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3. Chemical and Biological Warfare; Geneva Protocol; Bilological Weapons Convention

-139. Chemical and Biological Warfare; Geneva Protocol; Biological Weapons Convention 139. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 30, 1969  [ PDF version   ] 

Laird recommended that the National Security Council undertake an immediate review of U.S. chemical and biological weapons programs.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-75-0089, Box 50, 370.64 CBR (April 1969). Confidential. Sent for action.

Kissinger recommended the President approve an NSSM calling for an overall study of U.S. policy on chemical and biological warfare and agents.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-153, NSSM 1-348, NSSM 59. Secret. Sent for action. The attached NSSM is printed in Document 141. [5/28]

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (43–103). Secret. A copy was sent to Wheeler.

In this meeting, Laird stated that it was important to discontinue the use of the term CBW term as such since it lumps together two separate programs, one for chemical warfare and one for biological research.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-28, Office Chrons, June-Aug 1969. Secret.

Laird indicated he wanted the views of the various interested DOD elements incorporated in DOD's input into the NSSM 59 study and he wanted to be consulted as DOD papers on key policy issues were formulated.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-75-89, 370.64 CBR (August 1969). Confidential. A handwritten notation by Laird stated: "Warren—As you know I requested this study and I'm most interested in it—hope the item I discussed at Monday staff meeting is handled as per my instruction. MRL."

This detailed CIA report, entitled "Disarmament: Chemical-Biological Warfare Controls and Prospects for Improvement," provided historical background, analysis, and projections on chemical-biological warfare controls and the prospects for improvement.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare-Vol. I. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem.

Halperin informed Kissinger that DOD's input into the NSSM 59 study would be delayed. It then provided a five-page overview of U.S. policy, programs, and issues of chemical and biological arms control.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare-Vol. I. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it on September 23.

As chairman of the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group, Spiers discussed the delay in response to NSSM 59 from the Department of Defense and the implications of the delay.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-153, NSSM 1-348, NSSM 59. Secret. Halperin forwarded Spiers' memorandum to Kissinger under cover of a September 10 memorandum. (Ibid.)

Kissinger extended to October 5 the due date for completion of the NSSM 59 study.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-153, NSSM 1-348, NSSM 59. Secret. It was also sent to Laird, Helms, DuBridge, and Gerard Smith. A copy was sent to Wheeler.

Rogers and Gromyko discussed the Soviet proposals to ban chemical and biological weapons and to maintain international security that were before the UN General Assembly.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, POL US-USSR 5/1/69. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William D. Krimer. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Towers in New York City.

The Department of State issued instructions to the United Nations and the Committee on the Conference for Disarmament delegations on how to handle the UN General Assembly discussions of chemical and biological warfare while awaiting NSC guidance from the NSSM 59 review.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, POL 27-10 UN. Confidential. It was also sent to USMission Geneva. It was repeated to Ottawa, London, Moscow, Stockholm, and USNATO. Drafted on October 3 by Day and Lorenz (IO/UNP); cleared in IO, IO/UNP ACDA, ACDA/GC, L, L/UNA, DOD/ISA (info), and PM; paragraph 6 was cleared in substance in DOD/OGC; and approved by De Palma.

Yost noted that the U.S. delegation would be in considerable difficulties if the U.S. position on CBW remained unsettled and expressed hope that a decision could be made to seek ratification of the 1925 Protocol.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 296, Agency Files, U.S.U.N., Vol. II, 1 Aug 1969-31 Jan 1970, Pt. 3. Confidential and Personal.

This ten-page analytical summary of the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group Paper on CBW, prepared in response to NSSM 59, addressed U.S. policy on biological and chemical warfare, and the use of tear gas in war.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-40, Review Group Meeting Folders, NSSM 59, CW and BW, 10/30/69. Top Secret. The summary was prepared for the NSC Review Group meeting on October 30. The summary bears no drafting information.

The Talking Points outlined the policy issues for discussion at the upcoming Review Group meeting under three main headings: 1) biological warfare; 2) chemical warfare; 3) ratification of the Geneva Protocol and the use of tear gas and herbicides.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-40, Review Group Meeting, NSSM 59, CW and BW, 10/30/69. Top Secret. The handwritten revisions made to II A ("1," "2," "3," and "appears to be"), to II B ("Option one and perhaps option two"), and to III B ("1" and "2") are in an unknown hand. Other handwritten markings are Kissinger's, including "incapacitants" on page 4, "Def. of retaliatory capability?" at the top of page 5, "State & Defense in disagreement" at the bottom of page 5, and "Why? State?" on page 6.

