Documents 166-190
PCC Refugee Initiative: Continuation of the Special Representative Function
PARTICIPANTS
Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Mr. Sherwood G. Moe, UNRWA Liaison Officer, New York
NEA--Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot
IO--Assistant Secretary Harlan Cleveland
USUN--Ambassador Francis Plimpton
NEA--Deputy Assistant Secretary James P. Grant
NEA/NE--Mr. Robert C. Strong, Director
NE:Mr. Thacher
NEA:Mr. Ludlow
USUN:Mr. R. Blake
UNP:Mr. Palmer
NE:William R. Crawford, Jr.
Assistant Secretary Talbot asked Dr. Johnson's views on continuing the work of the PCC Special Representative.
Dr. Johnson said he is considerably encouraged as the result of recent informal meetings with Arab delegates in New York who appear to have met on January 15 to determine their common attitude toward continuation of the Special Representative mission. They now believe their governments are disposed to cooperate with the PCC and will not push the issue of PCC reconstitution at this time provided Paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III)
/2/ is clearly the basis of the PCC's actions and of the Special Representative's terms of reference. It is evident that the Arabs are disturbed by references to area economic development in the November 22 Special Representative report./3/ They fear this may be an effort to turn attention away from Paragraph 11 and to place emphasis on resettlement. In this connection, the French representative on the PCC has received an inquiry from Paris asking his opinion as to the possibility of omitting mention of Paragraph 11 in the Special Representative's terms of reference. Such mission would be disturbing to the Arabs and should not be considered. /2/U.N. Resolution 194 (III) of December 11, 1948. Article 11 deals with repatriation; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949, pp. 718-719. /3/See Document 140. Dr. Johnson said he must have all reasonable assurance of free access to chiefs of state and foreign ministers during the next round. This is implied in the PCC's draft message, to be transmitted through U Thant, informing governments that the SR function is being continued./4/ Dr. Johnson said he is now inclined to play "a little hard to get" to elicit assurances of access. /4/The Palestine Conciliation Commission reappointed Joseph Johnson as its Special Representative on January 18. U.N. Secretary-General U Thant on January 24 sent a cable to the Arab governments hosting Palestinian refugees and to Israel informing them of Johnson's reappointment and of his instructions to initiate discussions with the Governments of Israel and the Arab host states at both the highest and technical levels. (Circular telegram 1315, January 25; Department of State, Central Files, 324.84/1-2562) Department officers commented that the proposed PCC-SYG notification to governments does not specifically request a reply. (After discussion it was agreed that it would be politic to assume Arab approval of a continuation of the SR function and of the SR's access to highest levels unless negative replies are received within the ten days following transmittal of U Thant's message.)Dr. Johnson said he can continue as Special Representative for one further year only. If by June or July there are signs this work will have to be carried on beyond next fall, thought should be given to his successor. Additionally, he wishes to have Mr. Moe assigned to him for the coming year, with a title appropriate to his responsibilities. As regards a timetable, several questions arise. When the SR has accepted appointment by the PCC there should be some announcement, for the record, in a very low key. After this announcement there would follow a long period in which hard examination could be given to a series of questions or "studies" directly relating to the SR's second round, to be carried out under the aegis of the PCC, or perhaps the Special Representative himself, with a competent staff including some non-Americans.
/5/ Among the matters to be studied would be (a) methods of ascertaining refugee preferences (perhaps by a questionnaire similar to that used in connection with release of refugee blocked accounts), (b) the feasibility of some refugee leaders making an inspection trip to Israel, and (c) the advantages or disadvantages of dealing with refugee movement on a piecemeal basis, country-by-country or camp-by-camp. These studies would serve both to educate the Special Representative and enable him to have in hand a whole series of proposals to fire at the Arabs and Israelis. /5/Dr. Johnson said he is interested in obtaining the services of Dr. Bryant M. Wedge, a psychiatrist in Hartford who has shown a real interest in, and an understanding of, the refugee problem, and perhaps also Mrs. Georgiana Stevens, Don Peretz, and Albert Grand, a French officer with much experience in this problem who is now believed to be on the staff of UNTSO. Dr. Johnson said that, following a suggestion of the French PCC representative, he intended to call on French officials concerned with the refugee problem during a trip to Europe, in another connection, in February. Perhaps in Paris he might be able to recruit a French expert to help in preparing technical studies. [Footnote in the source text.] Dr. Johnson said it seems important to avoid the "numbers game", aiming instead for limited, parallel movement within prescribed periods.Dr. Johnson said that after completion of extensive technical studies he looked to a second round to begin about mid-April and last four or five weeks. It is better not to try to predict where the problem will stand at completion of the second round.
Mr. Strong remarked that the seriousness of our intentions can be questioned if the second round is delayed too long. However, if the states of the area know that studies are going on this will help explain the delay.
Dr. Johnson said he has certain broad questions on which he welcomes the Department's comments. These are:
1. How far is the United States prepared to go in providing diplomatic support? In this regard, Mrs. Meir had stated on the first round that Israel is willing to take back some refugees, but must be "the last not the first". It seems obvious that things must be the other way around if progress is to be made, although the difference between a commitment to take back refugees and the act of taking them back can be recognized. Israel will obviously have to be the first country visited on the second round. Presumably, there will have to be strong U.S. support if Mrs. Meir's view is to be altered. Support with the Arab governments will also be necessary, for example, if the SR is to enter refugee camps in safety to obtain indications of refugee attitudes.
Mr. Talbot commented that there has been extensive communication between our Government and both the Arabs and Israelis which illustrates our support of the refugee initiative. This is "as important a piece of business" as we have underway anywhere. The degree of U.S. support provided will, of course, relate to determination of what is required to get on with the job.
2. Dr. Johnson noted there are very important financial considerations in an approach to the refugee problem. There is the estimate of Mr. Jarvis, the PCC property expert, that the value of refugee property as of 1948 was perhaps 200 million sterling. At the most, this might mean minimal payments to as many as 125,000 refugee families (500,000 refugees). The 200 million figure presumably must be adjusted to show some allowance for loss of intangible property (20%), devaluation of the pound since 1948, and the absence of any return from property for 13 years. To the result must be added a minimum figure, perhaps $2,500, to assist each family in resettlement. Finally, funds for area economic development to create necessary jobs must be considered. In all, the financial basis for a meaningful effort to resolve the refugee problem may exceed $1 billion. Obviously, Israel cannot pay all of this, although unofficial statements from Israel diplomats have referred to the possibility of Israel's setting up a compensation fund of $250 million. It will be important for the Special Representative to have an indication of U.S. Government willingness to provide financial support to enable him to say in negotiation that funds to do the job can be counted upon if the parties agree on specific steps toward a solution.
Mr. Talbot agreed that the financial aspect of this problem is one that deserves most careful consideration.
3. Are there U.S. policies elsewhere with which the SR mission conflicts?
Mr. Talbot replied that the SR mission is in itself a cardinal element of U.S. policy in the area.
Dr. Johnson clarified his question by explaining that the pattern of U.S. relations in the Near East would have an influence on the determination as to whether there should be emphasis on making progress in one particular country. Because of the U.S. position in Jordan, it would obviously be easy to start there; Gaza will be the toughest nut to crack.
Mr. Strong commented that there is merit in trying for limited, parallel movement in each country.
4. What is the U.S. view of the "Palestine entity" concept?
Mr. Talbot replied that the Department sees advantage in dealing with existing entities. We hope the SR action will not give impetus to the "Palestine entity" concept.
Dr. Johnson asked for the Department's current evaluation of the strength of the movement. Mr. Strong remarked that the effort to create a Palestine entity is subject to the pull of many different influences. A reconciliation of these is unlikely in the near future.
5. What is the Department's estimate of Nasser's current position and attitudes? Might Nasser be willing to use his good influence in the refugee problem in order to relax tension on a major element of instability in the area and thus be free to concentrate on the internal development of Egypt?
Mr. Strong said this is hard to determine. It would be logical for Nasser to reach such a conclusion, but we cannot be certain that logic will motivate his actions. We are sure that Nasser does not want to see the Arab-Israel issue stirred up at the moment. This is a moderately hopeful factor.
6. What should be the nature of the Special Representative's relations with governments other than those of the host countries and Israel, particularly Iraq and Saudi Arabia?Department officers commented that the formula adopted during Dr. Johnson's first round appeared satisfactory. It is desirable for him to show a willingness to consult, but not to seek consultation in a way to invite rebuff or increase the difficulties of negotiation by expanding the number of negotiating parties. The more this problem can be kept out of the Arab League context the better. Even well-disposed states such as Sudan and Tunisia are unlikely to be willing to take the risk of involving themselves in this problem in a constructive fashion.
7. What is the Department's estimate of the position of the present Syrian Government? Syrian Delegate Rifai had seemed very helpful during the fall Assembly session.
Mr. Strong replied that, while today the Syrian Government is somewhat more subdued and moderate in its actions toward the United States, and we try to encourage the moderate tendency, there is no assurance that Syria will not soon "revert to type".
8. (Mr. Moe) Is it the Department's view that at the recent GA the Arabs feel they suffered a defeat in the sense that they can no longer expect the Afro-Asian states and fellow neutralists to follow blindly whatever path they may take in U.N. debates of the Palestine problem?
Mr. Cleveland asked whether in the long run, if the Arabs feel more isolated, they will be easier or harder to deal with?
Ambassador Plimpton said that, thanks to the African direct peace negotiations resolution, the Arabs certainly realize they will not necessarily find all Afro-Asians in their camp. However, this sense of isolation will probably make them frustratingly harder to deal with.
Parenthetically, Dr. Johnson asked whether it would be wise to have Ambassador Macomber talk to responsible Jordanian officials. The composition of the Jordanian Delegation at the last Assembly was very unsatisfactory in that all delegates save one were refugee leaders. As a result, the Jordanians were time and again the most immoderate and unhelpful.
Mr. Strong commented that the degree to which Jordan can be helpful will depend very much on what the King feels he can or cannot do in terms of public opinion.
9. What does the Department intend to do in terms of conditioning domestic U.S. attitudes?
Department officers commented that the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, and Rabbi Miller and Mr. Label Katz seem disposed to be helpful. Assistant Secretary Cleveland remarked that it might be useful for him to talk to Senator Javits.
10. How much is it feasible to think in terms of resettlement outside the Near East?
Department officers replied that a call for the creation of resettlement opportunities outside the Near East must be a part of any program for progress on this problem. It is unwise to be optimistic in this regard, however, since the same factor which prevents assimilation of the refugee in the Middle East--his lack of skills--makes him unattractive as a prospective immigrant to other countries.
11. What countries other than the members of the Conciliation Commission can be helpful to the Special Representative's mission?
Department officers agreed that The Netherlands, New Zealand, and Canada have all shown a constructive interest in this problem over the years.
