Documents 191-217
President Kennedy-King Saud Meeting/2/ /2/While staying at his residence in Palm Beach, Florida, President Kennedy on January 27 paid a 15-minute courtesy call on King Saud. The King was recuperating in Palm Beach after hospitalization in Boston. Following this meeting, King Saud formally accepted President Kennedy's invitation to visit him in Washington (see Document 152). The memorandum of the January 27 conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 786A.11/1-3162. See Supplement, the compilation on Saudi Arabia, for documentation relating to the two Kennedy-Saud meetings. PARTICIPANTS
President Kennedy
NEA--Mr. Grant
U/PR--Mr. Duke
NE--Mr. Seelye
King Abdul Aziz al-Saud
Shaikh Abdulla al-Khayyal, Saudi Ambassador
Jemal Hussaini, Royal Counselor
Bakhir Yunis,
The President expressed pleasure at the opportunity to discuss with His Majesty some of our concerns in the Middle East. He asked the King for his views on the Kuwait-Iraqi relationship and whether Qassim would continue to exert pressure on Kuwait. The King expressed confidence that Kuwait would succeed in withstanding Iraqi pressures in view of the support Kuwait enjoys from "all of the Arabs" as well as Great Britain's vital interest in Kuwait. The President wondered whether this was a sufficient enough deterrent against a possible Iraqi surprise attack on Kuwait which conceivably might be accomplished within the space of a few hours. The King expressed the view that the presence of Arab troops in Kuwait, together with back-up British military support, would be sufficient.
2. Syria
The President asked the King for his views on the new regime in Syria. The King expressed pleasure with the new regime although, contrary to U.A.R. assertions, he said Saudi Arabia had had nothing to do with the Syrian secession from the U.A.R. The President asked whether the King saw any danger signals in the Syrian Government's economic mission to the Soviet Union. The King expressed confidence that the Syrian Government would remain anti-Soviet and emphasized the importance of U.S. assistance to Syria as insurance. The President indicated that the U.S. is alert to Syria's need for assistance and has already pledged a certain amount. He said our Ambassador to Syria has returned to Damascus from consultations in Washington with instructions to follow up closely Syria's need for further U.S. assistance. In response to the President's question as to the existence of pro-Nasser sentiment in Syria, the King replied that while many Syrian youth had once been enamored with Nasser, the U.A.R. President now commands virtually no following in the country.
3. U.A.R.
The President asked the King for his assessment of developments in the U.A.R. The King reported that at the time of the Suez campaign in 1956 he had pledged Nasser his full support and for a number of years Saudi Arabia had enjoyed excellent relations with the U.A.R. The recent nationalization and sequestration decrees, however, had revealed Nasser as a Communist who presents a real danger to the Arab World. (The King repeated this point several times during the meeting.) The President noted that the Communist Party is banned in the U.A.R. The King contended that this is merely a facade. In response to the President's question as to how long the King thought Nasser would stay in power, the King commented that while only God knew, Nasser's days appeared to be numbered. The President asked whether the military in the U.A.R. is disaffected with Nasser. The King replied that both military and civilians in the U.A.R. now oppose Nasser. The King called the President's attention to the vehement attacks being leveled by the U.A.R. against both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. He understood the reason Saudi Arabia was the object of these attacks but why the U.S. which continues to provide the U.A.R. with economic assistance? The President pointed out that our assistance to the U.A.R. has been mainly in the form of sales of agricultural surpluses for Egyptian currency for which humanitarian reasons exist. He said our economic assistance to the U.A.R. should not be misunderstood as supporting U.A.R. policies. Nevertheless, continued the President, we are watching Nasser's policies carefully and are prepared to review our economic assistance to Nasser in the light of future developments.
4. Saudi Complaint Regarding U.S. Assistance to States with Leftist Tendencies
The King told the President he wished to speak to him in all candor on the following subject which had been bothering him: U.S. aid to states which have pronounced leftist tendencies and sympathize more with the Soviet Union than with the U.S. The President asked the King specifically what countries he had in mind but did not succeed in eliciting any definite response. The President told the King that the basis of our assistance to such countries as Indonesia, Ghana and Guinea is to reinforce anti-Communist elements in the hope that the latter will eventually assume a predominant role and, at the same time, in order to prevent a further drift to the leftist camp. When the King mentioned the U.A.R. in this category, the President said that the same principle applied. The President acknowledged the impossibility of predicting accurately the direction these countries will take. The King commented that there are some countries which are 100 percent Communist which receive U.S. assistance. The President replied that our aid to Yugoslavia, for example, has kept Yugoslavia out of the Warsaw Bloc and this, in turn, has protected the flanks of Greece and Turkey. The President called the King's attention to the Soviet-Chinese split. The King asked what side the President thought the U.A.R. would take in the event of war. The President said this depended on the type of war. It would not matter in the case of nuclear war and should the war be localized, he believed the U.A.R. would remain neutral.
5. Pakistan-Afghanistan Transit Dispute
The President informed the King of our concern over the impasse which has been reached in connection with the Pakistan-Afghanistan transit dispute. He reviewed briefly the current history of the problem and pointed out that if the matter is not soon resolved, we will be faced with the necessity of considering the construction of a road of ingress into Afghanistan through Iran. The Afghanistani action in reopening the border on a temporary basis has helped somewhat, he observed. The President recalled that the Saudi Government had been helpful in the preliminary stages of negotiating a settlement of the 1955 Pakistan- Afghanistan dispute and asked the King for his views on how the problem might now be ameliorated. The King replied that he, too, has been concerned at the existence of this dispute between these two neighboring Moslem countries. He expressed a desire to help again if this could be effective, and called attention to the Soviet pressures being placed upon Afghanistan. (Jemal Hussaini remarked that as a former member of the Saudi negotiation team in 1955 he believed that Afghanistan would resist Soviet domination to the last man.) The King stated that while in the hospital in Boston he had received letters from the chiefs-of-state of both Afghanistan and Pakistan independently seeking his support. He mentioned a long-standing invitation from the Afghanistan Government to visit the country and indicated the possibility that upon his return to Saudi Arabia he might take advantage of this invitation to offer his mediation services.
6. Saudi Concern with Algeria, Palestine and Southern Arabia
The King asked for the President's forebearance while he raised three subjects uppermost on his mind: Algeria, Palestine and Southern Arabia. With regard to Algeria, the King expressed appreciation for the position the President had taken while a Senator and hoped the President's views had not changed. The U.S. should use its influence to assure a "favorable" solution. With regard to Palestine, the King indicated the importance of implementing the 1947 UN resolutions and thus adhering to the UN charter. On the subject of Southern Arabia he referred to the British policy of "colonialism" in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula, including that affecting Buraimi. The King expressed the hope that the U.S. would persuade the British to modify their policies in this area.
The President indicated optimism that the matter would be settled soon. He pointed out General de Gaulle is doing his very best under trying circumstances. On Palestine, the President recalled the correspondence last year he had exchanged with the King on the subject and said that he was fully aware how strongly Saudi Arabia feels on this issue. He acknowledged the "gap" in the respective U.S.-Saudi approaches to the problem, but pointed out that the United States wishes at the same time to maintain good relations with both Israel and with Saudi Arabia. With regard to the King's comments on Southern Arabia, the President stated that he was not fully informed on the subject and following consultation, we would be in touch with His Majesty.
7. Request for U.S. Economic Assistance
The King reminded the President that Saudi Arabia is a relatively backward country whose native resources are inadequate to cover the growing needs and appetites of a population of some 10 million. (Note: An exaggeration of approximately 4 to 5 million.) He said Saudi Arabia is in dire need of hospitals, schools, ports, roads and artesian wells, and relies on the United States for required assistance. The President noted that the Saudi Arabian Government has hired a number of technicians including, in particular, Mr. Harold Folk, an American employed as the top planning advisor in the new Supreme Planning Board. He expressed his understanding that the World Bank had prepared a development plan for Saudi Arabia which was being executed under the aegis of these technicians. Nevertheless, he continued, the U.S. would be prepared to discuss the matter of possible economic assistance with the Saudi Government and suggested that the Ambassador might wish to raise the subject with Mr. Fowler Hamilton, among others in the State Department. The King wondered whether the United States might be able to send an economic mission to Saudi Arabia and whether, in any case, the U.S. could agree in principle at the outset to providing economic assistance. The President replied that we would first need information on specific projects and areas of need before making any decision. He said the U.S. would be delighted to receive a Saudi economic mission and would be willing to dispatch a mission to Saudi Arabia. He expressed certainty that U.S. lending institutions would be willing to consider projects which the Saudi Arabian Government might wish to submit on their merits.
8. Status of USMTM
The King called attention to the needs of his Government to develop a strong military force. His Government, he said, was requesting the U.S. to retain its Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia but on a reduced scale of 80 officers and men. The President replied that we are prepared to be sympathetic to the proposal to retain the USMTM but the figure of 80 is too small. With the removal of the Second Air Division from Dhahran, the administrative requirements of the mission would increase and an adequate training job could not be accomplished with less than some 200 men. The King said that the reason for his desire to reduce the size of the mission was to economize. The King was then informed that the U.S. defrays the costs of the USMTM with the exception of housing and local transportation. The King commented that if the U.S. could pay for all the costs of the mission, it could be any size.
9. Credit Terms for Latest Saudi Arms Purchase Request
The King stated he would also like the U.S. to arrange credit terms for the most recent Saudi request for the purchase of about $16 million worth of arms and equipment in accordance with the 1957 arms sale agreement. The President asked for the status of existing credit payments and was told that several more payments are still due. The King expressed regret at Saudi delinquency in past payments and said he wished to correct this. The President informed the King we would look into the matter of further credits and would ask the Saudis to indicate the nature of the credit arrangements they had in mind.
10. Port of Damman Customs Difficulties
The President told the King that there were two irritants in U.S.-Saudi relations which he wished to draw to the King's attention, the first of which was the matter of customs difficulties experienced by our Consulate General personnel at Dhahran. The President said he hesitated to bother the King about such an administrative matter, but this was causing us a serious operational problem. The King referred to the matter of reciprocity in privileges accorded Consular personnel. It was pointed out to the King that reciprocity already exists and yet equipment for our Consulate General in Dhahran continues to remain in customs. The King promised to look into the matter and pledged all possible assistance. He asked that in the future the American Ambassador in Saudi Arabia deal directly with the King on this matter.
11. Discrimination Against American Jews
Another irritant the President referred to was the inability of American citizens of Jewish faith to transit Dhahran airport and the refusal of the Saudi Government to issue visas to American Congressmen of Jewish faith. The King replied that the Saudi restrictions are only placed upon Zionists and that "many" non-Zionist American Jews have visited Saudi Arabia. The President commented that Congressmen of the Jewish faith, whether or not they are Zionists, are Americans who have pledged allegiance to the United States. The Saudi refusal to allow them to enter Saudi Arabia is grist for the propaganda mill and hurts the Saudi cause. The President surmised that some who claim a desire to visit Saudi Arabia would probably not go once they were issued visas. The President stated that Saudi policy in this regard is more extreme than that pursued by other Arab states. The King promised that he would give the matter consideration after his return to Saudi Arabia and expressed his intention to apply the policy followed by other Arab states. This memorandum is in response to your comment to Carl Kaysen that we seemed to be giving too much aid to the UAR.
The facts are as follows--our aid to the UAR has been rising since the FY 1957/58 post-Suez low, and FY 1962 level will be higher than in any of previous six years (see attached table). Those of us who favor this strategy are fully conscious both of the risks involved and the limited prospects for any quick or far-reaching results. At best we can only expect to pull Nasser back from leaning too far eastward, exert some moderating influence on his meddling in ME and African affairs, and encourage him to focus his energies as much as possible on Egypt's own internal development. But if one regards even these goals as important, they seem to justify aid at least as great as that we are now providing the UAR.
