Africa http://www.state.gov/rss/channels/africa.xml Latest developments on Africa-related issues, including new public statements and testimony by the Assistant Secretary, as well as official statements by other State Departmental officials and some releases from the White House. This list generates about 3 mailings a week. en-us Sat, 26 Jul 2008 10:15:00 EDTSat, 26 Jul 2008 10:15:00 EDT 15 Africa: Daily Press Briefing -- July 24 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2008/july/107436.htm http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2008/july/107436.htm
Daily Press Briefing
Gonzalo R. Gallegos, Acting Deputy Spokesman
Washington, DC
July 24, 2008

INDEX:

RUSSIA
Izvestiya report on Russian bombers

MACEDONIA
Status of U.S. Ambassador-designate to Macedonia

PAKISTAN
Mid-life Update Package / Funds to Upgrade F-16s
U.S Shifted Funds to Help Pakistanis Fight Common Foe

TAIWAN
Transit Considered on Case-by-Case Basis

AFGHANISTAN
U.S. Working with Afghan Government to Root Out Corruption
Five Pillar Strategy to Combat Drugs

SUDAN
Deeply Concerned About Deteriorating Situation in Darfur
U.S. Supports Rapid Strengthening of UNAMID

ISRAEL / PALESTINIANS
General Jones Has Full Support of Secretary Rice

IRAQ
Expansion of Visas for Iraqis Who Have Worked for the USG


TRANSCRIPT:

View Video

1:05 p.m. EDT

MR. GALLEGOS: I don’t have anything for you. Anne.

QUESTION: There’s a denial out of the Russian Defense Ministry today of this – the Izvestiya report on Russian bombers. Have you all seen that? Can you update us on whether there were any direct assurances from the Russian Government that this wasn’t true or any other --

MR. GALLEGOS: Yeah, I actually saw the report a few minutes ago, Anne. I think over the last couple of days I’ve made note that we hadn’t seen any confirmation of what was, my understanding always has been, an unnamed individual who purportedly made those statements. That’s where it stands.

QUESTION: So you’re satisfied that this isn’t going to happen?

MR. GALLEGOS: We’ve seen a report from a senior official from Washington – excuse me, senior official from Russia saying that they aren’t going to be doing that. That’s – I believe that’s where we are right now. 

QUESTION: So you think that’s a good thing?

MR. GALLEGOS: I think that’s a very good thing, yes. 

Lambros, how may I help you today?

QUESTION: Okay. Mr. Gallegos, on FYROM, any update on the appointment of Philip Reeker as the new U.S. Ambassador to Greece (sic), which has been on hold in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee almost for a month, I would say?

MR. GALLEGOS: My understanding is that there’s still a hold on his nomination. We would hope that at some point in the very near future he would be allowed to move forward – his nomination will be allowed to move forward. We believe that the best way that we can clearly communicate our policies to the government there, is with a representative, with an ambassador there in country. So --

QUESTION: One more question on the same issue. According to reports, Senator Olympia Snowe, in a letter to Secretary Condoleezza Rice, seeking information that the U.S. Administration will encourage FYROM to stop the violations of the UN interim agreement and to recognize FYROM by the name which will be agreed upon by the two sides, Athens and Skopje. Any comment on that? 

MR. GALLEGOS: I haven’t seen this letter; however, I would say that our policy on Macedonia and its name is well known and has not changed.

Yes.

QUESTION: There’s a report in The New York Times that the U.S. will give Pakistan about $230 million to upgrade its F-16s. Now, these are supposed to be antiterrorism funds.

MR. GALLEGOS: Yes.

QUESTION: And how will the F-16s be used against terrorists?

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, Pakistan is a key partner in the war on terror. It plays a critical role in our long-term efforts to build a stable and prosperous South Asia. Shifting Foreign Military Financing that was already allocated to Pakistan for other military equipment allows Pakistan’s F-16 program, a tangible symbol of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, to continue on track. Pakistan is currently undergoing economic turmoil, including rising food and fuel prices, and this is a daunting challenge to the new civilian government. This $226-227 million funds is – was already allocated for other updates on different airframes in Pakistan. The government came to us, asked us if we could assist them, and we decided that this would be a good option for them. It would help to relieve the government, allow them to use that amount of funds for different projects of their own while providing an update that had already been – that we had already approved in 2006. So basically, what we did was we shifted funds from one set of antiterrorism projects, one set of airframes, to a different set.

In terms of what the benefits are to us, what we’re looking at is advanced avionics and radar upgrades, and communications and targeting systems that will enable real-time communication with ground forces that will generate ground position data that can be used to direct guided munitions to a target. We believe that these updates will effectively employ the F-16s. We’ll – they’ll be able to use them during nighttime operations.

The bottom line here is that we’ve shifted money to help the democratically elected Government of Pakistan to fight a common foe, a common enemy that we have. We believe that these upgrades that had already been approved will help the Pakistanis – us – will help the Pakistanis help us fight this common foe, and that we believe that this is a positive way to help a friend. 

QUESTION: About two weeks ago when Senator Joe Biden said Pakistan should be paid for performance, that it should receive a democratic dividend – right? – the Administration seemed to agree with him. But now we see that money is being spent on upgrades which will, to quote the New York Times, improve the survivability in a hostile environment.

Now, I don’t think the Taliban have the wherewithal to make the, you know, (inaudible) there (inaudible) difficult to survive. 

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, I’ll tell you, these mid-life update enhancements are going to provide Pakistan’s air force with the technological capability to conduct precision close airstrikes against al-Qaida, Taliban and associated terrorist targets who exploit the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas, as well as providing nontraditional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The effectiveness and accuracy of real-time intelligence is central to winning counterinsurgency and counterterrorism battles. In addition, these mid-life update enhancements will allow Pakistan’s F-16s to operate safely in all weather and to perform day and night missions. We’re going to be training the Pakistani forces to develop their capabilities, effectively employing these aircraft in support of ground operations against terrorist groups that threaten the security of Pakistan and the United States.

QUESTION:  One last question on this. How many times has Pakistan conducted air strikes against the Taliban and other militants in that area? 

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, I’ll tell you what, unfortunately, I’m not with the DOD and couldn’t tell you that number. I’d refer you to them to discuss.

QUESTION: Have they always done that?

MR. GALLEGOS: I do not know, simply because I work for the State Department, not the DOD, and I would refer you to the DOD.

Yes. 

QUESTION: Were you able to find out of if the U.S. had consulted India before this shift in --

MR. GALLEGOS: No, we did not. Like I said, this is a package that had been agreed – this is a mid-life update package that had been decided upon in 2006. And we’ve just made a decision to shift funds from one set of upgrades for a couple of different airframes, let me be specific about that. I’m not going to go into any more detail about that, other than to say then a couple of different airframes -- to these F-16s. And one thing I said earlier that I want to make very clear is that we have recently agreed to sell Pakistan some F-16s and that this midlife update of these aircraft will provide these older aircraft with the same level of technology that the current models that we are selling them have. 

QUESTION:  How many planes will be –

QUESTION: (Inaudible) the latest shift in the F-16 money was the subject of the President’s call to the Indian Prime Minister? 

MR. GALLEGOS: I’d have to send you to the White House for that. I don’t know. 

Yes. 

QUESTION:  How many planes are we talking about? How many new planes and how many will be upgraded? 

MR. GALLEGOS: Oh, I just said – I’m not going to get into the numbers. I think I’ll send you to the Pakistan Government, if they’d care to describe the number and amount. 

Yes.

QUESTION:  On Taiwan.

MR. GALLEGOS: Yes. 

QUESTION: Taiwan’s President Ma is going to make transit stops on the west coast during his way in and back from Latin America. Do you have any information? 

MR. GALLEGOS: I don’t have any announcements at this time regarding any possible transit by the Taiwan President. Our consistent position concerning transits by Taiwan’s senior leaders is that, in keeping with the official nature [1] of our relations and with longstanding policies and practice, we are prepared to consider on a case-by-case basis requests for transits based on the criteria of safety, comfort, convenience, and dignity of the traveler. 

QUESTION:  The following: Would the -- any federal government official plan to go to west coast to welcome or meet with President Ma? 

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, I have no announcement at this time. I’ve got no information to provide on that. 

QUESTION:  Okay. One last -- yes. Yes, one more. Because Taiwan’s Foreign Minister has announced that Ma – President Ma is going to fly a regularly scheduled commercial flight instead of a chartered flight. Will that be a burden to the U.S. regarding to the security or convenience criteria you just mentioned? You --

MR. GALLEGOS: Oh, I would say I’d be prepared to field questions on this issue if and when I make an announcement about that. I don’t have one for you today. 

Yes.

QUESTION: Will there be a formal announcement during Prime Minister Gilani’s visit to the White House on this? And this visit, is it being seen as sort of – will it bring the focus on the trouble in the tribal area on cross-border operations by the Taliban and al-Qaida or is it also an opportunity for the United States to tell the Pakistanis that they are with the particular government to support the democratic process. I mean, how do you see the visit? 

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, I’ll leave the announcements for the visit to the White House. 

Param.

QUESTION:  Have you seen the opinion piece by the former State Department official in charge of drugs, anti-drug campaign in Afghanistan? And have you seen the --

MR. GALLEGOS: I’ve seen the op-ed. 

QUESTION: Yeah.

MR. GALLEGOS: Specific question?

QUESTION: Yeah. What will be – how do you view his proposals and criticism on the Karzai government and Karzai himself? 

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, I think – look, corruption remains a problem in Afghanistan. We’re working with the Afghan Government to root it out through training and development of rule of law. Ultimately, you know, development of democratic institutions and a more solid democracy
in Pakistan isn’t about one person, isn’t about several, isn’t about many. It’s about Afghanistan and all Afghanis. You know, we’re working with the democratically elected leader who has shown to us he’s committed to developing democratic institutions in Afghanistan. We’re going to continue that effort with him. We look forward to his support as we work to support the Afghani people. 

