Press Conference at U.S. Embassy Kabul

Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State

Kabul, Afghanistan

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you all very much for being here. I want to start by thanking Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal and all of the dedicated men and women of the U.S. and NATO ISAF missions here in Afghanistan. The work that Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal are doing together, both their personal collaboration and the joint efforts of their teams, is a model for civilian-military cooperation and a source of confidence that we will make progress toward our objectives.

I also want to thank Ambassador Holbrooke and his team in Washington, who have provided vision and leadership to our efforts in this region.

This is an important moment. Today’s inauguration opens a real window of opportunity for a new compact between the Afghan Government and its people, and for a new chapter in the partnership between Afghanistan and the international community. And we must seize this moment. For the United States and Afghanistan, this means a renewed partnership based on mutual responsibility, where we each do our part to deliver for the Afghan people and to advance our common fight against our common enemy.

President Karzai’s inaugural address provides an important new starting point, and we intend to build on it. The speech laid out Afghanistan’s commitment to take responsibility for the security of its own country by speeding efforts to stand up a capable and effective Afghan national security force that can replace international forces over time. The United States shares this same objective, and we welcome this strong commitment.

Of course, our civilian effort will remain long after our security effort has concluded, and it will be just as decisive to Afghanistan’s future and our interests. So I was pleased that the inaugural speech also outlined the steps the Afghan Government will take to improve its efforts to deliver for its citizens, to bring them basic services, access to justice, and the educational and economic opportunities they deserve.

It’s an effort that will require steady progress on government capacity, transparency, and accountability. It will also require us to pursue a broader and deeper partnership with capable Afghan ministries responsible for carrying out their own programs. Last night, I met with the education and agriculture and finance ministers, and received detailed briefings on past progress and future plans.

Through their work and our support, we are starting to see results. Farmers are beginning to switch from poppies to pomegranates, girls are attending schools – many taught by newly trained teachers, families are visiting new health clinics and driving on freshly paved roads. Thousands of new civil servants, trained through a partnership with USAID, are helping build democratic institutions from the ground up.

Moving forward as we work with President Karzai and his government in Kabul and leaders at the local, district, and provincial levels, we will keep in mind that our most critical partnership is with the people of Afghanistan. We will use clear benchmarks and measures to ensure that our efforts are delivering results for them. We will also coordinate with our international partners to ensure we are engaged in a common and effective effort in service of their needs as well as our common interests. I had a series of extremely productive discussions with my counterparts here, with the foreign ministers from troop-contributing countries, donor countries, and those who have a stake in the future of Afghanistan.

Now, as we call for accountability from others, we will hold ourselves accountable as well. That’s why we are working to ensure that development funds are tracked, accounted for, and used as intended; that our detention facilities and procedures are consistent with our security and our values; that we do everything we can to minimize civilian casualties.

I am here in Afghanistan and so many brave Americans are serving here because we believe that we can make progress. Now, we are under no illusions about the difficulty of this mission. The road ahead is fraught with challenges and imperfect choices. Setbacks are inevitable, and we have to be realistic about what we can accomplish. But we are also clear-eyed about the stakes. For the Afghan people, it is about a better future. For the United States, it is about protecting our people, our allies, and our interests. That is why we are working so hard to renew this partnership and why it is so vital that we seize this moment, this crucial window of opportunity.

Again, I want to thank everyone serving here and really express, on behalf of not only President Obama and the Obama Administration but our country as well, our gratitude for the service of the men and women who serve the United States of America. Thank you all very much.

MODERATOR: The first question is going to be (inaudible) TV.

QUESTION: (Via interpreter) First of all, let me thank you and – for coming here to Afghanistan and the inauguration ceremony. My first question is that whether President Karzai has not bring any reforms in his new cabinet, and the second is that if there is a six-month deadline as you’ve given to President Karzai to bring reforms? And the third is that – the question of whether the U.S. – Mr. Ambassador Eikenberry has said that more forces should not be sent to Afghanistan, in contrast to the request that was made by General McChrystal.

So in those cases, the first few cases, whether the United States will leave Afghanistan or will work with the new government if President Karzai does not make any changes or if that deadline is not achieved in six months time?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, first, I thought that the inaugural speech that President Karzai gave today set forth an agenda for change and reform. He was particularly strong on the steps that he intends to take regarding corruption, the idea that government officials will have to register their assets so that any money or other influence can be more easily tracked is a very bold proposal.

So we are heartened by what we see as the agenda for change and reform that was outlined by President Karzai. We think that the issue now is to ensure that it is implemented, that we see results. I had a number of conversations with President Karzai, and I know that he has every intention of moving on these reform measures to stand against corruption and to make the Government of Afghanistan even more effective.

