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Foreign Relations,
1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972 Released by the Office of the Historian To view the original document in PDF format, click the document heading. To view a text only version of the document, click "View Text" at the end of the source note. The United States and South Asia India and Pakistan: Pre-Crisis, January 1969–February 1971 The memorandum, prepared by the NSC staff and sent by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger to Nixon, analyzed the causes underlying the riots occurring in Pakistan and the implications for Pakistani President Ayub Khan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1, President’s Daily Briefs. Secret. The memorandum is undated but was sent to the President on January 27 by Kissinger under cover of a briefing memorandum that summarized a number of foreign policy issues. Kissinger indicated that he was forwarding the attached memorandum because of the President’s interest in Khan. Kissinger’s memorandum stated that he had prepared the analysis of the situation in Pakistan, but it was apparently prepared by members of the National Security Council staff. (Ibid.) Kissinger also attached to his memorandum copies of telegrams 284 from Dacca, January 24, 292 from Dacca, and 247 from Karachi, both dated January 25. The telegrams reported on the rioting. (Ibid.)
2. Telegram 944 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, January 29, 1969, 0824Z The Embassy commented on the possibility that Pakistani President Ayub Khan might not stand for reelection. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 3. Telegram 1238 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, February 5, 1969, 1100Z The Embassy reviewed mounting political unrest in Pakistan and concluded that Pakistani President Ayub Khan’s "eventual withdrawal from the political scene must be considered likely." Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Jidda, Kabul, Karachi, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Tehran, Dacca, Lahore, Peshawar, DIA, and CINCSTRIKE. The memorandum assessed the politically volatile situation in Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.
5. Telegram 19762 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan, February 7, 1969, 0126Z In a conversation with Secretary Rogers, Pakistani Ambassador Hilaly outlined Pakistan’s concerns about reduced economic assistance from the United States and the delay in promised military supplies. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL PAK–US. Confidential. Drafted on February 6 by James W. Spain (NEA/PAF), cleared by William J. Handley (NEA), and approved for transmission by Spain. The conversation took place on February 6. Rogers reported on the conversation in a memorandum that he sent to the President on February 6. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1, President’s Daily Briefs, Feb 1–8, 1969) The note assessed the implications of Pakistani President Ayub Kahn’s call for the opening of a dialogue with the political opposition. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 PAK. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. 7. Telegram 1439 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, February 11, 1969, 1058Z Ambassador Oehlert reviewed the protracted effort to arrange for military supplies for Pakistan and urged a "prompt liberalization of policy" to expedite the process. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5 INDIA. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Ankara, New Delhi, Laird, JCS, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA, USCINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. Sent with an instruction to pass to the White House. Ambassador Bowles took sharp exception to Ambassador Oehlert’s proposal to expedite military assistance to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. INR assessed the situation in Pakistan, where rioting by mobs in the streets created "chaos, in many places approaching anarchy." Pakistani President Ayub Khan’s attempt to foster a compromise with the opposition through a round table conference had apparently collapsed. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 PAK. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Telegraphic reports of riots and demonstrations are ibid. Student supporters of former Foreign Minister Zulfiqur Ali Bhutto rioted in Karachi on February 17 following his release from prison. (Telegram 512 from Karachi, February 18; ibid.) The release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from prison on February 22 had the effect of calming passions in East Pakistan and opened the prospect of reviving the round table conference. (Telegram 697 from Dacca, February 22; ibid., POL 29 PAK) President Ayub Khan’s announcement on February 21 that he would not be a candidate in the next election also facilitated the revival of negotiations with his political opponents. (Telegram 1832 from Rawalpindi, February 21; ibid., POL 15–1 PAK) The round table conference convened in Rawalpindi on February 26, and Ayub accepted demands for direct elections and a parliamentary system, but negotiations collapsed on March 13 following the withdrawal of Mujibur Rahman over the issue of autonomy for East Pakistan. Telegraphic reports on the round table conference are ibid., POL 12 PAK and POL 23–8 PAK. 10. National Security Study Memorandum 26, Washington, February 21, 1969 President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger directed that a study be prepared on military supply policy in South Asia. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 1–42. Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of the Treasury and Agriculture, and to the Chairman of the JCS. INR analyzed the implications of a serious food shortage in East Pakistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AGR 15 PAK. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Nixon approved a recommendation from Kissinger involving the subsidized sale of food to India. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Confidential. Sent for action. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation. Kissinger informed Nixon that Ayub Khan had resigned as President of Pakistan after declaring martial law and appointing General Yahya Khan martial law administrator. The principal question, he noted, was whether the people of East Pakistan would accept the change. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Secret. Sent for information. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it and that a copy was sent to Richard L. Sneider of the National Security Council staff. Ayub’s resignation and the establishment of martial law were reported from Rawalpindi on March 25 in telegrams 2954, 2956, 2957 and 2958. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 PAK) Hilaly transmitted a message from General Yahya Kahn to President Nixon in which he explained former Pakistani President Ayub Khan's decision to relinquish power to Pakistan’s defense forces, and Yahya’s subsequent assumption of the position of martial law administrator. Yahya expressed his commitment to restore democratic rule and a civilian government as soon as possible. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 PAK. Confidential. Sent to the White House on March 29 under cover of a transmittal memorandum from Acting Executive Secretary John P. Walsh to Kissinger. Nixon returned a reply to Yahya on April 22 in which he wrote: "I wish you well in your efforts as President to restore normal conditions." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69) 15. Telegram 50241 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan, April 2, 1969, 2250Z Under Secretary of State Richardson questioned Deputy Martial Law Administrator Admiral Ahsan about the restoration of normal political processes in Pakistan and indicated that the U.S. traditionally reserved judgment in its dealings with authoritarian governments. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 7 PAK–US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to New Delhi. Drafted by Spain; cleared by Howard B. Schaffer (NEA/INC) and Joseph Sisco (NEA); and approved by Richardson. Vice Admiral Syed Mohammed Ahsan, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Navy and one of three Deputy Martial Law Administrators appointed by General Yahya Khan, was Pakistan’s representative at the funeral of former President Dwight D. Eisenhower. A memorandum of Ahsan’s conversation with Nixon on March 31, during which Ahsan offered the assurance that the Pakistani military forces had no desire to perpetuate themselves in power, is ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 1, Memoranda for the President, Beginning March 30, 1969. Ahsan subsequently told Spain that he "got the message" that while the U.S. might understand the necessity for martial law in Pakistan, future actions of the martial law administration in governing the country and establishing a timetable for a return to representative government would determine how helpful the United States could be to Pakistan. (Telegram 50354 to Rawalpindi, April 2; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 PAK) 16. Telegram 4797 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, April 10, 1969, 1049Z Ambassador Bowles urged that positive action be taken on a proposal, which had been under consideration for several years, to establish a binational foundation in India to fund mutually agreed educational, scientific, and cultural activities. The foundation would be funded by excess U.S.-held rupees generated by loan repayments and the sale of PL–480 commodities. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Confidential; Exdis. Public Law 480 was the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, enacted July 10, 1954, as amended. (68 Stat. 454) PL–480 was a program of agricultural subsidies to developing countries popularly known as the Food for Peace Act. 17. Telegram 3842 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, April 16, 1969, 1050Z Ambassador Oehlert reviewed the history of U.S. military supply policy for South Asia and argued for a revision to increase supplies to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Secret; Exdis. Sent with an instruction to pass to the White House, Department of Defense, the Departments of the Air Force, Army and Navy, JCS, and CINCSTRIKE. 18. Telegram 4169 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, April 25, 1969, 0845Z The Embassy outlined U.S. policy options in Pakistan and recommended increased economic and military assistance as leverage to encourage progress toward the reestablishment of civilian government and an equitable settlement of the grievances of the eastern wing of the country. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 1 PAK–US. Secret. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE, DIA, Ankara, Dacca, Karachi, Lahore, London, New Delhi, Moscow, Peshawar, Tehran, Calcutta, Hong Kong, Kabul, and Kathmandu. 19. Telegram 4275 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, April 29, 1969, 0832Z Ambassador Oehlert reported that the Pakistani Government was offering to consider a continuation on a "smaller and less visible basis" of the U.S. use of the facilities at Peshawar. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15 PAK–US. Secret; Exdis. Sent with an instruction to pass to the White House. The Department responded on April 30 that Oehlert should not take the initiative in discussing continuation of the operations at Peshawar, and if Yahya raised the issue, Oehlert was instructed to take a non-committal attitude and report to Washington. (Telegram 66922 to Rawalpindi; ibid.)
20. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 16, 1969 President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger discussed economic assistance for Pakistan with M. M. Ahmad, the principal economic adviser to President Yahya. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Harold Saunders, and approved in S/S on June 1. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: "version sent State."
The telegram reported the results of the Pakistan consortium meeting, May 19–20. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID 9 PAK. Limited Official Use. Joint State/AID message. Sent also to Rawalpindi. Repeated to New Delhi for Spain. The consortium of governments and institutions organized to provide development assistance to Pakistan met in Paris, May 19–20, under the chairmanship of the World Bank. The meeting was attended by representatives of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The International Monetary Fund also sent observers.
The telegram reported the results of the India consortium meeting, May 22–23. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID 9 INDIA. Limited Official Use; Priority. Joint State/AID message. Repeated to the Department of State. The consortium of governments and institutions organized to provide development assistance to India met in Paris, May 22–23, under the chairmanship of the World Bank. The meeting was attended by representatives of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The International Monetary Fund sent observers.
23. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State, May 26, 1969, 0950Z Rogers reported on his conversation with Pakistani President Yahya during his stop in Pakistan on May 24. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 7 S. Confidential; Priority. Sent as Secto 111/2059. Repeated to Rawalpindi, New Delhi, Kabul, Ankara, Saigon, Bangkok, London, and the mission at Geneva. Rogers visited South Asia following his participation in the SEATO meetings in Bangkok, May 19–23, and prior to his participation in the CENTO meetings in Tehran, May 26–27. He stopped in New Delhi May 23–24, in Lahore May 24–25, and in Kabul May 25.
24. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State, May 29, 1969, 2237Z Rogers met with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi on the morning of May 24 during his stop in India to discuss U.S. relations with India and U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Secret; Exdis. Sent as Secto 143/WH 90729 with an instruction to repeat to New Delhi. Rogers sent the telegram from his plane while crossing the Atlantic Ocean from London en route to the United States. The meeting between Gandhi and Rogers took place on the morning on May 24. A copy of Nixon’s letter to Gandhi, which commended Rogers to her and emphasized the importance of India and its economic development to his administration, can be found ibid., RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972: Lot 70 D 387, CF 366. The Secretary’s meeting with Foreign Minister Singh was reported to the Department on May 24 in telegram 7246. (Ibid., Central Files 1967–69, ORG 7 S)
25. Telegram 6484 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, July 2, 1969, 1100Z The Embassy renewed its arguments for limited direct sale of lethal weapons to Pakistan and India. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and New Delhi. On July 8 the Embassy in New Delhi commented on the recommendations advanced in telegram 6484 from Rawalpindi as follows: "We must emphasize that any policy change permitting direct sales to Pakistan of lethal end items--even on a severely limited basis--would evoke sharp GOI reaction and severely damage our position in India." (Telegram 9574 from New Delhi; ibid.)
26. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 10, 1969, 4:37–5:15 p.m. President Nixon and Indian Foreign Minister Singh discussed relations between the U.S. and India in advance of Nixon’s forthcoming visit to India. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Saunders on July 12. The meeting was held in the Oval Office of the White House. The time of the meeting is from the President’s Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files) Singh was visiting the United States in response to an invitation extended by Rogers in New Delhi on May 24. A summary of Singh’s conversations with Rogers on July 10 and 11 was sent to New Delhi on July 11 in telegram 115492. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69) Singh also met with Kissinger on July 10. A memorandum of that conversation is ibid.
Kissinger analyzed a political crisis for Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and the possible effect on Nixon’s impending visit to India. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. The Embassy in New Delhi reported on the political crisis on July 15 in telegram 10025, and on July 16 in telegram 10082 (both ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 12 INDIA) On July 19 Gandhi’s government issued an ordinance nationalizing 14 of the country’s largest banks. The Embassy commented: "By boldness and swiftness of her move on July 19 to nationalize leading banks, Prime Minister Gandhi has achieved leadership of Congress Party and confounded her powerful opponents within that party." (Telegram 10333 from New Delhi, July 21; ibid.)
Nixon approved proposals put forward by Kissinger for economic assistance to India. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Confidential. Sent for action. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Nixon initialed his approval of both recommendations. Attached but not published at Tab A was a July 3 memorandum to Nixon from Robert P. Mayo, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, entitled "Proposed P.L. 480 Program for India." Attached but not published at Tab B was a June 23 memorandum to the President from Rogers, entitled "Economic Assistance to India."
U.S. relations with India were discussed on July 31 in a conversation between the advisers to President Nixon and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi, including Kissinger and Indian Foreign Secretary T. N. Kaul. On August 1 Nixon and Gandhi joined the discussion. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1320, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 9 of 19. Secret. Drafted by Saunders on August 1. The combined memoranda were apparently typed from notes taken by Saunders that were not refined into finished memoranda of conversation. The conversations recorded in this memoranda were also reported to the Department on August 2 in telegram 11040 from New Delhi. (Ibid., RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972: Lot 70 D 387, CF 383) The conversations were held in the Panel Room of the President’s Palace in New Delhi during Nixon’s visit to India July 31–August 1. The meeting on July 31 was held from 3:00–4:45 p.m., and the meeting on August 1 was held from 8:30–10:00 a.m. Nixon was on a round-the-world trip that began on July 23 with the observation of the splashdown and recovery of the Apollo 11 spacecraft from the deck of the USS Hornet, followed by an overnight stop in Guam. He then embarked on a series of official visits to meet with chiefs of state and heads of government of the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, India, and Pakistan. The President also made an unannounced visit to the Republic of Vietnam, an official visit to Romania, and a brief stopover at Mildenhall Air Force Base in England to meet with Prime Minister Harold Wilson. The President returned to the United States on August 3.