QUESTION:  Any concentration to any – to a change in the current strategy, anti-drug strategy in Afghanistan? 

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, I think – no, there isn’t. Right now, we’re working on a five-pillar strategy to combat drugs in Afghanistan, based on, first, alternative development, based on eradication, interdiction, and law enforcement operations, and justice reform. This is a plan that,
I believe, was announced to you all several months ago. It’s something that we’re committed to. And we believe ultimately that we will have – our greatest – we believe our greatest successes have been in those areas where we’ve been able to provide security, where security has led to development, and where development has led to stability. And we believe that it’s important that we use this multi-pronged approach to provide security, which allows for development, which creates stability, which allows for the strengthening of democratic institutions. And so we’re going to continue that effort.

Yes. David.

QUESTION: I asked you earlier – Rwanda is threatening to leave the peace force in Sudan if one of its generals who was implicated in war crimes about a decade ago is forced to leave his post. I just wonder where the – given the interest that the U.S. has in this force, where do you stand on the issue of this individual?

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, bringing peace to Darfur is the priority for the international community and the UN. We’re deeply concerned about the deteriorating situation in Darfur. We support the rapid strengthening of UNAMID through the provision of experienced commanders and the deployment of additional troops. While the peacekeepers in Darfur are noted for their professionalism and courage -- five of them were recently killed in the line of duty – losing four Rwandan battalions would devastate the operation. It’s in the interest of a strong UNAMID that this general continue as Deputy Force Commander, given his strong record of performance over the last year.

QUESTION: Does that – does that mean that you’re not interested in what he may have done in the war?

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, prior to his appointment, we were able to examine allegations associated with the general. We have not found grounds to object to his candidacy.

Yes. Samir.

QUESTION: There’s a report in the Middle East that General James Jones presented a report to Secretary Rice about the security situation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and it was very critical to Israel. Do you have anything about this?

MR. GALLEGOS: Yeah. My understanding is that he is yet to publish a report. There are stories about drafts that have been released. The bottom line is the general has been there. He’s taken a look at the situation. He has the full support of the Secretary. We’re going to continue working through him and with him and we’ll see – ultimately see what is published.

QUESTION: Does the President have a decision made on whether the full report will be published and public?

MR. GALLEGOS: I don’t have any information on that (inaudible).

QUESTION: Is that under discussion at the moment? 

MR. GALLEGOS: I’ll have to check. I don’t have anything on that.

QUESTION: Does the State Department have a position on whether it should be?

MR. GALLEGOS: I’ll have to check. 

Yes.

QUESTION: On this decision to significantly expand Iraqi visas for Iraqis who have worked for the U.S. Government, why has that come at this particular time? And what, if anything, will the Embassy have to do to step up its processing of those visas?

MR. GALLEGOS: I think it probably – in terms of the visas, I don’t have information on this – this most recent – was there a report on a recent increase?

QUESTION: Right. About 5,000.

MR. GALLEGOS: About 5,000? I tell you what – let me – I’ll have to get somebody to get back to you on that specific issue. I think, you know, the issue with – one of the things is that we have been working to allow for a greater number of those Iraqis who did work for us to be able to come back – to be able to, excuse me –to be able to come to the United States. We’re going to continue that process. We’ve been ramping up our resources in recent months. Ambassador Jim Foley has been the lead in those efforts.  I know his efforts are ongoing. We continue to do as much as we can to help those who helped us.

Yes.

QUESTION: Can I go back to the F-16?

MR. GALLEGOS: Sure.

QUESTION: This offer to upgrade and provide new F-16 to Pakistan –

MR. GALLEGOS: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: Does it aid you to enhance Pakistan’s capability to fight al-Qaida or also to enhance its conventional weapon capability?

MR. GALLEGOS: Its – excuse me?

QUESTION: Also enhance its conventional weapon capability.

MR. GALLEGOS: Oh, its conventional? No. (Inaudible) are a strong ally and friend who came to us in a tough situation financially. We have a package program that had already been approved a couple years ago. Basically, we were looking at ways to assist this ally and friend of ours. We saw this as an opportunity to do that, and we decided this would be a great opportunity and we would take it. 

Anything else? Thank you.

QUESTION: Thank you. 

(The briefing was concluded at 1:23 p.m.)

DPB # 132

[1] unofficial nature


Released on July 24, 2008

   ]]> Thu, 24 Jul 2008 17:04:36 EDT Africa: Daily Press Briefing -- July 23 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2008/july/107407.htm http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2008/july/107407.htm
Daily Press Briefing
Gonzalo R. Gallegos, Acting Deputy Spokesman
Washington, DC
July 23, 2008

INDEX:

SYRIA
State Department Will Not Meet with Group from Syria

ZIMBABWE
U.S. Welcomes European Union Announcement of Expanded Sanctions on ZANU-PF
U.S. Wants to See the Will of the Zimbabwean People Reflected in Resolution

VENEZUELA
Venezuela’s Arms Purchases from Russia
Venezuela’s Relationship with Russia

NIGERIA
U.S. Condemns Violence in Niger Delta; Encourages Peaceful Resolution of Disputes

MISCELLANEOUS
Visa Requirements for U.S. Diplomats Traveling to EU Countries
U.S. Continues Working toward Expansion of EU Countries in Visa Waiver Program

NORTH KOREA
Process of Rescinding North Korea’s Designation as State Sponsor of Terror
U.S. Will Work Through Six-Party Talks to Develop Verification Protocol
Next Six-Party Ministerial

SERBIA
Rewards for Justice / Radovan Karadzic


TRANSCRIPT:

View Video

12:41 p.m. EDT

MR. GALLEGOS: Good afternoon. Thank you for coming. I don’t have anything for you.

Charlie.

QUESTION: Well, I hardly have a question, but just to – we’ll try and do something till the (inaudible) get here. You were going to look into the details of the U.S.-Syria delegation meeting earlier – or later this week? Did you --

MR. GALLEGOS: Yeah, as a matter of fact, I did. I did get some news on that earlier this morning. 

Representatives from the State Department will not meet with this group from Syria. Upon review of their program and changes in schedules, ultimately, this did not work out. We understand they will continue with their other activities. Our understanding is this group did not come here to meet with U.S. Government representatives. However, we believe it is still important that international visitors are exposed to Americans and our way of life, and are happy that they will continue with that program.

QUESTION: You said, you know, reviewing their – you mentioned two factors, but --

MR. GALLEGOS: Yeah.

QUESTION: -- it’s not clear which of those is causal. One was their schedule – their program, and the other was the schedules for the U.S. --

MR. GALLEGOS: We – well, we reviewed the program, we reviewed their requests, we reviewed our schedules, and we decided, ultimately, we weren’t going to be able to meet with them.

QUESTION: Why? But why?

MR. GALLEGOS: That’s what I have for you today, Arshad.

QUESTION: But it’s perplexing because the State Department – I mean, you said yesterday, on the record, there will be a meeting.

MR. GALLEGOS: My understanding at that time was that we – they had requested it, that we had looked at the meeting, and we had – we were going to meet with them today. Conditions have changed, and we’re not going to be meeting with them.

QUESTION: Well, was there something on their schedule specifically you’d like to refer to to tell us --

MR. GALLEGOS: Not that I can refer to specifically.

QUESTION: Well, if not specifically --

MR. GALLEGOS: Kirit --

QUESTION: What was the problem with their program? I mean, what --

MR. GALLEGOS: I don’t understand – I don’t see if there – I don’t believe there is a problem with their program. We’ve reviewed their schedule. We’ve taken a look at their program. They are going to be meeting with other groups and individuals here in the United States. And unfortunately, we’re not going to be able to have this meeting with them this week.

QUESTION: Well, is there a problem with some of the participants on the delegation?

MR. GALLEGOS: I don’t know. I don’t believe so.

QUESTION: Is it just a matter of not having the right officials available in this building to meet them?

MR. GALLEGOS: I would say that we’ve taken a look at the schedules, we’ve reviewed their request, we looked at the program that they are going to participate in outside of meeting with the U.S. Government representatives. The fact is that they did not come here to specifically meet with a U.S. Government representative. And my understanding is that we’re unable to meet with them now.

QUESTION: Just to put it this way, is it that you can’t meet with them because of schedule or you won’t meet with them because of substance?

MR. GALLEGOS: I will say I have exhausted my points on this. You can look back to my previous comments.

QUESTION: But Gonzo, you said this yesterday that it’s so critical to meet people like these guys who come over here to explain to them the policies of the government and – you know?

MR. GALLEGOS: No – and I believe, ultimately, we do believe that, that it is very important that international visitors are exposed to as many degrees of American life as possible. We would hope that that would include U.S. Government representatives, at the proper time. We’ve taken a look at the scheduling. We’ve taken a look at their schedule, their program, and we’re not able to do that at this time. However, we do see that they are going to meet with a generous representation of Americans and be exposed to our system of government.

Yes, in back.

QUESTION: Can I change the topic?

MR. GALLEGOS: Yes.

QUESTION: Yesterday, the European Union slapped rather tight sanctions against the Government of Zimbabwe, President Mugabe and his associates, and they added some more people into the list of those who are sanctioned. First of all, do you support that move by the European Union? And secondly, are we about to see you following soon with the --

MR. GALLEGOS: The European Union yesterday announced – did announce expanded sanctions. We welcome this move by our European partners. Expanded sanctions at this critical juncture will keep the pressure on the ZANU-PF to show good faith in these talks. I understand the talks were originally scheduled to begin today, but we’re aware of media reports that they may not start until tomorrow. We’re going to continue to watch. We’re going to continue to see what happens there. Ultimately, as I’ve said before, from here, what we want to see is that the will of the Zimbabwean people is reflected in the results of this or any talks that may take place to come to a resolution to this situation.

QUESTION: Could I just quickly follow up? Aren’t you afraid that slapping sanctions while there are talks going ahead at the same time, that that might delay their own talks, that --

MR. GALLEGOS: I think the issue here is that we try to ensure that there are actually talks, that people do come – that both sides do come to the table, and that they are able to discuss, in a clear and effective way, how they might come to a resolution to this crisis, a resolution that reflects the will of the Zimbabwean people.