167. Memorandum of Conversation
Location of Diplomatic Missions in Israel
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Avraham Harman of Israel
Mr. Mordechai Gazit, Minister, Embassy of Israel
Mr. Shaul Bar-Haim, Counselor, Embassy of Israel
NEA--Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot
NEA--Deputy Assistant Secretary James P. Grant
NEA/NE--William L. Hamilton
Ambassador Harman devoted forty minutes of an hour's conversation to this subject. He protested in very strong terms the Department's practice of informing other governments that in accord with U.N. resolutions the international community refuses to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and that most governments, accordingly, have located their diplomatic missions in Tel Aviv. His remarks complemented objections voiced by Israel Foreign Minister Golda Meir when she summoned Ambassador Walworth Barbour January 12 (cf. Tel Aviv's telegram No. 348)
/2/ but differed somewhat in intensity and content. According to Harman, the status of Jerusalem is an issue on which the two governments had defined their differences many years ago and had tried to accommodate by an elasticity of approach which added up to a modus vivendi. His Government had been under the impression that both sides shared a desire not to "elevate" the problem to an issue. Because this effort has met with considerable success, he said, the Israel Government is distressed by United States initiative in volunteering its views to third governments, most recently in the case of Ethiopia. Does the United States assume, he asked, that it has a United Nations mandate to make the problem an issue of principle? (Note: Mrs. Meir told Ambassador Barbour she had been assured by then Acting Secretary Herter on March 9, 1959,/3/ that the United States would not take the initiative but explain the situation only if its advice were requested. Ambassador Harman treated the Herter-Meir conversation with much more caution, only hinting that his Government had been led to expect different practices from those pursued with the Ethiopians.) /2/Reference is to telegram 438 from Tel Aviv, January 15. (Ibid., 611.84/1-1562) /3/See Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. XIII, pp. 151-152. Mr. Talbot replied that United States policy has not changed since 1952, when U.S. objections to Israel's establishing its capital in Jerusalem had been expressed in an Aide-M?moire./4/ The juridical position and the United States interpretation of it remain unchanged. He admitted that U.N. resolutions, intended only to have a temporary effect pending more permanent settlements, have after the lapse of years produced difficulties and anomalies which would prevail indefinitely. It is difficult to believe, he said, that new governments would not be interested in determining why most diplomatic missions remain in Tel Aviv. /4/Dated July 9, 1952; for text, see ibid., 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part 1, pp. 960-963, and Department of State Bulletin, August 4, 1952, p. 181. Ambassador Harman reiterated his question as to why the U.S. feels it has a mandate to keep people posted on this particular U.N. position, describing it as inconsistent with U.S. silence on other U.N. resolutions. He referred to a Washington Post report that Marshal Amer of Egypt had suggested that Dutch ships would be denied Suez Canal passage and asked why the United States had not pronounced its views on this statement.Mr. Talbot replied that, press comments aside, the United States is just as precise with governments in defining positions on other United Nations resolutions. No government, he said, has any difficulty ascertaining U.S. views on any resolution, and this applies to those on freedom of transit.
Ambassador Harman said that the case of Ethiopia had some special characteristics. It had produced two deviations from what Israel had hoped was United States policy. In the first place, U.S. remarks had not been solicited and, in the second, U.S. remarks were not expressed as representing its own reasons for maintaining its Embassy in Tel Aviv but as advice to Ethiopia as to how it should decide.
Mr. Talbot said he could not agree there is any great difference between an expression of U.S. views unsolicited or volunteered. In conversations between officials, a U.S. viewpoint might be expressed in response to an inquiry volunteered for reasons of U.S. interest.
Ambassador Harman rejoined that there is a deep, substantive difference. When the United States volunteers a viewpoint, he said, no responsible government would conclude that it is less than serious, urgent, and important.
To this Mr. Talbot replied that the converse is also true.
Ambassador Harman introduced other subjects which were discussed for a quarter of an hour, but as he prepared to leave he said he wanted to return once more to the Jerusalem issue, saying he would appreciate assurances by Mr. Talbot that when it appeared other countries are considering where to locate their diplomatic missions in Israel, the United States will not volunteer its views, expressing them only if solicited.
Mr. Talbot gave him no encouragement. He said that the problem is a difficult and complex one, and because it has these characteristics he had studied the record of our policy to determine (a) whether our policy had changed since 1952, and (b) on what rationale, if any, would a change be warranted. On a basis of this investigation, he said, he found no evidence of a change or of reason to change. He expressed his general agreement with the position Ambassador Barbour had taken in his conversation with Mrs. Meir.
168. Report of the Chairman of the Iran Task Force (Talbot)
Specifically:
1. It has surmounted the immediate political crisis which brought it into office and has fought off extremist pressures from all sides. It has retained the Shah's support in domestic matters and has supported his pro-Western foreign policy.
2. It has taken the first steps to reduce inefficiency and corruption within the government; high-level dishonesty has decreased sharply and dozens of former officials are being tried, punished, investigated, or exposed.
3. It has waged an effective but difficult and unpopular fight against inherited problems of inflation and foreign exchange shortages, involving restrictions on imports, bank credit, government spending, and wage increases. It is tooling up for the Third Economic Development Plan, and is widening and accelerating the land reform program.
These are significant, if limited, gains. They have been achieved through the efforts of Amini, the acquiescence or sporadic support of the Shah, and a judicious combination of United States advice, pressure, and financial assistance.
These accomplishments have not, however, cured the underlying malady of the country. Iran remains politically sick and economically disorganized, and a synthesis of moderate political forces is not yet in sight. Despite the Shah's good intentions, patriotism, and intelligence, he remains essentially mystical, vain, and suspicious. As reflected in Annex C some concrete progress has been made but the Shah is either unwilling or unable to take the difficult and, to him, distasteful measures which would enlist the full confidence and enthusiastic support of the majority of his more politically conscious and articulate subjects. At best he can be induced to consent to the efforts of Amini or a like-minded successor. At present the political drives of the Mosadeq-oriented "Nationalists" and their immediate following among the educated and semi-educated are largely destructive and unrealistic, and are directed almost exclusively toward obtaining supreme power as an end in itself. Nor is there in existence or in prospect any effective group which can occupy the middle ground between the Shah on the one hand and the heirs of Mosadeq on the other. With insignificant exceptions the conservative element in Iran is hopelessly short-sighted and is concerned only with its private vested interests. The Iranian military has not produced imaginative political leadership and is not likely to do so.
Although there are variants in between, fundamentally, for the foreseeable future, the United States will continue to be faced with the hard choice between two basic strategies:
1. To support the National Front as the current embodiment of a revolutionary element which will probably sooner or later come to power. The day may come when the United States could well be forced to this policy as an alternative to chaos or an overt communist takeover of Iran. Were this element to assume power now, however, the almost inevitable result would be the breakup of CENTO, the expulsion of the United States military mission, the loss of Iran as an intelligence base, the denunciation of the Oil Consortium agreement, Soviet economic penetration, and a resurgence of the domestic communist movement which could not be checked by a weak and fragmented power structure.
2. To continue to support governments acceptable to the Shah, whose character is such as to make his years as the ultimate repository of power almost certainly numbered. In any fundamental sense the Shah appears unwilling or unable to make the changes necessary to assure the support of the "Nationalists" over the coming decade, if such support is at all possible. His pride, his reputation, and his openly pro-Western attitudes are perhaps insuperable barriers. Heavy pressure by the United States or other friends to force the Shah into a major attempt to compromise with these critics would involve risks of his retiring to Europe or seeking an accommodation with the USSR, of strengthening the determination of the "Nationalists" to seize power, and of precipitating a conservative coup, thus leading to the developments foreseen in the first strategy alternative.
Faced with these fundamental choices, it is my judgment that United States policies in Iran will be best promoted by continued support of a government acceptable to the Shah, emphasizing in the strongest possible terms at the same time the need to press forward with social and economic reforms. Only by pursuing this course of action can we hope to avoid a major political defeat and concurrently maximize opportunities for a more favorable reshaping of the basic political and economic situation in Iran. This is the basis of our support for the Amini Regime and why his program must remain the center of our efforts in Iran. The test of this policy is whether we have successfully assured, at the lowest political cost, the Shah's acceptance of the best government in sight (at present the Amini Regime) and at the same time found the most effective way to push that government--without shattering it--in directions that could provide cynical and disturbed young Persians with a spark of enthusiasm, hope, and confidence. Every policy decision turns on how we play this game--without overplaying it.
Mosadeq-oriented elements will seize on the slightest sign of United States disapproval of the regime to mount massive efforts to undermine and overthrow it. The Shah himself has a breaking point which could mean his abdication and flight, leaving chaos behind him. Relations between the Shah and his Prime Minister are delicate, and could be broken if the Shah were to feel that the United States was supporting a potential threat against him. Ambitious military men and greedy conservatives who are masters of political intrigue will attempt to take advantage of any strain in relations between the United States and the regime. Communist propaganda will exploit every opportunity to convince the public that national sovereignty has been abandoned to a foreign power.
Many forceful measures are of dubious value in this brittle situation. What is required is a skillful mixture of enticement and prodding, of periodic involvement and occasional seeming withdrawal, of patience and decisive action. The authority to act must be adequate to the problem. The actions themselves must be shrewdly conceived and flexibly executed.
Officials in Washington and our Ambassador in Tehran are functioning according to these dictates. When the day comes that they need more extensive powers than they now possess, these powers will be requested. For the task immediately ahead, the initially approved Task Force recommendations appear still largely adequate. Certain modification in the initial Task Force Recommendations should, however, be noted, as reflected in Annex A to this report. I have concluded, therefore, it is not necessary to request additional authority from the National Security Council at this time. The most effective steps possible to strengthen and broaden the base of the Amini government and to keep prodding it into forward motion will continue to be taken.
Discussion
It has emerged from the Task Force's deliberations that there is no significant divergence of opinion with the United States Government as regards United States objectives in Iran. To prevent Soviet domination of Iran must be our immediate and overriding objective. This requires the continuance in power of a pro-Western regime, for the most likely ultimate alternative is a weak neutralist government which could not withstand Soviet pressures and maintain Iran's independence. The pro-Western regime has been maintained and is no longer immediately endangered, although many longer-term weaknesses remain. Prime Minister Amini has succeeded in overcoming a near-crisis situation and thus continuing Iran's pro-Western alignment. He has, however, been unable fully to pursue his program of vigorous reform measures designed to lead to a more permanent resolution of these basic weaknesses.
The Prime Minister has had to retain the confidence and support of his somewhat reluctant monarch. He has been faced with political pressures from the fanatical Mosadeqist opposition, and with the sniping of ambitious and discontented conservative leaders. The implementation of the vital economic stabilization program has intensified these difficulties by infringing on the interests of various special groups. The basic inadequacy of the administrative tools available to him, which can be improved only slowly, have further limited his freedom of action.
