Recent Developments in Honduras

Thomas A. Shannon, Jr.
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs

Dan Restrepo, White House Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs

Via Teleconference

Washington, DC

October 30, 2009

OPERATOR: Welcome and thank you for standing by. At this time, all participants are in a listen-only mode. During the question-and-answer session, please press *1 on your touchtone phone. Today’s conference is being recorded. If anyone has any objections, you may disconnect at this time. I would like to go ahead and turn today’s call over to Ian Kelly. Sir, you may begin.

MR. KELLY: Welcome to our conference call. We have two speakers in Tegucigalpa. They are Tom Shannon, Assistant Secretary, and Dan Restrepo, who is a senior director at the NSC. We don’t have a whole lot of time, only around 15 minutes, so I’m going to turn it right over to Mr. Shannon.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: Thank you very much, Ian, really happy to talk to you all. I look forward to your questions. We’ve got kind of a brief opening statement. I mean, as you know, an agreement was reached last night at the negotiating table between representatives of President Zelaya and de facto regime leader Roberto Micheletti that effectively opens a pathway to resolve Honduras’s current political crisis and that will allow the international community to support Honduras’s elections on November 29^th.

This is an important moment for Honduras. This is an agreement done by Hondurans in response to a Honduran crisis in which we and the international community, especially the Organization of American States, provided support and facilitation. But what’s striking about this agreement is, as Secretary Clinton noted yesterday, I’m not aware of another country in Latin America having suffered the kind of rupture of democratic and constitutional order that Honduras did on June 28, having been able to find a way out of that rupture and repair that rupture through internal dialogue, obviously with help from the international community, but peacefully without violence and without an imposition of a solution from outside.

This is a huge accomplishment for the Hondurans. It’s a big accomplishment for the Organization of American States. I think it shows the value and worth of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. But it also highlights a central aspect of our diplomacy in the hemisphere as articulated by President Obama and Secretary Clinton, which is to work off broad principles that are shared through the region, but to develop a pragmatic approach in our diplomacy based on those principles, but that uses dialogue and engagement and cooperative action with key allies and partners in the region to achieve results that are in the broad United States interest, but also in the interest of the region. And as we move forward, we’ve got a lot of work in front of us. The implementation of this agreement is going to be complicated and it’s going to require a lot of international cooperation and support. But we’re on a good path right now. We’re looking towards a good, peaceful election on November 29 and a peaceful transfer of power in Honduras on January 27.

Let me stop there and take your questions.

OPERATOR: Thank you. We will now begin the question-and-answer session. If you’d like to ask a question on the phone, please press *1, please unmute your phone and record your name clearly when prompted. Your name is required to introduce your question. To withdraw your question, press *2. One moment, please, for the first question.

The first question comes from Nicholas Kralev. Your line is open.

QUESTION: Thank you. Hi, Tom. It’s only been a few hours obviously since the agreement, but in your mind, what is the most fragile part of it that you and your partners will have to really work hard to make sure that it doesn’t unravel in the next few weeks?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: Well, there’s a variety of moving parts to this agreement. One of the most important and immediate parts is setting up a government of national unity. The second is setting up a commission of verification in which notable Hondurans and notable members of the international community will join together to oversee the implementation of this agreement and ensure that it’s being done in a transparent and fair way. But obviously, the nut of the problem here, what really was the difficult issue to deal with was the issue of restitution of President Zelaya.

And as I’m sure you know, the agreement effectively sends the issue of restitution to the congress with both President Zelaya and Mr. Micheletti agreeing that at the end of the day, the congress, in consultation with the Supreme Court and other organisms of the Honduran state, will determine when, if, and how President Zelaya returns to office. And that is the issue that is going to be the most provocative internally in Honduras and probably the one where we and the rest of the international community are going to have to pay the closest attention.

OPERATOR: The next question comes from Mary Beth Sheridan. Your line is open.

QUESTION: Hi, Tom. Thanks for taking these questions. Congress obviously stripped President Zelaya of his power, so why is there any thought that it might restore him the presidency?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: Because of the political dynamic inside of the country.

MR. RESTREPO: Right.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: First, because – although the congress did do what you suggested, there was a dissident component of the congress that did not participate in it. That dissident component is still there. There is a liberal party that is fractured inside that congress which is competing for elections and is looking for a way to repair that fracture and to present a more united front in the elections. And there is a national party which does not want to be tagged one way or another in regard to Mr. Zelaya’s future, and therefore is insisting that it’s up to the liberal party to make a decision before it defines itself.

So there is an evolving and an emerging political dynamic inside the congress that really makes this whole issue up for grabs and requires some real political leadership. But that said, there’s another point that I think needs to be made here, and that is that as the negotiators work through the issue of restitution, the reason they agreed to send this back to the congress is at the end of the day, they realize that this was a political decision and that this decision had to be made in the political body. Not the Supreme Court, which was the legal body, but the congress, which is a political body.

And more importantly, they were looking for a way to root the agreement in a democratic institution. They wanted it to be more than just an agreement between two political leaders, between President Zelaya and Mr. Micheletti. They wanted this to be something where political parties and the different sectors of Honduran society had to commit themselves.