Kirit.

QUESTION: Are U.S. sanctions on Zimbabwe or additional sanctions contingent on the outcome of the talks?

MR. GALLEGOS: My understanding is that we’ve been reviewing our options. We’re going to continue to do that. And when we have – when we’ve made the decision, we’ll ultimately announce them.

QUESTION: But is it contingent on the outcome of the negotiations?

MR. GALLEGOS: We’re continuing to watch the situation. We’re continuing to weigh our options, and we’ve seen what our European allies have done. And we’ll continue to do that. And when we have an appropriate announcement, we’ll make that.

Yes.

QUESTION: On Venezuela, what is your reaction to this alliance or partnership that President Chavez from Venezuela is trying to have with Russia in relation to oil and weapons?

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, I think, number one, is we’ve seen the Venezuelans’ substantial purchases from the Russians, in terms of arms. This is something that we’ve expressed concern over. The fact is that Venezuela is expending an awful lot of resources to obtain an awful lot of military hardware, some would say much more than they actually need if you reflect on their actual defense needs. However, that’s a decision for the Venezuelan Government to make for themselves.

In terms of their relationships with Russia, they’re a sovereign state. They will have these relations with them. In terms of any gas deals or other economic issues, I think we’ve expressed our belief in the past that what we believe is that multiple sources, through multiple means of transportation, when it comes to any sort of fuel, based on the open market system, is what we’re concerned about seeing. So that would be the criteria that we would review any discussion or agreement that they may come to.

Yes.

QUESTION: Do you have any reaction to the story in Nigeria about the government-- state-run oil company paying off militants $12 million?

MR. GALLEGOS: Yeah, I’m not going to comment on this general threat; however, we condemn any resort to violence in the Niger Delta. We encourage all parties to use peaceful means in resolving their disputes. And we’re going to remain supportive of efforts, including the promotion of political dialogue, to deal with legitimate grievances in the Delta. 

Arshad.

QUESTION: I raised this question this morning about a European Commission threat to impose additional visa requirements on U.S. diplomats traveling on official business, as of January 1. I’ve talked to DHS --

MR. GALLEGOS: Yes.

QUESTION: -- and I understand that visa, but there’s just one part that I don’t get, which I think the State Department is the right place to comment. Is it your understanding that, at present, U.S. diplomats are required to get visas to make official travel in the European Union, or not, or sometimes they are and sometimes they aren’t?

MR. GALLEGOS: My understanding of this – I did a bit of an inquiry and I got some answer – is that some countries do allow U.S. diplomats to travel on diplomatic passports for short periods of time or for specific reasons without diplomatic visas. Those are some – other countries do not, and other countries we automatically need to request a visa to work diplomatically.

QUESTION: So it depends.

MR. GALLEGOS: To work – to travel on that diplomatic passport. So that’s where we are.

QUESTION: And are you dismayed by the threat of this retaliatory action on the part of the European Union?

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, I think we knew that this was coming down the road, and we continue to stress the fact that we, the U.S. Government, is continuing to work on expanding the number of European countries that are included in the Visa Waiver Program. So we are going to continue to work to move forward with that. Obviously, as you know and understand, this comes down to security matters, comes down to what kind of passports that each country is able to use and produce. And so there are a lot of details that have to be worked out, and we’re continuing to do that.

Yes.

QUESTION: Still looking for anything specific that you might have on once the 45-day period is over and, if the U.S. is satisfied with the verification protocol, what, if any, action the Secretary has to take.

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, what we’re doing right now is we’re in the process of reviewing exactly what the North Koreans have done, what they are doing, and ultimately we’ll see, there around August 10th, what they will have done at that point in terms of verification. You know, the President on June 26th in the Rose Garden, when he spoke of this, spoke of his intention – of his notification of Congress of his intention to rescind North Korea’s designation as a state sponsor of terror. He said, “The next 45 days will be an important period for North Korea to show its seriousness of its cooperation. We [will] work through the Six-Party Talks to develop a comprehensive and rigorous verification protocol. And during this period the United States will carefully observe North Korea’s actions -- and act accordingly.”

And ultimately, what we’re doing is seeing what’s happening. The Secretary’s out in the region right now. She’s had a meeting today. We’ve shared the transcript with you. And we’ll see what happens August 10th. 

QUESTION: Just one follow-up. When Libya was de-listed, I looked back on some State Department records – she just announced the de-listing. Did she or the President have to sign something?

MR. GALLEGOS: I’m – the mechanics, I’m not quite sure of. I think we’ll – I’ll have to ask about that, so –

Yes.

QUESTION: Has anyone registered a claim on the U.S. bounty for Radovan Karadzic?

MR. GALLEGOS: My understanding is no, no one has claimed any reward from the Rewards for Justice Program for him. 

Yes.

QUESTION: Just to follow on North Korea, are you expecting to schedule a ministerial before August 10th?

MR. GALLEGOS: I think there’s been discussion of one. We don’t have anything scheduled now. There’s been a discussion of a ministerial, not specifically before August 10th. I don’t have any information on one now. 

QUESTION: Is there anything more on the technical briefing for the Secretary in relation to the IAEA safeguards?

MR. GALLEGOS: I don’t have anything for you on that, Param. I’m sorry. And I’ll get back to you this afternoon with that.

QUESTION: Sure.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. GALLEGOS: Thank you.

(The briefing was concluded at 12:54 p.m.)

DPB #  131



Released on July 23, 2008

   ]]> Thu, 24 Jul 2008 09:27:42 EDT Africa: Daily Press Briefing -- July 21 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2008/july/107309.htm http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2008/july/107309.htm
Daily Press Briefing
Gonzalo R. Gallegos, Acting Deputy Spokesman
Washington, DC
July 21, 2008

INDEX:

DEPARTMENT
Cable Regarding Embassy Practices for Visiting Congressional Delegations
Cable Designed to Let Posts Know What They Can and Can Not Do
Travel by Senators McCain, Obama / Posts Concerned About Being Ethical
Personnel Were Provided Necessary Information to Give Equitable Treatment
Differences Between CODEL Travel and NODEL Travel
Sitting Senators Running for President
Delineations Between Which Meetings Posts Can and Can Not Arrange

RUSSIA
Russian Statements on Missile Defense / Not a Threat to Russia
Missile Defense to Provide Security from a Growing Danger
Russian Arms Trade with Venezuela

ZIMBABWE
Meeting Between Mugabe and Tsvangirai / A Vehicle for Undertaking Talks
Need for a Process that Would Express the Will of the Zimbabwean People

INDIA
India Civil-Nuclear Deal / U.S. Continues to Support

IRAQ
U.S. Looking to Ensure Troop Levels Based on Conditions on the Ground
U.S. Desire to Shift Role in Iraq / Flexibility, Not an Arbitrary Timeline

SYRIA
Visit of Syrian Intellectuals, Possibly Officials Travelling as Private Citizens
In Washington at the Invitation of the NGO Search for Common Ground
A/S Welch Prepared to Meet with Group
Various Cultural Exchanges / Opportunity to Speak with Syrian Private Citizens


TRANSCRIPT:

View Video 

12:55 p.m. EDT

MR. GALLEGOS: Alright. Good afternoon. I don’t have any – I’m sorry, I don’t have any statements for you. So I’m guessing you all have some questions for me, though. 

Anne.
 
QUESTION: Can you be any more precise about the reasons for the – sending this cable about what employee -- embassy employees can and can’t do for visiting delegations, visiting candidates now, as opposed to four months ago?

MR. GALLEGOS: Yeah. As you saw, one of the newspapers here in town reported the fact that there was a cable that had been sent to our post overseas that discussed basically some of the dos and don’ts, what they can and shouldn’t do for both CODELS, which is congressional travel that’s federally funded, and NODELS, which is travel that is not funded with federal funds. And basically, the idea here is to, first of all, let the person know and understand what they can and can’t do and to assure all that each candidate would be – each individual participating in this NODEL travel would be dealt with in the same way. 

What had happened was that -- you know, we communicate pretty regularly to our posts. This is a big bureaucracy and we communicate with our posts to advise them of legal requirements and to ensure that they understand their responsibilities. In the past, we’ve done that via cable and through e-mails. What we’ve done – and obviously, I spoke earlier today about some differences between now and four years ago. 

One of those differences is the fact that we have two sitting senators who are running for election. And what had happened was earlier this year, Senator McCain had done a couple of trips to overseas, and we had communicated to his campaign and we had communicated to the post – actually, excuse me – we had communicated to the post where he visited pretty much the same information that was provided in this cable that went out. Subsequent to that, we find out that Senator Obama had intended to travel and therefore we decided to send that same general information that we’d sent out to the post about Senator McCain to all of the posts around the world. 

Our posts are concerned that they do things right. They are concerned that they are perceived as fair and equitable in their treatment of all of the travelers.  And there were questions coming in about what they can and can’t do, what they should or shouldn’t do. And our ethics lawyers, working with our legislative folks, decided that the time had come to send out this cable to all posts. 
 
QUESTION: So you had sent -- at the time of Senator McCain’s travel, you had sent something just to the particular post that he was visiting? 
 
MR. GALLEGOS: That’s right. 

QUESTION: Now, this is going out to all posts? 

MR. GALLEGOS: And now this went out to all posts, so that whatever travel either candidate or anybody participating in a NODEL trip, which is a trip that is taken that is not at the expense of the American people, they would know and understand what they can and can’t do. 
 
QUESTION: You said pretty much the same --

QUESTION: What form did that take?

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, I tell you, unfortunately, I don’t have the exact cables or other information that went out on my left hand and this cable in my right hand. So I’ve been told that it is the same information and they decided to codify it in an ALDAC, which, in our terms, is when we want everybody to get the same message and to get on the same sheet of music, that is what we do. We send a document that goes out to all of our posts around the world. 

