come to power. The day may come when the United States could well be forced to this policy as an alternative to chaos or an overt communist takeover of Iran. Were this element to assume power now, however, the almost inevitable result would be the breakup of CENTO, the expulsion of the United States military mission, the loss of Iran as an intelligence base, the denunciation of the Oil Consortium agreement, Soviet economic penetration, and a resurgence of the domestic communist movement which could not be checked by a weak and fragmented power structure.
2. To continue to support governments acceptable to the Shah, whose character is such as to make his years as the ultimate repository of power almost certainly numbered. In any fundamental sense the Shah appears unwilling or unable to make the changes necessary to assure the support of the "Nationalists" over the coming decade, if such support is at all possible. His pride, his reputation, and his openly pro-Western attitudes are perhaps insuperable barriers. Heavy pressure by the United States or other friends to force the Shah into a major attempt to compromise with these critics would involve risks of his retiring to Europe or seeking an accommodation with the USSR, of strengthening the determination of the "Nationalists" to seize power, and of precipitating a conservative coup, thus leading to the developments foreseen in the first strategy alternative.
Faced with these fundamental choices, it is my judgment that United States policies in Iran will be best promoted by continued support of a government acceptable to the Shah, emphasizing in the strongest possible terms at the same time the need to press forward with social and economic reforms. Only by pursuing this course of action can we hope to avoid a major political defeat and concurrently maximize opportunities for a more favorable reshaping of the basic political and economic situation in Iran. This is the basis of our support for the Amini Regime and why his program must remain the center of our efforts in Iran. The test of this policy is whether we have successfully assured, at the lowest political cost, the Shah's acceptance of the best government in sight (at present the Amini Regime) and at the same time found the most effective way to push that government--without shattering it--in directions that could provide cynical and disturbed young Persians with a spark of enthusiasm, hope, and confidence. Every policy decision turns on how we play this game--without overplaying it.
Mosadeq-oriented elements will seize on the slightest sign of United States disapproval of the regime to mount massive efforts to undermine and overthrow it. The Shah himself has a breaking point which could mean his abdication and flight, leaving chaos behind him. Relations between the Shah and his Prime Minister are delicate, and could be broken if the Shah were to feel that the United States was supporting a potential threat against him. Ambitious military men and greedy conservatives who are masters of political intrigue will attempt to take advantage of any strain in relations between the United States and the regime. Communist propaganda will exploit every opportunity to convince the public that national sovereignty has been abandoned to a foreign power.
Many forceful measures are of dubious value in this brittle situation. What is required is a skillful mixture of enticement and prodding, of periodic involvement and occasional seeming withdrawal, of patience and decisive action. The authority to act must be adequate to the problem. The actions themselves must be shrewdly conceived and flexibly executed.
Officials in Washington and our Ambassador in Tehran are functioning according to these dictates. When the day comes that they need more extensive powers than they now possess, these powers will be requested. For the task immediately ahead, the initially approved Task Force recommendations appear still largely adequate. Certain modification in the initial Task Force Recommendations should, however, be noted, as reflected in Annex A to this report. I have concluded, therefore, it is not necessary to request additional authority from the National Security Council at this time. The most effective steps possible to strengthen and broaden the base of the Amini government and to keep prodding it into forward motion will continue to be taken.
Discussion
It has emerged from the Task Force's deliberations that there is no significant divergence of opinion with the United States Government as regards United States objectives in Iran. To prevent Soviet domination of Iran must be our immediate and overriding objective. This requires the continuance in power of a pro-Western regime, for the most likely ultimate alternative is a weak neutralist government which could not withstand Soviet pressures and maintain Iran's independence. The pro-Western regime has been maintained and is no longer immediately endangered, although many longer-term weaknesses remain. Prime Minister Amini has succeeded in overcoming a near-crisis situation and thus continuing Iran's pro-Western alignment. He has, however, been unable fully to pursue his program of vigorous reform measures designed to lead to a more permanent resolution of these basic weaknesses.
The Prime Minister has had to retain the confidence and support of his somewhat reluctant monarch. He has been faced with political pressures from the fanatical Mosadeqist opposition, and with the sniping of ambitious and discontented conservative leaders. The implementation of the vital economic stabilization program has intensified these difficulties by infringing on the interests of various special groups. The basic inadequacy of the administrative tools available to him, which can be improved only slowly, have further limited his freedom of action.
The first Iran Task Force Report stressed that the United States should actively and vigorously, albeit discreetly, press for political, economic, social, and institutional reforms in Iran which would provide the indispensable foundation for true and lasting social and economic development. The Third Development Plan which embraces the total economy and takes account of both social and economic requirements is scheduled to begin in September 1962. It must be the primary vehicle to initiate the fundamental political and economic progress needed in Iran. The intervening period will be of critical importance in laying the necessary foundations for the implementation of this Third Plan.