Whichever way we go, however, our policy toward the UAR is a matter of sufficient import to deserve a full review. We don't want to back into a new policy via a series of aid offers, without knowing where we want to go. Therefore, in view of your reservations about our UAR policy, I urge a frank airing of the whole issue with Secretary Rusk and your key advisers. The best timing would be as soon as we have Bowles' full report from Cairo, which should be in by the middle of next week (he will not be back till 21 March).
R.W. Komer
2. Pragmatic approach of the UAR gives some hope that most extreme aspects of recent domestic economic moves, which partly reflect frustration after breakup of the UAR, may be modified somewhat. Also some hints in our conversations that arms race with Israel could be scaled down on a de facto basis if UAR reassured of US intent to help preserve peace.
3. Views of Nasser and colleagues on USSR and Communist China appear equally pragmatic: UAR will accept military and economic aid when convenient but will tightly restrict Sino-Soviet activities and will vigorously oppose encroachment of communism into the Middle East. While US will continue to face frustrations in dealing with UAR, those of Kremlin may [be?] equally formidable.
4. Throughout the top level of UAR Government there is genuine fear that Israel, France and Britain are still plotting to bring about Nasser's downfall. UAR intelligence convinced by what they believe to be strong factual evidence that these three nations are determined to destroy present Government. The alleged evidence is said to be particularly damaging in regard to British activities in Lebanon and current joint British-Israeli activities along Sinai frontier. Whether true or not, it is deeply believed in UAR and this makes it a factor in evaluating Egyptian attitudes. Nasser and his associates are products of the long history of suspicion, fear and weakness which characterized the Middle East for generations and which will continue to plague both them and us.
192. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, February 15, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer. Secret. Komer transmitted this memorandum to Bundy under cover of a brief memorandum that reads: "Here is my response to JFK on aid to UAR. It avoids re-argument in extenso, but urges confrontation with Rusk, et al, on whole issue of UAR policy. This simply revives idea you had at end of January, for which time now seems ripe." To this Komer added the handwritten remark: "Bowles reports will give us peg!"
SUBJECT
Aid to the UAR
193. Telegram From the Embassy in Sudan to the Department of State
5. In my five hour discussion Nasser and in detailed discussions with his colleagues I stressed decisive importance of Government's efforts to improve life of Egyptian people. Nasser's place in history would be determined not by what he said over the Voice of Arabs but what he accomplished in his own country. If he succeeded in Egypt his influence throughout the world would be constructive and important.
This approach appeared to be effective.
6. Although the three [there are] points of basic disagreement between UAR and US there are also significant areas of shared objectives. We must not let tactical irritations obscure this fact or deflect US from pursuit of our strategic interest.
It would be naive to expect sweeping UAR-US accord or dramatic moves toward solution of the Palestine problem. However at best I believe we can expect tangible progress in these directions; at worst some lessening of UAR active hostility and plotting.
7. My recommendations for US policy in immediate future are:
A) Mason should explore frankly and fully UAR economic difficulties and prospects. If these talks are encouraging our aid should be expanded but heavily qualified by UAR performance. Nasser and senior UAR officials promised me their utmost cooperation with Mason mission and are eagerly awaiting his arrival.
B) The President should invite Nasser to visit US. This invitation should take the form of a letter to Nasser from the President referring to my report of our cordial and constructive discussion emphasizing our desire for close understanding and expressing the President's wish to continue exchange in Washington. While subject never alluded to in our talks, it is clear that he would be greatly flattered and impressed by such an invitation after years of our cold shoulder.
His talks with the President and the opportunity to clarify his confusion about our country and our economic system would have important psychological effects on him and his policies even though as seems likely Nasser later goes out of his way to demonstrate his non-alignment.
C) The invitation should be for late April rather than November. The mood right now is forthcoming and it would be a mistake not to take advantage of it. If this opportunity for meaningful but modest progress is missed it may not soon reoccur.
Let me add that Ambassador Badeau appears to be doing an excellent job. His relations with Nasser and his associates are cordial and he handled himself with excellent judgment throughout my stay.
Moose
During the President's meeting with King Saud in the White House at 4:30 p.m. February 13, 2. Credit Terms for Latest Saudi Arms Purchase Request. In view of the President's indication to the King that we would examine the possibility of extending credit terms to the Saudis with respect to their latest request for purchase of approximately $16 million worth of arms, we are (a) examining the feasibility of providing such credit and (b) will await receipt from the Saudis of their views as to the nature of credit terms desired.
3. Negotiations in Saudi Arabia on the U.S. Military Training Mission. In accordance with the President's request to be kept informed on negotiations regarding the future of the U.S. Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia, we are asking our Ambassador in Jidda to make regular reports on the status of these negotiations. As the President knows, these negotiations are just getting under way.
4. Saudi Difficulty with British in Southern Arabia: With regard to the King's expression of concern over British policy in Southern Arabia, the President promised that we would communicate our views to the Saudis at a later date. At an early opportunity the Department will acquaint the Saudi Ambassador with our position on the matter.
5. Irritants in U.S.-Saudi Relations Raised by the President: Our Ambassador in Saudi Arabia is being requested to pursue directly with the King following the latter's return to Saudi Arabia two irritants in U.S.-Saudi relations raised by the President: (1) customs difficulties at the Port of Dammam and (2) visa difficulties for certain categories of Americans of Jewish faith who wish to visit Saudi Arabia.
Melvin L. Manfull My five days in and around Cairo were more encouraging than I had anticipated. Two talks with Nasser, totalling more than five hours, gave me an opportunity to outline the global policies of the new Administration in some depth, to exchange views on the Middle East, and to discuss the complexities of Egypt-US relations.
These talks were extremely cordial with no show of emotion at any time. Nasser was restrained, and his views were frankly and clearly presented. My discussions with Vice President Muhiyadin, Vice President Baghdadi, and Minister of the Presidency Ali Sabri, followed the same pattern.
It is clear that the UAR Government has made a decision to improve its relations with the US, and they considered my visit as the President's Representative an opportunity to establish the basis for a more understanding relationship.
Ambassador Badeau reported in detail on our first visit with President Nasser before I left Cairo. A cabled summary of the Ambassador's second report, which I have just seen, will also have reached the Department before this message. I have cabled from Khartoum a summary of my recommendations. 1. Because of its central position in the cultural life of the Arab World, its importance in Islamic affairs, its large population, its agricultural wealth and the capacity and fervor of its leaders, Egypt will almost certainly continue to play a pivotal role in Middle Eastern affairs.
In the face of a hostile Egypt no significant progress can be made toward solution of the Palestine problem nor can we achieve US objectives throughout the region.
2. Short-term political accommodations will provide no more than a breathing space. Unless realistic answers can be found for Egypt's multiplying population, the rising expectations of her people, and the severely limited economic base, the situation within this key nation will become increasingly explosive with widespread repercussions throughout the Middle East.
3. On the other hand, if Nasser can gradually be led to forsake the microphone for the bulldozer, he may assume a key role in bringing the Middle East peacefully into our modern world.
B. Following Are My Brief Impressions of Nasser and the UAR Government:
1. The government in Egypt is headed by some extremely competent men, most of them young, vigorous, and with a powerful dedication to their objectives.
2. Whatever their defects I am persuaded that Nasser and his associates are sincerely dedicated to the improvement of conditions of the Egyptian people. They are conscious of the economic injustices which have plagued Egypt for generations and determined to eliminate them.
3. The leaders of the UAR are pragmatists searching for techniques that will enable them to expand their economy rapidly and to maintain their political grip.
Egyptian industry has been traditionally oriented towards extremely high, short-term profit margins and restrictive practices with little interest in basic long-range investment. Although the government made some effort to encourage foreign investment the results were disappointing.
When Nasser and his colleagues lost confidence in their ability to achieve their economic objectives through the Egyptian version of free enterprise, they began to move toward more centralized control.
The recent step up of economic centralization reflected the government's frustration and anger following the Syrian break and the fear of a domestic coup in Egypt.
After moving far in the direction of public ownership the UAR Government now appears to be having some second thoughts. Several real or potential opponents of the regime have been released from jail. Some property has recently been returned to its owners.
In my talks with Nasser I stressed the political danger of any government taking responsibility for too many economic decisions. He appeared moderately responsive.
Nasser is acutely aware of the need for a better urban-rural balance. Several of his associates with whom I talked were born in the villages and expressed strong views on the traditional exploitation of the peasants and the need for what amounts to the creation of new rural societies based on small farms and cooperative credit and distribution systems.
194. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Points Raised in the Meeting Between the President and King Saud
195. Airgram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State/1/
Addis Ababa, February 21, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 123-Bowles, Chester. Secret.
A-74. Subject: Egypt. For: The President, the Secretary and AID Administrator Fowler Hamilton. From: Chester Bowles.
4. The view of Nasser and his associates on the Soviet Union and Communist China appears to me to be equally pragmatic. They will use the Soviets as a source of arms or investment whenever it suits their purpose (precisely as they will use us). However, they are skeptical of Soviet economic and political concepts and even more skeptical of the Chinese.
If they have a model I believe it is Yugoslavia, which is developing its economy along equally pragmatic lines. Nasser indicated a surprising, practical knowledge of our own economy, particularly of our federal tax system and the division of our national income.
While Nasser and his colleagues are willing to take economic and military aid from the Sino-Soviet Bloc and to work closely with Tito, they are firmly intent on keeping Communism out of the Middle East. Nasser was scathing in his comments on theoretical Marxism; Vice-President Zakariya Muhiyadin and Presidential Intelligence Director Sami Sharaf were also outspoken on this point.
I believe it is fair to say that whatever frustrations we may have in Egypt in the next few years are likely to be more than equalled by those of the Kremlin.
5. The UAR takes the same view of Israel that the US takes of the USSR. We will make no headway by scorning this evaluation.
The Egyptians are aware of our initial and continuing support for Israel, and convinced that our government cannot stand against internal Zionist pressure. They believe that the US reaction to the Suez attack was the exception rather than the rule.
Nasser and his associates recognize and fear Israeli superiority on the ground and in the air, its economic power, its skilled and educated population and its potential nuclear and rocket capacity.
Because they know we are aware of these points, they did not belabor them. Yet they clearly formed the underlying basis of our discussion of Israeli-Egyptian relations, present and future.
6. In the same way, the Egyptians are convinced that the British and the French have not given up their determination to destroy Nasser which led to the Suez attack in 1956. Their intelligence service is firmly convinced that the British are now actively involved with the Israelis in some activity in the Sinai-Negev area.
They genuinely believe the British and the Jordanians were deeply involved in Lebanon (and offered to provide proof of this). They are persuaded that the French mission members, now on trial in Cairo, were plotting the murder of Nasser.
We may dismiss all this as emotional and irrational, as a demonstration of paranoia or whatever. Yet it forms the basis of what is in effect an Egyptian "National Intelligence Estimate" and in dealing with Egypt we must take it into account.
Nasser and his associates are products of a colonial past, scarred by deep-seated suspicions, frustrations, and plagued by a sense of weakness and inferiority.
Coming into power themselves through conspiracy and having cut their teeth on British intelligence fact and fancy, they are in effect human seismographs reacting violently to every adverse wave.
7. All this leads me to believe that the current US view of Nasser and his colleagues is oversimplified and defective. We have underestimated the basically revolutionary character of the regime.
While reacting with understandable irritation to Egyptian plotting and diatribe, we have tended to overlook the profound strategic importance of Egypt and Nasser to the future of the Middle East.
8. From the standpoint of US objectives the outlook in the UAR is in no sense hopeless. By wise policies there is a reasonable chance that we can modify Egyptian hostility and gradually turn the country into a more constructive force.
