• Multimedia
• Blog
• Subscribe
• What's New
• Contact Us
• Archive

• Topic
  • A
  • B
  • C
  • D
  • E
  • F
  • G
  • H
  • I
  • J
  • K
  • L

  • M
  • N
  • O
  • P
  • Q
  • R
  • S
  • T
  • U
  • V
  • W
  • XYZ

  
  Select the list of topics to display.
• Country
  • A-B
  • C-E
  • F-K
  • L-O
  • P-S
  • T-Z
  • Regions

  Please choose a country or other area, or a Region.
• Publication Type
• Speaker
  • A-C
  • D-K
  • L-R
  • S-Z
• Date
  • • Most Recent
    • Past 7 days
    • Past 90 days

1. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Implementation of Safeguard System

-1. Memorandum of Conversation, New York, January 2, 1969 [ PDF version   ] 

During a January 2 meeting, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Counselor at the Soviet Embassy Boris Sedov discussed the ratification of the NPT.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 66, Country Files, Europe-USSR, Soviet Contacts (Sedov) 1968-1969. Secret; Nodis. The attachment at Tab A is not published.

In this memorandum, Kenny analyzed each paragraph of the NPT provisions and provided a nuanced discussion of the potential problems of the proposed treaty. He focused his analysis specifically on those issues that were likely to effect U.S.-Federal Republic of Germany relations, IAEA/EURATOM safeguards arrangements, and PNEs (Peaceful Nuclear Explosives).

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty through March 1969. Secret. The attachments are not published. The memorandum was forwarded to the President by Kissinger under cover of a January 28 memorandum in which Kissinger suggested Nixon would want to skim through the memorandum prior to the NSC meeting the next day.

Sonnenfeldt commented on National Security Council staff member Spurgeon Keeny's January 24 paper concerning the NPT. In it, Sonnenfeldt cautioned against Keeny's simplification of what he saw as a more complex German problem.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty through March 1969. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Haig, who wrote "Concur" next to his name on page one and initialed it.

In this memorandum, Kissinger briefed recipients on the NSC meeting scheduled for the following day and attached a ten-page issues paper on the NPT.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–19, NSC Meeting, 1/29/69 Meeting. Secret. It was also sent to Rogers, Laird, and Lincoln. A copy was sent to the Wheeler, Helms, and Richardson

The meeting was devoted to a detailed discussion of the NPT. Over the course of the two hour meeting, the participants examined the articles, debated various problems associated with the ways in which the treaty would affect U.S. interests, and discussed strategies for presenting the treaty to the U.S. Senate to ensure its ratification.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, National Security Council, Meetings, NSC, January-March 1969. Top Secret.

Kissinger forwarded a list of actions resulting from the January 29 NSC meeting. He specifically requested that the President respond with his comments on U.S. security capabilities and potential strategies for dealing with non-nuclear countries.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–19, NSC Meeting, 1/29/69 Meeting. Top Secret; Sensitive.

In a meeting with Secretary of State Rogers, German Ambassador Pauls discussed the FRG’s concerns with the NPT. In this meeting, Pauls indicated FRG Chancellor Kiesinger’s support of the non-proliferation agreement, but indicated that it would be easier for the FRG to sign the NPT if the Soviets gave an assurance that the FRG would not be discriminated against but treated as other parties to the treaty.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Secret. Drafted on February 3 by Gleysteen (ACDA/IR) and approved on February 4 in S.

This memorandum announced President Nixon’s decision to go forward with ratification of the NPT. Although the U.S. would ratify the agreement, Nixon directed that no efforts be made to pressure other nations, specifically the FRG, to follow suit. Instead the U.S. Government “should reflect a tone of optimism that other countries will sign or ratify,” and emphasize that the Treaty would not “broaden or modify U.S. commitments abroad.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDM's (1–50). Secret. The President submitted the treaty to the Senate for ratification the same day. For text of his message to the Senate, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, p. 62. The Senate gave its consent on March 13 by a vote of 83–15. For text of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, see Documents on Disarmament, 1969, pp. 78–97.