In this memorandum, Guhin discussed the Talking Points prepared on CBW for Kissinger for the upcoming NSC Review Group meeting. He then attached an outline of probable agency positions on the various policy issues.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-40, Review Group Meeting, NSSM 59, CW and BW, 10/30/69. Top Secret. Sent for information.

The group discussed chemical and biological weapons for 90 minutes. Over the course of the meeting, participants specified 7 changes to be made in reworking the IPMG paper—which included regrouping the issues into categories; clarifying the distinction between offensive and defensive R&Ds; outlining the arguments for and against informing the German Government on the deployment of chemical weapon stocks in Germany; specifying policy on the UK’s draft biological weapons convention; defining an adequate chemical weapons retaliatory capability; a discussion of the ratification of the Geneva Protocol; and the possibility of requiring a Presidential decision to use tear gas in conflicts other than Vietnam.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, Meeting Minutes, SRG Minutes 1969. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. The minutes bear no drafting information.

This fifty-one page report on CBW, prepared in response to NSSM 59 and revised following the October 29 Review Group meeting, outlined the U.S. policies on chemical and biological warfare and agents and was considered at the NSC meeting on November 18.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-25, NSC Meeting, 11/18/69, CBW, NSSM 59. Top Secret. Davis forwarded the report to Agnew, Rogers, Laird, Lincoln, Mitchell, Richardson, Wheeler, Helms, Gerard Smith, and DuBridge under cover of a November 12 memorandum in which she noted that it reflected discussion at the October 30 Review Group meeting and would be considered at the upcoming NSC meeting. (Ibid.) Under cover of a November 17 memorandum, Davis notified recipients of the IMPG report that on page 46, line 4, the text should read, "The United States has not sought to establish…." (Ibid, Box H-153, NSSM 59)

Kissinger responded to Yost that the National Security Council would discuss the issue on November 19 and that Yost would be given policy guidance on the 1925 Protocol and other CBW issues shortly thereafter.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 296, Agency Files, U.S.U.N., Vol. II, 1 Aug 1969-31 Jan 1970, Pt. 3. Confidential.

Kissinger briefed the President for the NSC meeting on CBW the next day, emphasizing the need to develop frameworks compatible with the national security and arms control objectives. The attached Issues for Decision paper outlined Kissinger's recommendations for the policies on the use of chemical and biological weapons; the use of tear gas in relation to the 1925 protocol established by the Geneva Convention; and the authorization policy for the use of tear gas and herbicides in war.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-25, NSC Meeting, 11/18/69, CBW, NSSM 59. Top Secret. The attached Talking Points are not published.

Kissinger and Laird had a brief discussion of CBW issues in anticipation of the NSC meeting the next day.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, November 11-17, 1969. No classification marking.

Kissinger and Laird discussed further the upcoming NSC meeting on CBW.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, November 18-28, 1969. No classification marking.

The meeting focused on U.S. chemical warfare policies. It included some discussion of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical and biological agents in warfare and where tear gas and herbicides fit into that agreement.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Meeting Minutes Originals, 1969. Top Secret. The minutes bear no indication of who drafted them. The attachments (the NSC book and Helms' briefing on Soviet chemical and biological warfare) are not published.

The conversation dealt with follow-up to the NSC meeting and the possible draft of a legislative strategy to address the CBW.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, November 18-28, 1969. No classification marking.

Kissinger informed Tomkins about the decision to be announced the next day concerning chemical and biological weapons.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 18-28 November 1969. No classification marking.

Among the President's decisions on chemical warfare and bacteriological/biological research were decisions to submit the Geneva Protocol for Senate ratification and to associate the U.S. with the UK draft convention on biological warfare presented to the ENDC in August 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs (1-50). Top Secret; Nodis. A copy was sent to Wheeler.

The President highlighted his decisions on CBW. This statement confirmed the U.S. alliance with the objectives of the UK Draft Convention banning the use of biological agents in war. It included the decision to submit the 1925 Geneva Protocol, prohibiting the first use of chemical and biological agents in warfare, to the U.S. Senate for ratification. Moreover it established a research agenda to investigate the methods of disposal for bacteriological weaponry and restricted research to “defensive measures” only.