MR. RESTREPO: And Mary Beth – this is Dan Restrepo – I think it’s also important to recall congress acted in a very different environment and a very charged and heated environment when it acted in the wake of the events of the early morning of June 28. This provides a very different context in which the congress can carry out its responsibilities, its political responsibilities, within the context of Honduran institutionality and constitutional order. So it’s a very different moment in time in which the institution and the body – the Honduran body politic – will have to reflect upon this question of the way – of the proper way forward to create an enduring, sustainable democratic order here in Honduras.

OPERATOR: Next question comes from Tim Padgett. Your line is open.

QUESTION: Thank you very much, both Tom and Dan. I was curious, given how observist Micheletti has been in the past months about the issue of restoration of President Zelaya, what to your mind was the factor that finally pushed him over the line on that issue? What finally convinced him that he had to accept that?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: I think recognition that Honduras has to go to elections with the support of the international community, and that lacking that support, the elections were actually going to deepen the political crisis and make Honduras’s relationship with the international community even more problematic.

And that it was worth the political risk in order to ensure that on November 29^th, there were international observers on the ground and broad recognition in the OAS and elsewhere that the results of that election were going to be free, fair, and legitimate, and that the president who takes power on January 27^th was going to be in a position to petition for Honduras’s reintegration into the Inter-American community and to begin to get access again to international financial institutions. Another –

QUESTION: Did the --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: Go ahead.

QUESTION: Did the U.S. make it more of a condition? Was the U.S. a little harder on that point now during these talks this week that it would not accept the results of the election?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: Well, I mean, we’ve been clear for quite some time, and the Hondurans have understood us and – but I think what was important here is not so much what we were telling Micheletti as what other Hondurans were telling Micheletti.

We’ve had a very, very active outreach program over the past several weeks. And over the past two days, while some of the team here has been working with the negotiators around the dialogue table, others of us have been out talking to just about every Honduran we could get our hands on. And these Hondurans, I think, had been communicating directly to Mr. Micheletti and to President Zelaya about how we saw things and what our intentions were.

And I think at the end of the day, it was Hondurans talking to each other that allowed Micheletti and Zelaya to make the decisions they did.

MR. RESTREPO: Yeah, and to underscore Tom’s last point, one of the striking things in our broad set of discussions here over the course of the last few days was the recognition throughout Honduran society, regardless of where people find themselves on the political spectrum of this notion, that for Honduras to move forward in a sustainable way, it needed to do so accompanied by the international community.

And I think that message resonated throughout Honduran political and civil society, and was clearly being reflected back to the leadership on both sides. And I think that was a crucial factor – it wasn’t just that Roberto Micheletti changed his mind. It was that Honduran society had come to the recognition that the path forward, accompanied by the international community, was the right path forward. And then that got reflected back to the political leadership and created the conditions for them to make the decisions that they made last night.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: I would like to highlight that these decisions weren’t easy for either one of them to make. And after the agreement was done, our team visited both of these leaders – Mr. Micheletti and President Zelaya – to congratulate them on the work of their negotiators and to praise them for their political leadership and vision.

QUESTION: Thank you.

OPERATOR: Next question comes from Juan Lovez, CNN.

QUESTION: Yes, hi. Thank you. We’ve seen a lot of congratulatory emails and messages from members of the Congress, especially from Democrats. Have any of the members of Congress been in touch with you on these negotiations? And how likely is it for Manuel Zelaya to return to power? And how likely is it that he will keep his word if he doesn’t return to power?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: I mean, in regards to Congress, we’ve been in regular touch with a variety of members of both parties and their staffs, over time, through regular briefings then, and also through the STAFFDELs and CODELs that have taken place, but – so we have a regular and fluid dialogue with our Congress on this and it’s been mostly positive.

In terms of Mr. Zelaya, both President Zelaya and Mr. Micheletti have committed to the decision on restoration to the congress, recognizing that it is the congress that will decide if President Zelaya returns, when he should return and how he should return, and they recognize that this is a political decision that is not going to be made in a vacuum. And I can assure you that both sides are reaching out to members of congress right now and trying to build levels of political support that will favor the outcome that each of them would prefer.

But I think what’s important here is that there’s a broad expectation that they will abide by whatever that decision is. And I think the creation of a national unity government and the presence of a verification commission is going to ensure that that happens.

QUESTION: Will Mr. Zelaya leave the Brazilian embassy anytime soon? Is the agreement done? Is it signed? And is there a timeframe for congress to take action or could we have elections for the 29^th and Mr. Micheletti still be in power?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: There is not a timeline for the congress to take a decision and the negotiators were very clear on this. In fact, last night, Mr. Zelaya’s chief negotiator came out and said that the commission could not impose a timeline on the congress because it was an independent institution. But there is a political dynamic here and a political imperative for the congress to move quickly on this decision. It’s just not something that can be ignored in the short term.

I’m sorry. I don’t remember the first part of your question.

QUESTION: Is Mr. Zelaya leaving the embassy or is Honduras normalizing again?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: Yeah. At this point he is not. The agreement itself does not refer to Mr. Zelaya’s – President Zelaya’s status inside of Honduras at this point. But this is, obviously, a point of dialogue for us with the de facto regime. It’s our view that President Zelaya’s status should be normalized in some fashion and that the de facto regime should end its harassment of the Brazilian Embassy.

OPERATOR: The next question comes from Martha Mendoza. Your line is open.

