• Multimedia
• Blog
• Subscribe
• What's New
• Contact Us
• Archive

• Topic
  • A
  • B
  • C
  • D
  • E
  • F
  • G
  • H
  • I
  • J
  • K
  • L

  • M
  • N
  • O
  • P
  • Q
  • R
  • S
  • T
  • U
  • V
  • W
  • XYZ

  
  Select the list of topics to display.
• Country
  • A-B
  • C-E
  • F-K
  • L-O
  • P-S
  • T-Z
  • Regions

  Please choose a country or other area, or a Region.
• Publication Type
• Speaker
  • A-C
  • D-K
  • L-R
  • S-Z
• Date
  • • Most Recent
    • Past 7 days
    • Past 90 days

2. Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Commitee; Seabed Arms Control Treaty

-63. Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference, Spring Session 1969; Seabed Arms Control Treaty 63. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 5, 1969  [ PDF version   ] 

Kissinger recommended holding an NSC meeting to discuss the issues on the agenda for the upcoming Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) meeting in Geneva. In addition to this conference, he also recommended that an ad hoc study group be established to prepare a paper on the issues likely to be discussed, including the comprehensive test ban, ending production of fissionable material, and seabed arms control.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–136, NSSM 20. Secret. Nixon initialed his approval of both of Kissinger’s recommendations.

President Nixon directed that a study be prepared on the full range of issues and proposals involved in the ENDC meeting scheduled to resume on March 6, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–21, NSC Meeting, 3/15/69. Secret.

Smith reviewed the issues on the agenda for the March ENDC meeting. The items included a comprehensive test ban (CTB), seabed arms control, chemical and biological warfare (CBW), prohibitions on nuclear weapons or fissionable material, nuclear free zones, conventional disarmament, general and complete disarmament, and ENDC enlargement.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). Confidential.

Smith forwarded the four issues paper that had been prepared in response to NSSM 20. These detailed papers provide extensive background information, multiple perspectives, and proposals for the possible upcoming topics—comprehensive test ban, cut-off fissionable material production for weapons purposes, and seabed arms control—at the ENDC meeting.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-34, Senior Review Group Meeting, 3/6/69. Top Secret; Restricted Data; Limdis. The documents at Tabs B, C, and D and their attachments and annexes are not published.

The memorandum briefed Kissinger for the next day’s Review Group. It focused on the three key issues for the ENDC, the test ban, the halting of production of fissionable material, and arms control for the seabeds. He went on to outline the “substantial” disagreement between the AEC, the JCS, the ACDA, and the DOD on each item. On the second issue, the NPT, Keeny reiterated the U.S. position of not pressuring nations to sign the agreement. Also included was an Agenda for the following day’s ENDC meeting.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–34, Senior Review Group Meeting, 3/6/69. Top Secret. Sent for action.

The memorandum summarized the discussion at the March 6 NSC Review Group Meeting. The Review Group conducted a brief discussion of the accuracy of the paper “Positions of Key Countries on the Non Proliferation Treaty” and a more complete analysis of the preparations made for the upcoming ENDC.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01086A, Director of Central Intelligence, ER Subject File, Box 7, NSC Review Group. Secret. Prepared by R. J. Smith.

The three issues papers on the U.S. positions for the ENDC were forwarded to NSC members prior to the March 15 NSC meeting. These papers addressed the three key issues on the agenda of the ENDC, the comprehensive test ban, the cutoff of fissionable material production, and the seabed arms control. The papers fully detail the problems, issues, and summaries of each item.

Source: National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 83, NSC Meeting 1/29–4/9/69, ENDC–3/15/69 Meeting. Top Secret. Jeanne Davis forwarded the papers to Agnew, Rogers, Laird, and George Lincoln under cover of a March 10 memorandum in which she stated that the papers would be discussed at an NSC meeting on March 12. The NSC meeting was held on March 15.

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Smith discussed the upcoming ENDC meeting and signing of the NPT.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–3. Secret. Drafted on March 11 by Gleysteen. The meeting was held in Smith’s office at ACDA.

