U.S. Department of State

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PAGE 01 STATE 104623

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ORIGIN SS-10

INFO OCT-01  ISO-00  CCO-00  SSO-00  /011 R

66602

DRAFTED BY:  S/S-O:KKURZE

APPROVED BY:  S/S-O:KKURZE

S/S-WLUERS

                       ---------------------     084198

O 191850Z MAY 74

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

USMISSION IAEA VIENNA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 104623

EXDIS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION JERUSALEM, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI,

LONDON, OTTAWA, MAY 18, FROM SECSTATE RPTD TO YOU:

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 104623

EXDIS TOSEC  794

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:    PFOR, MCAP, IN

SUBJECT: INDIAN NUCLEAR TESTS

S/S FOR ATHERTON AND SISCO

LONDON FOR MOYNIHAN

1.  THIS CABLE PROVIDES  STRICTLY PRELIMINARY WEEKEND ASSESS-

MENT OF SOME OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF INDIA'S NUCLEAR DETONA-

TION.  IT DOES NOT PROFESS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF ALL POSSIBLE

REACTIONS AND CONCERNS FROM THE NUMEROUS AREAS OF THE USG WITH

AN INTEREST IN THIS DEVELOPMENT.  THE IMMEDIATE

IMPACT OF COURSE WILL BE FELT IN CONNECTION WITH CENTO MINIS-

TERIAL MEETING AND WE ARE DEVELOPING GUIDANCE SEPARATELY FOR

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PAGE 02 STATE 104623

THAT SESSION, RELATING PARTICULARLY TO WHAT WE EXPECT WILL

BE STRONG EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN FROM PAKISTANIS, LINKED

TO THEIR CONTINUING EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE CHANGE IN US ARMS

POLICY.  MEANWHILE, WE ARE HOLDING STRICTLY TO LOW-KEY

GUIDANCE CONTAINED SECTO 764 IN RESPONSE PUBLIC AND

PRESS QUERIES.

2.  THE NTH POWER HAS FINALLY COME FORWARD.  THE INDIAN TEST

IS A SETBACK TO NONPROLIFERATION;  WE HAD MADE IT CLEAR

TO THE INDIANS THAT WE OPPOSED A TEST BY THEM, EVEN ONE

LABELLED, AS IN THIS INSTANCE, A PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION

(PNE).  THE IMPLICATIONS COULD BE CONSIDERABLE, BOTH WITH

REGARD TO SOUTH ASIA AND IN THE BROAD NONPROLIFERATION

CONTEXT.  THE CHALLENGE IS NO LONGER KEEPING INDIA FROM

GOING NUCLEAR; IT IS STABILIZING A NEW NUCLEAR "POWER"

WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AND TRYING TO DISSUADE

OTHERS FROM FOLLOWING SUIT.  NOW THAT THE BARRIER HAS BEEN

BROKEN BY INDIA THIS TASK WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT.  HOW-

EVER, NONE OF THE OTHER NEAR-NUCLEARS--JAPAN, ISRAEL, SOUTH

AFRICA--ARE LIKELY TO BE DECISIVELY INFLUENCED BY THE

INDIAN ACTION.  THE MOST IMMEDIATE PROBLEM  WILL BE CON-

TAINING THE PAKISTANI REACTION.

3.  SOUTH ASIA.  THE INDIAN TEST IS BOUND TO HAVE AN UN-

SETTLING EFFECT ON THE SOUTH ASIA SCENE, MOST PARTICULARLY

ON THE PAKISTANIS.  WHATEVER THE INDIANS SAY, THE PAKISTANIS

WILL REGARD INDIA'S GOING NUCLEAR AS POSING A NEW THREAT

TO PAKISTANI SECURITY.  IT WILL INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS

TO GET A CHANGE IN OUR ARMS POLICY; THEY COULD SEEK ADDED

SECURITY ASSURANCES FROM CHINA AND THE US.  THEY COULD

CONCEIVABLY DECIDE TO LAUNCH THEIR OWN CRASH PROGRAM,

ALTHOUGH WE ESTIMATE THAT THEIR CAPABILITIES FOR DOING

THIS ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED.

