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Ch. 4. India-Pakistan 1

-103. Telegram 32 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, January 2, 1973, 1048Z. [ PDF version   ] 

The Embassy assessed the Bhutto Government's first year in power, with a specific focus on Pakistan's foreign policy.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, Political and Defense, POL 1 PAK. Confidential. It was repeated to Dhaka, Hong Kong, Kabul, Karachi, Lahore, London, Moscow, New Delhi, and Tehran. Sober offered a separate assessment of the Pakistan domestic political situation in Telegram 355 from Islamabad, January 11. (Ibid.)

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Indian Ambassador Jha discussed Indo-U.S. relations on the occasion of Jha's departure from his post. Much of the conversation also included the relations of India to its regional neighbors in South and Southeast Asia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1030, Presidential/HAK Memoranda of Conversations, HAK/Amb. Jha and Amb. Kaul of India [2 of 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in Kissinger's office in the White House.

Secretary of State Rogers summarized a report that offered a fundamental reassessment of American interests and policies in South Asia that reflected recent developments. Although the report focused on U.S. policy in South Asia in general, its principal focus was the prospect for improved bilateral relations with India.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 202, Geopolitical File, Pakistan, Chronological File, 13 September 1971-7 March 1973. Secret. Attached but not printed are the four unpublished attachments, "Military Supply Policy: Interim Recommendations," "Talking Points for Ambassador Moynihan," "South Asia Policy: Interests and Options," and "South Asia Scenario."

Ambassador Moynihan spoke to President Nixon on the day the U.S. Senate confirmed his appointment as Ambassador to India.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 853–16. No classification marking. The meeting took place in the Oval Office of the White House.

On February 10, the Pakistani military seized a cache of Soviet-made arms in the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad, which the Government of Pakistan claimed was being used to support separatist elements in Baluchistan. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research compiled a brief synopsis of the events and analyzed the political repercussions.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12 PAK. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. It was drafted by Howells and Gerth; cleared by Jones, and approved by Mark.

The Embassy reported that Prime Minister Bhutto apparently had used the Iraqi arms smuggling controversy as an opportunity to purge opposition governments in Baluchistan and on the frontier through constitutional means; however, the Embassy also speculated that the move may signal the “end of his government’s experiment with democracy.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, Political & Defense, POL 23-8 PAK. Confidential; Priority. It was repeated pPriority to Kabul, Karachi, and Lahore, and to New Delhi and Tehran. On February 14, Bhutto sent a letter to Nixon requesting U.S. aid to combat what he believed to be Soviet attempts to subvert Pakistan. (Ibid., POL PAK–US)

The Embassy attempted to gauge the impact of the Iraqi arms incident on Pakistan's foreign and domestic policy but admitted, "we have never known the principal facts."

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12 PAK. Confidential. It was repeated to Dhaka, Colombo, Kabul, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Tehran, Karachi, and Lahore.

The Embassy commented on previous assessments of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research that cast doubt on Prime Minister Bhutto's allegations of Soviet arms being smuggled into Pakistan. While it agreed that Bhutto had definitely used the crisis as an opportunity to request U.S. support and to discredit domestic opposition, the Embassy was reluctant to dismiss outright the possibility of Soviet involvement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL PAK USSR. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. It was drafted by Sober and repeated to Kabul, Karachi, Lahore, London, Moscow, New Delhi, and Tehran.

President Nixon approved a reversion to the 1967-1971 policy for South Asia that would authorize sales of non-lethal military aid to Pakistan and would provide the Pakistanis with armored personnel carriers sold under the 1970 "one-time exception." Nixon also conditionally authorized the release of suspended pre-1971 loans to India.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 202, Geopolitical File, Pakistan, Chronological File, 13 September 1971-7 March 1973. Secret. Sent for action. Nixon approved the recommendations. A copy without Nixon's signature's approvals is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept. 72-Oct. 73, Country Files, Middle East.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger advised President Nixon of Prime Minister Bhutto's recently stated claims of Soviet-Indian alignment against Pakistan and presented a letter of reply for Nixon's signature.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 202, Geopolitical File, Pakistan, Chronological File, 13 September 1971-7 March 1973. Secret. Sent for action. Attached but not printed is a signed copy of Nixon's March 8 letter to Bhutto. (Ibid.)

