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O R 251420Z NOV 74

FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2010

INFO AMCONSUL ASMARA

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 14026

LIMDIS

E.O.11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR MASS EAID ET US

SUBJ: FIRST REFLECTIONS ON RECENT TURN OF EVENTS

1. SUMMARY. THE REMOVAL OF GENERAL AMAN AND THE EXE-

CUTION OF 60 POLITICAL PRISONERS ON THE NIGHT OF NOVEMBER

23 MARKED A FURTHER RADICALIZATION OF THE ETHIOPIAN

REVOLUTION. WE EXPECT THE "RADICALS" IN THE ARMED FORCES

COORDINATING COMMITTEE (AFCC) TO EXERCISE GREATER POWER

IN THE NEW STAGE, HOWEVER LONG OR SHORT IT MAY BE, BUT

IT IS STILL DIFFICULT TO FORESEE WHAT FORM THEIR RADICALISM

WILL TAKE. A KEY ISSUE IN THIS RESPECT IS WHETHER THE

PRESENT LEADERSHIP WILL WISH TO RETAIN THE TRADITIONAL

CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US, OR WILL TURN TO THE

SOVIETS AND/OR CHINESE FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE. WHILE

IT WILL PROBABLY BE DESIRABLE TO CONTINUE US ASSISTANCE

PROGRAMS AT NORMAL LEVELS, WE INTEND TO AVOID FOR THE MOMENT CON-

CLUSION OF NEW AGREEMENTS PURSUANT TO THOSE PROGRAMS

LEST THEY BE MISREAD AS A SIGN OF APPROVAL

OR INDIFFERENCE TO THE SATURDAY NIGHT MASSACRE. END SUMMARY.

2. MOST OF THE MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COURSE OF THE

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ONGOING ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION SINCE THE ORIGINAL UPHEAVAL

IN JANUARY THROUGH MARCH HAVE BEEN MARKED BY THE ACQUISITION

OF GREATER POWER BY RADICAL ELEMENTS AT THE EXPENSE OF

MODERATES. THE PRINCIPAL TURNING POINTS IN THIS RESPECT

WERE THE SECOND GREAT WAVE OF ARRESTS AT THE END OF JUNE,

THE REMOVAL OF ENDALKACHEW MAKONNEN ON JULY 22, THE

DEPOSITION OF THE EMPEROR ON SEPTEMBER 12, AND NOW THE

DISMISSAL OF GENERAL AMAN AND THE MASSACRE OF NOVEMBER

23. IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE RADICALS IN THE AFCC WILL

WIELD EVEN MORE POWER IN THE NEW CHAPTER WHICH IS JUST

BEGINNING THAN THEY DID WHILE THE MODERATELY INCLINED

AMAN WAS CHIEF OF STATE.

3. IT IS FAR EASIER, HOWEVER, TO DESIGNATE MANY MEMBERS

OF THE AFCC AS RADICAL THAN IT IS TO DESCRIBE THE NATURE

OF THEIR RADICALISM. THE PRINCIPAL REASON FOR THIS IS

THAT MOST OF THESE RADICALS APPEAR TO BE CONSTRUCTING THEIR

OWN PROGRAMS AND PRINCIPLES AS THEY GO ALONG RATHER THAN

CARRYING OUT A PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED IDEOLOGICAL OR PARTY

PROGRAM. WE DO NOT KNOW VERY MUCH ABOUT THEIR PRINCIPLES

EXCEPT THAT THEIR EMPHASIS HAS BEEN ON HARSH PUNISHMENT

RATHER THAN FAIR TRIALS, THAT THEY INCLINE TO FAVOR VIGOR-

OUS MILITARY METHODS IN ERITRE, AND THAT RAPID SWEEPING

MEASURES OF LAND REFORM APPEAL MORE TO THEM THAN A STEP-

BY-STEP APPROACH. IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN POLICY WE KNOW

THAT THEY ARE AS A GROUP CONSIDERABLY MORE INCLINED THAN

THE MODERATES TO ADVOCATE TURNING TO THE SOVIETS OR

CHINESE AS A MEANS OF SOLVING THE SOMALI THREAT. JUST HOW

GREAT THE LIKELIHOOD IS THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL MOVE

IN THIS DIRECTION IS FAR FROM CLEAR, HOWEVER.

4. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE SELECTION OF A NEW CHIEF OF

STATE WILL PROVIDE US WITH SIGNIFICANT EVIDENCE REGARDING

THE INTENTION OF THE PRESENT DIRG LEADERS. IT SEEMS

QUITE LIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT THE NEW CHIEF OF STATE WILL

BE CHOSEN LARGELY FOR HIS WILLINGNESS TO TAKE ORDERS

FROM THE DIRG. HIS SELECTION MAY THEREFORE LEAVE US

LITTLE WISER THAN BEFORE.

5. THUS FAR INTO THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION US POLICY HAS

BEEN GUIDED BY TWO PRINCIPLES. THE FIRST IS THAT WE

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SHOULD NOT ONLY AVOID INTERVENTION IN THE SITUATION BUT

SHOULD TRY HARD TO AVOID ACTIONS WHICH COULD READILY BE

INTERPRETED AS INTERVENTION. THE SECOND PRINCIPLE HAS

BEEN TO CONTINUE ALL OF OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AT FULL

STRENGTH IN THE BELIEF THAT THIS WOULD HELP TO STRENGTHEN

THE POSITION OF THOSE WHO WILL STRUGGLE FOR A CONTINUATION

OF CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE US. IT WILL PROBABLY

REMAIN DESIRABLE TO OBSERVE THESE TWO PRINCIPLES UNDER THE

NEW CIRCUMSTANCES. HOWEVER, THE INFORMATION WHICH WE OBTAIN

DURING THE COMING WEEKS REGARDING THE CAPABILITIES, POLICIES

AND INTENTIONS OF THE NEW LEADERSHIP WILL PROVIDE VALUABLE

ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE REGARDING THE POLICIES WE SHOULD

PURSUE.

6. IN THE MEANTIME, WE MUST CONSIDER IMMEDIATELY

WHAT OUR ATTITUDE SHOULD BE THIS WEEK REGARDING THE THREE

MAJOR US ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.

7. WITH REGARD TO DROUGHT ASSISTANCE, WE NOW HAVE AUTHORIZATION

TO SIGN THE RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION AGREEMENT FOR

THREE MILLION DOLLARS. TO DO SO NOW, HOWEVER, WOULD BE

INTERPRETED BY MANY AS AN INDICATION THAT WE APPROVED

OF THE SATURDAY NIGHT MASSACRE. WE WILL THEREFORE TAKE

NO ACTION FOR THE TIME BEING TO ARRANGE FOR A SIGNATURE

OF THIS AGREEMENT. WITH REGARD TO ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE,

THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT YET INDICATED WHETHER IT IS PREPARED

TO SIGN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR LOAN WITH THE SPECIFIC

COMMITMENTS ON DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES WHICH WE HAVE

PROPOSED. WE WILL MAKE NO EFFORTS AT PRESENT TO EXPEDITE

ITS DECISION. WITH REGARD TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE, WE

WILL NOT DISCUSS FOR THE TIME BEING ANY SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES

TO THE GRANT AID PORTION OF THE PROGRAM SUCH AS THE F-5A

ISSUE. SINCE THE DECISION INTERFACE ON THE FMS CASH AND

CREDIT PORTION OF THE PROGRAM IS IN WASHINGTON WITH THE

ETHIOPIAN AMABASSADOR, NO CHANGE OF COURSE IS REQUIRED

HERE IN THAT AREA.

WYMAN

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