Visit of President U Thein Sein of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar / U.S. Assistance

The United States recognizes the important ongoing reform efforts underway by President Thein Sein, his government, Parliament, and key stakeholders among civil society to build a modern, peaceful, and democratic country. Building on a long legacy of support for the aspirations of the Burmese people, the United States is providing assistance to strengthen and accelerate the political, economic, and social transition; promote and strengthen respect for human rights; deliver the benefits of reform to the country’s people; and support the development of a stable society that reflects the diversity of all its people.

Drawing on the technical expertise and assets of U.S. Government agencies, institutes of higher education, U.S. businesses, nongovernmental organizations, and other partners, the United States is working to bring American ingenuity and ideas to the Burmese people. Through our calibrated policy and targeted foreign assistance programs and partnerships, we are working with the government and civil society to foster a sustainable transition to a democracy that respects and promotes human rights. Program activities include the following:

• Recognizing that the development of a transparent, accountable, representative government responsive to the needs of the people is critical for the democratic transition, the U.S. Government is assisting in improving electoral administration to ensure free, fair, and credible elections in 2015 as well as promote voter education, strengthen parliament, and support political party development. U.S. assistance promotes legal reform by supporting the technical capacity of the Government and empowering a broad-based civil society.
   
• The reestablishment of the Fulbright program is an important opportunity for the people of our two countries to work and learn side by side, teach students, build human capital and institutional capacity, and engage in scholarly collaboration through educational exchanges. In addition, EducationUSA advising offered at the U.S. Embassy provides accurate, comprehensive, and current information about how to apply to U.S. colleges and universities; the first ever EducationUSA fair in Rangoon in February 2013 drew the participation of 10 U.S. institutions and more than 1000 students and parents.
   
• The United States is catalyzing university-private sector partnerships involving U.S. businesses and U.S. and Burmese institutions of higher education to address critical development needs. The American Center in Rangoon, which has the highest attendance of any American Center in the world, trains political, civil society and labor activists in democratic systems, and civic engagement.
   
• The United States welcomes the Government’s support for the establishment of a Peace Corps program. A new program would not only build strong people-to-people ties between the people of our two countries, but also help meet development needs.
   
• Recognizing the role of agriculture in providing livelihoods for the majority of the Burmese people, the U.S. Government has funded a study that provides an expanded knowledge base for developing food security programs. In addition to providing essential health services, the United States is also laying the groundwork for the country’s first ever Demographic and Health Survey, which will provide data to relevant authorities, service providers, and the international community to best serve the health needs of the people.
   
• One of the country’s most significant challenges is achieving the national unity that has eluded it since independence. U.S. assistance aims to address the root causes of long-running conflicts and ethnic tensions. In addition, we continue to provide substantial humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected and vulnerable populations in border areas, the interior of the country, and in the region.
   
• The United States is taking additional steps to promote inclusive, broad-based economic development and strengthen economic relations between our two countries. Following the targeted easing in 2012 of economic sanctions, in consultation with Congress, we are supporting U.S. businesses as they apply their high standards in bringing responsible investment to Burma. We also seek to support reform by leveraging the talents and resources of the U.S. private sector to enhance economic development and extend the benefits of economic reform to all of the country’s people.
   
• As reaffirmed in a joint statement, the United States, through the State Department’s Energy Governance and Capacity Initiative, intends to provide technical assistance in support of the implementation of international best practices in oil and gas management and oversight, financial accountability, and safety and environmental stewardship.
   
• The United States is providing assistance to facilitate the transformational opportunities that result from a competitive and accessible telecommunications market. As the country liberalizes its telecommunications sector, the U.S. Government intends to provide technical assistance and capacity building, provide counsel in the development of a national broadband plan, and assist in the development of a universal service plan, supporting the government in meeting its goals to rapidly expand connectivity across the country in the context of an open regulatory and legal framework.

With these and other activities, the United States underscores our commitment to support and assist all of the people of Burma in their efforts to embrace reform and promote and respect human rights, and highlights our dedication to help them realize the full potential of their extraordinary country.

For further information, please visit:

http://www.state.gov/p/eap/ci/bm/

http://www.usaid.gov/burma

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External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein.

Benghazi Accountability Review Board Implementation

Following the September 11, 2012 attack on U.S. government facilities in Benghazi, Libya, the independent Benghazi Accountability Review Board (ARB) issued 29 recommendations (24 of which were unclassified) to the Department of State. The Department accepted each of the ARB’s recommendations and is committed to implementing them. This will require fundamentally reforming the organization in critical ways. While risk can never be completely eliminated from our diplomatic duties, we must always work to minimize it. A brief summary of the Department’s actions on the 24 unclassified recommendations is as follows:

Unclassified Recommendations of the ARB (Text abridged) and Department Actions

OVERARCHING SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

1. The Department must strengthen security for personnel and platforms beyond traditional reliance on host government security support in high risk, high threat posts.

• The Department established a High Threat Board to review our presence at High Threat, High Risk posts; the Board will review these posts every 6 months.
• We created a Deputy Assistant Secretary for High Threat Posts in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), who is responsible for ensuring that such posts receive the focused attention they need.

2. The Board recommends that the Department re-examine DS organization and management, with a particular emphasis on span of control for security policy planning for all overseas U.S. diplomatic facilities.

• The Department established a six-person panel to thoroughly review DS’s organization and management structure; the panel has developed draft findings.

3. Regional bureaus should have augmented support within the bureau on security matters, to include a senior DS officer to report to the regional Assistant Secretary.

• DS staff attend regular Regional Bureau meetings, and Regional Bureau staff attend DS daily briefings to better communicate on security issues.
• The Department has adjusted the work requirements (position descriptions) for senior level staff (Assistant Secretaries and Deputy Assistant Secretaries) to reflect everyone’s responsibility for overseas security.

