Iran 1972

--  157. Telegram 77 From the Embassy in Iran to Secretary of State Rogers and the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco), January 5, 1972, 1235Z 

Ambassador MacArthur advised against a recently-drafted presidential message since it cast doubt that the long-awaited presidential visit to Tehran would take place.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL US/NIXON, Box 2697. Secret; Nodis. In Telegram 1238 to Tehran, January 4, the Department had sent a message from Nixon requesting the Shah’s input on the President’s upcoming trip to China but expressed uncertainty about one to Iran. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Middle East – Iran, Box 602, Volume IV 9/1/71-4/73) In Telegram 3152 to Tehran, January 6, Sisco agreed that the message should not be delivered yet. (Ibid.)

Kissinger recommended that the President authorize $942,000 in military grant funds for Iran, above the $500,000 limit for countries designated “economically developed.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Box 1282, Iran Economic 1/1/72-12/31/72. No classification marking. Tab A is not published. Nixon signed the Determination on January 12. (Ibid.)

The Shah emphasized that although it would be a “blessing” for the United States to maintain its port facilities in Bahrain, he wished to be informed in advance if Washington planned to withdraw, so as to style himself as head of the group advocating withdrawal.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL IRAN-US. Secret; Nodis.

Ambassador MacArthur reported that a prominent Tehran newspaper, under government instruction, had run a lengthy editorial objecting to the continued presence in the Gulf of the U.S. fleet.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Box 1282, Iran 1/1/72-5/31/72. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, London, CINCEUR, COMIDEASTFOR. The material submitted to Kissinger for the President’s Wednesday Briefing, January 18, included the fact that the Shah had told American journalists that Iran was opposed to any foreign presence in the Gulf. The comment was published in the New York Times on January 16. (Ibid.) In Telegram 302 from Tehran, January 15, MacArthur requested a moratorium on government-approved criticism of MIDEASTFOR’s presence in Bahrain, since the Gulf States might take Iran at its word that it desired U.S. withdrawal. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL IRAN-US.)

Ambassador MacArthur reported that the U.S. mission premises in Tehran had been subjected to four bomb explosions but that damage was not serious.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8 IRAN. Confidential; Immediate. In Telegram 365 from Tehran, January 19, MacArthur related some local Iranian interpretations of the bombings, including the suggestions that they were motivated by anti-capitalism and opposition to U.S. policy in the Middle East, or designed to demonstrate the dissidents’ power and contempt for SAVAK. (Ibid.) The day prior to the explosions, a SAVAK spokesman gave a public briefing announcing the arrest of 120 dissidents over the previous 10 months, including 60 members of the Iranian Liberation Organization (Siah Kal) jailed on charges of plotting to kidnap Iranian and foreign personalities during the 2500th Anniversary celebrations. The group was accused of having received training in Iraq and at Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. (Attachment to Donald Toussaint to Jack Miklos, February 11, 1972, NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 75D410, Box 7, INT, Intelligence, General Iran, 1972.)

Secretary Rogers asked Ambassador MacArthur to seek clarification of the Shah’s views on the continued U.S. naval presence in the Gulf, which the United States had understood were favorable.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1282, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran 1/1/72-5/31/72. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Manama, CINCEUR, COMIDEASTFOR.

In conversation with Ambassador MacArthur and Secretary of the Navy John H. Chafee, the Shah was dubious about the wisdom of maintaining MIDEASTFOR in Bahrain.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL IRAN-US. Secret; Nodis. Passed to SECDEF and SECNAV. This telegram was submitted for inclusion in the President’s Wednesday Briefing for January 25. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Box 1282, Iran 1/1/72-5/31/72.)

In a study called “Iran: Arms and the Shah,” the Bureau assessed the Shah’s request for a firm agreement for high-technology American weapons to Iran through 1980.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1282, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran Military 1/1/72-12/31/72. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Drafted by Peter S. Maher (INR/Near East and South Asia); and approved by Curtis F. Jones (INR/Near East and South Asia). An attached note wondered whether the summary would be useful in connection with the Presidential trip to Iran. Kissinger responded, “Yes--that is why I have included for file!”