In any event our past policies have been resounding failures and we have little to lose in attempting to formulate a more affirmative relationship.
C. The Points I Made to Nasser:
During my own talks with Nasser I emphasized several points:
1. In the event of a Soviet attack the US is confident of its continuing ability to inflict unacceptable damage to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, we have the will to face up to the Soviet threats. (I do not think the Egyptians harbor any doubts on this score.)
At the same time, we have no conflict with the Russian people. We genuinely seek an arms control system with suitable safeguards, and we are prepared to negotiate sincerely towards this end.
We are also determined to use our great economic power and that of our Atlantic Community allies to enable and encourage non-Communist Asian, African and Latin American nations to build viable economies. I believe that Nasser realizes this and hopes to profit from it.
2. In this context we have no wish to impose our system upon other nations. Our assistance programs in Yugoslavia and Ghana bear witness to this principle.
I was frank in saying that in many ways the policies which the new Administration inherited in January 1961 were the result of the special pressures of the post-war period. Of particular importance was our concern that the Soviet Union, which had launched the North Korean armies across the 38th parallel, might embark on similar aggressions elsewhere.
Although the principles on which these policies are based may no longer be relevant in all instances, we shall faithfully live up to the commitments already made.
In dealing with many countries, however, we will gradually move towards a different emphasis which will be more in line with the realities with which both we and they must contend in the coming years.
I laid particular stress on US objectives in the Middle East, emphasizing again and again that we had no desire to control the area (even if we could), that we are no longer narrowly dependent on Middle Eastern oil, and that our primary objective is to foster the development of independent countries capable of making their own free choices within the framework of their own cultures.
In particular, we had no desire to bring pressure to bear on Egypt. We accept Egypt's policy of non-alignment and as long as the Cairo Government remains truly non-aligned we have no desire to change the situation.
3. We understand the overriding emotional pressures generated in both Cairo and Tel Aviv by the Israeli-Arab conflict and we harbor no illusions that the present impasse can easily be liquidated.
Above all we were earnestly hopeful, first for a closer understanding between the United States and the nations of the Middle East, and second for more cooperative relations growing out of that understanding. We know that this cannot be achieved overnight and therefore expect no miracles.
4. We believe that the success or failure of the revolutionary efforts of the UAR in improving the lives of the Egyptian people and building a modern state will go far to determine the future not only of the Nasser government but the entire Middle East.
From the UAR's point of view the outcome will depend not on the invective of propaganda speeches over the Voice of the Arabs but rather on the ability of the government to deal effectively and on a down-to-earth basis with the practical problems of the Egyptian people.
Nasser's place in history will be determined by his capacity to meet this challenge.
D. Nasser's Main Points:
Nasser did not make any new or unexpected comments or proposals. What was new was his mood and indication of receptivity to which I have referred. To emphasize his major concerns, however, I shall list Nasser's key points:
1. We should not aim our policies at individuals who will change over the years but rather to the evolution and development of Middle Eastern societies.
2. Israel is a real and present danger to the UAR. The UAR will never attack first, but Israel has demonstrated its willingness to do so.
3. In regard to Israel-UAR relations, the US should follow its national interests and not allow the special interests of a US minority to shape its policies.
4. The traditional feudal society of Egypt is dead and the UAR Government, acting with the full support of the people, is determined to do away with its vestige.
5. While the US and UAR have some differing or even conflicting objectives, we share several significant objectives. We should identify these objectives and work along parallel courses to achieve them.
6. Communism as a political or economic system is unworkable in Africa or the Middle East.
E. Policy Conclusions and Recommendations:
1. I believe the time has come for a change of emphasis in our dealings with the UAR in general and with Nasser in particular. If Nasser were now riding high he might view any effort by us to establish a new relationship as an act of weakness.
However, Nasser is deeply conscious of the serious problems which now face him and his regime. Barring an assassination there is little likelihood of his being replaced by an upheaval from within.
Under these circumstances I believe that a skillful, sophisticated, sensitive effort to establish a more affirmative relationship is called for. Furthermore, I believe that Nasser is likely to meet us more than half way.
We must not, however, expect too much. Although he is ready to be influenced, and perhaps influenced in a significant way, in no sense will he be subject to our control nor will his reactions ever be wholly predictable.
2. Ed Mason's visit to the UAR comes at an opportune time. In my talks with both Nasser and his associates I stressed the need for the frankest kind of economic discussion between our two governments. I said that one of the reasons why our aid to Yugoslavia and India was so effective was the willingness of these governments to take us fully into their confidence.
Nasser and senior UAR officials promised me that they would give Mr. Mason their complete cooperation and stressed that they are eagerly awaiting his arrival.
3. If these economic talks are encouraging, I believe we should consider an expansion of our aid efforts, carefully qualified, of course, by the degree of UAR cooperation and performance.
Although I do not want to emphasize my personal ideas on Egypt's economic development on the eve of the Mason mission, I would like to suggest that US aid to the rural areas of Egypt is likely to pay particularly big dividends.
The Aswan Dam will gradually increase Egypt's cultivated lands by roughly one-third. This will require the creation of new communities to farm these lands, with new schools, roads, clinics, and a modern rural extension service. Plans for this comprehensive effort are in the earliest planning stages.
This development will profoundly affect the lives of the millions of Egyptians who will occupy these lands. If we were to take the leadership on a down-to-earth basis in organizing this vast new source of productivity, we may obtain greater practical political dividends from the Aswan High Dam than the Russians themselves.
Our PL-480 funds are already playing an important role in Egypt. I think that I was able to persuade Nasser of their vast importance in helping build his country. This program could well be expanded and extended.
In addition, the Egyptians will undoubtedly try to persuade Ed Mason of their need for a loan of roughly $125 million to purchase machinery in the US for industrial development. Our response to this proposal, it seems to me, should be tied to the feasibility of each project as well as to the political temperature in the next sixty to ninety days.
4. Although he gave no hint, it is clear that Nasser would be pleased by an invitation to visit the United States. He spoke in the warmest terms of the recent letters from President Kennedy. The fact that he and his senior officials returned to the subject several times persuaded me that their respect for the President is genuine.
An invitation may help to moderate his attitudes and pronouncements and to keep him in better balance.
It would be naive, however, for us to assume that such a visit would assure us a docile UAR. For instance, it would not be surprising following his visit to the US if Nasser should attempt to redress the balance by a visit to the Soviet Union.
Although there are strong arguments on both sides of the case, on balance I am persuaded that we have much more to gain than to lose by inviting Nasser to the US. In my view the time has come to take the plunge.
5. If we agree that it will be wise to issue the invitation, the next question involves the timing. If he comes soon the pressure of Congressional matters and the forthcoming elections point to a visit the latter half of April. Otherwise, I believe it should be postponed to sometime in November following the elections.
The arguments in favor of the later date are in some ways persuasive. It may be argued that by inviting Nasser now to visit us in November we will receive some immediate benefits, while providing a lever which may serve to moderate his activities and utterances during the next eight months.
In addition, it may be said that it is safer to invite him after the elections since an incident might occur during his visit which would be embarrassing from a political point of view.
On balance, however, I favor the April date. Our relations with the UAR are now more susceptible to improvement than at any point since 1956 and Nasser's expectancy that these relations can be furthered is very real.
Moreover, I am convinced that key Jewish leaders in the US may be persuaded to see the advantages for Israel should a visit result in genuine relaxation of tensions in the area.
If the meeting is postponed until November there is an excellent chance that the present fragile expectancy may be destroyed by some sudden development in the Middle East or elsewhere, and the opportunity lost.
Moreover, once the invitation has been offered it will surely become public. If the visit is eight months away trouble makers in both the United States and in the Middle East will have ample time to deprive us of what I believe may be an opportunity to improve our relations with this difficult, unpredictable, but key country.
5. [sic] On balance, therefore, I suggest that the President write Nasser as soon as possible along the following lines:
The President has seen the report of my visit with President Nasser and his colleagues and is extremely pleased to hear of the breadth of our discussions and the cordial basis on which they were conducted. This encourages him to feel that a more precise identification of our areas of common interest would be beneficial.
To this end, he would like to suggest that President Nasser come to the United States for a visit as the President's guest. This would give him an opportunity to see something of our country and also to discuss at greater length some of the common problems which we face in all parts of the world.
The latter part of April would be a particularly convenient time for President Kennedy and he urgently hopes that President Nasser can accept.
In closing let me underscore my conviction that we must not lose sight of our strategic interests in any part of the world as a result of frustrations with individual personalities, however exasperating they may be.
It would be foolhardy for us to expect Nasser or any likely successor to stop acting like the revolutionary leader that he clearly is, no matter what gestures toward him we may make.
Progress towards a more constructive relationship, however, is possible. If the present opportunity is missed it may not soon reoccur.
Richards
1. Departmental Action: (a) examine on inter-agency basis form possible economic assistance to Saudi Arabia might take and subject of despatch economic mission to Saudi Arabia; (b) examine feasibility extending credit terms to SAG re latest arms request approximately $16 million; (c) acquaint Saudi Ambassador our views re boundary problems southern Arabia including Buraimi.
2. Embassy Action: (a) submit Embassy views and recommendations re SAG need for economic aid in general and possible projects particularly justifying US assistance (we prefer you defer discussion with SAG Supreme Planning Board until after Dept and Embassy views coordinated; (b) submit regular status reports re negotiations USMTM for forwarding to President; (c) at earliest suitable opportunity following King's return Saudi Arabia Ambassador communicate with King directly re customs difficulties Port of Damman and SAG policy issuance visas Americans Jewish faith (see talking papers and memcon pouched this date for guidance).
White House has been informed foregoing action being taken.
FYI. On subject economic assistance President made clear he was not making commitment for economic assistance but only promising explore need.
Rusk
On February 21 Syrian Prime Minister Dawalibi handed Ambassador Knight a note protesting Israel's intention to divert Jordan River water to the Negev. Although aware of the probable motivation of the Syrian note and of Jordan's bellicose statements during the recent visit to Amman of Arab League Secretary-General Hassouna, we would not like to see these actions lead us into a Security Council debate at this time. While scrupulously avoiding a conspicuous public role, we would like to do what we can to take some of the heat out of this issue at all points in the circuit. With this objective, we have already undertaken or plan the following steps:
1. We have suggested informally to the Israel Embassy that Israel might think about ways in which, over a period of time, it might spread the word in the press and in U.N. corridors as to the scheduling of its water program, its intention to adhere to equitable (i.e., Johnston Plan) allocations, its willingness to discuss unified development at any time; its readiness to accept international observation (provided the other riparians do), and the already great contribution which its programs and research (Hula drainage, reduction in evaporation, salt spring capping, etc.) are making to the Valley's water resources.
2. Ambassador Meyer has given the Lebanese strong advice regarding the need for moderation.
5. We are instructing Ambassador Knight (Tab A) 1474. Embtels 504 and 505. 2. USG considers precipitate action by any of riparians will only make it more difficult arrive at accommodation. So far, no riparian has taken action inconsistent with the most thorough and equitable plan for just utilization of basin resources that has been devised.
3. In addition these general considerations and while USG declines becomes guarantor of any riparian's intentions, we have no information to indicate Jordan River diversion by Israel is imminent. We too oppose revision in status quo in Demilitarized Zones without approval both parties. This was USG position in 1953 Outline follows by separate telegram of other steps which Department has initiated in effort take some heat out of this issue. 1. Department February 23 suggested informally to Israel Embassy that GOI might usefully consider means whereby in press and in UN corridors it could spread word in defense of its own actions by citing (a) intention adhere allocation under equitable (i.e., Johnston) plan for unified development, (b) willingness talk unified development with Arabs at any time, (c) readiness accept international supervision of water programs and usage if Arabs do likewise, and (d) contributions its programs and research are making to Jordan Valley's water resources.