Also, I think what you have seen in the debate in the United States is a very serious effort to try to analyze all the different aspects of the decision that has to be made. And I’m very proud that we have a country and we have a President who really encourages people to express themselves, so that we don’t leave any questions. We try to answer all the questions. And I think when President Obama makes his announcement, he will be very well prepared to express the significance of his decision because he will have asked, and asked many others to contribute to the debate.

I want to make something very clear: Our relationship with Afghanistan is not exclusively military. Obviously, we have troops here along with our allies to try to assist the people of Afghanistan in defeating the terrorist threat. But we also are committed to a long-term relationship with Afghanistan to assist the people of this country in having a better future, having the education and healthcare opportunities, ensuring that the farmers can be productive and have a good income going forward, helping with infrastructure that will enhance the economy of Afghanistan.

So we see our relationship as very broad and deep, and our approach now is to focus on security so that the people of Afghanistan can feel that they are free from intimidation and threats from our common enemy, but it is much more than that as well.

MODERATOR: The next question is Chris Lawrence of CNN.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, Iran now says that it will not export its uranium for further processing, and its courts have now decided to give the death sentence to two – or five, I should say – of its election protestors. How do these two developments affect your efforts to engage Iran in the process?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I think it’s clear that the President and our Administration have made a good-faith effort to reach out to the Iranian leadership. The effort to engage Iran through the P-5+1 process with the offer (inaudible) to Iran, or to ship out its low-enriched uranium in order for it to be reprocessed outside of Iran, had the unified support of the international community. And according to press reports, Iran may well be prepared to reject that offer at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting next week.

And it is important to remember that our approach to Iran was always a dual-track one. On the one hand, we said we would reach out to see whether or not there could be any common discussions about their nuclear program, other problems that we and many countries in the region have with Iran. But we also said that there was a second track, and that track was to work toward consequences for Iran if engagement did not work. As recently as the United Nations meeting in New York in September, I joined with the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China, as well as the EU in signing a document which said basically that. So we will proceed accordingly.

But I do think it is a very unfortunate, distressing development to see these sentences handed down in Iran, imposing the death penalty on people who participated in expressing their opposition to the government in demonstrating in the streets, and it underscores the approach that this government in Iran takes for their own people. So we will proceed on our international track and we will continue to stand up for the rights of the people of Iran to speak for themselves, to have their votes counted, to be given the opportunity to have the measure of freedom and rights that any person deserves to have.

MODERATOR: Okay. The next question is BBC (inaudible).

QUESTION: (Via interpreter) My question, please, Secretary Clinton, is that today in the inauguration ceremony, we saw the two warlords standing on each side of President Karzai. So if people like this remain in the future government, what will be the reaction of the United States Government in the future?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, we understand the concerns that have been expressed about this. We have certainly conveyed those concerns ourselves. What we are looking for in the second term of President Karzai is an effective government that respects the rights of the people of Afghanistan, delivers services to them, responds in a transparent and accountable way to the concerns of the people. Anyone who’s in the government should agree with that kind approach that President Karzai outlined today.

And we expect that the government he is putting together will abide by the directions that his inaugural speech set. And we want to work with a government that is ready to meet the needs of the people of this country, and that is our priority and that’s what we’re going to expect from the government.

MODERATOR: Final question is to Nick Kralev of Washington Times.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, I wanted to ask you about two issues that the president mentioned in his speech. And the first was his goal that in five years Afghan troops will take responsibility for the security of the entire country and the foreign troops out. Is that goal too ambitious? Do you think it’s doable? And what’s the link between that goal and to what might happen to the American troops?

And the second question on corruption. He wasn’t very specific in what he said. He was very general and vague. In your private meetings with him and his ministers, were they any more specific about the measures they have in mind to prove to you that they have really resolved to fight corruption?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, as to the first question, I was personally pleased to see the president set an ambitious goal for the training of the Afghan national security forces. It is a goal that he believes can be met. We want to assist him and the military and police leadership in Afghanistan to move as quickly as they can to stand up and deploy a professional, motivated, effective force on behalf of the people of this country.

And I think that both the analysis that General McChrystal has made and the analysis that’s been made within the Afghan Government is that we can do more, we can provide greater support to assist them in doing that. And we intend to follow through. It is clearly one of the highest priorities, both for the government and people of Afghanistan, as well, as for our NATO ISAF leadership here, because the goal is to create conditions of security that will be able to be transferred and maintained by the Afghan security forces. And we are – we’re going to work with the president to try to move toward the goal that he set.