In October the Task Force found that additional United States resources, beyond those allocated in accordance with last spring's Task Force Recommendations, would be required to enable the Amini Government, or a like-minded successor, to surmount the political and economic difficulties which it faced and which it will face between now and the beginning of the Third Plan. Discussions within the Task Force disclosed divergent views as to the means by which the introduction of those resources could best accomplish United States objectives. The possibility was explored of supplementing our continuing diplomatic efforts by developing a package action program with the Government of Iran involving other international sources of economic assistance so that desirable public conditions could be agreed upon for the provision and use of development resources in the context of a joint cooperative and effective effort to solve Iran's basic economic problems. Alternatively, it was held that the same objectives, given the complexities and fragilities of Iranian society, could best be accomplished by the private and discreet exercise of United States influence and pressure. It was agreed with the Agency for International Development that the provision of the necessary additional assistance, amounting to $15 million in Supporting Assistance and $20 million in development lending, should be made conditional upon a clear understanding by the Iranian Government that it must undertake seriously certain self-help measures. Our Ambassador has informed the Prime Minister of the additional assistance, and has obtained appropriate assurances from the Iranian Government. A recent and spectacular example of the implementation of the Task Force Recommendations was the finesse with which the U.S. and U.K. Ambassadors, working with the Prime Minister, dissuaded the Shah from dumping the Prime Minister or reducing him to puppet status. This course was being urged on the Shah by jealous and apprehensive courtiers, conservative business men, landlords, and reactionary military officers. This effort backfired on its instigators, with the Shah publicly reinforcing his support of the Prime Minister, increasing the powers of the Cabinet, and backing a positive and specific program of reforms. Extremist conservatives are as a result beginning to attack the Shah himself.
Our Ambassador in Tehran has recommended that the Shah be invited to the United States on a state visit, in order that His Majesty be informed of the nature of U.S. support for Iran and specifically that he be told of plans for U.S. military assistance for Iran over the next five years. Approval of Country Team Tehran's recommendations as to the nature of this program was a precondition of the state visit as recommended by the Ambassador; a final decision has not been made and approval of the Country Team's plan is doubtful. Therefore, and in view of other rapidly changing political factors, I am inclined to believe that the Shah's visit should follow the successful initiation of the Third Economic Plan, to begin in September, 1962. I am consulting with our Ambassador on this problem.
Difficult decisions remain in the shaping of the future of the United States military assistance program to Iran and in the preparation of political and military contingency plans for Iran. However, the various aspects of these problems are under consideration in the regular channels of the Government, and no NSC is necessary at this time. (See Annex A, items 5 and 7, for details.)
Guided by the approved recommendations, specific guidance for United States actions in Iran has been drawn up setting forth the goals toward which our assistance, encouragement, pressure, and advice should be directed. (See Annex B.) These recommendations should continue as basic policy guidance to the United States Government. These and portions of other recommendations have provided the indispensable basis of our detailed action goals in Iran (See Annex "B") and of the progress made recently toward those goals (See Annex "C").
Approved Task Force Recommendation 4
This recommendation continues to be valid. The actions called for in subsections (a) and (b) have been taken, and the funds reserved under subsection (b) have been absorbed in the latest tranche of United States assistance.
Approved Task Force Recommendation 5
A joint State-Defense working group has studied the problem intensively and has concluded that the deployment of specifically earmarked forces is not feasible unless and until it is decided that Soviet military aggression against Iran is probable in the near future, and then only if other and overriding military requirements do not prevent such a deployment. The working group has also recommended to me that in the light of assurances already made to Iran and in view of certain dangers which further assurances and specific information as to United States military planning would imply, no such fresh assurances or additional information should be supplied to the Government of Iran at present. I have accepted these recommendations.
Approved Task Force Recommendation 7
This recommendation should be amended to include the words "as feasible" between the words "encourage" and "the formation". The immediate situation is such that United States action to stimulate the immediate formation of broadly-based political parties would probably be counterproductive, although we, along with moderate political elements in Iran, recognize the need for action in this direction whenever the situation of the moment will permit it.
Approved Task Force Recommendation 9
The purpose of the recommendation has been accomplished, and the problem to which it refers has entered a new phase within the established mechanisms of the United States Government.
In accordance with this recommendation, planned expansion of the Iranian Armed Forces was halted and they have remained at a manpower level of about 200,000. The Military Assistance Steering Group under Mr. Kitchen The CENTO study is now in its final stages, having gone through the formal planning mechanism of the government. Specific phased recommendations as to actions to further United States interests through CENTO will be forthcoming within a few weeks. Established channels, rather than the Iran Task Force, will be utilized.
Approved Task Force Recommendation 11
This recommendation has been overtaken by and included in broader military and political contingency planning studies which were set in motion by a series of reports to the effect that the USSR might be preparing to launch a military attack on Iran in the near future. A relatively low estimate of probability was later assigned to these reports. Existing approved military planning in Iran covered only United States action against hostile elements other than the Red Army. A study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the problems posed by possible United States military action in Iran to counter direct Soviet aggression led to the following conclusions:
1. Commitment of United States forces in sufficient time to counter a Soviet advance into Iran requires use of the only two airborne divisions presently in the United States Strategic Reserve and all of the airlift capability including the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, resulting in a serious dilution of the capability to respond to other contingencies.
