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Foreign Relations,
1961-1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961-1962 Released by the Office of the Historian Documents 218-245 218. Record of Briefing for the NSC Standing Group Meeting/1/
Washington, March 23, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group Meeting 3/23/62. Top Secret. Drafted by Bowling. The source text bears numerous handwritten additions and corrections; presumably the drafter missed parts of the conversation and someone filled in blanks and revised the text. According to a March 22 memorandum by Studds inviting several offices in the Department of State and AID to send representatives to this NEA briefing for Under Secretary McGhee, the briefing was to be held at 11 a.m. on March 23 in preparation for the Standing Group meeting scheduled for 2:30 p.m. that day. (Ibid.)
Mr. Talbot pointed out that the Shah was highly emotional and was particularly disturbed by what he thought to be our inclination toward being more generous to neutrals than to our allies. Mr. Talbot said that we very much need the Shah in the next few years. We need an increasingly reformist government in Iran and a controlled revolution there. Our primary task during the Shah's visit will be to reassure Iran, and specifically the Shah. Uppermost in the Shah's mind is the Iranian Military establishment. He feels that the US has no deterrent in the event of a Soviet attack on Iran. Our job is to convey to the Shah the US concept of global military strategy and of Iran's place in this overall picture, attempting to convince him of the need for reductions and improvement of his armed forces.
Mr. Talbot pointed out that three recommendations had been made with regard to the aid level in Iran. The Kitchen Committee recommended a Multi-year program of $300 million dollars. State-Defense and AID have agreed on a Multi-year program of $330 million. Amb. Holmes recommends a program of $420 million, which he insists is essential to prevent the Shah's abdication. The State-Defense-AID recommendations are on the President's desk now. The President has deferred any decision until he has had a chance to speak with the Ambassador. The major difference between the $430 million and the $330 million program is the Shah's desire for a sophisticated anti-aircraft defense system. Mr. Rostow pointed out that our military has no formal place for Iran in our War planning. The Shah definitely feels that he should have such a role. William Bundy in Defense is working on a paper that will endeavor to convince the Shah of the credibility of our global deterrent. Mr. Rostow stressed the importance of being able to say to the Shah that we are committed to defend Iran and have a significant capacity to do so. For, he pointed out, only if we can convince him of this can we proceed to talk to him rationally about his own forces. We must, said Mr. Rostow, convince our military to make this notion credible to the Shah. He suggested in this connection that the Shah be invited to see for himself STRAC forces in a demonstration of their capability, and that he be told that these forces are earmarked for the defense of such countries as Iran. Mr. McGhee emphasized that we can no longer stall the Shah; that this has been a blind, corrosive and dishonest dialogue. He agreed to the importance of having our military talk to the Shah about the STRAC forces. Mr. Rostow said that we view a Soviet attack on Iran as an unlikely contingency; that in the event of such an attack hostilities could probably not be confined solely to Iran; and we have units committed to defend Iran in such an unlikely eventuality. The criteria, he said, for the Iranian forces should be: A) an effective internal defense force; B) possessing a high civic action component; and C) able to fulfill some useful role in connection with the arrival of STRAC forces. He said that the Shah's criteria for these forces were: A) Ability to sustain his throne within Iran; B) to provide the best possible defense against Soviet attack; and C) to provide a capability to take on Iraq and Afghanistan at the same time.
AID, Mr. Gaud stressed the importance of conveying to the Shah our view that the main threat to Iran is now an internal one. He said that the Third Plan seems to have broken down and that AID recommends against giving the Shah specific AID figures now. The real problem he said is one of organization and intent, not one of money. The Iranians seem to be afraid to make decisions and there is a very real need to talk toughly to the Shah. We must talk to him about our overall relations, not just about military needs. Mr. McGhee felt strongly that our program should be put to the Shah when he is here and he asked that W. Bundy be pushed to produce a convincing paper on our military policy before the Shah's arrival so that we can work towards joint military planning with Iran.
Mr. McGhee asked Messrs. Talbot, Gaud and Rostow to accompany him at the NSC Standing Group Meeting.
PRESENT (Mr. Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and Mr. William Gaud, Assistant Administrator, Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development, attended for this item.)
a. Discussed the forthcoming visit of the Shah of Iran and noted the importance of reaching a decision on an agreed aid level for Iran as promptly as possible after the return to Washington of Ambassador Holmes.
b. Agreed that the President should be asked to convey to the Shah an outline of the U.S. aid "package," even though the U.S. program would not be presented to him in all its details until sometime after the visit.
c. Agreed that special security measures should be taken to insure that no untoward incident takes place during the Shah's visit.
[Here follows Item 2, Policy Directives.]
It was decided that the Shah should be given a briefing on STRAC potentialities (by Lt. Gen. Quinn). Mr. William Bundy is to look into this. William Bundy said, however, that Iran was the one place to which the STRAC forces were not really applicable. He therefore felt badly about such a briefing, given the fact that we are "not about to send our two STRAC divisions into Iran."
William Bundy said that the real dangers of the Shah's visit would be the questions he would probably ask: such as, How do your troops get in? and What about the prepositioning of equipment? He pointed out that it would be difficult to come up with any credible plan. He asked what "degree of phoniness" we could get away with. It was also pointed out that Iran's 1921 Treaty with the USSR would cause difficulties with the prepositioning of any equipment.
No real conclusions were reached concerning the presentation of a plan to the Shah, but William Bundy was nevertheless to try to come up with a paper by next Wednesday or Thursday which would convince the Shah of the credibility of the US deterrent and of our ability to come to the aid of Iran.
It was pointed out by McGeorge Bundy that merely convincing the Shah of our strategic superiority would not be sufficient. What kind of assurances can we give the Shah? It was concluded that Gen. Lemnitzer's statements at the CENTO conference in March 1961 It was also decided that the Pentagon would give the Shah a briefing on our assessment of the Iraq-Afghanistan potential (which is considerably lower than the Shah's assessment thereof). It was decided that the overall US Program for Iran should be presented to the Shah while he is here (or at least enough of it to reveal to him the "bad news" aspect thereof).