QUESTION: Hi, thanks for taking our questions today. This standoff went on for months. You came in and got all the parties on the same page in about a day. What did you offer? What did you do? Did you offer to restore the Millennium funding before the election? Did you follow the Arias agreement?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: You know, I think what drove this, as I mentioned, was this desire and belief to have the international community accompany this election process. And yesterday was an important day because it was 30 days before the elections. It was the day in which the command of the armed forces transferred to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and it was a clear recognition by all Hondurans that the elections were coming and that the Hondurans had pretty much run out of time, and that there was no longer an opportunity or a space for them to dither. And so I think that drove the decision more than any particular offer.

But we did make it clear to them that with this agreement, we could be move – we could begin to move immediately on electoral observation support and that we would mobilize electoral observation support within the OAS and elsewhere, but that also this would open a space for us to begin to discuss normalization of our relationships to elsewhere and whether it’s in the activities of our consulate or in our assistance relationship. So the Hondurans were well aware that this agreement was the first step towards a normalization of our relationship.

QUESTION: Was there any piece of the Arias agreement on the table?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: Well, almost the whole thing was accepted as is. The only significant change, or substantive change, in the language referred to the restitution of President Zelaya, and that change, as we noted, was to send that issue to the congress. But for the most part, the rest of President Arias’s proposal – the San Jose Accord – was the basis for the Guaymuras Accord.

QUESTION: Thank you.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: We can do one more question, and then we’re going to have to go.

OPEATOR: Next question comes from Sergio Davila. Your line is open.

QUESTION: Hi, my question is for Secretary Shannon. Thanks for taking the question. My question is: What if the congress decides that Zelaya will no – will not go back to power, is he willing to accept that? Did he say that to you guys? And Secretary Shannon, are you already packing your luggage to Brazil?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: In terms of President Zelaya and Mr. Micheletti, both sides, in regard to the issue of restitution, have committed this decision to the congress. Both have indicated that they will abide by it, and I believe them. I mean, President Zelaya, I think, believes he has a strong hand to play in the congress, and that’s why he agreed to this, and Mr. Micheletti believes the same thing. So this is a political issue that’s going to be resolved politically. And I’ll pack my bags once the Senate confirms (inaudible).

Thank you all very much.

MR. KELLY: Thank you. That was on the record, just to remind everybody.

U.S.- Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement

Office of the Spokesman

Washington, DC

October 30, 2009

On Friday, October 30, the United States and Colombian governments signed the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), which is now in force.

The United States and Colombia enjoy a close and strategic bilateral relationship. The anticipated signing of the DCA (formally titled a Supplemental Agreement for Cooperation and Technical Assistance and Security, or SACTA) will deepen bilateral cooperation on security issues. The DCA will facilitate effective bilateral cooperation on security matters in Colombia, including narcotics production and trafficking, terrorism, illicit smuggling of all types, and humanitarian and natural disasters.

The DCA does not permit the establishment of any U.S. base in Colombia. It ensures continued U.S. access to specific agreed Colombian facilities in order to undertake mutually agreed upon activities within Colombia.

The agreement facilitates U.S. access to three Colombian air force bases, located at Palanquero, Apiay, and Malambo. The agreement also permits access to two naval bases and two army installations, and other Colombian military facilities if mutually agreed. All these military installations are, and will remain, under Colombian control. Command and control, administration, and security will continue to be handled by the Colombian armed forces. All activities conducted at or from these Colombian bases by the United States will take place only with the express prior approval of the Colombian government. The presence of U.S. personnel at these facilities would be on an as needed, and as mutually agreed upon, basis.

The DCA does not signal, anticipate, or authorize an increase in the presence of U.S. military or civilian personnel in Colombia.

The presence of U.S. military and associated personnel in Colombia is governed by statute. In October 2004, Congress authorized the permanent or temporary assignment of up to 800 U.S. military personnel and up to 600 U.S. civilian contractors. That cap will continue to be faithfully respected. In fact, in recent years the actual presence of such U.S. personnel has averaged half or less of the authorized number. Consistent with U.S. policy to nationalize U.S.-supported activities by turning them over to Colombian authorities, U.S. personnel presence has been in a gradual decline. It is the United States’ expectation and commitment that those trends will continue.

At a technical level, the DCA harmonizes and updates existing bilateral agreements, practices, and arrangements on security matters, and continues to ensure appropriate protections and status for U.S. personnel. Bilateral U.S.-Colombian engagement in the security sphere is governed by conditions set in a number of bilateral agreements, including the 1952 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, the 1962 General Agreement for Economic, Technical and Related Assistance, and related subsequent agreements in 1974, 2000, and 2004.

Briefing on the Situation in Honduras

Thomas A. Shannon, Jr.
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs

Via DVC from Tegucigalpa, Honduras

Tegucigalpa, Honduras

MODERATOR: Assistant Secretary Shannon, thanks very much for joining us today and briefing our Washington-based press corps. We understand you’ll start off with a brief statement and then give it back to us for the first question.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: Thank you very much. I’m delighted to be talking to you all from Tegucigalpa. As I stated previously, our delegation here – Ambassador Craig Kelly, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, and Dan Restrepo, the Special Assistant to the President for Western Hemisphere Affairs – were sent – we were sent to Tegucigalpa by Secretary Clinton and President Obama to underscore U.S. interest and support for the national dialogue which is underway now and to underscore the necessity of an agreement within that national dialogue in order to win broad support in the international community for the elections that Honduras will face on November 29^th.

