118. Telegram 14026 From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State, November 25, 1974, 1420Z
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PAGE 01 ADDIS 14026 251459Z
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ACTION AF-04
INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00 NSC-05
INR-05 CIAE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 EUR-08 EA-06 DODE-00 PM-03
L-01 EB-03 RSC-01 /054 W
--------------------- 103603
O R 251420Z NOV 74
FM AMEMBASSY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2010
INFO AMCONSUL
USCINCEUR
C O N F I D E N T I A L
LIMDIS
E.O.11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR MASS EAID ET US
SUBJ: FIRST REFLECTIONS ON RECENT TURN OF EVENTS
1. SUMMARY. THE REMOVAL OF GENERAL AMAN AND THE EXE-
CUTION OF 60 POLITICAL PRISONERS ON THE NIGHT OF NOVEMBER
23 MARKED A FURTHER RADICALIZATION OF THE ETHIOPIAN
REVOLUTION. WE EXPECT THE "RADICALS" IN THE ARMED FORCES
COORDINATING COMMITTEE (AFCC) TO EXERCISE GREATER POWER
IN THE NEW STAGE, HOWEVER LONG OR SHORT IT MAY BE, BUT
IT IS STILL DIFFICULT TO FORESEE WHAT FORM THEIR RADICALISM
WILL TAKE. A KEY ISSUE IN THIS RESPECT IS WHETHER THE
PRESENT LEADERSHIP WILL WISH TO RETAIN THE TRADITIONAL
CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
SOVIETS AND/OR CHINESE FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE. WHILE
IT WILL PROBABLY BE DESIRABLE TO CONTINUE
PROGRAMS AT
CLUSION OF NEW AGREEMENTS PURSUANT TO THOSE PROGRAMS
LEST THEY BE MISREAD AS A SIGN OF APPROVAL
OR INDIFFERENCE TO THE SATURDAY NIGHT MASSACRE. END SUMMARY.
2. MOST OF THE MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COURSE OF THE
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ONGOING ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION SINCE THE ORIGINAL UPHEAVAL
IN JANUARY THROUGH MARCH HAVE BEEN MARKED BY THE ACQUISITION
OF GREATER POWER BY RADICAL ELEMENTS AT THE EXPENSE OF
MODERATES. THE PRINCIPAL TURNING POINTS IN THIS RESPECT
WERE THE SECOND GREAT WAVE OF ARRESTS AT THE END OF JUNE,
THE REMOVAL OF ENDALKACHEW MAKONNEN ON JULY 22, THE
DEPOSITION OF THE EMPEROR ON SEPTEMBER 12, AND NOW THE
DISMISSAL OF GENERAL AMAN AND THE MASSACRE OF NOVEMBER
23. IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE RADICALS IN THE AFCC WILL
WIELD EVEN MORE POWER IN THE NEW CHAPTER WHICH IS JUST
BEGINNING THAN THEY DID WHILE THE MODERATELY INCLINED
AMAN WAS CHIEF OF STATE.
3. IT IS FAR EASIER, HOWEVER, TO DESIGNATE MANY MEMBERS
OF THE AFCC AS RADICAL THAN IT IS TO DESCRIBE THE NATURE
OF THEIR RADICALISM. THE PRINCIPAL REASON FOR THIS IS
THAT MOST OF THESE RADICALS APPEAR TO BE CONSTRUCTING THEIR
OWN PROGRAMS AND PRINCIPLES AS THEY GO ALONG RATHER THAN
CARRYING OUT A PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED IDEOLOGICAL OR PARTY
PROGRAM. WE DO NOT KNOW VERY MUCH ABOUT THEIR PRINCIPLES
EXCEPT THAT THEIR EMPHASIS HAS BEEN ON HARSH PUNISHMENT
RATHER THAN FAIR TRIALS, THAT THEY INCLINE TO FAVOR VIGOR-
OUS MILITARY METHODS IN ERITRE, AND THAT RAPID SWEEPING
MEASURES OF LAND REFORM APPEAL MORE TO THEM THAN A STEP-
BY-STEP APPROACH. IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN POLICY WE KNOW
THAT THEY ARE AS A GROUP CONSIDERABLY MORE INCLINED THAN
THE MODERATES TO ADVOCATE TURNING TO THE SOVIETS OR
CHINESE AS A MEANS OF SOLVING THE SOMALI THREAT. JUST HOW
GREAT THE LIKELIHOOD IS THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL MOVE
IN THIS DIRECTION IS FAR FROM CLEAR, HOWEVER.
4. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE SELECTION OF A NEW CHIEF OF
STATE WILL PROVIDE US WITH SIGNIFICANT EVIDENCE REGARDING
THE INTENTION OF THE PRESENT DIRG LEADERS. IT SEEMS
QUITE LIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT THE NEW CHIEF OF STATE WILL
BE CHOSEN LARGELY FOR HIS WILLINGNESS TO TAKE ORDERS
FROM THE DIRG. HIS SELECTION MAY THEREFORE LEAVE US
LITTLE WISER THAN BEFORE.
5. THUS FAR INTO THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION US POLICY HAS
BEEN GUIDED BY TWO PRINCIPLES. THE FIRST IS THAT WE
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SHOULD NOT ONLY AVOID INTERVENTION IN THE SITUATION BUT
SHOULD TRY HARD TO AVOID ACTIONS WHICH COULD READILY BE
INTERPRETED AS INTERVENTION. THE SECOND PRINCIPLE HAS
BEEN TO CONTINUE ALL OF OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AT FULL
STRENGTH IN THE BELIEF THAT THIS WOULD HELP TO STRENGTHEN
THE POSITION OF THOSE WHO WILL STRUGGLE FOR A CONTINUATION
OF CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE
REMAIN DESIRABLE TO OBSERVE THESE TWO PRINCIPLES UNDER THE
NEW CIRCUMSTANCES. HOWEVER, THE INFORMATION WHICH WE OBTAIN
DURING THE COMING WEEKS REGARDING THE CAPABILITIES, POLICIES
AND INTENTIONS OF THE NEW LEADERSHIP WILL PROVIDE VALUABLE
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE REGARDING THE POLICIES WE SHOULD
PURSUE.
6. IN THE MEANTIME, WE MUST CONSIDER IMMEDIATELY
WHAT OUR ATTITUDE SHOULD BE THIS WEEK REGARDING THE THREE
MAJOR
7. WITH REGARD TO DROUGHT ASSISTANCE, WE NOW HAVE AUTHORIZATION
TO SIGN THE RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION AGREEMENT FOR
THREE MILLION DOLLARS. TO DO SO NOW, HOWEVER, WOULD BE
INTERPRETED BY MANY AS AN INDICATION THAT WE APPROVED
OF THE SATURDAY NIGHT MASSACRE. WE WILL THEREFORE TAKE
NO ACTION FOR THE TIME BEING TO ARRANGE FOR A SIGNATURE
OF THIS AGREEMENT. WITH REGARD TO ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE,
THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT YET INDICATED WHETHER IT IS PREPARED
TO SIGN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR LOAN WITH THE SPECIFIC
COMMITMENTS ON DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES WHICH WE HAVE
PROPOSED. WE WILL MAKE NO EFFORTS AT PRESENT TO EXPEDITE
ITS DECISION. WITH REGARD TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE, WE
WILL NOT DISCUSS FOR THE TIME BEING ANY SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES
TO THE GRANT AID PORTION OF THE PROGRAM SUCH AS THE F-5A
ISSUE. SINCE THE DECISION INTERFACE ON THE FMS CASH AND
CREDIT PORTION OF THE PROGRAM IS IN
ETHIOPIAN AMABASSADOR, NO CHANGE OF COURSE IS REQUIRED
HERE IN THAT AREA.
WYMAN
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