AID is still unwilling to make a specific dollar commitment to the Third Plan. They insist on prior pressure.
McGeorge Bundy pointed out that a Soviet attack on Iran would not be "so damned unlikely" if the Soviets find out about this kind of thinking. It was reluctantly concluded that the hard military facts made a bunch of dreams of McGhee's and Bundy's desires, to reassure the Shah. It was also pointed out that this sort of military thinking put us on a collision course with Gen. Norstad with regard to supporting assistance to Greece. It was decided that the Shah would be given a general outline of the Aid Program.
Is then SARG's belligerent stance of irrevocable opposition to Israeli diversion a propaganda tactic to counter Cairo's charges that imperialism dominates Syria? If so, SARG policy is bankrupt before it starts; it will be only matter of time before Israel begins pumping and SARG stands, like Qasim before Kuwait, stripped of pretense to a sound foreign policy.
In Embassy's view, however, SARG policy toward Israel has more substance than Qasim's toward Kuwait and consequently holds more danger for Middle East peace.
We believe sequence of events cited in reference telegram bears out our suspicion, stated in Embtel 583, On other hand, by taking issue to UN on "legal" grounds, SARG probably seeking provide USG with face-saving means for modifying its Palestine policy. We understand SARG's March 22 note was conceived by Dawalibi and drafted by Syria's reputedly pro-Soviet expert on law and UN, Salah Tarazi. We suspect they hope US will espouse their case, not because US is enchanted with its legal precision, but because it offers least embarrassing alternative to Middle East chaos.
While we are first to sense disingenuousness of SARG's artifices and strategy, we are nevertheless genuinely concerned on two major counts:
(A) As we foresee next SC episode, all too likely that a draft resolution unpalatable--however unreasonably--to Arabs will be vetoed by Soviets. Net result would be that substantive situation would find itself unchanged except with Soviets popular heroes and US in doghouse.
(B) We can not dismiss risk of collision of greater than incident proportions. Department has already commented that Kursi raid apparently failed in its objective of intimidating SARG. Jerusalem's 179 Mrs. Meir then commented that Israeli sovereignty over lake had not been questioned before except by Syrians and Israeli gravest concern now raised by US bringing matter to fore. Should Syrians sense any hesitation in US point of view relative to Israeli sovereignty over lake, Mrs. Meir believed trouble would then really begin and Syria could be expected in those circumstances abandon principles underlying Johnston plan, overthrow GAA, and perhaps resort to more serious measures. It should [be] clearly understood Israel did not plan to abandon in whole or in any part its claims over the lake. GOI was not disposed to obtain peace and quiet in area by permitting a chip of Israel to be broken off there. Jews were given nothing in Israel, she claimed, but bought the land with blood or money. As a consequence, GOI wanted Israel as it stood; peace and quiet in area not worth any invasion or diminution of Israeli sovereignty in any way. Normally, it was said, this question would have been raised in Washington but Gazit now in Israel so matter discussed here. To emphasize importance GOI attaches to subject, Mrs. Meir informed me she had interrupted full and heavy schedule attendant upon current visit of Swedish Prime Minister to raise matter with me.
I noted that I did not have benefit of any minutes on Ludlow-Israeli conversation and hence could not comment directly. Israelis had made statement of sovereignty, however, in their complaint to the Security Council and sovereignty was legal concept. As Department was working on all aspects of problem to prepare its position in the debate, legal facet also had to be considered and US motives should not be suspect merely because legal point raised. I was sure, I continued, Department wished reasonable solution to matter, but in view of expressed Israeli amazement and worry over point of view expressed in Department, I would endeavor ascertain Department's thinking.
Please advise.
Barbour
We recognize US under considerable pressures from both sides in this case, and that these pressures will mount as text of res crystallizes. Arabs will insist as minimum on outright condemnation rather than merely deploring Israeli raid, while GOI will undoubtedly resist any condemnation and insist at minimum reference to Israeli retaliation. Dept will transmit text draft res shortly. We informing Israelis and Syrians that insofar as we are concerned the primary tactical focus in SC consideration will of course be in New York rather than here or in respective capitals.
We assume that parties will wish to be heard in first instance on Wednesday. Since the Shah's visit will be a particularly delicate exercise in reassurance, we suggest at least two prior strategy sessions with you. The first would be this Friday to get your preliminary reactions and another next week when Holmes will be back. For background, you should read the attached. While the Shah is much bucked up by earlier visit, he'll probably still insist on ventilating his military concerns. Our proposed strategy is to soften him up first by taking the initiative with a forthright confidence-building portrayal of continued US strategic superiority and our growing general purpose strength (we'd like your reactions to draft State talking points at Tab A). Hence it is important to decide at least tentatively beforehand on what size MAP package to use as the backdrop for our approach. The MAP Steering Group recommended offering a $300 million five-year package as means of getting Iran to cut its forces from 200,000 to a more efficient 150,000. State/DOD/AID have all agreed to up this to $330 million, which they believe will be impressive, and is maximum in light of our world-wide commitments (see AID's powerful case at Tab B). R. W. Komer
Washington, March 28, 1962.
The Problem 2. Nasser's defeat in Syria has clearly cost him stature, but he remains the most formidable single leader in the Arab world. He will keep up propaganda and subversion against the secessionist Syrian regime and against rival Arab rulers elsewhere. He will remain strongly opposed to Arab communism. He is unlikely to cooperate in efforts to reduce tension with Israel. We do not believe, however, that he feels any immediate compulsion for direct overt use of force against either Israel or his Arab opponents. (Paras. 19-23, 29)
3. Nasser's basic suspicions of France and the UK probably will not change. For the next few years at least he is likely to be reasonably restrained in his dealings with both the US and the USSR because of his heavy dependence on the US for food and on the USSR for military and development aid. The nature of his interests and his objectives makes it likely that on many issues his views will be closer to those of the Bloc than the West. However, he will be alert to detect and will react vigorously against any attempt by either to use aid as a lever to influence his basic international position or his policies in Egypt and the Arab world. (Paras. 14, 28-31)
[Here follows the 6-page Discussion section; see Supplement, the compilation on the United Arab Republic.]