The President directed that a study be made reviewing the positions of key countries on the treaty and the alternative courses of action available to the U.S. to influence their signature or ratification of the treaty.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–34, Senior Review Group Meeting, 3/6/69. Secret.

In this conversation, Soviet Ambassador to the United States Dobrynin and President Nixon discussed the ratification of the NPT and the corresponding situation developing in Berlin. The ensuing discussion outlined the mutual desire to work together to bring about an “era of negotiations, not confrontation,” and illuminated multiple domestic and international outcomes for the NPT.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files POL 1 US–USSR. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Malcom Toon. The conversation was held in the Oval Office. The memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in its entirety in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, 1969–October 1970.

In this note, Soviet leaders emphasized the need for cooperation between the U.S. and the USSR to ensure international security. Moreover, they stressed their belief that all possible efforts should be made to have the NPT start operating effectively and as soon as possible.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 340, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Memcons. No classification marking. The note was given to President Nixon by Dobrynin during their February 17 meeting. The note is scheduled for publication in its entirety in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, 1969–October 1970.

In this private conversation between Nixon and Kiesinger, the two leaders discussed the need for an open "line of communication" connecting the two countries so as not to fall into the trap set by the Soviets to break the alliance. The NPT would prove to be a key component to that relationship. At the heart of this discussion was the need to maintain a "firm but not hostile" regarding the NPT and any subsequent Soviet action.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 834, Name Files, Staff Memos, Sonnenfeldt, Helmut. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, which is labeled "Uncleared—For Embassy Use Only." The memorandum was forwarded to National Security Council Operations staff member Sonnenfeldt by Russell Fessenden, Charge d'Affaires at the Embassy in West Germany, under cover of a March 10 letter in which he indicated that the memorandum of this "private session" between Nixon and Kiesinger was drafted by interpreter Hans Holzapfel. (Ibid.) The memorandum of conversation in its entirety is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume XL, Germany and

Prepared in response to NSSM 13, the study outlined three courses of action that the U.S. could utilize to secure the signing and ratification of NPT that ranged from a passive approach to a uniquely tailored and intensive treatment. In the 28-page discussion, not published here, the Ad Hoc Interagency Group recommended courses of action on a country-by-county basis.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-34, Senior Review Group Meeting, 3/6/69. Secret.

Kissinger informed President Nixon that during a March 11 conversation, Soviet Ambassador to the United States Dobrynin handed him a copy of a note that the Soviets intended to deliver to Bonn to meet some of its concerns about the NPT. Kissinger attached an analysis of the note and copies of exchanges.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, 489, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger 1969 (Pt. 2). Secret; Nodis. In a March 6 memorandum, Kissinger informed the President that in a March 3 conversation he had told Dobrynin, "If the Soviet Union could give the Germans some reassurance on Article 2 [of the UN charter], either through us or directly, it would ease the problem of signature considerably." (Ibid.)

In this memorandum, Kissinger told Rogers that President Nixon wanted Rogers to explore the feasibility of synchronizing the completion of ratification and the deposit of procedures for the NPT with the Soviet Union.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty (through March 1969). Secret; Nodis. In a March 28 memorandum to Kissinger, Acting Executive Secretary John Walsh indicated that Rogers would meet shortly with Soviet Ambassador to the United States Dobrynin to propose simultaneous deposit. (Ibid.) For a record of that meeting see Document 17. [4/1/69]

Sonnenfeldt briefed Kissinger on instructions given the Department of State regarding NPT ratification and on his conversation with the German minister.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty (through March 1969). Confidential. Sent for information. Brigadier General Haig initialed the memorandum and a handwritten notation indicated Kissinger saw it.

Secretary of State Rogers and Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kuznetsov discussed the benefits and drawbacks surrounding simultaneous ratification and the issues associated with Germany's signing of the NPT.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, DEF 18-6. Secret. Drafted on April 2 by Krimer (OPR/LS) and approved on April 9 in S.