Kissinger discussed the potential impact of releasing military equipment to Pakistan that had been purchased prior to the arms embargo.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 872–3. No classification marking. The meeting took place in the Oval Office of the White House.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger met with Khar for a brief discussion of military aid and other issues of bilateral concern after Khar's meeting with President Nixon earlier that day.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 612, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept. 72-Oct. 73, Country Files, Middle East. Secret. It was drafted by Saunders. The meeting took place in Kissinger's office.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger summarized cables from Ambassador Moynihan in which the Ambassador evinced strong opposition to potential resumption of U.S. arms sales to Pakistan.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 203, Geopolitical File, Pakistan, Chronological File, 8 March 1973-11 May 1974. Secret. Sent for information. Nixon appended a lengthy handwritten comment: "K--Moynihan will be desperately disappointed--do your best to reassure him--pointing out the overriding consideration (in confidence) which leads to this one time exception--also point out--letting the balance get too much on India's side could lead to another war & to China intervention." In telegram 2632 from New Delhi, March 7, Moynihan had first stated his objections to Pakistani arms sales to the Secretary of State. (Ibid.)

Secretary of State Rogers summarized his meeting with Special Emissary Khar of Pakistan. Pakistani officials complained that the Indian Government was delaying the Simla peace process and expressed concerns about Soviet ambitions in South Asia. Rogers replied that U.S. policy was under currently under review.

Source: National Archives, RG 84, Dhaka Embassy Files: Lot 76 F 62. Confidential; Priority. It was repeated priority to New Delhi and to Dhaka, Tehran, London, Moscow, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

Assistant Secretary of State of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Sisco reported on a meeting with Indian Ambassador L. K. Jha to discuss tensions in Indo-U.S. relations, especially regarding the U.S. decision to resume arms sales to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL INDIA-US. Secret; Immediate. It was drafted on March 15 by Hawes; cleared by NEA/INS; and approved by Sisco.

The Department relayed a summary of Ambassador Moynihan’s first official meeting with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, covering various topics, such as U.S. arms sales to Pakistan, PL–480 food aid, and the Simla negotiations between India and Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. It was drafted by Holmes; cleared by NEA/IRN and NEA; and approved by Laingen. Secret; Exdis.

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger met briefly with Indian Finance Minister Y. B. Chavan to discuss the U.S.-Indian economic relations.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 150, Geopolitical File, India, Chronological File, 2 Jan-27 June 1973. Secret. It was drafted on March 29. Brackets in the original.

Nixon and Kissinger met with Jha before his departure from Washington to discuss the state of United States-Indian relations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 890–17. No classification marking. The meeting took place in the Oval Office of the White House. The transcript is part of a longer conversation that took place between 11:39 and 11:56 a.m.

Ambassador Moynihan submitted a country summary for India.

Source: National Archives, RG 84, Colombo Embassy Files: Lot 77 F 54, Subject Files 1973, POL 3 Organizations and Agreements. Secret; Priority. It was repeated to Amman, Ankara, Athens, Beirut, Colombo, Dhaka, Islamabad, Jidda, Kabul, Katmandu, Kuwait, Nicosia, Sanaa, Tel Aviv, Theran, Abu Dhabi, Manama, and Muscat.

The Bureau assessed the reactions in India and Pakistan to the resumption of U.S. arms sales to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 India. Limited Official Use. It was drafted by Jones; cleared by James Leader (INR); and approved by Mark (INR/Near East and South Asia).

The Embassy prepared a summary of Pakistan's foreign and domestic situation as requested by the Department of State.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL PAK. Confidential; Immediate. It was drafted by Sober and repeated to Colombo, Dhaka, Kabul, Katmandu, New Delhi, Tehran, Amman, Ankara, Athens, Beirut, Jidda, Karachi, Kuwait, Lahore, Nicosia, Sanaa, Tel Aviv, Abu Dhabi, Manama, and Muscat.