Prepared in anticipation of the March 12 NSC meeting, the paper outlined the four key issues on which the President should be prepared to make decisions. Although the paper encouraged the President to support the comprehensive test ban, it cautioned him not to “press for an agreement.” It then recommended that the President support the cutoff and insist the inspections be the responsibility of the IAEA. It requested the issue of seabed arms control be tabled to allow for future discussions. While the meeting was scheduled for March 12, it was held, instead, on March 15.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–21, NSC Meeting, ENDC 3/15/69. Top Secret. The paper is not signed and bears no indication of who drafted it or whether it was forwarded to the President.

This paper was prepared in the Department of Defense for use by Laird and Wheeler at the March 15 NSC meeting on the ENDC. The OSD and JCS opposed the support of a test ban, but had conflicting views on whether to support the CTB. On the issue of the proposed cut-off of fissionable material, the JCS and the OSD differed considerably. The OSD argued a cut-off was in the interest of U.S. security and the JCS disagreed with the assessment. Finally, both the OSD and the JCS agreed that a seabed arms control agreement was not in the interests of the U.S. and should not be supported.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, Box 7, FRC 330–75–103, 388.3 (August 1969). Top Secret. The approval lines on page 7 were signed by Vice Admiral Nels Johnson of the Joint Staff and Ralph Earle II, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Earle forwarded the talking paper to Laird under cover of a March 14 memorandum. (Ibid.) Document 69 includes the issues papers at Tab A. NSSM 20 at Tab B is Document 64. [2/12] The OSD/JCS paper at Tab C is not published.

In this memorandum, Smith noted that the only “negotiable” issue concerned the seabed arms control agreement. He then asked for the authority to make a specific proposal at the ENDC.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). Secret. The memorandum was forwarded to Kissinger by NSC staff member Keeny under cover of a March 14 memorandum. (Ibid.)

Seaborg kept detailed notes on the March 15 NSC meeting. At this discussion, participants examined the current U.S. position on the three key issues presented at the ENDC meeting—the comprehensive test ban, the cutoff of fissionable material production, and the seabed arms control proposal—and debated whether to modify the position. Ultimately, the participants agreed to maintain the U.S. position on all three issues.

Source: Department of Energy, Records of the U.S AEC, Job 65-42, Seaborg Diary, pp. 99100-99108. Confidential.

In this letter, publicly released on March 18, Nixon issued instructions to Smith on the positions he should take at the conference in order to usher in "an era of negotiations". Smith was to articulate the U.S. interest in working with other nations to address all issues on the agenda without making solid commitments to any one issue.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). No classification marking.

Kissinger discussed Director of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Smith's formal instructions for the ENDC. He attached a cable with a proposed change to the U.S. position on the fissionable material cutoff for Nixon's approval.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). Confidential. Sent for action. Nixon initialed "Approve." Attached are Documents 75 and 77. [3/15 letter; tel 3/18]

Secretary of State Rogers cabled detailed instructions to Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Smith during the ENDC conference. Rogers confirmed that the U.S. supported a CTB providing the on-site inspections were sufficiently verified and to restrict production of fissionable weapons materials. Moreover, the U.S. favored a seabed arms treaty, providing a list of four questions were satisfactorily discussed.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, DEF 18-3. Confidential; Immediate. It was repeated to USNATO, USUN, all NATO capitals, Tokyo, and Moscow. Drafted by Kranich (ACDA/IR) and Scoville (ACDA/ST); cleared in ACDA, AEC, DOD, J/PM, and the White House; and approved by Rogers.

The Soviets submitted a draft seabed arms control treaty at the opening session of the ENDC. This proposed treaty banned nuclear weapons and those of mass destruction from the seabed and the ocean floor outside of the twelve-mile territorial zone and opened those former ocean testing sites for inspection and verification.

Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1969, pp. 112-113. No classification marking.

In this memorandum, Haig recounted the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Wheeler's objection to the ACDA's proposal to transmit to Director of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Smith additional instructions that, in Wheeler's view, "clearly stepped beyond the bounds set earlier."

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). Confidential. The March 25 memorandum at Tab A has four attachments; the attachments at Tabs 1 and 2 are Documents 75 and 77; [3/15 letter; tel 3/18] the draft telegram at Tab 4 was sent, as revised, to the U.S. Mission in Geneva on March 22. (Telegram 44780; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, DEF 18-3)

Following a number of general observations, Smith set forth the United States position on the comprehensive test ban proposal, restrictions on fissionable weapons material, and the seabed arms treaty to the ENDC.

Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1969, pp. 131-138. No classification marking.

The telegram reported on the March 25 Co-Chairmen meeting in which Smith and Roshchin of the Soviet Union discussed progress toward a seabed arms treaty.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty through March 1969. Secret; Limdis; Priority. It was repeated to Moscow, USUN, and USNATO. Sonnenfeldt forwarded the telegram to Kissinger under a covering note noting "that things seem to be moving quite fast on this" and "we may find ourselves in the midst of a real negotiation on a treaty on the basis, so far, of telegraphic instructions rather than an NSC decision." (Ibid.)

Kissinger and Smith discussed the situation at the ENDC meeting in Geneva. Smith told Kissinger that "if we wanted the Seabed Treaty we could probably get one." Kissinger remarked that he thought the issue should go before the NSC.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, Box 359, 14-31 March 1969. No classification marking.

Kissinger outlined the debate over the proposed Soviet treaty to ban all military use of seabeds and highlighted the ACDA counter proposal targeting nuclear weapons only. He then recommended that the NSC consider whether a treaty prohibiting nuclear arms on the seabeds would be in the overall U.S. interest and what time scale they should follow should the negotiations continue. He attached a draft NSSM requesting a study of the issue for Nixon's consideration.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-146, NSSM 41. Confidential. Nixon initialed "Approve." The attachment at Tab A is not published. The signed and dated NSSM is Document 202. [8/11]

The President directed that a report outlining both the positive and negative perspectives on the proposed plan to prohibit the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabeds. Specifically, Nixon wanted an analysis of all alternate suggestions and their feasibility, possible influential factors, and whether seabed arms control was in the best interest of the U.S.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (1-42). Confidential. Haig initialed the memorandum.

The memorandum briefed Kissinger on key issues and differing policy positions for the upcoming Review Group meeting on a seabed arms control treaty. The March 12 NSC meeting revealed conflicting opinions over what weapons to ban, the territorial zone restrictions, and the feasibility of hosting an inspection.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-35, Senior Review Group Meeting, Seabeds 4/25/69. Top Secret; Sent for Action.

The study was prepared in response to NSSM 41 and addressed whether the agreement proposed by the U.S. was in its national interests; the feasibility of the alternative solutions introduced; whether the agreement should create a blanket ban or target only certain weapons; would apply to a specific zone; and if there should be provisions for inspection. The study continued with a discussion of possible difficulties and prospective successes on an issue by issue basis. It was then circulated, with revisions, on April 26 for discussion at the April 30 NSC meeting.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-22, NSC Meeting 4/30/69. Top Secret; Controlled Dissem; Limdis. Under cover of an April 26 memorandum, Jeanne Davis forwarded copies of the paper, for discussion at the NSC meeting on April 30, to Agnew, Rogers, Laird, Lincoln, Richardson, Wheeler, and Helms. She noted that the study had been revised to take into account comments received on the version distributed April 25. (Ibid.)

Ware transmitted a Talking Paper which discussed the projected seabeds treaty for Laird's use at the NSC meeting on April 30. The more detailed Talking Paper unpacked the nuanced disagreement between the OSD and JCS over security interests, factors, and prospective success of the proposed seabed treaty.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-75-103, 801.2, Jan-Mar. Top Secret. A stamped notation on Ware's memorandum indicated the Secretary of Defense saw it on April 30. The attached Talking Paper is signed by G. Warren Nutter and Vice Admiral Nels Johnson of the Joint Staff. Attached to the Talking Paper at Tabs A and B are Documents 86 and 84. [4/26 study; 4/11 NSSM]

Prepared in anticipation of the April 30 NSC meeting, the paper outlined the issues for decision. It recommended four things. First, that the President investigate the degree of opposition to the DOD position that the treaty is not in the overall interest of the United States before making any substantial decisions. Second, is to focus on a ban of fixed systems on the seabeds instead of all military activities. Third, that there should be no provision for a formal inspection to gauge compliance. Finally, that the zone be restricted to twelve miles.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-22, NSC Meeting 4/30/69. Secret. The paper is not signed and bears no indication of who drafted it or whether it was forwarded to the President. The attached intelligence report, SNIE 11-12-68, Emplacement of Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed, is not published. It is printed in part in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 271.