Secretary of State Rogers and German Foreign Minister Brandt discussed the NPT, focusing primarily on the continuing FRG concerns and the Soviet response to simultaneous ratification.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, DEF 18-6. Secret. Drafted by Johnpoll (EUR/GER) and approved on April 15 in S.

Under cover of a March 26, 1969, memorandum, Henry Kissinger forwarded to Jacob Beam the President's instructions for Beam's meeting with Soviet Premier Kosygin upon becoming Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Nixon's instructions included the following:

"5. As regards Berlin and Germany, you may say that we would welcome any improvement in Soviet-German relations. We think German signature of the NPT will assist this and we hope that the Soviets will be able to give Chancellor Kiesinger any help they consider feasible to enable him to get the treaty adopted. On Berlin, we are prepared to examine any way to improve the present unsatisfactory situation and I believe from my recent talks with the Germans that they are prepared to do so too. But this cannot be done under pressure. Perhaps some quiet exchanges would show the way. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Backchannel, Box 433, Beam Instructions, 3/26/69)

Ambassador Beam met with Kosygin on April 22. The next day, in the enclosure to Airgram A-446 from Moscow, Beam reported on his oral presentation, including the following:

"6. As regards Berlin and Germany, we would welcome any improvement in Soviet-German relations. We think German signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will assist this and we hope that the Soviets will be able to give Chancellor Kiesinger any help you may consider feasible to enable him to get the treaty adopted. Meanwhile as we have told Ambassador Dobrynin and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov in Washington, nuclear powers, including simultaneous deposit of instruments of ratification, would be helpful in bringing about the widest possible endorsement of the treaty which we both seek. On Berlin, we are prepared to examine any way to improve the present unsatisfactory situation, and the President believes from his recent talks with the Germans that they are prepared to do so too. But this cannot be done under pressure. Perhaps some quiet exchanges would show the way. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974, Box 765, USSR, Premier Alexei Kosygin, Correspondence)

In this memorandum, Sonnenfeldt briefed Kissinger for the Under Secretaries Committee meeting scheduled to take place that afternoon that was to review an options paper prepared by ACDA on the NPT ratification. Sonnenfeldt attached the options paper for Kissinger's consideration.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 66, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. I, April 69-March 70. Secret. Sent for information. The memorandum at Tab B is not published. Written in the right hand margin of page 2 of the attachment is, "But Senate itself asked for simultaneous ratification." An arrow points to the last sentence in paragraph (b). The attachment cited in the footnote to page one of Tab A is not published.

In this office diary entry, Seaborg recounted the discussion of the NPT at the May 1 Under Secretaries meeting. The Commission focused on easing German concerns, creating a strategy for depositing the ratification at the most advantageous time, and the status of other nations with regards to the NPT.

Source: Department of Energy Archives, Records of the U.S Atomic Energy Commission, Job 65-42, Seaborg Diary, pp. 101003-101010. Confidential.

The memorandum listed the follow-up decisions on the NPT, including the issue of Soviet-U.S. simultaneous ratification and the status of other national positions on the NPT, which had been made at the NSC Under Secretaries Committee meeting on May 1.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-75-89, Atomic 388.3. Secret; Exdis.

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Secretary of State Rogers discussed the U.S. proposal for joint action in the ratification of the NPT.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, USSR-Memcon's, Dobrynin/Secretary, Mar 69. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on May 8 by Toon.

In Kosygin's response to Nixon's March 26 letter, Kosygin reiterated the Soviet readiness to enter "into an era of negotiations" with the United States and their desire to improve relations with the FRG. The problem, according to Kosygin, lay with the West Germans whose "stubborn refusal" to accede to the NPT greatly impeded its entry into force. He then encouraged the U.S. to use its influence "to secure the most rapid accession to the treaty."

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, 765, Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974, USSR, Premier Alexei Kosygin, Correspondence. Kissinger forwarded Kosygin's letter to Nixon under cover of a May 28 memorandum in which he stated: "on Europe, he bears down hard on the demand that the FRG sign the NPT and appears to rule out Soviet ratification until then. He asks us to press the German and other countries allied with us (presumably meaning Japan and, by Soviet definition, Israel." (Ibid.) Kosygin's letter and Kissinger's memorandum are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, 1969-October 1970.