4. The Department should establish a panel of outside independent experts (military, security, humanitarian) with experience in high risk, high threat areas to identify best practices (from other agencies and other countries), and evaluate U.S. security platforms in high risk, high threat posts.

• The Department established a six-person panel to identify best practices used by other agencies and countries; this panel’s work is expected to be complete by late summer.

5. The Department should develop minimum security standards for occupancy of temporary facilities in high risk, high threat environments, and seek greater flexibility to make funds rapidly available for security upgrades at such facilities.

• The Department has re-affirmed that Overseas Security Policy Board Standards apply to temporary facilities.
• We identified flexible funding authorities to make improvements to our overseas facilities.

6. Before opening or re-opening critical threat or high risk, high threat posts, the Department should establish a multi-bureau support cell, residing in the regional bureau.

• The Department developed standard operating procedures for “Support Cells” for opened/reopened posts. The process is being incorporated into the Foreign Affairs Handbook.

7. All State Department and other government agencies’ facilities should be collocated when they are in the same metropolitan area, unless a waiver has been approved.

• We verified all data on our overseas facilities; we are exploring which non-collocated facilities can be eliminated and their personnel relocated.

8. The Secretary should require an action plan from DS, OBO, and other relevant offices on the use of fire as a weapon against diplomatic facilities, including immediate steps to deal with urgent issues.

• The Department issued guidance to all posts on “weapons of opportunity.”
• Fire testing is ongoing at U.S. military facilities.

9. The Department should revise its guidance to posts and require key offices to perform in-depth status checks of post tripwires.

• The Department reviewed and revised requirements for posts on how to respond to changing security benchmarks (i.e., “tripwires”).
• The Department established a Washington-based "Tripwires Committee" to review tripwires upon breach, to help ensure that posts and regional bureaus in Washington respond more quickly should security deteriorate at post.

10. The State Department must work with Congress to restore the Capital Security Cost Sharing Program [for embassy construction] at its full capacity, adjusted for inflation to approximately $2.2 billion in fiscal year 2015.

• The FY14 President's Budget included a request for $2.2 billion in the Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance account.

11. The Board supports the State Department’s initiative to request additional Marines and expand the Marine Security Guard (MSG) Program – as well as corresponding requirements for staffing and funding.

• Along with the Congress and Department of Defense, we are working to increase the number of Marine Security Guards at U.S. diplomatic facilities, and have requested (and received) more resources to build facilities at additional posts to host Marine Security Guards in the future.

STAFFING HIGH RISK, HIGH THREAT POSTS

12. The Board strongly endorses the Department’s request for increased DS personnel for high- and critical-threat posts and for additional Mobile Security Deployment teams, as well as an increase in DS domestic staffing in support of such action.

• With Congressional support, the Department is creating 151 new Diplomatic Security positions -- 113 are expected to be hired this fiscal year. The remainder will be hired in FY14.

13. The Department should assign key policy, program, and security personnel at high risk, high threat posts for a minimum of one year. For less critical personnel, the temporary duty length (TDY) length should be no less than 120 days.

• All high threat posts now have a minimum of a one-year tour of duty. We are planning to ensure overlap between incumbent and incoming positions to facilitate continuity of operations at high threat posts.
• Temporary duty assignments are set at a minimum of 120 days.

14. The Department needs to review the staffing footprints at high risk, high threat posts, with particular attention to ensuring adequate Locally Employed Staff (LES) and management support. High risk, high threat posts must be funded and the human resources process prioritized to hire LES interpreters and translators.

• The Department surveyed every post to review the numbers of interpreters and translators on staff, and found that there was adequate staffing.

15. With increased and more complex diplomatic activities in the Middle East, the Department should enhance its ongoing efforts to significantly upgrade its language capacity, especially Arabic, among American employees, including DS, and receive greater resources to do so.

• The Department is ramping up the language capacity of its American employees, including Diplomatic Security agents, especially in Arabic. Increasing language capacity takes time – certain languages take up to 2 years to learn. In the short term, the Department is committed to better equipping the growing cadre of security experts to engage local populations and cooperate with host nation security forces.

TRAINING AND AWARENESS

16. A panel of Senior Special Agents and Supervisory Special Agents should revisit DS high-threat training with respect to active internal defense and fire survival as well as Chief of Mission protective detail training.

• The Department established a panel of Supervisory Special Agents to participate in a Program Review of the High Threat Tactical Course; as a result, DS revised high-threat training and COM protective detail training and raised standards for passing the High Threat Tactical Course. DS and the Foreign Service Institute are currently revising the curriculum.
• DS is pursuing a high-threat training strategy that will incorporate elements of this training across the full spectrum of courses required for DS special agents throughout their careers.

17. The Diplomatic Security Training Center and Foreign Service Institute should collaborate in designing joint courses that integrate high threat training and risk management decision processes for senior and mid-level DS agents and Foreign Service Officers and better prepare them for leadership positions in high risk, high threat posts.

• The Department has enhanced security training efforts, including by requiring personnel headed to high threat posts to receive additional, specialized security training.

SECURITY AND FIRE SAFETY EQUIPMENT

18. The Department should ensure provision of adequate fire safety and security equipment for safe havens and safe areas in non-Inman/SECCA facilities, as well as high threat Inman facilities.

• The Department has surveyed fire and life safety equipment requirements abroad and is now upgrading this equipment, to include enhanced fire safety equipment and personal protective equipment, at all high-threat, high-risk U.S. diplomatic posts abroad.

19. There have been technological advancements in non-lethal deterrents, and the State Department should ensure it rapidly and routinely identifies and procures additional options for non-lethal deterrents in high risk, high threat posts and trains personnel on their use.