On March 28 the United Nations Security Council will commence consideration of Syrian and Israeli complaints regarding military incidents taking place around the northeastern area of Lake Tiberias. Exchanges of fire going back to late February culminated the night of March 16 in a retaliatory raid of Israeli forces numbering perhaps 300 or 400. They assaulted Syrian positions from which the Israelis alleged the Syrians had been firing upon their patrol boats and fishermen. The raid was probably intended also to intimidate the Syrian government and deter it from molestation of Israel's territory.
From information available thus far, it seems likely the Syrians were guilty of initiating fire against Israeli police boats from Syrian posts on the hillsides overlooking the lake. It is also possible that the boats came close to the Syrian shore. Also the Syrians have been very much concerned recently with Israel's plans to withdraw water from Lake Tiberias through pumping installations now being constructed on the northwestern shore although, as far as we can determine, these will not be ready to operate until late 1963.
We believe the Israelis have not taken advantage of the UNTSO machinery to the extent that they might have. While they are in contact with General Von Horn and his staff and agreed to the cease fire suggested by UNTSO officers, they have refused to return to the forum of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission for settlement of border outbreaks.
The Security Council has on past occasions, with U.S. support, condemned Israel's use of retaliatory raids as a means of settling border disturbances. However, there are differences between these recent incidents and the events of the Gaza raid of 1954 /3/Reference is presumably to Israel's attack on Syrian positions in the Lake Tiberias area during the night of December 11/12, 1955; see ibid., pp. 854-856.
The U.S. has constantly opposed any Israeli use of retaliatory raids, and we believe Israel must continue to understand it cannot continue to take the law into its own hands. Israel will argue, no doubt, its subjection to considerable provocation from Syria, but for the U.S. to adopt any posture other than strong opposition to these Israeli tactics might well be taken by the Israelis to indicate we were prepared to tolerate similar future incidents and would, in addition, create strong feelings in the Arab world against the U.S. for its abandonment of a well established principle important to maintenance of order in the area.
During the first session of the Security Council, on March 28, we plan to speak briefly. The U.S. Representative would make two major points. First, he would suggest the UNTSO Chief of Staff be recalled to New York for consultation and recommend the Security Council recess for about five days until he returns. This would buy time until the implications of the latest Syrian coup are known, permit tempers to cool, and establish the facts of the case more clearly. Secondly, we would try to pre-empt the inevitable Soviet efforts to curry favor with the Arabs by making a brief general statement which would indicate that we condone neither the Syrian provocations nor the Israeli retaliation, putting heavier stress on the latter than the former.
Our ultimate objective in the Security Council will be to get the Council to express itself strongly in favor of maintenance of the cease fire, to uphold the general armistice agreement, and to support and strengthen the United Nations peacekeeping machinery in the area.
Israel prefers no resolution whatsoever. We consider, however, that this is unrealistic. Since an extreme resolution is likely to be introduced by the USSR or UAR, we have informed our Mission to the United Nations that in order to exercise some control over the outcome, they should embark on consultations with friendly Council members with a view to developing a reasonably balanced resolution which would contribute the maximum to stabilizing the situation in the Near East while doing the minimum damage to our relations with the Israelis and the Arabs. We would plan after consultation with other friendly members of the Council to support, and possibly co-sponsor, a resolution which would contain the following elements: expression of our concern over developments in the area and note of the fact that a cease fire is now in effect; in its operative sections the resolution would remind the government of Israel that the Council has already condemned military action "whether or not undertaken by way of retaliation." Our resolution would then condemn the Israeli attack of March 16 and 17 as a "flagrant violation" of the cease-fire provision of the Council's resolution of July 15, 1948, The voting picture in the Council will be roughly as follows: An extreme resolution is likely to be supported by the UAR, Ghana, USSR, and Rumania. At the other end of the spectrum, the French will probably support the Israeli position to the maximum, including a preference for no resolution. The UK will find itself in a dilemma like our own. The Latin Americans, China and Ireland will probably tend to follow our lead.
Dean Rusk Washington, March 29, 1962.
2. We concur in the desirability of working for introduction of the IAEA inspection system into the Near East countries and acceptance by Israel would seem to be the logical starting point. However, two significant objections can be foreseen: One is Israel's clear opposition to submission to IAEA controls until these are generally accepted by other nations, and the other is that, under IAEA procedures, both parties to any agreement would probably have to agree to IAEA supervision. The Israel bilateral is with France, and it seems doubtful France would agree to inspection by the IAEA of irradiated elements after their return to French soil. A further problem, recognized by the Foreign Office, is that IAEA inspection, even if accepted, would not commence until the Dimona reactor goes critical, some two years hence, and it is in the intervening period that Arab suspicions and the probability of sharp Arab reactions are likely to be greatest. While we wish ultimately to see all nuclear reactors under IAEA inspection, we doubt Israel's present objections can be overcome regardless of the amount of suasion used, and thus question the value of the sort of immediate, intense effort envisaged by the Foreign Office. However, in forthcoming renegotiation of the United States-Israel atoms-for-peace bilateral, 4. A further complication to the introduction of IAEA controls has been the UAR attitude toward these. It has voted against the IAEA system at every step. With the object of reducing its suspicions and, ultimately, of winning its acceptance of IAEA controls after these have been accepted by Israel, we intend to encourage the fullest possible working relationship between the UAR and the IAEA in other matters.