2. Embassy Beirut has already given GOI strong counsel re need for moderation.
3. Ambassador Macomber has instructions for talks with Jordanians.
4. Department intends speak to UAR Embassy February 26 pointing out in low-key that Cairo propaganda stimulation in large measure responsible for current buildup of tensions and continuation such stimulation hardly consistent with UAR statements re desire put all aspects Palestine problem "in icebox".
5. We are instructing Ambassador Knight (separate telegram) UK EmbOff said he thought FonOff would share Department views on handling this problem and would concur in Department suggestion.
During same conversation Department informed UK EmbOff of general nature Bowles-Nasser talks on basis summary telegrams from Cairo.
Rusk
United States officials will be guided by the following:
REFERENCES 1) To encourage the stability and Western orientation of new regime in Syria.
2) To aid the Syrian Arab Republic to establish free trade and a convertible currency which have great psychological as well as economic importance to the Syrian people.
3) To prevent excessive Syrian dependence on the Soviet Bloc for military supplies.
Plan of Action:
The above objections will be met by:
1) Extending P.L. 480 Assistance to redress urgent food shortages caused by several years drought.
2) Joining other Western countries and the IMF in providing credits needed by Syria to undertake a currency stabilization program.
3) Considering negotiation of an Economic Cooperation Agreement.
4) Considering ways we can assist in meeting Syrian arms requests made to Western countries.
5) Welcoming visits of important Syrian delegations to the United States.
Action by:
1) P.L. 480 Program: NEA
Title I and II P.L. 480 agreements for the supply of 150,000 tons of wheat and flour and 12,000 tons of rice valued in excess of $15 million were signed in November 1961. Shipments are presently underway.
Support Action by: AID, E, Agriculture, American Embassy Damascus.
2) Syrian Stabilization Program: NEA, AID
The Syrian Government was informed by our Embassy February 14, 1962 (Deptel 334) 3) Economic Assistance Agreement: NEA, AID
We have authorized our Embassy in Damascus to negotiate an agreement relating to economic, technical, and related assistance at such time as it proves feasible to do so. (AID Airgram sent December 16, 1961). 4) Possible Syrian Military Assistance Requests: NEA
A position paper outlining U.S. policy regarding possible Syrian military assistance requests was forwarded by M for approval on February 13, 1962 /6/Section 503 of the International Development Act of 1961 authorized the President "to furnish military assistance on such terms and conditions as he may determine, to any friendly country or international organization, the assisting of which the President finds will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace and which is otherwise eligible to receive such assistance." (P.L. 87-194; 75 Stat. 435)
5) Visits of Important Syrian Delegations: NEA, CU
Our Embassy in Damascus has been in touch with Syrian officials regarding the possible visit of a Syrian economic delegation (which is intended as a parallel to the military and economic delegation currently visiting Moscow). We have welcomed the delegation's coming. (Deptel 348) With reference to Dr. Edward Mason's meeting with the President on March 1 at 12:00 noon, Assistant Secretary Talbot will accompany Dr. Mason when he calls on the President.
GR Olsen
196. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia
197. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Grant) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (McGhee)
Jordan Waters
198. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2-2462. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Crawford, cleared by Sisco, and approved by Grant. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, Moscow, Paris, Rome, Tel Aviv, Bucharest, and USUN.
Washington, February 24, 1962, 5:15 p.m.
199. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in the United Kingdom and in Syria
200. Policy Directive Prepared by the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Efforts to Help Stabilize the New Syrian Government
Memorandum to Mr. McGeorge Bundy entitled "U.S. Policy toward the UAR and Syrian Arab Republic", November 16, 1961
201. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Objectives of Dr. Edward Mason's Mission to the United Arab Republic and United Arab Republic Expectations
Enclosure 1
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC OF DR. EDWARD MASON
1. Appraise the development potential of the UAR taking into account its material and human resources, the soundness of its objectives and plans, the favorable or unfavorable character of the political-social atmosphere in which these must be carried forward, and the degree to which UAR planners are heard and supported by key officials of the UAR Government.
2. Assess the UAR's requirements for foreign assistance, technical and financial, either on the basis of its existing development plans if these seem sound or on another more realistic basis if necessary. Estimate the most effective means of supplying needed assistance, including such aid to UAR planning as might be appropriate.
3. Appraise UAR expectations and intentions with regard to foreign aid.
4. While assessing to the extent possible the UAR's short term credit and foreign exchange difficulties, make clear to the Egyptians that our concern is with long range aspects of UAR growth and economic potential.
5. Adhere to an exploratory role and resist pressures for actual negotiations.
6. Determine, insofar as possible, whether the UAR is prepared to demonstrate frankness and cooperativeness to the extent required for a successful mutual effort with the United States and other Western countries for Egypt's economic development.
7. Inform Nasser frankly of the principal conclusions reached and the principal problems to be faced.
Enclosure 2
Since Suez, economic matters--or more explicitly U.S. aid--has been an area in which U.S. and UAR relations reflected a spirit of satisfactory cooperation. The resumption of U.S. assistance, which had been halted subsequent to the Suez crisis, led to a normalization of relations in favorable contrast to the low point in the 1956-58 period. While the magnitude of our aid, especially in the form of food, has steadily expanded, the modestly cooperative atmosphere accompanying it has not noticeably improved. A plateau seems to have been reached in our overall relations. Under present arrangements, it has no doubt appeared to the UAR that the U.S. doles out aid the UAR [solely ?] needs, such as wheat, while remaining ready at any time to withhold further deliveries.
U.S. willingness to continue its help, however, through periods of heightened political disagreement such as the Congo crisis has apparently resulted in some increased confidence in U.S. intentions.
The past six to eight months have witnessed probing by both sides. Initially the UAR asked the U.S. to consider a multi-year PL 480 sales program to facilitate its longer term economic development planning and endeavored to ascertain more clearly U.S. intentions with respect to economic development loans. On the U.S. side, we began to consider whether a less cautious posture could lead to greater mutual confidence in U.S.-UAR relations and facilitate achievement of our broader objectives in the area.
In this atmosphere the UAR Ambassador reported to his government conversations with Administration spokesmen regarding U.S. aid criteria. Subsequently he conveyed to U.S. officials on specific authority of President Nasser a request for U.S. assistance of three main elements: (a) high level planning assistance; (b) a consortium for development financing; and (c) a long term commitment on food supply.
Dr. Mason's mission represents an initial response to (a). With regard to (c), we have already informed President Nasser we are prepared to consider a multi-year PL 480 sales agreement. Both responses are probing rather than definitive. One of Dr. Mason's missions is to determine and advise the U.S. whether and in what form planning aid might be considered. Our PL 480 approach is intended to produce recognition and acknowledgement by the UAR of the real value of our food supply.
Whatever its professed desires, the UAR's primary objective in its current approaches to the U.S. appears to be to obtain increased financial assistance.
Specifically, the UAR is likely to try to derive from the Mason mission (a) a loan of as much as $125 million to tide it over the present crisis; (b) U.S. support vis-?-vis the IMF to eliminate current obstacles to creation of an IMF-supported stabilization fund; (c) assurances of continuity of American economic aid; and (d) U.S. support for an international consortium to mobilize resources on a long term basis for carrying out the UAR's five-year plan. The UAR will no doubt also seek American or international planning help but probably desires this only in the context of assurances of larger contributions of American aid.
To a certain extent, thus, the UAR objectives will be in conflict with our own which are geared to long term assistance to Egypt as an entity rather than as short term help to the Nasser regime per se. Our objectives can perhaps be reconciled, however, within the framework of (a) a multi-year PL 480 agreement; (b) a sound IMF stabilization program; (c) the possibility of sending a planning team; and (d) a possible pre-consortium study by the IBRD. Ambassador Bowles has recently emphasized to Nasser that we will have to move into the economic picture on a step-by-step basis with each step being measured in terms of UAR responsiveness and in terms of sound economic justification.
202. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy
Despite your hesitations about our policy toward the UAR, I believe that Ed Mason's brief, exploratory visit will be a useful follow-on to Bowles probe. His trip as a planning consultant is another step in our effort to turn the UAR inward toward greater focus on its own domestic problems instead of constant meddling in the other Arab states and Africa. When we told Nasser via a personal message from you that Mason is coming and that we expect him to be given every facility, Nasser's reception was cordial.
Before talking with Mason, you should read Chester Bowles' long despatch on his Cairo visit
/2/ which strongly endorses sending Mason as part of our long-term policy toward the UAR. Bowles also comes down in favor of an invitation to Nasser this April, but the State Department has since decided against so proposing, although leaving open the possibility of a visit toward the end of the year. /2/Document 195. Though Mason's visit commits us to nothing, it will inevitably stimulate UAR desires for, and expectations of, further US aid. I think you will want to caution Mason not to indicate in any manner the likelihood of further US commitments beyond those already made (e.g. multi-year PL-480). Instead you might want to suggest he emphasize that US aid to the UAR will depend upon our evaluation of Nasser's policies about which we have many reservations.R.W. Komer
Dawalibi stressed that his prime objective was through all means at his disposal to induce USG to take new substantive look at entire Israel problem. If situation allowed to coast along or is handled by officialdom on routine and "bureaucratic" basis it will inevitably sooner or later lead to a regional catastrophe.
I asked Prime Minister if he could develop what he had in mind when seeking over-all substantive new look by USG. I said that apart from pros and cons re creation of Israel--in which large UN majority, including Soviets, had participated--that country was a fact today. Any new look on basis of oft expressed Arab objective of Israel delenda est obviously out of question. To this Dawalibi clearly answered that, while he knew that many members of UN who had voted for creation Israel would not vote against, his purpose was not to go back over past but rather see what could be done to insure the peace, taking today's situation as point of departure. At one point I sought unsuccessfully clarification of what I am quite sure Dawalibi intended as reference to guarantees against further Jewish immigration and other "solid" guarantees. As Dawalibi dodged the issue and as I was merely seeking ascertain direction of his thinking, I let matter drop.
At close of talk, which had lasted one hour, Dawalibi said with first show of emotion in several meetings I have had with him how much he wanted to penetrate barriers of officialdom and bureaucracy so as to make USG feel depth of his conviction that new and unprejudiced look at entire Israel problem must be taken by US "as real world leader" if eventual catastrophe not to befall this key area.
I said I would do my best convey depth his conviction but that in same spirit I wanted make sure of non-existence of any misunderstanding, which in such cases would do utmost harm. Thus I did not want very real appreciation of USG and myself for SARG's concern re matter at hand to obscure basic US position on aggression; we are not allies of Israel against Arabs; we stand however for peaceful settlements of disputes and against resort to arms; therefore while not easy to say so, Prime Minister should expect to find us in opposition in case of Arab military move.
Prime Minister expressed appreciation for spirit in which I had spoken.
He added he would keep my comments for himself as coming from a friend because he feared that some of his colleagues, unfamiliar with manner in which they had been expressed, might interpret them as a threat. This exchange took place in relaxed and friendly atmosphere.
Comment: As I was waiting for Dawalibi with his Executive Secretary Juwayjati, latter, who is most friendly, made two interesting comments: 1) in answer to question he said on basis all information at his disposal USSR was playing no role either positive or negative in Jordan waters crisis; 2) spontaneously he told me "off the record" that Prime Minister had exclaimed to him in private "Why did Jordan have to stir up crisis at this time".