The discussion at the NSC meeting focused on the recent ENDC meeting in Geneva, Switzerland and whether to go ahead with a seabed arms control treaty. They introduced a detailed list of pros and cons concerning each facet of the proposed Soviet draft and the U.S. counterproposal and debated the provisions at length. The President concluded that negotiations should proceed.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, TS 82, NSC Meetings, April 1969. No classification marking. On page 9 of the minutes is written, "Could not understand the tape. There was an echo." The minutes were drafted on June 9, 1969. No final minutes have been found.

Laird indicated that he had suggestions for the wording of a draft treaty which he did not want to discuss at the April 30 NSC meeting. He wanted to get his changes to the President before the final draft was determined and he asked to send them over to Kissinger. Kissinger agreed.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 23-30 April 1969. No classification marking.

Kissinger and Smith discussed the proposed treaty and the NSC meeting earlier that day. Smith inquired into a comment made by President Nixon at the meeting and Kissinger responded with an outline of Nixon's general philosophy concerning international responsibility vis `a vis the seabeds treaty.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 23-30 April 1969. No classification marking.

Nutter forwarded a proposed memorandum to the President from Laird articulating the preferred DOD wording for the proposed seabed arms control treaty and discussed its purpose.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330-72-6309, 388.3 May-July 1969. Secret. The attachment is not published. The signed memorandum is Document 93. [5/1]

Laird indicated that the Defense Department did not favor a seabeds treaty; however, it suggested language for a treaty should the President decide to move ahead on it. The memorandum cautioned the President to take a "restrained and conservative" approach.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 382, Subject Files, Seabeds Vol. II. Secret.

Smith and Rogers discussed the problems associated with Laird's position concerning the proposed seabed treaty, specifically the potential future problems associated with Congressional approval of the agreement.

Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, Chronological/Working Files of G. Smith and P. Farley: FRC 383-97-10, January 1962-April 1977, Smith Correspondence with Secretary of State Rogers concerning SALT, NPT and the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), February 1969-May 1970. Secret; Exdis.

Sonnenfeldt forwarded Laird's May 1 memorandum to Kissinger and recommended that the President authorize presentation of a draft seabeds treaty at the ENDC incorporating the language proposed by Laird.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 382, Subject Files, Seabeds Vol. II. Secret; Noforn. Cleared in substance by Halperin. Tab A, the attached memorandum for the President, was not signed and forwarded by Kissinger and is not published.

Kissinger told Packard the President would probably go ahead with the treaty if Smith put into the draft the changes that DOD wanted.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1-14 May 1969. No classification marking.

Kissinger and Laird discussed the next steps in the "Seabed matter."

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1-14 May 1969. No classification marking.

Smith reported on a meeting with Rogers on the seabed arms control treaty.

Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, Chronological/Working Files of G. Smith and P. Farley, January 1962-April 1977: FRC 383-97-10, ACDA-Telephone Conversations Between Ambassador G. Smith and U.S. Government Officials, February-October 1969. No classification marking.

Laird indicated he was having problems with Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Smith. Smith had seen a letter written by Laird to the President and was upset about the first sentence noting Laird's opposition to the treaty.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1-14 May 1969. No classification marking.

Kissinger responded to Smith's concerns over Laird's letter to the President.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1-14 May 1969. No classification marking.

Smith summarized his conversations with Kissinger regarding Laird's letter.

Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, Chronological/Working Files of G. Smith and P. Farley, January 1962 - April 1977, ACDA - Telephone conversations Between Ambassador G. Smith and U.S. Government Officials, February-October 1969: FRC 383-97-10. Secret; Nodis; Absolutely No Distribution.

Smith informed Kissinger of steps taken toward a possible seabed arms control treaty and asked for authorization to start North Atlantic Council and Congressional consultations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 197,Agency Files, ACDA, 1/20/69-12/31/69. Confidential. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that it was received at the White House Situation Room on May 10 at 3:19 p.m. The attachments are not published. In the last paragraph the words "the State Operations Center" are crossed out and "S/S" substituted.