30. Memorandum of Conversation, New Delhi, August 1, 1969, 7:45–8:30 a.m. Before the second meeting of advisers, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger met with P.N. Haksar, his counterpart in the Indian Government. Haksar suggested that good relations between the U.S. and India depended upon the U.S. willingness to recognize the situation on the subcontinent and cease equating India with Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1320, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 9 of 19. No classification marking. Drafted by Saunders. The meeting was held in the Presidential Palace.
31. Memorandum of Conversation, Lahore, August 1, 1969, 2:30–4:30 p.m. President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger explained the Nixon Doctrine and discussed U.S. relations with Pakistan with senior advisers to Pakistani President Yahya. Presidents Nixon and Yahya joined the conversation at the end. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1320, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 9 of 19. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, but it is similar to the memoranda prepared by Saunders of the conversations in New Delhi on July 31 and August 1. This memorandum was apparently also prepared from the unrefined notes Saunders took during the meeting. The conversation was held in the Governor’s House in Lahore during Nixon’s visit from August 1–2. According to another record of the meeting between Nixon and Yahya, relations with China were discussed at some length. Nixon said that in any discussion of Asia’s future, China could not be ignored. He said that he recognized the need for a dialogue to bring China into the community of nations, but it would take time before the U.S. public accepted that point of view. (Memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger, September 2, 1969; ibid., Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I (1970)) According to Kissinger, who was present at that part of the meeting, Nixon also told Yahya that the United States would not be party to any arrangement to isolate China and asked Yahya to convey his feeling to the Chinese at the highest level. (Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 180–181) Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman, who was traveling with the President, recorded in his diary on August 2 that Yahya had made a strong impression on Nixon "as a real leader–very intelligent –and with great insight into Russia-China relations." He added that Nixon felt that "Yahya can be valuable channel to China esp.–but also USSR." (Ibid., Handwritten Journals and Diaries of Harry Robbins Haldeman, H.R. Haldeman Journal, Trips I, February 23, 1969–September 1970)
32. Memorandum of Conversation, Lahore, August 1, 1969 President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger met with Air Marshal Nur Khan to discuss China, Indo-Pak relations, and the question of U.S. military supplies to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1320, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 9 of 19. Secret. Drafted on August 7 by Spain. The conversation was held in the Governor’s House in Lahore.
Schneider analyzed a developing political crisis in India. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 INDIA. Confidential. Drafted by Schaffer.
The Department assessed Indian Prime Minister Gandhi’s victory over her rivals in the Congress Party and concluded that it would improve prospects for political stability in India. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 14 INDIA. Confidential. Drafted by Schaffer, cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Stuart W. Rockwell, and approved by Schneider. Sent with an instruction to pass to San Francisco for Rogers and to San Clemente for Kissinger.
35. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson), Washington, September 12, 1969 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Meetings, 1969. Secret; Eyes Only. [2 pages of source text not declassified.]
36. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson), Washington, September 15, 1969 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, 303 Meetings, 1969. Secret; Sensitive. [2 pages of source text not declassified.]
37. Letter From Pakistani President Yahya to President Nixon, Rawalpindi, October 1, 1969 Yahya requested urgent approval of the sale of 1.7 million tons of wheat under PL–480 to offset a serious food shortage in East Pakistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID (US) 15–8 PAK. No classification marking. The Consulate General in Dacca underlined the problem of food shortages in East Pakistan on October 10 in telegram 2855 from Dacca. (Ibid., POL 18 PAK )
38. Airgram A–550 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, October 6, 1969 Chargé Spain traced the history and drew the lessons from the experience of the Air Force communications facility at Peshawar. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 21 PAK. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Spain on October 2, and cleared in draft by General Geary and in the political section by Stephen E. Palmer and Alan D. Wolfe. Repeated to New Delhi, Ankara for Handley, Tehran for Minister Thacher, London for Minister Hughes, the Peshawar Air Station for the Commanding Officer, Dacca, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, USAFI for Hilbert, CIA for Sheldon, NSA for General Carter, USAFSS, and DOD/ISA. The 10-year agreement governing the communications facility at Peshawar was not renewed by Pakistan and expired on July 17, 1969. A limited number of U.S. personnel remained after July 17 to effect an orderly turnover of the facility to Pakistan. A brief ceremony effected the turnover on January 7, 1970, rather than on February 28 as anticipated by Spain. (Telegram 001 from Peshawar, January 8, 1970; ibid., DEF 15–10 PAK–US)
Nixon approved the sale of 1 million tons of wheat to Pakistan under PL–480. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Limited Official Use. Sent for action. Attached at Tab A was an October 10 memorandum from John Hannah to Nixon; attached at Tab B was an October 13 memorandum from Mayo to Nixon; neither is published. The October 1 letter from Yahya to Nixon, attached at Tab C, is printed as Document 37. The President initialed his approval of the recommendation on October 22. On November 13 Nixon sent a letter to Yahya indicating that the United States was prepared to negotiate a PL–480 agreement of 1 million tons of wheat for Pakistan. (Ibid., Box 759, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, (1969–1970) )
40. Telegram 175434 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India, October 16, 1969, 1713Z Secretary Rogers reviewed Indo-U.S. relations with Indian Foreign Secretary Kaul and warned that Indian recognition of North Vietnam would have a "serious and lasting" negative effect on relations with the United States. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, Oct 69–Aug 70. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Schneider on October 14, cleared by Van Hollen, Sisco, and James D. Rosenthal (EA/VN), and approved by Rogers. Sent also to Saigon, Rawalpindi, and Paris. The telegram sent to Paris was also numbered Todel 3367. Kaul was in Washington as head of the Indian delegation to the Indo-US Bilateral Talks; see Document 42. The Secretary’s meeting at the United Nations with Foreign Minister Singh on September 29, during which he raised similar objections to the proposed Indian recognition of the North Vietnamese Government, was reported to the Department on October 1 by USUN in telegram 3325. (Ibid,. Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, Oct 69–Aug 70)
41. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, October 27, 1969 Rogers reported to Nixon that Southeast Asia was the principal focus of bilateral talks held in Washington between U.S. and Indian delegations. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, Oct 69–Aug 70. Secret. The bilateral talks were the second round in what were anticipated to be annual talks between the United States and India. The initial talks took place in New Delhi from July 26 to 28, 1968. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, South Asia, vol. XXV, Document 509. A 69-page record of the talks on October 16–17 is in the National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972: Box 503, Lot 70 D 387, CF 409. The talks were reported to New Delhi in telegrams 177194, 179522, and 180313, dated October 18, October 23, and October 24 respectively. (All ibid., Central Files 1967–69, POL INDIA–US)
The summary is of a paper prepared in the Department of State in response to NSSM 26 and approved by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia. The paper reviewed U.S. military supply policy toward South Asia and outlined options for consideration by the Review Group. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–040, Review Group Meeting, South Asia Military Support Policy, 11/25/69. Secret. This summary is of a paper drafted in the Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in response to NSSM 26 (Document 10), and approved by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia. Sisco, the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group, sent the paper on November 14 to Kissinger, the Chairman of the NSC Review Group. The paper, entitled "U.S. Military Supply for South Asia–Response to NSSM 26," is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–040, Review Group Meeting, South Asia Military Support Policy, 11/25/69. Saunders sent the analytical summary and the paper to Kissinger on November 19 under a covering memorandum. Kissinger’s handwritten note reads: "Hal–The President wants action not study. When are the tanks moving? When will the lawyers decide? Please get me quick answers." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 1244, Saunders Subject Files, Pakistan Military and Intelligence, 1/20/69–12/31/69)
Discussion of military supply policy toward South Asia focused on the question of resuming military sales and assistance to Pakistan and the cost to U.S. relations with India of doing so. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, Review Group Meeting, Minutes, Originals, 1969. Secret. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. For a summary of the paper prepared in response to NSSM 26, see Document 42.