The two men discussed the scope of the EURATOM safeguards and the process of negotiating compatibility between the Treaty of Rome and the NPT.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, AE 13 EURATOM. Confidential. Drafted on June 3 by H. Malin (ACDA/IR). The attached list of participants is not published.

Rogers and Gromyko discussed simultaneous ratification and deposit of the NPT.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, POL US-USSR 5/1/69. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William D. Krimer and approved on September 24 by R. L. Brown. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Towers in New York City.

Kissinger discussed the issue of joint U.S.-Soviet ratification in light of Secretary of State Rogers' meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 280, Agency Files, Department of State, 6/1/69 Vol. III. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information.

The telegram transmitted the text of the talking points that the German NPT delegation intended to use in its upcoming talks in Washington. The points indicated a positive FRG appraisal of the NPT, even in light of the less than satisfactory German-Soviet discussions the previous March. The FRG then listed several requirements before it would consent to sign the NPT. Among those were requests to the U.S. Government to issue a statement denying the Soviet alleged "right of intervention" as noted in Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter, for its continued support of NATO and the subsequent safeguards agreements, and its willingness to publicize its position in support of these requests to "avoid any subsequent disagreement" concerning the interpretation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, DEF 18-6. Confidential. It was repeated to Moscow, USMission Geneva, and USNATO.

The telegram reported on Chancellor Brandt's decision to "push ahead" on the NPT. Brandt intended to approach the Soviets and requested Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's assurances of the expansion of peaceful atomic energy use in writing, so that Brandt could distribute it to the German Bundestag.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, DEF 18-6. Confidential. It was repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Brussels, The Hague, Luxembourg, Rome, Berlin, USNATO, USMission Geneva, and USUN.

Eliot discussed the prospects for German signature of the NPT now that Brandt had been elected Chancellor, noting they had improved considerably as the result of the lack of U.S. to sign the agreement and encouraging the continuation of that policy.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, DEF 18-6. Confidential. Drafted by Sutter (EUR/GER); cleared in draft by Katz (EUR/RPE), Hillenbrand (EUR), and Glysteen (ACDA). R. C. Brewster signed for Eliot.

In the first of five U.S-German NPT discussions, ACDA Deputy Director Farley commented on each of the FRG talking points provided to him. Ambassador Roth also raised the issues concerning the use of nuclear energy and assurances of nondiscriminatory safeguards. He intended to use the results of these discussions to determine priorities for future discussions.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, DEF 18-6. Secret. The meeting was held in the ACDA Conference Room. Drafted on November 3 by Malin (ACDA/IR).

In their second meeting, U.S. and German officials continued their discussions of the NPT, focusing more specifically on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, safeguards, and the German Government Statement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, DEF 18-6. Secret. Drafted on November 12 by Malin (ACDA/IR). The meeting was held in the ACDA Conference Room.

In this third session of U.S. and German NPT discussions, officials continued their discussion of the German talking points, focusing their energies most specifically on Points 7 through 14.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, DEF 18-6. Secret. Drafted by Malin (ACDA/IR) on November 18. The meeting was held in the ACDA Conference Room.

In this fourth session of U.S.-German NPT discussions, Hillenbrand and Roth discussed the status of the NPT talks, the Brandt Government, and U.S. military force reductions in Germany.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, DEF 18-6. Confidential. Drafted by Barkley (EUR/GER).

Disarmament Division Chief Roth confidentially told Farley that Chancellor Brandt planned to have a one-day Bundestag debate on NPT in November. Following that discussion, the FRG would sign the treaty.

Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, DD/ACDA, P. Farley Subject Files, March 1969-June 1973: FRC 383-98-0096, Chron Files: Deputy Director, ACDA, J. Philip Farley, April-October 1969. No classification marking. The note is unsigned.