Deputy Secretary Rush recounted his meeting with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi. Ambassador Moynihan and Assistant Secretary Sisco accompanied him.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL INDIA-US. Confidential; Limdis. It was repeated to Dhaka and Islamabad. Rush reported a further meeting on April 20 with Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh. (Telegram 2749 from Tehran, April 25; ibid., RG 84, Colombo Embassy Files: Lot 77 F 54, Subject Files 1973, POL US/INDO Relations).

Deputy Secretary Rush reported on his meeting with Prime Minister Bhutto on April 26. Bhutto expressed concerns about Pakistan's relations with Bangladesh and India following those countries' recent joint declaration and about Soviet ambitions in South Asia. Rush clarified U.S. policy toward the Simla negotiations and reassured Bhutto of U.S. desire for close relations with Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL PAK-US. Secret; Priority. It was repeated priority to New Delhi, Dhaka, Moscow, Tehran, and Kabul.

The Embassy assessed Pakistan's domestic political situation as more stable following its government's passage of a new constitution on April 10.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 PAK. Confidential. It was repeated to Karachi, Lahore, New Delhi, and Tehran. The Embassy had reported on the ratification process in telegrams 2903, April 10 (Ibid.), 2993, April 12, (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files), and 3017, April 13, (Ibid., Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-5 PAK) all from Islamabad.

Secretary of State Rogers issued the White House's statement on current arms supply policy toward India and Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 84, New Delhi Embassy Files: Lot 78 F 45, Subject Files 1974 DEF 19 Mil Asst/MAP/Sales 1974. Confidential. It was repeated to Tehran, London, USUN, Dhaka, SecDef, and CINCPAC.

Chargé Sydney Sober reported that Prime Minister Bhutto requested that he act as an intermediary with Baluchistan Governor Bizenjo in order to quell political tensions between the provincial and central governments.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Confidential; Stadis; Exdis; Eyes Only for Sisco and Meyer. Telegram Islamabad 4532 outlined the particulars of the problem in greater detail, including anti-government violence, to which Bhutto had responded with limited military force to keep order. Sober summarized his subsequent meeting with Bizenjo in Telegram Islamabad 4659 on June 7. (Ibid.)

Assistant Secretary of State of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Sisco ordered Chargé Sober to cease acting as a channel of communication between Prime Minister Bhutto and regional leader Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo due to concerns that the U.S. could be accused of meddling in Pakistani domestic affairs.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 PAK. Confidential; Stadis; Exdis. It was drafted by Armin Meyer on June 6 and approved by Rogers, Sisco, and Porter.

Chargé Sydney Sober reported to Assistant Secretary of State of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Sisco that, as instructed, he had informed Bhutto that he could no longer act as an intermediary in the Baluchistan conflict.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 PAK. Confidential; Priority; Exdis; Stadis; Eyes Only for Sisco.

Ambassador Meyer met with Indian Ambassador Kaul to discuss the U.S. Government's position on Indian debt rescheduling. Kaul pressed Meyer for a more definite declaration of availability of future U.S. aid to India, noting that the current vagueness of U.S. intentions would hamper India's ability to construct its fifth five-year economic plan. Meyer indicated that he believed the U.S. would rule in favor of extending future aid to India.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID 3 India. Confidential; Immediate. It was repeated immediate to the Mission to OECD. It was drafted by Kux; cleared by AID/ASIA and NEA/INS; and approved by Meyer.

The Department offered its approval of recent Embassy initiatives to assist Pakistan's efforts to combat the production of opium. It authorized Embassy personnel to convey assurances of U.S. support by both equipping interdiction strike teams and by providing development assistance as economic compensation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 11-5 PAK. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. It was drafted on June 14 by Robert Flaten (NEA/PAB); cleared NEA/PAB, S/NM, BNDD, and AID/ASIA.NE; and approved by Davies.