4.  WITH RESPECT TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH INDIA,

THE TEST ALSO CAUSES CONCERN.  WE HAVE LONG URGED THE

INDIANS NOT TO TEST, AND THEY KNOW THAT IN SO DOING THEY

ARE DISREGARDING OUR VIEWS.  A NOVEMBER 16, 1970 AIDE

MEMOIRE TO THE INDIAN ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY COMMISSION

STRESSED THE USG POSITION THAT ANY NUCLEAR DEVICE, INCLUDING

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ONE LABELLED A PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION WAS TANTAMOUNT

TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON.  IT APPEARS

PROBABLE THAT IN DEVELOPING THEIR DEVICE, THE INDIANS

USED HEAVY WATER THAT WE PROVIDED FOR THE CANADIAN SUPPLIED

CIRUS RESEARCH REACTOR.  IN OUR NOVEMBER 1970 AIDE MEMOIRE

WE STATED THAT THE US WOULD CONSIDER USE US NUCLEAR

MATERIEL IN   DEVELOPMENT OF PNE'S A CONTRAVENTION OF THE

TERMS UNDER WHICH IT WAS MADE AVAILABLE.  (SEPARATE MESSAGE

REVIEWS OUR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT ON MATERIEL USED IN

TEST.)

5.  THE INDIAN TEST ALSO COMES AT A PARTICULARLY AWKWARD

TIME IN THE PROCESS UNDER WAY TO BUILD A NEW INDO-US

RELAIIONSHIP WHEN THE INDIANS ARE TURNING TO US FOR RENEWED

ECONOMIC AND POSSIBLY FOODGRAIN ASSISTANCE AND ARE ASSUMING

A VISIT TO SOUTH ASIA BY THE SECRETARY.  WE NOTE THAT THE

INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY EXPRESSED HIS "DEVOUT HOPE" TO

OUR CHARGE THAT INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS WOULD NOT BE SET

BACK.  WE AGREE WITH EMBASSY DELHI THAT THE DECISION TO

TEST NOW WAS AT LEAST IN GOOD PART AN ATTEMPT ON MRS. GANDHI

PART TO DISTRACT INDIAN CONCERNS FROM AN INCREASINGLY

DEPRESSING DOMESTIC SCENE, AND TO PROV IDE A MORALE BOOSTER

TO FLAGGING SPIRITS.

6.  THERE WILL BE SEVERAL POLICY ISSUES RELATING TO SOUTH

ASIA THAT HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED:

A.  SECRETARY'S VISIT.  A VISIT TO INDIA IN THE NEXT FEW

WEEKS COULD BE SEEN AS SOMEHOW CONDONING THE INDIAN

ACTION.  ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO THE

AREA WOULD SERVE OUR LARGER INTERESTS, PARTICULARLY SINCE

IT WOULD INCLUDE PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH AS WELL.  SINCE

THE VISIT HAS NOT BEEN FORMALLY SCHEDULED THERE IS THE

OPTION OF LETTING THE MATTER RIDE FOR PERHAPS A FEW MONTHS.

B.  AID TALKS.  ALTHOUGH THE ECONOMIC COST OF THE TEST IS

FAIRLY MINIMAL (WE ESTIMATE $10-20 MILLION) THERE WILL

BE SENTIMENT IN CONGRESS THAT ANY NEW AID TO INDIA WILL

BE EATEN UP BY NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT.

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C.  SOUTH ASIAN ARMS POLICY.  IN REAL TERMS, THE INDIAN

TEST IS IRRELEVANT TO THE SOUTH ASIAN ARMS BALANCE.

INDIA ALREADY HAS OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY OVER PAKISTAN

WITHOUT A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY.  EVEN GENEROUS

US SUPPLY OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONRY TO PAKISTAN WOULD NOT

AFFECT THIS.  NONETHELESS, THE TEST IS LIKELY TO INCREASE

SUBSTANTIALLY PAK PRESSURES FOR A REVISION OF OUR ARMS

POLICY.

7.  NONPROLIFERATION.  IN THE NONPROLIFERATION CONTEXT,

THE INDIAN TEST COMES AT A BAD TIME.  IN 1975 THERE WILL

BE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO REVIEW THE NPT.  BY

BREAKING THE NTH COUNTRY BARRIER INDIA HAS MADE IT DIFFI-

CULT FOR US TO ARGUE THE VALUE OF THE NPT AND HAS IN

PARTICULAR MADE IT EASIER FOR OTHER POTENTIAL NUCLEAR

POWERS TO CLAIM THEIR "RIGHT" TO DETONATE UNDERGROUND

"PEACEFUL" NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS.

8.  FINALLY, OTHER POTENTIAL NUCLEAR POWERS WILL BE WATCHING

CLOSELY TO SEE HOW WE REACT TO THE INDIAN TEST AS A GAUGE

OF OUR REAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS PROLIFERATION.  SPECIFICALLY,

IF IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT US MATERIALS WERE USED, THEY WILL

WANT TO SEE WHETHER WE CONTINUE TO TAKE SERIOUSLY OUR

PEACEFUL USES AGREEMENTS AS PRECLUDING UTILIZATION OF

US-SUPPLIED MATERIAL OR EQUIPMENT FOR PNE'S.   RUSH UNQUOTE.

RUSH

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