In this fifth and final session of the U.S.-German NPT discussions, participants continued to ferret out problematic phrases and vague statements in the U.S. position and the FRG Statement. Both sides expressed approval with the overall accomplishments of the sessions.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, DEF 18-6. Secret. Drafted on November 19 by Malin (ACDA/IR).

Sonnenfeldt forwarded the memorandum of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Smith's October 30 conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on NPT and expressed concern about holding a joint U.S.-Soviet NPT deposit ceremony with, as Dobrynin put it, "full publicity."

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 197, Agency Files, ACDA, Jan 69-Dec 70, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. A stamped notation indicated Kissinger saw it on November 10. Also attached but not printed is Part I of the Smith-Dobrynin conversation.

In this memorandum, Sonnenfeldt discussed the FRG request for a U.S. statement on NATO and security guarantees. The FRG wanted confirmation that, should the NPT outlast NATO, the U.S. nuclear guarantee would continue to pose as a deterrent to nuclear attack. While he noted he had "no real objection" to confirming U.S. support of the German requests, Sonnenfeldt called the U.S. statement "painful in the extreme." As the procedure applied an outdated rhetoric to the NPT and made unavoidable connections between the NPT and SALT, which would force the U.S. to make unfortunate concessions on both should SALT encounter difficulties.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. 1, April 69-March 70. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger wrote at the top of page one: "Can't we get control of [these ?] matters? How about showing Hillenbrand SALT instructions with Colorado language?" The attachments are not published.

Rogers asked Nixon to authorize release of a statement in connection with the signing of the NPT by the FRG. Rogers noted that recent talks between U.S. and FRG representatives revealed two requisite provisions before the FRG would adhere to the NPT, the continuation of NATO and U.S. commitment to European security. Rogers assured the President that the drafted statement would confirm U.S. support while not further extending U.S. international commitments.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. I, April 69-. Kissinger approved the statement for the President on November 12. (Draft memorandum to the President, undated; ibid.)

Sonnenfeldt notified Kissinger that the Soviets had indicated they planned to ratify the NPT on November 24. Given the perceived lack of Soviet interest in a signing ceremony, Sonnenfeldt recommended against a U.S. signing ceremony.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. I, April 69-March 70. Confidential. Sent "urgent" for information/action. A notation at the top of the page indicated Kissinger saw it and that action had been completed.

Nixon and Kissinger tentatively decided not to have an NPT signing ceremony.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Records, 1969-76, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 18-28 April 1969. No classification marking.

The Department instructed posts in those countries that had not yet signed or ratified the NPT to encourage their host governments to do so. The telegram encouraged all officials to cite the recent U.S., USSR, Swiss, and FRG signature of the NPT as indication of NPT legitimacy and as reason to reexamine their own ratification status. It closed with further strategic advice for encouraging ratification in European capitals and former British dependencies.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. I, April 69-March 70. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Gleysteen (ACDA/IR) on November 28; cleared by ACDA/D, EUR, NEA, L, PM, AF, ARA, EA, IO, AEC, and the White House; and approved by Rogers.

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Under Secretary of State Richardson discussed efforts to persuade enough countries to ratify the NPT to allow the treaty to come into force. By December, twenty four nations had indicated their intention to deposit their ratification by January, 1970. Should this occur, the two men tentatively agreed to hold a joint U.S.-Soviet ceremony for the deposit of instruments of ratification in early February.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 711, Country Files, Europe, USSR Vol. VI. Confidential. Drafted by Bowden (EUR/SOV); concurred in by Leonard (ACDA); and approved on December 31 by Abramowitz. The meeting was held in Richardson's office.

Smith expressed concern over getting key non-nuclear governments to sign the NPT before it came into force. He attached a draft telegram to posts in most of the principal non-signatory states and proclaimed it as a "low-key way" to circumvent the U.S. policy against "arm twisting" reluctant governments into signing the agreement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-1973, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis. The attachments are not published. The telegram at Tab A was approved and sent on February 11 as number 0211405 to multiple posts. (Ibid.)