5. We are asking the West Germans for a report on the status of their present dealings with the UAR. As the Foreign Office is no doubt aware, the Germans have repeatedly assured us that they have no intention of assisting the UAR in reactor development without adequate safeguards.
6. Lacking early arrangement of an open, neutral visit to Dimona, the United States is prepared to consider another secret visit to Dimona, roughly on the one-year anniversary of our last visit in May 1961.
7. We will welcome continued close consultation with the United Kingdom on all aspects of this issue. We will keep the Embassy in Washington informed of our progress and of the reply we receive from the Germans to the approach described in (5).
Washington, March 29, 1962.
1. Reference is made to a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 21 March 1962, For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Curtis E. LeMay An Assessment of the Military Threat to Iran A precarious political situation as well as an unstable economic situation, both operating under the prevailing uneasy calm which presently pervades the Iranian scene, are far more of a threat to Iran than any present military threat.
A military threat to Iran stems only from Soviet capabilities in the form of formidable ground, sea and air forces deployed behind the contiguous border with Iran. While a limited conflict could be instigated by the Soviets through the medium of Iraq and Afghanistan, this threat is not considered an immediate one and would only develop if direct and extensive Soviet support would be provided to them. This is considered to have little likelihood of materializing within the next few years.
The Iranian army could not contain or seriously delay a major Soviet attack. While the USSR may view Iran as an especially promising and vulnerable target, it believes that events are moving toward an internal revolutionary explosion which will result in the overthrow of the Shah's regime by nationalist, anti-Western forces who would sever Iranian ties with the West. Soviet propaganda has endeavored to hasten these developments by seeking to discredit the Shah and his government. While Iran is the most vulnerable target for a Soviet attempt to undermine CENTO, we believe that Soviet policy toward Iran and CENTO will continue along the same non-military lines described above. Barring a domestic upheaval which offered the Soviets new opportunities for subversion and expansion of their political influence or a global war, we do not foresee any dramatic Soviet military moves against Iran over the next four or five years.
Iraq and Afghanistan have received extensive military and economic support from the Soviets and are almost solely dependent on the USSR for a wide range of equipment and supply for their armed forces as well as instruction in the use of the new equipment. Over a period of time the USSR military aid and training is certain to have an important influence on their internal as well as foreign policy. For the present, however, it appears that Soviet aid has been delivered to these countries for political effect and has not substantially increased the military capability of their Armed Forces which are concerned primarily with internal security and will be for the foreseeable future. They do not have the trained manpower, facilities, maintenance, and supply ability to properly employ the equipment over a sustained period. Thus while their military capabilities are certain to increase gradually during the next few years provided Soviet assistance continues, neither Iraq nor Afghanistan have a present capability for offensive operations against Iran.
The military assistance effort already planned by the U.S. will enable Iran to stay ahead of Iraq and Afghanistan in its military capabilities. In spite of the steady efforts which the U.S. has made to modernize the Iranian Army and increase its effectiveness, its capabilities continue to be limited. Its main deficiencies are its excessive size, the low level of general education and technical aptitude, inept leadership, a cumbersome system of command, supply and administration, inadequate transportation and communication facilities, and a lack of combat experience. Despite the attention that has been lavished on the military by the Shah whose rule rests primarily on their loyalty, the army has not acquired great prestige in the eyes of the Iranian people both in and out of government, and a growing number of the younger officers have the discontent of the civilian middle class from which they come. In order to reduce the possibility that the army could become a threat to his position, the Shah has encouraged factionalism, competing intelligence services and conflicting chains of command. To a considerable degree, the military hierarchy is corrupt, wasteful and inefficient. The capabilities of the Armed Forces are generally low, although a slow, steady improvement has been made.
We believe that in spite of the foregoing U.S. assessment of the poor capability of the Iranian Armed Forces, that Iran does have the capability to defend against any purely Iraqi or Afghan aggression but in the foreseeable future will not have any significant capability against Soviet military action.
March 26, 1962.
Background--See Enclosure.
Discussion--Two major considerations influence the US strategic concept for the defense of the Middle East: First, the unusually formidable terrain obstacles to Soviet over-land incursion to the area and, second, the unquestionable Soviet recognition of the United States and Free World vital interests in the area.
Consideration of the above factors, together with Soviet military inaction in the area over the past several years impels the United States to the view that Soviet military attack of the Middle East area is, first, unlikely in the near future, and, secondly, would under any circumstances occur in conjunction with aggression in other world areas.
The United States places reliance upon the Armed Forces of Iran and its other CENTO Allies to execute effective ground delaying action in areas adjacent to the Soviet borders.
Certain measures of limited nonnuclear response to Soviet attack on Iran can be taken by US forces to counter limited Soviet intervention and probing aggression. Inadequacies of road and rail facilities in Iran limit commitment of US conventional forces to two Army Divisions and Marine and US Air Force Combat elements to Northern Iran. By extensive use of US Air Transport capabilities, about two additional battle groups could be supported.
Commitment of US forces in sufficient time to counter a Soviet advance into Iran requires use of the only two airborne divisions presently in the US Strategic Reserve and all of the airlift capability including the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, resulting in a serious dilution of the capability to respond to other contingencies.
The ability to commit conventional forces as indicated above is based upon the assumption that authorization by the President for the use of nuclear weapons will be given as required to achieve US objectives in the area, should the Soviets persist in spite of US actions.
Should this conventional response on the part of the United States, Iran, and their Allies prove to be insufficient to turn back a Soviet invasion, the United States and her CENTO Allies are capable of a limited nuclear action consisting primarily of interdiction of Soviet routes of advance through the difficult terrain in the border areas and nuclear attack of Soviet airfields which are directly supporting their operations. CENTO plans for such action exist.
Finally, the United States has the option of fully escalating the defense to general nuclear war.