Source: Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 968–969. No classification marking. For text of the President’s remarks on his CBW decisions, made the same day, see ibid., pp. 969–970.

Guhin briefed Kissinger on the CBW resolutions at the UN. He then attached a Department of State telegram transmitting guidance to the U.S. Mission to the UN.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 29, Agency Files, U.S.U.N. Vol. II, 1 Aug 69-31 Jan 70- [Part 3]. No classification marking. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it on December 3. A copy was sent to Behr and Sonnenfeldt.

The paper discussed a New York Times article that alleged an interagency disagreement over whether toxins were more properly classified, for purposes of the President's November 25 statement, as chemical or biological agents.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-75-0103, 370.64 CBR, October-December. Top Secret.

Laird noted that there was no disagreement on labeling toxins as chemicals and told Kissinger it was essential to stop the ACDA people from discussing toxins.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 9-16 December 1969. No classification marking.

Guhin briefed Kissinger on the toxins issue. Guhin included the definition of "toxin", an outline of the current toxins program, and those arguments in favor and opposed to maintaining a complete toxin program. He concluded with a commentary on the ways in which the information given fit into the larger international discussion of the Geneva Conference and the UK Draft Convention.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. I. Top Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicated Kissinger saw it December 20.

Kissinger and Laird engaged in a detailed discussed about the hearings in the House of Representatives concerning the toxins issue.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 17-31 December 1969. No classification marking.

Guhin forwarded a draft NSSM indicating the President authorized a study and review, to be conducted by the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group, of current U.S. programs and policies on toxins. Given that the Joint Chiefs, and the Departments of State and Defense, had already undertaken steps to comply with the request for information, Guhin noted there should be no difficulty complying with the January 9 deadline.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-168, NSSM 85. Secret. Sent for action. At Tab A is a draft of Document 173. [12/31 NSSM] At Tab B is Document 170. [12/18 Guhin memo] At Tab C is a document (not published) in the margin of which Kissinger wrote that a NSSM should be issued for the following reasons: "Laird's sensitivity;" it was "a policy & not an operational issue;" the President should "get credit."

The President informed the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Directors of Arms Control and the Office of Science and Technology that, in compliance with NSSM 59, he had directed the preparation of a study on all aspects of U.S. policy and programs with respect to toxins. The report was due January 16.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (43-103.) Secret. A copy was sent to Helms and Wheeler.

Guhin briefed Kissinger on the status of the Geneva Protocol package, explaining that a Presidential decision was needed on three contentious issues before the Protocol package could be completed: the use of riot control agents and herbicides; issuing a separate NSDM for these two agents; and the U.S. right to retaliate with CBW.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. Sent through Behr (NSC). Haig initialed the memorandum. Kissinger wrote on the first page, "Where is the Geneva Protocol package? When can we move it?"

Yost advised that a decision not to ban the use of toxins, or to allow for their continued manufacture, would be seen as a retreat from the President's position announced November 25 by members of the United Nations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 296, Agency Files, U.S.U.N. Vol. II, 1 Aug 69-31 Jan 70-. Confidential; Limdis. It was repeated to the White House.

The Review Group met to consider the draft NSSM 85 study on U.S. toxin policy. The group agreed to make some substantive changes to Part II but did not render any policy decisions.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, Meeting Minutes, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Secret. This meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. The response to NSSM 85 is Document 177. [1/30]

Prepared in response to NSSM 85, this two part analysis of U.S. policies, programs, and operational concepts, with respect to toxins, provided a detailed discussion of IS and foreign production capabilities, those existing research programs investigating chemical and biological agents, and the possibly utility of toxins by the U.S. military. It then outlined the ways in which the international community dealt with the issue of toxins in the 1907 Hague Convention, the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and the UK Draft Convention. Part II was devoted to a close examination of the U.S. policies, programs, and preparedness surrounding possible chemical warfare in light of the international agreements.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-26, NSC Meeting 2/11/70, Policy on Toxins. Secret. The report was submitted to the NSC by the IPMG on January 21 and revised following the Review Group meeting on January 29.

Nutter discussed the drafting of a joint memorandum to the President on the recent U.S. ratification of the Geneva Protocol. Before the memorandum would be sent to the President, Secretary of Defense Laird wanted the issues raised by the memorandum considered by the Under Secretaries Committee.