The Embassy reported on Chargé Sydney Sober's meetings with Prime Minister Bhutto regarding the plans of the Pakistani Narcotics Control Board to begin a three-year domestic opium eradication program. The Embassy recommended the use of USAID as a channel for economic "compensation" programs for affected growers.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 11-5 PAK. Limited Official Use. It was repeated to Karachi and Lahore.

Ambassador Moynihan transmitted a cable in reaction to remarks Indian Ambassador Kaul made to Ambassador Meyer on June 14. Moynihan's recent conversations with Indian Planning Minister Dhar on June 13, he believed, contradicted Kaul's assertion that lack of U.S. aid would hinder the development of India's five-year plan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID 3 India. Confidential. State 115596 printed as Document 131. Assistant Secretary Sisco talked to Kaul on July 11 and stated that there was a "new realism" in U.S. foreign policy and the Indian public posture could affect future aid to India. (Telegram 135892 to New Delhi, July 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

Deputy Chairman of the Pakistani Narcotics Control Board, Qamarul Islam, registered sharp disapproval of the U.S. proposal on eliminating opium production, stating that the U.S. attempt to "dictate" the Pakistan Government's position was "unacceptable." Chargé Sydney Sober emphasized a lack of U.S. willingness to dictate policy and urged that the proposal be carefully considered before Bhutto's official visit to the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 11-5 PAK. Confidential; Exdis; Priority.

The Bureau prepared a study "South Asia: A Look Ahead" on the state of affairs in South Asia on the eve of Prime Minister Bhutto's state visit to the United States. It focused on Bhutto's prospects for resuming negotiations with India over the unresolved status of prisoners of war from the 1971 war and the influence of China on these negotiations. Additionally, the report noted Bhutto's increased public pressure on the United States for the resumption of military aid and speculated on the potential for renewed conflict in South Asia.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 PAK. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad. It was drafted by Howells; cleared by Jones; and approved by Denney (INR/NEA).

Indian Ambassador Kaul met with Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger to discuss the recently concluded U.S.-Soviet summit and its implications for South Asia and Indo-U.S. bilateral relations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1030, Presidential/HAK Memoranda of Conversations, HAK/Amb. Jha and Amb. Kaul of India. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Kaul had a meeting with Deputy Secretary Rush on similar topics. (Telegram 138287 to New Delhi, July 15; National Archives, RG 84, New Delhi Embassy Files: Lot 77 F 97, Subject Files 1973, POL Affairs and Relations 1973, India/US)

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research issued a report "Pakistan under Civilian Government," which assessed the challenges and prospects for Pakistan's first civilian government since 1960.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15 PAK. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. It was drafted by Arietti, cleared by Jones, and approved by Denney.

Indian Finance Minister Y.B. Chavan and Ambassador Kaul of August 1, 1973 met with Assistant to the President for National Security of Affairs Henry Kissinger to discuss Indo-U.S. bilateral relations, Pakistan, the rupee settlement, and Indian grain purchases.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1038, Presidential/HAK Memoranda of Conversations, HAK/Ambassador Jha and Ambassador Kaul of India. Confidential.

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger met with Ambassador Sultan Khan to discuss the damage caused by recent severe floods in Pakistan. Kissinger also disclosed that President Richard Nixon had chosen to nominate Henry A. Byroade as his choice for Ambassador to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1027, Presidential/HAK MemCons, MemCons April-November 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive.

Indian Ambassador Kaul called on the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger to discuss relations with Pakistan and regional South Asian economic and security issues.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1030, Presidential/HAK Memoranda of Conversations, HAK/Ambassador Jha and Ambassador Kaul of India. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Map Room of the White House. The meeting continued in Kissinger's office, 2:50-3:05 p.m., at which time Finance Minister M. G. Kaul joined the discussion (Ibid). The second conversation is not printed.

Indian Ambassador Kaul met Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger to discuss recent developments in Pakistani negotiations at Simla for the return of its prisoners of war from the 1971 war.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1030, Presidential/HAK Memoranda of Conversations, HAK/Ambassador Jha and Ambassador Kaul of India. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the Western White House.