The memorandum, entitled “Iran’s Balance-of-Payments Prospects Look Up,” analyzed the impact of recent oil consortium concessions on the Iranian economy.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, ORR (OTI) Files, Job 79T00935A, Box 67, Project 45.6314, CIA/ER IM 72-23. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared by the Office of Current Research of CIA and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence.

Nutter endorsed the view of the Country Team in Iran, as well as that of USCINCEUR, that Defense should authorize the sale of the MAVERICK missile to Iran.

Sources: Washington National Records Center, OASD Files, ISA Files, FRC 330-75-125, Box 13, Iran 334-1972. Secret. Tabs A through F were not found. The last page of the document indicates that on February 26, Laird approved the release of promotional information on the missile to Iran, but qualified his approval of the sale of the missile pending MAVERICK’s successful operational tests.

The Iranian Government, citing Soviet ambitions in the region, requested accelerated delivery in 1972 of one squadron of F-4Es.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Secret. Repeated to SECDEF, EUCOM, and CSAF.

The report indicated that mass rallies against a variety of sources of popular discontent were planned for the following day.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 75D365, Box 7, POL 23, Internal Security, Counter Insurgence, Iran 1972. Secret. A handwritten notation on the front page reads “Disturbing.”

In an apparent effort to offset criticism over the trials of dissidents, the Iranian Government staged a “spontaneous demonstration” in Tehran to show popular support.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8 IRAN. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Khorramshahr, and Tabriz. In Telegram 1282, March 3, the Embassy reported that as the demonstrations ended, the government announced the executions of six anti-government dissidents. (Ibid.) At this time, the 120 Iranians accused of terrorism were facing military tribunals. Donald Toussaint of the Embassy noted to Jack Miklos on March 28 that “there is undoubtedly ambiguity in the charge that all those tried are ‘terrorists.’ All were, it seems, members of various subversive groups, and some members of each group apparently did engage in acts of terrorism. While, in general, the entire membership of a group is charged with the crimes of any of its members, the individual sentences appear to have been based on the severity of the crime each man personally committee . . . There are reliable reports that an additional number of people, mostly students, have been arrested for political reasons--but we have no information to indicate they are among those presently on trial.” (NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 75D365, Box 7, POL 29, Political Prisoners, Iran 1972)

Heck stressed to Miklos that the question of advance delivery of the F-4Es in 1972 was paramount to the Shah, and potentially could cause serious problems in U.S.-Iranian relations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Official-Informal. Secret.

Despite the opinion of ARMISH/MAAG that the Iranian air force could absorb no more than eight aircraft in 1972, the Iranian Minister of War pressed the Shah’s demand for a full squadron of sixteen F-4Es, and the Country Team in Iran recommended approval.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Secret. Repeated to SECDEF, EUCOM and CSAF.

Abshire responded to Fulbright’s demand for a justification for the $942,000 allotted to Iran in grant military assistance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-8 US-IRAN. No classification marking. Drafted by Felix Dorough (PM/MAS); cleared by Alexander Schnee (H), Davies, Ex-Im Bank, DOD/ISA, Miklos, and Chapman. Fulbright requested the justification for the military assistance “in view of the recent ostentatious anniversary celebration in Persepolis.” (Ibid.)

The Embassy reported that the Shah had responded to the advice of ARMISH/MAAG and the IIAF, and had reduced his demand for accelerated 1972 delivery of F-4s to eight aircraft.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Secret. Repeated to SECDEF, CSAF, and EUCOM.

Protesting the trials and executions of anti-government dissidents, students at the University of Tehran staged 2 days of demonstrations, which were ultimately put down by the police.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 IRAN. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Ankara, Bonn, Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, London, and Paris.

Nutter advised Laird of the Shah’s insistence on the delivery of eight aircraft in 1972, suggesting that the required F-4Es be leased to Iran.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD Files, (C) (A), 330-77-0094, Iran 1972, Box 62. Secret. The attachment is not published. Laird wrote on the memo, “What does Warren recommend--these points don’t impress me as the case made by others. MRL” He later added, “3/13/72 After our conversation today approval okay--M.R. Laird.”

Despite the need for a fifteen percent MAAG reduction world wide, the country team in Iran lobbied for a requested increase in the ARMISH/MAAG complement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-9 US-IRAN. Confidential.