For what it may be worth I believe Dawalibi neither plans nor wishes military action now. However, I believe he is deeply sincere in his expressed conviction that war will result if Arab-Israel situation continues on present collision course. Therefore his earnest entreaty for a new look. I am of course well aware of many contradictory and vastly complicated facts of this problem which face Department. I would however not be doing my job if I did not convey to Department my view that Prime Minister is considering problem from angle of over-all and long-range Israel threat and power relationship and that such considerations as to whether Israel withdraws Jordan water through DZ or from Lake Tiberias not germane to his thinking.
Also, while Juwayjati's comment may well have been entirely factual report of Prime Minister's feelings re unwelcome muddying of Jordan waters by Amman at this time, I believe it would be hazardous to place undue significance on this remark. Instead I am unfortunately convinced that Dawalibi moved by substantive and long-range elements of problem quite apart from tactical and timing considerations implicit in above quoted comment.
Knight
The new Syrian government has frequently reiterated its desire for friendly relations with the U.S. Publicly it will assume a neutralist posture to avoid charges of subservience to the West. A successful parliamentary democracy in Syria with a gradually restored free economy could provide valuable and heartening testimony of the effectiveness of Free World methods. We should do all we can to help it succeed but without seeking or appearing to embrace it.
2. Stabilization Program
The Syrians are continuing efforts to secure the final $5 million needed for completion of their $40 million stabilization fund.
3. Syrian Military Assistance Requests
Should the Syrians seek military equipment from the U.S., we would face a delicate problem: we would like to reduce their present dependence on the Soviet Bloc but we do not wish to stimulate Israeli fears, with consequent intensification of the Near East arms race. We propose to take quiet, tentative soundings with several European governments as to what they might be prepared to supply.
4. Syrian Delegations to U.S.
Plans are not yet firm for visits of either the economic or parliamentary delegations (the latter as guests of the U.S. Government), but we may well need assistance of other Agencies in assuring their success. Ambassador Knight has made clear that, while we extend a sincere welcome to the economic delegation, we can provide no assurance more aid will be forthcoming.
5. Jordan Waters
The attached memorandum (Tab A) Despite the recommendations of Ambassadors Bowles and Badeau favoring an early State Visit by President Nasser, we consider the circumstances unpropitious. My memorandum of January 10 proposing consideration of a visit by Nasser envisages the possibility of political advantage from the visit sufficient to offset certain obvious political drawbacks. We now believe it unrealistic to look for a balance of political advantage from a visit in April. Our growing doubts have been crystallized by Nasser's intemperate speech on February 22. Apart from delay in an invitation to Nasser, we intend to continue our current program of step-by-step efforts to draw the UAR into a closer relationship with the long-range objectives of providing the UAR an acceptable alternative to primary reliance on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, assisting in the more rapid development and modernization of the UAR, and ultimately moderating some of the UAR's more extreme policies. We continue to believe we should avoid public controversy with the UAR, discussing our differences frankly in private.
Dean Rusk In attached memo, Meanwhile, to see the case for a Nasser visit you should read the attached views of Ambassadors Bowles and Badeau. Despite the political risks, I also continue to believe it worth an investment of your time and prestige to influence Nasser toward a less radical stance; he can cause us a lot more trouble if actively hostile than if he has a vested interest in good relations with us.
R.W. Komer He said substantially the things he had said to Yatsevitch as stated in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] citation which I need not repeat here in detail. The Shah professed to understand all of this and then launched into his favorite comparison of the treatment accorded Turkey and Iran. He again pointed out that, in his view, Iran was the best basically equipped in this part of the world to establish as strong bastion both from a military and political point of view. I agreed with this but pointed out again that the ultimate strength of the nation lay in its economic and social improvement. The Shah responded to this by saying that assistance on a major scale for Iran would only be required for a limited time because, with its capacity for growth, the country would be able to maintain itself within a few years. He reverted to a comparison with Turkey and I pointed out to him that he was in error if he believed that the U.S. classified its allies as good, indifferent and bad and parceled out economic and military aid on this basis. I told him that all of our aid is supplemental of indigenous resources and that it is allocated as judiciously as possible in order to maintain the strength of our allies and to encourage progress. Said that on this basis Turkey obviously required more help than Iran particularly with respect to foreign exchange because of Iran's assured income of 300 million dollars a year from oil revenues. I went on to say that Turkish forces had been brought up to a high level because of Turkey's obligations under the NATO Treaty, that our military assistance to Turkey was being reduced in order to give greater emphasis to economic aid. Although the Shah understood all of this he gave no indication of agreeing with its logic.
203. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State
204. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (McGhee)
Possible NSC Standing Group Discussion of Syria/2/
/2/The agenda for the NSC Standing Group meeting, scheduled for March 2, included Syria as an item for discussion. According to the Record of Actions for the meeting, the Standing Group: "a. Discussed and agreed in general with the paper entitled 'Efforts to Help Stabilize the New Syrian Government' [Document 200]. b. Agreed that the State Department could proceed to consult with other friendly governments on the assumption that Syria would be made eligible for U.S. military sales assistance, if requested by Syria, and if found necessary." The Record of Actions also indicates that Strong attended the meeting during discussion of this item. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group, 3/3/62)
In a discussion of the policy directive on efforts to help stabilize the new Syrian government,/3/ you might mention the following:
/3/Document 200.
1. General
205. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, March 2, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.11/3-262. Secret. Drafted by Strong. Komer forwarded this memorandum to President Kennedy on March 5; see Document 206.
SUBJECT
Visit by Nasser
207. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
At this point I told the Shah that the matter of economic and military assistance to Iran was under active consideration in Washington and that I was hopeful that within a short time I should be able to present him with a comprehensive and balanced program. I added that it was my personal hope that we should be able to consider a long-term program rather than the year to year basis on which we have been proceeding in the past. The Shah said that of course he would be anxious to receive a communication on this subject but that he needed to know where he stood with regard to the military within the next two weeks because it was necessary to establish the 1341 budget and a decision on this had to be made. I refrained from giving him any estimate of when a program might be ready for a presentation to him.
The Shah then expressed regret that he would not have an opportunity to discuss these matters personally with the President before September and speculated as to whether or not a private visit to Washington could be arranged possibly with some desire of going to Canada. He felt that to seek such an opportunity to talk with the President would not be humiliating to him. This was said in a rather ruminating manner, without specifically suggesting that such visit be undertaken. I rode him off of this and think that he understands that it would not be possible for such a visit to occur.
The audience ended with the Shah stating that he had come to his present state of mind after great thought and examination of his conscience. That he wanted it understood that no threat of blackmail was intended but that it was his deep conviction that in order for the country to be secure and progress, the only real stability lay in him and armed forces; that in order for Iran to succeed he required a loyal army with good morale. Had cast his lot with the West out of conviction and against the desire of many elements in the country, he was correct in doing so and could not and would not change although the Russians would no doubt respond to a gesture from him. He would not do so in any circumstances; he looked to the West for support not as a reward for a position he had taken but in deep belief that it was necessary for him to do so in the interest of the nation. I reminded him that to abandon the country might produce the same disastrous results as if he were to turn to the Russians.
The substance of what the Shah told me this morning was substantially what he said to Yatsevitch in the unpremeditated and casual meeting on the ski slopes of Abe Ali, nor was it far from what he said to the British Ambassador in the same circumstances. There was, however, less apparent emotionalism and a more grim attitude than either Harrison or Yatsevitch reported.
I think that he has done little else but to mull these problems over and that there is no doubt that he has convinced himself that the position he has taken is the correct one for him. I believe that he had not wanted to send for me to tell me these things in the first instance that hence used the device of talking to Yatsevitch and Harrison when he had the opportunity at Abe Ali and by sending the message he did send through the FonMin. He no doubt expected that I would respond to this by asking to see him.
I do not believe that the Shah coldly set out with a calculated plan to make our flesh creep in order to get what he wants from us but rather that he has worked himself into a state of mind where his thoughts go round and round on the same track, digging in deeper and deeper and making firmer his convictions. I think that the principal explanation why he has done so is that he isn't in fact big enough for the job in hand. However, there is no individual or element in Iran qualified to do the job and there probably will not be for a number of years to come. We are faced here with a situation where we are obliged to lean on a weak reed but I see no other one on which we may rely to accomplish our objectives.
I have made several recommendations in my personal letter to Talbot of March 4th and my airgram 241 of March 5th. I hope that a combination of these proposals may be worked out without delay in order that we may preclude some precipitous and irresponsible act by the Shah. Although in his present mood he is capable of committing one, I do not believe that he will do anything rash until he hears from us again. NSC Action 2447--Proposed Approach to the Shah of Iran After a thorough review of the military, economic, and political aspects of the Iranian situation, I have concluded that a shift in emphasis from the Shah's present preoccupation with military security to a situation where requirements for economic and social development are reasonably in balance with requirements for military security is likely to be successful only if it includes the following three elements: (a) discussion with the Shah of an FY 1962-67 MAP planning level which we believe should not exceed an estimated $330 million (stated to the Shah in terms of equipment programmed In seeking to persuade the Shah to reduce his force levels to 150,000 men, I believe it is essential that the interrelationship of military, economic, and political factors be discussed. I think it should be made clear that neither the United States nor Iranian resources are sufficient to provide Iran with absolute security against all internal and external threats. What we seek, therefore, is a balanced program which allocates human and financial resources among various military, civil government, and economic development needs most effectively and consistently within the limited amounts available.
I have concluded that the MAP planning level of Iran for FY 1962-67 should be no more than the estimated $330 million referred to above. This figure somewhat exceeds the Steering Group recommendation of a program of not more than $300 million but, in my judgment, a useful concession to counter the Shah's preoccupations and to reduce the risk of an adverse response to an approach to him suggesting a reduction in force levels and restraint on local defense expenditures. The $330 million figure represents about $170 million of modernization. The total also includes $41 million worth of items described by the Defense Department as being "desirable" but not necessary from a strictly military point of view and of lower priority than military requirements elsewhere. On the other hand, I have eliminated $92 million of modernization from Ambassador Holmes' total recommended program of $421 million. These figures should be viewed in the light of the Shah's desire for substantially more equipment than recommended by the Ambassador.
208. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) to the National Security Council
I have concluded that it is not feasible at the present time to make a specific commitment to the Iranian Third Economic Development Plan, prior to further review by the U.S. Government and by an international group in early summer. We should, however, be prepared to promise general support in general terms now, to participate in international consideration of the Plan next summer, and to encourage other countries to do likewise. Subsequent steps would depend, however, upon the soundness of the Plan, the evidence of consistency of current civil and military allocations with development needs, and the effectiveness with which various "self-help" measures are carried out.
The content and final magnitude of the Third Plan are still being discussed. In the absence of an Iranian assessment of the foreign exchange needs of the whole economy for the Plan period, our own crude estimate is $1.2 billion. This opens the prospect that during the course of the Plan Iran may be seeking from one-third to one-half of this amount in the form of economic aid from the U.S. The lower of these figures ($400 million) is about 25 percent above the projection for five and a half years of the FY 1962 volume of U.S. economic assistance from all sources.
Although we expect to obligate $40 to $60 million in FY 1963 for foreign exchange costs of projects in the Third Plan, it is not thought advisable to indicate any level of U.S. long-term economic commitment at this time, prior to international financing discussions this summer. It is nonetheless desirable to give the Shah some evidence of support for the Third Plan when discussing the military assistance program. I am specifically recommending that we now indicate to the Shah our willingness to give favorable consideration to an Iranian application for a loan for the foreign exchange costs of about $20 million for both the Port of Bandar Abbas and the complementary hinterland road projects to the north. The engineering and preparatory work for these projects, which are contained within the Third Plan, have been completed. These projects have been selected because they are part of the Third Plan economic development program of Iran and would contribute to the regional development as well by making possible an alternative trade route for Afghanistan. Such a move would also help to maintain a momentum of economic development at the start of the new Plan period in September and may have an appeal to the Shah.