The Department transmitted instructions for consultations concerning the proposed U.S. draft for the seabed arms control treaty. It includes a commentary on each of the articles in the treaty.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 33–6. Confidential; Immediate. It was also sent immediate to USNATO, Tokyo, and all NATO capitals. It was repeated immediate to Moscow and USUN. Drafted by Durkee and Neidle (ACDA/IR); cleared in EUR, L, J/PM, J, EA, IO, AEC, OSD/ISA, JCS/SAAC, and the White House; and approved by Smith.

The telegram transmitted instructions to table the U.S draft of the seabeds treaty to offset focus on the Soviet proposal, but to submit it without Articles VII and VIII. These articles were deleted to appease German concerns articulated at the May 19 North Atlantic Council meeting.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, POL 33-6. Confidential; Immediate. It was repeated to immediate Bonn, USNATO, and USUN. Drafted by Malin (ACDA/IR); cleared in substance by Hillenbrand (EUR) and McIntyre (IO/UNP); and approved by Kranich (ACDA/IR).

The text of draft treaty, titled "United States Proposal Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft Treaty Prohibiting the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor," recognized national and global interest in restricting nuclear testing on the ocean floor and proposed six provisions articulating specific limitations.

Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1969, pp. 211-213. No classification marking.

Smith assessed the spring session of the ENDC and discussed plans for the summer session. The spring session made headway toward a suitable seabed arms control agreement. Smith requested to lead the summer delegation as well as he predicted an emphasis on biological and chemical warfare.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). Confidential. The memorandum bears Smith's typed signature.

Kissinger forwarded, for Nixon's approval, a message from the President to the ENDC to be read at the opening of the summer session.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). Confidential; Limdis. Sent for action. Kissinger initialed "Approve" for the President. The attached message is not published.

The Soviet Representative and Co-Chair of the ENDC, Alexey Roshchin, discussed with U.S. Representative and Co-Chair, James Leonard, a counterproposal to the United States May 22 draft seabed arms control treaty. In this discussion, the two men examined the differences between the articles proposed in the Soviet and U.S. drafts and analyzed the language of the Soviet counterproposal.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, POL 33-6. Secret; Limdis; Immediate. It was repeated to Moscow, USUN, and USNATO.

Smith articulated his thoughts on the new Soviet draft treaty to Rogers, noting that the Soviets embraced the U.S. emphasis on denuclearization over demilitarization and that the Soviet draft was indicative of the new "era of negotiation" the Nixon administration was working to cultivate. Smith then conducted a thorough, comparative analysis of the U.S. and Soviet proposals.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 9, NSC Miscellaneous-Seabed. Secret. "Secretary Saw," is written on page one. Tab B is Document 93. [5/1 Laird memo]

Farley informed Rogers about the difficulties that State and ACDA officials were having in their negotiations with DOD and JCS officials on how to respond to the Soviets' August 19 proposal on seabed arms control.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 9, NSC Miscellaneous-Seabed. Secret.

Kissinger and Smith discussed the problems associated with Article II of the proposed seabeds treaty. In previous meetings, the Soviets had agreed to apply the treaty outside of the 12 mile coastal zone. The Department of Defense, however, "refused to budge" on the zone extending outside three miles. Kissinger and Smith examined the issues associated with each side.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1-18 September 1969. No classification marking.

Smith stressed the urgency of responding to the Soviet proposed treaty. He encouraged Rogers to authorize Ambassadors Leonard and Ellsworth to negotiate with the Soviets and to accept the 12-mile zone.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 381 Subject Files, Seabeds Vol. I, May 1970. Secret. Smith forwarded the talking points to Rogers under cover of September 3 memoranda and sent a copy of the talking points to Kissinger the same day. (Ibid.)

Laird withdrew his objections to the 12 mile line providing there was some kind of provision preserving issues of accessibility.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1-18 September 1969. No classification marking.

Kissinger and Rogers discussed the 3 versus 12-mile issue.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1-18 September 1969. No classification marking.

Kissinger informed Smith that the President had agreed to go ahead with the 12-mile limit if a proviso was included for arms control purposes.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1-18 September 1969. No classification marking.