Source: Gerald Ford Library, Melvin Laird Papers, Box 38, Chemical Warfare & Biological Research, Vol. II, Jan-Dec. 1970, Calendar (1). Secret. The draft memorandum at Tab A is not published. The attachment at Tab B, signed by Packard, is Document 179. [2/2/70]

Packard requested an Under Secretaries Committee meeting to review the draft memorandum on the Geneva Protocol.

Source: Gerald Ford Library, Melvin Laird Papers, Box 38, Chemical Warfare & Biological Research, Vol. II, Jan-Dec. 1970, Calendar (1). Confidential.

Guhin updated Kissinger on the status of the Geneva Protocol package. Per Secretary of Defense Laird's request, the joint memorandum prepared by Departments of State and Defense had been sent to the Under Secretaries Committee for review. Guhin noted the next meeting would take place on February 12. He then commented on the necessity of expediting the ratification of the Geneva Protocol or risk criticism from the President's political opponents.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 338, Subject Files, HAK/Richardson Meetings, January 1970- March 1970. Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Behr (NSC). Document 175 [1/27 memo] and its attachment include Tabs A and B. The document at Tab C is not published. Kissinger wrote at the top of page one, "Discuss with Richardson to-morrow." Guhin's memorandum is attached to a January 6 memorandum by Haig, according to which Kissinger discussed the issue with Richardson on the 6 and both agreed to have the Under Secretaries Committee meet "at an early date."

The memorandum lists the main points of a CIA report on commercial toxin production in the U.S.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. Sent through Behr (NSC). None of the attachments are published.

Shakespeare commented on the NSSM 85 report on toxin policy. He emphasized the importance of maintaining the credibility of the President's November 25 renunciation of biological weapons, for fear it could potentially damage his reputation domestically and internationally. Then outlined those points in the study he believed would be helpful in maintaining that credibility.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-26, NSC Meeting 2/11/70, Policy on Toxins. Secret. The attachment is not published.

Smith recommended Option III in the NSSM 85 report on toxin policy, renouncing the use of toxins and confining development to defensive purposes. Smith argued the other two options could incur potentially high political costs by undermining the President's November 25 announcement and that the prohibition of synthesized toxins would not impede upon U.S. security interests enough to outweigh the prospective damage to the U.S. reputation in the international community.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-26, NSC Meeting 2/11/70, Policy on Toxins. Secret.

DuBridge recommended Option II in the NSSM 85 report on toxin policy, arguing it would be more favorably received in public forums than Option I and less restrictive of DOD's future activities than Option III.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-26, NSC Meeting 2/11/70, Policy on Toxins. Secret.

Richardson recommended Option III of NSSM 85. Richardson argued the political liabilities for maintaining an arsenal of toxic weaponry vastly outweighed the potential national security benefits of the other two Options.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-1973, POL 27-10. Secret.

Van Dorn discussed the differences between State, the ACDA and DOD on three issues in the draft memorandum for the President on the Geneva Protocol.

Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of Director, Subject Files of the Former Executive Director Office, December 1969-December 1970: FRC 383-98-0004, Chemical Biological and Radiological Warfare (CBW), Laser Technology and U.S. Position on Toxins, February 1970. Secret. Drafted by Van Doren (ACDA/GC). The memorandum is an unsigned copy. The attachment is not published. No record of the Under Secretaries Committee meeting was found.

Packard indicated that Secretary of Defense Laird favored Option II in the NSSM 85 report on toxin policy but did not believe it was urgent to announce U.S. policy on toxins in the immediate future. Packard then analyzed the differences which led to the JCS recommendation of Option I and the Department of Defense recommendation of Option II.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. I. Secret.

Kissinger outlined the three options on toxin policy, reviewed the agency recommendations, endorsed Option II, and attached a draft NSDM and draft public statement. The President approved Option III.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-26, NSC Meeting 2/11/70, Policy on Toxins. Secret; Nodis. The President initialed his approval of the draft NSDM. Written above his approval is "OPTION III." The President also initialed his approval of the draft public statement.

The White House announced its new policy on toxins, renouncing the use of toxins in warfare and restricting all programs concerning toxins to defensive purposes only.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-26, NSC Meeting 2/11/70, Policy on Toxins. No classification marking.

The NSDM listed the President's decisions, in accordance with Option III of NSDM 85, on U.S. policy on toxins.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs (1-50). Secret. A copy was sent to Wheeler.