2. Because of limited combat capability of Iranian forces, and the limiting concept of the CENTO alliance, United States commitment with available forces could be successful only against a limited Soviet intervention or limited probing aggression.
3. Owing to inadequacies of road and rail facilities in Iran, a United States force of only two Army divisions and Marine and USAF combat elements can be supported in northern Iran in addition to Iranian forces. By extensive use of United States air transport capabilities about two additional battle groups could be supported. In light of limited Iranian capabilities this force is too small to cope with substantial Soviet aggression.
4. Any chance of success requires immediate authorization to conduct air attacks against air bases in Russia directly supporting operations in Iran. These attacks would employ nuclear or conventional weapons as appropriate to the military situation.
5. Any commitment of United States forces in Iran against overt Soviet involvement must be preceded by a decision to employ whatever degree of force is required to achieve United States objectives in the area and to preserve the integrity of United States forces, to include the use of nuclear weapons or the initiation of general war if the Soviets persist in spite of United States action.
6. It is feasible to conduct military operations in Iran against limited Soviet intervention and probing aggression; it is not feasible to conduct limited war in Iran against substantial and determined Soviet aggression under present conditions and in light of worldwide commitments.
It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that subject to these conclusions, and assuming that the President would declare a state of national emergency and that authorization for the use of nuclear weapons would be given as required to achieve United States objectives in the area, certain measures of limited non-nuclear response could be taken in Iran by United States forces to counter limited Soviet intervention and probing aggression.
Contingency planning for political and political-military measures to deter Soviet military attack, direct or indirect, on Iran is under way through a State-Defense working group. A phased list of possible United States actions and supporting information is in the final stages of a clearance among the agencies and offices involved. This study has involved the following pertinent conclusions:
1. The maintenance of an Iranian will to resist is an indispensable element in deterring Soviet attack.
2. Soviet tactics of threats and military aggression would be counterproductive for the USSR in terms of the present Soviet tactic of fomenting revolution by a broad coalition of discontented elements.
4. Deterrent measures must in large part be taken if and when our estimate of Soviet intentions and tactics in Iran is revised, or in response to ad hoc Soviet political actions.
5. Should it become necessary to act to deter a Soviet military attack on Iran, a basic decision will be desirable as to whether the United States is willing to go to general war if all else fails in order to protect Iran from Soviet military aggression, and, if not, whether the United States is willing to go to any lengths at possibly high costs to its prestige in an attempt to convey to the USSR an impression that it is so willing. Such a decision should be reached as early as may be feasible in the process of implementing deterrent measures.
1. The Shah has remained confident, pro-Western, and anti-communist, and has withdrawn to an encouraging extent from the exposed political position he has occupied in recent years, and has delegated important powers to his capable Prime Minister. He has constituted the entire Royal Estates as an irrevocable religious trust, the profits of which will be devoted to charity and the financial details of which will be publicized. The Shah has shown interest in a dynamic internal reform program, although his interest in technical military matters is still strong.
2. Iran has maintained a firm but non-provocative attitude toward the USSR, insisting that as a prerequisite to improved relations the USSR cease its massive and abusive propaganda campaign against Iran. Neutralist sentiment remains widespread but apparently is not expanding. Internal security and respect for minority rights remain excellent by Middle Eastern standards. Iran continues to stand by CENTO, despite pressures from the USSR and domestic neutralists; in the Kuwait crisis, on the Shatt-al-Arab, and in the Pakistan-Afghanistan crisis Iran has behaved in a restrained and helpful fashion.
3. The Prime Minister has successfully defended those of his officials, particularly in the Justice Ministry, under attack from rightist forces as being too "moderate". The National Front, however, has refused to respond to the Prime Minister's invitation to cooperate in a reform program. Distribution of Crown Estates land is nearing completion, distribution of public domain land continues, and a new program of model experimental distribution of private estates is under way. The Prime Minister, at great cost to his health, continues personally to solicit the support of all types of non-elite groups through personal contact and radio addresses. A massive adult literacy campaign has been launched. Public trials of high officials accused of corruption in the past have begun, investigations and the preparation of cases against others continue, and high-level corruption has been sharply reduced, all within a pattern of strict legality and the protection of the rights of the individual. A basic civil service reform statute has been drawn up and is under consideration by the Cabinet.