Nixon approved a recommendation to endorse the sale of 100 U.S.-originated tanks by Turkey to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Secret. Sent for action. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation on December 6.
Kissinger forwarded Secretary of State Rogers’ objections to the sale of tanks by Turkey to Pakistan. Kissinger reiterated his support for the sale. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, 1 Dec 69–Sept 70. Secret. The attached memorandum is dated December 18. Nixon did not approve or disapprove the recommendation, but wrote on the memorandum as follows: "K Discuss with me." On December 23, David Schneider, Country Director for India, sent a letter to Keating about the memorandum that Rogers sent to Nixon. He wrote of Rogers: "We met with him to discuss the proposal and he was quite emphatic in his opposition to it." He added, however, "the recurrent theme one hears from the NSC staff is that the President ‘wants to do something for Pakistan.’" (Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 51, Eyes Only Correspondence 1969/1970)
Kissinger summarized a letter to Nixon from Pakistani President Yahya in which Yahya pressed for a decision on military supply policy. Nixon indicated that he was disposed to respond favorably. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 759, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan (1969–1970). Secret. Sent for information. The attached letter from President Yahya to President Nixon is dated January 19. The December 20 letter to which Yahya responded can be found ibid. The reference to a speech on November 3, 1969, is to Nixon’s address to the nation on the war in Vietnam. For text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 901–909. Nixon underlined the last seven words of point 5 and added the following handwritten instructions in the margin: "1 Let’s give them spare parts immediately as basis of keeping the US word. 2 I lean to the Turkish tanks unless it raises too much hell with Congress. I don’t care about Indian reaction." He also wrote on the memorandum: "K–doesn’t this show advantage of our letter idea? Let’s continue the practice on a selective basis."
Richardson recommended that the U.S. maintain the embargo on military supplies to South Asia. If, however, Nixon felt he was under an obligation to Pakistani President Yahya, Richardson recommended that military supplies for Pakistan be limited to a one-time exception. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret. Drafted by Van Hollen on February 6, and cleared by Sisco. A typewritten notation on the source text reads: "OBE. See S/S 8019. RLBrown 6/10/70." For a citation to the paper entitled, "U.S. Military Supply Policy for South Asia," see Document 42. The enclosures to the memorandum are not printed. In the order in which they are cited, the enclosures are an undated memorandum entitled, "Recent Developments Affecting South Asia Military Supply Policy Issue," another undated memorandum entitled, "Possible Gestures Toward Pakistan," and the December 18 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon, printed as an attachment to Document 45.
Saunders summarized the contending arguments advanced with regard to military supply policy for South Asia. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, Dec 69–Sept 70. Secret. Sent for information. The attached cable is telegram 1333 from Rawalpindi, February 18. (Ibid.) It can also be found ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Ambassador Keating sent a telegram from New Delhi on February 20 making the anticipated arguments against revising the existing arms policy for the subcontinent. (Telegram 1961 from New Delhi; ibid.) Kissinger’s handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: "We must move this." He added: "Let me see my memo." The memorandum is marked in an unknown hand to indicate that Saunders had the action responsibility to respond to Kissinger’s instructions. The memorandum to which Kissinger referred was sent to the President on March 16 and is printed as Document 54.
49. Telegram 29569 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India, February 27, 1970, 2153Z The Embassy was instructed to deliver a message from Secretary Rogers to Foreign Minister Singh concerning India’s decision to close five USIS cultural centers. Rogers expressed regret over the decision and asked for evidence to support the allegation that the centers had been engaged in "political and other undesirable activities." Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Schneider; cleared by Van Hollen, Sisco, Richardson, and in USIA by Assistant Director for Near East and South Asia David Nalle; and approved by Rogers. The decision by India on February 10 to close five USIS cultural centers was triggered by a Soviet request on December 3, 1969, to open a cultural center in Trivandrum. The Soviet request led to a review of all foreign cultural centers operating in India and a decision to close the U.S. centers in Ahmedabad, Nagpur, Chandigarh, Ranchi, and Varauasi. These were the only such centers operating in cities without diplomatic or consular representation, and they operated on the basis of an understanding reached by former Ambassador Chester Bowles and Prime Minister Nehru. The Soviet Union sought to establish a cultural center in Trivandrum on the same basis.
50. Telegram 2388 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, March 3, 1970, 1532Z Ambassador Keating reported on a conversation with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi on the "not so pleasant" issue of the impending closure of the U.S. cultural centers. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to the consulates in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras.
Rasgotra transmitted a letter from Foreign Minister Singh to Rogers. Singh explained that the Indian decision to close the U.S. cultural centers was part of an effort to establish a uniform policy with regard to such centers and was not directed against the United States. No suggestion of improper activities on the part of the U.S. was intended. Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/INS Files: Lot 73 D 377, India 1970, US Cultural Centers. No classification marking. The text of the letter was also conveyed to the Department from New Delhi on March 5 in telegram 2505. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70)
Saunders and Haig sent a memorandum to Kissinger, conveying Nixon’s reaction to the closure of the cultural centers: "Tell Sisco I’d like to take a stronger line on this. Not to object to closing—but to accept it and close some other facilities which may ‘irritate’ them a bit." Saunders and Haig surveyed the possibilities. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Secret. Haig and Saunders sent the memorandum through David Young of the NSC staff for Kissinger. Attached is a copy of the page of the briefing memorandum with the President’s comments.
53. Telegram 34382 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India, March 9, 1970, 2152Z Secretary Rogers instructed Ambassador Keating to see Indian Foreign Minister Singh to ask him to issue a public statement absolving the U.S. of any "political or other undesirable activities" in the cultural centers. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Van Hollen; revised in S by Herbert S. Okun and Rogers; cleared by Sisco, and Alan Carter, Assistant Director for Near East and South Asia (USIA); and approved by Rogers.