The Ambassador should, therefore, be instructed to undertake discussions with the Shah within the current month along the following lines:
1. Iran's security involves military, economic, and political aspects. The USG wishes to be of assistance in all respects and welcomes the opportunity to review with the Shah the interrelationships of military and economic programs.
2. After a careful review of the military role of the Iranian armed forces, which we consider to be essentially defensive and for maintenance of internal security, the U.S. suggests that Iran's need can best be met by a modern, mobile, but significantly smaller force. We have planned a military equipment program to modernize Iranian forces on the basis of a graduated reduction over two to three years in force levels from 200,000 to about 150,000 men the proposed equipment program is contingent on implementation of a phased schedule for the force reduction and ability to absorb and maintain present mat?riel and new equipment. The discussions should make clear the equipment list is not subject to upward revision and deliveries are contingent on our annual appropriations. However, the Shah can be informed of U.S. thinking in relationship to Iranian needs for the period 1962-67, with implementation dependent upon appropriations by the Congress and as may be modified by the world military and political situation.
a. The USG is aware of the importance the Shah attaches to certain highly sophisticated equipment, but believes that U.S. assistance should be geared to military realities rather than to the political glamour value of weaponry, in contrast to Soviet deliveries to certain neighboring countries which are primarily for political purposes.
b. In recognition of the Shah's genuine concern for the security of Iran, which we share, but which we believe cannot be achieved by Iran in isolation, the Ambassador should indicate the U.S. interest in the security of Iran and give general assurances which U.S. deterrent power affords the area.
3. The U.S. believes that currently the threat to Iranian security comes as much if not more from internal rather than external sources, and that economic and social progress is crucial to the maintenance of stability. Adequate progress can only be achieved if the Shah gives the development program the same personal attention and interest that he now does to military matters.
a. The U.S. hopes the Third Plan will be sound enough to permit the U.S. to contribute effectively and to induce other international agencies and other free nations to do likewise. Prior to making commitments to the Third Plan and in encouraging other countries to join us in this effort, the U.S. will need to be assured that the total Plan for the Iranian economy has made firm provision for defense purposes without supporting assistance grants, which is also consistent with making adequate provision for the other needs of the economy, so that contributions to economic development will not be vitiated by a subsequent unplanned impingement of military requirements.
b. The U.S. believes that a sound financial plan cannot be developed without firm Iranian "self-help" actions in such matters as fiscal policy, budget, and tax administration to make the Third Plan effective. The level of external assistance will, in large part, depend upon success in these "self-help" actions.
c. The U.S. as a token of expression of support of the Third Plan is willing to finance, by loan, the $20 million foreign exchange costs of the Bandar Abbas port and related hinterland roads as indicated in the Plan.
Frank M. Coffin Recent indications that the Shah of Iran is depressed and resentful over allegedly inadequate United States military assistance and over the alleged lack of American appreciation for his position and his accomplishments raise the possibility that the Shah may be considering abdication. His abdication would result in political chaos in Iran which could only benefit the Soviet Union in the long run. He has indicated that he wishes to visit the United States in the Spring rather than in the Autumn, when his visit was originally planned. In the enclosed letter (Enclosure 1) The jointly agreed recommendation proposes that the Ambassador present our approach to the Shah as quickly as possible, so that he would have absorbed its meaning before his visit to the United States. This would be preferable to either (a) presenting such an approach at the time of the Shah's visit, or (b) postponing its presentation until after his visit. In addition to normal careful driving practices, the requirement of a valid driver's license, and other accepted precautions, we believe that all Americans in Iran must have adequate liability insurance. The absence of such insurance is an invitation, at the least, to adverse publicity and possibly to political complications. The recent accident and confinement of Specialist 4th Class Frederick E. L. Adams have brought to our attention the fact that ARMISH/MAAG does not require liability insurance for "official duty driving". Adams' errand, at the time of the accident, seems to have fallen within that category.
We, however, do not believe that ARMISH/MAAG regulations on insurance are in full agreement with the spirit and intention of existing guidance from the Operations Coordinating Board and instructions from the Embassy in Tehran. Although the OCB guidance is only for "private motor vehicles", ARMISH/MAAG personnel use the official cars assigned to them for both official and private purposes with no well-defined line between the two. Considering all of this, it is our opinion that liability insurance should be required for all ARMISH/MAAG drivers for all types of driving. Adequate liability coverage is possible in Iran through individual policies which could be arranged by each driver. Also, the possibility of a master policy covering all military personnel operating motor vehicles both on-duty and off-duty would be worth investigating. Whatever the means, I hope full coverage can be arranged for all military personnel for all types of driving. This, plus renewed emphasis on extremely "defensive" driving habits, will be of real help in negotiating and later implementing a jurisdictional agreement with Iran. Phillips Talbot 2. USG basic objectives are (a) avert serious clash (b) keep US out of position in which we will become target of Arab frustration at inability forestall Israel action (c) encourage equitable and efficient use of Jordan waters along lines of Unified Plan by international agreement if possible but, since this not now possible, by national plans compatible with Unified Plan and not precluding latter's eventual implementation.
3. In implementing its national planning Israel with extensive USG help has moved faster than Arabs. Arab frustration can perhaps be mitigated if they gain sense of parallel movement with equivalent outside help. This will be the more true if Arabs can argue to themselves that they are acting to prevent "theft of Arab water".
4. However valid from engineering point of view, and despite 1955 Arab agreement to it on technical level, Unified Plan per se has come to symbolize in Arab eyes USG support of Israel at continuing expense their interests. Unfortunately, therefore, USG considerably discredited as an objective party in position to encourage both sides to equitable accommodation. Further public central role by USG and emphasis on Unified Plan likely further stimulate Arab suspicions.
209. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, March 8, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.11/3-862. Secret. Drafted by Bowling; cleared by McGhee, Johnson (G), Talbot, Coffin (AID), and King (U/PR). A typed notation on the source text indicates that the White House approved the memorandum on March 16 and that the telegram attached to it was sent. Komer forwarded this memorandum and its attachments to President Kennedy on March 9 with the following comment: "I strongly urge that, while approving an earlier visit, you reserve judgment on the thorny issue of how much military baksheesh we will pay the Shah until you can hear more arguments from both sides. For example, AID's well-balanced paper (Tab 4) points out the difficulty in going over $300 million, and the likelihood that we may have to commit some $400-600 million to Iran's new development plan. Our job is not just how to keep this unstable monarch from kicking over the traces but how to cajole him into paying more attention to what we consider are the key internal problems confronting Iran." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Iran Subjects: Shah Visit) This copy of Battle's March 8 memorandum is filed separately, but is clearly described in Komer's memorandum. (Ibid., Iran, 3/2/62-3/26/62)
SUBJECT
State Visit of Shah of Iran--Military Assistance to Iran
210. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, March 9, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.551/3-962. Official Use Only. Drafted by Greene (NEA/GTI) and cleared in draft by Colonel Kettelhut (NEA/NR), Winfree (G/PM), and Pender (L/SFP).
Dear Bill: With the increasing concern both here and in Tehran about criminal jurisdiction over American military personnel in Iran, our two Departments are, as you know, drafting a joint instruction to the Embassy in Tehran. Although the exact details of the instruction have not been completed, we will probably suggest to the Iranians that all members of our military missions in Iran be considered "administrative and technical personnel" as defined in the recent Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities./2/ If and when the Iranians accept this proposal, criminal jurisdiction will in effect be given to the American authorities.
/2/The joint State-Defense message, sent to the Embassy in Tehran in telegram 626, March 17, conveyed the text of a note responding to an Iranian Foreign Ministry note of February 7 in which Iran had agreed to a 1-year extension for the American Military Advisory Mission. The U.S. note conveyed U.S. agreement to the extension and also proposed that the United States and Iran reach an understanding covering the status of U.S. forces in Iran along the lines described in Talbot's letter printed here. (Ibid., 611.887/3-1462)
We will be greatly relieved if some means of protection such as this can be agreed upon. We know, however, Iran's long history of suspicion about all forms of foreign involvement, especially any involvement which seems to them to be an infringement on Iranian sovereignty. Once it is agreed upon and becomes public knowledge, this jurisdictional agreement will be considered by some articulate Iranians as just such an infringement. We, therefore, believe it is incumbent upon all Americans who will be protected by this agreement to do everything possible to abide by Iranian laws. If we abide by these laws as best we can now as well as after a jurisdictional agreement is reached, we will have helped immensely in accomplishing two ends: to be able to approach negotiations with the feeling that we have done all we can to abide by the law and normal precautions and, secondly, to be able to exercise our rights once agreement is reached without too much fear of Iranian reactions.
211. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Near Eastern Posts/1/
Washington, March 10, 1962, 11:46 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/3-1062. Secret. Drafted by Crawford on March 8; cleared by Sisco, Hewitt (L/NEA), and Strong; and approved by Talbot. Sent to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus and repeated to Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Jerusalem, London, Paris, and USUN.
1545. Dept most appreciative posts comments re type of approach US officials should take in discussing Jordan waters problem now and in coming months. Synthesizing these and Dept's considered views we generally agree Beirut's thoughtful Embtel 844/2/ (although we would prefer omit second sentence point (4) substituting "However we not inclined be put in position of guarantor of any party's intentions", and would also wish soft-pedal all references to Johnston Plan by that name). Our considerations as follows:
/2/Dated March 5. (Ibid., 684A.85322/3-562) For text, see Supplement, the compilation on the Arab-Israeli dispute.
1. Exacerbation Israel-Arab tensions likely and probably inevitable as time for Israel's tapping of Jordan River at Tiberias draws near.
5. In view Jordan's request for IBRD assistance in water development, particularly execution Yarmuk storage (Maqarin Dam), which is last major construction element of Unified Plan yet to be initiated, IBRD appears logical vehicle through which accomplish (3).
6. Since Jordan can not pursue the IBRD path without support at least of Syria (and hopefully Lebanon), our quiet efforts should be directed to (a) helping Jordan along in its own efforts obtain this support and (b) discreetly making felt a sufficient degree of US influence to prevent problem flaring into major international issue (e.g. in Security Council) while productive and independent involvement of IBRD proceeds.
7. We have reasonably satisfactory assurances from Jordan and Israel that present programs will not result in water withdrawals in excess of Johnston Plan allocations. We know Israel approves execution of Maqarin Dam. We intend hold these assurances intact and make sure they are adhered to in practice. Although concurring that it is generally desirable demonstrate our even-handedness to the Arabs, we think any major US step at this time (such as public d?marche to Israel) would tend put US back in active central role and divert Arabs incipient awareness that they will be on the losing end unless they take advantage of constructive elements in present situation.
8. Finally, despite present flare-up, we anticipate many steps in evolution this problem before Israel's diversion in fall 1963. From time to time it may become apparent that US representations can be helpful in allaying area tensions on water issue. In general, however, we are convinced of benefits remaining in background. To extent we do discuss this issue with Arabs our talks should be (a) with a very few key individuals in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and occasionally the UAR only and (b) in vein of low-key objective counsel.
Ball
Current unrest in Syria appears to stem from three principal sources, viz: (1) The High Command of the Army which, while divided within itself but dominated by anti-UAR elements, is dissatisfied by the performance of the recent civilian government; (2) Civilian politicians, some of whom have a pro-UAR propensity, who are dissatisfied with Army intervention in civilian affairs; (3) Some young Army officers and non-coms, students and some labor elements who are generally pro-UAR.
In this connection it is pertinent to discuss the following contingencies:
A. Communist Intervention: Because the Army was largely purged of Communist officers during the period of the union with the UAR and because Syrian Communists have been kept under strict control since the Syrian secession, we believe the Communists, though capable of contributing to some degree to existing unrest, are presently not in a position to affect the basic situation materially. We believe the danger of Communist takeover is out of the question for some time to come and we should establish our policies on the basis that Syrian unrest is due essentially to internal and inter-Arab quarrels. Only if Israel or the West place heavy pressure on Syria is an early resurgence of Communism likely.