4. Recent agreements by the United States and Germany to provide new loans to the Plan Organization give promise that the essential elements of Iran's Second Plan will be completed. Formulation of a Third Plan to capitalize on major investments made during the Second Plan and to maintain an average 6% growth rate is moving forward rapidly. The IBRD expects to dispatch a team to Iran in January 1962 to prepare a full report on the Third Plan for presentation to potential members of a financing consortium for the Plan. In spite of stiff opposition the Prime Minister has enforced an unpopular stabilization program which includes a sizeable cutback in credit expansion and the prohibition of luxury imports. The shake-out in the economy has been severe but most of the strong enterprises seemed to have survived, the rising cost-of-living has leveled off, and Iran's foreign exchange position is beginning to recover slowly. The Central Bank has begun to exercise increasingly effective control over the banking system, and measures to direct capital to productive investments have been instituted. Public sector expenditures have been held down and a major public buildings program has been eliminated from the current budget. In response to United States prodding, the Prime Minister has given us written assurances that Iran will develop a consolidated budget for the coming year. He has also promised to undertake tax reform measures to improve tax collections and is examining ways to improve the tax structure. Cordial relations with Western oil companies have been maintained, and a number of outstanding technical and financial problems have been settled amicably in recent talks with the oil consortium in London. Oil revenue for Iran in 1961 will be approximately 7% ($20 million) over 1960, or a total of $305 million.
5. In the current Iranian budget (ending March 21, 1962), military costs have been held down for the first time in almost a decade, and manpower increases have likewise been halted. Plans now under consideration in the United States Government provide for manpower decreases with a concomitant increase in military capability through a restructured United States MAP Plan. More senior officers are being retired than promoted, and promotion lists appear to be based largely on merit rather than influence. Vocational training in the armed forces continues to be limited by the availability of funds.
6. The lack of communication between the Shah and the leaders of the "Nationalist" opposition continues, and there is little hope for improvement on either side. Opposition criticism of the regime continues to be almost entirely irresponsible and destructive. Recent developments, including publication of proof obtained by the security forces that a respected National Front student was a communist, have apparently increased "Nationalist" awareness of the dangers of Tudeh penetration. The "Nationalist" opposition force continues however to be intractably bent on the seizure of power as a primary aim, and the complete lack of understanding between it and the Shah continues to be a very dangerous factor. The United States is beginning a new and major effort in the field to analyze "Nationalist" leadership to ascertain the feasibility of an attempt to influence it in the direction of greater responsibility.
On January 18, 1962, at its 496th meeting, the National Security Council discussed the Report of the Military Assistance Steering Group, an interagency body formed to examine U.S. military assistance to several nations, including Iran, considered to be "double threat countries," that is, on the Sino-Soviet periphery and facing both an internal and external security problem. NSC Record of Action No. 2447 records instructions given by President Kennedy in regard to the report, including a directive to prepare "For Iran a report (to be submitted as promptly as possible and not later than 15 February) on a proposed approach to the Shah to achieve a reduction to a force level of 150,000 taking account of relevant political and economic factors." (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
The Report of the Military Assistance Steering Group had been submitted by its chairman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, Jeffrey C. Kitchen, to the Secretaries of State and Defense. Copies of the Report and covering memorandum by Kitchen are ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Military Assistance Steering Group Report, and NSC Meeting of 1/18/62. Additional documentation relating to the steering group is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4541, Notebook, Steering Group--General. For portions of the December 12, 1961, report dealing with Iran, see Supplement, the compilation on Iran.
In wanting to discuss new Iran report Friday Indeed, this report is a vestigial remnant of the original TF exercise. It was proposed four months ago by me in order to close off TF effort by showing everybody that movement was underway (at that point Talbot was urging that Ken/3/ and I leave him and Holmes alone).
/3/Kenneth Hansen, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget and member of the Iran Task Force.
Of course I still believe we are going to hell in a hack in Iran, and that our policy is not sufficient unto the need. Nor have I found anybody in State or elsewhere (except perhaps Holmes and his staff) who disagrees with first proposition. The desk officer (John Bowling), just back from Teheran, says that chief disagreement he had with Embassy was their surprisingly optimistic outlook. Note how new report itself reeks with pessimism, pointing out that "the underlying malady of the country" has not been cured. "Iran remains politically sick and economically disorganized . . ." "The Shah is either unwilling or unable to take the difficult and, to him, distasteful measures which would enlist full confidence and enthusiastic support of . . . his more politically conscious and articulate subjects." The National Front "will probably sooner or later come to power." The Shah's character "is such as to make his years as the ultimate repository of power almost certainly numbered." He "appears unwilling or unable to make the changes necessary to assure the support" of the Nationalists. Add all this up and you wonder why we're not more worried about Iran.
The guts of the problem are illustrated on Page 2 of State paper. Are we really confronted with only "the two basic strategies" outlined? Note that way these are phrased makes us appear to be backing a losing proposition--instead of supporting "a revolutionary element which will probably sooner or later come to power" we "continue to support governments acceptable to the Shah whose character is such as to make his years . . . of power almost certainly numbered." Put this way we are running a holding action which will sooner or later fail.
But there is also a middle course which was that recommended by the Iranian TF and approved by President in the moment of truth during last May's crisis. It was to back a moderately progressive government in an attempt to take the wind out of the NF's sails, risking the Shah's displeasure if necessary but seeking to keep him in line. To say that the Shah won't let this type of government succeed yet that we must confine ourselves to what the Shah will allow is tantamount to saying that sooner or later we will have an NF government in Iran with disastrous consequences. Indeed this is what the paper says.