The telegram provided an update on the IAEA negotiations over establishing a committee to implement the NPT's safeguards provisions. It includes text outlining a set of eight responsibilities mandated by the NPT; encouraged all member states to engage in discussions concerning those tasks with the Director General; and ensured the prompt dissemination of those viewpoints to all member states for consideration. It closed with a discussion of the use of specific terms in facilitating the terms of the agreement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-1973, AE 13 IAEA. Limited Official Use; Priority. It was repeated to AEC, Bonn, USMission EC Brussels, London, Paris, Rome, and The Hague.

Seaborg briefly summarized his meeting on NPT with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and attached the talking points of the discussion. These talking points emphasized cooperation, IAEA organization, and the identification of IAEA objectives. These goals included safeguarding NPT negotiations, the maintenance of an effective and credible system, encouraging acceptance in reluctant nations, and the creation of a resolution for a focused forum of discussion with specific time limits.

Source: Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg, volume 21, pp. 524, and 532–538. No classification marking.

The telegram reported on Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Seaborg's March 18 meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. Seaborg recounted the FRG's decision to sign the NPT. Dobrynin concurred with Seaborg's assessment, cautioning that the difficulties would arise when "ironing out the differences in texts." Both participants expressed their desire to prompt the adoption of the resolution at the April Board meeting.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-1973, AE 13 IAEA. Limited Official Use; Priority. It was repeated to London and Vienna. Drafted and approved on March 18 by Allen (IO); and cleared by Kratzer (AEC). Trevithick (SCI) was informed.

The telegram reported that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kozyrev’s had handed the UK a statement criticizing its proposal for forming an IAEA safeguards committee.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, AE 13 IAEA. Limited Official Use. It was repeated to London and Vienna.

The telegram transmitted the text of the Soviet statement concerning the NPT's entry into force on March 5 and the creation of the Safeguards Committee. This statement is reported in Document 49.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-1973, AE 13 IAEA. Limited Official Use. It was repeated to Moscow, London, and USMission Geneva. Drafted and approved by Trevithick (SCI/AE); and cleared in IO/OES, EUR/SOV, EUR/BMI, and ACDA.

The telegram analyzed the IAEA Board of Governors' decision to establish a safeguards committee to prepare the agency for its NPT safeguards role. Specifically, the telegram examined the Soviet objection to certain paragraphs in the preamble, attempts to alter the focus of the committee, and the introduction of a resolution from Spain revising the Safeguards system. Given the wide ranging support for the Spanish resolution, the conclusion predicted continued discussion concerning possible revisions to the safeguard system.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-1973, AE 13 IAEA. Limited Official Use. It was repeated to AEC, USMission Geneva, USUN, USMission EC Brussels, Bonn, London, Moscow, and Rome.

This document entitled "The Structure and Contents of IAEA Safeguards Agreements Under the Nonproliferation Treaty," outlined the objectives and applications of the agreement, including policies on cooperation, implementation, accountability, and finance.

Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1971, pp. 218-244.

The memorandum addressed concerns among Euratom countries that the U.S. might terminate its supply of enriched uranium and the Soviet threat to "make a public issue" should the U.S. continue to distribute the substance. Given that Euratom nations had not yet concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA, Pollack and Hillenbrand supported the continued supply of uranium over Soviet objections and outlined a potential rationalization to use with the Soviets to assuage their concerns.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) December 1970-December 1971. Drafted by Loftness (SCI/AE) on December 3. Confidential. Drafted on December 3, by Loftness (SCI/AE) and concurred in by SCI/AE, ACDA, EUR/RPE, EUR/G, L/SCI. IO/SCT. Johnson initialed "Approve" on page 5 on December 7 but added a handwritten note stating, "on assumption AEC concurs & H does not perceive any Congressional problem." The attachments are not published.

The telegram informed the Mission that the Department, the ACDA, and the AEC had approved of continued U.S. supply of enriched uranium to Euratom countries. It then included a three part statement outlining the official statement to use should the Soviets question the decision either in a formal discussion or in an informal format.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-1973, DEF 18-6. Confidential; Priority. It was also sent priority to the Mission to the European Community in Brussels and repeated priority to Moscow. Drafted on February 23 by Haendler and Dodd (EUR/RPE); cleared in SCI, ACDA, EUR, IO, AEC, and the White House; and approved by Springsteen (EUR).

