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The Horn

-265. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze), Washington, January 13, 1969 [ PDF version   ] 

Warnke urged Nitze to press the Department of State on the political viability of alternate sites for the activities at Kagnew.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-75-089, Ethiopia 1969.

Warnke suggested that decisions regarding Kagnew be referred to their successors. While he agreed on the eventual withdrawal from the facilities, there were several functions that should be retained as long as possible.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-75-089, Ethiopia 1969.

This joint Department of State-Department of Defense telegram informed the Embassy that Ethiopia would receive $12 million in Military Assistance Program (MAP) funding in Fiscal Year (FY) 69 and in FY 70.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19 US-ETH.  Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Colonel Hadley (DOD/ISA) and J.A. Buche (AF/NE); cleared in AF/I, AF/NE, DOD/ISA, and JCS; and approved by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Palmer.  Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/USC INCMEAFSA and CHMAAG Addis Ababa.

Reporting on "The Eritrean Liberation Front [(ELF)] and Kagnew Station," the airgram stated that although there was no indication of a change in the ELF policy of friendliness to Americans, Kagnew was maintaining an alert security posture. It was recommended that the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and the intelligence community collect information on ELF activities.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 ETH-US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Addis Ababa.

The Department asked the Embassy to extend a Presidential invitation to Emperor Haile Selassie to make a state visit to Washington July 7-9. Themes of the visit would be current African developments and Ethiopia's economic development.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 ETH. Secret; Limdis. Drafted May 14 by M. Looram (AF/NE); cleared in draft by Palmer, J, AF/P, DOD/ISA, and S/CPR; cleared in S/S and and by the White House; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Moore (AF). Repeated to Athens.

Entitled "An Assessment of the Eritrean Liberation Front," (ELF) the airgram concluded that there was no indication the ELF intended to attack Kagnew though it was a possibility. The United States should consider reductions in Kagnew personnel and land tracts. Three policy alternatives were presented, but only alternative A, status quo with reductions, was considered feasible.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 13, ETH. Secret. Repeated to Aden, Asmara, Beirut, Cairo, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, Jidda, Karachi, Khartoum, Mogadiscio, Nairobi, New Dehli, Paris, Rome, Tehran, Tel Aviv, and USUN.

Palmer recommended approval of Emperor Selassie's proposed visit to Atlanta to lay a wreath at Martin Luther King's tomb and accept an honorary degree from Morehouse College.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 ETH. Secret.

Morris provided Kissinger with a "complete run-down" on Haile Selassie's stop in Atlanta. His judgment was that, from a foreign policy point of view, it would be embarrassing but not impossible to avoid making the stop with the Ethiopians.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 914, VIP Visits Ethiopia-State Visit of Emperor Haile Selassie I, July 7 - 10, 1969 1 of 2, Folder 04/054. Confidential; Eyes Only. Kissinger wrote at the top of page one: "Are you sure Ethiopians raised it - or did State do it by putting words into Ethiopians mouth?"

Kissinger briefed the President for his meeting with the Emperor on July 8. The purpose of the visit was to honor the Emperor and to show that the new administration would continue the close relationship with Ethiopia. The main problem was to reassure Selassie of U.S. support without being drawn into his exaggerated view of threats to Ethiopian security. The United States was key to Ethiopian economic development and provided $12 million yearly for military assistance, 60% of U.S. military assistance to Africa. In return, the United States operated Kagnew communications center.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 914, VIP Visits - Ethiopia - State Visit of Emperor Haile Selassie I, July 7 - 10, 1969, 1 of 2, Folder 04/054. Secret. Sent for briefing. At Tab A is an undated Talking Points paper.