The Embassy conveyed the request of the Shah’s sister, Princess Ashraf, for U.S. Government assistance in refuting the charge that the U.S. Federal Narcotics Bureau had once recommended that she be denied entry to the United States due to a heroin trafficking incident in 1961.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 IRAN. Confidential; Exdis. In Telegram 35450 to Tehran, March 1, the Department inquired about a press story regarding a member of the Shah’s entourage, Amir Hushang Davallou, who had been charged in Switzerland with narcotics trafficking. Invoking diplomatic immunity, Davallou had departed the country on the private plane of the Shah, who allegedly cut short his vacation to get Davallou out of the country. The scandal rekindled charges of narcotics trafficking within the Shah’s inner circle. (Ibid, SOC 11-5 SWITZ)

Davies replied that while in principle the Department would be pleased to help exonerate the Princess, official U.S. involvement was likely to draw more attention to the matter.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Miklos; cleared by Stephen M. Boyd (L/NEA), John S. Brims (S/S); and approved by Davies.

Saunders summarized the correspondence received from a U.S.-based Iranian dissident, Nasser Afshar, who denounced the Shah’s rule.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Box 1282, Iran 1/1/72-5/31/72. No classification marking. In 1971, Congressman Graham Purcell inserted into the Congressional Record letters from Afshar’s “Free Iran” movement, condemning the Shah’s reign. In response, on August 18, 1971, Ambassador MacArthur wrote to Purcell, denouncing the character and activities of the organization and its chairman, on the basis of FBI information. The Department official assigned to deliver the letter to Purcell was advised to “reminisce about a number of other Congressmen who had taken up the anti-Shah banner in the 1960’s, much to their subsequent embarrassment.” On October 21, 1971, Purcell apologized for his action, agreeing that “Free Iran” was unworthy of his support. All of this correspondence was passed to Court Minister Alam for the Shah’s perusal on November 7, 1971. (NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 75D351, Box 6, PS 7, Iran 1969-71, Assistance to Americans, Nasser Afshar 1971)

The CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence analyzed the current political structure of Iran.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OCI Files, Job 79T00832A, Box 9, 46. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated within CIA.

The CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence examined the recent trends in Iranian arms procurement, particularly Tehran’s sources of supply.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, ORR Files (OTI), Job 79T00935A, Box 70, Project 35.6402, CIA/ER IM 72-79. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. The memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence.

In preparation for the President’s visit, the Embassy transmitted a summary of the current conditions in Iran.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 US/NIXON. Secret; Exdis. The first message in the series on the Presidential visit, Telegram 2440 from Tehran, April 28, dealt with logistical issues and is not published. (Ibid.)

The Embassy surveyed the state of U.S.-Iran relations and the significance of the relationship to the Shah.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 US/NIXON. Secret; Exdis.

The Embassy outlined the Shah’s views on specific domestic and foreign issues which might arise during his meetings with the President.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 US/NIXON. Secret; Exdis.

Summarizing the Shah’s regional foreign policy, Helms suggested topics for the President to broach in discussion.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80B01086A, Box 1, Executive Registry, Subject Files, I-13, Iran. Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum is a copy that bears Helms’ typed signature with an indication that he signed the original.

The Department dismissed the charges made in the Nation article against Princess Ashraf, arguing that it was unnecessary for her representative to come to Washington to refute them.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 IRAN. Secret. Drafted by Miklos; cleared by Robert M. Miller (S/S); approved by Davies.

The Embassy highlighted topics that the Shah would be likely to raise during the Presidential visit.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 US/NIXON. Secret; Exdis.

In the last of a series of telegrams prior to the President’s visit, the Embassy offered an assessment of Iran’s importance to the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 US/NIXON. Secret; Exdis.

Kissinger passed along Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs Flanigan’s recommendation that the Shah not be encouraged to expect special access to the U.S. market for Iranian oil.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Box 602, Vol. IV, 9/1/71-4/73. Confidential. A note on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. The attached memorandum, April 27, is not published.

Helms forwarded to Kissinger the substance of Kermit Roosevelt’s recent conversation with the Shah, which they had agreed would be passed only to the White House.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80B01086A, Box 1, Executive Registry Subject Files, I-13 Iran. Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum is a copy that bears Helms’ typed signature with an indication that he signed the original.