Farley recommended that Kissinger urge the Japanese to adhere to the NPT during his upcoming trip to that nation. Farley wanted to address recent reports cited in the Japanese press indicating that the U.S. had lost interest in Japanese adherence to the agreement. To correct this, he highlighted the following considerations for Kissinger to stress in his discussions: 1) U.S. interest in maintaining control over the number of nations with nuclear capabilities; 2) U.S. interest in the overall success of the agreement; and 3) U.S. interest in maintaining the momentum generated by U.S. Soviet cooperation in arms control.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 21, HAK Trip Files, HAK's Japan Visit, June 1972 (2 of 3). Confidential.

Sonnenfeldt reviewed the issue of delivery of U.S. nuclear material to Euratom after March 1, 1972. Concerned this could become an "irritant in U.S.-Soviet relations," Sonnenfeldt recommended the approval of a statement to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin detailing the reasons for the continued delivery.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 719, Country Files, Europe, USSR Vol. 22. Confidential. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Walsh. Haig initialed "OK" next to "Approve" on page three. An adjacent note in an unidentified hand states: "Livingston notified State by phone 5/25. To be followed by written confirmation by Mrs. Davis." All Tabs are not published.

Johnson requested that Kissinger stress the U.S. Government's interest in Japan's ratification of the NPT on his upcoming trip. He cited the recent Japanese press reports portraying the U.S. as lacking in its commitment to preventing Japan from acquiring nuclear weapons. These reports had also caused concern amongst Soviet officials in the IAEA. Johnson concluded by emphasizing the importance of putting "these fears to rest once and for all" and noting the reverberating effects the Japanese ratification would have on other "threshold" nations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 21, HAK Trip Files, HAK's Japan Visit, June 1972. Secret.

The President and Kissinger discussed the NPT and the Department of State’s effort to get Kissinger to urge Japanese ratification of the treaty while visiting that nation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 732–11. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the tape recording published here specifically for this volume.

Sonnenfeldt summarized negotiations between IAEA and Euratom on a safeguards agreement under the NPT. The attached telegram reported on a meeting between Department of State officials and a European Community delegation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 322, Subject Files, European Common Market, Vol. II 1971-1972. Confidential. Sent for information. At Tab A is Document 56. Initialed by Kissinger.

Sonnenfeldt forwarded a Department of State telegram containing the text of a verbal statement made by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Davies in response to an April 10 verbal statement by Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin complaining U.S. policy on nuclear fuel supplies to Euratom violated Article III of the NPT.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 720, Country Files, Europe, USSR Vol. XXIII. Confidential. Sent for information. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it. At Tab A is Document 56. [4/27]

In this memorandum, Pollack reviewed the safeguards agreement program and proposed moving ahead with negotiations for a U.S. safeguards agreement. This agreement was not ultimately concluded until November 1977.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, U.S. Safeguards Agreement with IAEA and Administrative Statements June-September 1972. No classification marking. Drafted on August 14 by Zook (SCI/AE) and concurred in by L, L/SCI, IO/SCT, S/PC, EUR/RPE, H, PM/AE, USAEC, ACDA, PM/DCA. Johnson initialed his approval on August 24. The attachments are not published.

The telegram discussed the reasons for the delay in signature of the Euratom–IAEA safeguards agreement. Disagreements over the limitation of inspector access were of particular importance to the delay. The postponement of the signature raised “serious problems” for the United States as it would suspend the implementation of the agreement, pave the way for those nations which had not adhered to the NPT, and raise additional obstacles in the U.S. Congress.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, AE 3 EURATOM. Limited Official Use. It was also sent to The Hague, and Vienna. It was repeated to EC Brussels, Paris, Luxembourg, and Rome. Drafted by Boright (ACDA); cleared in IO/SCT, EUR/GER, EUR/RPE, and USAEC/IP; and approved by Brewster (SCI/AE).