From our point of view, an agreement within the national dialogue opens a large space for members of the international community to assist Honduras in this election process, to observe the elections, and to have a process that is peaceful and which produces leadership that is widely recognized throughout the hemisphere as legitimate. This will be important as a way of creating a pathway for Honduras to reintegrate itself into the inter-American community, to not – and not just the OAS, but also the Inter-American Development Bank and its other institutions, and to access development funding through the international financial institutions.

At the end of the day, we respect Honduras’s sovereignty, we respect its democracy and its constitutional institutions. And at the end of the day, a solution to this crisis, which is Honduran in origin, will be Honduran also. But we believe the solution will be more enduring and more peaceful if it is accompanied by the larger inter-American community and other members of the international community that are interested. Secretary Clinton and President Obama instructed us to come down and try to ensure that this national dialogue continues, that it continues on a sound basis, and to reassure the Honduran people and Honduras’s political leaders that the United States is prepared to work with members of the international community to provide the guarantees and incentives necessary to ensure that any agreement reached in the national dialogue is implemented in a transparent and effective fashion.

The negotiators are meeting now. They’ve done a lot of work, a lot of important work, and I think the Honduran people can be very proud of what these negotiators have accomplished. But they’re dealing with a tough issue, and that’s the larger issue of what the San Jose Accords called restitution. And this is an issue that both sides feel deeply about, but both sides have been working to structure or fashion a solution that meets their different needs and interests. From our point of view, the deal’s on the table. This is not really a question of drafting or of shaping a paragraph. It’s really a question of political will. And that’s why it was so important, I think, for us to come to Honduras at this moment to make clear to all Hondurans that we believe the political will that is displayed and expressed by Honduras’s leaders should respect the democratic vocation of the Honduran people and the democratic aspirations of the Honduran people, and the desire of Honduras to return to a larger democratic community in the Americas.

So let me stop there and take your questions.

MODERATOR: Go ahead. Please give your name.

QUESTION: Sergio Davila from Brazilian Folha de Sao Paulo. The Brazilian Government and a large group of countries in the region said again this week that they will not recognize the elections in Honduras is President Zelaya is not back to the presidency. Will the U.S. do the same?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: What we’re focused on right now is the national dialogue and winning agreement in the national dialogue. Because at the end of the day, our point of view is the international community cannot argue with what Hondurans determine and decide themselves. In other words, if there’s an agreement in the national dialogue, we think that is sufficient to open a space for international support for Honduras’s elections. And we have to respect the ability of Hondurans to come to terms within that dialogue.

QUESTION: Debbie Charles with Reuters. You said that – in Spanish, you were saying that time is running out. Do you feel that your presence there is actually going to result in something? I mean, you’re staying longer. Are you trying to leave with something already finished, or what? And is the United States doing enough –

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: We’d like that, obviously. When we say time is running out, of course, today is October 29^th. There’s only 30 days until the elections on November 29^th. And from our point of view, as I mentioned earlier, this really isn’t a complicated question of negotiation as much as it is a question of expressing political will. And that’s why we came, to underscore our interest in ensuring that the political will is there to do a deal. So we’ve decided to stay longer because we’ve asked – we’ve been asked to stay by different groups participating in this negotiation. And it’s our hope that an agreement will emerge soon.

QUESTION: Before you leave? Do you hope that happens before you leave?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: We would like that very much.

QUESTION: Thanks. I’m Julio Marenco with La Prensa Grafica. The representative from President Micheletti, Vilma Morales, suggested yesterday that they are willing to reinstate Mr. Zelaya to the presidency after the elections. Would you accept something like that?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: In this process, the question really isn’t what we would accept. The question is what the Hondurans can negotiate among themselves and what Hondurans are prepared to accept. Again, that’s what’s been so important about how the OAS and the international community has fashioned its approach to Honduras. Obviously, we started with the important principles that are based in the Inter-American Democratic Charter and the charter of the OAS, which is the respect for democracy and democratic institutions and constitutionality.

But at the same time, as we expressed our principles, the OAS and the United States looked for a way to address those principles in a pragmatic fashion that recognized Honduras’s reality. And that required us to construct a dialogue process that had Hondurans talking to each other. In other words, this wasn’t about the OAS or the international community trying to impose a solution. We’ve seen that fail elsewhere. We know that solutions to be enduring and peaceful have to be rooted in, in this instance, in Honduran soil. And so in that regard, our purpose has always been to respect our principles, but to do so in a context in which Hondurans themselves were going to fashion their solutions.

QUESTION: Matt Lee with AP. I’m just wondering if you could give a more direct answer to the first question that was asked by my Brazilian colleague, which was, as you may remember, is the United States willing to accept an agreement that does not include the return of President Zelaya or the restitution of – his restitution to power.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: We’re not going to anticipate what the negotiators are going to work on, but I will say that we – and not just the United States, but the rest of the inter-American community – have constructed these negotiations in a way that the solution be Honduran. And therefore, from our point of view, a deal is a deal. What the Hondurans can determine to decide among themselves, we’ll accept.