• The Department has addressed this recommendation.

20. DS should upgrade surveillance cameras at high risk, high threat posts for greater resolution, nighttime visibility, and monitoring capability beyond post.

• Over the next year the Department will have upgraded high-threat, high-risk facilities with more modern surveillance cameras that feature greater resolution and monitoring capability at all times of day.

INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ANALYSIS

21. Careful attention should be given to factors showing a deteriorating threat situation in general as a basis for improving security posture. Key trends must be quickly identified and used to sharpen risk calculations.

• The Department has addressed this recommendation.

22. The DS Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis should report directly to the DS Assistant Secretary and directly supply threat analysis to all DS components, regional Assistant Secretaries, and Chiefs of Mission in order to get key security-related threat information into the right hands more rapidly.

• The DS Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, now reports directly to the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security for threat reporting and supplies threat analysis to regional Assistant Secretaries and Chiefs of Mission.

PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY

23. The Board is of the view that findings of unsatisfactory leadership performance by senior officials in relation to the security incident under review should be a potential basis for discipline recommendations by future ARBs, and would recommend a revision of Department regulations or amendment to the relevant statute to this end.

• The Department is working with Congress to increase accountability. In January, the Department proposed legislation to grant future ARBs the authority to recommend disciplinary action on the basis of unsatisfactory leadership, and thus increase accountability for security incidents.

24. The Board was humbled by the courage and integrity shown by those on the ground in Benghazi and Tripoli, in particular the DS agents and Annex team who defended their colleagues… We trust that the Department and relevant agencies will take the opportunity to recognize their exceptional valor and performance, which epitomized the highest ideals of government service.

• The President and the Secretary of State have publicly mentioned the bravery and heroic efforts of our personnel on numerous occasions.
• The Department bestowed the Holbrooke award on Ambassador Chris Stevens; the Thomas Jefferson award to the personnel who gave their lives in September; the Secretary’s award to one officer who was seriously injured; and the Secretary's Heroism Award to 12 personnel who defended the Benghazi facilities.

The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department.
External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein.

U.S. Policy and Programs in Support of International Religious Freedom

The Department of State, our missions abroad, and especially the Office of International Religious Freedom in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, leverage the various tools of the U.S. Government to promote and protect religious liberty around the world. Led in these efforts by the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom Suzan Johnson Cook and the new Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism Ira Forman, we use bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, public diplomacy, reporting, Countries of Particular Concern designations, and foreign assistance programming to urge greater respect for religious freedom for all, assist members of religious minorities, increase societal respect for religious freedom, highlight abuses, and monitor and combat anti-Semitism.

The Obama Administration has prioritized integrating religious freedom and religion writ large into the U.S. Government’s broader foreign policy objectives. Specifically, the Department of State has emphasized freedom of religion and protection of religious minorities by: 1) encouraging accountability for religious-based violence and ensuring the protection of citizens and places of worship; 2) urging governments to adopt legal protections for religious freedom and minorities and to amend or rescind restrictive laws; and 3) promoting societal respect for religious freedom and diversity.

Officers at U.S. missions abroad meet regularly with government officials and representatives of religious groups, both large and small, to discuss religious freedom. U.S officials criticize unjust laws and proposed laws, intervene on behalf of persecuted individuals, urge governments to permit religious groups to register, protest offensive statements by government officials, and encourage interfaith dialogue. In recent months, Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom Suzan Johnson Cook has visited Vietnam, China, and Saudi Arabia, raising religious freedom issues with senior government officials, and meeting with religious leaders of multiple faiths, including those not recognized by governments.

Embassy and consulate officers actively support those who work for a better climate for interfaith cooperation. Embassy officials maintain active relationships with non-governmental organizations, and embassies often host meetings with political and religious leaders to discuss religious freedom issues. This includes engagement with Islamic schools and other educational institutions directly and through exchange programs on topics such as religious freedom, tolerance, and respect for diversity. The executive summary and individual reports of the 2012 International Religious Freedom Report include examples of country-specific efforts.

The United States works through multilateral as well as bilateral channels to promote increased respect for religious freedom. In the multilateral arena, the United States continued to urge implementation of the UN Human Rights Council’s March 2011 adoption of resolution 16/18 on “Combating Intolerance, Negative Stereotyping and Stigmatization of, and Discrimination, Incitement to Violence and Violence Against, Persons Based on Religion or Belief.” This resolution focuses on concrete, positive measures that states can take to combat religious intolerance, rather than pursuing legal measures to restrict speech, including religious expression. The U.S. Government continues to work with its international partners to further this strong stand for freedom of expression and worship, and against discrimination and violence based upon religion or belief.

We continue to focus foreign assistance funds on programs that promote religious freedom and combat anti-Semitism around the world. Projects include a rapid response program to provide emergency assistance to victims of religious persecution; a program that works with madrassahs to advance curriculum reform to promote religious tolerance and combat violent extremism; and a regional strategy linking religious freedom and other human rights with stability and combating violent extremism. We also have programs that promote interfaith cooperation and mutual respect through joint action programs, and others that promote the political rights and representation of religious minorities. Our programs are helping foreign governments review textbooks, curricula, and teacher training materials to identify and promote the removal of content that is biased, intolerant, and inflames sectarian tension. We also have a program that provides training to government officials in all areas of the world on engagement and cultural awareness with religious minorities, and on enforcing nondiscrimination laws.

For more information on the U.S. government's engagement on international religious freedom, visit www.humanrights.gov. Follow Ambassador-at-Large Suzan Johnson Cook on Facebook and Twitter at @HumanRightsGov and @IRFAmbassador.

The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department.
External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein.

Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic

The Government of Canada, the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Government of the Republic of Finland, the Government of Iceland, the Government of the Kingdom of Norway, the Government of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden, and the Government of the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as “the Parties”,

Taking into account the relevant provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,

Being Parties to the 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation,

Taking also into account the 1969 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties,

Taking further into account the “polluter pays” principle as a general principle to be applied,

Recalling the 1996 Ottawa Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council,

Highlighting that in the 2011 Nuuk Declaration on the occasion of the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council, ministers representing the eight Arctic States decided to establish a Task Force to develop an international instrument on Arctic marine oil pollution preparedness and response,

Acknowledging the role of the International Maritime Organization, in particular in the development and adoption of additional rules and standards to address risks specific for operations in the Arctic environment,

Conscious of the threat from marine oil pollution to the vulnerable Arctic marine environment and to the livelihoods of local and indigenous communities,

Mindful that in the event of an oil pollution incident, prompt and effective action and cooperation among the Parties is essential in order to minimize damage that may result from such an incident,

Recognizing the challenges posed by harsh and remote Arctic conditions on oil pollution preparedness and response operations,

Mindful also of the increase in maritime traffic and other human activities in the Arctic region, including activity of Arctic residents and of people coming to the Arctic,

Mindful further that indigenous peoples, local communities, local and regional governments, and individual Arctic residents can provide valuable resources and knowledge regarding the Arctic marine environment in support of oil pollution preparedness and response,

Recognizing also the expertise and roles of various stakeholders relating to oil pollution preparedness and response,

Aware of the Parties’ obligation to protect the Arctic marine environment and mindful of the importance of precautionary measures to avoid oil pollution in the first instance,

Recognizing further the importance of the Arctic marine ecosystem and of cooperation to promote and encourage the conservation and sustainable use of the marine and coastal environment and its natural resources,

Emphasizing the importance of exchanging information, data and experience in the field of marine oil pollution preparedness and response, especially regarding the Arctic environment, and on the effects of pollution on the environment, and of regularly conducting joint training and exercises, as well as joint research and development,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Objective of this Agreement

The objective of this Agreement is to strengthen cooperation, coordination and mutual assistance among the Parties on oil pollution preparedness and response in the Arctic in order to protect the marine environment from pollution by oil.

Article 2

Terms and Definitions

For the purposes of this Agreement:

1. “Oil” means petroleum in any form including crude oil, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse and refined products.

2. “Oil pollution incident” means an occurrence or series of occurrences having the same origin, which results or may result in a discharge of oil and which poses or may pose a threat to the marine environment, or to the coastline or related interests of one or more states, and which requires emergency action or other immediate response.

3. “Ship” means a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine environment and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, and floating craft of any type.

Article 3

Scope of Application of this Agreement

1. This Agreement shall apply with respect to oil pollution incidents that occur in or may pose a threat to any marine area over which a State whose government is a Party to this Agreement exercises sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction, including its internal waters, territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, consistent with international law and above a southern limit as follows:

Canada – marine areas above 60 degrees North;

The Kingdom of Denmark, including Greenland and the Faroes – marine areas above the southern limit of the Greenland exclusive economic zone and the Faroese fisheries zone;

Finland – marine areas above 63 degrees 30 minutes North;

Iceland – marine areas above the southern limit of the exclusive economic zone of Iceland;

Norway – marine areas above the Arctic Circle;

The Russian Federation – marine areas above the coastlines of the White Sea, the Barents Sea, the Kara Sea, the Laptev Sea, the East Siberian Sea and the Chukchi Sea, and the mouths of the rivers flowing into these seas seaward of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured;

Sweden – marine areas above 63 degrees 30 minutes North; and

The United States of America – Marine areas seaward of the coastal baseline from the border between the United States and Canada at the Beaufort Sea along the north side of the mainland of Alaska to the Aleutian Islands, above 24 nautical miles south of the Aleutian Islands, and, in the Bering Sea, east of the limits of the exclusive economic zone of the United States.

2. Each Party shall also apply Articles 6, 7, 8, 10, and 15 and other provisions of this Agreement as appropriate to areas beyond the jurisdiction of any State, above the southern limit set forth in paragraph 1 of this Article, to the extent consistent with international law.

3. This Agreement shall not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary or other ship owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on government non-commercial service. However, each Party shall ensure by the adoption of appropriate measures not impairing the operations or operational capabilities of such ships owned or operated by it, that such ships act in a manner consistent, so far as is reasonable and practicable, with this Agreement.

Article 4

Systems for Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response

1. Each Party shall maintain a national system for responding promptly and effectively to oil pollution incidents. This system shall take into account particular activities and locales most likely to give rise to or suffer an oil pollution incident and anticipated risks to areas of special ecological significance, and shall include at a minimum a national contingency plan or plans for preparedness and response to oil pollution incidents. Such contingency plan or plans shall include the organizational relationship of the various bodies involved, whether public or private, taking into account guidelines developed pursuant to this Agreement and other relevant international agreements.

2. Each Party, as appropriate, in cooperation with other Parties and with the oil and shipping industries, port authorities and other relevant entities, shall establish:

a. a minimum level of pre-positioned oil spill combating equipment, commensurate with the risk involved, and programs for its use;

b. a program of exercises for oil pollution response organizations and training of relevant personnel;

c. plans and communications capabilities for responding to an oil pollution incident; and

d. a mechanism or arrangement to coordinate the response to an oil pollution incident with, if appropriate, the capabilities to mobilize the necessary resources.