If this is so, I don't quite see the overriding risk in pushing the Shah harder. As Cuyler Young put it, we should have no qualms about "intervention". He felt we are "damned if we do and damned if we don't." And the paper itself agrees. So why not take risk of pushing Shah harder in light of probability of failure if we don't. This is the core of the long-standing TF divergencies on Iranian policy. Given the pessimistic consensus about the Iranian outlook, Ken Hansen and I have argued for a much more dynamic effort to avoid the otherwise inevitable result.
However, we have given up for the moment butting our heads against the stonewall of State, and of being told that one must accept in the last analysis the Ambassador's judgment. Had you heard Holmes when he was back here last time, describing how he really shared the Shah's fear of the Afghans and Iraqis and how we must insure Iran's security as first priority, you would realize that this competent but traditionally-minded diplomat just doesn't understand the essential nature of the problem we confront in Iran today. The first priority is rather how to accomplish the transition from a feudal regime to a modernized society without such chaos and upheaval as will permit Khrushchev to make good on his boast that Iran will fall like a ripe plum into his lap.
I argued that Phil should use this report as a vehicle for bringing forward the two immediate issues now confronting this Administration, i.e. how much military baksheesh to give the Shah and whether to have him here for a visit. But these subjects are merely mentioned in passing.
As the President put it, an extra $70 million spread over five years isn't much; but the point is that giving it would symbolize our intent to continue the same half-baked policy as in the last decade, I favor a visit by Shah for quite different reasons--because I feel that only JFK will be able both to tell the Shah the home truths which Ambassador obviously will not and to reassure him (with the Kennedy flair) of our unflagging determination to defend Iran. Moreover, let's remember that Iran is now preparing its Third Development Plan and that we are committed to support this in a substantial way. My idea would be to tell Shah that we are giving him so much more of what we really think important, i.e. development aid, that he and we will have to take a few risks on the military side. And in the last analysis, Iranian army couldn't fight its way out of a paper bag anyway, so it is the US which would have to defend him against any substantial attack. Why can't we reassure him that if he is so threatened, he must (as he will have to anyway) rely on our support?
Recommendation: That we not send this report to President or put it on NSC agenda, since it calls for no action.
But that we tell State and Defense President wants their prompt recommendations on: (1) Preferred FY 63/68 MAP levels for Iran (i.e. decision on Steering Group vs. Holmes called for in draft MAP paper); (2) Comparable FY 63/68 projection of AID requirements so President can see both sides; (3) Timing of visit by Shah; and (4) Future policy toward Iran--are we pushing hard enough? These things can then be discussed in NSC.
R.W. Komer
My memorandum to you of January 10, 1962 The primary purposes of Mr. Bowles' visit, as set out in the enclosed draft of a telegram to Embassy Cairo, Dean Rusk
In my view the report would in effect undermine the substantial political and financial investment which we have devoted to our Military Assistance Program here in favor of a new approach based on theory and supposed to be sold to the leaders of this country without the substance which might give it a chance of being persuasive. Thus, as we edge toward what might soon be regarded by the Shah as unilateral repudiation of our July 1958 commitment to him, he is to be asked to rely upon U.S. retaliatory power for Iran's defensive military needs when no specific commitment of this power to Iran in various possible contingencies has been or is likely to be made. The Sixth Fleet can come quickly to the aid of Greece or Turkey; the Seventh Fleet is a powerful defender of our Asian friends to the South and East. But whence will come effective U.S. military intervention in Iran's hour of need? The Shah fully comprehends the logic of geography in this respect. The report points out (paragraph 11 of the Annex) that ". . . a commitment by the United States to defend Iran has to be believable. Even if it were contained in an ironclad military alliance and territorial guarantee, it is apparent that for some time to come the United States could defend Iran against a determined attack only by the use of air-delivered thermonuclear weapons." The report states, furthermore, that the increasing U.S. capability to intervene militarily abroad is earmarked for Berlin and possibly Southeast Asia.
With regard to the increased development assistance which the Iranian Government is to be persuaded to accept in place of military aid, the Steering Group itself confesses that it "has not been able to obtain a clear cut picture of what the long term shape of economic programs is likely to be in many of the subject countries". It does not seem to me realistic to expect the Iranian Government to find the above approach persuasive, and to say, as the report does, that "the countries themselves should not be allowed to gain the impression that we are any less resolute in our intent to assist them in maintaining their independence nor that their military establishments are being so emasculated as to invite overt aggression or internal revolt" is to indicate unfamiliarity with the natural and to my mind logical reaction of the Iranian leaders in the face of a program such as that recommended by the Steering Group.