QUESTION: The first time you said, “pretty much the same,” which implies some differences. And just now, you said “the same.” Can you –

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, I think we can – I’ll tell you what, why don’t I save us both time. I’m not going to parse those words. I don’t know if the wording was exact. I don’t know if the paragraphs were in the same order. And I do know that one was sent to posts that were participating in that travel, and I do know that this ALDAC came out subsequent to or – as a result of the questions that we were getting and the information that we felt it was important for us to provide our posts so that they are able to do their jobs, to do it effectively, to do it in the fairest way possible. 
 
QUESTION: But just to clarify, the earlier communication was also in the form of a cable and also came atop Rice’s signature? 
 
MR. GALLEGOS: My understanding was that there are various forms of communication with the posts to make sure – those posts where Senator McCain traveled, to make sure that they understood the same type of information that was provided in this ALDAC to all posts. 

QUESTION: Again, when you said there – questions were coming in about what they could and couldn’t do, was there anything that happened during any of McCain’s visits that potentially caused a problem or from which questions arose about what they could or couldn’t do? 

MR. GALLEGOS: I have no indication of that.
 
QUESTION: When you say that questions were coming in, did you mean about this particular trip coming in from Senator Obama? And did his staff ask embassy employees to do any of the things in the cable, like, did they say, you know, Senator Obama’s staff asked us to arrange X and we want to make sure that that’s okay? 
 
MR. GALLEGOS: I tell you what, I couldn’t get at any specifics about it nor could I talk about it any specific or individual trip that had come. What I do know --
 
QUESTION: Well, do you think questions were coming in -- 

MR. GALLEGOS: What I do know --
 
QUESTION: -- about the general nature of the two candidates or about this particular trip?

MR. GALLEGOS: What I do know and understand is that our posts were concerned that they were asking us questions, and that we wanted to provide an answer that we could give them that would ensure the equitability of action of our officers overseas, that would provide them a legal basis under which they could act, and that we’re providing with information so that they could follow up for any additional questions. 

QUESTION: But when you say --
 
MR. GALLEGOS: We have some very good people in this business who plan and who look forward. And so, questions coming in could be somebody from the post, where a trip had been announced or was understood somebody might go, but they don’t have verification that they’re going to go. It could be from somebody who was just pondering, an admin type, who was just pondering, “What do I do if,” and so questions come in. They took the totality of this interest, understood that we needed to make sure that all of our people were singing from the same sheet, and they provided them this information so that they could proceed in an efficient way.

QUESTION: Can I just (inaudible)?

MR. GALLEGOS: Sure.

QUESTION: The information that was provided to the specific post concerned prior to Senator McCain’s travel, was that in the form of a cable or not?

MR. GALLEGOS: I’m not sure of exactly how it went.

QUESTION: Okay. And then second, however that was conveyed, can you – you know, I guess it could have been an email or something, but could you provide that to us so we can look at whether there’s any difference between the two?

MR. GALLEGOS: We’re not in the general practice of providing you all with that information, although I do know that people do leak it to you, which is how the story came out, I guess, on this one. I’ll look into it.

QUESTION: Okay. The reason I ask is that you yourself gave differing accounts. You said “pretty much the same,” then you said “the same,” then you said you weren’t going to parse it, and were – you know, there may be no story here. It may well be that you gave precisely the same or substantially the same advice in both cases. But I would like to see that, and since you’re not able to tell me, I would be grateful if you would give us the text of the original – of the earlier messages regarding McCain’s travel.

MR. GALLEGOS: I will see what we can do about that. However, I want to be clear about this. The most important thing for us, as an institution, was the fact that our folks, our people in the field, our action officers, were provided with the information they needed to provide equitable treatment to these individuals. 

That’s the most important thing for us.  It’s stated specifically by the Secretary in the cable, in this latest cable to them, that they would treat with an even hand representatives of these individuals, as well as the individuals themselves. It’s the most important thing to us. That’s what we want to be able to do. And through this information we provided them, they have the information they need to proceed in an efficient way to carry out this --

QUESTION: Was there some kind of concern that they weren’t going to do that? I mean, the military, for instance, has been kind of sending out, you know, various photos of Senator Obama, you know, with the troops, things like that. I mean, is there a concern on the part of the Secretary that diplomats need to be reminded to be even-handed?

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, our concern is that they know and understand what their responsibilities are, and that they carry out their actions in an informed way. And that’s what we’ve been able to do with this cable.

QUESTION: Can you tell us what their responsibilities are, and what is it they can and they can’t do?

MR. GALLEGOS: I’ll tell you, I’m not going to go through the entire cable here for you.

QUESTION: General lines?

MR. GALLEGOS: General lines are that there are some actions that can be carried out when a person is traveling in one manner, when a person is not traveling in that manner. What it comes down to is what can resources be applied to for a participant. Now, that obviously shifts when the participant is a senator, which we have in these cases, at which point, when there is no government money involved, we would be able – we would not be able to provide some forms of support in terms of briefings, in terms of travel, that type of thing. 

Bottom line here is when security comes into play here, there is an element that we have to review and decide whether or not, you know, that is an issue that we need to move forward with, that we need to provide information and we need to provide support for. So that’s the type of thing that they have to look at. But other than that, I’m not going to be able to go any deeper.

Charlie.

QUESTION: Can you at least put in perspective for us whether this is the kind of cable or the exact kind of cable that has gone out in previous year – previous elections?

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, I wanted to preface it at the very top, and I did preface it at the top, this is a situation where I was not able to determine when the last time we had two sitting senators running for election. So that’s a different aspect than in previous years and therefore would provide us a situation where we would have some information being different than the general cables that provide information on responsibilities and what people can and can’t do that we’ve given out the last four years and eight years and 12 years before – before then, so --

QUESTION: Senator Kennedy --

QUESTION: Just to follow up, whether you have two senators or one senator – four years ago, you had one senator, Senator Kerry. I mean, is – and in previous election cycles, you’ve had other elected officials.

MR. GALLEGOS: My understanding, that this was not an issue four years ago.

QUESTION: Why not?

QUESTION: I mean, shouldn’t Senator Kerry have been treated in accordance with U.S. laws regarding the use of funding for – you know, for a presidential candidate making a trip?

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, my understanding is that the issue – people were – people seemed to have understood and were comfortable with the information in the way that they provided that – the services that they were to provide him when he was traveling as a candidate. Other than that, I don’t have any more information.

QUESTION: I’m sorry, I don’t – I don’t understand what you mean there. When you say that people seemed to be comfortable and it wasn’t an issue last year, are you saying that posts didn’t ask the same kind of questions last year?

MR. GALLEGOS: I’m saying I don’t remember reports about it. So I don’t remember reports about it. I don’t remember it becoming an issue, so – yes, Param.

QUESTION: Gonzo, can you confirm that, under the new directive, they cannot help the candidates arrange for meetings and – or receptions, or arrange receptions for them?

MR. GALLEGOS: Yeah, I’m not going to get into the brass tacks of that. I don’t have this in front of me, so I don’t want to go down that path. However, obviously, in terms of their being senators and asking to meet with government officials so that they know and understand the issues that the U.S. Government is facing and dealing with any issues that they’re going to have to deal with as presidential candidates and as potential presidents of the United States, then yes, we can assist them and can participate with government officials in those meetings. However, in terms of other private sector funding, my understanding is that, no, we don’t. 

QUESTION: What’s wrong in helping the candidates with all this (inaudible)?

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, I believe – I’m not a lawyer so I’m not going to go into any finer detail than there is a question of the expenditure of the people’s funds and what candidates should pay for themselves and what congressmen should be provided in terms of information they need to perform their jobs. 

QUESTION: Can we go back to – you said that the Secretary’s – the most important thing to the Secretary was that the two candidates be treated in an evenhanded manner. Our interest is in seeing that that is indeed the case, or has been the case, and therefore I would again request that you provide to us the communications sent in advance of Senator McCain’s travel so that we can see for ourselves that the cable recently sent is substantially the same as whatever communications were sent before --

MR. GALLEGOS: I will take that – for the third time, I will consider that taken under consideration. 

QUESTION: Isn’t there a difference, though, Gonzo? I mean, didn’t Senator McCain lead a congressional delegation; whereas, in this particular case with Senator Obama, I believe that trips to Afghanistan and Iraq were part of a CODEL but some of these other countries were not. Is that – isn’t there a difference?

MR. GALLEGOS: I probably couldn't tell you. In fact, I’m telling you right now I couldn't tell you the exact difference between them. What we have are senators who are traveling who are requesting information, and under certain circumstances we want to be able to provide them with that information so that they can perform their jobs, and we’ll provide them with that information. And this cable was something that was put out to assist our posts in determining which – what situation these different requests fall under.

QUESTION: It seems as if – I mean, it seems as if, though, you’re suggesting that one of these senators has been requesting information and resources and treatment that made diplomats feel uncomfortable. 

MR. GALLEGOS: I’ve never made that suggestion, Elise. I have not made that suggestion. What I’ve said is that information, when requested, can be provided under certain circumstances, and is provided to them. 

Yes.
 
QUESTION: In the – on the current trip, Senator Obama just this morning met with Nouri al-Maliki and some others. Is there any difference between what is being done to set up that sort of meeting or the one with Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan, than has been done either for Senator McCain or for Senator Obama’s traveling companions, Reid and Hagel, on this trip? Is there – are – do diplomats have different rules for, like, because he’s running for president they can’t make this phone call on his behalf, like right now today, or not?

MR. GALLEGOS: I couldn't get into the – that down into the weeds on that for you, Anne.

QUESTION: Well, isn’t that the question? I mean --

MR. GALLEGOS: I think that there is – in terms of a meeting with the prime minister of a country, that would – by a senator be requested, that would be something that, to my understanding, that we would assist in coordinating and then likely participate in so that we could see and understand what was being discussed. 

QUESTION: Because he’s a senator and he’s traveling in --

MR. GALLEGOS: As a senator, yes.

QUESTION: -- in his senatorial capacity?