QUESTION: Well, that seems to be quite a climb down from your initial position immediately after the coup.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: I would disagree with that. As I just noted, in the aftermath of the coup --

QUESTION: I’m sorry. What was your position immediately after the coup? I thought it was that you wanted Zelaya back and in power. And now you’re saying that something short of that is acceptable.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: No, I didn’t say that. What I said – and I’ll say it again – is that we constructed a process with our partners in the OAS and elsewhere in the international community to express our commitment to democratic principles and processes, as encapsulated in the Inter-American Democratic Charter. But we also created a process that would have Hondurans speaking to each other, and that ultimately this process had to be resolved by Hondurans. But as we did so, what we were doing was respecting what we believe – and as I mentioned earlier – is the democratic vocation of Hondurans and Honduras, and a longstanding commitment to democracy and constitutionality, which has been consolidating itself over time.

And the real tragedy that Honduras has faced at this point is that the events of June 28^th have shaken that process of consolidation in a fundamental way. But it’s important to understand that June 28^th was the product not of just a particular series of events, but of a larger and more fundamental problem inside Honduran society, which is going to have to be addressed by the next government. And this is one of the reasons why it’s so important for us to construct a pathway that will allow the international community to work with Hondurans as they move forward, and why an agreement in the national dialogue is so important. Because the next president of Honduras has in front of him a huge challenge, which is not just to win the confidence of the international community and gain access again to the resources and technical expertise that is offered in the international community, but also to being a profounder national dialogue in Honduras that will allow Honduras to strengthen its democracy, strengthen its institutions, and emerge in a much stronger position than when it began.

And as I noted previously, today is the 11^th anniversary of Hurricane Mitch hitting Honduran soil. And what I said was that at that time, Hondurans showed enormous courage and determination to rebuild their society and their country, to rebuild their cities, their infrastructure, their towns, and their economy. And they have a lot to be proud of in that regard. But they were able to do so at the speed they did because of the help they got from the international community.

The crisis that was brought on by June 28^th was not a natural crisis. It was a man-made crisis. But it’s one that has had also a terrible impact on Honduras. And what we are saying to our partners here in Honduras is that the international community stands ready to help, but that in order for that help to be widespread and to enjoy broad consensus within the inter-American community, we need an agreement within the national dialogue.

QUESTION: Okay. All that is well and good, but I really need to get a – I really need to get an answer to the question. Is it or is it not U.S. policy, the U.S. position, that Zelaya must be restored to power? Is that still the U.S. position or not? Just a yes or no. And Hurricane Mitch and all that and them coming together is great, but –

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: Well, I appreciate your persistence – (laughter) – but I would say that the question of restitution has been a central question not just for the United States but for the entire international community. And OAS resolutions and UN resolutions have clearly indicated that President Zelaya should be returned to office. But we recognize that we are operating in an environment in which, at the end of the day, Hondurans have to make this decision.

QUESTION: Okay. So that seems to be no, right?

MODERATOR: Next question.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: What’s important to note here is that the negotiators represent both sides of this dispute, and they are fashioning an agreement around restitution which we believe can be successful.

MODERATOR: Go ahead.

QUESTION: Thank you. Mr. Shannon, it’s Sonia Schott. The international community, the OAS, seems to be divided regarding Honduras. So how do you expect that the OAS or the international community could reach or could help in a consensus to reach a solution in Honduras when the international community and the OAS is divided? And I would like to hear what is your perception on the OAS role in the Honduran crisis. Thank you.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: I would argue, actually, that the OAS is not divided and has shown throughout this crisis a remarkable consistency. Given the many differences that exist among countries and different appreciations of events in Honduras, in fact, I am not sure I can remember a moment in which the inter-American community has spoken so clearly on this, on such a challenge, or has been able to support over four months the different processes that we have seen evolve – first the San Jose process and now the Guaymuras process. So in that sense, I think the OAS has really played an important role and has really offered an important touchstone for Hondurans as they attempt to deal with this issue.

But obviously, we have in front of us the final part of this negotiation. It’s our hope that it ends successfully. That’s why we’re here. But we’re not diminishing the difficulty of the challenge that still sits in front of the negotiators. And so it’s our hope that with an agreement, the consensus that we have seen in the OAS can be maintained.

MODERATOR: Elise.

QUESTION: Tom, it’s Elise Labott. I understand what you’re saying about, you know, that the solution has to be Honduras, but in the beginning, just to kind of follow up on Matt’s point in a different way, in the beginning, not only the United States but the international community was so insistent that Zelaya return because you didn’t want to set a precedent for other – you know, for a whole ‘nother round of military coups or any type of coups in the region. And so what do you say to critics that would charge this does set a precedent that all an opposition needs to do is show some fortitude and the international community will come along to your point of view; and even if you can get some negotiations together, that this will set a precedent for other movements that feel that if they have the fortitude, they can change the government in a non-constitutional way?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: Well, I think at this point, the message is still clear. Again, we still have some steps to go in this negotiation process. But it’s important to remember that President Zelaya is represented in this negotiation process, and anything that is agreed to in that process is going to be agreed to by President Zelaya. And so in that sense --

QUESTION: Well, does he really have a choice, though? I mean, isn’t this kind of window dressing? Isn’t this kind of window dressing –

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: No, I mean, I met with --

QUESTION: -- would have at this point?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: No, this is a real process, this negotiation. It’s not an issue of window dressing. And we met with President Zelaya yesterday, and his communication with his negotiators is fluid and his negotiators represent his interests. And this is – when I talk about the importance of an agreement within the national dialogue, it’s important to understand that these agreements can’t be imposed. In other words, it’s not one side imposing an agreement on another side. Either side of this negotiation can get up and walk whenever they want to. Obviously, we’re very intent on seeing a solution that meets Honduras’s broad interests. But I think – I mean, I understand the question. I understand the point you’re trying to make, and it’s an important one. But I think it’s premature, because I think we’re still at a moment in which we can send a very strong message to the international community that coups won’t be tolerated and that countries such as Honduras have the capability within their democracy to resolve this kind of problem.