The report seems totally to disregard the value which our policy and position in the Middle East have derived from our Military Assistance program to Iran. This program has been instrumental in keeping this underdeveloped Moslem state, located on the borders of the Soviet Union, firmly on the side of the Free World in the cold war. The Steering Group report appears to assume that our military aid program for Iran can be radically altered against the desires of the Iranian regime while that regime's adherence to the United States will remain as strong as ever. I am convinced that the concept held in some quarters that the Shah has no place to turn but to the United States is erroneous. Out of concern for his country's security and worried by an apparent lessening of U.S. interest in this he might seek some accommodation with the USSR, with the concomitant adjustment of Iranian policy which the Soviets would require. We must not forget that the Shah was on the point of making such an arrangement with the Soviets before. I would ask: is it worth the candle to threaten so directly our political position in this area by adopting recommendations based on theory and unaccompanied, as far as I can see, by careful evaluations of the political risks involved? I would hate to see Iran, by turning to neutralism and accommodation with the USSR, demonstrate to us that there are points beyond which the needs and desires of an ally cannot be ignored. The catastrophic nature in that event of the consequences to U.S. interests need not be elaborated.
I hold no brief for large military establishments in countries such as this and in fact my recommendations on the Military Assistance Program for Iran for the period FY 62-67 Turning to the Iran Country Annex, I should say that it suffers from the same basic weakness as the report itself--its conclusion is designed to fit a pre-ordained course, and the excellent reasoning against that course, set forth in the first nine pages of the Annex, is paid little or no heed. One example is the statement in paragraph 12 that "there would be a doubtful return in taking action which would reduce military and raise investment allocations by $130 to $140 million a year if the price for that re-allocation were to be a change in the Shah's policy or in his determination and courage which would lay Iran, developed or undeveloped, open to Soviet influence". To this very real possibility the authors of the conclusion apparently attach little credibility or importance. But my main quarrel with the conclusion of the Annex is the erroneous evaluation of the basis of Iran's present Western orientation. Paragraph 21 states that "the political value of such a (modernized military) program in maintaining Iran's Western orientation is becoming more marginal in relation to the basic internal developments which we can influence better by other means" and paragraph 29 asserts that "the risk of an ultimate change in Iran's foreign policy is no greater (indeed it is probably smaller) from displeasing the Shah than it is from failure to deal effectively with the forces of change in Iran". This may be all right from the point of view of detached theory, but anyone who has closely observed Iranian political developments for any period of time knows that the Shah is still the basis of power here, that he is likely to remain so for the period with which our military aid planning is currently concerned, and that it is he, and he alone, who brought Iran into the pro-Western camp and is keeping it there despite the constant pressures from neutralist-minded politicians. Paragraph 14 realistically points out that it is not unnatural that a quid pro quo is expected for this, and our interest in preserving the current direction of Iranian foreign policy makes it well worth while for us to "ante up".
As for the "forces of change" to which the Annex apparently attributes urgent capability, it is my view that changes are going to take place here gradually, as we are now witnessing, under the aegis of the Shah, who has publicly committed himself to a program of economic and social reform. It is to our interest to have the Shah in a position, by his having received or been promised a reasonable amount of what he wants from us, where we can exert effective influence to insure his continuing constructive role in furthering progressive change. How else, indeed, can we better promote the success of the policies we wish to see applied here?
I get the impression that the authors of the conclusion believe that the preferable way to seek to maintain our position here is to take action which will seriously displease the Shah but will better enable us to improve the lot of the Iranian people as a whole--"nation-building". Let them make no mistake about this--the realities of the situation here are such that our position for the period under discussion will depend as much upon the Shah as upon the results of increased development assistance. These results are notably slow to manifest themselves politically here, and certainly to have an effect on the people's attitude toward foreign policy. Moreover, such of the "forces of change" as are interested in foreign policy are opposed to Iran's aligning herself in the world power conflict.
In the light of the above I strongly disagree with the classification of the military aid program as "activities of secondary importance". The program is just as important as the development program to the maintenance of our position here, and should be continued at the level I have recommended.
I believe that at this point I have addressed myself to the main weaknesses and flaws of the Steering Group's recommendation. I do not wish to draw out this letter by enumerating various other inconsistencies and oversights of the Steering Group's report, beyond pointing out that there are some startling discrepancies between the figures quoted in paragraph 67 and elsewhere for past and projected military assistance to Iran, and those which are available to my staff here. A comparison of these figures is set forth in the enclosed tabulation.
I have gone on at some length because I am convinced that adoption of the Steering Group's proposal would constitute a retrograde course. It would seriously hamper and retard the promising economic and social movement forward that has been sponsored by and has the continuing support of the regime here and would thus work against the very objectives that United States policy in Iran seeks to attain. I believe, considering the high stakes involved, that the risks entailed by such a course would be too great and I urge, therefore, that favorable consideration be given to my recommendations on the Military Assistance Program for Iran for the period FY 1962-1967.
Sincerely,
Julius
I'd respond to your query as follows, bearing in mind that State proposals involve no "sweeping commitments" to UAR in early phases but are mainly to feel Nasser out:
1. Our first aim would be to dangle before UAR more of a Western alternative to excessive dependence on the Bloc. Egypt's economic troubles are such that if we do not help her she will almost be forced to turn even more to Moscow.
2. It serves our interests to have good relations with a key neutralist like Nasser, just as with Tito or Nehru. Moreover, he is still the most important single Arab leader.