Secondly, I had a somewhat different reaction. I’ve sat through a lot of inaugural speeches, and they often don’t get down to specifics at all. As I recall, the president talked about the registration of assets, which is a very tangible demand that will be placed on government officials, the major crimes tribunal, the end of a culture of impunity. I thought that the commitment that we heard today from President Karzai gives us all a very strong base on which to measure the actions taken by his government. He could have been very vague and talked about how we’re all against it and we all want to end it, but he got much more specific. And we’re going to – along with the people of Afghanistan – watch very carefully as to how that’s implemented.

So thank you all very much. It’s been wonderful being back here, and I really appreciate the chance to participate in this historic day here in Afghanistan. Thank you.

Opening Remarks for Hearing on Counterterrorism in Africa (Sahel Region)

Johnnie Carson
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs

Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa

Washington, DC

November 17, 2009

Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Isakson, and Members of the Committee:

I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss our counterterrorism approach in Africa’s Sahel region. I look forward to working with the Congress, and especially with this Committee, to identify appropriate tools to support the efforts of the countries in the region to improve their long-term security and constrict the ability of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and a variety of criminal networks to exploit the area’s vast territory.

This hearing is very timely. While the security challenges in the Sahel are not new, several attacks in recent months against African and western targets have drawn additional focus to the situation. Key countries in the area, including Algeria, Mali and Mauritania, have intensified efforts to coordinate their activities against AQIM and address the region’s short, medium, and long-term vulnerabilities. At the same time, we have consulted with African and European partners to identify areas where we can more effectively support regional efforts to improve the security environment in the Sahel over the long-term.

The United States can play a helpful supporting role in the regional effort, but we must avoid taking actions that could unintentionally increase local tensions or lend credibility to AQIM’s claims of legitimacy. First and foremost, we must be sensitive to local political dynamics and avoid precipitous actions which exacerbate long-standing and often bloody conflicts.

AQIM’s ideology and violent tactics are antithetical to the vast majority of people in the region and the group’s ability to mobilize significant popular support for its objectives has been largely frustrated. It has failed to build and sustain meaningful alliances with insurgencies and criminal networks operating in the region. In fact, AQIM’s murder of a Malian military officer this summer, the unprecedented execution of a British hostage, and the murder of an American citizen in Mauritania may have caused some groups in Northern Mali to sever opportunistic economic arrangements occasionally established to supplement local groups’ efforts to survive in the region’s austere environment. By contrast, the perceptions of the United States have been generally favourable throughout the Sahel, even during periods when our popularity around the world declined. It is instructive that a 2008 poll involving 18 Muslim countries revealed that Mauritanians had the highest opinion of the United States.

The countries in the region continue to demonstrate the political will to combat terrorism and trans-national crime. They have explicitly stated that the Sahel’s security is the responsibility of the countries in the region. They have not asked the United States to take on a leadership role in counterterrorism efforts and have, in fact, clearly signalled that a more visible or militarily proactive posture by the United States would be counterproductive. We fully concur that the appropriate roles for the United States and other third countries with even more significant interests in the region must be to support regional security efforts while continuing to provide meaningful development assistance to the more remote areas. Moreover, we have emphasized that while the United States will do its part, the burden must be shared.

We recognize, however, that the security environment in the Sahel requires sustained attention to address a wide range of vulnerabilities and capacity deficits. There is insufficient capacity to monitor and protect immense swaths of largely ungoverned or poorly governed territory. The arid northern half of Mali alone covers an area larger than Texas. Niger is the poorest country in the world according to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Mauritania and Mali rank near the bottom of the Human Development Index scale.

The vulnerability of the northern Sahel has not only led AQIM to seek out safe-havens in the region, but has also enabled the operations of a range of trans-national criminal networks. Criminal traffickers in human beings, weapons, and narcotics also exploit parts of the region. West Africa has emerged as a major trans-shipment area for cocaine flowing from South America to Europe. Narco-trafficking poses a direct threat to U.S. interests since the proceeds of cocaine-trafficked through the region generally flow back to Latin American organizations moving drugs to the United States.

The Committee has asked how our counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel relate to our long-term goals of good governance, civilian control over security forces, and respect for human rights. The first priority President Obama has identified for our Africa policy is helping to build strong and stable democracies on the continent. This is essential in West Africa. In recent years, the region has witnessed two military coups in Mauritania, deeply flawed elections in Nigeria, and an undemocratic seizure of power in Niger. Our experience in the region has underscored the urgency of improving governance, strongly promoting the rule of law, developing durable political and economic institutions at all levels of society, and maintaining professional security forces under civilian control.