Guhin briefed Kissinger on the three issues for Presidential decision prior to submitting the Geneva Protocol to the Senate. Noting that the U.S. use of herbicides in Southeast Asia would most likely come under the scrutiny of the U.S. Senate, Guhin introduced three possible options for informing the Senate of the Administration's decision to interpret the Geneva Protocol as allowing for the use of tear gas and herbicides in war.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Behr and Kennedy (NSC). Haig initialed the memorandum. At Tab A is a draft of Document 192. [3/10]

Kissinger presented Nixon with the three options outlined by National Security Council member Michael Guhin in his February 25 memorandum and proposed taking Congressional soundings prior to making a final decision. Nixon approved but instructed Kissinger to resubmit the options in thirty days.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. II. Secret. Sent for action. Nixon checked "Approve" and wrote "But" next to his check. Below he wrote, "Delay all this for 30 days - ask me then - give no ["no" is underlined twice] reasons - Just say the matter is being prepared - The Senate isn't ready to take it up anyway."

Guhin forwarded, and Kissinger approved, a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Laird requesting his recommendations on the destruction of biological weapons, future candidates for the Directorate of Biological Operations, and the transfer of biological weapons facilities.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H-212 and H-213, NSDM 35. Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Robert Behr (NSC). Kissinger wrote on the memorandum, "Doesn't need Pres. Give Laird 2 weeks in memo." Rather than forwarding the memorandum at Tab I to the President, Kissinger initialed approval for him. The memorandum to Laird at Tab A, revised to provide a two week deadline, is Document 195. (6/15)

Kissinger asked Laird for Defense's recommendations on the destruction of biological weapons and the transfer of biological weapons facilities.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H-212 and H-213, NSDM 35. Secret.

At an NSC operations staff meeting, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger asked Colonel Behr to redraft a staff paper on the ways in which Congressional testimony during the ratification hearings for the Geneva Protocol could be used to reserve the right to use tear gas and herbicides.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 314, National Security Council, 1969-77, Staff Meetings 1969-1971. Secret. Prepared by Jeanne Davis.

Guhin forwarded two versions of a memorandum for the President requesting his decision on how to proceed on ratifying the Geneva Protocol while reserving the right to use tear gas and herbicides.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc) Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Behr and Kennedy. The attachments are not published.

Guhin reviewed recent Congressional comments in response to the delay in submitting the Geneva Protocol for ratification, discussed options for submitting it during the summer, and attached a letter from Senator Fulbright.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc) Vol. II. Confidential. Sent for information. The memorandum was sent through Behr. A handwritten notation on the top, right hand corner of the memorandum states, "Action." Kissinger wrote at the top of page one, "Pres. has answered memo - Now how about timing?" Following the last sentence on page two is written, "Behr/Guhin now working on this."

Kissinger forwarded an interagency decision memorandum for the President, along with his own analyses and recommendations, asking inter alia how the administration should reserve the right to use tear gas and herbicide when it submits the Geneva Protocol to the Senate.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc) Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. The President initialed his approval of all of Kissinger's recommendations. The attachment at Tab C is not published. At Tab D is Document 192. [3/10/70] At Tab E is an attachment to Document 197. [6/25/70] At Tab A is a draft of Document 201. [8/5] At Tab B is a draft of Document 202. [8/11 NSDM 78]

Laird responded to Kissinger’s June 15 memorandum with a complete outline of the Defense Department’s recommendations on the destruction of biological weapons and the transfer of biological weapons facilities.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc) Vol. II. Secret. Kissinger initialed the memorandum next to the subject line

Kissinger recommended prompt submission of the Geneva Protocol to the Senate and a meeting with key Senators.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc) Vol. II. Secret. Sent for action. The President initialed his approval on August 4.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 27–10. Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to Laird and Moorer.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs (51–96). Secret. A copy was sent to Moorer.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3 Switz (GE). Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Malin (ACDA/IR); cleared by Perry (SOV); and approved by Day (ACDA/IR).