Kissinger’s memorandum laid out the options for the question of military supply for India and Pakistan, which in practice related largely to Pakistan. Nixon indicated that he favored continuing the policy of selling replacement parts to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I, 1970. Secret. Sent for action. Attached at Tab A but not published was a January 7 paper, apparently prepared by the NSC staff, entitled, "Issues For Decision." Attached at Tab B but not published was Secretary Rogers’ February 10 memorandum to the President. Both are ibid. Rather than approving or disapproving the recommendation put forward in the memorandum, Nixon responded with handwritten comments in the margins. The thrust of his comments was that he preferred the course of action outlined as option 4. He highlighted the second paragraph of the discussion of option 4 and wrote "OK" next to it. He underscored the first sentence of the following paragraph and wrote next to it, "I agree we do this by all means." He began his comments under the approval line as follows: "I believe option 4 is less provocative politically in the U.S.–& for that matter in India." He considered that option 4 plus an increased economic package constituted a substantial gesture in support of Pakistan that he could more easily support politically than the other options detailed in the memorandum. In a handwritten comment in the margin, Kissinger concurred with the President’s response: "I think option 4 gives Paks most." He added an instruction to Haig: "Al–Get note from Hal [Saunders] what it means." He was apparently referring to a more complete discussion of the implications of adopting option 4 as policy.
Nixon approved a recommendation that the U.S. accept the closure of the cultural centers by India without complaint, while reserving the possibility of a further response. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. An attached draft of the memorandum indicates that it was drafted by Saunders and revised by Kissinger. The President initialed the approval line on April 2. Not published is the attached March 17 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon.
Nixon approved a recommended $102.5 million program of economic assistance for Pakistan for fiscal year 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, 1 Dec 69–Sept 70. Confidential. Sent for action. The memorandum is undated, but the President’s approval of the recommendation is dated April 6. Kissinger initialed the approval line for the President. Attached at Tab A but not published is Rogers’ March 12 memorandum to Nixon on the economic assistance program. Mayo summarized the recommendations of the Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, and the Bureau of the Budget in a March 24 memorandum to the President; attached at Tab B but not published. Both are ibid.
Kissinger asked Nixon to clarify his decision on South Asian arms policy. Nixon reaffirmed the sale of spare parts for previously supplied equipment and approved a revision of the embargo on the sale of lethal equipment to allow a "one-time exception" for Pakistan for a limited number of items. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I, 1970. Secret. Sent for action. For the previous memorandum dealing with the supply of arms to South Asia to which Kissinger refers, see Document 54. Nixon checked the first option to indicate his approval of a one-time sale to Pakistan. He added the following handwritten instruction: "Hold until we see whether the Indians will be in a control commission." Nixon’s instruction raised questions as to which control commission he meant, and what he hoped to achieve with regard to India’s participation in a control commission by delaying a decision on arms supply to South Asia. Saunders posed these questions in a memorandum he sent to Haig on April 27. Saunders assumed the President was referring to one of the control commissions in Southeast Asia. Haig did not answer the questions but responded with a handwritten note on the memorandum that reads as follows: "Hal–Pres is inclined to move but wants to wait at least until next week." (Ibid.)
Eliot reported that the five cultural centers at issue in India would be closed on May 16. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential. The May 6 memorandum cited by Eliot is ibid.
Nixon approved a recommended program of $193 million in economic assistance for India for fiscal year 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential. Sent for action. The memorandum itself is undated, but the President’s approval of the recommendation is dated May 19. Kissinger initialed the approval line for the President. The Rogers to Nixon memorandum, attached at Tab A but not published, is dated March 20. James R. Schlesinger, Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget, summarized the recommendations of the Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, and the Bureau of the Budget in an April 30 memorandum to the President, attached at Tab B but not published. Both are ibid.
60. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 21, 1970, 2:30–3 p.m. Ambassador Farland warned Secretary of Defense Laird that Pakistan was disappointed with the U.S. and was turning increasingly to China and the Soviet Union for military supplies. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files, FRC 73 A 1975, Box 22, Pakistan 1970, 000.1–100. Secret. Drafted by Kravitz and approved by Nutter on May 26. The conversation was held in Laird’s office.
Schneider informed Stone of the decision made by Nixon to provide military assistance to Pakistan. Source: Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 51, Eyes Only Correspondence, 1969/1970. Secret; Eyes Only; Official-Informal. Published from an unsigned copy.
62. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 27, 1970, 3:30–4 p.m. Ambassador Keating warned Secretary of Defense Laird that a decision to provide military assistance to Pakistan would have a "devastating" effect on U.S. relations with India. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files, FRC 73 A 1975, Box 19, India 1970, 000.1–334. Secret. Drafted by Kravitz, and approved on June 1 by Nutter and on June 5 in Laird’s office. The conversation was held in Laird’s office.
Nixon confirmed his decision to make a one-time exception for Pakistan to the arms embargo for South Asia, and he specified the inclusion of tanks and B–57 bombers. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I, 1970. Secret. Sent for action. Attached but not published at Tab A was the June 4 Rogers memorandum. It can be found ibid. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation, and with check marks on the two succeeding option lines indicated his intention to add tanks and B–57 bombers to the package of armaments recommended by Rogers.
Kissinger and Sisco discussed the President’s decision to include tanks and B–57 bombers in the one-time exception package for Pakistan. Sisco warned that to do so would increase opposition in the Congress and cause a greater reaction in India. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 363, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.
Sisco and Kissinger discussed the contemplated one-time exception again, and Sisco revised the proposal to eliminate the tanks and change the 6 bombers to 12 interceptor fighters. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 363, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. The omissions are in the original transcript.
66. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 17, 1970, 7:30 p.m. President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger informed Pakistani Ambassador Hilaly of President Nixon’s decision to make a one-time exception to the embargo on arms supplies for South Asia on Pakistan’s behalf. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1026, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Memcon–Ambassador Hilaly, 6/17/70. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office.
67. Telegram 96236 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan, June 18, 1970, 2220Z The Department instructed Ambassador Farland to inform Pakistani President Yahya about President Nixon’s decision on arms supplies for Pakistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Van Hollen on June 17; cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Plans and National Security Affairs Robert J. Pranger (DOD/ISA), Director of the Office of Military Assistance and Sales Christian Chapman (PM/MAS), William F. Spengler (NEA/PAF), Sisco, David Abshire (H), and Saunders; and approved by Rogers. Saunders sent a draft of the telegram to Kissinger on June 18 under a covering memorandum. A handwritten notation by Saunders on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger revised and cleared the telegram. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, 1 Dec 69–Sept 70) Telegram 96481 to Rawalpindi, June 18, cited at the conclusion of the telegram, provided Farland with the rationale underlying the policy decision. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK)
68. Telegram 5012 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, June 21, 1970, 1353Z Ambassador Farland reported that Pakistani President Yahya was "deeply pleased and appreciative of President’s action." Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, 1 Dec 69–Sept 70. Secret; Priority; Nodis.