Article 5

Authorities and Contact Points

1. Each Party’s national system for responding promptly and effectively to oil pollution incidents shall include as a minimum the designation of:

a. the competent national authority or authorities with responsibility for oil pollution preparedness and response;

b. the national 24-hour operational contact point or points, which shall be responsible for the receipt and transmission of oil pollution reports; and

c. an authority or authorities entitled to act on behalf of the Party to request assistance or to decide to render the assistance requested.

2. The entities designated by each Party pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article are specified in Appendices to this Agreement. Each Party shall promptly inform the other Parties in writing through its competent national authority or authorities and through diplomatic channels of any changes to those designations. The Appendices to this Agreement shall be modified accordingly.

Article 6

Notification

1. Whenever a Party receives information on oil pollution, or possible oil pollution, it shall:

a. assess the event to determine whether it is an oil pollution incident;

b. assess the nature, extent and possible consequences of the oil pollution incident, including taking appropriate steps within available resources to identify possible sources; and

c. then, without delay, inform all States whose interests are affected or likely to be affected by such oil pollution incident, together with

(i) details of its assessments and any action it has taken, or intends to take, to deal with the incident, including mitigation measures, and

(ii) further information as appropriate, until the action taken to respond to the incident has been concluded or until joint action has been decided by such States.

2. When the severity of such oil pollution incident so justifies, the Party shall notify all the other Parties without unnecessary delay.

Article 7

Monitoring

1. Each Party shall endeavor to undertake appropriate monitoring activities in order to identify oil pollution incidents in areas under its jurisdiction and, to the extent feasible, in adjacent areas beyond the jurisdiction of any State.

2. In the event of an oil pollution incident, the Party or Parties affected shall, to the extent possible, monitor the incident to facilitate efficient and timely response operations and to minimize any adverse environmental impacts.

3. The Parties shall endeavor to cooperate in organizing and conducting monitoring, especially regarding transboundary oil pollution, inter alia, through conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements.

Article 8

Requests for Assistance and Coordination and Cooperation in Response Operations

1. The Parties may request assistance from any other Party or Parties to respond to an oil pollution incident.

2. The Parties requesting assistance shall endeavor to specify the type and extent of assistance requested.

3. The Parties shall cooperate and provide assistance, which may include advisory services, technical support, equipment or personnel, for the purpose of responding to an oil pollution incident upon the request of any Party affected or likely to be affected.

Article 9

Movement and Removal of Resources across Borders

In accordance with applicable national and international law, each Party shall take the necessary legal or administrative measures to facilitate:

a. the arrival and utilization in, and departure from, its territory of ships, aircraft and other modes of transport engaged in responding to an oil pollution incident or transporting personnel, cargoes, materials and equipment required to deal with an oil pollution incident;

b. the expeditious movement into, through, and out of its territory of personnel, cargoes, materials, response supplies and other equipment referred to in subparagraph (a).

Article 10

Reimbursement of Costs of Assistance

1. Unless an agreement concerning the financial arrangements governing actions of the Parties to deal with oil pollution incidents has been concluded on a bilateral or multilateral basis prior to an oil pollution incident, the Parties shall bear the costs of their respective actions in dealing with pollution in accordance with subparagraph (a) or subparagraph (b). The principles laid down in this paragraph apply unless the Parties concerned otherwise agree in any individual case.

a. If the action was taken by one Party at the express request of another Party, the requesting Party shall reimburse to the assisting Party the cost of its action. The requesting Party may cancel its request at any time, but in that case it shall bear the costs already incurred or committed by the assisting Party.

b. If the action was taken by a Party on its own initiative, this Party shall bear the costs of its action.

2. Unless otherwise agreed, the costs of action taken by a Party at the request of another Party shall be fairly calculated according to the law and current practice of the assisting Party concerning the reimbursement of such costs.

3. The assisting Party shall be prepared to provide upon request documentation and information to the requesting Party on the assisting Party’s estimated costs for the assistance and on the assisting Party’s actual costs following the provision of any assistance. The Party requesting assistance and the assisting Party shall, where appropriate, cooperate in concluding any action in response to a compensation claim.

4. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be interpreted as in any way prejudicing the rights of Parties to recover from third parties the costs of actions to deal with pollution or the threat of pollution under other applicable rules of national and international law. Special attention shall be paid to international instruments and national law on liability and compensation for oil pollution damage.

Article 11

Joint Review of Oil Pollution Incident Response Operations

After a joint response operation, the Parties shall make best efforts to conduct a joint review of the operation, led by the Party or Parties that coordinated the operation. Where appropriate, and subject to relevant national law, Parties involved in a joint review should document their findings and conclusions and make the results of such joint review publicly available.

Article 12

Cooperation and Exchange of Information

1. The Parties shall promote cooperation and exchange of information that may serve to improve the effectiveness of oil pollution preparedness and response operations. Such cooperation and information exchange may include, inter alia, the topics identified in the Appendices to this Agreement.

2. Each Party, subject to its national law and international law, should endeavor to make information provided to other Parties under paragraph 1 of this Article publicly available.

Article 13

Joint Exercises and Training

1. The Parties shall promote cooperation and coordination by endeavoring to carry out joint exercises and training, including alerting or call-out exercises, table-top exercises, equipment deployment exercises, and other relevant activities.

2. Joint exercises and training should be designed to incorporate lessons learned.

3. Where appropriate, the Parties should include stakeholders in the planning and execution of joint exercises and training.

4. When conducting joint exercises and training, the Parties should apply the relevant provisions of this Agreement to the extent possible.

Article 14

Meetings of the Parties

1. The Parties shall meet no later than one year after the entry into force of this Agreement, as convened by the depositary, and from then on as decided by the Parties. At these meetings, the Parties shall review issues related to the implementation of this Agreement, adopt Appendices to this Agreement or modifications to the Appendices as provided in Article 20 of this Agreement, as appropriate, and consider any other issues as decided by the Parties. Parties may elect to convene such meetings in conjunction with meetings of the Arctic Council.