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 314, National Security Council (Classified), 1969–77, Meetings, Staff, 1969–71. Secret. Prepared by Davis on August 19.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 82, White House Special Files, President's Office Files 1969–74, Memoranda for the President, Beginning 8/16/70. No classification marking. Prepared by BeLieu on August 19. An attached list of signatories to the Protocol is not published.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc) Vol. II. Secret. Sent for information. Written at the top of page one is “copy to John Whitaker & Ken Cole.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc) Vol. III. Secret. Sent for action. A handwritten notation on page two indicates that Kissinger approved the memorandum for the President. It was sent to Laird on December 15. (Ibid.) The attachments at Tabs A, B, C, H, and I are not published. NSDMs 35 and 44 (at Tab G) are Documents 165 and 190; [11/25/69; 2/20/70] Laird’s July 6 memorandum and the inventory of weapons (at Tabs E and F) are Document 199 and its attachment; and Kissinger’s memorandum at Tab D is an attachment to Document 207. [9/14]

Source: 1 p. Gerald Ford Library, Melvin Laird Papers, Box 39, Chemical Warfare & Biological Research– Vol. III– Jan. 1971–July 1972, Calendar (1). No classification marking.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (104–206). Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to Moorer. In an April 23, 1971, memorandum, Kissinger notified recipients of NSSM 112 that the due date for the NSSM study had been extended to October 15, 1971. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 27–10 VIET)

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, Top Secret, POL 27–10 VIETS. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Pickering of PM. The memoranda at Tabs C and D are published but not the press release at Tab D. At Tabs A is Document 212. [2/2 to Laird] A revised version of the memorandum at Tab B is Document 214. [2/11 to Pres]

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 27–10 VIETS. Top Secret; Exdis. The attachment is Document 214. [2/11] In a February 3 memorandum, Eliot notified Laird’s aide, General Pursley, that Rogers planned to forward his memorandum to the President on or about February 10, not February 1 as Rogers’ letter erroneously stated. (Ibid.)

Source: Washington National Records Center, ACDA Central Depository of Top Secret Documents Covering the Period of July 1955–April 1983: FRC 383–98–162, NSC Under Secretaries Committee, Annual Review of U.S. Chemical Warfare and Biological Research Programs, February 1971. Top Secret. The attached Annual Review is not published.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, Top Secret, POL 27–10. Top Secret; Exdis. In a February 11 memorandum, Eliot informed Rogers that DOD did not concur with an immediate phase-out of defoliants in Vietnam and Rogers’ memorandum to the President had been revised to reflect that fact. (Ibid.)

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. III. Secret.

Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1971, pp. 19–21. No classification marking.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. III. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. Kissinger wrote on the memorandum, “OBE” (Overtaken By Events) and “(Put into personal file).” Attached is Document 214.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–197, 370.64 CBR (Feb–Mar). No classification marking. Written at the bottom is, “Dick, “Capen has talked to Sen. Sparkman and Sen Aiken. They were not upset in the first place. This is a ‘non-issue’ contrived by Sen. Fulbright’s staff. REP [Robert E. Pursley].” A stamped notation on the memorandum indicated the Secretary of Defense saw it March 22.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. IV [Part 1]. No classification marking. The attachments are not published. Kissinger wrote on the memorandum, “Talk to Pursley—that we want higher level representative.” In a March 20 note, Kennedy wrote at the bottom of the memorandum, “Dave—“Adm Murphy advised that both Secretary Laird & Mr. Packard were already committed to appearances with the Hill on the 22nd. I informed Ted Curran that DOD had been urged to provide higher level representation but was unable to do so—for the delay in appearing would affront the Committee. Curran noted that he would make a note for the file to this effect and assume the matter was put to rest.” A note adjacent to “(Tab A)” in line one of the memorandum reads, “—destroyed—telcon of 3/17/71, jlj.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 27–10. Secret.

Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1971, pp. 190–194. No classification marking.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. IV [Part 1]. Confidential. Sent for information. Sent through Behr (NSC). Kissinger initialed the memorandum. The attachment is not published; the text of the draft convention contained in the telegram is Document 231. [3/30 above]

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. IV. Secret; Exdis.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18. Confidential; Priority. It was repeated to London, Moscow, USNATO, USUN, and USDel SALT.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. IV [Part I]. Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicated the President saw it. The instructions at Tab C were transmitted in Document 226. [4/28 tel]

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. IV [Part I]. Confidential; Priority. It was repeated to USNATO, Moscow, USUN, USDel SALT, and London. Drafted by McCormack (ACDA/IR); cleared by Farley (ACDA), Pickering (PM), Anderson (DOD/ISA), De Palma (IO), Rhinelander (L), and Kissinger; and approved by Rogers.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. IV [Part I]. Confidential. It was repeated to USNATO, Moscow, USUN, USDel SALT IV, and London. Drafted by McCormack and Neidle (ACDA/IR); cleared by Farley (ACDA), Pickering (PM), Anderson (DOD/ISA), De Palma (IO), Rhinelander (L), and Kissinger; and approved by Rogers.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. IV [Part 2]. Confidential. It was repeated to London, USNATO, USUN, and USDel SALT IV. Drafted by McCormack and Neidle (ACDA/IR); paragraphs 7 and 8 were cleared in OSD/ISA, ACDA/GC, PM/DCA, IO/UNP, and L/PM, and, in substance, in the White House; and approved by Farley (ACDA). The proposed text in paragraph 7 was added to the text of Document 226 [4/28 telegram 72644] and sent as telegram 71873 to all NATO capitals on May 6, 1971. (Ibid., Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. IV [Part 2].)