Nutter briefed Laird for his meeting with the Emperor on July 9. He indicated that the objective was to demonstrate U.S. concern for Ethiopia's security without increasing the current or planned level of military assistance. He did not believe the Emperor would use the leverage provided by the Kagnew communications facility because of U.S. leverage represented by its overall economic and military assistance.  The U.S. objective was to retain the facility at minimum cost to the United States by providing limited but effective support to Ethiopian military forces.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: Ethiopia, 091.112. Secret. At Tab C is a report on military assistance and Kagnew Station. At Tab C-1 is a report on Kagnew Station. Tabs A, B, C-2 and C-3, are not published.

During his meeting with the Emperor, President Nixon noted that Ethiopia received 60% of U.S. military funds available for Africa. The United States, however, recognized Ethiopia's problems and what it stood for and would continue to assist its development as a strong and independent nation. The Emperor expressed his concern about Soviet influence in Somalia, Sudan, and parts of the Arabian peninsula. The two leaders also discussed the situation in Nigeria and the Middle East.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Africa, Ethiopia, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Palmer.

Packard reviewed the Study Group Report on Kagnew Station, which recommended that the Navy assume responsibility for all communications and the Army phase out by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 72. In a memorandum at Tab A, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics reported that this would reduce manpower by 160 positions out of 1,800 and permit return of 1,070 acres to the Ethiopian government from a total of 3,400 acres.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-75-089, Ethiopia 1969. Secret; Special Handling Required; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals.

Rogers reported the assassination of Somali President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke on October 15.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 12, President's Daily Briefs. Unclassified.

Kissinger informed the President that, according to intelligence, an army takeover in Somalia was not likely but there might be some tribal fighting. All leading candidates to succeed assassinated Somali President Shermarke were pro-Western.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 64, Memoranda to the President, October 1969. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.

Kissinger reported that elements of the Somali army and police had seized power from Prime Minister Egal's elected government. For the United States, the most important issue was the survival or collapse of ditente in the Horn. If Somalia returned to bellicose irredentism, tensions would rise throughout the area, including Kenya and Ethiopia.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 287, Memoranda to the President, October 1969. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The memorandum, an unsigned copy, is marked "ret'd Oct 24, 1969."

The note discussed the coup in Somalia--its motivation, leadership, and implications.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 Somalia. Secret.

Morris recommended approving an attached draft State telegram to the embassy in Mogadiscio instructing low-key recognition of the new military government in Somalia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Somalia Republic, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action. Haig checked "Approve cable" for Kissinger. At bottom is written, "'s/s informed (Brown) cable cleared by Watts - 10/29, 5:45 PM' per CF."

Kissinger informed the President, who had expressed concern over former Prime Minister Egal's welfare, that Egal was under house arrest. Kissinger also noted that that little was known about the new government or its intentions.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Somalia Republic, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action. At the bottom Nixon wrote, "Maybe (hopefully) they are like the Greek Colonels." Next to his note is stamped, "Nov 6 1969."

Ambassador Hadsel reported on his meeting with President General Siad of the Supreme Revolutionary Council, during which he indicated U.S. willingness to cancel its phase-out of AID programs and described U.S. encouragement of private investment activities. Hadsel told Siad that recognition of North Vietnam and Somali flag ships carrying cargo there could create significant problems. Siad sought to brush away any implication that Somalia might be dominated by the Soviets through military and economic assistance programs.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970­-73, POL Somali-US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Rome and CINCSTRIKE.

Resor recommended that consolidation of facilities at Kagnew Station be deferred indefinitely and assignments left unchanged.

Source: Department of Defense, OASD/ISA, 73A, 1975, Box 18, Ethiopia 000.1 -- 1970. Secret; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals. Two enclosures are not published.

Ambassador Azhari, in a farewell visit with Secretary Rogers, stated that ditente would continue as would Somali flag vessels trading with North Vietnam. While the financial benefits of the latter were negligible, the trade continued as a matter of national sovereignty and prestige. The Secretary noted that Congress had laid down very explicit instructions with regard to aid to countries engaged in such trade.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL ETH-Somali. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Edward Holmes (AF/E).

