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Foreign Relations,
1969-1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971 Released by the Office of the Historian According to Henry Kissinger, "When the Nixon administration took office, our policy objective on the subcontinent was, quite simply, to avoid adding another complication to our agenda." (Kissinger, White House Years, page 848) As events developed in South Asia, that proved to be an increasingly difficult objective to achieve. A political crisis developed in Pakistan out of Bengali demands for autonomy for East Pakistan, demands which were highlighted by the results of a general election in December 1970. The subsequent crisis, which roiled the subcontinent in conflict from March to December 1971, led to warfare between India and Pakistan, and eventuated in the transition of the east wing of Pakistan into the new nation of Bangladesh. The United States, which was using Pakistan at the time as a conduit in conducting secret negotiations with China, intervened in the crisis to try to prevent fighting between India and Pakistan. When fighting developed, the Nixon administration "tilted" toward Pakistan. 2. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)/1/ Washington, March 1, 1971. /1/ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 625, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IV, 1 Mar 71-15 May 71. Secret. Sent for information. SUBJECT The Situation /2/ March 3. The future course of events now depends largely on the decision of Mujibur Rahman and the other leaders of the dominant Awami League party in East Pakistan. A general atmosphere of tension prevails throughout Dacca, and numerous spontaneous processions and demonstrations calling for the independence of East Pakistan are reported to be underway./3/ So far violence reportedly has been limited, but the potential for major destructive outbursts would seem to be great, especially if the West Pakistani-controlled /3/ The Consulate General in Dacca reported on March 2 on the popular reaction in East Pakistan to the announcement that the meeting of the General Assembly would be postponed indefinitely: "It would be impossible to over-estimate sense of anger, shock and frustration which has gripped people of east wing. They cannot but interpret postponement as act of collusion between Yahya and Bhutto to deny fruit of electoral victory to Bengali majority." (Telegram 567 from Dacca; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL PAK) In response to the postponement, the Awami League on March 2 called for a hartal, or general strike in Dacca. (Telegram 564 from Dacca, March 2; ibid., POL 15-2 PAK) It is impossible to predict what Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League will do at this point. They are most unlikely, however, to back down from their six-point program calling for virtual autonomy. It has the strong emotional and popular backing in East Pakistan and is adamantly opposed by West Pakistani leader Z.A. Bhutto, important elements of the military and many politically aware West Pakistanis. -The constitution should provide a federal and parliamentary form of government based on direct elections and universal suffrage. In terms of substantive issues, the differences between Rahman and Bhutto seem to have largely narrowed to those of foreign trade and aid. Bhutto in a speech February 28 said he felt the central government would have to retain control in these fields if its control of foreign affairs was to be realistic. The constellation of political forces and interests in Pakistan is such that any compromise is most difficult at this point. Yahya and Bhutto are both opposed to Rahman's plan for decentralized government but they both have different and conflicting bases of support: -Yahya's base of support is the army and economic elite. They do not want to compromise with Bhutto because they fear his platform of "equitable distribution of the wealth." They figure that the weak central government the East wants would loosen their grip on West Pakistan. The Army feels it would jeopardize security. -Bhutto's base is the masses. He does not want to compromise with the East because he wants to control a strong central government. The two men have different ideological outlooks-Yahya a fairly conservative approach Rahman is almost solely concerned about East Pakistan and is unwilling to compromise on the autonomy issue. Because he favors normalization of relations with India, he is in further conflict with Yahya and Bhutto who are both fairly hard-line toward India. The scope for compromise is probably minimal and Rahman could well decide that now is the best time to opt out of the Pakistani union. He clearly had this on his mind when he talked with Ambassador Farland on Sunday/4/ and asked about U.S. aid to an independent East Pakistan and as a lever to prevent West Pakistan from intervening militarily against a succession [secession] movement. /4/ February 28. Farland's conversation with Mujibur Rahman was reported in telegram 540 from Dacca, February 28; published in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972, Document 121. President Yahya is well aware that he is risking a strong East Pakistani reaction, but presumably decided that the alternative to postponement would be even worse. He may have seen two principal alternatives: (1) postpone the session and-although he left some room for maneuver-risk an immediate confrontation with East Pakistan; or (2) hold the session, risk an immediate confrontation with his army, the West Pakistani political/economic establishment, or both, and, because he would in the end have to reject an East Pakistan autonomy constitution, a confrontation with the East Pakistanis in a few months. Thus, Yahya is unable to compromise with Rahman or move closer to Bhutto without jeopardizing his own base of power and risking his ouster by hardline military elements who would end the move toward representative government and most likely precipitate widespread and perhaps uncontrollable disorders in West Pakistan. In short, Yahya may only feel that his only course is to cut his and Pakistan's losses. In short, Yahya appears to have decided to risk a confrontation with East Pakistan now in the slight hope that, if he pushed all the parties to the brink, a compromise might evolve from their coming to grips with the consequences of a split-up of Pakistan. Given the sentiment within the West Pakistani political-military establishment, he may have seen no other realistic choice. U.S. Policy Beyond that, we have these questions: /5/ National Security Study Memorandum 118, directed by Kissinger on February 16 to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, called for a contingency study to be prepared outlining the possible range of U.S. reactions to movement in East Pakistan toward secession. See Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972, Document 115. /1/ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda, Nos. 97-144. Secret. A copy was sent to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Washington, March 2, 1971. TO SUBJECT The President has considered the recommendations for FY 1971 economic assistance for India, contained in the memorandum of February 2, 1971, from the Secretary of State./2/ The President has approved the approximately $150 million Title I PL 480/3/ program of concessional sales of surplus agricultural commodities and $10.8 million in technical assistance. The President also has approved a grant of $15-20 million for family planning subject to the review of progress under last year's program as proposed by the Secretary of State. /2/ The Department of State recommendations, detailed in a February 2 memorandum from Secretary Rogers to President Nixon, were sent to the White House under cover of another February 2 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon which provided a brief rationale for the recommendations; published in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972, Document 110. /3/ The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. (68 Stat 454, as amended) With reference to the development loans, the President has authorized an initial loan of $170 million on the assumption that India's needs will have a high priority claim on additional funds that might become available later this fiscal year. After reviewing competing requirements for such funds, the Secretary of State at that time should seek the President's authorization before providing such additional funds. Washington, March 2, 1971. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Files, 1971. Secret. 3 pages of source text not declassified.] /1/ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 625, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IV, 1 Mar 71-15 May 71. Secret. Sent for information. Washington, March 4, 1971. SUBJECT Overnight reports from Pakistan indicate that the situation in East Pakistan is deteriorating. The following are the new developments: -Mujibur Rahman seems to have virtually slammed the door on the possibility of East-West accommodation by categorically rejecting President Yahya's plan to hold a conference of the major political leaders on March 10. -Mujib has admitted to several foreign correspondents "off the record" that he will announce the equivalent to independence for East Pakistan on Sunday./2/ He did, however, go on to say that the East and West wings should write their respective constitutions and thereafter discussions over the form of linkage could take place. [This leaves the door open to some sort of confederal relationship and is the reason we advocate-via your talking points/3/-not jumping too soon to recognition of East Pakistani independence.]/4/ /2/ March 7. /3/ Reference is to talking points developed for Kissinger in a March 6 memorandum from Saunders, Hoskinson, and Richard Kennedy to prepare Kissinger for a meeting of the Senior Review Group that day. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-052, SRG Meeting, Pakistan, 3/6/71) /4/ All brackets in the source text. -At least one Pakistani air force C-130 has been seen flying into Dacca and there are recurrent reports of forces being flown into Dacca via the Pakistani commercial airline and of the movement of troops from the West via ship. These reports can not be confirmed but it is known that there is pressure from some elements in the military to make a quick repressive strike against the East Pakistani leaders in hopes of cowing them and the rest of the province. [The contingency paper/5/ says intervention is "very unlikely". This seems less and less true. CIA working level judges that the East would respond with further violence rather than surrender.] /5/ Reference is to the response to NSSM 118 prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia. The contingency study on Pakistan was sent to Kissinger on March 2 by Joseph Sisco as chairman of the interdepartmental group. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 PAK-US) It was circulated to members of the Senior Review Group on March 3 (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-052, SRG Meeting, 3/6/71) Regarding NSSM 118, see footnote 5, Document 2. -The East Pakistanis in the embassy here have approached State concerning their relations with the Department following a "declaration of independence." They expect to be expelled from the chancery and the current DCM, who is an East Pakistani, would then become the Chargˇ of a new embassy. These developments just heighten my concern-which I know you fully share-of postponement of discussion of this issue. Regrettably, State just has not given this issue the attention it deserves. That is why we wrote the NSSM three weeks ago. Only because of our prodding is there a contingency paper today. As for the notion that this is not a policy issue, I cannot believe that the repartition of South Asia after twenty-three years is not a policy issue of major proportions. State has not objected to dealing with this in the NSC framework so far. Washington, March 6, 1971, 11:40 a.m.