The first Iran Task Force Report stressed that the United States should actively and vigorously, albeit discreetly, press for political, economic, social, and institutional reforms in Iran which would provide the indispensable foundation for true and lasting social and economic development. The Third Development Plan which embraces the total economy and takes account of both social and economic requirements is scheduled to begin in September 1962. It must be the primary vehicle to initiate the fundamental political and economic progress needed in Iran. The intervening period will be of critical importance in laying the necessary foundations for the implementation of this Third Plan.
In October the Task Force found that additional United States resources, beyond those allocated in accordance with last spring's Task Force Recommendations, would be required to enable the Amini Government, or a like-minded successor, to surmount the political and economic difficulties which it faced and which it will face between now and the beginning of the Third Plan. Discussions within the Task Force disclosed divergent views as to the means by which the introduction of those resources could best accomplish United States objectives. The possibility was explored of supplementing our continuing diplomatic efforts by developing a package action program with the Government of Iran involving other international sources of economic assistance so that desirable public conditions could be agreed upon for the provision and use of development resources in the context of a joint cooperative and effective effort to solve Iran's basic economic problems. Alternatively, it was held that the same objectives, given the complexities and fragilities of Iranian society, could best be accomplished by the private and discreet exercise of United States influence and pressure. It was agreed with the Agency for International Development that the provision of the necessary additional assistance, amounting to $15 million in Supporting Assistance and $20 million in development lending, should be made conditional upon a clear understanding by the Iranian Government that it must undertake seriously certain self-help measures. Our Ambassador has informed the Prime Minister of the additional assistance, and has obtained appropriate assurances from the Iranian Government.
A recent and spectacular example of the implementation of the Task Force Recommendations was the finesse with which the U.S. and U.K. Ambassadors, working with the Prime Minister, dissuaded the Shah from dumping the Prime Minister or reducing him to puppet status. This course was being urged on the Shah by jealous and apprehensive courtiers, conservative business men, landlords, and reactionary military officers. This effort backfired on its instigators, with the Shah publicly reinforcing his support of the Prime Minister, increasing the powers of the Cabinet, and backing a positive and specific program of reforms. Extremist conservatives are as a result beginning to attack the Shah himself.
Our Ambassador in Tehran has recommended that the Shah be invited to the United States on a state visit, in order that His Majesty be informed of the nature of U.S. support for Iran and specifically that he be told of plans for U.S. military assistance for Iran over the next five years. Approval of Country Team Tehran's recommendations as to the nature of this program was a precondition of the state visit as recommended by the Ambassador; a final decision has not been made and approval of the Country Team's plan is doubtful. Therefore, and in view of other rapidly changing political factors, I am inclined to believe that the Shah's visit should follow the successful initiation of the Third Economic Plan, to begin in September, 1962. I am consulting with our Ambassador on this problem.
Difficult decisions remain in the shaping of the future of the United States military assistance program to Iran and in the preparation of political and military contingency plans for Iran. However, the various aspects of these problems are under consideration in the regular channels of the Government, and no NSC is necessary at this time. (See Annex A, items 5 and 7, for details.)
Guided by the approved recommendations, specific guidance for United States actions in Iran has been drawn up setting forth the goals toward which our assistance, encouragement, pressure, and advice should be directed. (See Annex B.)
Annex A/4/
/3/Top Secret.
IRAN TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS/4/
/4/The numbered Iran Task Force Recommendations that appear in Annex A correspond to those in NSC Record of Action No. 2427, Document 51. Approved Task Force Recommendations 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8
These recommendations should continue as basic policy guidance to the United States Government. These and portions of other recommendations have provided the indispensable basis of our detailed action goals in Iran (See Annex "B") and of the progress made recently toward those goals (See Annex "C").
Approved Task Force Recommendation 4
This recommendation continues to be valid. The actions called for in subsections (a) and (b) have been taken, and the funds reserved under subsection (b) have been absorbed in the latest tranche of United States assistance.
Approved Task Force Recommendation 5
A joint State-Defense working group has studied the problem intensively and has concluded that the deployment of specifically earmarked forces is not feasible unless and until it is decided that Soviet military aggression against Iran is probable in the near future, and then only if other and overriding military requirements do not prevent such a deployment. The working group has also recommended to me that in the light of assurances already made to Iran and in view of certain dangers which further assurances and specific information as to United States military planning would imply, no such fresh assurances or additional information should be supplied to the Government of Iran at present. I have accepted these recommendations.
Approved Task Force Recommendation 7
This recommendation should be amended to include the words "as feasible" between the words "encourage" and "the formation". The immediate situation is such that United States action to stimulate the immediate formation of broadly-based political parties would probably be counterproductive, although we, along with moderate political elements in Iran, recognize the need for action in this direction whenever the situation of the moment will permit it.
Approved Task Force Recommendation 9
The purpose of the recommendation has been accomplished, and the problem to which it refers has entered a new phase within the established mechanisms of the United States Government.
In accordance with this recommendation, planned expansion of the Iranian Armed Forces was halted and they have remained at a manpower level of about 200,000. The Military Assistance Steering Group under Mr. Kitchen
/5/ is in the final stages of a review and modification of the five year MAP plan for Iran. Their tentative recommendation is that the manpower ceiling should be further reduced to 150,000 during the Fiscal Year 1963-67 planning period, but with the recognition that, in addition to the bare minimum of military requirements, a certain amount of "sophisticated" material will be needed to make up a package sufficiently attractive to the Shah to gain his approval for a cut in forces. The Shah must be persuaded, however, that great danger lies in internal security and special efforts must be made to meet the high priority requirements for economic and social improvement in Iran. Reduction in forces and military budgets would in themselves be politically popular in Iran and constitute a favorable step in the right direction. /5/See Document 169. Approved Task Force Recommendation 10The CENTO study is now in its final stages, having gone through the formal planning mechanism of the government. Specific phased recommendations as to actions to further United States interests through CENTO will be forthcoming within a few weeks. Established channels, rather than the Iran Task Force, will be utilized.
Approved Task Force Recommendation 11
This recommendation has been overtaken by and included in broader military and political contingency planning studies which were set in motion by a series of reports to the effect that the USSR might be preparing to launch a military attack on Iran in the near future. A relatively low estimate of probability was later assigned to these reports. Existing approved military planning in Iran covered only United States action against hostile elements other than the Red Army. A study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the problems posed by possible United States military action in Iran to counter direct Soviet aggression led to the following conclusions:
1. Commitment of United States forces in sufficient time to counter a Soviet advance into Iran requires use of the only two airborne divisions presently in the United States Strategic Reserve and all of the airlift capability including the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, resulting in a serious dilution of the capability to respond to other contingencies.
2. Because of limited combat capability of Iranian forces, and the limiting concept of the CENTO alliance, United States commitment with available forces could be successful only against a limited Soviet intervention or limited probing aggression.
3. Owing to inadequacies of road and rail facilities in Iran, a United States force of only two Army divisions and Marine and USAF combat elements can be supported in northern Iran in addition to Iranian forces. By extensive use of United States air transport capabilities about two additional battle groups could be supported. In light of limited Iranian capabilities this force is too small to cope with substantial Soviet aggression.
4. Any chance of success requires immediate authorization to conduct air attacks against air bases in Russia directly supporting operations in Iran. These attacks would employ nuclear or conventional weapons as appropriate to the military situation.
5. Any commitment of United States forces in Iran against overt Soviet involvement must be preceded by a decision to employ whatever degree of force is required to achieve United States objectives in the area and to preserve the integrity of United States forces, to include the use of nuclear weapons or the initiation of general war if the Soviets persist in spite of United States action.
6. It is feasible to conduct military operations in Iran against limited Soviet intervention and probing aggression; it is not feasible to conduct limited war in Iran against substantial and determined Soviet aggression under present conditions and in light of worldwide commitments.
It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that subject to these conclusions, and assuming that the President would declare a state of national emergency and that authorization for the use of nuclear weapons would be given as required to achieve United States objectives in the area, certain measures of limited non-nuclear response could be taken in Iran by United States forces to counter limited Soviet intervention and probing aggression.
Contingency planning for political and political-military measures to deter Soviet military attack, direct or indirect, on Iran is under way through a State-Defense working group. A phased list of possible United States actions and supporting information is in the final stages of a clearance among the agencies and offices involved. This study has involved the following pertinent conclusions:
1. The maintenance of an Iranian will to resist is an indispensable element in deterring Soviet attack.
2. Soviet tactics of threats and military aggression would be counterproductive for the USSR in terms of the present Soviet tactic of fomenting revolution by a broad coalition of discontented elements.
3. There are no significant deterrent measures open to the United States at present which would not be counterproductive in terms of our present efforts to reverse the disunifying trends being utilized by the Soviets in their current tactics in Iran.4. Deterrent measures must in large part be taken if and when our estimate of Soviet intentions and tactics in Iran is revised, or in response to ad hoc Soviet political actions.
5. Should it become necessary to act to deter a Soviet military attack on Iran, a basic decision will be desirable as to whether the United States is willing to go to general war if all else fails in order to protect Iran from Soviet military aggression, and, if not, whether the United States is willing to go to any lengths at possibly high costs to its prestige in an attempt to convey to the USSR an impression that it is so willing. Such a decision should be reached as early as may be feasible in the process of implementing deterrent measures.
Annex C
Pursuant to the Iran Task Force Recommendations approved by the President on May 16, 1961, the following progress has been made as a result of the continual encouragement, support, and pressure exerted by the United States Government through all its various instruments;
1. The Shah has remained confident, pro-Western, and anti-communist, and has withdrawn to an encouraging extent from the exposed political position he has occupied in recent years, and has delegated important powers to his capable Prime Minister. He has constituted the entire Royal Estates as an irrevocable religious trust, the profits of which will be devoted to charity and the financial details of which will be publicized. The Shah has shown interest in a dynamic internal reform program, although his interest in technical military matters is still strong.
2. Iran has maintained a firm but non-provocative attitude toward the USSR, insisting that as a prerequisite to improved relations the USSR cease its massive and abusive propaganda campaign against Iran. Neutralist sentiment remains widespread but apparently is not expanding. Internal security and respect for minority rights remain excellent by Middle Eastern standards. Iran continues to stand by CENTO, despite pressures from the USSR and domestic neutralists; in the Kuwait crisis, on the Shatt-al-Arab, and in the Pakistan-Afghanistan crisis Iran has behaved in a restrained and helpful fashion.
3. The Prime Minister has successfully defended those of his officials, particularly in the Justice Ministry, under attack from rightist forces as being too "moderate". The National Front, however, has refused to respond to the Prime Minister's invitation to cooperate in a reform program. Distribution of Crown Estates land is nearing completion, distribution of public domain land continues, and a new program of model experimental distribution of private estates is under way. The Prime Minister, at great cost to his health, continues personally to solicit the support of all types of non-elite groups through personal contact and radio addresses. A massive adult literacy campaign has been launched. Public trials of high officials accused of corruption in the past have begun, investigations and the preparation of cases against others continue, and high-level corruption has been sharply reduced, all within a pattern of strict legality and the protection of the rights of the individual. A basic civil service reform statute has been drawn up and is under consideration by the Cabinet.