2. The current general war plan for the Middle East area does not envisage the deployment of US combat forces to the area at least initially. Primary reliance for defense of the area against Soviet attack is placed on indigenous forces. The area would accrue benefits through the Allied strategic offensive.
3. Current US plans do not provide forces for a limited war with the Soviets in Iran.
4. Current contingency plans for operations short of general war in support of Iran are designed to assist in restoration of law and order resulting from internal disorder which may include communist volunteers. If US and Soviet forces were to become engaged, these plans assume that general war plans would be invoked. The forces earmarked for contingency operations short of general war consist of two battle groups, five fighter squadrons, 1/3 Marine Division/wing team, plus naval and air transports. 5. The planned movement of units by air requires the use of staging bases in Turkey. Routes to Teheran and Hamadan are within range of Russian air elements in the Azerbaijan area. Therefore, if the US deployment into Iran takes place after overt Soviet involvement in Iran, the movement by air over these planned routes is no longer feasible, and new air routes requiring overflight of Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and Iraq would be required.
6. Any commitment of US forces in Iran against overt Soviet involvement must be preceded by a decision to employ whatever degree of force is required to achieve US objectives in the area and to preserve the integrity of US forces, to include the use of nuclear weapons or initiation of general war if the Soviets persist in spite of US actions.
March 27, 1962.
Discussion--The following considerations pertain to the support which Iran obtains from the over-all US defense posture:
US policy with regard to the Middle East is to hold as far forward as possible of the Northernmost boundary of the CENTO countries. This includes Iran, which has a common frontier with the USSR.
The only US forces in the vicinity of Iran are 2 Destroyers and 1 AVP, under the control of CINCNELM and operating in the Persian Gulf, the Red and Arabian Seas.
Two US Tactical Fighter Sqs in Turkey are earmarked for NATO use; however, it is conceivable that they could be employed in Iran as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The US 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, although committed to NATO, could be considered as a potential force for use in reinforcing Iran, particularly the air-transportable elements of the Marine BLT normally embarked.
The US 7th Fleet in the Pacific, although committed to the PACOM area, could also be considered a potential for use in support of contingencies in Iran.
The nearest Army forces which could be sent to reinforce Iranian forces are 2 Airborne Battle Groups in Europe. These appear in CINCNELM plans for the Middle East.
The over-all US defense posture has increased to a considerable degree during the past year as a result of Presidential determination to increase the US conventional capability. With activation of USSTRICOM, a US unified command has been established which will contribute a great deal to US world-wide strength in increasing capability to react rapidly to cope with communist-inspired emergencies. Recent exercises in which US troops were lifted to Europe from Ft. Lewis, Washington, in 10 hours have pointed up the tremendous strides which have been made in speeding up troop airlift through the use of jet transport.
March 27, 1962.
Discussion--Objectives for and Role of Iranian Armed Forces--The objectives of MAP for Iran are a defense posture capable of maintaining internal security, contributing to deterrence of limited war, protection of Middle East LOC within or contiguous to Iran, participating in CENTO, and effecting maximum delay in event of Soviet attack. The role of the Iranian Armed Forces is to meet these objectives. To this end, military assistance in the amount of $577,888,000 was provided Iran by the US during FY 1951-62 and $63,450,000 in military assistance is proposed for Iran in FY 1963.
MAP Accomplishments--Since MAP for Iran commenced in 1950, the Iranian Army has advanced from a poorly trained, ill equipped force of 84,000 to an Army of almost 200,000 men with more modern equipment and an improved combat capability. The Iranian Navy, which became a separate service in 1955, has shown slow but continuous improvement in training and quality of personnel. The Iranian Air Force has measurably improved its organization, training and operational capability. The Gendarmerie has improved from a poorly trained, organized and equipped unit to a force capable of performing its mission acceptably.
Deficiencies--The Army lacks mobility and requisite communications and logistic capabilities. The Navy's capability, due to lack of modern ships, is limited to a minimum contribution to protection of LOC in the Persian Gulf. The Air Force lacks modern high performance transport and fighter aircraft. The Armed Forces lack an air defense capability.
Estimate of Iranian Military Capabilities--With MAP assistance, recommended by SecDef to the NSC on 18 January 1962, the Iranian Armed Forces will become increasingly able to maintain internal security; can defend successfully against a limited war attack by either Iraq or Afghanistan; can probably withstand a coordinated attack by those two countries; but without help, cannot defend successfully against a Soviet attack or an Iraqi-Afghan attack covertly supported by the USSR. Iran's capability to meet a Soviet attack as part of a general war offensive would be limited to minimum defense by successive delaying actions. Iranian capability to maintain and operate complex equipment is limited. However, the Iranian Armed Forces at a level of 150,000 men, with US assistance and advice, can operate and maintain effectively the equipment necessary to meet current JCS force objectives.
FY 1962-67 Military Assistance Plan for Iran--The Administrator, AID, has recommended to the President a FY 1962-1967 Military Assistance Plan for Iran at a cost not to exceed $330 million which includes about $170 million for modernization of Iranian Armed Forces at a strength reduced from 200,000 men to 150,000 men. A table extracted from the final Steering Group Report, which summarizes FY 1962-67 MA Plans for Iran recommended by USCINCEUR, the US Ambassador to Iran and the Steering Group, is attached. Discussion:
On March 27-28 the Army in Syria ousted the President, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, dissolved the Parliament, and is presently governing the country with the assistance of senior civil servants who are operating the various Ministries as Acting Ministers. Reports from our Embassy in Damascus indicate that the main motivation for the Army takeover was dissatisfaction with various policies and actions of the civilian authorities, that it may reflect increased pressure for a socialist policy within the Army, and may partially have been inspired by fear that the Government of President Qudsi had gone too far in seeking rapprochement with Iraq. Whereas some of the Army's earlier communiqués suggest that an attempt would be made to conciliate the U.A.R., it seems clear that the ring leaders of the present Army movement are, with minor exceptions, the same officers who carried out the September 28 revolution. It has been emphasized by the regime and by the Acting Foreign Minister in a conversation with our Ambassador that this government is a "continuation of the 28th of September revolution and . . . a purely internal measure to correct certain internal conditions. . . ."