Nutter briefed Laird on the new U.S. draft treaty in light of JCS concerns. The JCS maintained the position that the treaty should not blanket weapons of mass destruction, but cover only "fixed weapons installation" and that the inspection provision be modified to prevent an implication of access. Nutter then attached a memorandum for Wheeler analyzing these issues.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-75-89, 801.2 (June- 1969). Secret. The attached memorandum to Wheeler, was signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard not Laird. Tabs A-D are not published.

The telegram transmitted the text of the new U.S. draft seabeds treaty, applying the 12 mile zone and articulating specific conditions for inspection.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, POL 33-5 Secret; Immediate; Limdis. It was also sent immediate to all NATO capitals and USMission Geneva. It was repeated to Canberra, Moscow, Tokyo, and USUN. Drafted by Hancock (ACDA/GC); cleared by Gleysteen (ACDA/IR) and in draft by Packard (DOD/OSD), Labowitz (AEC), Stevenson (L), Hillenbrand (EUR), Greene (IO), and Shaw (J/PM); and approved by Smith.

The telegram instructed USNATO to circulate the new draft treaty to other delegations. To expedite consideration of the draft by NATO Governments. Embassies at NATO capitals were instructed to convey the draft together with explanatory points provided in the telegram.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, POL 33-5. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Also sent immediate to all NATO capitals and USMission Geneva. It was repeated to Canberra, Moscow, Tokyo, and USUN. Drafted by Gleysteen and Malin (ACDA/IR); cleared in draft by Packard (DOD/OSD), Labowitz (AEC), Hancock (ACDA/GC), Stevenson (L), Hillenbrand (EUR), Greene (IO), and Shaw (J/PM); and approved by Smith.

The telegram reported North Atlantic Council approval to proceed with discussion of the draft U.S. treaty with the Soviet Co-Chairman. It then provided a detailed summary of the comments made by each permanent representative.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, POL 33-6. Secret; Limdis. It was repeated to all NATO capitals, Canberra, Moscow, Tokyo, USMission Geneva, and USUN.

The telegram reported Soviet Representative Roshchin's questions and comments upon receiving copy of the new U.S. draft.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, POL 33-5. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. It was repeated to Moscow, USNATO and USUN.

Farley discussed the issue of coastal waters raised by the Soviets and outlined five alternative courses of action.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-72-6309, 388.3 (August-September 1969). Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicated Nutter saw it.

Wheeler indicated that, of the five alternatives introduced by Farley in his September 24 memorandum, the Chiefs agreed alternative two—removing reference to "historic waters"—was the least detrimental to U.S. security.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-72-6309, 388.3 (August-September 1969). Secret. Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original.

Nutter responded to Farley's September 24 memorandum citing alternative two as the least detrimental to U.S. security. In the explanation of DOD's concerns, Nutter noted that alternate two eliminated Soviet claim to the strategically important Sea of Okhotsk as "historic waters" and therefore opened it to compliance inspections.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-72-6309, 388.3 (August-September 1969). Secret. Printed from a copy that indicates Nutter signed the original.

Sonnenfeldt forwarded for Kissinger's approval draft instructions to Geneva outlining the compromise reached by State, ACDA, and Defense on territorial waters.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 381, Subject Files, Seabeds Vol. I, May 1970. Secret; Limdis. Sent for urgent action. Kissinger initialed "Approve." A handwritten notation on the first page reads, "Watts informed." Tabs B and C are Documents 121 and 123. [Farley, 9/24; Nutter, 9/26]

The telegram transmitted further Soviet comments on the new U.S. draft seabeds treaty, accepting the majority of the draft but rejecting the U.S. provision establishing the coastal zone as articulated by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 381, Subject Files, Seabeds Vol. I, May 1970. Secret.; Limdis. It was repeated to Moscow, USNATO, and USUN.

The telegram instructed Leonard to seek a meeting with Soviet Representative Roshchin. At the proposed meeting, Leonard was to present a detailed response addressing each issue articulated by the Soviets with regards to the seabeds treaty.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, POL 33-5. Secret; Limdis. Also sent to USNATO and Tokyo. It was repeated to USUN, Moscow, and all NATO capitals. Drafted by Gleysteen (ACDA/IR) and Hancock (ACDA/GC); cleared by Sonnenfeldt and, in draft, in PM, H, AEC, IO, EUR, L, and DOD/ISA; and approved by Smith.