-12:20 p.m. /1/ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. A briefer record of the meeting, prepared by Brigadier General Devol Brett of OSD, is in the Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330 76 0197, Box 74, Pakistan 092 (Jan-Jul) 1971. SUBJECT PARTICIPATION CIA JCS NSC Staff SUMMARY OF DECISIONS -advise our missions at Dacca and Islamabad of our thinking and instruct Dacca, if they receive an approach from Mujib on recognition of a separate East Pakistan regime, to say nothing and refer it to Washington; -consult by telephone on Sunday, March 7 following word on Mujib's speech./2/ /2/ Reference is to a speech Mujibur Rahman was scheduled to deliver in Dacca on March 7. Mr. Kissinger: I thought we might have a brief discussion of what may be ahead and what our basic choices may be. I assume we will know something tomorrow. Mr. Johnson: We have a good interagency contingency paper./3/ /3/ See footnote 5, Document 5. Mr. Kissinger: Yes, it's a very good paper. Mr. Johnson: We're already on page 7 of that paper/4/ so far as events go. I would like to make two points. First, this is not an East-West, or a US-Soviet, or a US-Indian confrontation. The US, USSR and India all have an interest in the continued unity of Pakistan and have nothing to gain from a break-up. Second, we have no control over the events which will determine the outcome, and very little influence. We will know better what the issues are tomorrow after Mujibur Rahman's speech. Yahya's speech/5/ today was described by our Embassy as a mixture of sugar and bile. If the issue is postponed for a few days, we don't face any immediate problem. If Mujib should come to us and tell us he plans to make a unilateral declaration of independence and ask what our attitude would be, we would then face the issue of what to say. If Yahya carries out his declaration on the use of force against East Pakistan, we would have to decide what attitude to adopt. The judgement of all of us is that with the number of troops available to Yahya (a total of 20,000, with 12,000 combat troops) and a hostile East Pakistan population of 75 million, the result would be a blood-bath with no hope of West Pakistan reestablishing control over East Pakistan. In this event, we would be interested in bringing about a cessation of hostilities, but the question of whether we or others should take the lead remains to be seen. We are talking with the British this afternoon about the situation. Mujib has unparalleled political control, capturing 160 of the 162 seats up for grabs in the last election. And he is friendly toward the US. In West Pakistan, Bhutto is almost unparalleledly unfriendly to the US. While we have maintained a posture of hoping the country can be brought together and its unity preserved, the chances of doing so now are extremely slight. It is only a question of time and circumstances as to how they will split, and to what degree the split is complete or may be papered over in some vague confederal scheme. /4/ Page 7 of the contingency study introduced the question of what the U.S. posture would be if the secession of East Pakistan appeared to be imminent. /5/ In a radio address on March 6, Yahya announced that he had decided to convene the National Assembly on March 25. He concluded the speech by warning that as long as he was in charge of the armed forces he would defend the integrity of Pakistan. (Telegram 1957 from Islamabad, March 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL PAK) The Embassy's comments on the speech were reported in telegram 1963 from Islamabad, March 6. (Ibid.) I plan to send something out today to give our people in Dacca and Islamabad the flavor of our thinking in terms of the pros and cons, and to instruct Dacca, if they are approached by Mujib, to stall and refer to Washington./6/ We can then make a decision on our reply in the light of the circumstances at the time. In general, we would like to see unity preserved. If it cannot be, we would like to see the split take place with the least possible bloodshed or disorder. If Mujib approaches us, we will have to walk a tightrope between making him think we are giving him the cold shoulder and not encouraging him to move toward a split if any hope remains for a compromise. /6/ Telegram 38122 to Islamabad and Dacca, March 6. (Ibid.) Mr. Van Hollen: There are three possibilities for Mujib tomorrow: a unilateral declaration of independence; something just short of that-possibly a suggestion for two separate constitutions; or acceptance of Yahya's proposal that the National Assembly meet on March 25. Mr. Kissinger: But doesn't Mujib control the Assembly? Mr. Van Hollen: Yes, but Yahya controls its convening. Mr. Kissinger: Why wouldn't the convening of the National Assembly on March 25 be acceptable to East Pakistan? They control the Assembly and nothing can pass without them. Mr. Van Hollen: They may interpret it as another stalling tactic by Yahya. Mr. Kissinger: If they accept the proposal for an Assembly meeting, we have no foreign policy problem. Mr. Johnson: I agree; the temperature drops. Mr. Kissinger: What would be the motive for a declaration of independence? Mr. Van Hollen: There has been movement in East Pakistan in that direction which was intensified by Yahya's postponement of the National Assembly meeting that was scheduled for last Wednesday./7/ Also, they have interpreted Yahya's speech yesterday as being particularly hardline, blaming Mujib for the situation and threatening the use of force. /7/ March 3. Mr. Kissinger: I agree that force won't work. Mr. Van Hollen: Yes, but they might try. Mr. Helms: To coin a phrase, Yahya's attitude is that he did not become President of Pakistan to preside over the dissolution of the Pakistan state. Mr. Kissinger: What force do they have? Mr. Helms: 20,000 troops. Mr. Kissinger: Would East Pakistan resist? What is their population? Mr. Johnson: 75 million, and they would resist. Also, West Pakistan would not be allowed to overfly India. Mr. Kissinger: It would be impossible. They would have to reinforce by ship. Mr. Johnson: They have some C-130's which could fly around India by refueling in Ceylon. Mr. Kissinger: Ceylon wouldn't let them, would they? Mr. Van Hollen: They do it now, but they might not if circumstances should change. Mr. Noyes: India would put pressure on Ceylon to refuse. Mr. Johnson: They could use their jet transports. Mr. Noyes: They only have 11 of limited capacity. Mr. Kissinger: They would have to have some logistics back-up. Mr. Noyes: They have three ships which could move 8000 men in a week's time. Mr. Van Hollen: Despite all the problems, our mission in Islamabad estimates that Yahya is prepared to use force. Mr. Noyes: They have 15,000 troops in Dacca. Mr. Kissinger: You mean 15,000 of their 20,000 troops are in Dacca? They might just want to hold Dacca. Mr. Johnson: This is not a situation which would be resolved by the use of force. Mr. Kissinger: Doesn't contingency 3/8/ get us three weeks, if not more. If the matter goes to the National Assembly we should have several months to study it. /8/ Contingency 3 of the contingency study cited in footnote 3 above outlined a U.S. response to a situation in which Pakistan rejected a unilateral declaration of independence and attempted to put down the secession by force. Mr. Johnson: In those circumstances we would have no immediate foreign policy problem. Mr. Kissinger: If an autonomous situation develops-possibly two constitutions with some vague confederal links-would we be required to make some immediate decisions? Mr. Van Hollen: It would depend on the West Pakistan reaction. It would probably buy us time. Something short of a unilateral declaration of independence might be accepted by West Pakistan. In that event, they would not use force. Mr. Kissinger: How would two separate constitutions work? The National Assembly wouldn't meet? Or would meet and draft two separate constitutions? Mr. Van Hollen: It wouldn't have to be done by the National Assemblies; the country could be operated by the provincial assemblies. The Provincial Assembly in East Pakistan could draft their constitution. Mujib in the East and Bhutto in the West would wield effective power. Mr. Kissinger: Would East Pakistan conduct its own foreign policy? Mr. Van Hollen: That's a moot point. Mr. Kissinger: In any event, that's not our problem. If West Pakistan accepts a solution in which each part conducts its own foreign relations, we would go along. If West Pakistan doesn't accept such a solution, we will have to decide whether to go along and grant recognition to East Pakistan. There would be no need for us to take a stand on autonomy. If they declare independence, we face the recognition question. If autonomy is rejected, we face the problem of our positions on the use of force. In other words, we have to face the question on the use of force in independence and autonomy. We face the problem of recognition only if they declare independence. Is that a fair statement? What are your views on this? Mr. Johnson: On autonomy, if West Pakistan does not accept that solution and seeks to use force, I think we would want to discourage the use of force. We would do the same in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence. Mr. Kissinger: If I may be the devil's advocate, why should we say anything? Mr. Johnson: If the West Pakistanis use force, there will be a bloodbath or, at least, a situation of great turmoil in East Pakistan. If it is quickly over, there would be no problem. But if it continues, there would be problems. The Indians, and possibly others, might feel impelled to intervene if it continued. In the short run, probably not. Mr. Kissinger: What would we do to discourage the use of force? Tell Yahya we don't favor it? Mr. Johnson: We would first go to the British to try to get them to take the lead. We shouldn't take the lead. Mr. Helms: Amen! Mr. Kissinger: Intervention would almost certainly be self-defeating. Mr. Johnson: We have no control over developments and very little influence. Mr. Kissinger: When is Mujib's statement? Mr. Helms: Tomorrow at 1600 GMT. Mr. Van Hollen: Another reason for our not taking the lead is that West Pakistan is very suspicious that we are supporting a separate East Pakistan state. If we tell Yahya to call off the use of force, it will merely fuel this suspicion. Mr. Kissinger: The President will be very reluctant to do anything that Yahya could interpret as a personal affront. When we talk about trying to discourage West Pakistan intervention, we mean try to get another country with a history of concern in the area to do it. Would they do it in both our names? Mr. Johnson: We're not at that point yet. We've just begun to look for someone to do it, if necessary. How it is done and the degree of our association will be decided at the time. Our objective is to discourage the use of force. Mr. Kissinger: Will this mean that Yahya is through anyway? Mr. Van Hollen: Not necessarily. He could still remain as President with Bhutto wielding all effective political power. Mr. Kissinger: Yahya had counted on being in control because of the divisions in the National Assembly. Mr. Van Hollen: Of course, the elections seriously eroded his position. Mr. Kissinger: He had been able to play off Bhutto against East Pakistan. If East Pakistan becomes an independent state, Bhutto is in effective control in the West. Mr. Van Hollen: Yahya will continue to represent the military establishment which is a significant political force in West Pakistan. He may retain some limited residual power. Mr. Kissinger: In any event, we can't neglect him. Mr. Johnson: No. Mr. Kissinger: Let's keep that in mind. Mr. Johnson: It would be most unwise to do anything to prejudice our relations with Yahya. To whatever degree he remains and has power, we should do what we can to help him. Mr. Kissinger: Would it make any difference if we suggested to West Pakistan that the use of force would be unwise? You understand I don't mind having another country taking the rap. Mr. Johnson: When we say "discourage" or "participate in discouraging" we don't mean pound the table and tell them they can't do it. We mean discuss it with them. Mr. Helms: We don't want to get into a family fight. Mr. Kissinger: If we could go in mildly as a friend to say we think it's a bad idea, it wouldn't be so bad. But if the country is breaking up, they won't be likely to receive such a message calmly. If we can get the British to do it, I wish them well! Mr. Johnson: There has been no decision on our part to do anything. This is the purpose of our talks with the British. Mr. Kissinger: If we should make an approach, we might give them an alibi, so that Bhutto could say that the Americans, by warning them against the use of force, kept West Pakistan from restoring the unity of the country. Mr. Johnson: That's right. Mr. Kissinger: It is essential that we discuss this with the British. Mr. Johnson: We can't reach a decision now on how to proceed. If we can get someone else to take the lead, okay. If not, we will have to decide whether we want to do anything. I am not proposing we do anything, but it is a course of action we may have to consider. Mr. Kissinger: I think we all see the pros and cons clearly. Alex (Johnson) and