Source: Gerald Ford Library, Melvin Laird Papers, Box 39, Chemical Warfare & Biological Research, Vol. III Jan. 1971–July 1972, Calendar (5). Secret; Sensitive.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–179, NSSM 1–248, NSSM 112. Confidential: Secret; Eyes Only. The attached memorandum of June 17 from Guhin is published but not the attachments to the June 17 memorandum, other than the letter from Fulbright to the President, which is an attachment to Document 226. [Tel 72644, 6/286]

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, TS Files, POL 27–10 VIETS. Top Secret; Exdis.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. IV. Confidential; Limdis. A copy was sent to Helms, Smith, Moorer, and David. Regarding the proper date of Fulbright’s letter, see the attachment to Document 230. [Guhin memo, 6/21] According to an undated, unsigned note attached to Document 272, [9/7/72], a secretary in Fulbright’s office erroneously typed March 5 prior to sending the letter to the White House.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3 Switz (GE). Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Tokyo. It was repeated to USMission Geneva, USDel SALT V, USUN, and Moscow. Drafted by Van Heuven (ACDA/IR); cleared by Day (ACDA/IR), Martin (PM/DCA), Breer (EA/J), and Nolan (OSD/ISA); and approved by Goodby (EUR/RPM).

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3 Switz (GE). Confidential; Immediate. It was repeated to USNATO, Moscow, USUN, USDel SALT V, London, The Hague, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, and Tokyo.

Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1971, pp. 456–460. No classification marking. The text of the draft convention was transmitted to Washington in telegram 3312.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 8, NSC– Miscellaneous, Memos, October & November 1971. Secret. Under cover of a September 8 memorandum, Davis forwarded the report to Rogers, Laird, Helms, Moorer, Farley, and Edward David with a request that their views on the report’s options and alternatives be submitted to NSC by September 16 for incorporation in a memorandum to the President. Document 232 and its attachment are at Tabs A and C. [Kissinger’s 6/28 memo] The other attachments are not published.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–74–83, 384 Jan—1971. Secret. For text of the August 5 draft convention, see Document 235. [8/5]

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–179, NSSM 112. Secret.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–74–83, 384 Jan—1971. Secret.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare Vol. IV. Confidential. Sent for action. Kissinger wrote “Approved H” on page one and initialed the “Approve” option on page two. At Tab A are the instructions transmitted in Document 241. [9/23; tel 175047]. At Tab B is Document 225. [4/28 HAK memo] The attachment at Tab B is not published.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3 Switz (GE). Confidential; Immediate. Repeated immediate to All NATO Capitals, USUN, Moscow, Tokyo, and USDel SALT V. Drafted by Rodes (ACDA/IR); cleared in PM/DCA, DOD/ISA, EUR/RPM, IO/UNP, L, the White House, ACDA/IR, and ACDA/GC; and approved by Farley.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–74–83, 40 NSC (September 1971). Secret.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3 Switz (GE). Confidential; Priority. It was repeated to USNATO and USUN.

Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1971, pp. 568–573. No classification marking. The final text of the convention is in Documents on Disarmament, 1972, pp. 133–138, but is essentially the same as the revised draft convention dated September 28, 1971.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 8, NSC Miscellaneous Memos, October & November 1971. Secret.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–197, 370.64 CBR (Jul--). Secret. Davis circulated the memorandum and its attachments to Laird and other officials, under cover of a memorandum in which she requested comments before December 28. (Ibid.)

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 27–10. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Van Novena (ACDA/IR).

Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, DD/ACDA, P. Farley Subject Files, March 1969–June 1973: FRC 383–98–96, Chron Files: Deputy Director, ACDA, J. Philip Farley, September–December 1971. Secret.