3. The Syrian debacle plus acute UAR economic difficulties create a real opportunity for US. The Arabists say that Nasser's state of uncertainty and confusion make him most impressionable at this point; and we don't want him to flail out blindly in desperation.
4. At the moment, Nasser seems to have concluded from the Syrian failure that, instead of trying so hard to promote revolution elsewhere, he had better turn inward toward solving Egypt's own colossal problems. We want to encourage him to do so.
5. It is also to our interest to disabuse Nasser of his idee fixe that "Western imperialists", primarily U.K. but even the US (despite Suez), are basically hostile. He has felt this way since the Aswan Dam fiasco.
6. At the same time Nasser, while accepting anything the Bloc will give him, seems under no illusions as to Moscow's aims. So he is worth supporting not just to keep him out of Khrushchev's clutches, but because at some points (e.g. Iraq, Syria) his line and Soviets may sharply diverge.
7. Hopefully, greater reliance on the US could have some restraining influence on UAR policies, if only by creating a vested interest on Nasser's part in staying on good terms with us. At any rate we could at least talk to a friendly Nasser better than we can now.
Admittedly, these potential gains are intangible and long term, in fact a gamble. But what is called for doesn't cost us much either--it is essentially some forthcoming gestures; State doesn't propose giving Nasser much (PL 480, etc.) that we aren't planning on giving him anyway at this point. 2. Two principal deterrents exist as obstacles to quick grab of Kuwait by Qasim:
a) The presence of British military power capable of repulsing Iraqi attack or uprooting Iraqis should they become established before British military could arrive in force.
b) Secondary but important is general acceptance of Kuwait as an independent state, particularly by its Arab neighbors.
Obviously these two deterrents are closely interdependent. Without status as an independent Arab nation in good standing, British guarantees of Kuwait would leave it with little but the appearance of a British dependency. Qasim might be tempted to contest British power if he thought he could obtain sympathy or support from his fellow Arabs or others in the Afro-Asian Bloc. Yet lacking the deterrent of British power, Qasim might think it worthwhile to risk the opprobrium and isolation from his Arab neighbors and the rest of the world consequent to riding roughshod over Kuwait's now widely accepted sovereignty.
As to (a), we believe that in two tries the British have gained a better understanding of how and with what probable after effects their strength can be applied. The question remains as to what the US can do to strengthen deterrent (b) above. Surprising progress has been made since the British-Kuwaiti exchange of letters on June 19, 1961; accepted into the Arab League, Kuwait had as of December 31, 1961 secured recognition from over 60 governments while 4 diplomatic missions had been established on Kuwaiti soil and Kuwait missions had been established in 3 foreign countries. Since before last June Kuwait had been moving toward independent status through gradually expanding its membership in subsidiary international organizations.
Nevertheless, the key fact about Kuwait for its Arab colleagues (and most important supporters) is its oil resources, considered by many of its neighbors not Kuwaiti but rather as "Arab" wealth. Arab respect for Kuwait's sovereignty is based on, (a) an aversion to seeing such overwhelming resources accrue entirely to one country, Iraq, thus providing it the basis for a dominant role in Arab affairs, and (b) their hopes that Kuwait may adopt a wealth-sharing program. As noted in the various messages under reference and Deptel 405 to Kuwait rptd Baghdad 195, Kuwait is now moving cautiously toward satisfying the latter hopes by supplementing earlier private gifts (which whatever their size and extent have failed so far to create for Kuwait an image of benevolence) with a business-like program of development lending.
In these circumstances the US can:
(1) Offer encouragement in the course of our normal contacts with Kuwaitis for orderly and rapid development of their Development Fund. Department doubts necessity or desirability at this time of making direct, formal representations to the Ruler on this subject.
(2) Make available the fruits of our experience in this field and encourage Kuwaitis to take advantage of the experience of others, particularly the IBRD.
(3) In due course discreetly encourage other governments to take advantage of the assistance Kuwait is prepared to offer, noting as appropriate our understanding that the Kuwaitis are going at development assistance in a business-like manner.
(4) Encourage the Kuwaitis as opportunities arise to give maximum publicity to their foreign aid program.
(5) In collaboration with the British encourage the Kuwaitis to enlarge the scope of their diplomatic contacts by placing missions in a number of key countries, bolstering these by dual accreditations if necessary. As necessary encourage other countries to extend recognition and place diplomatic representatives in Kuwait.
On the Department and Embassy Kuwait will fall much of the burden for implementing the foregoing although Embassy London may find opportunities to encourage the UK Government to take a similar line in its contacts with the Kuwaitis and other Arab governments. Other addressees may find the foregoing useful background guidance, as the problem of Kuwait continues to be a matter of discussion in the Near East over the next few months.
The Department would welcome whatever comments posts may wish to submit.
Ball
We do not envisage Nasser-Bowles meetings will deal except in general way with proposed steps in US-UAR economic cooperation. Dept expect be able authorize you convey our views on multi-year PL-480 and economic cooperation before Bowles' arrival.
Bowles will be accompanied by two assistants and secretary. Wishes protocol aspects visit kept to absolute minimum.