4. Recent agreements by the United States and Germany to provide new loans to the Plan Organization give promise that the essential elements of Iran's Second Plan will be completed. Formulation of a Third Plan to capitalize on major investments made during the Second Plan and to maintain an average 6% growth rate is moving forward rapidly. The IBRD expects to dispatch a team to Iran in January 1962 to prepare a full report on the Third Plan for presentation to potential members of a financing consortium for the Plan. In spite of stiff opposition the Prime Minister has enforced an unpopular stabilization program which includes a sizeable cutback in credit expansion and the prohibition of luxury imports. The shake-out in the economy has been severe but most of the strong enterprises seemed to have survived, the rising cost-of-living has leveled off, and Iran's foreign exchange position is beginning to recover slowly. The Central Bank has begun to exercise increasingly effective control over the banking system, and measures to direct capital to productive investments have been instituted. Public sector expenditures have been held down and a major public buildings program has been eliminated from the current budget. In response to United States prodding, the Prime Minister has given us written assurances that Iran will develop a consolidated budget for the coming year. He has also promised to undertake tax reform measures to improve tax collections and is examining ways to improve the tax structure. Cordial relations with Western oil companies have been maintained, and a number of outstanding technical and financial problems have been settled amicably in recent talks with the oil consortium in London. Oil revenue for Iran in 1961 will be approximately 7% ($20 million) over 1960, or a total of $305 million.
5. In the current Iranian budget (ending March 21, 1962), military costs have been held down for the first time in almost a decade, and manpower increases have likewise been halted. Plans now under consideration in the United States Government provide for manpower decreases with a concomitant increase in military capability through a restructured United States MAP Plan. More senior officers are being retired than promoted, and promotion lists appear to be based largely on merit rather than influence. Vocational training in the armed forces continues to be limited by the availability of funds.
6. The lack of communication between the Shah and the leaders of the "Nationalist" opposition continues, and there is little hope for improvement on either side. Opposition criticism of the regime continues to be almost entirely irresponsible and destructive. Recent developments, including publication of proof obtained by the security forces that a respected National Front student was a communist, have apparently increased "Nationalist" awareness of the dangers of Tudeh penetration. The "Nationalist" opposition force continues however to be intractably bent on the seizure of power as a primary aim, and the complete lack of understanding between it and the Shah continues to be a very dangerous factor. The United States is beginning a new and major effort in the field to analyze "Nationalist" leadership to ascertain the feasibility of an attempt to influence it in the direction of greater responsibility.
169. Editorial Note
On January 18, 1962, at its 496th meeting, the National Security Council discussed the Report of the Military Assistance Steering Group, an interagency body formed to examine U.S. military assistance to several nations, including Iran, considered to be "double threat countries," that is, on the Sino-Soviet periphery and facing both an internal and external security problem. NSC Record of Action No. 2447 records instructions given by President Kennedy in regard to the report, including a directive to prepare "For Iran a report (to be submitted as promptly as possible and not later than 15 February) on a proposed approach to the Shah to achieve a reduction to a force level of 150,000 taking account of relevant political and economic factors." (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
The Report of the Military Assistance Steering Group had been submitted by its chairman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, Jeffrey C. Kitchen, to the Secretaries of State and Defense. Copies of the Report and covering memorandum by Kitchen are ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Military Assistance Steering Group Report, and NSC Meeting of 1/18/62. Additional documentation relating to the steering group is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4541, Notebook, Steering Group--General. For portions of the December 12, 1961, report dealing with Iran, see Supplement, the compilation on Iran.
170. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen)
In wanting to discuss new Iran report Friday
/2/ George McGhee apparently had nothing in mind beyond showing that State has things in hand. Indeed purpose of report itself is to tell WH to keep its cotton-picking hands off this problem--it says no NSC action of any kind is needed. Just leave it to our diplomats, who with flexibility, skill and wisdom, will do all that can be done to save this flea-bitten country. /2/The Iran Task Force Report of January 18 (Document 168) was placed on the agenda of the NSC Standing Group meeting for Friday, January 19. According to the Record of Actions for that meeting, the Standing Group: "Noted that the Department of State has prepared a report on activities and progress made in carrying out U.S. policy in Iran, as set forth in the approved report of May 15, 1961, of the Task Force on Iran, but postponed discussion of this report until the next meeting to be held on January 26, 1962." (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group, January 19, 1962) During 1962, the NSC Standing Group, composed of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and the Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, met every Friday at 2:30 p.m.Indeed, this report is a vestigial remnant of the original TF exercise. It was proposed four months ago by me in order to close off TF effort by showing everybody that movement was underway (at that point Talbot was urging that Ken/3/ and I leave him and Holmes alone).
/3/Kenneth Hansen, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget and member of the Iran Task Force.
Of course I still believe we are going to hell in a hack in Iran, and that our policy is not sufficient unto the need. Nor have I found anybody in State or elsewhere (except perhaps Holmes and his staff) who disagrees with first proposition. The desk officer (John Bowling), just back from Teheran, says that chief disagreement he had with Embassy was their surprisingly optimistic outlook. Note how new report itself reeks with pessimism, pointing out that "the underlying malady of the country" has not been cured. "Iran remains politically sick and economically disorganized . . ." "The Shah is either unwilling or unable to take the difficult and, to him, distasteful measures which would enlist full confidence and enthusiastic support of . . . his more politically conscious and articulate subjects." The National Front "will probably sooner or later come to power." The Shah's character "is such as to make his years as the ultimate repository of power almost certainly numbered." He "appears unwilling or unable to make the changes necessary to assure the support" of the Nationalists. Add all this up and you wonder why we're not more worried about Iran.
The guts of the problem are illustrated on Page 2 of State paper. Are we really confronted with only "the two basic strategies" outlined? Note that way these are phrased makes us appear to be backing a losing proposition--instead of supporting "a revolutionary element which will probably sooner or later come to power" we "continue to support governments acceptable to the Shah whose character is such as to make his years . . . of power almost certainly numbered." Put this way we are running a holding action which will sooner or later fail.
But there is also a middle course which was that recommended by the Iranian TF and approved by President in the moment of truth during last May's crisis. It was to back a moderately progressive government in an attempt to take the wind out of the NF's sails, risking the Shah's displeasure if necessary but seeking to keep him in line. To say that the Shah won't let this type of government succeed yet that we must confine ourselves to what the Shah will allow is tantamount to saying that sooner or later we will have an NF government in Iran with disastrous consequences. Indeed this is what the paper says.
If this is so, I don't quite see the overriding risk in pushing the Shah harder. As Cuyler Young put it, we should have no qualms about "intervention". He felt we are "damned if we do and damned if we don't." And the paper itself agrees. So why not take risk of pushing Shah harder in light of probability of failure if we don't. This is the core of the long-standing TF divergencies on Iranian policy. Given the pessimistic consensus about the Iranian outlook, Ken Hansen and I have argued for a much more dynamic effort to avoid the otherwise inevitable result.
However, we have given up for the moment butting our heads against the stonewall of State, and of being told that one must accept in the last analysis the Ambassador's judgment. Had you heard Holmes when he was back here last time, describing how he really shared the Shah's fear of the Afghans and Iraqis and how we must insure Iran's security as first priority, you would realize that this competent but traditionally-minded diplomat just doesn't understand the essential nature of the problem we confront in Iran today. The first priority is rather how to accomplish the transition from a feudal regime to a modernized society without such chaos and upheaval as will permit Khrushchev to make good on his boast that Iran will fall like a ripe plum into his lap.
I argued that Phil should use this report as a vehicle for bringing forward the two immediate issues now confronting this Administration, i.e. how much military baksheesh to give the Shah and whether to have him here for a visit. But these subjects are merely mentioned in passing.
As the President put it, an extra $70 million spread over five years isn't much; but the point is that giving it would symbolize our intent to continue the same half-baked policy as in the last decade, I favor a visit by Shah for quite different reasons--because I feel that only JFK will be able both to tell the Shah the home truths which Ambassador obviously will not and to reassure him (with the Kennedy flair) of our unflagging determination to defend Iran. Moreover, let's remember that Iran is now preparing its Third Development Plan and that we are committed to support this in a substantial way. My idea would be to tell Shah that we are giving him so much more of what we really think important, i.e. development aid, that he and we will have to take a few risks on the military side. And in the last analysis, Iranian army couldn't fight its way out of a paper bag anyway, so it is the US which would have to defend him against any substantial attack. Why can't we reassure him that if he is so threatened, he must (as he will have to anyway) rely on our support?
Recommendation: That we not send this report to President or put it on NSC agenda, since it calls for no action.
But that we tell State and Defense President wants their prompt recommendations on: (1) Preferred FY 63/68 MAP levels for Iran (i.e. decision on Steering Group vs. Holmes called for in draft MAP paper); (2) Comparable FY 63/68 projection of AID requirements so President can see both sides; (3) Timing of visit by Shah; and (4) Future policy toward Iran--are we pushing hard enough? These things can then be discussed in NSC.
R.W. Komer
My memorandum to you of January 10, 1962 The primary purposes of Mr. Bowles' visit, as set out in the enclosed draft of a telegram to Embassy Cairo, Dean Rusk
In my view the report would in effect undermine the substantial political and financial investment which we have devoted to our Military Assistance Program here in favor of a new approach based on theory and supposed to be sold to the leaders of this country without the substance which might give it a chance of being persuasive. Thus, as we edge toward what might soon be regarded by the Shah as unilateral repudiation of our July 1958 commitment to him, he is to be asked to rely upon U.S. retaliatory power for Iran's defensive military needs when no specific commitment of this power to Iran in various possible contingencies has been or is likely to be made. The Sixth Fleet can come quickly to the aid of Greece or Turkey; the Seventh Fleet is a powerful defender of our Asian friends to the South and East. But whence will come effective U.S. military intervention in Iran's hour of need? The Shah fully comprehends the logic of geography in this respect. The report points out (paragraph 11 of the Annex) that ". . . a commitment by the United States to defend Iran has to be believable. Even if it were contained in an ironclad military alliance and territorial guarantee, it is apparent that for some time to come the United States could defend Iran against a determined attack only by the use of air-delivered thermonuclear weapons." The report states, furthermore, that the increasing U.S. capability to intervene militarily abroad is earmarked for Berlin and possibly Southeast Asia.
With regard to the increased development assistance which the Iranian Government is to be persuaded to accept in place of military aid, the Steering Group itself confesses that it "has not been able to obtain a clear cut picture of what the long term shape of economic programs is likely to be in many of the subject countries". It does not seem to me realistic to expect the Iranian Government to find the above approach persuasive, and to say, as the report does, that "the countries themselves should not be allowed to gain the impression that we are any less resolute in our intent to assist them in maintaining their independence nor that their military establishments are being so emasculated as to invite overt aggression or internal revolt" is to indicate unfamiliarity with the natural and to my mind logical reaction of the Iranian leaders in the face of a program such as that recommended by the Steering Group.