I will talk after his talks with the British. Every department will be consulted before we make any move. We will also have a chance to take the issue before the President if necessary. Mr. Van Hollen: The British may be very reluctant to do anything. It does have some advantages, though, because the Pakistanis are not as suspicious of the British as they are of us and the British odor in Pakistan is not bad now because of their attitude toward the recent hijacking. Mr. Kissinger: In the highly emotional atmosphere of West Pakistan under the circumstances, I wonder whether sending the American Ambassador in to argue against moving doesn't buy us the worst of everything. Will our doing so make the slightest difference? I can't imagine that they give a damn what we think. Mr. Helms: I agree. My visceral reaction is to keep our distance as long as we can. Mr. Kissinger: Alex (Johnson) will talk to the British and we will all consult tomorrow-unless, of course, Mujib's speech is conciliatory. What if they declare their independence? Will we get an immediate recognition request? Mr. Johnson: Probably, but we don't have to rush. We can see what Mujib says in his approach to us. We shouldn't be the first to recognize. We will want to consult with the British first since they have interests in both East and West Pakistan. Mr. Van Hollen: The Japanese do too; also, possibly the West Germans and the French. Mr. Johnson: We will want to recognize eventually but not be the first. Mr. Van Hollen: Of course, if the parting is amicable and we get a request for recognition, it would be okay. Mr. Kissinger: Suppose the request for recognition comes to our Consul General in Dacca. What will he say? Mr. Van Hollen: He will refer to Washington. Mr. Johnson: I'll tell them so this afternoon, not that I think he would do anything else. /9/ Of the contingency study. Mr. Van Hollen: The prospect of Indian intervention is very slim in the early stages. Mr. Kissinger: I question too great activity on our part. We can't win anything from it, and some Pakistani leaders would be delighted to stick us with it. I wonder whether we should intervene with them or with the Indians. Mr. Johnson: There is a case to be made for massive inaction. Mr. Helms: Absolutely. Mr. Kissinger: I'm just going through the options. The possibility of Chinese military intervention seems so unlikely. Mr. Johnson: The paper dismisses it. Mr. Kissinger: I assume the mention of international diplomatic intervention was put in for intellectual symmetry. Mr. Van Hollen: That is far down the road. If a real blood-bath develops, comparable to the Biafra situation, we may want to review the picture. In such case, international attention could be focussed on the problem, but this is a long way ahead. Mr. Johnson: In any event, we wouldn't threaten West Pakistan with any sanctions. Mr. Kissinger: Or call our Ambassador home for consultation. Mr. Johnson: Our Ambassador is in Bangkok for some medical problem. Mr. Kissinger: Who is our Chargˇ? Mr. Saunders: Sid Sober. He's a good man. Mr. Johnson: Yes. We don't need to rush the Ambassador back. Mr. Kissinger: I was really only joking. We'll be in touch tomorrow. Mr. Johnson: I'll get something out to our people today giving them our thinking. When will we know about the speech tomorrow? Mr. Noyes: About 5:00 a.m. Mr. Saunders: There is a ten-hour time difference. We should know fairly early in the morning. Yahya's speech of yesterday was on the CBS 8:00 a.m. news today. Mr. Johnson: Our Operations Center will be on the alert for the speech. Mr. Kissinger: We'll check with each other as soon as we know about the speech-with a view to taking no action! Mr. Helms: What's the situation at the Technical University (in Ankara) today? Mr. Kissinger: What about the four Airmen? Do they still think they are in the University? Mr. Saunders: We have no word. The Embassy doesn't think they are in the University and the Turks have widened their search-they went into 100 private homes last night looking for them. The demonstrations have stopped, though, and things are quieter today. 7. Editorial Note National elections were held in India March 1-10, 1971. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's Congress Party won 350 seats in the 521 seat Lok Sabha, the lower house of parliament. In an assessment of the election sent to Secretary Rogers on March 22, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph Sisco concluded that the election served Gandhi by "making both her party's and her own position unassailable." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 INDIA) On March 13 President Nixon sent a message to Prime Minister Gandhi congratulating her on her "landslide victory." (Telegram 42498 to New Delhi; ibid.) In a telephone conversation with Secretary Rogers on March 17, Henry Kissinger said that he had discussed the election over lunch that day with Indian Ambassador Jha. According to Jha: "Now that she has won, she wants good relations with us." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 367, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) 8. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon/1/ /1/ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 210, Geopolitical File, South Asia, Chronological File, Nov 1969-July 1971. Secret. Sent for information. President Nixon put a checkmark on the memorandum to indicate he saw it. SUBJECT An immediate showdown between East and West Pakistan has been averted for the time being. The prospects for a reconciliation and settlement remain poor, however, and the basic elements of the situation remain essentially unchanged. Situation in Perspective President Yahya and the West Pakistani military appear determined to maintain a unified Pakistan by force if necessary. The replacement of the Military Governor in East Pakistan with a tougher man, the generally harsh tone of Yahya's March 6 speech/2/ and the explicit warning that force would be used against any move for separation are all indications in this direction. There is also evidence that the military forces in the East Wing are being gradually strengthened by troops being airlifted through Ceylon. Yahya may personally lean toward conciliation, but he must answer to the dominant hardliners in his army. /2/ See footnote 5, Document 6. While East Pakistani leader Mujibur Rahman has stepped back a bit from a declaration of independence, the full text of his March 7 speech/3/ conveys a harsher tone than the initial summary reports, and it seems apparent that his retreat was tactical. He made clear that something very close to independence, i.e., "emancipation," is his goal and that his movement will not be deflected until that is achieved. Noteworthy also is the fact that Rahman quite openly took issue with Yahya, accusing him of "submitting to the declaration of a minority" [West Pakistan]/4/ and asserting that his own Awami League is the only legitimate source of authority in the country. /3/ Awami League President Mujibur Rahman addressed a rally at Dacca racecourse on March 7 and called for a continuation of the "peaceful non-cooperation" movement against the government, including the closure of all government offices and educational institutions. He said that he would consider attending the National Assembly session scheduled by President Yahya for March 25 if martial law were terminated, the troops in East Pakistan were withdrawn to their barracks, and power was returned to the elected representatives of the people. (Telegram 637 from Dacca, March 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL PAK) /4/ Brackets in the source text. Our embassy in Islamabad believes that Rahman's goal remains unchanged-"emancipation" of East Pakistan from West Pakistani domination. This could still conceivably mean "full provincial autonomy" within a united Pakistan. But it is just as likely, if not more so, that Rahman has come to believe firmly that the freedom he seeks is only attainable by outright independence. His speech last Sunday would suggest an effort to achieve his goal by gradual assertion of power without risking a direct confrontation with the army that might follow a unilateral declaration of independence. The other element in this delicate political equation-West Pakistani political leader Z.A. Bhutto-is for the moment remaining relatively quiet. Since triggering the current crisis in mid-February with his refusal to attend the constituent assembly, Bhutto has worked to consolidate further his support in the West Wing and at least to appear more conciliatory. Substantively, the differences between Bhutto and Rahman on the division of powers between the center and the provinces might be reconciled, or at least papered over, if a constituent assembly could be held. The bigger question, at this point, is whether either Bhutto or Rahman retain any genuine interest in cooperating toward settlement. Conclusions The coming days should tell whether Yahya and the West Pakistani military decide there are still grounds for trying to work out a political solution that would insure the continued unity of Pakistan. Yahya reportedly is going to Dacca to meet with Rahman shortly. The following would seem to be the most likely situations that could now develop: 2. A static waiting game could develop with neither the army nor the civilians prepared to take a bold initiative to break the deadlock and each hoping the other will break first. This is where we are now and Rahman would probably prefer to continue like this for a while longer so that he can gradually take de facto control of East Pakistan without forcing a showdown. 3. There might be more tactical political moves by Yahya, Rahman or Bhutto designed to probe for areas of accommodation and buy more time without giving up anything. This has been the mode of operation so far but it may be that just about all of the possibilities in this sphere have been played out. In short, the Pakistan crisis is far from over and could suddenly flare up again. As you know, the Senior Review Group met last Saturday/5/ to consider the U.S. posture at this juncture. It was generally agreed that very little, if anything, could be gained by U.S. diplomatic intervention at this point and that the best posture was to remain inactive and do nothing that Yahya might find objectionable. The choice was basically between continuing on this course, at least until the situation jelled, and weighing in now with Yahya in an effort to prevent the possible outbreak of a bloody civil war. The case for inaction at this point is: /5/ March 6; see Document 6. -It is not necessary for us to shift now to a more activist approach since Yahya knows we favor unity and is doing everything possible to achieve a political settlement. It should be pointed out that the main cost of following this approach is that it may jeopardize our future relations with East Pakistan if it becomes independent. On balance, however, it is a more defensible position to operate as if the country remains united than to take any move that would appear to encourage separation. I know you share that view. Washington, March 15, 1971. /1/ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8 PAK. Confidential. Drafted by Craig Baxter (NEA/PAF) and cleared by Spengler and Van Hollen. SUBJECT Mujib Takes Over East Pakistan; Yahya Flies to Dacca Sheikh Mujibur Rahman announced in Dacca early today, that his party, the Awami League, was taking over the administration of East Pakistan on the grounds that the party had a majority (288 of 300) in the Provincial Assembly. Mujib acted unilaterally and in defiance of President Yahya Khan's Martial Law Administration which continues to be the Government of Pakistan. The fact that Mujib's announcement contained 35 "directives" for assuming control of the administration indicates that it was a deliberate and carefully planned move. In taking this step, Mujib has directly confronted the Yahya government but has carefully avoided an unqualified declaration of East Pakistani independence and has based his action on the "democratic" voice of the people as expressed in the December election. The Yahya regime must react quickly to this critical move, and Yahya himself has flown to Dacca to talk with Mujib. The options available to Yahya appear to be two, either of which would further endanger the already fragile unity of Pakistan. If Yahya acquiesces in the step, he has forfeited his martial law powers, at least in the East, and would be hard pressed to retain them in the West (see below regarding Bhutto's speech on Sunday/2/). If Yahya, or others in the military, decide to resist Mujib's action by force, East Pakistan will be engulfed in a struggle between the military and the Bengali nationalists, the outcome of which can only be eventual independence of Bengal and the breaking of all ties with West Pakistan-unless, as seems unlikely in the long run, the army can successfully contain a rebellion. Mujib's statement called on Bengalis to resist "by all possible means" any force used against them. /2/ March 14. In a speech in Karachi on Sunday, West Pakistan political leader Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto demanded that power be turned over to majority parties in each wing, Bhutto's in the West, Mujib's in the East. Bhutto's speech, in fact, may have triggered Mujib's action. It may also indicate what has been suspected for some time, that Bhutto has decided that his chances of attaining power in the West are best achieved by a split-total or nearly so-in the country. However, Bhutto has less opportunity to act than Mujib because the army is strong in the West and could probably contain a rebellion. The day's events cast further doubt on continued unity in Pakistan. Yahya's response will be the most important determining factor. 10. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon/1/ Washington, March 26, 1971. /1/ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 625, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IV, 1 Mar 71-15 May 71. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. SUBJECT The West Pakistani army has moved to repress the East Pakistan secession movement. Our embassy believes that the military probably has sufficient strength to assert immediate control over Dacca and other major cities, but is not capable of maintaining control over an extended period. This raises two immediate problems for us: (1) the safety of official and private Americans, and (2) the U.S. role, if any, in a peacemaking effort. I have called a WSAG meeting for 3:00 p.m. today and will provide recommendations after that. Safety of Americans There are at present some 850 Americans, including 250 U.S. officials and dependents, in East Pakistan. State's plan is to make no immediate move to evacuate these people since they could be in greater danger on the streets and we have no information yet as to the situation at the airports. Our consulate, however, is seeking the protection of the local authorities, and evacuation plans-worked out earlier in the present crisis-are being reviewed for both East and West Pakistan. Military aircraft from Southeast Asia could be made available on short notice for the purpose of evacuation. No reports have been received so far of injuries to Americans or any other foreigners in East Pakistan. U.S. Peacemaking Role Contingency plans on East Pakistan have been drawn up and reviewed by the Senior Review Group. For this situation, these plans present a series of theoretically possible options ranging from doing nothing other than protecting resident Americans through approaching Yahya in concert with the British and other powers, with an appeal to halt the bloodshed, if necessary using the threat of sanctions including the cessation of economic aid and military supply. The real issue is whether we involve ourselves or not. The British may well weigh in on their own, and that has advantages for us. Beyond that, however: -The advantage of not involving ourselves at this stage is that we do not prematurely harm our relationship with West Pakistan. We can for a time yet claim with the Easterners that the situation is too unclear there to provide a basis for action. Comment I shall send you recommendations after the WSAG meeting. In addition to reviewing the evacuation plans, the group will concentrate on the two operational decisions that may present themselves: 1. Whether to approach Yahya, urging him to end the bloodshed. It is probably a bit early to make this decision today because we do not yet know whether calm will be restored in the East or whether the pattern of violence will continue and broaden. This, therefore, seems a decision for the next two or three days. 2. How to respond to a definitive announcement of East Pakistani independence. Our Consul General has standing instructions to refer any such question to Washington. The issue might remain unclear for some time if the military re-establishes control in the cities and the resistance moves to the countryside. On the other hand, our response will set the tone for our relationship with both wings. 11. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting/1/ Washington, March 26, 1971, 3:03-3:32 p.m. /1/ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-115, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. A briefer record of the meeting was prepared in OASD/ISA by James Noyes. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330 76 0197, Box 74, Pakistan 092 (Jan-Jul) 1971) SUBJECT PARTICIPATION Chairman-Henry A. Kissinger CIA JCS NSC Staff SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS After reviewing the situation in East Pakistan, the WSAG agreed that the U.S. should continue its policy of non-involvement in the dispute between West and East Pakistan. In particular, the U.S. should avoid being placed in a position where it could be accused of having encouraged the break-up of Pakistan. The WSAG agreed that the U.S. should delay action on any request that might be forthcoming for recognition of an independent East Pakistani regime. The WSAG agreed that the State Department should be responsible for monitoring developments in Pakistan on a day-to-day basis and for insuring that the White House is fully informed. The State Department should insure that adequate preparations have been made to evacuate U.S. citizens should that become necessary. Mr. Helms: [1 line of source text not declassified] the situation in the area of the Consulate General is very quiet but that an enormous fire has been going on for hours in the old part of the city. Very few shots or explosions have been heard. Only two of the Consulate personnel had been able to get to the Consulate building by 6:30 p.m. [1 line of source text not declassified] Mujibur Rahman was taken into custody at 1:00 p.m. by the martial law authorities. Two of his supporters were killed when the arrest took place. [2 lines of source text not declassified] [11/2 lines of source text not declassified] They say that Yahya's speech Friday/2/ night has to be heard to appreciate the venom in his voice as he described Mujibur Rahman. The fat is in the fire. Islamabad confirms that Mujibur Rahman was successfully arrested. /2/ March 26. It is unclear what caused the collapse of the talks. Dr. Kissinger: I have no idea what caused the breakdown in talks. I was as much surprised as anyone else. Mr. Van Hollen: One possible reason was that Yahya was unable to sell the settlement in West Pakistan. Another factor was the killing of twenty people and the resultant rise in tension. Dr. Kissinger: Had the compromise/3/ [under discussion between Yahya and Mujibur Rahman]/4/ gone through, the next step toward independence couldn't have been prevented. That being the case, I don't understand why Mujibur Rahman wouldn't accept the compromise. /3/ According to telegram 927 from Dacca, March 24, Mujibur and Yahya reached tentative agreement on March 23 on a solution that involved the immediate establishment of provincial governments, temporary continuation of the central government under Yahya, and the drafting of a constitution. The constitution would embody a division of power between the central government and the provinces in which central government control would be limited to defense, foreign affairs, and currency. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 625, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IV, 1 Mar 71-15 May 71) /4/ Brackets in the source text. [omission in the source text] Will Bhutto become the dominant figure in the West? Mr. Van Hollen: Possibly there will be a backlash in the West against Bhutto because it was he who forced Yahya to postpone the constituent assembly. Dr. Kissinger: What do you think is going to happen? Mr. Van Hollen: An effort will be made to prevent secession. However, the ability of the West Pakistani forces to maintain law and order in East Pakistan over the long run approaches zero. They may be able to control Dacca, but the Awami leadership will move to the countryside. Dr. Kissinger: Do you think the Awami will organize a resistance? Mr. Van Hollen: They began to prepare for it last month. Dr. Kissinger: If their leaders are arrested, can they continue? Mr. Van Hollen: Yes, because of the tremendous popular sentiment behind them. After all, they won 160 out of 162 of the Assembly seats from East Pakistan in the election. Dr. Kissinger: Then the prognosis is for civil war resulting eventually in independence or for independence fairly quickly. Mr. Van Hollen: That's right. Dr. Kissinger: Now that Yahya has taken the lead in opposing the secession, how will he be able to back off without fighting? Mr. Van Hollen: It will be very difficult. He was on record as early as March 6 as opposing secession. Mr. Johnson: The question is how long he can sustain this policy. Dr. Kissinger: How long can he supply his forces in East Pakistan? Mr. Van Hollen: It will be very difficult to do so. Dr. Kissinger: Do his forces have stocks in East Pakistan? Mr. Helms: No. Mr. Van Hollen: There is one understrength division there. It has effective control of only a part of Dacca. It is surrounded by 75 million hostile Bengalis, who could easily be stirred up, particularly if Mujibur Rahman is arrested. Dr. Kissinger: What is the prognosis for the next few days? Mr. Johnson: Dawn comes in Dacca at 7:00 or 8:00 p.m. our time. We will know better in one more day how much bloodletting there is likely to be. Dr. Kissinger: Do we all agree that there is nothing we can do except evacuate our citizens if that becomes necessary? Mr. Johnson: As of this time, that is true. Mr. Helms: Yes. Mr. Packard: Yes. Mr. Van Hollen: The British are no more inclined to do anything positive. After our earlier approach Heath sent an anodyne message to Yahya. At best that is what we might get again from the British. Mr. Johnson: We have made arrangements with them to get the reports from their people in Dacca. We are maintaining a 24-hour watch at the Department. Dr. Kissinger: I talked to the President briefly before lunch. His inclination is the same as everybody else's. He doesn't want to do anything. He doesn't want to be in the position where he can be accused of having encouraged the split-up of Pakistan. He does not favor a very active policy. This probably means that we would not undertake to warn Yahya against a civil war. Mr. Johnson: I agree. If we do so, he can blame us for the break-up of his country. Dr. Kissinger: What about recognition? Mr. Johnson: We can drag our feet on that. Mr. Van Hollen: We can defer a decision and lay low. A public request would make things more difficult. We should certainly not be the first to recognize. Mr. Johnson: Our principal concern is the Americans who are there. Thus far, the disturbances have not taken any anti-American tone. The best thing for Americans to do right now is to stay home. We have a warden system, with radio communications. Our evacuation people have been in touch with Pan American and TWA to tell them that we might want some planes. They have also contacted the Pentagon, JCS, and CINCPAC about the possible use of military aircraft. If the airport is available, we can get our people out. We are going to ask Islamabad this afternoon about the possibility of getting West Pakistani troop support to get our people moved out. Dr. Kissinger: What happens to the aid shipments that were diverted to West Pakistan?