69. Telegram 8424 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, July 16, 1970, 1615Z Ambassador Keating reported on a conversation with Swaran Singh, the new Minister of External Affairs, in which Singh said that a U.S. decision to resume military supplies to Pakistan would "greatly impair" his efforts to improve relations between India and the United States. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 ASIA SE. Secret; Exdis.
70. Letter From President Nixon to the Ambassador to India (Keating), Washington, July 17, 1970 Nixon wrote to Keating to explain the rationale behind his decision to provide "at least one package of equipment" to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, USSR–Firyubin–Keating, Jul 70. Secret; Eyes Only.
Kissinger confirmed the information concerning arms for Pakistan that was sent to Keating in a letter from President Nixon on July 17. He added that India’s pending decision on recognition of North Vietnam would "be considered in assessing the timing on Pakistan arms package." Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, USSR–Firyubin–Keating, Jul 70. Top Secret; Sensitive. Initialed by Haig for Kissinger. The message is undated, but an attached note indicates that it was sent on the date and at the time given. Telegram 112500 to New Delhi is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK.
72. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 22, 1970 President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Ambassador Jha discussed prospects for improving relations between the U.S. and India. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Secret. A copy was sent to David Young. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office. The time of meeting is not indicated on the memorandum.
73. Telegram 122180 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India, July 29, 1970, 2210Z The Department transmitted the text of a letter from Indian Foreign Minister Singh to Secretary of State Rogers in which Singh expressed his interest in improving Indo-U.S. relations but warned that a U.S. decision to resume arms sales to Pakistan would have "serious repercussions." Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 INDIA. Limited Official Use; Limdis. Drafted on July 28 by R. Grant Smith (NEA/INC), cleared by M. Gordon Tiger (NEA/INC) and by Craig Baxter (NEA/PAF), and approved by Van Hollen. Repeated to Rawalpindi.
Ambassador Farland reported from Dacca on severe flooding in East Pakistan that had led Pakistani President Yahya to postpone national elections from October to December. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Rawalpindi. The telegram, signed by Consul General Blood, was sent by Farland. Nixon followed Farland’s advice. On August 18 Farland was authorized to deliver a letter from Nixon to Yahya that was virtually identical to the letter proposed by Farland. (Telegram 134524 to Rawalpindi; ibid.)
75. Telegram 7184 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, September 10, 1970, 1125Z President Yahya told Chargé Sober that his decision to postpone national elections until December should not be taken to mean that he was wavering in his determination to restore civilian government. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–PAK. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Dacca, Karachi, and Lahore.
76. Memorandum for the Record, Washington, September 24, 1970 Ambassador Farland summarized his conversation with President Nixon during which he reported on Pakistani President Yahya’s enthusiastic reaction to Nixon’s offer of a one-time exception to the embargo on military sales to Pakistan. Source: Department of State, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 78 D 98, Military Supply–Pak Requests. Secret; Nodis. Prepared by Farland. For the message delivered by Farland to Yahya on June 20, see Document 67.
77. Telegram 160165 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India, September 29, 1970, 1809Z The Embassy was instructed to inform the Indian Government that the U.S. intended to make a limited sale of arms to Pakistan as a one-time exception to the arms supply policy established in 1965. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Quainton and Schneider on September 28; revised and cleared by Van Hollen; cleared by Spengler, Chapman, Deputy Assistant Secretary Colgate Prentice (H), Saunders, Colonel Gross (OSD/ISA), and Rear Admiral St. George (DOD/Joint Staff); and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Rawalpindi. The Embassy in Rawalpindi was instructed on September 29 to inform Pakistan about the details of the decision to offer a one-time exception to the existing restrictions on military supply. (Telegram 160449 to Rawalpindi; ibid.)
78. Telegram 12174 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, September 30, 1970, 1537Z Ambassador Keating conveyed the decision to allow limited arms sales to Pakistan in a conversation with Acting Foreign Secretary S. K. Banerji. Banerji described the issue as "extremely explosive" and expressed regret at the decision. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Under Secretary Johnson called in Ambassador Jha on September 30 and informed him about the decision to offer limited arms sales to Pakistan. Jha protested the decision and anticipated that it would produce a "great deal of unhappiness" in India. (Telegram 161070 to New Delhi, September 30; ibid.)
79. Telegram 7754 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, October 1, 1970, 1005Z Deputy Chief of Mission Sidney Sober reported on his meeting with Foreign Secretary Alvie and Defense Secretary Ahmed to discuss the U.S. offer to sell military equipment to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. The reference to Conte–Long provisions in the telegram is a reference to the Conte–Long amendment to the Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations Act of 1968. The amendment, adopted as section 119 of the appropriations act on January 2, 1968, directed the President to withhold economic assistance in an amount equivalent to the amount spent by any underdeveloped country other than Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, the Republic of China, the Philippines, and Korea for the purchase of sophisticated weapons systems. (PL–90–249; 81 Stat. 936)
80. Telegram 7805 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, October 5, 1970, 1110Z Pakistani President Yahya indicated that Pakistan would have difficulty financing the military sales being authorized and asked for alternative purchase plans. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
Sisco summarized the Indian and Pakistani reactions to the decision to authorize limited arms sales to Pakistan. Source: Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 51, DTS–Chrons, Oct–Dec 1970. Secret. Drafted by Schneider and cleared by Spengler and Van Hollen.
Nixon approved a $72 million proposed program of PL–480 commodities for Pakistan for fiscal year 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. No classification marking. The memorandum is undated. Transmitted under an October 9 covering memorandum from C. Fred Bergsten of the NSC staff to Kissinger for submission to the President. Kissinger initialed the approval line of the memorandum for Nixon. Attached at Tab A but not published is a September 3 memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Johnson to the President, in which he recommended the proposed PL–480 program on behalf of the Departments of State, Agriculture, and the Treasury. Caspar Weinberger, Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget, concurred with Johnson’s recommendation in a September 26 memorandum to the President, attached at Tab B but not published. Also attached was an October 20 memorandum from NSC Staff Secretary Jeanne Davis to Eliot informing the Department of State of the President’s decision and instructing the Department not to inform Pakistan until after Nixon had met with Yahya in Washington on October 25.
83. Letter From President Nixon to Pakistani President Yahya, Washington, October 15, 1970 Nixon’s letter conveyed to Yahya the terms of the offer of an arms sale to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, 1969–1970. No classification marking. The text of the letter was transmitted to Rawalpindi on October 16 to be conveyed to Yahya prior to his trip to New York for the fall session of the UN General Assembly. (Telegram 170588 to Rawalpindi; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK)
84. Telegram 8141 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, October 16, 1970, 1129Z The initial status report from the Embassy indicated that the "major problem" affecting the U.S. offer to sell arms to Pakistan was the question of whether Pakistan could afford to finance the package of arms being offered. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis.
85. National Intelligence Estimate 31/32–70, Washington, October 20, 1970 NIE 31/32–70 provided a summary of long-term political and economic prospects for India and Pakistan. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R 01012A, NIC Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence R. E. Cushman, Jr. According to a note on the cover sheet, "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on October 20, except for the Assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside of his jurisdiction."