The Embassy offered guidance on whether the President should raise the issue of narcotics during his Iranian visit.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 11-5 IRAN. Confidential; Exdis.

Rogers submitted to Nixon a summary of the Shah’s concerns and recommended themes the President might wish to touch upon in Iran.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Presidential Trip Files, Box 479, Briefing Book, Visit of Nixon to Iran, May 1972. Secret. The attached briefing book is not published.

The new ambassador, Joseph S. Farland, provided the Department with a list of the Shah’s latest requests for his airforce.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 US/NIXON. Secret; Limdis.

Saunders and Hoskinson supplied Kissinger with background material for the President’s Iran visit.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Presidential Trip Files, Box 479, Briefing Book, Visit of Nixon to Iran, May 1972. Top Secret/Codeword/Talent-Keyhole. Tab A and Tab B (on Iraq only) are Documents . Tabs B (on Syria), C, D, and E were attached, but are not published.

Rush provided Kissinger with talking papers on the Defense Department position on the Shah’s military requests.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD Files, (C) (A), FRC 330-77-0094, Iran 1972, Iran 452. Confidential.

Kissinger gave the President a briefing packet on his upcoming talks with the Shah.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 481, Presidential Trip Files, Iran Visit. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for Action. Tab B is published as Document 185. Tabs C and D were not published. A stamp on the document indicated “the President has seen.” In the margin of page 3, tab A, next to a paragraph on the U.S. naval force in the Persian Gulf, the President wrote, “K – increase it.”

Lord and Rodman attached a memo from Peter Flannigan describing the current state of oil discussions between the Shah and the oil consortium, and recommended talking points.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 481, Presidential Trip Files, Iran Visit (Cherokee) [pt. 1]. Secret; Flash.

Hoskinson and Haig forwarded a memorandum from Peter Flanigan on Nixon’s possible oil discussions with the Shah for Kissinger.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 481, Presidential Trip Files, Iran Visit (Cherokee) [pt. 1]. Secret. A note on the first page indicates that the document was sent to Kissinger in Moscow on May 27.

Ambassador Farland updated the President on the status of talks between the Iranian Government and the consortium on the issue of participation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET 3 OPEC. Secret. Immediate. Repeated Immediate to the Department of State.

The Shah, President Nixon, and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Kissinger, discussed the Moscow Summit and its significance to the Middle East.

Source: Library of Congress, Kissinger Papers, Box TS-28, Kissinger Telcons, Geopolitical Files, Iran, Memcons, Notebook 30 May 72 – 15 September 73. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation took place in the Saadabad Palace in Tehran. According to Henry Kissinger’s memoirs, the President during this visit also agreed that, “without American support, the existing Kurdish uprising against the Baghdad Government would collapse. American participation [in the effort to aid the Kurdish insurgency] in some form was needed to maintain the morale of such key allies as Iran and Jordan…” (Kissinger, Years of Renewal, pp. 582-3.) No record of this conversation was found.

The Shah, President Nixon, and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Kissinger, talked about regional problems, notably the Arab-Israeli conflict, and concluded with Nixon’s pledge to furnish Iran with laser bombs and F-14s and F-15s.

Source: Library of Congress, Kissinger Papers, Box TS-28, Kissinger Telcons, Geopolitical Files, Iran, Memcons, Notebook 30 May 72 – 15 September 73, Box TS – 28. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation took place in the Saadabad Palace in Tehran.

The Embassy transmitted a copy of the joint U.S.-Iranian communiqué released following the President’s visit.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL US/NIXON. Unclassified. On June 6, Kissinger conveyed a message from President Nixon to the Shah, thanking him for Nixon’s recent visit and informing him that former Treasury Secretary John Connally would be dispatched to Iran in early July to continue U.S.-Iranian discussions. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 425, Backchannel, Backchannel Messages, Middle East, 1972.)

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research’s report on “Iran: Internal Dissidence--A Note of Warning” noted that the bombings in Tehran during Nixon’s visit were part of a broader pattern.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8 IRAN. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Drafted by Maher; approved by Jones.

Saunders offered Kissinger a record of the specific commitments for military hardware that Nixon had made to the Shah while in Tehran, and the Shah’s interpretation of those pledges.