/5/ Are they on the way now? /5/ In response to a request from the Government of Pakistan, a decision was reached in Washington on March 1 to divert to West Pakistan 150,000 tons of wheat intended for disaster relief in East Pakistan. The request was triggered by grain shortages and rising prices in West Pakistan, and U.S. agreement to the request was conditioned upon the understanding that Pakistan would make commercial purchases before the end of 1971 to replace the grain that was diverted. (Memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger, March 1; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 625, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IV, 1 Mar 71-15 May 71) Mr. Van Hollen: They have almost certainly reached Karachi. Dr. Kissinger: The problem is that West Pakistan now owes East Pakistan for these shipments. This question will have to be settled later. Mr. Van Hollen: We will probably have to make it up. Dr. Kissinger: Are you sure we can't get into any problems domestically? Mr. Van Hollen: No, we made arrangements [for compensation to East Pakistan]./6/ /6/ All brackets from this point are in the source text. Dr. Kissinger: Our judgment on representations to Yahya [against trying to suppress the secession] is that they would serve to make a record for international and domestic opinion and that they would be money in the bank in East Pakistan. However, we don't need to make a gesture to domestic opinion, and we can't judge what international opinion is like. It might, however, help us in East Pakistan. Mr. Van Hollen: In the present situation I don't think it would put much money in the bank. If we get a public appeal for recognition, we will have a problem. Dr. Kissinger: What should we do in that case? Mr. Van Hollen: Go slow. This will be a problem for our relations with Yahya. Dr. Kissinger: I talked to the Indian Ambassador the other day. He said that the Indians preferred Pakistan to remain united because of the pressure an independent Bengal would create. Mr. Van Hollen: I think all the principal countries (the Soviet Union, India, and the U.S.) feel that the integrity of Pakistan is in their interest. Dr. Kissinger: China would be different. Mr. Van Hollen: No, it wouldn't. The Indians have a problem because of the Bengali sentiment in India. Dr. Kissinger: Secession might encourage communal separatism. Mr. Van Hollen: Yes. Dr. Kissinger: I take it we are not competing with India in East Pakistan. It doesn't matter if they steal a march on us. Mr. Van Hollen: No, [it doesn't matter]. Dr. Kissinger: This seems to be a straightforward operational problem. We can let Alex [Johnson] handle it. There are no major interdepartmental differences. (to Johnson) I will keep in close touch with you. Mr. Van Hollen: The situation in West Pakistan may possibly be worse from our standpoint than in East Pakistan because of the suspicion in the West that the U.S. is behind separatism. Mr. Johnson: Certainly Bhutto won't discourage that impression. Dr. Kissinger: Yahya doesn't believe that. Mr. Van Hollen: He has been told enough times that we are not supporting separatism. Dr. Kissinger: Is there more suspicion of us than of the British? Mr. Van Hollen: Much more. Dr. Kissinger: What would we stand to gain from the break-up of Pakistan? Mr. Van Hollen: In the eyes of the Pakistanis we somehow want to weaken Pakistan. Mr. Saunders: This is a case of smear politics being exploited for personal gain. Dr. Kissinger: Should we send a message to Yahya on this? Mr. Van Hollen: We have made this point to him again and again. Mr. Johnson: It would not be a good idea at this time. Yahya would think we were encouraging separatism. Lt. Gen. Zais: We have looked into the possible availability of military planes in case commercial aircraft cannot be used because the East Pakistanis took their people out of the control tower. Dr. Kissinger: That would make it difficult to evacuate by commercial aircraft. Lt. Gen. Zais: It would certainly be a problem. Dr. Kissinger: Can anyone land now? Lt. Gen. Zais: It would be possible to land. We could get four C-141s with seats in Westpac. They could be launched out of Uttapau. From there it is a two-hour flight to Dacca. We would have control personnel on the first plane. After they got there, we could bring the evacuees out fast. We could get everyone in two roundtrips. Dr. Kissinger: Doesn't this make it probable that evacuation will have to be by military aircraft? Mr. Johnson: No commercial plane would go in under these conditions. Dr. Kissinger: We will have to make our plans on that basis [i.e., using military aircraft]. Lt. Gen. Zais: The field is under the control of the West Pakistanis. Mr. Johnson: Have we been in communication with their air force? Col. Rhea: The last communication we had was three or four days ago. Mr. Johnson: Can't the tower at Bangkok determine whether there is anyone at Dacca? Col. Rhea: The Pakistani Air Force has people operating the tower. They said they might be able to handle six flights per day. Mr. Johnson: All this suggests we might be able to use commercial aircraft if their communicators could give us some help. Mr. Packard: That would be all right with me. 12. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, March 27, 1971, 1400Z. /1/ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Islamabad, London, CINCSTRIKE for POLAD, and 4416. Subj: GOI Reaction to East Pakistan Developments. 1. At Foreign Secretary Kaul's request, I called on him afternoon March 27. DCM and Joint Secretary Ray, Pakistan Division, MEA, also present. 2. Foreign Secretary began by handing me copy of Foreign Minister's statement made in Lok Sabha earlier in day. (Text and subsequent developments in Lok Sabha reported septel.)/2/ Kaul said Foreign Minister had been criticized by members of all parties on the basis his statement was too cold. Foreign Minister had had to intervene and state there was no doubt that the Government of India's sympathy was with the people of East Pakistan who were being suppressed. Kaul said GOI was deeply concerned at developments. It now appeared that Yahya's attempt at a settlement had been a facade in order to allow time for the transport of additional troops to East Pakistan. /2/ In his statement in parliament, Foreign Minister Singh described developments in East Pakistan and accused the Pakistan army of suppressing the people of East Pakistan. (Telegram 4414 from New Delhi, March 27; ibid.) On March 31 Prime Minister Gandhi introduced a more strongly worded resolution in the Lok Sabha. The resolution, adopted by the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha, expressed "deep anguish and grave concern at recent developments in East Bengal" and alleged that "a massive attack by armed forces, despatched from West Pakistan, has been unleashed against the entire people of East Bengal with a view to suppressing their urges and aspirations." (Telegram 4677 from New Delhi, March 31; ibid.) 3. Kaul said GOI information was that [garble] meeting that Yahya had had was with Bhutto who had objected to acceptance of Mujib's six points./3/ Latest information, to which Kaul said he did not know whether to give credence or not, was that casualties ran into the tens of thousands. /3/ The six-point program of the Awami League, drafted by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, called for virtual autonomy for East Pakistan within a confederated state with the central government exercising control over only defense, foreign policy, and currency, with limited powers of taxation. The six-point program is included in the Awami League's 1970 election manifesto. (Sheelendra K. Singh, et al., eds., Bangla Desh Documents, Vol. I, Madras: B. N. K. Press, 1971, pp. 66-82) 4. Kaul said GOI was concerned about its own borders. There could be a threat to India's security. It had to be expected that they would have an unusually large influx of refugees. GOI, he said, were prepared to make their contribution toward the care and feeding of such refugees. However, they were deeply concerned that the magnitude of the problem would considerably exceed their ability to cope with it. 5. Kaul said he would be grateful if I could get in touch with my government and ask what its ideas were about coping with this problem./4/ Already some refugees had started coming into India. When he was asked where this had happened, Kaul said it was in the Tripura area. /4/ In telegram 53097 to New Delhi, March 31, the Department instructed the Embassy to inform the Indian Government that since a serious refugee problem had not yet developed, it was too soon to anticipate what the United States response to such a development would be. If an emergency situation did develop, the United States would probably participate in a disaster relief effort, but would want to reserve judgment on specifics in light of Pakistan's concerns. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 PAK) 6. I told Kaul that I had understood that at least until recently the magnitude of the refugee influx had been trickling down. He confirmed this had been the case, but said that this time the problem would be of quite a different magnitude and he anticipated a need for medicines, blankets, food and shelter. He asked that we join with the GOI and other members of the international community in order to bring relief to the victims of the conflict. 7. The Foreign Secretary then said he hoped there would not be outside intervention by any country. He added that perhaps even at this late hour it may still not be too late for US to express to the Pakistan Government our hope that a political solution can be reached. Kaul said he would be grateful if we could exchange any information we may get on the situation with the GOI. 8. Kaul then said that there had been rumours of possible Chinese intervention. He could appreciate that the Chinese would feel that it was in their interest to support West Pakistan. There was some evidence that China may have authorized Pak overflights by way of Kashmir, Tibet and Burma to East Pakistan. DCM said we understood that Indian radar had not picked up any evidence of such overflights. Ray replied that was correct, but that the GOI still did not rule out possibility that such overflights had in fact taken place. 9. Foreign Secretary said that Chinese had at least, an understanding with the martial law administration. They did not like Mujib because he was considered to be pro-Western and pro-Indian. There were extremist elements in East Pakistan headed by Bhashani./5/ At the moment, Mujib had the upper hand over him. The Chinese might try to fish in troubled waters. There was also a hard core of Naxalites in East Pakistan. /5/ Maulana Abdul Hamid Bhashani, leader of the National Awami League. 10. Kaul said they had just heard that Radio Pakistan had reported the arrest of Mujib. This had subsequently been denied by the Free Bengal Radio which had said Mujib was not in his house at the time of the reported Pak raid. Kaul said "our apprehension is that this will not simmer down." He felt it was not wise for West Pakistan to be attempting to control the situation by force since this would only sow the seeds for future trouble. He then asked for my assessment. 11. I said that I had thought that Yahya was sincerely attempting to carry out his original idea of a democratic government in all of Pakistan and that he was prepared to accept the six points and recognize greater autonomy in East Pakistan. Speaking personally, I told him that when I heard six shiploads of army personnel had arrived in East Pakistan I had doubts and wondered if talks were being dragged out waiting for the troops to arrive and then crack down. I told Kaul that based on our cables, it was my government's position that the present conflict was an internal matter that should be settled internally. 12. Kaul said GOI had recently heard that all units of the Pak army had been permitted to ask for fighter support from the Pak air force and that there had in fact been some air activity in Comilla. At this point, Kaul read me the text of what I took to be a reporting telegram from the Indian High Commission in Islamabad recording the events of the last few days. The essential point was that Bhutto had made it known that he believed that accession to the Awami League demands verged on a grant of sovereignty. 13. Kaul said that GOI information was that there had been four army brigades in East Pakistan. Since the crisis began, two brigades had been added one of which had been brought in by air and one by sea. Seven passenger ships loaded with troops (not six, he said) had arrived. This all amounted to more than two divisions of West Pakistani troops. Kaul said that since March there had been at least 13 C-130 flights and 30 flights of PIA Boeings transitting Ceylon. In reply to a question about tank strength, Kaul said that West Pakistan had one armoured regiment in East Pakistan, one squadron of which was employed in Dacca city. 14. I asked Kaul if there had been any movement of Indian troops. He reminded me that they had militarily reinforced West Bengal prior to the elections and had said at the time that they would not remove such troops until they were certain that the situation had stabilized. So far, he said, we have not made any movements of troops in response to the developments in East Pakistan. However, "we may have to strengthen our borders". When asked if this meant increasing the border security forces, he replied that border security was already stretched to the limit. 