Nixon approved a recommended $100 million AID program loan to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Confidential. An October 22 covering memorandum from Bergsten transmitted the memorandum and attachments to Kissinger for submission to the President. Kissinger wrote on Bergsten’s memorandum that the proposed program loan to Pakistan was "approved on basis of oral instruction by President." Accordingly, Kissinger initialed the approval line for Nixon on October 28. Attached but not published at Tab A was an undated memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Irwin to Nixon recommending authorization for a $100 million program loan to Pakistan. Attached but not published at Tab B was an undated memorandum from Shultz to Nixon, in which Shultz concurred with Irwin’s recommendation.
Secretary of State Rogers and Pakistani President Yahya met in New York during the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. Yahya anticipated that it would take 6 months following the establishment of a constituent assembly based on the general election scheduled for December before a constitution could be drafted and martial law replaced with civilian government. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 S. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Also designated USUN 2646. Sent with a request to repeat to Rawalpindi, Cairo, and Amman.
Secretary of State Rogers and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi had a sharp exchange in New York growing out of the Indian reaction to the U.S. decision to supply additional arms to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. III, Sept 70–30 June 71. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Also designated USUN 2711. Sent with a request to repeat to New Delhi and Rawalpindi. In an October 26 letter to Keating, Schneider described the conversation between Gandhi and Rogers as "a very difficult one," but he felt that the exchange was colored by the fact that both were tired at the end of a stressful day of meetings and speeches. (Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 51, Eyes Only Correspondence, 1969/1970) Gandhi set the tone for the meeting by declining an invitation from Nixon to attend a dinner the President was hosting in Washington for heads of state attending the General Assembly. (Telegrams 173630 and 176269 to New Delhi, October 21 and 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDIA, and ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. III, Sept 70–30 Jun 71) Jha explained that Gandhi’s decision related to scheduling commitments on her return trip to India, but Keating saw it as a "studied affront related in large part to our decision to sell arms to Pakistan." (Telegram 12939 from New Delhi, October 19; ibid., RG 59, Conference Files, Box 519, 1966–1972: Lot 71 D 227, CF 469)
Rogers summarized his conversations with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and Indian Foreign Minister Singh for Kissinger. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 365, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. The omissions are as transcribed. For Rogers’ conversation with Singh on the morning of October 24, see Document 92.
90. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 25, 1970, 10:49–11:45 a.m. Presidents Nixon and Yahya discussed relations between the United States and Pakistan and the possibility of Pakistan facilitating secret contacts between the U.S. and China. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 63, Presidential File, Memoranda of Conversation, 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The conversation was held in the Oval Office of the White House. A copy of this memorandum of conversation, edited in the NSC for distribution to the Department of State, indicates that Kissinger was present and took the notes on which the memorandum was based. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71) The time of the meeting is from the President’s Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files)
91. Telegram 13362 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, October 26, 1970, 1528Z The Embassy reported on the growing public alarm in India over the prospect of increased shipments of U.S. arms to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Confidential. Repeated to London, Rawalpindi, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, CINCSTRIKE, and CINCMEAFSA.
In the wake of his conversation with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi, Secretary of State Rogers had a conversation with Indian Foreign Minister Singh in which the irritants affecting relations between the U.S. and India were aired at greater length. Both agreed to try to approach future problems with a clean slate. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on October 26 by Sisco and approved by Eliot. Sent to New Delhi eyes only for Keating and to USUN eyes only for Ambassador Charles W. Yost.
93. Telegram 8690 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, November 8, 1970, 0535Z In a conversation with Ambassador Farland, Pakistani President Yahya refined the list of weapons he asked to have included among those the U.S. was prepared to supply as part of the package President Nixon had authorized. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis. Sent with a request to pass to the White House and Secretary of Defense.
94. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 9, 1970, 2:40–3:20 p.m. President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Indian Ambassador Jha discussed what could be done to foster improved relations between the United States and India. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 546, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. III, Sept 70–30 June 71. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders. The conversation was held in Kissinger’s office in the White House.
The telegram transmitted a message from President Nixon to Pakistani President Yahya expressing Nixon’s concern over the loss of life and property in East Pakistan as a result of a cyclone. Nixon offered U.S. assistance in responding to the disaster. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 PAK. Confidential; Immediate. Also repeated to the Consulate at Dacca. Drafted by Alexander Fuller and Spengler; cleared by Davies, John F. King, Deputy Director of the Office of Press Relations, David J. Waters, Assistant Chief of Protocol for Public Affairs, Saunders at the White House, and in AID by Curtis Farrar (AID/NESA), and Stephen R. Tripp (AID/PRI/DRD); and approved by Sisco. A major cyclone followed by a tidal wave struck East Pakistan on November 12. (Telegram 2116 from Dacca, November 16; ibid.) By November 25, 168,000 deaths had been recorded, and over 500,000 deaths were anticipated. (Intelligence note prepared in INR, November 25; ibid.)
Kissinger outlined the initial steps taken and those under consideration to respond to the disaster in East Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 334, Subject Files, Items to Discuss with the President, 9 Sept 70–Dec 70. Confidential. Sent for action. A copy of this memorandum in another file indicates that Saunders drafted it on November 16. (Ibid., Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71) Kissinger told Nixon in a telephone conversation on the evening of November 16 that he would give him the proposal for relief assistance to Pakistan "the first thing in the morning." Nixon responded: "I don’t need to see it but I want them to know we care and we care fast." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 365, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
97. Telegram 14451 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, November 18, 1970, 1147Z Ambassador Keating questioned Indian Foreign Minister Singh about Indian allegations of U.S. interference in Indian politics. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Secret; Nodis.
Kissinger updated Nixon on the U.S. response to the disaster in East Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.
Kissinger summarized a "delicate" issue relating to U.S. efforts to respond to the disaster in East Pakistan. If the U.S acted on the Embassy’s assessment of the needs of the situation, it could contribute to the impression that the Government of Pakistan was not managing the situation effectively. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Confidential. Sent for information. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.
Haldeman argued for immediate U.S. assistance to the victims in East Pakistan. He was not concerned about the political sensitivities of Pakistani President Yahya’s government: "We have to look humanitarian." Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 365, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. A notation on the transcript indicates that the conversation took place in the early afternoon. The omissions are in the original transcription. A transcript of Kissinger’s conversation with Ambassador Hilaly earlier in the day is ibid.
Kissinger provided a further update of the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan that, he noted, was being described as "the greatest natural disaster in terms of destruction and danger to life of the century and perhaps of recorded history." Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.
Ambassador Farland reported from Dacca that relief efforts were proving to be effective in East Pakistan. He added that his information indicated that "few if any of the casualties died as a result of slowness of GOP expeditiously to move relief supplies to disaster victims." Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 PAK. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated immediate to Islamabad.