Source: Library of Congress, Kissinger Papers, Box CL-152, Iran Chronological File. Secret. Sent for action. Tab A is published as Document 205.

Kissinger provided Rogers and Laird with a summary of the commitments the President had made to the Shah.

Source: Library of Congress, Kissinger Papers, Box CL-152, Iran Chronological File. Secret.

The Iranian Foreign Minister had been alarmed by reports that a Congressman was recommending that the executive agreements governing the Azores and Bahrain naval facilities be replaced by treaties.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1282, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran 6/1/72 – 9/30/72. Confidential. Saunders submitted the memorandum to Kissinger for possible submission in the President’s Saturday Briefing of June 24. Attached, but not published, was telegram 3780 from Tehran, June 22.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET 3 OPEC. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted by Leo F. Cecchini, Jr. Approved by John F. L. Ghiardi.

Saunders submitted a recommended Presidential telegram for the Shah, congratulating him for the way he had conducted the recent negotiations with the oil consortium.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1282, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran 6/1/72-9/30/72. Confidential. Sent for action. Tab B is not published. A handwritten note by Kissinger reads “I signed off for Pres. HK”

Kissinger sent Connally a background paper and talking points for his upcoming meeting with the Shah of Iran.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 425, Backchannel, Backchannel Messages, Middle East, 1972. Secret. Haig signed the memo for Kissinger. The memorandum was sent to the Embassy in Singapore for Connally through Hoskinson. The source text is the White House message as approved for transmission. The separate message on the Kurdish problem was not found, but it is clear from previous and subsequent documentation that Connally was instructed to confirm U.S. willingness to cooperate with the Shah in aiding the Kurds.

Reminding the President of his promises to the Shah of military equipment, Kissinger forwarded the Defense Department’s suggestions for fulfilling them.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 602, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. IV, 9/1/71-4/73. Secret. Sent for action. Kissinger approved for the President. The document date is either July 5 or after, since the Department of Defense memorandum to which Kissinger refers (not published) was sent on that date. The decision memorandum, which was approved by Kissinger for Nixon, is not published.

Saunders briefed the President for talks with former Treasury Secretary John B. Connally by summarizing Connally’s recent discussions with the Shah.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1282, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran 6/1/72-9/30/72. Secret. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the President dined with Connally on July 13 at the San Clemente Compound residence. (Ibid., White House Central Files, Staff Members and Office Files, President’s Daily Diary, June 1, 1972 – July 31, 1972.) No other record of the meeting was found.

Saunders conveyed the recommendation from Ambassador Farland that the United States cease discouraging Iran from overspending on military items, to the detriment of U.S. arms suppliers.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 602, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. IV, 9/1/71-4/73. Top Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads “Haig and HAK sent with addition of sentence pencilled on draft at Tab A. 7/17/72. No further action required.” The additional pencilled sentence at the end of the first paragraph of Tab A reads, “In short, it is not repeat not our policy to discourage Iranian arms purchases.” Next to the addition was a handwritten note, “Change added by HAK.” Tab A is the backchannel message as submitted by the White House for transmission.

The Ambassador transmitted a record of former Treasury Secretary Connally’s conversation with the Shah during his visit as a special envoy to Iran.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 US/CONNALLY. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Treasury and White House.

Kissinger advised the Secretaries of the President’s decision as to how to implement his pledges to the Shah.

Source: Library of Congress, Henry Kissinger Papers, Box CL-152, Iran Chronological File, 28 May 1971-1 December 1972. Secret.

The paper made the case for approving the sale to Iran of the Redeye missile.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Secret; Noforn.

Saunders put to Kissinger the questions which arose from the President’s promise of U.S. military personnel to Iran.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 602, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. IV 9/1/71-4/73. Secret. Tab A is the White House backchannel message as sent for transmission. Tabs B and C are not published. At the top of this memorandum, Kissinger wrote, “Al--OK--but what do you think? HK.” Haig responded “I agree.” Kissinger initialed his approval. In Telegram 4467 from Tehran, July 24, the Embassy requested clarification as to the nature and extent of the U.S. military support to be provided to Iran. While recommending a forthcoming response, the Embassy also urged that Washington emphasize the non-operative role contemplated for U.S. personnel assisting the Iranian forces. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-9 US-IRAN.) In Telegram 4639 from Tehran, August 1, Farland conveyed Alam’s assurance that Iran did not foresee an operational role for U.S. military technicians. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1282, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran Military 1/1/72-12/31/72.)