MODERATOR: Last question.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) from Perfil Argentina. Hello, Tom Shannon. I want to ask you a question. Do you have meet with the candidates that are participating in these elections for being president, and there I want to know if they agree to receive the government from the coup government or they really want to receive the government from an elected democratic president? What’s their perception on this talking about the future, really?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: Yeah. We did meet with the presidential candidates last night, and I had met with several of them during my earlier visit as part of an OAS delegation. And we have regular communication with all of them, and they represent a broad political spectrum. But what was striking about last night’s meeting with the presidential candidates is that, in spite of that spectrum, they were all agreed that an agreement within the national dialogue was absolutely essential to the ability of the elections on November 29^th to go forward in a peaceful and productive fashion. And I think that answers your question. I think it indicates that all of the candidates recognize that once elected, whoever that is, that person will face an enormous challenge, and that challenge will be more successfully faced with broad support across Honduran society, broad recognition of legitimacy, and broad support from the international community.

MODERATOR: Great. Assistant Secretary, thank you very much for your time. We’ll have to stop there for the daily briefing.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: Thank you.

Breakthrough in Honduras

Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State

Islamabad, Pakistan

October 30, 2009

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton delivered the following remarks Friday morning, October 30, 2009, in Islamabad, Pakistan:

I'm very pleased to announce that we've had a breakthrough in negotiations in Honduras.

I want to congratulate the people of Honduras as well as President Zelaya and Mr. Micheletti for reaching an historic agreement. I also congratulate Costa Rican President Oscar Arias for the important role he has played in fashioning the San Jose process and the OAS for its role in facilitating the successful round of talks.

As you know, I sent Assistant Secretary Tom Shannon and his deputy Craig Kelly and the White House NSC representative for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo to Honduras yesterday after speaking with both President Zelaya and Mr. Micheletti last Friday to urge them finally, once and for all to reach an agreement.

I cannot think of another example of a country in Latin America that having suffered a rupture of its democratic and constitutional order overcame such a crisis through negotiation and dialogue.

This is a big step forward for the Inter-American system and its commitment to democracy as embodied in the Inter-American Democratic Charter. I'm very proud that I was part of the process, that the United States was instrumental in the process. But I'm mostly proud of the people of Honduras who have worked very hard to have this matter resolved peacefully.

We're looking forward to the elections that will be held on November 29, and working with the people and government of Honduras to realize the full return of democracy and a better future for the Honduran people.

St. Vincent and the Grenadines Independence Day

Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State

Washington, DC

October 27, 2009

On behalf of the people of the United States, I congratulate the people of St. Vincent and the Grenadines as they celebrate 30 years as an independent nation. Our two countries are united by our shared commitment to democracy and human rights and strong economic and cultural ties. We are working as partners to enhance the security and prosperity of the Caribbean region and build a brighter future for all our people.

As Vincentians gather to honor their history and enjoy their Independence Day parade, let me reaffirm the commitment of the United States to work together to deepen and strengthen our partnership.

United States-Bolivia Bilateral Dialogue

Washington, DC

October 26, 2009

The Department of State welcomes Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca and the Bolivian delegation to Washington for the second meeting of the U.S.-Bolivia Dialogue, which will take place on October 27, 2009. The first meeting was held in La Paz, Bolivia in May.

Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs Maria Otero will lead the U.S. delegation. The dialogue reflects both countries’ commitment to review and improve relations on the basis of mutual respect and shared interests. Key areas of discussion will include cooperation on development, social inclusion and our shared responsibility to combat drug trafficking.

U.S. and Bolivian representatives will address the press and answer questions at a joint walkout at the C Street Entrance of the State Department at 6:00 p.m., following the meeting on October 27, 2009.

Media representatives may attend this event upon presentation of one of the following: (1) A U.S. Government-issued identification card (Department of State, White House, Congress, Department of Defense or Foreign Press Center); (2) a media-issued photo identification card; or (3) a letter from their employer on letterhead verifying their employment as a journalist, accompanied by an official photo identification card (driver's license, passport).

PRESS CONTACT:

Darla A. Jordan

U.S. Department of State

(202) 647-4252

JordanDA3@State.Gov

# # #

Ian Kelly

Department Spokesman
Daily Press Briefing

Washington, DC

1:34 p.m. EDT

MR. KELLY: Good afternoon. I’d like to, first of all, make a few remarks at the top about Honduras, to give you an update. As you know, we’ve been working very hard with our partners in the hemisphere to reach our goal of restoring democratic and constitutional order in Honduras, and we continue to believe that the best solution to this is the San Jose Accord. As you know, President Zelaya is in Washington this week. He has meetings at the Organization of American States today. I’d refer you to them for further details on that. And on Thursday, Secretary Clinton plans to meet with him to discuss the best way forward on the situation in Honduras.