Sisco informed Irwin that the Indian Government had apparently decided to damp down its criticism of the U.S. decision to supply additional arms to Pakistan. He added that the Indians seemed inclined to try to repair the damage done to relations between the United States and India in recent months. Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/INS Files: Lot 74 D 17, India 1970, DEF 19, October Decision. Confidential. Drafted by Quainton and cleared by Schneider and Van Hollen. Attached but not published was telegram 14902 from New Delhi, November 27.
Cline summarized the election results in Pakistan and pointed to potential problems growing out of the election. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 PAK. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the intelligence brief.
105. National Security Study Memorandum 109, Washington, December 19, 1970 President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger tasked the Departments of State and Defense, the CIA, and AID to prepare a study of U.S. policy options in South Asia. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 104–206. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency.
Saunders and Hoskinson summarized discussions with Pakistan and India over the issue of arms supply to South Asia. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I, 1970. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders. Sent for information. Published from an uninitialed copy.
Nixon approved the provision of an additional 150,000 tons of food grains to East Pakistan for disaster relief. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret. Sent for action. Haig signed for Kissinger. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation. Attached but not published at Tab A was a memorandum from Williams to Nixon sent through Kissinger for the President on December 23 under a covering memorandum from Eliot. Attached but not published at Tab B was the proposed press release. Not attached at Tab C was the draft letter. The Pakistan Relief Committee was established on November 26 and chaired by former Ambassador Robert Murphy.
108. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, January 14, 1971 Rogers argued against extending credit to Pakistan for the purchase of arms. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret; Exdis.
109. Telegram 944 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, February 1, 1971, 1235Z Pakistani President Yahya addressed the developing movement for independence in East Pakistan and said that he did not intend to preside over the dissolution of Pakistan. Ambassador Farland assured him that it was U.S. policy to respect the unity and integrity of Pakistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK. Secret; Exdis; Eyes Only for Assistant Secretary Sisco. In telegram 930 from Islamabad, February 1, Farland reported that he had met with President Yahya on January 29 in Yahya’s home to "talk about things in general." (Ibid., POL 15–1 PAK)
110. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, February 2, 1971 Rogers suggested that Nixon approve the aid program for India proposed for FY 1971 without waiting for the results of the NSSM exercise that was examining U.S. policy options in South Asia. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) INDIA. Secret. Drafted on January 26 by Quainton and revised on January 29 in S/S by James L. Carlson. The attached February 2, confidential memorandum from Rogers to Nixon was also dated February 2 and was classified confidential. There is no indication that Nixon approved or disapproved the options on the attached memorandum.
Kissinger informed Rogers that President Nixon had approved the recommendation that the one-time exception military arms sale to Pakistan be conducted on a cash basis. He also instructed that Pakistan’s credit requirements for non-lethal arms sales be sympathetically considered. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret; Exdis. Farland was informed of the President’s decisions on February 5 and instructed to convey them to President Yahya. (Telegram 20428 to Islamabad; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK)
The telegram conveyed a letter from Secretary of State Rogers to Indian Foreign Minister Singh in which Rogers took exception to an allegation by Singh that the United States was interfering in election campaigns taking place in India. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 INDIA. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Quainton on January 26; cleared by Schneider, Van Hollen, Sisco, Deputy Assistant Secretary Colgate Prentice, and Coerr; and approved by Rogers. Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky visited New Delhi January 7–18.
Pakistani President Yahya requested the U.S. to use its good offices to mediate in a mounting dispute with India over an Indian airliner hijacked in Kashmir. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–PAK. No classification marking. The two men who hijacked the plane were members of the National Liberation Front for Jammu and Kashmir. They threatened to blow up the plane unless India released 30 political prisoners held in Kashmir. (Telegram 130 from Lahore, February 1; ibid., AV 12 INDIA) India subsequently demanded that Pakistan pay compensation for the loss of the plane, extradite the hijackers to India, and accept responsibility for the incident. (Aide-mémoire delivered to the Department of State by the Pakistani Embassy, February 12; ibid., POL INDIA–PAK) On February 24 the Embassy in New Delhi reported troop movements on both sides of the border between India and West Pakistan growing out of the hijacking incident. (Telegram 2759 from New Delhi; ibid., AV 12 INDIA) Additional documentation on the incident is ibid.
114. Telegram 1291 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, February 12, 1971, 0755Z Ambassador Farland argued strongly that unless Pakistan was afforded credit terms to help finance the weapons offered under the one-time excerption, the undertaking would prove to be "an exercise in futility." Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis.
115. National Security Study Memorandum 118, Washington, February 16, 1971 Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, on behalf of the President, instructed the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA to prepare a contingency study examining the options open to the U.S. in the event of a movement toward secession in East Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 104–206. Secret; Exdis. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
116. Letter From President Nixon to Pakistani President Yahya, Washington, February 17, 1971 Nixon responded to Yahya’s request for U.S. mediation in Pakistan’s dispute with India over a hijacking incident. He noted that the U.S. Government had discussed the incident with the Indian and Pakistani Governments but suggested that a multilateral approach to mediation through the International Civil Aviation Organization might prove more fruitful. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 759, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan (1971). No classification marking. On February 23 Yahya wrote to Nixon again and, citing the effects of the prohibition of overflights of Indian territory on contacts between the two wings of Pakistan, reiterated his request that Nixon take a personal interest in the dispute. (Ibid.)
The Department reiterated the reasoning behind the decision that all arms sales to Pakistan be made on a cash basis. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on February 19 by Spengler; cleared by Van Hollen, Schneider, and Senior Regional Adviser James H. Boughton (NEA/RA), PM/MAS, and DOD/ISA; and approved by Sisco.
Kissinger assessed the political tensions in Pakistan that were raising questions about the continued viability of the state, and which were compelling the U.S. to "walk a very narrow tightrope." Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Nixon underlined the last sentence of the sixth paragraph from "Counsel General" to the end and added the following handwritten comment in the margin: "Good." In the following paragraph, he underlined the part of the third sentence that reads: "more neutral stance toward Rahman, who is basically friendly toward the United States" and wrote in the margin: "not yet–correct–but not any position which encourages secession."
119. Telegram 1660 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, February 25, 1971, 1200Z Ambassador Farland reported on Pakistani President Yahya’s concern and pessimism over the political crisis developing in the country. Farland repeated that the U.S. felt it was important to maintain the unity of Pakistan, and Yahya encouraged Farland to go to Dacca and make the same point to Awami leader Mujibur Rahman. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated priority to the Consulate at Dacca.
120. Telegram 1664 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, February 25, 1971, 1226Z Ambassador Farland explained to Pakistani President Yahya that the one-time-exception arms package could not be financed on a credit basis, and he reported that Yahya was "saddened and depressed." Yahya noted that his Government was without the necessary funds to take full advantage of the offer, but he said that he would find the money to buy the armored personnel carriers. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
Ambassador Farland reported on his meeting with Awami leader Mujibur Rahman in Dacca. Mujib expressed his personal friendship for the U.S. as well as that of the "people of Bangla Desh." Farland found that Mujib favored a form of confederation rather than the separation of East Pakistan, but he insisted that "his people" be accorded their rights and not be kept in a "colonial status." Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK–US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore.
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