The report seems totally to disregard the value which our policy and position in the Middle East have derived from our Military Assistance program to Iran. This program has been instrumental in keeping this underdeveloped Moslem state, located on the borders of the Soviet Union, firmly on the side of the Free World in the cold war. The Steering Group report appears to assume that our military aid program for Iran can be radically altered against the desires of the Iranian regime while that regime's adherence to the United States will remain as strong as ever. I am convinced that the concept held in some quarters that the Shah has no place to turn but to the United States is erroneous. Out of concern for his country's security and worried by an apparent lessening of U.S. interest in this he might seek some accommodation with the USSR, with the concomitant adjustment of Iranian policy which the Soviets would require. We must not forget that the Shah was on the point of making such an arrangement with the Soviets before. I would ask: is it worth the candle to threaten so directly our political position in this area by adopting recommendations based on theory and unaccompanied, as far as I can see, by careful evaluations of the political risks involved? I would hate to see Iran, by turning to neutralism and accommodation with the USSR, demonstrate to us that there are points beyond which the needs and desires of an ally cannot be ignored. The catastrophic nature in that event of the consequences to U.S. interests need not be elaborated.
I hold no brief for large military establishments in countries such as this and in fact my recommendations on the Military Assistance Program for Iran for the period FY 62-67 Turning to the Iran Country Annex, I should say that it suffers from the same basic weakness as the report itself--its conclusion is designed to fit a pre-ordained course, and the excellent reasoning against that course, set forth in the first nine pages of the Annex, is paid little or no heed. One example is the statement in paragraph 12 that "there would be a doubtful return in taking action which would reduce military and raise investment allocations by $130 to $140 million a year if the price for that re-allocation were to be a change in the Shah's policy or in his determination and courage which would lay Iran, developed or undeveloped, open to Soviet influence". To this very real possibility the authors of the conclusion apparently attach little credibility or importance.
171. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy
Ambassador Bowles' Visit to the United Arab Republic
172. Letter From the Ambassador to Iran (Holmes) to Secretary of State Rusk
But my main quarrel with the conclusion of the Annex is the erroneous evaluation of the basis of Iran's present Western orientation. Paragraph 21 states that "the political value of such a (modernized military) program in maintaining Iran's Western orientation is becoming more marginal in relation to the basic internal developments which we can influence better by other means" and paragraph 29 asserts that "the risk of an ultimate change in Iran's foreign policy is no greater (indeed it is probably smaller) from displeasing the Shah than it is from failure to deal effectively with the forces of change in Iran". This may be all right from the point of view of detached theory, but anyone who has closely observed Iranian political developments for any period of time knows that the Shah is still the basis of power here, that he is likely to remain so for the period with which our military aid planning is currently concerned, and that it is he, and he alone, who brought Iran into the pro-Western camp and is keeping it there despite the constant pressures from neutralist-minded politicians. Paragraph 14 realistically points out that it is not unnatural that a quid pro quo is expected for this, and our interest in preserving the current direction of Iranian foreign policy makes it well worth while for us to "ante up".
As for the "forces of change" to which the Annex apparently attributes urgent capability, it is my view that changes are going to take place here gradually, as we are now witnessing, under the aegis of the Shah, who has publicly committed himself to a program of economic and social reform. It is to our interest to have the Shah in a position, by his having received or been promised a reasonable amount of what he wants from us, where we can exert effective influence to insure his continuing constructive role in furthering progressive change. How else, indeed, can we better promote the success of the policies we wish to see applied here?
I get the impression that the authors of the conclusion believe that the preferable way to seek to maintain our position here is to take action which will seriously displease the Shah but will better enable us to improve the lot of the Iranian people as a whole--"nation-building". Let them make no mistake about this--the realities of the situation here are such that our position for the period under discussion will depend as much upon the Shah as upon the results of increased development assistance. These results are notably slow to manifest themselves politically here, and certainly to have an effect on the people's attitude toward foreign policy. Moreover, such of the "forces of change" as are interested in foreign policy are opposed to Iran's aligning herself in the world power conflict.
In the light of the above I strongly disagree with the classification of the military aid program as "activities of secondary importance". The program is just as important as the development program to the maintenance of our position here, and should be continued at the level I have recommended.
I believe that at this point I have addressed myself to the main weaknesses and flaws of the Steering Group's recommendation. I do not wish to draw out this letter by enumerating various other inconsistencies and oversights of the Steering Group's report, beyond pointing out that there are some startling discrepancies between the figures quoted in paragraph 67 and elsewhere for past and projected military assistance to Iran, and those which are available to my staff here. A comparison of these figures is set forth in the enclosed tabulation.
I have gone on at some length because I am convinced that adoption of the Steering Group's proposal would constitute a retrograde course. It would seriously hamper and retard the promising economic and social movement forward that has been sponsored by and has the continuing support of the regime here and would thus work against the very objectives that United States policy in Iran seeks to attain. I believe, considering the high stakes involved, that the risks entailed by such a course would be too great and I urge, therefore, that favorable consideration be given to my recommendations on the Military Assistance Program for Iran for the period FY 1962-1967.
Sincerely,
Julius
I'd respond to your query as follows, bearing in mind that State proposals involve no "sweeping commitments" to UAR in early phases but are mainly to feel Nasser out:
1. Our first aim would be to dangle before UAR more of a Western alternative to excessive dependence on the Bloc. Egypt's economic troubles are such that if we do not help her she will almost be forced to turn even more to Moscow.
2. It serves our interests to have good relations with a key neutralist like Nasser, just as with Tito or Nehru. Moreover, he is still the most important single Arab leader.
3. The Syrian debacle plus acute UAR economic difficulties create a real opportunity for US. The Arabists say that Nasser's state of uncertainty and confusion make him most impressionable at this point; and we don't want him to flail out blindly in desperation.
4. At the moment, Nasser seems to have concluded from the Syrian failure that, instead of trying so hard to promote revolution elsewhere, he had better turn inward toward solving Egypt's own colossal problems. We want to encourage him to do so.
5. It is also to our interest to disabuse Nasser of his idee fixe that "Western imperialists", primarily U.K. but even the US (despite Suez), are basically hostile. He has felt this way since the Aswan Dam fiasco.
6. At the same time Nasser, while accepting anything the Bloc will give him, seems under no illusions as to Moscow's aims. So he is worth supporting not just to keep him out of Khrushchev's clutches, but because at some points (e.g. Iraq, Syria) his line and Soviets may sharply diverge.
7. Hopefully, greater reliance on the US could have some restraining influence on UAR policies, if only by creating a vested interest on Nasser's part in staying on good terms with us. At any rate we could at least talk to a friendly Nasser better than we can now.
Admittedly, these potential gains are intangible and long term, in fact a gamble. But what is called for doesn't cost us much either--it is essentially some forthcoming gestures; State doesn't propose giving Nasser much (PL 480, etc.) that we aren't planning on giving him anyway at this point. 2. Two principal deterrents exist as obstacles to quick grab of Kuwait by Qasim:
a) The presence of British military power capable of repulsing Iraqi attack or uprooting Iraqis should they become established before British military could arrive in force.
b) Secondary but important is general acceptance of Kuwait as an independent state, particularly by its Arab neighbors.
Obviously these two deterrents are closely interdependent. Without status as an independent Arab nation in good standing, British guarantees of Kuwait would leave it with little but the appearance of a British dependency. Qasim might be tempted to contest British power if he thought he could obtain sympathy or support from his fellow Arabs or others in the Afro-Asian Bloc. Yet lacking the deterrent of British power, Qasim might think it worthwhile to risk the opprobrium and isolation from his Arab neighbors and the rest of the world consequent to riding roughshod over Kuwait's now widely accepted sovereignty.
As to (a), we believe that in two tries the British have gained a better understanding of how and with what probable after effects their strength can be applied.
173. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy
174. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait and the Embassy in the United Kingdom
The question remains as to what the US can do to strengthen deterrent (b) above. Surprising progress has been made since the British-Kuwaiti exchange of letters on June 19, 1961; accepted into the Arab League, Kuwait had as of December 31, 1961 secured recognition from over 60 governments while 4 diplomatic missions had been established on Kuwaiti soil and Kuwait missions had been established in 3 foreign countries. Since before last June Kuwait had been moving toward independent status through gradually expanding its membership in subsidiary international organizations.
Nevertheless, the key fact about Kuwait for its Arab colleagues (and most important supporters) is its oil resources, considered by many of its neighbors not Kuwaiti but rather as "Arab" wealth. Arab respect for Kuwait's sovereignty is based on, (a) an aversion to seeing such overwhelming resources accrue entirely to one country, Iraq, thus providing it the basis for a dominant role in Arab affairs, and (b) their hopes that Kuwait may adopt a wealth-sharing program. As noted in the various messages under reference and Deptel 405 to Kuwait rptd Baghdad 195, Kuwait is now moving cautiously toward satisfying the latter hopes by supplementing earlier private gifts (which whatever their size and extent have failed so far to create for Kuwait an image of benevolence) with a business-like program of development lending.
In these circumstances the US can:
(1) Offer encouragement in the course of our normal contacts with Kuwaitis for orderly and rapid development of their Development Fund. Department doubts necessity or desirability at this time of making direct, formal representations to the Ruler on this subject.
(2) Make available the fruits of our experience in this field and encourage Kuwaitis to take advantage of the experience of others, particularly the IBRD.
(3) In due course discreetly encourage other governments to take advantage of the assistance Kuwait is prepared to offer, noting as appropriate our understanding that the Kuwaitis are going at development assistance in a business-like manner.
(4) Encourage the Kuwaitis as opportunities arise to give maximum publicity to their foreign aid program.
(5) In collaboration with the British encourage the Kuwaitis to enlarge the scope of their diplomatic contacts by placing missions in a number of key countries, bolstering these by dual accreditations if necessary. As necessary encourage other countries to extend recognition and place diplomatic representatives in Kuwait.
On the Department and Embassy Kuwait will fall much of the burden for implementing the foregoing although Embassy London may find opportunities to encourage the UK Government to take a similar line in its contacts with the Kuwaitis and other Arab governments. Other addressees may find the foregoing useful background guidance, as the problem of Kuwait continues to be a matter of discussion in the Near East over the next few months.
The Department would welcome whatever comments posts may wish to submit.
Ball
We do not envisage Nasser-Bowles meetings will deal except in general way with proposed steps in US-UAR economic cooperation. Dept expect be able authorize you convey our views on multi-year PL-480 and economic cooperation before Bowles' arrival.
Bowles will be accompanied by two assistants and secretary. Wishes protocol aspects visit kept to absolute minimum.