Ambassador Farland reported that despite a government crack-down, the pace of terrorist activities in Iran had quickened, and that the government was unlikely to halt such activities without first addressing the basic question of political, social, and administrative reforms.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8 IRAN. Confidential.

Ambassador Farland expressed skepticism regarding the efficacy of the Iranian anti-terrorist campaign.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8 IRAN. Confidential.

The Department forwarded the section dealing with Iran of a Washington Post article based on CIA narcotics reports.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 11-5 IRAN. Unclassified; Priority.

The Embassy conveyed the remarks of an Associated Press correspondent in Iran that SAVAK’s abuses of power were fueling opposition to the Shah.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Andrew I. Killgore, and approved by Heck.

Peet updated Laird on the status of the items promised to the Shah, including F-14/15s, laser-guided bombs, and uniformed technicians.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD Files, (C) (A), FRC 330-77-0094, Iran 1972. Secret. The enclosures are not published.

Ambassador Farland observed that although rumors abounded that narcotics were being smuggled from Iran, the evidence needed to approach the Iranian Government was lacking.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 11-5 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to Kabul, Islamabad, Manama, Kuwait, Jidda, Karachi, Dhahran, and BNDD.

The Embassy relayed the Iranian Government’s decision to reduce authorized 1973 poppy cultivation to ten per cent of the 1972 level.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 11-5 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to BNDD, Kabul, Islamabad, and Ankara. One Department official, identified only as “MAGM”, wrote to “JCM” on October 12: “I have reservations on this one. The Iranians are making no sacrifice and are taking no risk comparable to that taken by the Turks. This cutback is only for one year; there is nothing to suggest that Iran will not resume full cultivation once the surplus is used up. It could be useful to pat them on the back to remind them of our interest and encourage any inclination to hold down poppy cultivation in the future, but this cutback isn’t worth a public announcement at the high levels of the USG comparable to the President’s statement on the Turkish ban.” (NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 75D410, Box 8, SOC 11-5, Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Iran 1972)

The Department instructed the Ambassador, on the President’s behalf, to request that Iran turn over its entire force of 90 F-5As for immediate delivery to Vietnam.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Flash. Sent Immediate to Saigon.

Saunders recommended no reply to the most recent letter sent to the President by Nasser Afshar, editor of the Iran Free Press.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1282, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran 10/1/72 - 12/31/72. The attached copy of the August/September Edition of the Iran Free Press is not published. Afshar sent copies of the Iran Free Press to the American Embassy in Tehran, which on October 12, 1971 sought unsuccessfully to get off the distribution list, fearing that Afshar hoped to get the publication into local circulation. (Douglas Heck to Jack Miklos, NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 75D351, Box 6, PS 7 Iran 1969-71, Assistance to Americans, Nasser Afshar 1971.) On July 18, 1972, Douglas Heck of the Embassy argued against official replies to Afshar’s publication, since “such letters give the publication recognition it does not deserve as well as a peg for further attacks on us and Iran. In addition [they] might be misinterpreted here as suggesting that arguments in this rag are worthy of official response even though what you are trying to do is correct some of the outrageous statements about Iran.” (Heck to Miklos, NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 75D365, Box 7, POL 23, Internal Security, Counter-Insurgency, Iran 1972). Miklos agreed.

The Shah responded to the US plea for F-5As by agreeing to relinquish 32 aircraft for delivery to Vietnam, subject to early replacement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis. Passed Immediate to Saigon.

The Shah set out his demands for the replacement of his aircraft, including accelerated delivery of equipment orders previously placed in the US.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Nodis; Cherokee. Passed to Saigon.

The Ambassador sent suggestions for another approach to the Shah should more of his F-5As be needed in Vietnam.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Nodis; Flash; Cherokee. Passed to Saigon.

The Department urgently requested an additional 16 F-5A aircraft from Iran, offering concessions on other equipment in return.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Nodis; Cherokee. Drafted by Thomas R. Pickering (PM) and approved by Johnson, Defense, and Harry G. Barnes, Jr (S/S). Repeated to the Ambassador in Saigon.