MR. GALLEGOS: Yes.

QUESTION: Is there any attempt made to figure out what is the senatorial capacity and what is a presidential candidate capacity when it’s the same human being?

MR. GALLEGOS: I couldn't tell you how they delineate that; however, I would assume that if we have a sitting senator who is visiting a country who has a desire to speak to an official of that country, we would qualify that as something within his capacity as a senator.

QUESTION: So why is it different than because he’s on a CODEL versus not a CODEL? I guess, I mean, he’s going to want to talk to President Sarkozy in France, right? I mean – and he goes there by himself. Well, why is it different that you could set it up for Maliki and not for Sarkozy?

MR. GALLEGOS: I believe it has to do with what resources can be used to fund, what U.S. Government resources can be used to fund.

QUESTION: I’m sorry. Maybe I’m being dense, but I just don’t get the distinction. I mean, he’s a senator. He’s going to both places. He’s going to want to talk to the president of both places.

MR. GALLEGOS: Yeah, I see what you’re saying. The issue is when they want and need to travel to stay in various locations and to meet different people, then this cable will help the post decide which meetings that they can provide assistance with, which would be government officials, other groups that the U.S. Government may have interactions with in an official capacity, and other meetings they may want to have which don’t have anything to do with officials of that foreign country. 

QUESTION: So in answer to Anne’s question, the post in Paris can provide help arranging a meeting with President Sarkozy?

MR. GALLEGOS: My understanding is that, yes, that would be something that would fall under it. 

QUESTION: Can you explain why? Because in reading the recent cable, it says posts may not do the following, and there’s a series of bullet points. And the final bullet point says – so posts may not do the following: arrange the candidate’s meetings.

MR. GALLEGOS: Yeah.

QUESTION: So why is it permissible to arrange a meeting with Sarkozy if you construe this to be potentially a campaign-related activity?

MR. GALLEGOS: Because we allow the posts to extend courtesies to a member of Congress visiting in personal or semi-personal activities. One of those would be meetings with officials of the government. So there are meetings – let’s not be disingenuous. There are meetings with government officials and there are other meetings with nongovernment officials that candidates or other people participating in these programs may want to make. We were trying to delineate for our posts which meetings they can and should assist in preparing – in arranging and those in which they could expect to ask to be allowed to participate in, and those that they shouldn’t make. 

QUESTION: New topic?

MR. GALLEGOS: Yes, please.

QUESTION: Russia says it may start flights by long-range bombers to Cuba because of the U.S. plans for missile defense, and I was just wondering what, if any, concerns you might have about that. Have you talked to the Russians about these statements? 

MR. GALLEGOS: This is the first I’ve heard of it. However, I think our position on the missile defense is oft repeated and has not changed. This is something that we do not believe is a threat to Russia, that we will work very hard to make clear to them that this isn’t. The fact that we are talking about – I believe it’s something like ten missiles that are designed to – for a defensive capacity from an attack in the opposite direction is something that we don’t see as a threat to them and that we have repeatedly stated that we will continue to work with them to help them come to an understanding of what we’re doing and why we’re doing it. 

QUESTION: Well, don’t you think that flying long-range bombers to Cuba and – it would be concerning to you? I mean, you know, thinking back to the Cuban missile crisis – you know, things like that. I mean, wouldn’t that kind of escalate?

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, we’ve heard various comments coming out of Russia on this since -- Elise. Number one, I’d have to – I haven’t heard the reports, to begin with. Secondly, I’d have to talk to our folks to see, you know, who did these – who did these reports – do you know who they came – who made the purported comments or --

QUESTION: Air Force -- the Russian Air Force.

MR. GALLEGOS: The Russian Air Force. You know, I’d have to talk to our folks to see where we stand on this. Like I said, I’ve just heard about this. It’s a threat that’s made --

QUESTION: If you could take the question.

MR. GALLEGOS: Be happy to take it.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. GALLEGOS: Thank you.

QUESTION: Zimbabwe?

MR. GALLEGOS: Yes.

QUESTION: As you’re well aware, Morgan Tsvangirai and Robert Mugabe have met and agreed to begin a process to try to work out some kind of a power-sharing agreement. Is this a good thing that Mr. Tsvangirai should be embarking on such a negotiated process, particularly with Mr. Mugabe, whom the U.S. Government seems to believe essentially stole the last election?

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, we support a negotiation process that leads to a result that expresses the will of the Zimbabwean people. Our understanding is that this MOU that was signed by the leaders of the ZANU-PF and both factions of the MDC is providing a vehicle for undertaking talks, but that they haven’t actually started the talks. I think – we’re obviously keeping an eye on what’s happening there, and we are going to continue to watch it closely.

QUESTION: By the will of the people, do you mean that leads to Mr. Tsvangirai and his party, essentially, leading the government to run the country?

MR. GALLEGOS: No, I think we’ve been very specific about that in the past. And what we’re talking about is an election that is free and fair and open, and that all parties can participate in without fear of aggressive acts against them, so --

QUESTION: So you’re looking for another election that would be --

MR. GALLEGOS: We are looking for a process that will express the will of the Zimbabwean people.

QUESTION: So you would be amenable to a power-sharing agreement?

MR. GALLEGOS: We are looking for a process that will be amenable to the Zimbabwean people. I don’t think that we have defined that from this podium and nor will I start today.

QUESTION: Do you think that President – South African President Mbeki can be an honest broker in this case, given his close ties to President Mugabe?

MR. GALLEGOS: I think we are looking for countries that will come and support the Zimbabwean people in as official way as they can so that they can come to a resolution of the situation.

QUESTION: Well, just – but does South Africa support the Zimbabwean people or support President Mugabe?

MR. GALLEGOS: Talk to the South Africans. I think they can tell you what they support and don’t.

QUESTION: No, but I’m asking you if --

MR. GALLEGOS: I’m telling you to speak to the South Africans so that --

QUESTION: Well, I can’t ask the South Africans if the U.S. thinks that South Africa is an honest broker.

MR. GALLEGOS: I would say if you want to know, I think you should talk to the South Africans about what they think about Zimbabwe. We’ve made it very clear what we think, which is that we believe that the Zimbabweans should be allowed a process in which the will and the expression of the people is brought forward.

Yes.

QUESTION: Well, what would be considered an expression of the people?

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, we believe – we’re hoping that other elements in Africa – we have spoken about the situation that has gone on there. We are looking forward now to some resolution that will be worked out by the parties involved, all parties involved, that will come to a solution.

Yes.

QUESTION: Regarding Elise’s question earlier about Russia, you mentioned that there would be only ten missiles involved. But it’s our – my understanding that one of Russia’s main concerns is the U.S. having a toehold. It may be only ten missiles now, but they’re concerned it could escalate and so on and so forth. So have you addressed that particular concern?

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, our concern is about the security of the region. And you know, our allies – NATO has spoken out in support of this. We are looking to implement this to provide for security from a growing danger that will affect all of us, not just Central Europeans, and that’s our focus here, is to move forward with that.

QUESTION: If Iran does decide to comply with the U.S. – the UN sanctions regime, and the situation there is defused as it would seem to be since the Bush Administration sent over a high-level envoy, would that decrease the risks in that region of the world?

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, I’ve heard about three “ifs” in that question, so when we reduce it to no “ifs,” I think I could get to a point where I might be able to respond to that. I’m sorry.

Param.

QUESTION: Just one on Zimbabwe, the last part when you mentioned that we are looking forward to some kind of resolution by the parties involved --

MR. GALLEGOS: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: Do you rule out power-sharing as part of this?

MR. GALLEGOS: I think we’re waiting to see the evolution of this process.

QUESTION: Evolution of the left – which process is this?

MR. GALLEGOS: A moving towards a resolution that will allow the will of the Zimbabwean people to be felt.

Yes, in the back.

QUESTION: If I could draw your attention to Assistant Secretary Boucher’s statement to Rediff, which is an Indian website. He has said that the Administration intends to go ahead with the nuclear agreement with whatever government is in charge in Delhi, even if it’s a minority government. Now, can you tell me how many agreements of this kind have been signed with minority governments?

MR. GALLEGOS: I don’t – I think this is a pretty unique agreement. What we have stated is that this is an important agreement to us. We believe it’s an important agreement for India. Indians have to decide whether or not they wish to proceed with this agreement. We have said that we continue to support it, and we’ll do all we can to move forward with it once we hear from the Indians.

QUESTION: Well, (inaudible) because the fate of the coalition government hangs in the balance.

MR. GALLEGOS: My understanding is there may be a vote tomorrow, so I guess we’ll have to wait and see where we go with this. I’ll be here tomorrow, same time.

Yes.

QUESTION: After the meeting between Senator Obama and al-Maliki, a government spokesman said that he hoped that American troops would be out by 2010. Your reaction to that year, and does that affect current negotiations with this Administration?

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, I think – look, what we – I think Dana took this question, I think, at the gaggle, the White House gaggle this morning, but you know – basically, you know, we have an aspirational goal of these general – what we call this general time horizon, which – where we are looking to ensure that our troop levels will be based on the conditions on the ground. What’s happening on the ground is going to be driving what we’re able to do, how we’re able to assist.

That being said, we obviously – and have spoken often about our desire to shift, you know, our role there to one where we’re training – conducting counterterrorism, training with the – with the Iraqis, and to allow them to move forward in gaining more and more control of the various spaces in their country. I think the main words here are – we’re looking at flexibility and not an arbitrary timeframe. So we’re going to continue working with them. White House put out a statement on Friday which dealt with that, and that’s where we are.

Yes.

QUESTION: What comment, if any, do you have regarding – that Mahmoud Abbas congratulated Samir Kuntar for his return to Lebanon?

MR. GALLEGOS: I don’t have anything on that. I’ll have to take that.

QUESTION: Staying in that region, you were asked earlier about Syria officials meeting State Department officials this week. You have anything on that?

MR. GALLEGOS: Yeah, I think I do. Here we go. 