Ball
Dear Mr. President:
"In the past year I have found that a major problem in understanding more clearly the conviction and preoccupations of our friends abroad has been the lack of close enough contact with other chiefs of state.
"It is a truism that the world is changing at an extraordinary rate of speed. This year and this decade are crucial to all of us as few have been throughout history. I know you share my belief that we must do everything within our power to improve the prospects for peace in every corner of the world.
"My good friend and advisor, Ambassador Chester Bowles, is scheduled to take a trip to the Middle East and Africa. I should, therefore, like to ask him to discuss frankly with you on my behalf the whole range of the complex global issues which today trouble our world. Ambassador Bowles could stop for several days in Cairo in February for such a discussion with you. He would arrive on February 13 if this date would be convenient.
"As you may know, I recently appointed Ambassador Bowles as my Special Representative and Advisor on all aspects of US relations with Asia, Africa and Latin America. He has had a wide range of experience in the economic and political affairs of these parts of the world. He also has a thorough understanding of and sympathy with the manifold problems of the countries earnestly seeking to accelerate their own processes of national self-development.
"His stop in Cairo would be announced as an opportunity for him to visit the UAR to obtain a first-hand impression of conditions in modern Egypt. However, the real purpose of his visit to Cairo would be for him to meet with you. I hope that you would speak as frankly to him as you would to me about the questions which affect relations between our two nations, the Middle East in general, and the whole range of international affairs. He would be able to convey to you my views on all these questions.
"I have asked Ambassador Badeau to bring you this letter and to inform you of further details concerning Mr. Bowles' planned trip should you desire them. I should be most grateful for your reaction to my suggestion and I should be happy to know whether, with the many burdens pressing upon you, time would be available for the discussions which might prove most valuable to us both.
"With all good wishes, Sincerely, John F. Kennedy." Item 1 of the Record of Actions at the NSC Standing Group Meeting of January 26, 1962, reads as follows:
"Progress Report on Iran
"(Mr. Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and Mr. Robert W. Komer, NSC Staff, were present for this Item.)
"(a) Noted and discussed the Progress Report of the Iranian Task Force, dated January 18, 1962.
"(b) Agreed that no further action by the National Security Council with respect to Iran is required at this time.
"(c) Agreed that the report on the Military Assistance Program for Iran requested by the President should be acted on as soon as possible after its completion on February 15." (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group: January 26, 1962)
We recognize, however, that multi-year agreement, important as it is, is not whole answer to UAR's long-range economic problems. In order come to grips with many complex issues involved and to open way for possible consideration further areas cooperation, President is prepared provide services of highly-qualified economic consultant who would visit UAR for approximately two-week period. In view fact consultants of caliber required are heavily engaged, some delay in arrival inevitable. Worth waiting a bit to have right man.
Vital to success of both multi-year proposal and visit of consultant that talks proceed in atmosphere of absolute frankness. UAR should clarify areas where US cooperation would be useful. Similarly we expect instruct our consultant to be utterly frank and objective in expressing to UAR his views as to what steps, facilities, access to economic information, and above all, degree of mutual confidence required. Only through such candid discussions can we assess UAR needs against US capabilities. Demands on latter are, of course, steadily increasing as larger number developing nations look to US for help.
Thus, you should stress to Nasser that quick or dramatic results cannot be expected. Essential to proceed gradually, taking each step with eyes fully open and cards on table. We seek neither privileged position, political domination, nor irrevocable commitments. We believe foregoing demonstrates depth US interest in UAR and should serve allay any feeling of isolation or insecurity which Western policies alleged to create.
Although we have impression from your last conversation Nasser leaving economic details to others you should draw on Deptel 736 Ball
To me the key problems are:
(1) What is the rationale for proposed State action program (3) What do we get out of whole approach to Nasser?--Essentially this is an exercise in how to compete with the Soviets in getting along with a major neutralist, so President should be clued on long-term potential and limited likelihood of concrete short-term returns;
(4) What are the risks?--naturally, he (JFK) worried about domestic reaction although I gather Mike Feldman et al. were less concerned about strong domestic reaction than about likelihood our approach wouldn't add up to anything, so be regarded as a New Frontier failure--aside from this, however, we not risking very much in early phases of approach.
I heard conflicting reports about the President's attitude. State apparently heard that he was not very enthusiastic about Nasser gambit and said he would go ahead with visit only on strong State recommendation and would hold State responsible if anything went wrong. State office director, at least, was much shaken by this, because any number of things could go wrong (for example, Bowles visit leaked to press on Thursday, thus diluting impact we planned). On other hand, Carl (a) Rusk or Ball--Rusk himself signed memo of transmittal.
(b) McGhee?--My spies tell me George was chief objector in Department to new approach. (He never changes.)
(c) Phil Talbot
(d) W.W.R.--He and I, of course, were chief advocates of exploring new approach.
(e) Bowles--I don't see how we can leave him out.
(f) Hamilton or preferably Gaud--AID will pick up any tab so better be clued.
(g) Bundy and Komer Ball
The Shah has let it be known that he desires an invitation, and the coming visit of the Special Representative of the President, Ambassador Bowles, to Tehran affords an excellent opportunity to extend the invitation under the best possible circumstances. The Department suggests that a letter of invitation from the President be handed to the Shah by Ambassador Bowles on his forthcoming visit to Tehran. The Department understands that the period September 25-October 4 is open on the White House schedule.
No negotiations are contemplated during the visit. The issue of greatest importance to the Shah is the level of United States military assistance to Iran. This matter will have been settled by the suggested time of the visit. Furthermore, the Third Development Plan of Iran will have been launched by late September, thus providing recent and concrete evidence of the Shah's role as a forward-looking leader of his people.
A state visit, rather than a more informal one, is necessary because the Shah personally likes pomp and because President Nasser, his deadly personal enemy, is scheduled for a state visit; any lesser treatment of the Shah would appear to him and his people as a personal insult.
Attached is the suggested text of a letter from the President to the Shah, to be delivered to the Shah by Ambassador Bowles. Komer transmitted this memorandum to Bundy on February 1. For text of his covering note, see Document 185. Bundy forwarded the memorandum to President Kennedy on February 1 under cover of a note that reads: "This morning you said, 'Call off the idea of a Nasser visit.' I came downstairs and found this. If it seems to you to make a prima facie case, I suggest a brief meeting on U.A.R. policies and on Nasser visit in particular. We'd need Talbot, Feldman, Komer, and perhaps Bell and O'Brien. Or you may simply feel, as I must say I do, that the promise of gain is not worth the certain turmoil. How much good has it done us to have Sukarno regularly? We can improve relations and then have a visit, and Bowles is a smart negotiator who can easily play it that way." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, United Arab Republic, Nasser Visit)
In response to your request for an explanation of what is to be gained from a state visit by President Nasser to the United States in April we submit that such a visit would offer the opportunity to achieve the following:
Special Objectives
1. Encouragement of the United Arab Republic's desire to limit its relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc, of the U.A.R. to keep the Palestine issue in the "icebox", of the U.A.R.'s more moderate policy toward Africa, and of a more statesmanlike role for the U.A.R. among the neutralists.
2. Advancement of the prospect for a solution of the Arab refugee problem.
3. Exploring the possibility of arranging an informal understanding on arms limitations as between Israel and the U.A.R.
4. Exertion of influence on Nasser to moderate his more radical domestic policies directed toward "social justice".
5. Modification of President Nasser's belief that Near Eastern policy is controlled by Zionism.
6. Amelioration of President Nasser's sense of ostracism, arising from the fact that he of all neutralist leaders has never been invited to the United States although president of an important country for nearly eight years and its leader for nearly ten years.
General Objectives
1. Establishment of an atmosphere of greater confidence between the U.S. and the U.A.R. and encouragement of greater U.A.R. cooperation with the U.S.
2. Advancement of the personal relationship between you and President Nasser for future exploitation.
3. Communication directly to Nasser of your viewpoint and objectives in global issues and in the Near East and Africa as well as learning firsthand the viewpoints and concerns of President Nasser. We would expect Nasser's outlook to be broadened.
4. Giving President Nasser, through travel in the U.S., firsthand knowledge of our power, our political, economic and social systems and our national character.
Desirability of an Early Date for the Visit
Since Secretary Rusk's memorandum to you of January 10, 1962 proposing a carefully calculated series of steps with regard to the U.A.R. we have concluded that the state of tension in the U.A.R., disturbing to the entire Near East, arises from more than domestic concerns.
In brief, the U.A.R. seems convinced that the Western powers (perhaps excluding the U.S. but probably with U.S. consent) have decided to restore their grip on the Near East, to isolate the U.A.R., to involve the U.A.R. in a military conflict with Israel, and to cause the disappearance of the present U.A.R. Government as an aftermath of defeat by Israel. In response to the pressures it senses the U.A.R. is lashing out in propaganda against the British, the French, and those Arab regimes accused of working with the British, is trying the French "spies" in Cairo, and is building greater military strength despite economic stringency. The Soviets are exploiting this to the maximum.
In light of these current trends and the possible adverse developments they portend we are impelled to attach greater weight to a Nasser visit in April than to one in November in the hope of heading off serious trouble in the Near East. An initiation to Nasser need not be issued until after Ambassador Bowles' proposed talks with him in mid-February, but a decision favoring an April visit in principle would allow Ambassador Bowles to have a full and free discussion with Nasser on the subject.
I enclosure for your information a short statement of some of the forces we believe to be at work impeding an improvement of U.S.-U.A.R. relations.
George W. Ball
175. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic
176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic
177. Editorial Note
178. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic
179. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Presidential Meeting on Nasser Problem
180. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon/1/
Washington, January 30, 1962, 7:27 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.83A/1-3062. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Hamilton; cleared by Strong, Manfull, and Smith (White House); and approved by Talbot. Manfull initialed for Ball. Repeated to Paris and London.
583. Ambassador Dimechkie saw President briefly 30th at meeting arranged former's request to discuss Lebanese-US relations in wake coup attempt./2/ Dimechkie asked assurances continued US interest in Lebanon which he said could be conveyed with great influence on Paris meeting principal Lebanese Ambassadors and Foreign Minister Takla. President gave Dimechkie categorical assurances no US involvement, adding that from basis its own dedication to democratic principles USG gratified with Lebanese development in similar direction. Dimechkie said he had been personally convinced these facts but highly grateful for opportunity to hear them from President and convey to his Government.
/2/President Kennedy met with Ambassador Dimechkie, accompanied by Talbot, at 10:15 a.m. on January 30. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Books) No other account of the conversation has been found. A January 29 memorandum from Battle to Bundy requesting the meeting is in Department of State, Central Files, 601.83A11/1-2962.
President added USG has no evidence either British or Jordanian involvement. Dimechkie commented that he personally failed to see how British could benefit; that if interested in Fertile Crescent they could have pursued it when they had friendly Nuri al-Said government in Iraq, but with Baghdad now hostile conspiracy to this end did not seem reasonable.
181. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Iran: Proposed State Visit by the Shah of Iran/2/
/2/Iranian Ambassador Zahedi first raised the question of a Shah visit to the United States with Walt Rostow during a dinner party on August 11, 1961. (Memorandum of conversation; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Iran, 8/1/61- 8/14/61)
The Department recommends that the Shah of Iran be invited to the United States for a state visit this autumn. Ambassador Holmes feels that an invitation is essential to bolster the Shah's morale and confidence in Western support against Soviet threats and subversive pressures. The internal stability of Iran, as well as its foreign policy, is for the present and the near future almost entirely dependent upon the resolution, courage, and common sense of the Shah. He is under heavy domestic and foreign pressure to abandon his openly pro-Western stance.
182. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, January 31, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786B.11/1-3162. Secret. Drafted by Thacher and Barrow on January 23.
Advantages to be Gained from a State Visit by President Nasser in April
Enclosure
A number of factors can be identified which tend consistently to have a negative effect on any efforts to develop and strengthen US-UAR relations.
The UAR's Own Policies contribute significantly to these difficulties frequently because the UAR may be engaged, as at present, in endeavoring to cultivate relations with the U.S. while attempting, at the same time, to secure certain of its requirements from the USSR. Thus, Nasser recently received Soviet naval and economic missions. Khrushchev's letter to Nasser of January 6 reflects Soviet willingness to renew efforts for closer Soviet-UAR relations. At the same time the Soviets foster UAR fears of supposed Western attempts at "encirclement" or isolation of the UAR. In general, an acceleration in Soviet-UAR contacts is probably seen by Nasser as a means of speeding up implementation of the Soviet industrialization loan of 1958, as a way of expediting construction of the Aswan High Dam, and as confirming the UAR's only reliable source of arms. Nasser probably seeks benefits from arousing U.S. concern at the prospect of closer USSR-UAR relations. For internal political reasons, as well as to convince the USSR and neutrals of the purity of its "anti-imperialist" policy, the UAR has recently created public rows with both France and the U.K.
Israel and France have thus been stimulated to undertake an anti-UAR campaign. French indignation at the Cairo "spy trials" has led to violent anti-UAR press campaigns not only in France but throughout Europe, and to negative French and Israeli reaction to U.S. aid to the UAR. For example, the UAR request for cotton under P.L. 480 to meet domestic deficiencies was interpreted by Israel as permitting the UAR to use more of its own cotton to purchase Soviet arms. This line has appeared in the U.S. press and has helped persuade U.S. opinion of an important new Soviet-UAR arms deal. This was further amplified by reports, vigorously denied by the UAR government, of establishment of a Soviet naval base in the UAR. (We do not believe Nasser has given the Soviets this privilege; Soviet arms now arriving in increased quantities in the UAR were ordered over a year ago. We have turned down the UAR cotton request and in fact we believe the UAR is anxious to prevent Soviet domination of the UAR cotton trade.) French counter-measures against the UAR have included recent efforts to block additional UAR drawings from the International Monetary Fund and efforts to cut down on lines of credit available to the UAR from European banks. The French clandestine radio, "The Voice of Free Men," habitually attacks U.S.-UAR cooperation, and its out-put of this type has recently been stepped up.
The UAR's Alleged Intent to Block the Suez Canal has been widely disseminated in connection with Portuguese vessels allegedly wishing to assist Goa or Dutch warships bound for West Irian. These statements appear to have been circulated by parties directly at interest and, while the UAR has seen fit neither to confirm or deny them, there is no evidence that the UAR is prepared to violate the Suez Canal Convention.
Conclusion: Such cross-currents are familiar to those dealing with UAR affairs over a considerable period of time. They tend to follow typical patterns. While a good deal of the responsibility lies with UAR policies themselves, as well as with Israeli, French and Soviet maneuvers, we believe we should not be deflected from our own objective of developing with patience and tenacity a stronger position in the UAR. At present, the UAR badly needs our help and has already modified certain policies to get it (putting Israel in the "icebox," reducing its ties with the Soviet Bloc, a more moderate line in Africa). The UAR greatly fears over-involvement with the Soviets since fundamental to Nasser's philosophy is a desire to remain free of foreign domination, Eastern or Western. We should pursue existing opportunities for attaining our objectives.
Washington, January 31, 1962.
183. National Intelligence Estimate
The Problem
To assess the outlook for Iraq over the next year or so.
1. Iraq's Prime Minister Qasim has proved more durable than appeared likely a few years ago, but his position still depends more on the ineffectiveness and mutual antagonisms of his opponents than on his own strength. No attempt to displace Qasim is likely to succeed without substantial military support. Although we cannot identify any particular individuals or groups likely to bring off a successful coup, plotting is endemic in military circles and assassination is an ever-present possibility. The present state of affairs could drift on awaiting a development which would focus the present generalized discontent. (Paras. 8-9, 11-12)
2. We believe the Iraqi economy will continue in its present sluggish state for the next year or so. Loss of oil revenues, which account for more than half the government's income, would cause economic difficulties, stimulate discontent, and increase the chances of a move against Qasim. We believe, however, that Qasim designed the recent oil legislation to take the maximum territory from the oil companies short of pushing them to cease production. Indications are that the companies will continue to produce at their present rate but will forego planned expansion. (Paras. 13-16)
3. Qasim will almost certainly continue to make oratorical threats to seize Kuwait, particularly in view of the domestic and regional benefits to be gained from harassing the British. We do not believe he will resort to force as long as he remains convinced that the British are determined to defend Kuwait and that his troops would have to face the prospect of a fight with other Arab forces. (Paras. 22-23)
4. The Soviets will strive to maneuver Qasim into increasing dependence on them through continuance of a large military and economic aid program, and will continue to support his "anti-imperialist" moves. Nevertheless, neither Qasim nor the Soviets fully trust each other, and the Iraqi Communists are neither influential in the government nor popular in the country. Relations with the West are likely to be further strained by such things as Qasim's pressures on Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) and Kuwait. Iraq is likely to continue in its presently isolated position in respect of its neighbors, the other Arab states and the neutrals. (Paras. 17-21)
[Here follows the 5-page Discussion section; see Supplement, the compilation on Iraq.]
184. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Nasser Visit
I have passed on to Phil Talbot and Bowles office our feeling that, in view of the President's obvious concern over the implications of a Nasser visit, it would be better not to press it at the moment. Rather than force the issue on this major foreign policy initiative and risk a turndown, it might be wiser to see how the initial overtures to Nasser (e.g. PL-480 offer, agreement to provide a planner, Bowles' visit) come out. If Nasser's reception is sufficiently positive, we then have better grounds for justifying a Presidential invite. Note that Nasser's reception of JFK letter announcing Bowles' visit and PL-480 offer was most cordial.
Talbot is in complete accord. He had already assured Mike Feldman that proposals for Nasser visit were only tentative and that we would wait and see how earlier overtures came out before making any firm decision. However, Phil feels that he must come forward with a recommendation that we reserve space on President's calendar for an April visit because once we get to point of decision there will be very little time left to make proper arrangements (Protocol requires at least three weeks). So Phil feels he must have all the staff work ready (we can of course sit on it when it comes over, if time not ripe).
Bowles, however, would dearly love to discuss the visit when he sees Nasser. One idea he has is to raise the topic as a "personal" idea with the idea of getting Nasser to realize the problems which a visit would create for both sides. Alternatively, if Bowles' reaction during his first talk with Nasser (14 February) were favorable, he would cable back recommendation for visit in hopes he could extend invite during second talk (17 February). I am sure that Bowles will want to discuss above with JFK when he sees him early next week.
/2/ To me, both options are worth considering. But above all I hope that Bowles pushing of Nasser visit will not give it kiss of death. Therefore, if you think time not ripe, let's be sure to clue Bowles not even to raise issue with JFK. /2/Bowles met with President Kennedy from noon to 12:25 p.m. on Tuesday, February 6. (Ibid., President's Appointment Books) No record of the conversation has been found. As to discussion with President of whole Egypt problem I infer that you prefer to hold this off until after more returns are in. Amen.RWK
185. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
However delayed, attached is a surprisingly powerful statement of advantages to be gained from a Nasser visit this April.
/2/ /2/Document 182. Note especially point (Page 2) that in its state of nervous tension since Syrian debacle, UAR has apparently convinced itself that Western Powers are trying to isolate it and knock it over. I'll bet my bottom dollar that Soviets are feeding this line to the hilt. It would be tragic if Nasser's economic straits and fear that West out to take advantage of his weakened position led him both to lash out blindly (note stepped up campaign against Saud, Hussein, and now Shah) and to turn in desperation even more to USSR. As I keep saying, I am no Nasser-lover but this guy can still cause us so much trouble if he's agin us that it is worth the candle to try and overcome these fears.And time to move is precisely when he is in such a state of nerves, not after it is too late. Hence I'd urge you to put this before JFK.
RWK
186. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Dutton) to Secretary of State Rusk
Farbstein Resolution on Arab-Israel Negotiations
Discussion:
In the past several weeks we have tried unsuccessfully to persuade Congressman Farbstein of our wisdom in voting, during the recent General Assembly debate, against the Israel-encouraged resolution calling for direct Israel-Arab peace negotiations (Tab B).
/2/ On January 24 he introduced a resolution stating the sense of Congress that the United States Delegation to the United Nations should favor direct Israel-Arab peace negotiations (Tab C)./3/ /2/Tab B is a letter from Dutton to Congressman Farbstein of December 18, 1961, pointing out that the U.S. draft resolution submitted during the recent U.N. General Assembly debate referenced previous General Assembly resolutions that had urged the governments concerned "to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly" and affirmed that the governments concerned had the primary responsibility for reaching a settlement. Dutton explained that the United States would be gratified if both sides decided to undertake direct negotiations, but that this did not appear to be a practical possibility until some movement was gained through the quiet diplomacy of the Johnson mission. /3/Tab C is the Congressional print of H. Res. 525, January 24, introduced in the House of Representatives and referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.We foresee serious complications for the Johnson mission if the resolution is adopted. Most important, it would raise again in Arab minds the bogey of Zionist ability to influence American policy. Arab leadership would inevitably fear that at some critical juncture in the Johnson effort the United States ability to back up whatever agreement might have been reached would be vitiated or turned against them. The progress we made in the recent General Assembly in convincing the Arabs of our impartiality would be dissipated, and heightened suspicion would replace the present willingness to cooperate.
Our current strategy is to seek defeat of the Farbstein resolution in Committee. Our chief steps have been (a) a Talbot-Farbstein letter regretting introduction of his resolution (Tab D), Recommendation:
That you sign the attached letter (Tab A) PARTICIPANTS 1. Questions for Study: Dr. Johnson said that following his meeting with Department officers on January 17 Complex One: The problem of selecting and repatriating or permanently resettling a limited number (20,000?) Complex Three: Timing, money, and machinery.