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger passed a letter to Prime Minister Bhutto (via Ambassador Sultan Khan) recommending a course of negotiations with the Indians for the release of Pakistani prisoners of war.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1030, Presidential/HAK MemCons, HAK/Amb. Jha to Amb. Kaul of India. Top Secret. The message was sent as cover to a August 22 letter, not printed, from Kennedy to Ambassador Khan.

Kennedy and Saunders suggested, and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger approved, a package of material and economic assistance for Pakistan in response to heavy flooding in South Asia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X. Confidential. Sent for action. Kissinger approved the recommendation.

The Embassy commented on regional anxieties about Indian expansionism after the 1971 war among its smaller neighbors, particularly Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh. The Embassy expressed a belief that although India's foreign policy was non-interventionist and thus consistent with U.S. policy, various factors would make tensions inevitable.

Source: National Archives, RG 84, New Delhi Embassy Files: Lot 77 F 97, Subject Files 1973, POL 1-2 Basic Policies 1973. It was drafted on August 22 by Smith; cleared by POL, ECON, and DCM; and approved by Moynihan. Confidential. It was repeated to Colombo, Dhaka, Islamabad, Kabul, Katmandu, London, Rangoon, Tehran, Bombay, Calcutta, Hong Kong, Madras, CINCPAC for POLAD, and to Moscow and USLO Peking by Pouch.

Ambassador Moynihan proposed and commented on a list of potential initiatives to improve bilateral relations between the United States and India.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1030, Presidential/HAK Memoranda of Conversations, HAK/Amb. Jha and Amb. Kaul of India. Confidential.

Account of Prime Minister Bhutto's meeting with President Nixon during the first day of his official visit.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office File, Box 19, India/Pakistan (2). Top Secret; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Oval Office of the White House.

Prime Minister Bhutto and President Nixon discussed South Asian affairs and the recent floods on the second day of Bhutto's official visit.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office File, Box 19, India/Pakistan (2). Top Secret; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Oval Office of the White House. Bhutto met later that afternoon at Blair House with Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and Chargé Sober regarding military issues with India and the Afghan coup. (ibid.)

During a luncheon meeting, newly appointed Indian Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, and Secretary of State Kissinger discussed India's relationships with Pakistan, China and Afghanistan, sales and transfers of U.S. and Soviet in the region, and U.S. agricultural aid to India.

Source: National Archives, RG 84, New Delhi Embassy Files, Lot 77 F 97, Subject Files 1973, Political Affairs and Relations, 1973 India/US. Confidential. It was drafted by Laingen.

The memorandum considered a broad range of political and economic factors that could have an effect on Indian-U.S. bilateral relations.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79-R01012A, Box 465, NIAM 31-73. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to the cover sheet, the CIA, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the NSA, the AEC, and the Treasury prepared this memorandum. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate except the representative of the FBI, who abstained because the subject was outside the Bureau's jurisdiction.

Kreisberg relayed statements from India's Ambassador to the IAEA that indicate his government's increased interest in the NPT.

Source: National Archives, RG 84, New Delhi Embassy Files, Lot 77 F 97, Subject Files 1973, DEF 18-4 1973. Confidential. It was drafted on November 11 by McCormack. Attached but not printed is Airgram A-603, October 25, from the IAEA Mission in Vienna to the Department.

Secretary of State Kissinger and Indian Ambassador Kaul met to discuss various topics of mutual concern, including China's relations with Bangladesh, recent statements by the Pakistani Government regarding Kashmir, the relationships of India to the United States and the Soviet Union, and U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL INDIA-US. Confidential. It was drafted by Kux; cleared by Laingen; and approved in S on January 4, 1974.