Ball
Dear Mr. President:
"In the past year I have found that a major problem in understanding more clearly the conviction and preoccupations of our friends abroad has been the lack of close enough contact with other chiefs of state.
"It is a truism that the world is changing at an extraordinary rate of speed. This year and this decade are crucial to all of us as few have been throughout history. I know you share my belief that we must do everything within our power to improve the prospects for peace in every corner of the world.
"My good friend and advisor, Ambassador Chester Bowles, is scheduled to take a trip to the Middle East and Africa. I should, therefore, like to ask him to discuss frankly with you on my behalf the whole range of the complex global issues which today trouble our world. Ambassador Bowles could stop for several days in Cairo in February for such a discussion with you. He would arrive on February 13 if this date would be convenient.
"As you may know, I recently appointed Ambassador Bowles as my Special Representative and Advisor on all aspects of US relations with Asia, Africa and Latin America. He has had a wide range of experience in the economic and political affairs of these parts of the world. He also has a thorough understanding of and sympathy with the manifold problems of the countries earnestly seeking to accelerate their own processes of national self-development.
"His stop in Cairo would be announced as an opportunity for him to visit the UAR to obtain a first-hand impression of conditions in modern Egypt. However, the real purpose of his visit to Cairo would be for him to meet with you. I hope that you would speak as frankly to him as you would to me about the questions which affect relations between our two nations, the Middle East in general, and the whole range of international affairs. He would be able to convey to you my views on all these questions.
"I have asked Ambassador Badeau to bring you this letter and to inform you of further details concerning Mr. Bowles' planned trip should you desire them. I should be most grateful for your reaction to my suggestion and I should be happy to know whether, with the many burdens pressing upon you, time would be available for the discussions which might prove most valuable to us both.
"With all good wishes, Sincerely, John F. Kennedy." Item 1 of the Record of Actions at the NSC Standing Group Meeting of January 26, 1962, reads as follows:
"Progress Report on Iran
"(Mr. Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and Mr. Robert W. Komer, NSC Staff, were present for this Item.)
"(a) Noted and discussed the Progress Report of the Iranian Task Force, dated January 18, 1962.
"(b) Agreed that no further action by the National Security Council with respect to Iran is required at this time.
"(c) Agreed that the report on the Military Assistance Program for Iran requested by the President should be acted on as soon as possible after its completion on February 15." (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group: January 26, 1962)
We recognize, however, that multi-year agreement, important as it is, is not whole answer to UAR's long-range economic problems. In order come to grips with many complex issues involved and to open way for possible consideration further areas cooperation, President is prepared provide services of highly-qualified economic consultant who would visit UAR for approximately two-week period. In view fact consultants of caliber required are heavily engaged, some delay in arrival inevitable. Worth waiting a bit to have right man.
Vital to success of both multi-year proposal and visit of consultant that talks proceed in atmosphere of absolute frankness. UAR should clarify areas where US cooperation would be useful. Similarly we expect instruct our consultant to be utterly frank and objective in expressing to UAR his views as to what steps, facilities, access to economic information, and above all, degree of mutual confidence required. Only through such candid discussions can we assess UAR needs against US capabilities. Demands on latter are, of course, steadily increasing as larger number developing nations look to US for help.
Thus, you should stress to Nasser that quick or dramatic results cannot be expected. Essential to proceed gradually, taking each step with eyes fully open and cards on table. We seek neither privileged position, political domination, nor irrevocable commitments. We believe foregoing demonstrates depth US interest in UAR and should serve allay any feeling of isolation or insecurity which Western policies alleged to create.
Although we have impression from your last conversation Nasser leaving economic details to others you should draw on Deptel 736 Ball
To me the key problems are:
(1) What is the rationale for proposed State action program (3) What do we get out of whole approach to Nasser?--Essentially this is an exercise in how to compete with the Soviets in getting along with a major neutralist, so President should be clued on long-term potential and limited likelihood of concrete short-term returns;
(4) What are the risks?--naturally, he (JFK) worried about domestic reaction although I gather Mike Feldman et al. were less concerned about strong domestic reaction than about likelihood our approach wouldn't add up to anything, so be regarded as a New Frontier failure--aside from this, however, we not risking very much in early phases of approach.
I heard conflicting reports about the President's attitude. State apparently heard that he was not very enthusiastic about Nasser gambit and said he would go ahead with visit only on strong State recommendation and would hold State responsible if anything went wrong. State office director, at least, was much shaken by this, because any number of things could go wrong (for example, Bowles visit leaked to press on Thursday, thus diluting impact we planned). On other hand, Carl (a) Rusk or Ball--Rusk himself signed memo of transmittal.
(b) McGhee?--My spies tell me George was chief objector in Department to new approach. (He never changes.)
(c) Phil Talbot
(d) W.W.R.--He and I, of course, were chief advocates of exploring new approach.
(e) Bowles--I don't see how we can leave him out.
(f) Hamilton or preferably Gaud--AID will pick up any tab so better be clued.
(g) Bundy and Komer |