You may recall that at the time we recognized the Syrian Arab Republic on October 10, 1961, the situation was as follows: The Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command, i.e. roughly the same group of officers conducting the present movement, had installed a civilian provisional government headed by Prime Minister and Acting Chief of State Mahmun Kuzbari, which governed pending the holding of elections for a Constituent Assembly.
The Assembly was later duly elected, under terms of an electoral law which had existed prior to Syrian union with Egypt, and the Assembly in turn elected Nazim al-Qudsi as President, and the Army declared it had "returned to its barracks" and was turning the reins of government over to civilian authorities. However, at the time of the Army takeover on March 27-28, the Assembly had not drafted or promulgated a permanent constitution.
It should be noted that the Army authorities issued an official statement on March 28 which, inter alia, asserted that "the Command will adopt the policy of positive neutrality and non-alignment, will safeguard international charters, will respect (its) agreements and will adhere to the principles of the United Nations." Further, our Ambassador was summoned by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on March 28 and was assured that the Army takeover was an internal matter and that there would be no change in Syrian foreign policy.
While the reassumption by the Army of power on March 27-28 is claimed by the Army regime to be a continuation of the 28th of September revolution, there has in fact been a major change in the character of the government which presents a question as to the recognition of the new regime. However, on the assumption that we desire to recognize and to continue relations with the new regime, this can be done without expressly raising the question of recognition. Recognition of a new government need not be expressly stated but may be implied from continuance of normal contacts and relations with the new regime.
We might also authorize Ambassador Knight at that time to assure the new government that we intend to carry on with present economic assistance programs and specifically with a loan agreement signed on March 27 designed to support the IMF-approved Syrian stabilization program.
We believe prompt action along these lines will provide a favorable basis for initiating our relations with the new government and accordingly request your approval.
Recommendation:
That you authorize us to inform Ambassador Knight early next week to inform the Syrian authorities (a) that we intend to continue doing business as usual, (b) that we intend to carry on with existing economic assistance commitments, including the stabilization loan, and (c) that we wish the Syrian Government and people every success.
REFERENCE 2. The United States should consider participation in an International Monetary Fund stabilization program: The two provisos which Dr. Mason attached to this proposal in discussions with the U.A.R. are (a) that the U.A.R. meet IMF terms and conditions; and (b) that other Western nations such as the United Kingdom, Italy, West Germany and Japan participate. U.A.R. drawings from the IMF could amount to $30 million but substantial additional funds would have to be provided by the U.S. and other countries to support a total program. It would be difficult for the U.S. to provide funds prior to Fiscal Year 1963.
The initiative on this matter is lodged with the U.A.R. which has yet to satisfy a number of IMF conditions for an agreement. Solving the present balance of payments crisis is probably a prerequisite to successful long-term development. We are investigating with AID the possibility of U.S. and other international assistance if and when the U.A.R. meets IMF conditions.
3. The U.S. should expand the technical assistance program. Dr. Mason has recommended that the technical assistance program be expanded and has suggested that agricultural extension and land reclamation activities might be fields in which American technicians could effectively be utilized. Conversely, he feels there is no need or desire for high-level planners since the U.A.R. has persons of considerable competence in this field. Ambassador Bowles has emphasized aid to the rural areas, referring specifically to new communities which will be created as the U.A.R.'s cultivated lands are increased through the Aswan Dam and other developments.
AID already has a staff of more than thirty technicians and at the present time has doubts about the advisability of any large increase in the technical assistance program. Moreover, in light of past experience and in view of the high quality of the U.A.R. agriculturists, AID is not sanguine that a rapid increase in agricultural activities is feasible or desirable. We will continue our discussions with AID as to the scope of our technical assistance in the U.A.R.
4. The U.S. should increase development lending: Dr. Mason believes that the AID projected level of $33 million development lending for FY-63 can be well utilized and might be moderately increased. AID has this question under review. Much will depend upon whether the U.A.R. is able to present suitably-documented projects fulfilling AID criteria.
Ambassador Bowles was informed in Cairo of a possible U.A.R. request for a loan of $125 million to purchase machinery for industrial development. We lack details, but given the magnitude of the amount stated and the fact that such a project would not appear to fulfill AID criteria we are not inclined to encourage the U.A.R. to pursue the matter further. The matter was not treated in Dr. Mason's report.
5. The U.S. should endeavor to identify and assist in a worthwhile land reclamation project: Dr. Mason believes the U.A.R.'s Western Desert project for utilization of underground water, to which some U.S. technical assistance has already been rendered, offers a possibility for developing land less expensively than the Aswan Dam development. Dr. Mason believes we might well consider assisting in the implementation of this or some other U.A.R. land reclamation project of long-term significance. Our aid to such a project would allow the U.S. to be identified with a project having widespread public impact.
The Western Desert project is still in a pilot stage and the long-term availability of replenishable water has not yet been completely proven. We agree, however, that this project may become increasingly attractive and we will keep the matter under review. AID is also doing considerable work on the EARIS project which includes land reclamation and resettlement of farmers on reclaimed land. We are considering the relationship of this work to developments in the area to be reclaimed as a result of the Aswan Dam project.
6. At a later stage the U.S. might consider whether the consortium approach to long-term development is feasible: Dr. Mason indicated action with respect to a development consortium is not presently desirable but might be a future consideration if a step-by-step evolution of U.S.-U.A.R. relations progresses favorably and if U.A.R. economic prospects continue to be encouraging.