2. On a regular basis the Parties through their competent national authorities shall discuss and review operational issues related to the implementation of this Agreement, in cooperation, as appropriate, with relevant bodies including but not limited to the Arctic Council. Operational issues include, but are not limited to, cooperation and exchange of available information.

Article 15

Resources

1. Except as otherwise provided in Article 10 of this Agreement or otherwise agreed, each Party shall bear its own costs deriving from its implementation of this Agreement.

2. Implementation of this Agreement, except for Article 10, shall be subject to the capabilities of the Parties and the availability of relevant resources.

Article 16

Relationship with Other International Agreements

Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as altering the rights or obligations of any Party under other relevant international agreements or customary international law as reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Article 17

Non-Parties

Any Party may, where appropriate, seek cooperation with States not party to this Agreement that may be able to contribute to activities envisaged in this Agreement, consistent with international law.

Article 18

Settlement of Disputes

The Parties shall resolve any disputes concerning the application or interpretation of this Agreement through direct consultations.

Article 19

Amendments to this Agreement

1. This Agreement may be amended by written agreement of all the Parties.

2. An amendment shall enter into force 120 days after the date on which the depositary has received the last written notification through diplomatic channels that the Parties have completed the internal procedures required for its entry into force.

Article 20

Appendices

1. The Appendices to this Agreement do not constitute an integral part of this Agreement and are not legally binding.

2. At meetings of the Parties referred to in Article 14 of this Agreement, the Parties may adopt additional Appendices or modifications to existing Appendices, except for those Appendices referred to in Article 5 of this Agreement, which may be modified as provided therein.

Article 21

Operational Guidelines

1. The Parties shall develop and maintain a set of Operational Guidelines to assist in the implementation of this Agreement. The Operational Guidelines will be included among the Appendices to this Agreement and be modified as appropriate.

2. The Operational Guidelines shall address, inter alia, the following topics:

a. a system and formats for notification, requests for assistance, and other related information;

b. provision of assistance, as well as coordination and cooperation in response operations involving more than one Party, including in areas beyond the jurisdiction of any State;

c. movement and removal of resources across borders;

d. procedures for conducting joint reviews of oil pollution incident response operations;

e. procedures for conducting joint exercises and training; and

f. reimbursement of costs of assistance.

3. In developing and modifying the Operational Guidelines, the Parties shall seek input from relevant stakeholders as appropriate.

Article 22

Provisional application, Entry into Force and Withdrawal

1. This Agreement may be applied provisionally by any signatory that provides a written statement to the depositary of its intention to do so. Any such signatory shall apply this Agreement provisionally from the date of its statement or from such other date as indicated in its statement.

2. This Agreement shall enter into force 30 days after the date of receipt by the depositary of the last written notification through diplomatic channels that the Parties have completed the internal procedures required for its entry into force.

3. Any Party may at any time withdraw from this Agreement by sending written notification thereof to the depositary through diplomatic channels at least six months in advance, specifying the effective date of its withdrawal. Withdrawal from this Agreement shall not affect its application among the remaining Parties.

4. Withdrawal from this Agreement by a Party shall not affect the obligations of that Party with regard to activities undertaken under this Agreement where those obligations have arisen prior to the effective date of withdrawal.

Article 23

Depositary

The Government of Norway shall be the depositary for this Agreement.

DONE at Kiruna this 15th day of May, 2013, in the English, French and Russian languages, all texts being equally authentic. The working language of this Agreement shall be English, the language in which this Agreement was negotiated.

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Kiruna Declaration: On the Occasion of the Eighth Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council

We, the Ministers representing the eight Arctic States, joined by the representatives of the six Permanent Participant organizations of the Arctic Council, have gathered in Kiruna, Sweden, at the conclusion of the first cycle of Chairmanships for the Eighth Ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council,

Recognizing the importance of maintaining peace, stability, and constructive cooperation in the Arctic,

Recognizing the importance of the sustainable use of resources, economic development and environmental protection,

Recognizing that the Arctic is first and foremost an inhabited region with diverse economies, cultures and societies, further recognizing the rights of the indigenous peoples and interests of all Arctic inhabitants, and emphasizing that a fundamental strength of the Council is the unique role played by Arctic indigenous peoples,

Expressing concern that global emissions of greenhouse gases are resulting in rapid changes in the climate and physical environment of the Arctic with widespread effects for societies and ecosystems and repercussions around the world, reiterating the urgent need for increased national and global actions to mitigate and adapt to climate change,

Noting the substantial progress we have made to strengthen our cooperation and acknowledging the leadership of the Arctic Council in taking concrete action to respond to new challenges and opportunities,

Hereby:

IMPROVING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Recognize the central role of business in the development of the Arctic, and decide to increase cooperation and interaction with the business community to advance sustainable development in the Arctic,

Welcome the Arctic Council’s work on corporate social responsibility and sustainable business, and encourage enterprises operating in the Arctic to respect international guidelines and principles,

Recognize that Arctic economic endeavors are integral to sustainable development for peoples and communities in the region, desire to further enhance the work of the Arctic Council to promote dynamic and sustainable Arctic economies and best practices, and decide to establish a

Task Force to facilitate the creation of a circumpolar business forum,

Welcome the Arctic Maritime and Aviation Transportation Infrastructure Initiative and its comparative analysis of seaport and airport infrastructure in the Arctic States, and encourage continued efforts to identify opportunities for complementary infrastructure development and use,

Appreciate that the first legally binding agreement negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council, the Agreement on Cooperation in Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, has come into force, recognize its important role for safe transport and enhancing cooperation in assisting people in distress in the Arctic, and acknowledge the importance of continued operational exercises in support of its implementation,