Meaningful progress in these areas is crucial to the success of ongoing efforts against AQIM and other criminal networks. The groups are drawn to areas where they can take advantage of political and economic vulnerabilities to safeguard their operating spaces and lifelines, cross borders with impunity, and attract recruits. They benefit when security forces and border guards lack the necessary training, equipment, intelligence, and mobility to disrupt their activities. Their cause is advanced when human rights abuses undermine the credibility of security forces. Terrorists and criminal organizations also take advantage of weak or corrupt criminal justice systems unable to effectively investigate, prosecute and incarcerate all forms of criminals.

Underdevelopment in key areas represents a critical security challenge in the Sahel. The region is extremely diverse and the sources of insecurity in the region vary. In Northern Mali, for example, insecurity in isolated border areas and along traditional smuggling routes is perpetuated by unmet economic expectations and the lack of legitimate alternatives to smuggling or opportunistic commerce with criminal networks. Mali is one of Africa’s most stable democracies, but its efforts to address insecurity in the northern part of the country are severely hampered by poor infrastructure and the inability to provide adequate service delivery and educational and vocational opportunities to isolated areas. This dynamic can become particularly problematic in cases where AQIM has provided small amounts of food and other consumables to generate good-will or at least tolerance from groups living in their vicinity.

Although AQIM’s attempts to recruit in Mali and elsewhere in the Sahel have been largely unsuccessful, its limited successes in countries such as Mauritania can largely be traced to its ability to capitalize on the frustration among the young over insufficient educational or vocational opportunities. AQIM has also attracted recruits and material support from isolated communities or neighbourhoods in Mauritania and elsewhere that lack alternatives to schools, media or networking centers that promote violent extremism.

The United States’ primary instrument to advance counterterrorism objectives in the Sahel and the Maghreb is the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). TSCTP is a multi-year commitment designed to support partner country efforts in the Sahel and the Maghreb to constrict and ultimately eliminate the ability of terrorist organization to exploit the region. The rationale and overarching strategy for TSCTP was approved by a National Security Council (NSC) Deputies Committee in 2005. TSCTP originally included Algeria, Chad, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia; Burkina Faso was added in 2009.

TSCTP serves two primary purposes. The program identifies and mobilizes resources from throughout the interagency to support sustained efforts to address violent extremism in the region. It was understood when TSCTP was created that sporadic engagements without adequate follow-up or sustainment would fail to achieve meaningful long-term results in a region with a multitude of basic needs. The emphasis was therefore placed on key capacity deficits that could be addressed over a period of years. The program draws resources and expertise from multiple agencies in the U.S. government including the State Department, the Department of Defense, and USAID. As the threat levels, political environments and material needs differ substantially among the partner countries, most engagements and assistance packages under TSCTP are tailored to fit the priorities of the individual countries.

TSCTP was also designed to coordinate the activities of the various implementing agencies. The coordination takes place at several levels. Action Officers representing the various agencies meet periodically in Washington to coordinate activities and share information. Representatives from Washington and AFRICOM also meet regularly with our Embassies in TSCTP countries. The first line of coordination and oversight takes place at our Embassies. While various assessments and inputs from throughout the interagency inform decisions regarding TSCTP programming, Chiefs of Mission must concur with all proposed activities. They are best placed to understand the immediate and long-term implications of various activities and are ultimately the primary interlocutors with the host countries.

Forming a definitive conclusion at this relatively early stage regarding whether our counter-terrorism approach in the Sahel is working is difficult, but we believe that we are making important progress. For example, TSCTP resources contributed to training and equipping more capable and professional security forces in Mauritania. We believe that our work with Mali to support more professional units capable of improving the security environment in the country will have future benefits if they are sustained. Our public affairs teams and USAID are implementing a range of beneficial exchanges and projects in Mali and promoting outreach to communities potentially vulnerable to extremism in Mauritania, Chad, Senegal, and elsewhere.

The decision in 2005 to focus on long-term capacity-building rather than search for quick fixes was clearly correct, even more so given the limited absorptive capacity of these countries. Clear victories against the underlying security and developmental challenges in the region are unlikely to clearly announce themselves in the near term, but I am confident that a steady and patient approach provides the best opportunity for success.

The recognition that we must take a holistic approach involving multiple agencies was also correct. Efforts to improve interagency coordination and the vital coordination between our Missions and program managers in Washington and Stuttgart have been crucial. We continue to seek a balance between the financial resources for the development and diplomatic pieces of TSCTP and funding devoted to military to military activities. We will continue to work toward a balanced approach envisioned when the program was created.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you have.