Iran's Nuclear Program: External Assistance

Question:   Have governments other than the Russian government assisted -- either wittingly or unwittingly -- in the development of Iran's nuclear program?

Answer:   The United States has made clear to friends, allies, and partners its strong concerns about Iran’s ambitious pursuit of nuclear weapons capability, and have called for the strictest possible enforcement of national and multilateral nuclear export controls with regard to Iran.

The United States is engaged in frequent and high-level discussions with Russia to share our strong concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. Senior U.S. officials have repeatedly raised with senior Russian officials our view that Russia should reconsider its ongoing cooperation with Iran and disavow any additional cooperation. . Russia agrees that we share a mutual interest in ensuring that Iran abides by its Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) obligations not to develop nuclear weapons. At the same time, Russia continues nuclear cooperation with Iran and we will continue to discuss these issues at senior levels with Moscow.

We have also held discussions with China regarding its past nuclear cooperation with Iran and have urged China to ensure that Chinese entities are not still aiding Iran’s nuclear program. In our discussions with China leading up to the 1997 U.S.-China Summit, China undertook a number of important nuclear non-proliferation commitments, including agreeing not to undertake new nuclear cooperation with Iran and to complete within a relatively short time two existing contracts for non-sensitive assistance. China also agreed to cancel cooperation on a uranium conversion facility.

We also believe that Iran attempts to support its nuclear program via covert procurement efforts. All members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, except Russia, have agreed in principle not to provide nuclear cooperation to Iran. Most have put in place strong export control policies, including catch-all controls, and are willing to exercise this option to deny nuclear-related exports to Iran. Unfortunately, countries that are developing clandestine nuclear programs typically employ illicit procurement tactics to circumvent export controls, including use of front companies, falsification of end use or end user information, and use of third countries as intermediaries. In this way, Iran can target any state with both nuclear or dual-use technology, and it important that all states with such technology be alert to such attempts.