2. Regional Economic Development: Dr. Johnson said the strongly adverse Arab reaction to statements in his original report regarding the need for regional economic development make him aware that this is not a path he can pursue if he is to have any success on political aspects of the problem. Nevertheless, he feels there must be a "separate but parallel" effort in this direction to facilitate the absorption of refugees once there is some movement out of the present political stalemate. He remains convinced of the need for this despite the pessimistic view recently expressed to him by Mr. Eugene Black. Mr. Black considers it doubtful that any effort to persuade the states of the area of the advantages of regional economic development will succeed at this time. However, he acknowledges that something hopeful may come out of Kuwait's announced intention to set up a regional development fund. Dr. Johnson said he hopes the Department will give this whole aspect of the problem further, careful thought. Mr. Crawford said this would be done, but noted that because of political differences between the Arab states we have found it necessary, almost without exception, to conduct USG aid programs on a bilateral basis.
The concept of a multilateral, regional approach has always been attractive, but it is difficult to impose an overlay of economic cooperation on a foundation of political factionalism. Even after study, therefore, the conclusion may be reached that economic support of refugee integration will have to be primarily through bilateral channels.
3. Dr. Bryant Wedge: Dr. Johnson remarked that if no objection is perceived he intends to proceed with the recruitment of Dr. Bryant Wedge, a psychiatrist and sociologist from Hartford. Dr. Wedge has demonstrated an extraordinarily objective and penetrating understanding of the Palestine refugee problem in his correspondence with the Department and his recent conversations with Dr. Johnson himself. For the moment, Dr. Wedge will be the only member of the Special Representative's staff except for Mr. Moe, who is shortly to be relieved of his UNRWA responsibilities and assigned as the Special Representative's "Senior Advisor".
4. United States Government view of goals and timing in relations to 17th GA: Mr. Crawford noted past discussion between Dr. Johnson, USUN and the Department regarding a simplified statement of the goals of the Special Representative operation. There emerges a consensus that these are (a) some movement, or promise thereof, of refugees prior to the 17th General Assembly, or (b) documentation that such movement is not a practical possibility and that the USG-PCC-Special Representative operation has failed, to permit ____ (c) a thorough re-examination of the United States Government role in relation to the refugee problem looking toward a gradual reduction of the US involvement with minimum disruption to area stability, over a multi-year period. Mr. Crawford remarked that while the US will continue to provide all appropriate support, the road of the Special Representative must increasingly become a lonely one. The ingredients of progress on the refugee problem are probably known to many persons, but only the individual negotiator can ultimately determine a combination and timing of these ingredients that will be acceptable to all the parties.
Dr. Johnson said he realizes that as the second round is approached he must increasingly "go it alone". He is only anxious that the base of the mountain to be climbed be as broad as possible. Dr. Johnson said he appreciates that the Department must know by mid-summer whether the Special Representative operation has succeeded or failed. He looks toward completion of his final report by the first week of August. It is perfectly possible, however, that the second round of consultations in the Near East will show that failure is inevitable. Because of other commitments, the timing of the next Special Representative trip to the area must fall in the period April 1-May 5.
187. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 6, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/2-662. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Crawford and Palmer on February 12.
SUBJECT
PCC Refugee Initiative
Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, Special Representative, Palestine Conciliation Commission
Mr. Sherrington Moe, UNRWA Liaison Officer, New York
USUN--Mr. Robert Blake (part)
USUN--Mr. Richard Pedersen (part)
UNP--Mr. Palmer
NEA/NE--William R. Crawford, Jr.
5. Presidential Interest: Dr. Johnson inquired regarding the degree of President Kennedy's personal involvement and interest in the Special Representative operation. Department officers commented that the President's continuing personal concern is attested inter alia by the letters he wrote last May to Arab leaders, which were the opening move in this initiative, and the sanction and full support given by the White House to our objective stand during the General Assembly refugee debate. As Mr. Talbot had remarked on January 17, this is "as important a piece of business" as the United States has in progress anywhere.
6. The Farbstein Resolution: Department officers noted the introduction into the House of Representatives on January 24 by Congressman Farbstein of a resolution (House Resolution 525) 8. PCC Press Release: It was agreed that a PCC press release announcing Dr. Johnson's "reappointment" as Special Representative is desirable for the record. A proposed text will be cabled to Dr. Johnson in Europe. After approval it will be shown by Mr. Gaillard to Arab host country and Israel representatives in New York, about February 19. The representatives will be notified of the Conciliation Commission's intention to issue the release a day or so after Dr. Johnson's return from Europe on February 23.
9. Possible Role of UNHCR: Dr. Johnson indicated his intention of calling on the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 11. Single Camp vs. Area-Wide Effort: The relative merits of clearing out a single camp or camps totaling roughly 20,000 persons, vs. implementing the freely expressed choice of the first 20,000 who apply from anywhere in the area, were discussed. It was agreed that this is a decision with which the Arab states must ultimately be identified. If, for example, it were decided to try to vacate a camp in Jordan, other Arab states might turn on Jordan in mid course unless they had concurred in advance in this being the best approach.
12. Israel Declaration: Department officers asked whether Dr. Johnson had given thought to the nature and timing of a carefully circumscribed Israel declaration of willingness to cooperate in principle in implementation of Paragraph 11. Dr. Johnson concurred that it might be too much to expect Israel to make such a declaration on its own behalf. The actions which Ben-Gurion has taken to buttress Israel's stand on the refugee problem (his encouragement of the recent Knesset resolution opposing repatriation, etc.) genuinely limit his freedom of action. Dr. Johnson said one might rather look toward announcement by the Special Representative that both parties had agreed to cooperate in implementing during Year One the freely expressed choice of the first 20,000 refugees to record a preference. To this would be added the further statement that all parties had assured the Special Representative of their agreement in principle to continue such cooperation consistent with national security and economic interests. It was agreed that something along this line might (1) satisfy Arab demands for Israel's acceptance in principle of paragraph 11, and (2) give the Year One pilot project the sense of continuing in the future.
13. United States Financial Support: Dr. Johnson hoped that the Department is actively considering the question of US financial support of progress on the refugee problem, particularly as regards the establishment of a compensation fund.
14. Further Meetings: It was agreed to consider a further meeting of the group about March 1. Further meetings could be arranged as necessary.
Pursuant to your request I submit the following as an addendum to the briefing papers previously prepared regarding objectives to be sought and particular points to be discussed in your conversations with President Nasser.
Essentially what we envisage is (a) progress toward the establishment of mutual confidence; (b) the planting of certain of our ideas in Nasser's mind; (c) learning something of Nasser's feelings and intentions; and (d) your recommendation whether the President should invite Nasser for a state visit in April or delay until after the election. Thus, we do not look for specific commitments but rather for creation of a platform of mutual confidence from which further discussions and, hopefully, a direct confrontation between Nasser and President Kennedy might be launched.
In this connection, we hope you can make Nasser understand the following points:
1. Our confidence in Ambassador Badeau (who will accompany you).
2. Our desire for cooperation to the extent that the UAR also desires it.
3. Our acceptance of UAR neutrality provided it is truly neutral.
4. Our world objectives and approaches to them.
5. That we are quietly confident of our military posture.
6. The constancy and magnitude of our assistance despite pressures against us.
7. Nasser's opportunity for genuine statesmanship as a neutral and damage he does to his image by extremism; he should realize the UAR is independent and without challenge to its independence.
8. That his freedom to be neutral depends on the economic, cultural and military strength of the West.
9. That UK interests in Middle East are confined to Persian Gulf and South Arabian protectorates. No internal support in UK for another Suez or other adventures in Middle East.
10. Need for stability and development in Near East; West is not pushing Fertile Crescent scheme and does not intend to.
11. Strenuous efforts of US to maintain impartiality between Arabs and Israelis and also as between Arab states.
12. Mischief-making of Sino-Soviet Bloc keeping area upset; false documents and rumors.
13. Objectives of our African policy.
14. Our support for concepts social reform and social justice, and positive contributions of our system thereto.
The following are points upon which we would like Nasser's frank views:
1. Depth and source of UAR jitters over its security, means to alleviate.
2. Nasser's view of his relations with the West, present and future; need for good relations with Western Europe if UAR development needs are to be met.
3. UAR intentions versus Israel and reasons for increasing its armaments; attitude toward Dimona Reactor and Jordan Waters.
4. UAR objectives vis-?-vis Iran and other Arab states.
5. UAR African policy.
6. UAR view of Kuwait impasse.
We would suggest the following tactics be used in connection with Nasser and others: 3. Care not to interfere in intra-Arab affairs.
4. Avoidance of serious concern at Soviet role in UAR.
5. Avoidance of details of US aid and UAR desires.
6. Avoidance of proposals for Near East arms limitation (presently not practicable for internal political reasons in UAR).
7. Concentration on what we hope for the future, rather than on troubles of past.
8. Full opportunity to Nasser and others to express their point of view.
9. A relaxed approach since Nasser will likely be prepared to spend several hours with you.
10. Engage in wide-range discussion of problems on first meeting; attempt in second meeting to summarize and conclude bringing out points of difference and points of agreement.
As regards dealing with other personalities, we would attach considerable importance to talks with Vice Presidents Baghdadi and Muhieddin, with whom you can be frank. Foreign Minister Fawzi is reliable, though not influential. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
With warm personal regards,
Sincerely,
Dean Rusk PARTICIPANTS 1. Farbstein Resolution. The Congressman said he could only bow to the Secretary's written request he not press his resolution. In bowing to the Secretary's request not to press the resolution (for which the Secretary expressed appreciation), Mr. Farbstein said he was seeking a quid pro quo, as follows.
2. Discrimination by Jordan Against American Jews. The Congressman asked from the Secretary in writing a commitment that Jordan would be forced to cease discriminating against American Jews. Specifically, Jordan should remove from its visa application form that question relating to the religion of the applicant. He referred to the fact that the United States provides half the Jordanian budget and read from the 1961 AID legislation As he departed, the Congressman suggested the Secretary issue a release about his call. However, he was quite pleased to accept the Secretary's counter proposal that the Congressman issue his own release.
(After leaving the Secretary's office, Mr. Strong explained in some detail the political circumstances in Jordan, the efforts we had made to persuade Jordan to end discrimination, our hopes for the future, the utter necessity of avoiding publicity regarding our efforts or our successes and the understanding of the problem which Ambassador Macomber had as former Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations. Mr. Farbstein counted Ambassador Macomber as a friend and had confidence in him.)
188. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Grant) to the President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs (Bowles)
Objectives of your Visit to the United Arab Republic
189. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Ambassador to Iran (Holmes)
190. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 13, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/2-1362. Confidential. Drafted by Strong and approved in S on February 22.
SUBJECT
Farbstein Resolution and Discrimination by Jordan Against American Jews
The Secretary
Leonard Farbstein, Representative from New York
NEA--Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert C. Strong
H--William Coblentz
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