We’re aware of a visit sponsored by Search For Common Ground, an NGO that includes Syrian intellectuals and possibly officials. The group is coming as private citizens and academics, not as a government delegation, will be in Washington at the invitation of the NGO, Common Ground. In terms of meetings here at the Department, the U.S. sponsor to the trip, Common Ground – Search For Common Ground, as is normal practice proposed a meeting with the State Department for the Syrian delegation, it’s customary for us to receive such visitors. And our NEA Assistant Secretary of State David Welch is prepared to meet with them.

Right now, my understanding is that we’re not sure who will be participating in the group or how many, so we’re going to have to wait and see how that plays out in terms of what --

QUESTION: (Inaudible) scheduled right now?

MR. GALLEGOS: That’s right. 

Yes – I’m sorry, Samir, yes.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) advisor to the Minister of Information --

MR. GALLEGOS: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: -- and another one was an advisor to the Prime Minister. How they won’t be government – is it --

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, I did ask that question cause it came up this morning. And we see participation in this trip that the individuals will be acting in a private capacity, in an individual capacity and not as representatives of their government.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) --

MR. GALLEGOS: I am not sure, like I said previously, who exactly is going to be on this trip, or when or if they will be meeting. But in a general sense, Assistant Secretary Welch has said that he is prepared to meet with them if requested. And so we’re going to have to wait and see if the request is made, when it’s made, and what it’s made for.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) that they had proposed a meeting?

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, they proposed a meeting, but in terms of the participants of the meeting, I’m not sure. But any participants we would consider as a private citizen of Syria.

QUESTION: So it’s --

MR. GALLEGOS: Yeah.

QUESTION: -- customary to meet with such delegations? Any delegations can come and – any delegation can come and meet Assistant Secretary Welch?

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, these are – we have – there are various cultural exchanges sponsored by the United States Government and not sponsored by the United States Government that officials here at the State Department participate in on a regular basis. These are programs that we would expect to develop wherever our embassies are overseas, wherever we have a specific interest in developing relations. 

You know, the fact is that we are finding and looking for ways to decrease the isolation of the Syrian people while we continue to pressure their government to change its policies. And this would be seen as an opportunity for us to speak with Syrian private citizens about what’s happening in their government -- in their country, about what’s happening here in the United States, explain our policies, why we have them, and then to discuss any specifics about their trip that they would want to participate.

QUESTION: But they’re not private citizens. They’re advisors to (inaudible) ministers.

MR. GALLEGOS: We would see – as I said before, Elise, we would see anybody who participates in this trip as a private – as acting in a private capacity.

QUESTION: So it would not be considered an official meeting with the Syrian delegation?

MR. GALLEGOS: No, it would not.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)?

MR. GALLEGOS: Sure.

QUESTION: I’m sorry to do this, but I wanted to give you an opportunity. You know, you said pretty much the same, and then you said the same.

MR. GALLEGOS: Yeah.

QUESTION: And rather than having me write that the State Department gave different descriptions of it, do you prefer to go with one versus the other? Is it pretty much the same or is it the same?

MR. GALLEGOS: I think what I would say is that the same basic information was provided to Senator McCain’s campaign and provided in this ALDAC to all of our posts that went out, provided to the posts that requested it for Senator McCain’s travel, and then provided to our posts in the ALDAC that went out to every post.

QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you.

MR. GALLEGOS: Yes.

QUESTION: I’m sorry. Hugo Chavez is on his way to Russia to sign off on some deals to buy military weapons and hardware. What’s your reaction to those purchases and the trade relationship between Caracas and Moscow?

MR. GALLEGOS: Well, I think – well, we’ve spoken to that relationship in the past. You know, we believe that, you know, the Venezuelans likely have a substantial number of weapons and arms to carry out the security functions that they need. We’re not here to tell them what they should or shouldn’t do. But I think it’s clear that, you know, the – Hugo Chavez has his government to lead. He’ll make the decisions he needs to make. However, he has other situations at home that he may want to pay more -- close attention to.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. GALLEGOS: All right. Thank you.

(The briefing was concluded at 1:29 p.m.)

DPB # 129


Released on July 21, 2008

   ]]> Mon, 21 Jul 2008 17:57:35 EDT Africa: Daily Press Briefing -- July 16 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2008/july/107065.htm http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2008/july/107065.htm
Daily Press Briefing
Sean McCormack, Spokesman
Washington, DC
July 16, 2008

INDEX:

IRAN
Under Secretary Burns to Travel to Geneva as Part of Delegation Lead by Solana
Conditions for P5+1 Negotiations with Iranians Remain
U.S. Committed to Diplomacy and Diplomatic Solution
Two Tracks Remain / Change in Signal but not in Substance
Comparisons to North Korea
Divisions within Iranian Regime
Companies Increasingly not Wanting to Do Business in Iran
Costs to Iranian Government Growing
U.S. Decision Making Process on New Tactic
John Bolton’s Comments / Criticism of New Tactic
Secretary Rice’s Discussions with Javier Solana
Under Secretary Burns’ Schedule / Itinerary

RUSSIA
Russian Policy on NATO Granting Membership to Ukraine & Georgia

SOUTH AFRICA
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Calling for an Apology for Ambassador Khalilzad’s Remarks after Vote on Zimbabwe Resolution
Upcoming Election in March

ISRAEL/PALESTINIANS
Visit by Palestinian Negotiating Team

MEXICO
International Court Decision on Mexican Nationals on Death Row in U.S.

ISRAEL/SYRIA
Prisoner Swap with Hezbollah
Status of Shebaa Farms


TRANSCRIPT:

View Video

10:34 a.m. EDT

MR. MCCORMACK: Good morning, everybody. Before we get started, I wanted to make a few points concerning some stories I’ve seen in the newspapers and on the wires and on the TV this morning. Under Secretary for Political Affairs Bill Burns will attend, as part of a delegation led by Javier Solana, Mr. Solana’s meeting in Geneva on Saturday to hear the Iranian response to the P-5+1 offer made about a month ago in Tehran. This is an offer that outlined a very clear set of attractive incentives for the Iranian Government to suspend its uranium enrichment and reprocessing related activities. So Under Secretary Burns will attend the meeting as a participant. He’ll be there to listen. He’ll be there to hear the Iranian response. And I would expect that he will also make the point and underscore the point that the P-5+1 condition for realizing full-blown negotiations with the United States at the table remains that Iran needs to suspend its uranium enrichment and reprocessing related activities. Should they take that single step, the United States and its partners in the P-5+1 will meet with the Iranian delegation anytime, anyplace, anywhere, to talk about a variety – any variety of subjects, but certainly our focus will be on the Iranian nuclear program.

Secretary Rice believes it’s a smart step to take. There’s no change in the substance, but it sends a strong signal. It sends a strong signal to our P-5+1 partners, it sends a strong signal to the world, it sends a strong signal to the Iranian Government that the United States is committed to diplomacy, to finding a diplomatic solution to this issue. It underscores the Secretary’s signature on the letter that was part of the transmittal to the Iranian Government of the most recent P-5+1 offer, as I cited before, handed over in Tehran. And it also underscores again, the condition of the United States and the P-5+1 for realizing negotiations.

So in essence, we are able to emphasize the two tracks of our diplomacy – the incentive side, the disincentive side. I think it’s pretty clear, and we can talk a little bit about recent events on the disincentive side, but there has been a robust response from the EU, from the world, in implementing Security Council sanctions. The Iranians are finding it much more difficult to access the international financial system. They are finding, one by one, their major banks being designated either by the EU, the U.S., or Security Council resolution, or all of the above. And it’s making it much, much more difficult for the Iranian Government to operate in the international system, thereby making clear to them that if they continue down the pathway that they are on, they are going to find themselves more and more isolated from the rest of the world. 

And with that, I’d be happy to take whatever questions you have. Yes, Matt.

QUESTION: Why – you know, why is not the decision to have Burns attend not a capitulation to the Iranians? You know, you’ve offered full – even though, recognizing the fact that he is not or you’re saying that he is not going to be negotiating --

MR. MCCORMACK: Right.

QUESTION: -- your offer to them is to sit down at the table with them. Isn’t this sitting down at the table with them before they’ve done anything that you want them to do?

MR. MCCORMACK: No, the central – the pivot point, if you will, the central condition in the – at the heart of our policy is the fact that there is a condition for realizing negotiations with the Iranians. And that condition is that the Iranians take the step of suspending their uranium enrichment program. That is at the heart of the two-track policy. 

So it – what this action does, as I said, is a – it’s a – you know, it’s a signal, for certain, but it’s not a change in substance. And the fact that Under Secretary Burns will be attending the meeting really serves to clarify the choices that the Iranian regime faces. They understand very clearly, I think, the cost to them for their continued defiance of the international community. And again, we can go through some of those if you want to. It also underscores the fact that if they make that choice, then the United States and its P-5+1 partners will fulfill their commitments. There was a one-time-only deal. We thought it was a smart step to take. The Secretary of State, conferring with the President and his top national security and foreign policy advisors, thought it was a smart step to take. And again, it – you know, it may be a signal, for certain, but it is not a change in substance. And again, I think any informed conversation about the policy has to start with the idea that at the heart of the two-track approach is conditionality. There’s a condition placed on the Iranians. We have been consistent from day one on that in talking about it, and that will remain a condition. And as I said, this particular signal is a one-time-only deal.

QUESTION: What happens if the – if Jalili tries to engage Ambassador Burns in some kind of a negotiation or try and take him off to the side and have some kind of a private meeting? Is he under instructions that he cannot do so?

MR. MCCORMACK: There aren’t going to be any one-on-one meetings. Look, I’m sure Ambassador Burns will be polite, as we have been in other encounters with Iranian diplomats in a variety of different venues when we have encountered them. And just as an aside, instructions to U.S. diplomats if you do find yourself in a position of encountering an Iranian diplomat is that you are to be polite but not engage in any substantive discussion. And that, I assume, will be Bill’s instructions here. And I’m sure – look, you know, Bill Burns is one of our most experienced diplomats. And I’m sure that, should the event occur that you have described where, you know, Mr. Jalili tries to engage him, I think Bill will make a strong point of highlighting to him, “Mr. Jalili, if you want negotiations, you know what to do. You can advise your government to suspend its enrichment-related activities, then you’ll see the Secretary of State at the table along with other ministers from the P-5+1.” 