B. UAR Intervention: The principal contingency (but unlikely) to be considered is the growth of a pro-Nasser movement from within, aided and abetted by the UAR financially, by propaganda and through the operations of undercover agents to bring about a government more amenable to Cairo's influence or possibly restoration of some form of unity between Syria and Egypt. Whereas this would not be an unmixed blessing (nor an unmixed advantage), such an eventuality would not impinge sufficiently on U.S. interests to justify the disadvantages of U.S. intervention.
From observation of UAR behavior during the Syrian revolt in September and the recent crisis, we believe external intervention by the UAR is unlikely. There would appear to be a possibility of UAR armed intervention only if an internal pro-UAR movement had grown to proportions where success or failure might depend on UAR military support and where such support could be given at negligible risk to the UAR, e.g. under conditions where large areas of the country, including the principal port at Latakia and the principal airports, were in pro-UAR hands, a separatist pro-UAR regime was established calling for UAR intervention. If there should appear to be a clear likelihood of overt UAR military intervention, we believe action should be taken through diplomatic channels (only as a last resort in the United Nations, preferably by an Arab country) to discourage such intervention. However, we believe a direct confrontation of UAR and US military forces should not be contemplated on view of (a) the benefits to the Soviets of such a policy; (b) the absence of sufficient US stake in Syria to justify such a drastic measure; and (c) the general desirability of avoiding direct US intervention in inter-Arab affairs in the absence of a significant element of Communist troublemaking.
C. Iraqi Intervention: Due to the internal problems which confront the Iraqi Government and Iraq's limited military capability beyond its frontiers, the possibility of Iraqi armed intervention, even in the event of a threatened UAR takeover, is remote to say the least, and need not concern us.
D. Jordanian Intervention: During the recent unrest Jordan threatened to intervene militarily if the UAR moved forces into Syria. We (and the UK) undertook strongly to discourage such intervention on the basis that it might provoke further instability in the area and would be disastrous for Jordan, as well as fastening on the US and the UK, by extension, responsibility for Jordan's action. This should continue to be our policy.
E. Turkish or Israeli Intervention: Any intervention by Turkey or Israel should be discouraged on grounds that as non-Arab powers such intervention would be considered aggression, would be productive only of harm, would reflect adversely on us, and would strengthen the Soviet position. In their present internal preoccupations the Turks would be unlikely to consider armed intervention in Syria except in the case of possible Communist takeover of Syria. While continued separation of Syria from the UAR would appear to be in Israel's interest, we tend to doubt that Israel would use force to try to prevent Syrian union or federation with another Arab country.
Summary
We believe we should adhere to the principle of non-intervention and we should encourage others to adopt a similar policy. Our conviction of the correctness of this policy is strengthened by the observation that, if left to themselves, the Syrians and other Arab peoples are generally able to find a modus vivendi which avoids direct hostilities between Arab and Arab. In the absence of serious Israeli or Western pressure the Syrians (and Arabs generally) are capable of successful resistance to Communist attempts to exploit situations of unrest.
PARTICIPANTS 1. Dr. Johnson's Recent Trip to Europe; Contacts with Jewish Leaders:
Dr. Johnson said he had discussed with appropriate officials in the British and French Foreign Ministries his general ideas about "the second round" (Sir Roger Stevens and Stewart Crawford in London, Sauvagnargues and Vincenot in Paris). None of these officials were optimistic, but there was some feeling that perhaps limited movement to break the present stalemate is a possibility. All were interested and proffered cooperation. One impression gained in Paris is that Foreign Ministry officials are much less keen on close relations with Israel than are officials in other sections of the French Government. One French official remarked that the threat to terminate UNRWA is the only lever which will mean anything to the Arabs. Dr. Johnson said he had pleasant but not particularly fruitful meetings with Ambassador Spinelli and officials of the UNHCR and ICEM in Geneva.
Dr. Johnson said, following his return from Europe, USUN had been helpful in arranging meetings for him with Mr. Label Katz, President, B'nai B'rith, Rabbi Irving Miller, President of the Conference of Presidents, and Dr. Nahum Goldmann. All had agreed to be helpful in arranging extra-official contacts in Israel. All had interesting comments to make regarding probable future immigration. Although these estimates were arrived at separately, they are virtually identical. From sources other than the Soviet Union (Rumania, Hungary, Morocco, and Algeria), Israel can expect a maximum of 250,000 immigrants in the next few years. Barring the rise of another Stalin, no more than 500,000 of Russia's Jewish population of approximately three million would consider leaving even if they were allowed to do so. It is a fact that most younger Jews in the Soviet Union are assimilated. From these calculations, it appears that the maximum possible immigration into Israel over the next decade is 750,000 persons. Dr. Johnson said the three Jewish leaders had pointed to the impossibility of Israel's placing any voluntary restrictions on immigration. All had agreed, however, that Israel's continued harping on the expectation of extensive immigration is unhelpful.
2. Israel's Concerns:
It was noted that Israel's U.N. delegate Comay had addressed a letter to PCC Chairman Eldem on March 13 terming the PCC's March 2 announcement of Dr. Johnson's reappointment "unsatisfactory". This was paralleled by an approach to Assistant Secretary Talbot by Ambassador Harman. It was agreed that these representations were "for the record" and the Israelis have little real grounds for complaint since the text of the PCC's proposed announcement was forwarded to Comay on February 28 and he acquiesced in its wording. Dr. Johnson said he intended to talk to Ambassador Comay to "mollify" him for Jerusalem's benefit.
It was also noted that the Israelis had made parallel approaches to Assistant Secretary Talbot in Washington and Mr. Moe in New York regarding the dangers of the Special Representative's talking to self-proclaimed refugee leaders. In reply to the Israelis' representations, both Mr. Talbot and Mr. Moe had pointed out the distinction between "consultation with governments" in the Special Representative's official capacity and what might be termed "information-gathering without prejudice".
3. Terms of Reference:
Dr. Johnson said he does not require a new, specific letter giving terms of reference for the "second round". It is obvious that his terms of reference, in fact, are contained in the PCC's August 1961 letter to governments (which presumably remains in effect because the PCC's March 2 action was to "reappoint" him as Special Representative) and Resolution 1725. Dr. Johnson was asked regarding the present state of his own thinking as to the nature of proposals he might make to governments. Dr. Johnson pointed out that two differing approaches had been suggested in Working Papers I and III, There was detailed discussion of the long-standing U.S. Government position that, insofar as U.N. "responsibility" is concerned, Paragraph 11 is predicated on the provision of compensation only to those refugees who choose resettlement. The Working Papers had revealed that the staff of the PCC Secretariat and Mr. Moe held that the U.N. itself should ensure the payment of (property) compensation to repatriated refugees. When Department officers noted, inter alia, the unlikelihood of Israel's accepting this thesis, Mr. Moe commented that if Israel refused, more pressure would develop against it for its intransigence. Dr. Johnson, however, tentatively concurred with the Department's view that the option should lie between guaranteed compensation (where applicable) if the refugee chose resettlement, or repatriation with no U.N. commitment on compensation. The idea of granting compensation for moveable property was discouraged by the Department officers on the grounds that claims would be virtually impossible to adjudicate and that some sort of per capita "rehabilitation" or "reintegration" allowance would obviate the need for such compensation. Department officers noted that there is tentative agreement on the Working Papers' premise that there must be some financial arrangement to give the refugees a new start in whatever area they move. Here, important questions are: (a) what is an equitable amount per refugee (a figure of $2,400 per family of four was tentatively mentioned), (b) what portion, if any, should be paid to the refugees and what to the receiving government, and (c) what voice, if any, should the U.N. have in approving releases from funds turned over to governments?
7. U.S. Financial Assistance:
Department officers noted that this problem had been carefully but not definitively considered in several working group meetings in the Department. As a matter of history, the U.S. has expressed willingness to give generous support to programs that offer prospect of real progress on aspects of the Arab-Israel problem. The willingness to seek legislative authority for such support continues today. The Department is anxious that Dr. Johnson have in hand the tools he requires to make his mission effective. The assurance of adequate financial support for projects that might be agreed upon is obviously of great importance. As far as a United States Government assurance is concerned, two types of approach might be envisaged, for use singly or in combination: (a) an executive statement of willingness, in principle, to assist, but in an unspecified amount, and (b) a specific commitment to more limited support in a given period. Before either can be undertaken, an indication of what Dr. Johnson desires is required. Relevant to this problem is the United States Government holding of Israel currency. Dr. Johnson agreed to provide the Department with a statement of his specific requirements.
Department officers noted the consensus of the working group that during the "second round" it might be desirable for Dr. Johnson to refer to financial considerations only in general terms.
8. Definition of "Refugee":
Several ways of defining a refugee, for the purposes of Paragraph 11, were discussed. Dr. Johnson agreed that his staff would turn its attention to this problem to formulate a working definition for discussion with the Department.
9. Recording of Refugee Preferences:
Several aspects of the functioning of U.N. centers to record refugee preferences were discussed. Among these were the possibility of using only one or two centers that could move successively from one country to another, thus reducing administrative problems; the related use of a "sub-quota" within the ceiling established for Year One and proportional to the percentage in each country of the total refugee population; the need to inform the refugees of the facts (of life in Israel), but to do this insofar as possible by providing straight answers to questions rather than volunteering information in a way that would subject the PCC to accusations of trying to influence refugee choice.
10. Resettlement:
It was acknowledged that there must be some assurance of Arab willingness to receive those refugees who opt for resettlement. It appears unlikely that Arab leaders can be induced to make new declarations to this effect soon, but they might assent to the Special Representative's announcing their continued adherence to previous expressions of willingness in the U.N. General Assembly.
11. Resettlement Outside the Area:
Department officers explained the fears expressed in the Department's working group regarding too early an appeal for refugee resettlement opportunities outside the Near East. It seems desirable that no move be made by the PCC in this direction until at least preliminary accord has been reached with the Arabs and Israelis. After preliminary accord has been reached, Dr. Johnson could make an international appeal to governments to help out. Again hypothetically, the U.S. could respond to this appeal by an appropriate executive announcement of intent to seek authority from Congress for a special refugee quota.
212. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (McGhee)
Contingency Planning in the Event of Further Unrest in Syria
213. Memorandum of Conversation
PCC Refugee Initiative
Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, Special Representative, Palestine Conciliation Commission
Mr. Sherrington Moe, Senior Advisor to the Special Representative
USUN--Mr. Robert Blake
IO/UNP--Mr. Stephen Palmer
NEA/NE--William R. Crawford, Jr.
12. A Following U.N. Presence:
It was agreed in general that U.N. assistance to the refugees whose options are implemented should continue for a limited period after these refugees move. How the U.N. could most effectively extend such aid was not determined.
13. The Wedge Cycle:
Department officers agreed that there is much of value in the repatriation-resettlement cycle theory proposed by Dr. Wedge as a means for breaking down the psychological barrier to solution of this problem which exists in the refugees' minds. Department officers commented that the Department's working group sees no advantage, however, to Dr. Wedge's suggestion regarding the possibility of prior consultation with the Soviets or Yugoslavs.
14. PCC and UNRWA:
Department officers noted that, while UNRWA may be in a position to provide limited, unpublicized advice and assistance in the operation of a plan for refugee movement, it is advisable to keep the PCC's initiative and the UNRWA structure formally separate at least during early phases.