Ambassador Byroade met with Pakistan Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs Aziz Ahmed to discuss arms policy. Ahmed raised the issue of press reports that the United States had proposed to resume construction of the "Peace Indigo" radar and communications network in India, ending the 1971 embargo.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Priority. It was repeated Priority to New Delhi, Tehran, London, CINCPAC, and Kabul. In Telegram Islamabad 431 of January 14, 1974, Byroade described a second meeting with Ahmed in which the Minister stated his belief that the Peace Indigo project, originally meant to provide a defense for India against Chinese air attacks, would be used against Pakistan by India. (National Archives, RG 84, Islamabad Embassy Files: Lot 77 F 114, Secret; Limdis. Sent for Action. It was repeated to New Delhi and CINCPAC).

Secretary of State Kissinger presented a memo for President Nixon's approval of the rupee settlement negotiated by Ambassador Moynihan with the Indian Government. Nixon assented, agreeing to send the proposed settlement to Congress for final approval.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974, India. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the first page indicates the President saw it. Nixon approved the first recommendation. Attached but not printed at Tab A are letters to Prime Minister Gandhi and Ambassador Moynihan.

Ambassador Byroade offered his views on Pakistan's need for military assistance from the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 84, Islamabad Embassy Files: Lot 77 F 114, POL EE-POL 14, Decentralized Subject Files, 1973-74 Pak/US. Secret; Priority; Limdis; Noforn. It was drafted and approved by Byroade and repeated to Kabul, Moscow, London, New Delhi, Tehran, and CINCPAC for Polad.

The Embassy assessed India's potential for development of nuclear weapons.

Source: National Archives, RG 84, New Delhi Embassy Files: Lot 78 F 45, Subject Files 1974, AE 1 General Policy/Plans 1974. Confidential. It was drafted by McCormack; cleared by DCM, POL, DAO, and SCI; and approved by Moynihan.

Secretary of State Kissinger recommended text for a congratulatory note to be sent to Prime Minister Bhutto and Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman on the occasion of Pakistan's formal recognition of Bangladesh.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. XI, November 1973-August 1974. Limited Official Use. Sent for action. It was approved by Haig for Nixon. An attached telegram with a copy of Nixon's congratulation message was transmitted immediate to Dhaka, Islamabad, Lahore, London, and New Delhi on the same day. (Ibid.)

The Embassy offered a pessimistic appraisal of Indian foreign policy and predicted that country's further isolation and loss of influence in world affairs.

Source: National Archives, RG 84, New Delhi Embassy Files: Lot 78 F 45, Subject Files 1974, POL AFF Pak India 1974, Jan-June. Confidential. It was drafted by McCormack; cleared by DCM, POL, ECON, S, and DAO; and approved by Moynihan. It was repeated to Colombo, Dakka, Islamabad, Kabul, Katmandu, Moscow, Rangoon, Tokyo, Peking, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, and Hong Kong. In Telegram 2779 from New Delhi, February 26, the Embassy had noted a short-term improvement in India-Pakistan relations following the Pakistani recognition of Bangladesh but predicted that the next five years would be characterized by "limited détente with continued suspicion." (Ibid.)

Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush reported on his April 2 meeting with Indian Ambassador Kaul to discuss the establishment of an Indo-U.S. Joint Commission to improve bilateral relations by promoting greater cooperation in educational and cultural exchange, trade and investment, and science and technology.

Source: National Archives, RG 84, Islamabad Embassy Files: Lot 77 F 114, Decentralized Subject Files 1973-1974, Pak/India January-June 1974. Limited Official Use. It was repeated to Islamabad, London, and Tehran. Moynihan describes the Joint Commission as an Indian initiative he first discussed in May 1973 with Ambassador Jha. (Telegram 4558 from New Delhi, April 4; ibid., New Delhi Embassy Files: Lot 78 F 45, Subject Files 1974, POL AFF U.S.-India 1974 Joint Commission)

Secretary of State Kissinger briefly met with Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh to discuss Indo-U.S. relations, including food and development aid, as well as India's foreign relations with its neighbors in the Subcontinent, with China and the Soviet Union, and with the Middle East.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1028, Presidential/HAK Memoranda of Conversations, March 1974-8 May 1974. Secret. It was drafted by Saunders. The meeting took place in the Secretary's suite at the Waldorf Towers.