And with that, I’ll turn it over to you.

QUESTION: Does she expect to make the determination at that point?

MR. KELLY: Well, we still haven’t made the determination. I think you know the issues that are being considered here, but I can’t give you an exact time when that determination will be --

QUESTION: I understand the issues that are being considered.

QUESTION: It’s been more than two months now --

MR. KELLY: Yeah.

QUESTION: -- since the events transpired --

QUESTION: Right.

QUESTION: -- so one would – would think that one would have had enough time to judge whether it was a military coup.

MR. KELLY: Right. Well, we have taken the actions that we would be required to take if that determination is made, and that is that we have suspended assistance that goes directly to support the Government of Honduras. And you know what the issue at hand is a – it’s a provision of the Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2009.

QUESTION: Before you launch into the whole explanation of what exact – we already know what it --

MR. KELLY: Yeah.

QUESTION: -- exactly it is. What is the holdup?

MR. KELLY: We – as I said – as I’ve said many times, we have – there are a number of diplomatic activities going on. We are – we have done what we have to do under the law, and that is not to provide assistance to the Government of Honduras if the Secretary decides to make this determination. But she hasn’t made the determination yet.

QUESTION: Can you follow up on that? I mean, one big exception to that, as I understand it, is the grant money from the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which would also be – could be implicated in such a decision.

QUESTION: And it’s my understanding that the MCC has so-called notwithstanding authority, so their aid is not automatically cut off? Their board has to make --

MR. KELLY: Right.

QUESTION: -- an affirmative decision to do so.

MR. KELLY: I think that’s right, Arshad.

QUESTION: And that’s more than a hundred – I think it’s something like 111 – well, it’s more. But it’s more than $100 million that would have to be scrutinized and that’s much bigger than the 18 – about 18.4, I think, that’s already been suspended. So in a way, there’s a big, big chunk of money out there that’s going to have to be – on which decisions are going to have to be made.

MR. KELLY: Yeah. You’re right. I mean, in the case of the Millennium money and the Challenge Corporation, it is something that will have to be decided by the board. Of course, Secretary Clinton is a member of that board, and so we’ll see about what exactly we have to do with both the USAID – with the USAID programs, military programs, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation programs.

QUESTION: One other thing on this. I mean when, in response to Matt’s question, you said that there are a number of diplomatic activities that are underway, are we to understand it is the case that it is solely a question of the diplomacy, that – in other words, the hope that you can find a diplomatic solution, that is holding off the determination? Or are there other factors, perhaps within the U.S. Government, that are holding it up?

MR. KELLY: As I’ve already suggested, of course, it is a – it’s not just a decision that affects the Department of State and the Agency for International Development. There’s a number of other – another – a number of other avenues that we have to go down, including briefing Congress. We need to – we have to coordinate with the Department of Defense. All along, in this whole conflict that we’ve had around Honduras, we’ve had to, as well, coordinate with the Organization of American States and with our partners in the region. So there is quite a bit of coordination that has to go on.

QUESTION: And regarding the DOD, would this affect Soto Cano Air Base – Soto Cano Air Base, excuse me – would such a cutoff have any effect on that air base and U.S. use of it?

MR. KELLY: Well, obviously, the Department of Defense is best positioned to answer that question. As I understand it, it will – I mean, the military – I shouldn’t say that the determination will affect programs. The suspension has already affected a number of programs that the U.S. military runs. Soto Cano is a – it’s not our base. It’s a Honduran base. Again, you really should – you should get the nitty-gritty details on this from the Department of Defense, but I think that they have suspended their programs except for the kind of activities that you would need to support a base – guarding the perimeter and provisions and activities like that. But please do try and get those kinds of details from DOD.

Yeah.

QUESTION: Can you walk us through what this meeting on Thursday will look like, what kind of access we’ll have to it, what kind of readout there will be?

MR. KELLY: Well, we haven’t determined the arrangements yet for the press. I am – I feel confident that there will be some kind of – that there will be – it will be closed to the press. I mean, there will be some – you will have some kind of engagement with the two principals, but --

QUESTION: But will we be able to --

MR. KELLY: -- it hasn’t been determined. In terms of readout, of course we’ll be happy to give you a readout.

QUESTION: Will we be able to actually ask them questions?

MR. KELLY: That hasn’t been determined yet, so I can’t give you an answer to that yet.

QUESTION: New topic?

MR. KELLY: Yeah.

QUESTION: Can I ask you about a report by the Project of Government Oversight about the Embassy in Kabul that lists, among other things, incredible understaffing, long hours, extreme long hours of guards, improper training, a language barrier between the guards and the staff at the Embassy, and also hazing of new recruits of guards, which has been – some of which has been listed in letters from the State Department to the contractor complaining about some of this behavior over the last two years?

MR. KELLY: Yeah. Well, Elise, we have received a long letter from the Project On Government Oversight with quite a few documents attached. You make reference to some of them. Let me just say that these are very serious allegations, and we are treating them that way. As soon as we received the documents, they were turned over immediately to our Office of the Inspector General. Secretary Clinton has been apprised of the allegations in these documents and has directed the Department and the Office of the Inspector General to take appropriate action.