National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–179, NSSM 112. Secret.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 27–10. Confidential. Also sent to London. It was repeated to USMission Geneva, USNATO, and USUN. Drafted on March 3 by Neidle (ACDA/IR); cleared by De Palma (IO) and Shaw (PM); and approved by Leonard (ACDA/IR).

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare Vol. V. Limited Official Use. Sent for action. Below the “Recommendation” line Sonnenfeldt wrote, “I reluctantly concur in view of Sec Rogers’ appeal. HS.” Below that, Kissinger wrote, “Add that Dobrynin has appealed because Kosygin will participate,” presumably meaning that Guhin should add the information to the schedule proposal for the President. The memorandum was sent through Haig, who initialed it. At the top of the memorandum is written “Rush,” with a line linking “Rush” to Kissinger’s note at the bottom. The schedule proposal is not published.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare Vol. V. Confidential.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 395, Telephone Conversations, Dobrynin, September 1971–April 1972. No classification marking.

During this discussion, Haldeman convinced the President to attend the signing ceremony for the Biological Weapons Convention.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 323–33. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording published here specifically for this volume.

Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1972, pp. 120–124. No classification marking. For text of the U.S. Work Program regarding negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, submitted to the CCD on March 20, and the statement of the U.S. Representative on chemical weapons, made March 21, see ibid., pp. 98–113.

Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1972, pp. 380–386. No classification marking. Nixon submitted the convention to the Senate for its advice and consent on August 10, 1972, but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held up the vote along with the vote on the Geneva Protocol because of its disagreement with the administration over whether the Protocol prohibited the use of herbicides and riot control agents. In December 1974, after a concerted lobbying effort by the Ford administration, the Senate gave its consent to both treaties, and President Ford ratified them on January 22, 1975.

Nutter forwarded a DOD study of chemical warfare initiatives for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and offered a detailed analysis of the options presented.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330-75-155, 384. Top Secret. Appendices A and B to JCSM-276-72 are not published.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–75–155, 384. Top Secret. Laird sent a similar letter to ACDA Director Smith. (Ibid.)

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare Vol. V, 1972–. Secret. Sent for information.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–75–155, 384. Top Secret.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–75–155, 384. Top Secret. Drafted on July 18 by McCormack (ACDA) and cleared by Leonard and Keeny. The letter is a copy that bears an indication Smith signed the original.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (104–206). Top Secret.

Nutter forwarded the study prepared in response to NSSM 157. His covering memorandum outlined the study’s seven negotiating options regarding chemical weapons and recommended Option 2, prohibiting the production and transfer of such weapons. The detailed study analyzed each option and its supporters.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–75–155, 40 NSC. Top Secret. The attachment at Tab A is not published. At Tab C is Document 259. [7/12]

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–66, SRG Meeting, NSSM 157, 3/5/73. Top Secret. The memorandum at Tab A is not published.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–66, SRG Meeting, NSSM 157, 3/5/73. Secret.

National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–66, SRG Meeting, NSSM 157, 3/5/73. Top Secret. Laird forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger under cover of an August 18 memorandum in which he noted that the JCS position was essentially that described in his August 15 memorandum (Document 265). (Ibid.)

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–66, SRG Meeting, NSSM 157, 3/5/73. Secret.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–66, SRG Meeting, NSSM 157, 3/5/73. Secret.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–192 and Box–193, NSSM 157. Secret: Sent for action. Kissinger wrote in the margin on page 3 near “Option 2,” How could we monitor?” The attachment at Tab A is not published, however for additional information see Document 273. [9/25]

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–192 and H–193, NSSM 157. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Haig, who initialed it. Attached is Document 270 [8/23] and, at Tab A, presumably Document 273. [9/25]

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–179, NSSM 112. Confidential. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Haig. At the top of page one Kissinger wrote, “Hold for next session of Congress.” Neither of Guhin’s recommendations is marked as approved, and the attached memorandum is not signed nor its recommendation marked as approved or disapproved. Kissinger’s note on page one and a covering note in the file indicate that Kissinger did not forward the memorandum to the President.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–192 and H–193, NSSM 157. Secret.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–192 and H–193, NSSM 157. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Elliot. A handwritten notation that was crossed out indicates it was also sent through Scowcroft. At Tab A is Document 275. [1/5/73]

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–192 and H–193, NSSM 157. Secret. The memorandum was also sent to Laird, Helms, Smith, and David.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–212 and H–213, NSDM 35. Top Secret. The attached Annual Review is not published.