Whereas the above recommended lines of action pose some difficulties in implementation, we believe that in general they represent a sober, balanced approach to the situation and offer a sound basis on which to proceed. If you concur the Department will incorporate them in its policy directives for the U.A.R. and proceed toward implementation. We will keep you informed of the progress of our discussions with AID and other interested agencies on these matters.
Dean Rusk REPORT ON MISSION TO THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC The most immediately pressing economic problem is a balance of payments difficulty arising principally from a serious crop failure last year. Shortage of foreign exchange has already forced a slowing down of development expenditures. If negotiations with the International Monetary Fund for a stabilization arrangement are successful, certain drawing rights on the Fund will become available, but these will not be large enough to relieve the difficulty without a further sharp cutback in the development program. It will certainly be expected that the U.S., presumably with others, will participate in any stabilization arrangement that is negotiated. I did not raise this question but the question was raised with me and I limited myself to the remark that no doubt the U.S. would want to be assured that arrangements satisfactory to the I.M.F. were negotiated and that other countries with important trade relations with the UAR would be willing to participate.
Information necessary to an assessment of development progress was made available and the cooperation of UAR officials was quite satisfactory. During the fiscal year 1960-61 the real national income of the UAR increased by 5.8 percent. The current year, as a result of the crop failure, will probably show only a slight increase. There seems sufficient reason to believe, barring further crop failures, and assuming foreign loans and grants at about the current rate, that the UAR can support a growth rate of four to six percent per annum, which, though short of the planned rate, is substantial. The large-scale nationalization and sequestration of last summer and fall have brought management difficulties, but they are not sufficiently serious, in my judgment, to modify this estimate. There is no real doubt in my mind that the UAR is seriously concerned with economic development and that the prospects of sustaining a satisfactory rate of growth are favorable. The implications for U.S. economic policy are, in my view, as follows:
1. A continuation of the PL 480 program at something like the current level is essential if the UAR is to have sufficient foreign exchange to meet its reasonable development requirements. Effective planning to meet these requirements would be greatly facilitated by a multi-year program on which, I understand, there have been initial discussions.
2. DLF loans during the current year have amounted to $17 million. The planning figure now current in AID for loans to the UAR is $30 million a year. In my opinion a figure of this magnitude, or perhaps a little larger is appropriate.
3. The present small figure of $2-1/2 million for technical assistance could appropriately be doubled. There is no shortage of useful projects.
4. The development of effective economic cooperation with the UAR should proceed on a step-by-step basis with a testing at every step of the willingness to honor obligations and provide necessary information.
It was agreed that an effort would be made to arrange a joint session of Congress to hear the Shah, even if Congressional attendance proved sparse. The Shah seemed insistent, particularly since Ayub had appeared before Congress, Secretary Rusk would call Senator Mansfield. The President would tell the Shah to discuss MAP with McNamara.
The President agreed that Secretary McNamara should give the Shah the highlights of our proposed MAP package. This was better than the President having to argue the case. It was agreed that the President would talk in general terms about our desire to modernize the Iranian forces. Secretary McNamara pointed out that we can accelerate MAP deliveries; this, plus the $330 million package should increase the apparent flow by 50-100% which would look very good to the Iranians.
The President desired a memo on things we were doing or planned to do for Iran that had not been done before, particularly MAP items.
Secretary McNamara suggested that the President tell the Shah we would send a small military planning mission (to be part of the MAAG) to assist the Iranians in planning more effectively for their own defense. Secretary McNamara suggested that he could avoid describing one or two key MAP items during his discussion with the Shah, e.g., the C-130s; then the President could tell the Shah about these at the second meeting as an additional concession.
The President desired that we take a look at the sufficiencies of our commitments to Iran to come to its defense in event of attack. Secretary Rusk hoped that we could go so far as to say we would send in one or two divisions in event of limited attack. It was agreed that this should be explored.
RWK When I questioned thesis that Jordan demise inevitable if Nasser regained control of Syria, Prime Minister held to his position but added that even if this not the case Nasser's reappearance in Syria would mean re-establishment of iron-fist totalitarian control not only in Syria area but in Jordanian area as well. Re latter said if UAR regained control of Syria, Jordan would have to take extreme internal security measures which in effect would mean establishment of rigid conservative military dictatorship here which would be completely incompatible with progressive objectives he and his government now pursuing in Jordan.
Prime Minister next said that while Nasser threat in Syria very great, he believed that anti-UAR forces could still prevail provided prompt action taken and he made it clear that if necessary Jordanians prepared send troops to Syria to bolster anti-UAR forces.
I repeated all arguments cited reference telegram. I then made added strong argument against Jordan taking precipitous action based on Arab "intuition" and noted that in fact GOJ had no more information this morning than it had yesterday and actual situation in Syria remained very unclear. Said that any Jordanian troop movement even within its own borders could greatly strengthen propaganda hand of Nasser and undercut GOJ objectives in Syria.
Prime Minister said that if Jordan Arab Army (JAA) troops moved they would not stop at border but would keep going until they reached Damascus. At same time, GOJ would make clear that purpose of troop movement to Syria would be to restore recently deposed civilian government and would withdraw immediately following a plebiscite which would give Syrians opportunity free choice type of government and alignment they desired. If Syrian people freely chose associate with Nasser, GOJ would regret this but would not oppose it. On other hand, GOJ could not tolerate Syrians being brought back forcefully and against the majority will into UAR.
I pointed out discrepancy between numbers of Jordanian and Syrian troops and suggested Jordan troops would be swallowed up before they could carry out this objective. Prime Minister disagreed saying that if JAA moved quickly and decisively they would be supported by elements Syrian army dedicated to same objectives.
I noted that if Jordan troops entered Syria, Iraqi troops might also come in. Prime Minister said that would not create problem as JAA would not fight Iraqis and both could withdraw after plebiscite and restoration of civilian government. I said I thought this great over simplification of problem and that if Jordan troops went across border they would be stepping into morass from which it would be most difficult extricate themselves.