Political officer Andrew Killgore discussed the likely future of Iranian politics, including the possibility that the Shah might introduce a one-party system.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 75D365, Box 7, POL 14, Elections. Confidential; Official - Informal. The referenced A-166 was not found. Adl was Yahya Adl, the leader of the opposition Mardom party. In a handwritten postscript, Killgore added, “Jack, your letter was particularly welcome because of the strong criticism of the Iranian regime implied in it. The Shah is a great man whose accomplishments are also great. But this gives no occasion for a worshipful attitude on our part. The Shah’s interests and ours will be better served in the long run by our looking dispassionately at the failures as well as the success of the regime. That’s what we are going to be doing. Cheers! Andy K.” Miklos’s letter was also not found. On October 13, as expected, the ruling Iran Novin party had won a sweeping victory over the Mardom party in local elections, taking 80% of the vote. In Telegram 6210, October 14, the Embassy had written that the importance of the election “lies not so much in Iran Novin victory, which observers already knew would be the result, but in their significance as a training vehicle in democratic forms.” (Ibid., Central Files, POL 18-1 IRAN.)

The Ambassador attempted to assuage the Shah’s security concerns over the U.S. request for additional F-5A aircraft.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis. Passed to Saigon.

The Ambassador expressed the chagrin of both the Iranian Government and the Embassy that Iran’s role in the mission to send F-5As to Vietnam had been divulged in a Department of Defense briefing.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis. In Telegram 201483 to Tehran, November 5, the Department explained with regret that since the story had been leaked to the New York Times, the Defense spokesman had been forced to address it. (Ibid.)

The Ambassador recommended a package of benefits that the Shah should receive as reward for his cooperation regarding the F-5As.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee.

Under Secretary Johnson advised the Ambassador of the compensation the U.S. Government would provide to Iran, including deeply discounted title to previously leased aircraft.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Immediate; Eyes Only. Drafted by Pickering and approved by Defense; Miklos, George S. Newman (U), Eliot, Davies, Lowell B. Laingen (NEA/PAB), Curtis F. Jones (INR/ARR/RNA).

Kissinger inquired whether the compensation package described for the Shah was sufficient or whether more was required.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1282, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran 10/1/72-12/31/72. Top Secret. The source text is the White House approved draft as sent for transmission.

Saunders submitted to Kissinger the revised compensation package for the Shah.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Box 602, Vol. IV, 9/1/71-4/73. Secret. Tabs A and B are not published. Haig approved the memorandum on Kissinger’s behalf.

The Department sent Farland an expanded copy of the proposed compensation package for the Shah.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Immediate; Eyes Only.

The report on “Iranian Oil Negotiations” observed that the recent Saudi Arabian agreement on oil participation had inspired Iran to demand a revision of its Spring 1972 deal.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Robert L. Dowell, Jr. (NEA); and approved by John F. Ghiardi (INR/Economic). Released by Leonard Weiss (INR).

With some suggested revisions, the Shah approved of the U.S. compensation package for his F-5As.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. This information was included in the material submitted to Kissinger on December 12 for the President’s Wednesday Briefing. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1282, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran Military 1/1/72-12/31/72)

The Embassy reported the local reaction to the appointment of former CIA director Richard Helms as Ambassador-Designate to Iran.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1282, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran 10/1/72-12/31/72. Confidential. Repeated to Islamabad, Jidda, Kuwait, London, and EUCOM.

Farland conveyed the Shah’s increasing anxiety for progress on the President’s promise for U.S. technicians to Iran.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 602, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. IV, 9/1/71-4/73. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to SECDEF, USCINCEUR, and JCS.

Nutter advised Laird of the status of planning for greater technical assistance support to Iran.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files, FRC 330-75-125, Iran 000.1-333, 1972. Secret. Of the first option, Laird wrote on the memorandum “This plan would never fly with Congress!!” Of the third, he wrote, “This would be best—but you may have gone too far.” Of the second, which he approved on December 31, he wrote, “If this is the best you can work out and Services see no trouble, I’ll approve.” Laird added a last comment at the bottom of the memo: “Warren: We are under orders from a co-equal branch of our government to civilianize as many positions in all four services as possible--This applies equally but even more so in our technical help to our allies. We have many civilian employees out of work.”