15. At this point, S.K. Singh, MEA spokesman, walked in carrying a ticker story. Kaul read this aloud. Story was based on a monitor report from Agatala of the Free Bengal Radio which claimed that martial law administrator Lt. General Tikka Khan had been killed by resistance forces which had stormed his premises. 16. Comment: I believe it will be useful for us to be reasonably full and frank in exchanging information on East Pakistan with the GOI. I hope Department can give me an indication of the extent to which we would be prepared to do in humanitarian relief effort on behalf of East Pakistan refugees soonest. Keating 13. Memorandum From Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)/1/ Washington, March 28, 1971. /1/ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 625, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IV, 1 Mar 71-15 May 1971. Secret. Sent for action. SUBJECT As you will have noted from the cables/2/ and situation reports, the situation in East Pakistan appears to have taken another turn for the worse. Having beaten down the initial surge of resistance, the army now appears to have embarked on a reign of terror aimed at eliminating the core of future resistance. At least this seems to be the situation in Dacca. We have virtually no reliable information on the situation in the other major cities or what is going on in the countryside where most of the population resides. /2/ On March 28 Consul General Blood reported from Dacca as follows: "Here in Dacca we are mute and horrified witnesses to a reign of terror by the Pak military. Evidence continues to mount that the MLA authorities have a list of Awami League supporters whom they are systematically eliminating by seeking them out in their homes and shooting them down." He recommended that the United States express shock to the Pakistani authorities "at this wave of terror directed against their own countrymen by Pak military." (Telegram 959 from Dacca) On March 29 the Consulate General reported that the army was setting houses on fire and shooting people as they emerged from the burning houses. (Telegram 978 from Dacca) On March 30 the Consulate General reported that the army had killed a large number of apparently unarmed students at Dacca University. (Telegram 986 from Dacca) The Embassy in Islamabad concurred in expressing its sense of horror and indignation at the "brutal, ruthless and excessive use of force by the Pak military," but went on to state: "In this Embassy's view, deplorable as current events in East Pakistan may be, it is undesirable that they be raised to level of contentious international political issue." (Telegram 2954 from Islamabad, March 31) All cables cited here are published in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972, Documents 125-128. When President Nixon discussed the reports of atrocities in East Pakistan briefly with Kissinger in a telephone conversation on March 28, he agreed with the position taken by the Embassy: "I wouldn't put out a statement praising it, but we're not going to condemn it either." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 367, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) -Is the present U.S. posture of simply ignoring the atrocities in East Pakistan still advisable or should we now be expressing our shock at least privately to the West Pakistanis? Our Consul General in Dacca thinks that the time has now come to approach the West Pakistanis. We do not yet, but should before long, have a recommendation from Ambassador Farland. [Comment: The Government has deported all foreign press correspondents but the story is still getting considerable play here. The full horror of what is going on will come to light sooner or later. After our major effort to provide natural disaster relief last fall, the Administration could be vulnerable to charges of a callous political calculation over a man-made disaster.]/3/ /3/Brackets in the source text. -The Indians are clearly nervous about the situation. They do not seem disposed to intervene but there is considerable pressure on Mrs. Gandhi and we know that they are dusting off their own contingency plans. At a time when tensions are high in the subcontinent, there is always a chance that another irrational move could ignite a larger and even more serious conflict. Is now the time, as our contingency plans would seem to suggest, to begin closer consultations with New Delhi? -There are a whole range of AID issues that will be coming up because of prior commitments and things already in the pipeline. Our actions on those could add up, in some peoples' eyes, to approval or disapproval of the West Pakistani actions. At a minimum, they imply U.S. involvement given the situation in Pakistan. Recommendation: It is hard to predict what the next several days will bring, but, based on the current situation, you might wish to consider adding Pakistan to the agenda for Wednesday./4/ /4/ Kissinger did not indicate whether he approved or disapproved the recommendation, but there was only passing discussion of the issue when the Senior Review Group considered developments in East Pakistan on Wednesday, March 31; see Document 17. 14. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and His Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)/1/ San Clemente, California, March 29, 1971. /1/ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 367, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. A note on the transcript indicates that the tape recording from which the transcript was prepared was "brought in" on March 29. P: Hello. K: Mr. President. P: Hi Henry. You sleep well? K: Yes, very well. It's really a very restful place out here. P: What's new today. Got anything on the wires or anything of interest? K: There's nothing of any great consequence Mr. President. Apparently Yahya has got control of East Pakistan. P: Good. There're sometimes the use of power is . . . K: The use of power against seeming odds pays off. Cause all the experts were saying that 30,000 people can't get control of 75 million. Well, this may still turn out to be true but as of this moment it seems to be quiet. P: Well maybe things have changed. But hell, when you look over the history of nations 30,000 well-disciplined people can take 75 million any time. Look what the Spanish did when they came in and took the Incas and all the rest. Look what the British did when they took India. K: That's right. P: To name just a few. K: Well in those cases the people were more or less neutral. In the Inca case they expected a god to come from the West . . . P: That sort of . . . yeah, put them out. K: Which helped a bit. P: That's right. But anyway I wish him well. I just . . . I mean it's better not to have it come apart than to have to come apart. K: That's right. The long-term impact of its coming about [apart] P: This will be only one blip in the battle and then it will go on and on and on and it's like everything in the period we live in isn't it since World War II. K: That's right, that's right. P: Where revolution in itself, independence is a virtue which of course it never was. That wasn't true at the time of the French revolution either and it isn't any more true today. The real question is whether anybody can run the god-damn place. K: That's right and of course the Bengalis have been extremely difficult to govern throughout their history. P: The Indians can't govern them either. K: No, well actually the Indians who one normally would expect to favor a breakup of Pakistan aren't so eager for this one. Because they're afraid that East Pakistan may in time, or East Bengal may in time have an attraction for West Bengal with Calcutta and also that the Chinese will gain a lot of influence there. P: Interesting. K: And that, I think, is a good chance. [Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to South Asia.] 15. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and His Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)/1/ San Clemente, California, March 30, 1971, 9:35 a.m. /1/ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 367, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. P: What's new today? [Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to South Asia.] K: In Pakistan it continues, but there isn't a whole lot we can do about it. P: No. Are we pressing? K: No, we may remove the American civilians. P: That's okay. K: But even that we won't do before Thursday./2/ /2/ April 1. P: But we should just stay out-like in Biafra, what the hell can we do? K: Good point. P: I don't like it, but I didn't like shooting starving Biafrans either. What do they think we are going to do but help the Indians. K: They have been ambivalent about it anyway. P: They are ambivalent about everything. K: That Consul in Dacca doesn't have the strongest nerves. P: Neither does Keating. They are all in the middle of it; it's just like Biafra. The main thing to do is to keep cool and not do anything. There's nothing in it for us either way. K: It would infuriate the West Pakistanis; it wouldn't gain anything with the East Pakistanis, who wouldn't know about it anyway and the Indians are not noted for their gratitude. [Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to South Asia.] 16. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Hilaly) to Secretary of State Rogers/1/ Washington, March 31, 1971. /1/ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 759, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan (1971). Most Immediate. The letter was conveyed to the White House on March 31 under cover of a transmittal memorandum from Executive Secretary Eliot to Kissinger. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL PAK-US) Dear Mr. Secretary, I have just been requested by the President of Pakistan to convey the following message from him to President Richard M. Nixon. I will be grateful if you transmit it to its high destination urgently. Begins: "Your Excellency. I am taking earliest opportunity to inform you of the political developments which have taken place in Pakistan since general elections were held last December. It has been my constant endeavour to lead the country towards a restoration of democratic processes through elected representatives of the people. For this purpose, I have been holding talks with leaders of political parties. I had hoped that these discussions would lead to a broad political agreement regarding convening of the National Assembly and framing of a constitution. Unfortunately however the political leadership in East Pakistan and especially Sheikh Mujibur Rahman took a progressively rigid stand which made such an agreement impossible. Meanwhile murder, arson and widespread disorder in defiance of governmental authority were let loose in the province. In the larger interest of the country I exercised utmost restraint and patience and tried to evolve a generally acceptable formula to resolve constitutional difficulties. In pursuit of the same objective, I went personally to East Pakistan to hold consultations with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Even while I was there, the Awami League leaders continued to make statements and to indulge in practices which clearly showed that they were not prepared for pursuing a compromise. The last round of talks in Dacca left me in no doubt that they had no intention of accepting any constitutional formula which would ensure integrity and unity of the country. Eventually a point was reached where the Awami League put forward final proposals which virtually amounted to dismemberment of the country. Since they had no such mandate from the people and as unity of the country was at stake, firm action had to be taken to assert government's authority and to safeguard the integrity of Pakistan. There was no option but to take that decision. The situation in East Pakistan is well under control and normal life is being restored. Accounts to the contrary circulated by some outside sources especially from news media, do not reflect the correct position and are designed to mislead world public opinion. While we are engaged in a national effort to safeguard our integrity, the Indian attitude is causing us grave concern. The Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and other important leaders of India have made public statements regarding developments in East Pakistan which constitute a clear interference in our internal affairs. A dangerous precedent is thus being set by India which is of direct concern to the international community. Far more serious is the deployment of nearly six divisions of the Indian Army not too far from the borders of East Pakistan. The composition of these forces which include artillery regiments and parachute brigades has no relevance to the needs of internal security in West Bengal or to the requirements of Indian elections which ended three weeks ago. This concentration of Indian forces on our borders constitutes a direct threat to our security. In view of Your Excellency's dedication to the cause of international peace and security and to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of other states, I hope Your Excellency would consider the desirability of expressing your support for the forces of peace and stability in this region and of impressing upon Indian leaders the paramount need for refraining from any action that might aggravate the situation and lead to irretrievable consequences. I remain Very sincerely yours A.M. Yahya Khan" Ends. With my warm personal regards. Yours sincerely, A. Hilaly 17. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting/1/ San Clemente, California, March 31, 1971, 11:55 a.m.-12:15 p.m. /1/ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information is indicated on the source text. The meeting was held in the Conference Room at the Western White House in San Clemente, California. SUBJECT PARTICIPATION Chairman-Henry A. Kissinger Defense JCS CIA VP Office NSC Staff SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS [Omitted here are conclusions relating to Greece.] Pakistan 1. The SRG briefly reviewed current developments in East Pakistan. [Omitted here is discussion relating to Greece.] Pakistan Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Johnson) Can you give us a two-minute rundown on Pakistan? Mr. Johnson: You probably know more than I do. We are approaching the Pakistanis about getting planes in to evacuate our people. As the story [of what is happening in East Pakistan]/2/ comes out, we are going to face a sort of Biafra situation. You might be interested in the Secretary's [Rogers']/3/ comment: "Sentiment in India may force the Indians to be the first to recognize unless Ambassador Keating beats them to the punch." /2/ Brackets in the source text. Lt. Gen. Cushman: That [what Mr. Johnson reported]/3/ is about all we have. Dr. Kissinger: India is the one country that would suffer from the establishment of an independent East Pakistan. Mr. Packard: How much fighting is there? Lt. Gen. Cushman: Dacca is quiet. Mr. Blee: Chittagong has been hit badly. The Indians are having a problem with East Pakistani refugees. Dr. Kissinger: What is our judgment on the countryside generally? Can 30,000 troops do anything against 75 million people? Lt. Gen. Cushman: It could be very bloody. Dr. Kissinger: Unless it turns out that with the cities under control of the government, the countryside will be indifferent. Mr. Blee: The Bengalis may be pretty indifferent if they think they really aren't in a position to fight. Dr. Kissinger: Is the countryside politically conscious? Mr. Blee: The Bengalis are extremely politically conscious, but they are not fighters. Mr. Johnson: In the long run, it will be difficult for 35,000 troops to maintain control over 75 million people. Mr. Blee: In the long run there will be pressure. The Bengalis may seek help from the Indians. Dr. Kissinger: Will the Indians provide it? Mr. Blee: Four hundred Indian parliamentarians signed a statement in favor of recognizing East Pakistan. Lt. Gen. Cushman: If India doesn't provide support, the Communist Chinese will. Mr. Blee: The Communist Chinese are on the other [West Pakistani]/3/ side right now, but they could change. /3/ Brackets in the source text. Dr. Kissinger: Does the government have Mujibur Rahman? Mr. Blee: They captured him. Presumably he is in West Pakistan, perhaps in Quetta. Dr. Kissinger: Will they execute him? Mr. Blee: The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports we have been getting indicate they might do so. It would be more sensible for them to keep him comfortable in captivity in order to use him as a pawn. Lt. Gen. Cushman: Yahya accused him of treason. Possibly he has been shot already or was shot inadvertently. Dr. Kissinger: Are we going to keep VOA quiet about reports coming from our Consul? Mr. Johnson: That was not VOA's fault. It was Charlie Bray's./4/ Frankly, we slipped on this. VOA just picked up what Charlie said at the briefing. Charlie talked on the basis of his daily report. No one had briefed him on the sensitivity of the Consulate communications. /4/ Spokesman of the Department of State. Dr. Kissinger: I didn't know about that either until I saw Farland's blast./5/ /5/ On March 27 Ambassador Farland reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had registered a complaint about a report broadcast by the Voice of America, All India Radio, and the BBC, which cited Consul General Blood as the source of a report that heavy fighting was taking place in Dacca and that tanks were being used. Farland noted that, despite the fact that communications between Islamabad and Dacca had been severed, he had denied that Blood was the source of the report. He also said that he had counseled against spreading incendiary rumors. (Telegram 2770 from Islamabad; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9) Mr. Blee: If the Indians recognize the Government of Bangla Desh, the Pakistanis might recognize Kashmir. However, this doesn't look probable. Dr. Kissinger: There is no government to recognize in East Pakistan. Mr. Blee: There is a radio [that purports to speak for the government of East Pakistan]./6/ /6/ Brackets in the source text. Dr. Kissinger: Where is it located? Mr. Blee: Probably in one of the small towns. Dr. Kissinger: Did they kill Professor Razak? He was one of my students. Mr. Blee: I think so. They killed a lot of people at the university. Dr. Kissinger: They didn't dominate 400 million Indians all those years by being gentle. 18. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon/1/ /1/ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 PAK. Secret. Drafted by Van Hollen and Anthony C.E. Quainton (NEA/INC) on April 2, and cleared by Sisco, and by Spengler in draft. Washington, April 3, 1971. SUBJECT The situation in East Pakistan has seriously deteriorated over the last ten days. In the period up to March 25 there had been considerable hope that President Yahya and the East Pakistan Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman would reach an agreement on some constitutional formula which would have permitted Pakistan to remain a united country. However, at some point in the period March 23-25, President Yahya decided that Mujibur Rahman's constitutional proposals would have led to a virtual separation of East from West Pakistan. As a result, on the evening of March 25 President Yahya, using Pakistan Army troops, arrested Mujibur Rahman and his principal followers, suppressed the Awami League and asserted full military control over East Pakistan. The details of what transpired on the night of March 25-26 may never be known in full because reports are conflicting and first-hand evidence is scarce. Our Consul General in Dacca estimates that between 4000-6000 people were killed in the Dacca area over the next several days. Extensive damage was done to the University, to the offices of the newspapers supporting the Awami League, and to Hindu settlements in the heart of Dacca. In Chittagong, the principal port of East Pakistan, considerable damage and fatalities also occurred. In the days which followed the Army's intervention a semblance of normality has returned to Dacca but there continues to be small arms firing at night in residential areas in which Americans live. Some foreigners already have had narrow escapes with their lives. Most shops remain closed, and a very small portion of the civil servants are at work in government offices. It is not possible for foreigners to leave the vicinity of Dacca or Chittagong, the two cities in which most of the approximately 750 Americans in East Pakistan are located. In this situation, our Consul General recommended the thinning out of the U.S. presence in East Pakistan. In making his recommendation, the Consul General noted the continuing danger to Americans and the psychological stress under which the Americans were living. He explained that schools were not operating, shops were closed, mail and telephone service was suspended, and that many of our people were unable to carry out the jobs to which they had been assigned. He also noted that the World Bank, the UN, the Germans, Japanese, and the Yugoslavs had already begun evacuating their personnel. Since then, the British, French and Australians have decided to evacuate dependents and we are informed that the Soviets have decided to do so as well. In keeping with the Consul General's recommendation, endorsed by Ambassador Farland, we have made plans to facilitate the departure within the next few days of nonofficial Americans who want to leave, the wives and children of American officials, and some official Americans who are considered non-essential. To ensure that their departure will not appear to be a precipitate or large scale evacuation, we have made it clear to the Pakistan Government and to the press that, although we are temporarily thinning out our people, we will maintain a substantial enough American presence in East Pakistan to represent our continuing interests and take care of our operational requirements. We are phasing the withdrawal of Americans over a period of days beginning on Sunday, April 4. The Pakistan Government has shown full understanding of our decision and has put at our disposal one Pakistan International Airline commercial flight each day to enable us to move our people from Dacca to Karachi. Our overriding concern to date has been the safety of the American community in East Pakistan. However, as a manifestation of our humanitarian concern, we have also made plans to be ready to offer food and other types of relief assistance if requested by the Pakistan Government. Looking toward the future, much will depend upon the ability of the Pakistan armed forces in the East, now numbering about 30,000, to maintain effective military control in the face of the general alienation of the Bengali population of 75 million. Thus far, the Awami League resistance groups have gained little momentum although they control an estimated 75% of the East Pakistan territory. However, over time these resistance elements may be able to mount a large scale rebellion with possible covert support from Bengali elements in India. The key question is whether the events of the last week have made it unlikely-or impossible-for the Government of Pakistan ever to reassert effective political influence over the East. During the period immediately ahead we may be faced with a number of difficult policy decisions. These include our political reaction to the events in East Pakistan and various aspects of our economic assistance and military supply programs for Pakistan. William P. Rogers 19. Telegram From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State/1/ Dacca, April 6, 1971, 0730Z. /1/ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 PAK-US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Sent as a joint State/AID/USIS message. Also sent to Islamabad and repeated to Karachi and Lahore. Received at 1008Z. In his memoirs Kissinger suggests that the Consulate General deliberately gave a low classification to this telegram in order to encourage broad circulation in Washington. (White House Years, p. 853) The distribution limitation was added to the telegram in the Department. 1138. Subj: Dissent From U.S. Policy Toward East Pakistan. 1. Aware of the task force proposals on "openness" in the Foreign Service, and with the conviction that U.S. policy related to recent developments in East Pakistan serves neither our moral interests broadly defined nor our national interests narrowly defined, numerous officers of AmConGen Dacca, USAID Dacca and USIS Dacca consider it their duty to register strong dissent with fundamental aspects of this policy. Our government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy. Our government has failed to denounce atrocities. Our government has failed to take forceful measures to protect its citizens while at the same time bending over backwards to placate the West Pak dominated government and to lessen likely and deservedly negative international public relations impact against them. Our government has evidenced what many will consider moral bankruptcy, ironically at a time when the USSR sent President Yahya a message/2/ defending democracy, comdemning arrest of leader of democratically elected majority party (incidentally pro-West) and calling for end to repressive measures and bloodshed. In our most recent policy paper for Pakistan,/3/ our interests in Pakistan were defined as primarily humanitarian, rather than strategic. But we have chosen not to intervene, even morally, on the grounds that the Awami conflict, in which unfortunately the overworked term genocide is applicable, is purely internal matter of a sovereign state. /2/ The text of President Podgorny's message to Yahya Khan, as released to the press by TASS on April 3, was transmitted to Islamabad on April 3 in telegram 56617. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 PAK) /3/ Apparent reference to the contingency study on Pakistan prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia on March 2; see footnote 5, Document 5. 2. Our specific areas of dissent, as well as our policy proposals, will follow by septel./4/ /4/ The dissenting members of the Consulate General sent a follow-on telegram to the Department on April 10 in which they characterized the martial law regime in East Pakistan as being of "dubious legitimacy" and took further issue with the view that the "current situation should be viewed simply as 'constituted' government using force against citizens flouting its authority." They concluded that it was "inconceivable that world can mount magnificent effort to save victims of last November's cyclone disaster on one hand, and on other condone indiscriminate killing of same people by essentially alien army defending interests different from those of general populace." Telegram 1249 from Dacca is published in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972, Document 130. 3. Signed: /5/ On April 6 seven specialists on South Asian affairs from the NEA bureau, one from INR, and another from AID/NESA sent a letter to Secretary Rogers associating themselves with the views expressed in telegram 1138 from Dacca. (National Archives, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 73 D 69, Box 6396, Pakistan) 4. I support the right of the above named officers to voice their dissent. Because they attach urgency to their expression of dissent and because we are without any means of communication other than telegraphic, I authorize the use of a telegram for this purpose. 5. I believe the views of these officers, who are among the finest U.S. officials in East Pakistan, are echoed by the vast majority of the American community, both official and unofficial./6/ I also subscribe to these views but I do not think it appropriate for me to sign their statement as long as I am principal officer at this post. /6/ Ambassador Farland supported the principle that members of his mission had the right to express their views on the problems facing the United States in the crisis developing in Pakistan. He noted that the Embassy had also submitted a proposal to register serious concern about developments in East Pakistan, and he suggested that it was time to review the policy toward Pakistan which excluded interference in its domestic affairs. (Telegram 3196 from Islamabad, April 6; ibid., Central Files 1970-73, POL PAK-US) 6. My support of their stand takes on another dimension. As I hope to develop in further reporting, I believe the most likely eventual outcome of the struggle underway in East Pakistan is a Bengali victory and the consequent establishment of an independent Bangladesh. At the moment we possess the good will of the Awami League. We would be foolish to forfeit this asset by pursuing a rigid policy of one-sided support to the likely loser./7/ /7/ The Department responded on April 7 in telegram 58039 to Dacca, drafted by Sisco and approved by Rogers. In addressing the complaint that the United States had failed to denounce the actions taken by Pakistan's army in East Pakistan, Sisco noted that there were conflicting reports about atrocities. He stated that the Department had not been silent about the conflict in East Pakistan and he reviewed a number of statements made by the Department spokesman between March 26 and April 5. One of the statements expressed concern about the "loss of life, damage and hardship suffered by the people of Pakistan," but none of them addressed the atrocities reported from Dacca. (Ibid., POL 27 INDIA-PAK) Telegram 58039 is published in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972, Document 129. Blood 20. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)/1/ Washington, April 6, 1971, 9:35 a.m. /1/ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 367, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. R: I wanted to talk about that goddam message from our people in Dacca./2/ Did you see it? /2/ See Document 19. K: No. R: It's miserable. They bitched about our policy and have given it lots of distribution so it will probably leak. It's inexcusable. K: And it will probably get to Ted Kennedy. R: I am sure it will. K: Somebody gives him cables. I have had him call me about them. R: It's a terrible telegram. Couldn't be worse-says we failed to defend American lives and are morally bankrupt. K: Blood did that? R: Quite a few of them signed it. You know we are doing everything we can about it. Trying to get the telegrams back as many as we can. We are going to get a message back to them. K: I am going in these [next] two days to keep it from the President until he has given his speech./3/ /3/ Reference is to the speech Nixon delivered to the nation on April 7 on the situation in Southeast Asia. For text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 522-527. R: If you can keep it from him I will appreciate it. In the first place I think we have made a good choice. K: The Chinese haven't said anything. R: They talk about condemning atrocities. There are pictures of the East Pakistanis murdering people. K: Yes. There was one of an East Pakistani holding a head. Do you remember when they said there were 1000 bodies and they had the graves and then we couldn't find 20? R: To me it is outrageous they would send this. K: Unless it hits the wires I will hold it. I will not forward it. R: We should get our answers out at the same time the stories come out. K: I will not pass it on./4/ /4/ In his memoirs Kissinger writes that the dissent cable from Dacca pointed up a dilemma for the administration. "The United States could not condone a brutal military repression," and there was "no doubt about the strong-arm tactics of the Pakistani military." He explains the administration's decision not to react publicly to the military repression in East Pakistan as necessary to protect "our sole channel to China." As a result of the cable, President Nixon ordered Consul General Archer Blood transferred from Dacca. Kissinger conceded that "there was some merit to the charge of moral insensitivity." (White House Years, p. 854) [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to South Asia.] 21. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Islamabad, April 6, 1971, 0838Z. 3164. Subj: Yahya's Letter/2/ to President Nixon. Ref: State 54514,/3/ Dacca 1045/4/ and New Delhi 4814./5/ /1/ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL PAK-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 5:25 a.m. /2/ See Document 16. /3/ Telegram 54514 to Islamabad, April 1, transmitted the text of President Yahya's March 31 letter to President Nixon. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL PAK-US) /4/ Consul General Blood commented on Yahya's letter in telegram 1045 from Dacca, April 2. He noted that 75 percent of East Pakistan was still under the control of the Awami League. He argued that if the U.S. Government were to make a public statement in support of the army's actions in East Pakistan, as Yahya had requested, the effect would be to put U.S. citizens in much of East Pakistan in danger. (Ibid., POL 27 /5/ Ambassador Keating commented on Yahya's letter in telegram 4814 from New Delhi, April 2. Foreign Secretary Kaul assured him on April 1 that India did not intend to interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs. Keating had also reviewed Indian military dispositions and concluded that the Indian army was not oriented against East Pakistan. Keating recommended against the initiative proposed by Yahya: "Given Indian military dispositions and positive statements of responsible Indian officials I believe there should be no question of dˇmarche to GOI along lines suggested by President Yahya in his last paragraph." (Ibid., POL PAK-US) 1. The main point of Yahya letter, which I presume is similar in content to the one Brits received and possibly also others, is the final section where Yahya seeks help against possibility of Indian intervention. Pak build-up of "Indian threat" is probably a mixture of genuine concern and an effort to divert internal and external attention from Pak army actions in East Pakistan. I know the Paks are worried about India's intentions, and from info available through intelligence channels they have cause for worry. At the same time, India serves, as always, a ready and convenient whipping boy. 2. This mission recommended in Islamabad 3018/6/ that we accommodate to Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan's request for public statement expressing concern about possible internalization of conflict. Department in State 56401,/7/ however, came down against our acceding to Sultan's request. I will not press our recommendation further, having modified it as explained hereafter. /6/ Dated April 1. (Ibid., POL 23-9 PAK) /7/ Dated April 3. (Ibid.) 3. In discussions in Washington and Delhi between USG and GOI, latter has stated that India will not intervene against Pakistan. Since our position against intervention has been made clear to GOI in these discussions, we have in effect already, albeit privately, responded to Yahya's request. Nonetheless, given what intelligence sources have reported about covert Indian activity, this mission believes the Department, on an early occasion and at an appropriately high level, should underscore our strong feeling that no outside power should take any steps that would tend to broaden and escalate the conflict. 4. With regard to Yahya's letter, I see the President's response primarily as providing a vehicle for USG to note our disquietude over course which GOP has chosen. As we have previously reported, we do not believe army over long run can hold East by bayonet against overwhelming opposition of Bengalis. I think Yahya's action against Awami League is a self-defeating step which in time will land Pak army into a hopeless morass. I share ConGen Dacca's view that Yahya's short-term action has probably made inevitable the thing he is ostensibly seeking to prevent in the long term; the disintegration of Pakistan. 5. The President has an excellent relationship with Yahya. Without reproaching or lecturing Paks, I think we have an opportunity to put across our point with Yahya, and not, coincidently, raise too many hackles. In combination with President Podgorny's outspokenly partisan and public message,/8/ which goes far beyond what we have in mind, President Nixon's private message would hopefully give Pak military some pause about course on which they are embarked. /8/ See footnote 2, Document 19. 6. In terms of specifics, I suggest that the President pass lightly over, without much comment, Yahya's justification for military intervention and suppression of Awami League as well as his questionable assertion that East Pakistan was again becoming "normal." I see no particular gain in arguing merits of Yahya's claims and believe these portions of his letter require little in the way of response. 7. I believe that the following would be appropriate points for the President to make, roughly in order outlined below: A. US sympathy with people of Pakistan and our humanitarian concern about the suffering and loss of life in East Pakistan. Our feeling that all friends of Pakistan, of which the US is one, share hope that peace can shortly return to the province. Our willingness to participate in an international relief effort to help the people of East Pakistan if requested by the Government of Pakistan. B. Our belief that events in East Pakistan are an internal affair of Pakistan and should remain so. Our agreement with Yahya that involvement by foreign powers would serve only to escalate the crisis, introduce new dangers, and render an ultimate settlement more difficult. The letter could (perhaps should) appropriately mention that we have been in touch with GOI and made clear the US position on the matter. C. The principal substantive paragraph to air concerns noted aforegoing could be made as follows: "I would be less than candid, Mr. President, were I not to mention the disquietude [we] feel about the grave human and economic loss which is occurrin |