Acknowledge that Arctic peoples are experiencing challenges associated with rapid socio-economic and environmental changes, note the previous work of the Arctic Council to promote mental health in Arctic communities, and decide to undertake further work to improve and develop mental wellness promotion strategies,

Recognize that the use of traditional and local knowledge is essential to a sustainable future in the Arctic, and decide to develop recommendations to integrate traditional and local knowledge in the work of the Arctic Council,

Acknowledge the importance of indigenous peoples’ traditional ways of life to their economic well-being, culture and health, and request Senior Arctic Officials to recommend ways to increase awareness regionally and globally on traditional ways of life of the Arctic indigenous peoples and to present a report on this work at the next Ministerial meeting in 2015,

ACTING ON CLIMATE CHANGE

Recognize that climate change in the Arctic causes significant changes in water, snow, ice and permafrost conditions, with cascading effects on biodiversity, ecosystems, economic and human living conditions in the Arctic with repercussions around the world, and that substantial cuts in emissions of carbon dioxide and other long-lived greenhouse gases are necessary for any meaningful global climate change mitigation efforts, and commit to strengthen our efforts to find solutions,

Recognize that Arctic States, along with other major emitters, substantially contribute to global greenhouse gas emissions, and confirm the commitment of all Arctic States to work together and with other countries under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to conclude a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force no later than 2015, and urge all Parties to the Convention to continue to take urgent action to meet the long-term goal aimed at limiting the increase in global average temperature to below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels,

Recognize that reduction of short-lived climate forcers, could slow Arctic and global climate change, and have positive effects on health, and welcome the report on short lived climate forcers, and support its recommendations including that national black carbon emission inventories for the Arctic should continue to be developed and reported as a matter of priority,

Urge the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer to take action as soon as possible, complementary to the UNFCCC, to phase-down the production and consumption of hydrofluorocarbons, which contribute to the warming of the Arctic region,

Decide to establish a Task Force to develop arrangements on actions to achieve enhanced black carbon and methane emission reductions in the Arctic, and report at the next Ministerial meeting in 2015,

Welcome the on-going work on the Arctic Resilience Report, and emphasize the need for forward-looking cooperation with a view to increase Arctic capacity to adequately address rapid change and resilience,

Recognize that adaptation to the impacts of climate change is a challenge for the Arctic, and the need for strengthened collaboration with Arctic indigenous peoples and other residents, governments and industry, welcome the reports, key findings and on-going work on the

Adaptation Actions for a Changing Arctic initiative, and decide to continue the work on enhancing the capacity of decision-makers to manage climate risks including through an on-line information portal and through improved predictions of combined effects,

PROTECTING THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT

Announce the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, the second legally binding agreement negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council, and encourage future national, bi-national and multinational contingency plans, training and exercises, to develop effective response measures,

Recognize that effective prevention, including related containment practices, is critical to ensuring the protection of the Arctic marine environment from oil pollution incidents, welcome the Recommended Practices in the Prevention of Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Project reports and recommendations to Ministers, and encourage Arctic States to pursue further work in the recommended areas,

Decide to establish a Task Force to develop an Arctic Council action plan or other arrangement on oil pollution prevention, and to present the outcomes of its work and any recommendations for further action at the next Ministerial meeting in 2015,

Recognize the value of sustaining Arctic ecosystems and biodiversity and that the Arctic environment needs to be protected as a basis for sustainable development, prosperity, lifestyles and human well-being, and commit to pursue the conservation and sustainable use of Arctic biological resources,

Note with concern that Arctic biodiversity is being degraded and that climate change is the most serious threat, welcome the Arctic Biodiversity Assessment, the first Arctic-wide comprehensive assessment of status and emerging trends in Arctic biodiversity, approve its recommendations and encourage Arctic States to follow up on its recommendations, and instruct Senior Arctic Officials to ensure that a plan for further work under the Arctic Council to support and implement its recommendations is developed, and that a progress report is delivered to the next ministerial meeting,

Encourage Arctic States to take decisive action to help sustain Arctic biodiversity and implement internationally agreed biodiversity objectives, to cooperate on adaptive management strategies for vulnerable species and ecosystems, and to continue existing Arctic biodiversity research and monitoring efforts through the Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program,

Welcome the Arctic Ocean Acidification assessment, approve its recommendations, note with concern the potential impacts of acidification on marine life and people that are dependent on healthy marine ecosystems, recognize that carbon dioxide emission reductions are the only effective way to mitigate ocean acidification, and request the Arctic States to continue to take action on mitigation and adaptation and to monitor and assess the state of Arctic Ocean acidification,

Recognize the important ongoing work in the International Maritime Organization to develop a mandatory Polar Code on shipping and decide to strengthen our collaboration in that work toward its expeditious completion,

Welcome the Arctic Ocean Review report, undertaken to provide guidance to Arctic States on strengthening governance in the Arctic through a cooperative, coordinated and integrated approach to the management of the Arctic marine environment, approve its recommendations and request appropriate follow-up actions, and report on progress at subsequent ministerial meetings,

Recognize that there are further persistent organic pollutants to be addressed that pose threats to human health and the environment in the Arctic, encourage Arctic States to continue monitoring and assessment activities and enhance their efforts to meet the objectives of the Stockholm convention, and welcome the completion of the successful demonstration project preventing the release of 7000 tons of obsolete pesticides into the Arctic environment, and look forward to further activities in this area,

Note the work of the Arctic Council in raising global awareness and understanding of the impacts of mercury on the health of people and wildlife in the Arctic, welcome the Minamata Convention on Mercury, appreciate the reference to the particular vulnerabilities of Arctic ecosystems and indigenous communities, encourage its swift entry into force along with robust use and emission reduction actions, and pledge to assist the evaluation of its effectiveness through continued monitoring and assessments,