15. Israel Immigration:
Dr. Johnson said one of the obstacles to Arab cooperation in an effort to solve the refugee problem is the real fear of continued large-scale immigration into Israel and, consequently, of an Israel move to expand. It was agreed that the philosophy of unrestricted Jewish immigration is so fundamental to the State of Israel that it is not realistic to expect that the Israel Government would ever agree to restrict this. Perhaps, however, there might be less public emphasis by Israel on unrestricted immigration. Additionally, the Special Representative can perhaps informally convey to Arab leaders the best current estimates of probable future immigration to Israel.
16. Israel Laws on Expropriation and Restitution:
At Dr. Johnson's request Department officers agreed to prepare a brief summary of information available in the Department's files regarding Israel's laws on expropriation and restitution. This is relevant to the means of redress that would be available to refugees being repatriated to Israel who find their property destroyed or expropriated.
17. Mr. Strong's Meeting with Jewish Leaders:
Mr. Crawford reviewed the substance of Mr. Strong's March 5 meeting with Jewish leaders. He also informed Dr. Johnson of the current (inactive) status of the Congressional resolutions introduced by Representatives Farbstein and Ryan.
18. Further Meetings:
It was agreed to hold one further meeting in New York on March 26. Mr. Crawford said the Department hopes Dr. Johnson can visit Washington shortly before his departure for a final review with appropriate senior officials, presumably Assistant Secretaries Talbot and Cleveland. Saying that he would welcome such a final meeting, Dr. Johnson suggested it be tentatively scheduled for late Friday afternoon, March 30.
Note: From the discussions of March 14, Department officers gained the impression that, to a very large extent, the Working Papers presented to the Department had been developed by Mr. Moe and other members of the PCC staff without regular, close coordination with Dr. Johnson. Dr. Johnson acknowledged, for example, that he had not yet had an opportunity to give careful study to Working Paper III. On several issues, Dr. Johnson's thinking seemed much closer to that of the Department's working group than to the members of his staff, with whom, in a few instances, he took fairly sharp exception. Department officers felt (and Dr. Johnson later so indicated privately to USUN) that Dr. Johnson's thinking about negotiating approaches and tactics in the "second round" is still quite fluid and that he was most appreciative of the Department's study of the Working Papers.
It is difficult to compare these three countries as their situations and needs are quite different, as well as the fact that U.S. military aid to Turkey and Pakistan has the indirect effect of enhancing Iran's security as they are all members of CENTO.
Turkey has received much more military assistance and more modern equipment than either of the other two countries. It is a member of both NATO and CENTO, which gives us a double return on our assistance. It stands astride three traditional routes from Russia to the Middle East: The Thracian Plain; the Black Sea; and the Caucasus. It has much larger and more effective armed forces than Iran, which can absorb considerable equipment, and has been in a position to offer us more quid pro quo in the way of sensitive installations, air bases, etc. The attached table sets forth the relative amounts and types of equipment which all three countries have received.
Our military aid to Pakistan, however, is much more comparable to that received by Iran. It has received roughly the same amount of equipment, and roughly the same proportion of modern equipment. However, it has received a few "glamour" items (F-104's for example) which Iran has not. Actually, Pakistan has been receiving military assistance only since 1954, so their annual rate has been higher. The Pakistani armed forces, being based on a fairly solid core of British training, were able to absorb this equipment more rapidly than the Iranian armed forces. However, the Pakistani forces are, at this stage, fairly well equipped, and it is expected that their annual military assistance program levels will drop below those of Iran in the future.
There is no factual basis for a claim of discrimination against Iran. There is a difference of view, however, between ourselves and the Iranians in that the United States gives more weight to the requirement for real economic progress than does the Iranian government. The Iranians, understandably, would favor the best of both worlds--more modern military aid and more economic assistance.
Maxwell D. Taylor
Therefore, President has approved following course of action:
(1) You inform Shah promptly that US aware of his concerns and proposes move visit up to mid-April or mid-June so full discussion possible (Presidential message for delivery to Shah at this time will follow). (3) You should reassure Shah as to great US interest in Iran, that intensive study both military and economic aid underway (delayed by lack completion Third Plan), and that President expects discuss whole picture with Shah, though of course inappropriate reach firm decisions during visit.
(4) During Shah's visit we will give him full treatment on continued US strategic superiority, growing US conventional strength, unlikelihood direct as opposed to indirect local aggression (with reminder Khrushchev's remarks to President at Vienna), all designed to reassure Shah as to military threat. These reassurances will be combined with full exposition our view as to Iran's most pressing requirements, and tentative indications shape and magnitude total aid we contemplate, given satisfactory Iranian performance and in view other global requirements.
(5) Following visit, which we hope will set stage effectively, we will give you detailed military and later economic aid proposals for discussion.
Above approach seems best calculated achieve immediate reassurance needed, permit President himself explain our strength and policies, and provide best setting for subsequent aid negotiations. PARTICIPANTS Assistant Secretary Talbot told Ambassador Harman that we had watched with increasing dismay the recent Israel-Syrian clashes on Lake Tiberias culminating in Israel's retaliatory raid on Syrian gun positions March 16-17. Mr. Talbot said he did not want to over-emphasize the importance of the situation, but nevertheless believes it has the seeds of very serious disturbances. The modus vivendi of the past few years is threatened, and it is difficult not to recall the tragedies of 1956 and 1958 and the problems they created for all principles.
Ambassador Harman expressed gratitude for Mr. Talbot's views, but said he wished to react immediately, which he did with vigor. He said that at least ten days ago the Department had been apprised of the gravity with which Israel regarded the worsening situation on the lake, which he described as 100% in Israel's territory--the whole lake and its shore.
Mr. Ludlow interposed an objection, informing the Ambassador that the United States does not accept this Israel assumption of unlimited sovereignty.
Remarking that he would return to this question later, Ambassador Harman said the Syrians had broken the peace repeatedly from the beginning of February molesting Israel fishermen pursuing their tasks on the lake. Each time, he said, the Israelis had gone to UNTSO, suggesting that it should arrange for additional U.N. observation posts in the troubled area for better surveillance and control of the problem. He enumerated a number of violations: February 1 and 7--rifle fire directed at Israel fishermen; February 10--machine gun and rifle fire; February 15--machine gun fire against fishermen; February 25--machine gun fire directed at Israel police patrol; and February 27 and March 7--machine gun fire.
On March 8, according to the Ambassador, the Syrians made use for the first time of recoilless rifles, bringing a turning point in Israel's appraisal of its security problem. In any rational military establishment, according to Ambassador Harman, a recoilless rifle is fired only on order from a military command. The Israelis could only infer either that anarchy prevails in the Syrian units situated above the lake or the recoilless rifles were put into play by direction of the Government of Syria. At that time, the Israelis summoned UNTSO representatives and asked that they convey to the Syrian Government in Damascus Israel's opinion that the Syrians were playing with fire.
Mr. Talbot suggested that instead of using UNTSO to send messages the MAC machinery might have been brought into use.
Ambassador Harman said that for weeks the Israelis had watched the Syrians strengthening their positions overlooking Tiberias. The situation remained very serious. United States concern is shared by the Government of Israel. A special meeting of the cabinet "this morning" had considered the implications of another artillery attack on an Israel police boat 1,000 meters out on the lake in which two policemen had been wounded.
Turning to the defense of Israel's use of reprisal raids, Ambassador Harman said that in quality and implication there is no difference between shooting or walking across a border. Israel can only regard gunfire as an act of aggression or war, and its defense against such acts is dictated by the military logic of Israel's situation. Israel's repeated appeals to the United Nations and the Secretary General have not produced a solution. Israel is as reluctant as anyone else to see the circumstances of 1956 reproduced, but for Israel to have its citizens and settlements under fire is an intolerable situation which the United Nations had been unable to correct.
Mr. Talbot commented that corrective efforts had been begun. The United States has been in close touch with the United Nations and had appealed to the Syrians to make full use of MAC facilities, which are in the locality for the express purpose of correcting violations of the Armistice Agreements. The United States is very much afraid that the Near East may be trembling on the brink of a return to 1956 and the misfortune which it brought to all parties.
Mr. Talbot added that the Israelis undoubtedly have labored under serious provocations. However, experience does not establish that this kind of reprisal is the way to deal with the problem. Similar efforts in the past have not always turned out as planned. Violence invites violent responses and greater violence still.
Ambassador Harman said that if Israel is put into a situation in which it is obliged to deal directly with a threat to its security, the problems of defense become objective and technical. Syrian guns commanded the entire lake and adjoining settlements. When it was decided to clean them out, the troops could not be sent out without the tools required.
Mr. Talbot asked rhetorically if the Israelis, should the shooting continue, be tempted to take and occupy the high ground, which might produce a united Arab reaction?
Ambassador Harman said all that is necessary is for the Syrians to stop shooting. He attempted to draw an analogy between Israel's retaliation and U.S. involvement in South Viet-Nam, where the U.S. is steadily "escalating" its involvement. Mr. Talbot pointed out there is considerable difference in the two controversies. No frontiers have been crossed in Viet-Nam. As in Malaya, it is a matter of subduing guerrillas within a state.
Nevertheless, according to Ambassador Harman, the Syrians have got to be persuaded to stop shooting. The Israelis can live with threats and taunts and also can live with the fact that Arab doctrine still considers that a state of war prevails. Israel has long ceased to hope for an early relaxation of Arab attitudes but it is not prepared to tolerate being made a target.
Mr. Talbot agreed that the fighting must be brought to a stop, but he could not accept Israel's use of retaliatory raids.
The conversation concluded with Ambassador Harman repeating that he would report the Department's views to his Government but make clear he did not accept the Department's thesis, nor expect his Government to. With renewal of exchange fire on Lake Tiberias reported this morning, Dept fears recurrence last week's retaliatory raid by Israelis. Our assessment Syrian feelings leads us to believe Israeli raid has been wholly unsuccessful in intimidating Syrians and that a steady escalation of incidents is distinct possibility. Therefore, we wish be sure no step is overlooked which might help pacify situation. For example, Dept has called in Israeli Ambassador and Syrian Charg? today to urge restraint and cooperation with UNTSO. Mission requested do same with respective Dels. FYI. It is premature to determine whether res in SC would be desirable. If efforts SYG and UNTSO mechanism, supplemented by appropriate bilateral representations, prove successful in maintaining cease fire, it might be possible and desirable to limit SC consideration to statements by parties concerned and SC members with view developing as broad a "consensus or summation" as possible in favor of maintaining peace and quiet, support for armistice agreement, and cooperation of parties with UNTSO.
However, this procedure will probably prove insufficient. If res found necessary, as is likely, we favor res along lines of S/3538 of Jan 19, 1956, Ball
214. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy
215. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran
216. Memorandum of Conversation
Israel's Reprisal Raid on Syrian Positions Overlooking Lake Tiberias
Ambassador Avraham Harman of Israel
Mr. Shaul Bar-Haim, Counselor, Embassy of Israel
NEA--Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot
NEA--Mr. James M. Ludlow, United Nations Adviser
NEA/NE--Acting Director Nicholas G. Thacher
NEA/NE--William L. Hamilton
217. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/
Washington, March 20, 1962, 8:52 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/3-2062. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Sisco, Palmer, Buffum (NEA/NE), and Thacher; cleared by Ludlow (NEA), Talbot, and Wallner (IO); and approved by Cleveland. Also sent to Jerusalem and repeated to Damascus, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.
2412. Tiberias Incidents. For USUN: We understand Syrians have requested an early meeting of SC, and that Israelis are preparing counter-complaint. Re timing, if cease fire were being scrupulously observed we believe there would be advantage to await UNTSO report and Chief-of-Staff recommendations before SC convened. (Tentatively Syrians thinking in terms of SC meeting sometime next week.) If violations of cease fire recur, however, earlier meeting of SC may be required to assist in averting serious escalation hostilities.
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