The telegram reported that Assistant Secretary Newsom had informed Italian Ambassador Ortona that the shipping issue required the United States to terminate its aid to Somalia. Concerned that Somalia might rupture diplomatic relations as a result, Newsom had expressed the hope that the Italian ambassador to Somalia would counsel moderation.

Source:National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL Somali-US. Secret. Drafted by Holmes, cleared in EUR/AIS, and approved by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Newsom. Repeated to Mogadiscio.

In Ethiopia, the Emperor was restraining dissidents such as students, bureaucrats, and young intellectuals, but a military coup was always a possibility. Kagnew Station was not now directly threatened. Should the Emperor die, the successor government would likely continue to look to the United States as its primary backer. Somalia was unstable, leftist, and susceptible to Soviet influence. Sudan also was leftist, but involved in a civil war. U.S. influence in Somalia and Sudan was minimal. Soviet interest in the area was growing.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, DDI Files, Job 79R-01012A, Box 391, Folder 2. Secret.

Ambassador Hadsel reported that he had informed General Siad that U.S. bilateral assistance would terminate as of June 1, 1970. Hadsel believed this would further strain U.S.-Somali relations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, STR 10 VIETN. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Addis Ababa. Also repeated to Nairobi, Rome, and CINCSTRIKE.

This memorandum, which was not forwarded to the President, reported the termination of economic aid to Somalia and the possibility of resulting damage to diplomatic relations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Somalia Republic, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for information. At Tab A is a memorandum from acting Secretary of State Elliot Richardson on the termination of U.S. aid. Attached but not published was a note, dated June 12, indicating that Kissinger's memorandum and the attached memorandum from Richardson to the President were not forwarded to the President "in accordance with current instructions re: priorities" (See Document 10).

The telegram reported that Foreign Secretary Arteh had informed the Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission that the June 6 aide-memoire providing 1 year to phase-out projects was appreciated. However, Somalia preferred to assume responsibility for the projects as soon as practicable.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US) Somali, POL Somali-US. Confidential. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and Rome.

Wright provided all the known details on the seizure of the American freighter, The Midnight Sun, by a Somali naval vessel. He believed the seizure was a fluke. Embassy officials were attempting to get in touch with the appropriate Somali officials.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Somalia Republic, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action. Wright attached a draft memorandum to the President that was not forwarded and is not published.

U.S. Chargi Dennis, who met that morning with the Director General of the Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reported on the situation regarding the seizure of the The Midnight Sun.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 33-6 Somali-US. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE and COMIDEASTFOR.

Wright's progress report on the The Midnight Sun outlined both the "good side" and the "bad side" of the situation. While there was as yet no publicity and Somali officials had not yet officially charged the ship with violations, U.S. officials had still not determined what would be necessary to gain the release of the vessel and its crew. Most worrisome was the fact that to Somalis it must appear there was good reason to believe they had intercepted an American spy ship.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Somalia Republic, Vol. I.No Classification Marking. Sent for information.

This joint Department of State-Department of Defense telegram informed the Embassy that the Navy's Kagnew Station consolidation plan was being reviewed. If approved, it would not be implemented until Fiscal Year 72-73 due to lack of funds.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 ETH-US. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Captain Hilscher (DOD/ISA); cleared in DOD, INR/RCI, AF/E, AF/I; and approved by Holmes. Repeated to Asmara and CINCSTRIKE.

Wright reported that the The Midnight Sun had become the subject of press interest due to an Evans and Novak column in The Washington Post that attributed the seizure to steadily rising Soviet influence in Somalia and East Africa.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Somalia Republic, Vol. I. Confidential.

The Embassy reported that the Somali Government had decided to release the "Midnight Sun" as a gesture of goodwill even though it had "blatantly violated internal and territorial waters."

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 33-6 Somali-US. Confidential. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE and COMIDEASTFOR.