The telegram transmitted the text of the joint U.S.-Soviet draft seabed treaty, to be tabled on October 7.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, POL 33-5. Secret; Limdis. Also sent to USNATO. It was repeated to USUN and U.S. embassies in Athens, Bonn, Brussels, Canberra, Copenhagen, The Hague, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Oslo, Moscow, Ottawa, Paris, Reykjavik, Rome, and Tokyo.

Text of the revised "American-Soviet Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof."

Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1969, pp. 507-509. No classification marking.

Kissinger complained to Rogers about the way that ACDA Director Smith handled the seabed arms control treaty.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, November 11-17, 1969. No classification marking.

The telegram discussed problems and prospects for the seabed arms control treaty in the UN General Assembly. It reiterated the more problematic issue of the Article defining the "contiguous zone," the potential Argentinean objection, and the various positions feasible in light of the previous extensive negotiations between the U.S. and USSR centered around that same issue.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, POL 33-6. Confidential. It was repeated to USNATO and USMission Geneva.

The telegram transmitted the Soviets' revised draft seabed treaty.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 381, Subject Files, Seabeds Vol. 1, May 1970. Confidential; Limdis. It was repeated to USUN and USNATO.

The telegram reported on the discussion at the co-chairmen's meeting of the Soviets' revised draft seabed treaty. The Soviets had made only minor changes and accepted all of the U.S. suggestions. As a result, Soviet Co-Chair Roshchin informed U.S. Co-Chair Leonard of the Soviet desire to compete consideration of the treaty by the end of the Spring Session. Leonard disagreed.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-1973, POL 33-6. Confidential. It was repeated to USUN, USNATO, and Vienna.

The telegram directed that U.S. NATO distribute the Soviets' revised draft seabed treaty to NATO delegations and that embassies in NATO capitals circulate it to their respective Governments. It then concluded with a positive projection for the passage of the new draft at the upcoming CCD meeting.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-1973, POL 33-6. Confidential; Priority. It was also sent to all NATO capitals, USMission Geneva, and Tokyo. It was repeated to Moscow, USUN, and Vienna. Drafted by Malin (ACDA/IR); cleared by Neidle (ACDA/IR) and in draft in ACDA/GC, PM/DCA, LO/PMO, EUR/RPM, IO/UNP, OSD/ISA, and the White House; and approved by Farley (ACDA/DD). The treaty, the text of which was essentially the same as in Document 131 [4/13, State 1145] was submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on April 23 and is printed, along with statements by the U.S. and Soviet representatives to the Committee, in Documents on Disarmament, 1970, pp. 175-188.

The telegram focused on the seabed arms control treaty in its wrap-up of the 1970 meetings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. It lauded the consensus supporting the revised treaty as the "main accomplishment of 1970," and listed those nations which had articulated their support of the draft.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-1973, DEF 18-3 Switz (GE). Confidential. It was repeated to Moscow, Mexico City, Rio De Janeiro, Buenos Aires, USUN, and USNATO, and pouched to 21 other embassies.

The telegram reported on U.S.-Soviet consultations on plans for submitting a seabed disarmament resolution to the UN General Assembly and individually examined the response of the other delegates who supported the agreement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-1973, POL 33-6. Confidential. It was repeated to USMission Geneva, USNATO, and Moscow.

The telegram reported on the status of negotiations at the UN General Assembly over a resolution commending the seabed arms control treaty, highlighting the positive response to the draft and noting all CCD allies of both the U.S. and USSR would co-sponsor the resolution.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-1973, POL 33-6. Confidential. It was repeated to USNATO and USMission Geneva.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 33–6. Confidential; Priority. It was repeated to USUN and USDEL SALT III.. Drafted by Rodes (ACDA/IR); cleared in IO/UNP, PM/DCA, and EA/IND; and approved by Day (ACDA/IR). The resolution, 2660 (XXV), passed on December 7, 1970 by a vote of 104 to 2, with 2 abstentions.

Text of the "Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof," opened on this day for signature in Washington, London, and Moscow .

Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1971, pp. 7-11. No classification marking. For text of President Nixon's remarks at the signing ceremony on February 11, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 150-151. The treaty was approved by the U.S. Senate on February 15, 1972, by a vote of 83 to 0, and ratified by the President on April 26, 1972. It entered into force on May 18, 1972.