Welcome the report on Ecosystem Based Management, approve the definition, principles and recommendations, encourage Arctic States to implement recommendations both within and across boundaries, and ensure coordination of approaches in the work of the Arctic Council’s Working Groups,

Agree that cooperation in scientific research across the circumpolar Arctic is of great importance to the work of the Arctic Council, and establish a Task Force to work towards an arrangement on improved scientific research cooperation among the eight Arctic States,

STRENGTHENING THE ARCTIC COUNCIL

Adopt the statement “Vision for the Arctic”,

Welcome the establishment of the Arctic Council Secretariat in Tromsø, Norway, note the Host Country Agreement signed between the Government of Norway and the Director of the Arctic Council Secretariat, approve its Terms of Reference, Staff rules, Financial rules, Roles and Responsibilities of the Director, and budget for 2013, and instruct Senior Arctic Officials to approve a budget for 2014-2015,

Approve the revised Arctic Council Rules of Procedure,

Note the Chair’s conclusions from the Arctic Environment Ministers Meeting in February 2013, and welcome further high-level engagement and meetings,

Welcome China, India, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea and Singapore as new Observer States, and take note of the adoption by Senior Arctic Officials of an Observer manual to guide the Council’s subsidiary bodies in relation to meeting logistics and the roles played by Observers,

The Arctic Council receives the application of the EU for observer status affirmatively, but defers a final decision on implementation until the Council ministers are agreed by consensus that the concerns of Council members, addressed by the President of the European Commission in his letter of 8 May are resolved, with the understanding that the EU may observe Council proceedings until such time as the Council acts on the letter’s proposal,

Acknowledge that the work of the Arctic Council continues to evolve to respond to new challenges and opportunities in the Arctic, request Senior Arctic Officials to recommend ways and means to strengthen how the work of the Arctic Council is carried out, including identifying opportunities for Arctic States to use the Council’s work to influence and shape action in other regional and international fora as well as identifying approaches to support the active participation of Permanent Participants, and to present a report on their work at the next Ministerial meeting in 2015,

Acknowledge the decision of the Permanent Participants to relocate the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat to Tromsø, Norway,

Adopt the Senior Arctic Officials Report to Ministers, including its working group work plans, and instruct Senior Arctic Officials to review and adjust the mandates and work plans of the Arctic Council working groups and other subsidiary bodies, and establish new ones, if appropriate, and to follow up on the recommendations agreed to by the Arctic Council,

Thank the Kingdom of Sweden for its Chairmanship of the Arctic Council during the period 2011-2013, concluding the first round of eight Arctic States chairmanships, and welcome the offer of Canada to chair the Arctic Council during the period 2013-2015 and to host the Ninth Ministerial meeting in 2015.

Signed by the representatives of the Arctic Council
15th of May 2013 in Kiruna, Sweden.

For the Government of
Canada
Leona Aglukkaq
Minister for the Arctic Council

For the Government of
Denmark
Villy Søvndal
Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Government of
Finland
Erkki Tuomioja
Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Government of
Norway
Espen Barth Eide
Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Government of
Sweden
Carl Bildt
Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Government of
Iceland
Hermann Örn Ingólfsson
Director General

For the Government of
the Russian Federation
Sergey Lavrov
Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Government of the
United States of America
John F Kerry
Secretary of State

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The President's Export Control Reform Initiative: Reinventing the System and Promoting National Security

“We need fundamental reform in all four areas of our current control system – in what we control, how we control it, how we enforce those controls, and how we manage our controls.” - President Barack Obama

President Barack Obama’s Export Control Reform Initiative is a common sense approach to overhauling the nation’s export control system. The President’s entire national security team supports a comprehensive overhaul of the system to meet the current and anticipated U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives of the 21st century.

Reform Goals

The Administration has determined that fundamental reform of the current system is necessary to enhance our national security by: 

• Focusing resources on the threats that matter most
• Increasing interoperability with our Allies
• Strengthening the U.S. defense industrial base by reducing incentives for foreign manufacturers to design out and avoid using U.S. parts and components.

Overlapping Jurisdictions

The current system operates under laws written in the 1970s and is designed to address the challenges of the Cold War. Its functions are spread across seven U.S. Government departments (Commerce, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Treasury). This results in ambiguity and confusion for U.S. companies and leads to jurisdictional disputes between departments, which delay license decisions for months and even years. This harms U.S. business, is bad for enforcing our export control requirements, and impedes our ability to prosecute those who violate U.S. export control laws. The solution is not simply to expand government by adding more licensing and enforcement personnel.

Need for Reform

Without better discrimination among export items and destinations of greatest concern, the U.S. Government would need to continually expand its licensing and enforcement resources to cover every export part and component, even those destined for governments of close Allies. The current system also is slowly strangling the U.S. defense industrial base and eroding America’s ability to manufacture domestically the parts and components needed for its own weapons systems.

National Security Dimension

The Export Control Reform Initiative will improve our ability to meet national security and foreign policy objectives. The reforms will more stringently protect our most sensitive items, ensuring that such items do not go to end-users or end-uses of concern. As part of these reforms, the Administration is recalibrating the controls and licensing requirements on items that, if diverted, pose a low risk to national security, so the government can focus its review on and improve its ability to protect more critical items. This amounts to a good government prioritization of our export controls.

Enhancing Export Prohibitions

The reform initiative will enhance, not ease, the prohibitions on destinations like Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria, and will reinforce the U.S. policy of not supporting China’s military modernization program. 

To follow developments on the reform initiative, visit www.export.gov/ecr

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