Kennedy stressed the need for a study of problems in the Horn of Africa. He noted that Kissinger had shied away in the past, but since the area consumed the lion's share of African military and economic aid and was home to the single most important U.S. facility in Africa, Kagnew Station, it was important to prepare a general policy.

Source: National Security Council Files, National Security Study Memorandum Files, NSSM 115. Secret. Attached is an undated draft memorandum from Kissinger to the President, as well as an undated draft National Security Study Memorandum. Neither of the attached documents was signed and forwarded.

Packard turned down an Army request to retain the status quo at Kagnew Station and directed consolidation on the basis of the Navy plan.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-067, Ethiopia 1970. Secret; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals.

Kissinger reported the release of the The Midnight Sun and its crew. A personal message from General Siad to President Nixon could not be delivered as Russian-provided coding machines did not function properly.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Somalia Republic, Vol. I. Confidential. A stamp on the memorandum reads: "The President has seen."

This joint Department of State-Department of Defense message reported that Kagnew would reduce personnel levels by 200 in the next 9 months in addition to numbers from planned consolidation. This was in accord with the Ethiopian Government's desire that the U.S. presence near Asmara be diminished.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 ETH-US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Hall (AF/E); cleared in draft in NSA, ASA, PM, INR/DDC; cleared by DOD/ISA, AF/E, AF/P, OSD/A, Joint Staff/J-5; and approved by Moore. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE.

The Chargi reported that the Ethiopian Foreign Minister welcomed the proposed personnel reductions at Kagnew Station.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 ETH-US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Asmara, CINCSTIKE and Kagnew Station.

In his meeting with Nixon, Selassie pleaded his case for increased military assistance. The President reassured the Emperor that the U.S. understood who its friends were and promised to study the military situation, giving full weight to Selassie's statements.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 278, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, Oct - Dec 1970. Secret; Exdis.

Packard agreed to withhold the consolidation of communications plans at Kagnew Station pending the outcome of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-requested study of September 16, 1970.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-067, Ethiopia, 1970. Secret; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals.

The telegram reported that during a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Newsom, Somali Ambassador Addou asked what aid might be given if Somali flag vessels discontinued trading with North Vietnam and Cuba. Newsom responded that even before the change in government in Somalia the U.S. bilateral aid program was scheduled to end after Fiscal Year (FY) 72 and it was not possible to make any promises.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 Somali-US. Confidential. Drafted by D.H. Shinn (AF/E); cleared in AF/E, and AID/AFR/ESA; and approved by Newsom. Repeated to Rome, Addis Ababa, and Nairobi.

The Embassy stated that the four U.S. policy objectives in Somalia were economic development, ditente in the Horn, true non-alignment, and the strengthening of ties to the West.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 Somali-US. Confidential. Only the summary is published.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 33-4 Somali-US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Jidda, Bonn, London, Nairobi, Panama, Paris, Rome, USUN, CINCSTRIKE, COMIDEASTFOR

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 33-4, Somali-US. Confidential; priority. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Jidda, Bonn, London, Nairobi, Panama, Paris, Rome, USUN, CINCSTRIKE and COMIDEASTFOR.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15-10 ETH-US. Secret. The attachment is not published.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15-10 ETH-US. Secret; Limdis; Priority. Drafted by Bader and Melone (AF/E); cleared in AF/E, AF/RA, A/OC, PM/ISO, INR/DD, OASD/ISA, JCS; and approved by Newsom. Repeated to JCS, USCINCEUR, Asmara, Addis Ababa, COMIDEASTFOR, DIA.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15-10 ETH-US. Secret. Drafted by Melone (AF/E) and Hilscher (OASD/ISA); cleared in AF/P, AF/RA, PM/ISO, DSAA, OSD/ISA/PP, CASD/I, JCS/J5, OASD/PA, OASD/I&L, OC/DLO; and approved by Coote (AF). Repeated to JCS, USCINCEUR, COMIDEASTFOR, CINCUSNAVEUAR, Asmara, CNO, CSA, CSAF, CMC.