But, you know, again, Bill is an experienced diplomat and I’m confident that --

QUESTION: You don’t think they know that already? I mean, you’ve made it clear over and over again. Why is his presence there somehow going to change the equation?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, again, part of – you have multiple – you know, in setting (inaudible) there, you have multiple audiences. Of course, it’s a signal to the Iranian Government that should they meet the condition that has been put out there for them by the international community, then the United States and its partners are going to abide by their stated commitments to be at the table.

It also sends a signal to the Iranian people, I think. And that’s very important, because one of the things that we have seen since the offer was – the most recent offer was tabled about a month ago – is the beginnings of a debate in the Iranian political system that has erupted into public. We’ve seen evidence of it in public with various high-ranking Iranian officials expressing different points of view in public about the advisability of taking up the P-5+1 on their offer. Some have said that they should. Others have, again, persisted in the view that they – the Iranian Government shouldn’t take up that offer.

One of the things – a couple of things that we did – the P-5+1, when we made that offer about a month ago: We published the offer in Farsi. We broadcast it. We made a point of telling the Iranian people, here’s what’s on the table. Just in case your government hasn’t informed you, which they hadn’t, here is the offer on the table. And the Iranian people with, you know, inflation raging at 25 percent and on an upward trend and a variety of other negative economic indicators, I think understand what the costs of starting --

QUESTION: Getting close to --

MR. MCCORMACK: Understand what the costs are to the Iranian Government persisting in these policies. So, part of the signal also is to the Iranian people highlighting the choices – highlighting the choices that face their government. And again, you start to see this political debate in Iran. And I don’t know how it’s going to turn out, you know. I’m not placing any bets. 

But one of the calculations that went into this decision is, you know, by sending a signal and underscoring all the things, both on the incentive side and the disincentive side that we have talked about, these start to change the calculation in the Iranian political system. Do those reasonable people, those reasonable decision-makers that we’re looking for in Iran, maybe start to change their calculations? Well, maybe they start to win some of the arguments within the Iranian political system. And maybe the outcome of that change in calculations is that they do take up the P-5+1 on the offer. 

Again, I’m not laying any bets. I’m not making any predictions. I don’t know how that will turn out.  But again, we think that this is a smart step that follows on and is consistent with our two-track strategy, and our strategy of gradually increasing the pressure on the Iranian Government and highlighting and contrasting the choices that they have there.

QUESTION: Yeah, one more and I’ll stop. The – you say there’s a signal – a signal being sent to multiple audiences.

MR. MCCORMACK: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: Would – is another audience the broader international community, in terms of showing your commitment to sitting – to a negotiated, diplomatic solution to this? One key member of that international community would be your good friend in the region, Israel, which has – appears to be getting a little anxious about what’s going on and when.

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, look, you know, we – you know, both through our words and our actions, are demonstrating that we’re committed to trying to find a diplomatic resolution here. You know, as the President of the United States himself has said on multiple occasions, also, he never takes any option off the table. 

But it’s a serious issue. I mean, the – you know, in dealing with this nuclear issue in Iran, the stakes are high for the international community. I think a number of people, a number of political leaders in the international scene have observed that the Middle East is – certainly would be a different place and a more uncertain and unstable place if Iran possessed a nuclear weapon.

So the stakes are high, but we believe that the strategy we have put in place with our partners in the P-5+1 gives the international system the best opportunity to find a diplomatic, negotiated outcome to the issue at hand.

QUESTION: Could you --

MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah.

QUESTION: -- just elaborate a little bit on the Secretary’s talk with President Bush and the others? When was it and how long --

MR. MCCORMACK: Look, you know, I’m not going to get into the details of the Secretary’s discussions with the President. You know, the White House can speak on behalf of the President, and should they want to talk about any more of the details, then obviously, they would. The Secretary never talks about her conversations with the President.

QUESTION: But it was generally to agree on the conditions for --

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, it was to talk about – you know, talk about the issue, talk about where we are in our diplomacy, and talk about this step. But it is something that both the Secretary and the President talked about and they both agreed upon. This is a smart step to take.

Yeah.

QUESTION: Is part of the logic behind this that you’ve looked at what’s happened in the North Korea talks and you’ve decided to extend the same strategy in Iran?

MR. MCCORMACK: You know, it’s apples and oranges, Iran and North Korea. In terms of the – you know, where we stand on the issue, where they stand in terms of their development in their nuclear programs, the history is there as well. You know, I guess you could say one very general common thread is one that you would find really throughout diplomacy and that is, very oftentimes, if you’re trying to confront a tough issue, it helps to highlight the contrasts, various pathways – various consequences, both negative and positive for certain decisions by the party at hand – in one case, North Korea, in the other case, Iran. 

So in that sense, yes. And you know, also, it’s a lesson in the importance of trying to deal from the point of leverage. You know, and again, that’s a strategy that this Secretary has employed in, you know, these negotiations. So I guess in those two, if you will, metaphysical senses, you know, the strategies are the same, but they differ in their specific application.

Yeah, sure.

QUESTION: Is part of the logic as well in joining these talks because you were a little nervous that -- I mean, the other five --

MR. MCCORMACK: Right. And joining the talks was a one-time deal.

QUESTION: Well, whether it’s one time or ten times --

MCCORMACK: Right. 

QUESTION: -- you’re still there. But is part of the idea here that you would like to be a partner at the table? I mean, you’ve been sort of at the outskirts here. You’ve not been – right -- in – the last time that it was presented, you were not there. Is it your sense that you need to be more where the action is, that you need to play a bigger role here and that --

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I think anybody can have their characterizations. I would differ with that characterization. I think we’ve been right at the heart of this strategy. As a matter of fact, if you go back to the Secretary’s first trip to Europe as Secretary of State, as a matter of fact, her first trip as Secretary of State, you really have her engaging in a serious way with her European interlocutors and the EU-3 countries is just the – at that point, the EU-3 countries, on how to address the issue of Iran. And it was really the Secretary looking – going back to May 2006, who outlined this and put together this basic strategy, this two-track approach with the kind of coalition, if you will, that we see right now with the P-5+1. 

So the United States has really been at the center of putting together this strategy, organizing and leading the international community on this particular issue. And again, I’m not – by saying that, I’m not trying to diminish the role and contributions of anybody else in the P-5+1. Each have made important contributions. But it is worth noting that this is a topic that the Secretary Rice has engaged on, really, from the earliest days of her tenure as Secretary of State. And again, we’ll see how this evolves. We think that this gives us the best opportunity to realize the kind of outcome the international system is looking for. But the ball is in the Iranians’ court. And we’ll see what the outcome of this public -- you know, this debate which has emerged in public, at times, in Iran plays out. 

Yeah, Charles. 

QUESTION: To follow up on your point that you’ve made numerous times already about it’s a one-time deal. 

MR. MCCORMACK: Mm-hmm. 

QUESTION: Why should the Iranians or others take that seriously? First of all, you said you wouldn’t do it at all – wouldn’t be there at all. And the Secretary came out some time ago and said, “We’ll do it if.” And then you said, “But we’re not going to come to the table, (inaudible) signing the letter but we’re not coming, now we’re coming.” So why do you limit yourself? Why should anyone take it seriously and why do you limit yourself by saying it’s a one-time deal? 

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, Charlie, all I can go back to it is a point that I’m making about the centrality of the condition for realizing negotiations. That is unchanged. The substance is unchanged here. Is this a new tactic, if you will? Yes. Does it send a signal? Yes. Is the substance any different? No. So, you know, I would argue that the fact that Ambassador Burns will attend the meeting, underscores, as I said, a commitment to diplomacy, the fact that if the Iranians take the step of suspending their enrichment-related activity, they will see an American at the table, they’ll see the Secretary of State for negotiations. But absent that, they will not see the Secretary of State, they will not see negotiations with the P-5+1. 

Kirit. 

QUESTION: Just a few weeks ago, you said that you wouldn’t do something like this, and now you have. Can you tell us what changed in your thinking to change your calculus? Is it because you have a sense of the response the Iranians might give? And also, is it an attempt to temper the kind of escalation in the region that’s still between Iran and Israel? 

MR. MCCORMACK: Right. Right. Well, um – a couple of things. In terms of the Iranians, I would cite the public debate that you’ve seen emerge as a result of the offer that’s been put on the table. It really is extraordinary what you’ve seen emerge in the media and the press, just by looking at some of the quotations from various Iranians officials. There’s a clear divide there. There’s, you know, clearly a group or individuals who are, at the very least, interested in considering taking up this offer. On the other hand, there are people that believe that Iran should maintain its current posture, continue to defy the international community, and incur even greater costs. That’s on the incentive side. 

And we believe that, in part, that debate has erupted because this offer was made in public. We published it. We made a point of translating it into Farsi, so everybody could see it. There would be no mistake and no misconstruing what the offer was. On the disincentive side, you’ve had a number of different things that have changed, really, in the past month or so. You have the EU back in June designating 38 entities and individuals. You have the Bank Melli being designated by the United States and the EU. Again, that’s something that occurred a while ago. You have the United States designating an additional 11 entities. You have continued implementation of Security Council resolutions. You start to see a number of businesses deciding they’re not going to do business with Iran. One high-profile example of that is the European company Total deciding it is going to pull out of the South Pars oil and gas development deal. It’s a huge step. And they cited the fact that because of the uncertainties surrounding doing business with Iran, they were going to pull out of that project. Again, I’ll let them describe for themselves what exactly those uncertainties are. 