After further discussion, Prime Minister stressed that he had not yet reached firm conclusion that it would be necessary send Jordanian troops to Syria and that he not yet prepared to make such a recommendation until situation further clarified. Said, however, that if GOJ decided to move would move very quickly and Jordanian troops might be in Damascus by tomorrow morning. I said I thought this not only unwise but impossible.
Prime Minister then made two specific requests. First, he asked that USG make immediate démarche to Nasser urging that he stay out of Syrian situation. Second, he requested that USG, through its Embassy in Damascus, seek put backbone in military junta by assuring it of USG support against "minority" forces seeking restore Nasser control over Syria. At same time, suggested USG apply pressure on junta to make its peace with previous civilian government so they could work together against pro-UAR elements. (After leaving Prime Minister's office, and while dictating this telegram, Prime Minister telephoned me adding further request that US Embassy in Damascus pass word to Zahr ad-Din that JAA stood ready to be of assistance if he should so request.)
Conversation concluded with my reiterating strong advice that GOJ remain calm and not take foolish or precipitous action. I emphasized again that neither GOJ, nor anyone else at moment, had any firm information re higher nature, or degree of seriousness, current Syrian situation. Prime Minister replied he still not ready recommend any major action unless further developments within Syria made this absolutely essential and said he would keep in touch with me.
Comment: While I believe GOJ is more concerned re Syrian situation this morning than yesterday, I conclude that much of Prime Minister's talk was designed to emphasize to USG gravity GOJ attaches to situation. Absence of JAA troop movement and low-key nature of military alert remains as reported reftel. I am, nevertheless, concerned that combination of Jordan fear of UAR and prevalence of unsubstantiated but alarming rumors, could lead to precipitous action on part of JAA particularly if GOJ authorities conclude that moment had been reached when they must act or UAR triumph in Syria will be assured.
Embassy is keeping in close touch with situation and will continue to counsel restraint. I will be seeing King later in day.
Macomber
U.S. desires exert whatever calming influence possible in situation, but unwilling become otherwise involved as requested by PriMin.
Rusk
In our view, direction Syria goes in next year or two will be determined principally by forces local to Near East. Our means for exerting decisive influence are inadequate and we believe best to avoid actions putting us in middle without achieving useful results.
Rusk
If asked whether this constitutes recognition, you may state in our opinion formal act of recognition not required unless SARG requests it.
FYI: We hope prompt action along these lines might help counteract SARG erroneous impression USG favors UAR control of Syria and establish favorable basis US relations new government. End FYI.
Embassy London may inform FonOff re foregoing instructions.
Ball
PARTICIPANTS 1. Dr. Johnson's Plans for the "Second Round"; Working Paper V:
It was agreed that consultations with Dr. Johnson and Mr. Moe over the past two months have served a useful purpose in refining possible approaches to the problem of winning Arab host government and Israel agreement on the movement, in both directions, of a limited number of refugees in a limited period. This appears the only practical way to break down the psychological and political obstacles that have precluded basic progress for thirteen years. Working Paper V (attached for selected posts) Mr. Crawford commented on the reasonableness of this approach. If negotiations break down, Dr. Johnson will clearly wish at least to avoid a situation in which the Arabs unite in opposition to his proposals. Provided that is avoided and the UAR were willing to stand on the sidelines, Dr. Johnson might consider whether there is hope of doing anything on a one or two country basis.
Dr. Johnson agreed this is one "fall back" position to be considered.
2. Joint Meeting with Arab Host Government Representatives:
Dr. Johnson said he had been advised on the previous day by Lebanon's permanent representative in the UN, Ambassador Hakim, that the current Arab League meeting in Riyadh has decided not to insist on joint Arab meetings with him.
3. Meeting with Chiefs of State:
Dr. Johnson said he will wish to meet chiefs and/or heads of state on this round. Little difficulty is anticipated except with Nasser. A letter has been sent to Foreign Minister Fawzi seeking an appointment, back-stopped by a personal message from IBRD President Black to Minister of Economy Kaissouni.
Dr. Johnson said he will inform Ambassador Badeau from Jerusalem, through American Consulate General channels, of the UAR response, if any. If no reply has been received, Ambassador Badeau's support will be appreciated.
4. U.S. Diplomatic Support:
Dr. Johnson said that, as during his first round, he will be under UN auspices and does not want close identification with American officials. He does not wish to be met on arrival and will take the initiative in getting in touch with Chiefs of Mission, with whom he is most anxious to consult.
Department officers assured Dr. Johnson that Missions would be instructed to provide full facilities consistent with this Government's continuing support of the PCC initiative. Thought has been given to the desirability of high level approaches to the Arabs and Israelis prior to Dr. Johnsons's departure. It is concluded that this is perhaps necessary only with the Israelis. In recent weeks they have tended to deprecate the Johnson mission as an exercise "for-the-record", presumably with the objective of watering down Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's May 1961 commitment to President Kennedy.
Dr. Johnson said he thinks a high level USG approach to the Israelis should be made.
5. Special Representative's Relations with Iraq and Saudi Arabia and non-government groups:
It was agreed PCC Chairman Eldem (Turkey) should inform Iraqi and Saudi UN representatives that, consistent with his terms of reference, Dr. Johnson has not scheduled visits to Baghdad and Saudi Arabia, but would be happy to meet with representatives of these countries at their initiative at any time. It was noted that the PCC's March 27 letter to Dr. Johnson (attached) Dr. Johnson was informed of certain detailed Department comments on Working Paper V, inter alia the Department's conclusion that it would not be wise to use the open mails in Near East countries for distribution of refugee questionnaires.
7. Financial Considerations and Compensation:
Department officers noted that Dr. Johnson has not requested a commitment in specific terms regarding U.S. willingness to contribute financially to progress on the refugee problem. The Department's position, therefore, remains as stated to Dr. Johnson in New York on March 14. |