So you start to look at that catalog of events over the past month or so – for the past several months – and you start to see a pattern of increasing costs to the Iranian Government. They are starting to feel the effects of Security Council resolutions. They are starting to feel the effects of the United States and European countries working together on individual designations and steps that individual countries might take. You know, Iran’s credit risk rating has been downgraded. Iranian companies are no longer able to get leverage of credit in order to do business on the – in the international trading and financial system. So there are real costs here. The situation is changing. It’s static. So you take a – you take stock of this evolving situation and you decide what, perhaps, are the best steps that we might take to advance the diplomacy. 

QUESTION: And so you’re taking this step because you there’s an opening now? 

MR. MCCORMACK: We’re taking this step because we think it’s a smart move. And again, I – you know, I can’t predict for you how the Iranians will react. I can’t predict for you how the Iranian Government will react. We’ll see. But do we think that this is consistent with our policy of highlighting the contrast between the two tracks, gradually increasing the pressure on Iran, highlighting the – or heightening the contrast for them? Yes, absolutely. 

QUESTION: You know, just -- again, are you trying to temper the tensions in the region by attending this and emphasizing the diplomacy? 

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, that’s been our emphasis for some time, from the very beginning. So you know, I don’t think that that is – you know, that is a primary concern here. Is it an ancillary effect? I don’t know. I can’t tell you. That’s for others to determine by their reaction to this.

You know, our focus is on how do we make this diplomacy work, how do we most effectively implement the strategy that we have. And we think this is a smart step to do so. 

Yeah, Charley.

QUESTION:  (Inaudible) multiple audiences, particularly the European allies, did they seek Mr. Burns’ inclusion in the delegation? Did they speak directly to Secretary Rice --

MR. MCCORMACK: I don’t – I don’t know, if you go back through the history of this, whether or not they ever mentioned it. This is an idea that we generated.

QUESTION: Did Mr. Solana invite him? How did that work?

MR. MCCORMACK: You know, again, I can’t speak to the definitive history of this, but this is an idea that we generated that we’ve been thinking about over the past month or so, and decided it was the right step to take. And in terms – you know, it’s an important point. It also signals to other audiences – European audiences and audiences in our P-5+1 partner countries – that the United States is committed to this. And it also sends an important signal of unity to the world as well as to the Iranians that the P-5+1 is truly united in pursuing the two-track policy. And you know, you see that on the incentive side as well as the disincentive side, and I think I’ve tried to catalog for you some items on both sides of that equation.

Yeah.

QUESTION: Did this idea come from Secretary Burns – Assistant – Under Secretary Burns himself? And what is the significance of the signature on – Secretary Rice’s signature on the document that was transmitted to Tehran? I mean, did the U.S. not sign the previous offer, the original one?

MR. MCCORMACK: I can’t tell you. I mean, it went with the support of the United States. This was one of those, I guess, additional steps, one of the refreshed steps, I guess is the term that we’re using, that we attached to the offer that we made about a month ago. And we thought it was – we thought it was, again, the right thing to do. It demonstrated – it does – it did a little bit of what Under Secretary Burns’ presence at the meeting will do, we believe. It signals unity. It signals to the world, to the Iranian publics, that we’re committed to this diplomatic track, that we are committed to following through on our obligations should the Iranians take the single step of suspending.

In terms of – in terms of the idea being generated, it was generated within the U.S. Government. I’m not going to go any further than that.

Yeah, Sue.

QUESTION: You said that this sends a positive signal to, you know, Europeans and others. But for some within the Administration and outside, the more hawkish elements like John Bolton, for example --

MR. MCCORMACK: Right.

QUESTION: -- this is seen as, you know, appeasement and that you’re kind of giving in. John Bolton said today it’s as if the – you know, it’s the Obama Administration six months early. I just wondered about the debate within the Administration in terms of coming to this point, and what do you say to those such as John Bolton who strongly reject this approach? 

MR. MCCORMACK: You know, I guess when he gets elected, he can follow his own policies. Look, you know, the fact of the matter is the President and the Secretary of State – and I’ll let others speak for themselves – believe that this is the right step. It is an effective, smart, diplomatic tactic, if you will, that doesn't change the substance of our policy. And in terms of – in terms of others like – the great thing about America is you can freely express your opinion. Duly noted. And – but we believe that this is – that this is the right strategy. We believe it’s the right policy, given the circumstances, to try to achieve the stated objectives of everybody in the international system, and the stated objectives of the United States. Believe it’s in our foreign policy and national security interest.

Yeah.

QUESTION: Were the Israelis consulted ahead of time on this move by --

MR. MCCORMACK: We did some – we informed a number of our diplomatic partners, but I won’t go farther than that. 

Yeah, Nina.

QUESTION: Did they include Israel?

MR. MCCORMACK: I’m not going to talk about the who’s. We did, we informed. We didn’t consult. Yeah.

QUESTION: Solana’s office said today that there was a phone call between Solana and Rice yesterday when this decision – this final decision was made --

MR. MCCORMACK: There were. We got one.  (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Can you confirm that?

MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah, they did talk. Yeah.

QUESTION: Can you – can you confirm that they have been talking about this for the past month? Was the U.S. under any pressure to make this decision this week?

MR. MCCORMACK: No, no. As – look, the idea, certainly this time around – and again, I would reiterate what I said in response to Charlie’s question, is I can’t give you the definitive history of this. But this is an idea that we generated. It’s an idea that we talked about within the Administration, considered, and ultimately decided upon taking. I think it’s received a generally favorable reaction, certainly among the P-5+1 partners. The Secretary did talk to Mr. Solana yesterday about it. You know, again, we’ll see how this plays out. We’ll see what the reaction is elsewhere.

QUESTION: I know (inaudible) being framed as a negotiation. I know that the U.S. envoy will just be at the table, he probably won’t speak, but are you not concerned that, in the eyes of the world and in the eyes of Iran, that this will – this will just look, in simple terms, as if the U.S. is sitting down at the table as they see these pictures around the world?

MR. MCCORMACK: Look, you know, I can’t – you know, I can’t shape everybody’s perceptions. I mean, people – you know, if people – if they want to put a square peg into a round hole, they might take away that conclusion. But the fact of the matter is he’s going to attend the meeting, he’s going to listen to what the Iranian response is. And yeah, I would expect that he would take the opportunity to affirm the condition that the P-5+1 has laid out about suspension being a condition for realizing negotiations. It’s not going to be a negotiation. I can’t say it any more simply than that.

QUESTION: So on the nuts and bolts of this, when is he leaving and does he have any other stops?

MR. MCCORMACK: He’s going to make his way to Geneva starting tonight. He’s going to leave tonight, do some consultations along the way, I think. What’s today? Wednesday. Thursday. Friday he has a --

QUESTION: Today’s Wednesday.

MR. MCCORMACK: Today’s Wednesday. Thursday, he’ll have some consultations pertaining to this matter in Europe. And --

QUESTION: Brussels or --

MR. MCCORMACK: Friday --

QUESTION: Not in Geneva? Is he going to somewhere else?

MR. MCCORMACK: I don’t – you know, I don’t know exactly what his itinerary is. Friday, he’s going to have some consultations at the IAEA related to the India civ-nuke deal. And then Saturday --

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

MR. MCCORMACK: In Vienna. And then Saturday, he’s going to be in Geneva.

QUESTION: But you don’t know where his first – are there multiple stops on his way to Vienna to --

MR. MCCORMACK: I don’t know. I don’t know that. I don’t know that.

Yeah, Dave. 

QUESTION: Sean, I was wondering if, emblematic of the debate going on in the Iranian political world, that they might show up in Geneva without a definitive answer, they might want to haggle on the terms of the incentives package and kick this down the road. Is there any kind of timeframe expectation for them to give you a straight answer?

MR. MCCORMACK: I don’t know. One can never tell, Dave. They have said that they intend to give a definitive response at this meeting. Having previously sent a letter as well as made some public statements about it that they said that they would provide a definitive response to the latest offer at this meeting, we’ll see. We’ll see if they do. Again, it’s difficult to predict.

Yeah, Michel.

QUESTION: Why do you expect Iran – that the Iranians will change their position or approach to this matter if Mr. Burns is not allowed to negotiate Mr. Jalili?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, because I assume that Burns simply showing up at a meeting isn’t – as much respect as I have for Under Secretary Burns, that that is not going to be the thing that itself tips the balance in terms of the decision-making equation in Iran. But what I would expect is that, again, those reasonable individuals within the Iranian political system who can do cost benefit analysis will start to perhaps make a different cost benefit analysis of the Iranian Government continuing on the current pathway that it’s on.

As I said, you know, I cited a few things on the disincentive side. In part related to the strategy that we have pursued, there are very real costs that are mounting in the Iranian system. They – as I said, the credit risk rating has been downgraded. Many banks have stopped issuing letters of credit to companies seeking to do business with Iran. The government has had to scale back export credits. Companies which trade with Iran have to reconsider whether or not that business will make any commercial sense. They have inflation running at 25 percent. They need to create a million jobs every single year just to keep pace with their demographics and to keep their economy moving. They’re not doing that despite having oil at $140 a barrel.

So there’s – you know, there’s mismanagement that is going on of the Iranian economy, putting aside any Security Council or individual state actions. The – however, the sanctions and the steps that the international system is taking accentuate the fact that the Iranian Government is mismanaging their economy, therefore increasing the cost to the Iranian Government of pursuing the kinds of policies that they’re pursuing. 

Contrast that with an attractive offer on the table, the heart of which is that they can have civilian nuclear power, which is their stated objective, should they come to agreement with the P-5+1. And the call – and the only price of admission for that is suspending their uranium enrichment program. Again, I think a set of reasonable, rational decision-makers will look at those cost-benefit analyses, look at the trend lines and say, this is a no-brainer. Let’s take up the P-5+1 on this offer. We’ll see if that is where the trend lines take us in terms of the Iranian decision-making apparatus. It hasn’t been to this point. We’ll see if that calculation changes. 

Yes.

QUESTION: I just want to follow up on a couple of different things. In terms of the U.S. decision-making --

MR. MCCORMACK: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION:  -- to come to this decision