And let me just say that the Secretary and the Department have made it clear that we will have zero tolerance for the type of conduct that is alleged in these documents.

QUESTION: If I might, I’d like to quote from a letter from the State Department to the contractor in June of 2007. So this was two years ago that you recognized that some of these deficiencies exist and you said these deficiencies endanger the performance of the contract to such a degree that the security of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul is in jeopardy, and that you threatened to terminate the contract.

Yet over the last two years, there are about 11 letters that have been released not just by the project, but by Senator McCaskill’s office, who is in charge of the Subcommittee on Government Oversight, that you continued to warn the contractor about these deficiencies and that you said that the security of the Embassy is in jeopardy, yet why did you continue to extend the contract?

MR. KELLY: Well, as I say, these are serious allegations. What you just read me, I would – I think they’re very serious too.

QUESTION: These aren’t allegations. These are your own words. These are your own words.

MR. KELLY: Well, I – let’s --

QUESTION: I mean, if this report came out today, yes.

MR. KELLY: Yeah.

QUESTION: But over the last two years, you’ve been continuing to warn this contractor about its performance. So does it take an independent nongovernment organization to cast light on what you’ve been kind of overlooking for the last two years?

MR. KELLY: Yeah. I mean, look, as I understand it, we have – we’ve been investigating this organization for some time now. We understand that we have made some – we have pointed out to them some of the deficiencies. And I can’t answer right now from this podium exactly what they have done in response to this letter.

QUESTION: Well, in your letters, it says that they’ve continued to let them go unaddressed.

MR. KELLY: Well, let me see if I can get you more information. But I just don’t have the information right now. And the matter is also under investigation.

QUESTION: Can I follow up with that, though?

MR. KELLY: Sure.

QUESTION: In June when Senator McCaskill held hearings, the Assistant Secretary of – Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Management William Moser told the hearing that these problems have been looked at, and that since January, they had been addressed. So on what basis did he give that testimony when, according to the POGO report, this behavior, this whole pattern that Elise just sketched out, this --

MR. KELLY: Yeah.

QUESTION: -- whole pattern has continued up to the present day, up to August?

MR. KELLY: Yeah. Well, I’ll have to ask Mr. Moser. I’m not exactly sure what he was basing his determination on when he did tell Congress that these issues have been addressed.

QUESTION: Can you tell us if, up till now, the State Department has been satisfied with the performance of ArmorGroup in providing security for the Embassy in Kabul?

MR. KELLY: I’m just not prepared to say that right now. I mean, let me just see what we can say about this congressional testimony that you --

QUESTION: The letter says Secretary Clinton says that the contract – it says the management of the contract to protect the U.S. Embassy Kabul is grossly deficient, posing a significant threat to the security of the Embassy and its personnel.

MR. KELLY: Yeah.

QUESTION: And this is a now question. Is this the case? Are you worried about how well your staff is protected?

MR. KELLY: Well, we always worry about our staff and how well they’re protected. There is no higher priority for us than the safety and well-being of our people, especially our people who are serving in a dangerous environment, like Kabul.

QUESTION: And the question of language was raised, which is that many of the staff on this security contract don’t speak English, and indeed, the State Department was made aware of that. If there are lots of security staff, something like two-thirds, who don’t speak proper English, how can you make that assurance?

MR. KELLY: Well, you’re asking a lot of good questions. But I just – I can’t comment on them. One, I don’t have the answers to them right now at this moment from this podium. And two, the matter is under investigation. I can’t comment on it.

QUESTION: Well, why is this matter under investigation, Ian? It looks like it’s been under investigation for the past two years.

MR. KELLY: I’m sorry, Elise. I can’t answer it. I’m sorry.

QUESTION: Can you answer one other matter raised in the letter, which is that POGO is saying essentially the State Department has a pattern of ineffectual oversight, and that Congress or somebody ought to give the oversight of embassy security, when you’re in a war zone to the military? Now what’s the State Department’s position on that?

MR. KELLY: Well, again, these are very serious allegations. This is – these particular recommendations are from this particular organization. We’re happy to consider them. But these are extremely serious questions that you’re asking. And I want to make sure that you get a good answer to it, because as I say, the security of our colleagues serving overseas is an extremely serious matter.

QUESTION: When did this stuff, this material, get turned over to the IG?

MR. KELLY: I don’t have an exact time, but it was – as I said when I was first asked this question, they were turned over as soon as we got them.

QUESTION: Well, which was when?

MR. KELLY: Well, I think we got the material in the last week or so. But I don’t have any --

QUESTION: Well, if you got it in the last week or so – they’re talking about letters that go back two years.

MR. KELLY: Oh – well, I mean, it’s a matter --

QUESTION: You’re saying that the IG – the IG has not been looking in --

MR. KELLY: -- a lot of this is a matter of public record --

QUESTION: -- the IG has not been looking --

MR. KELLY: -- because we testified in June.

QUESTION: -- the IG has not been looking into this since 2007? Is that --

MR. KELLY: Matt, I don’t --

QUESTION: And it’s only since you got this stuff from POGO that you’ve looked into this?

MR. KELLY: I think that we’ve been looking into – separate from some of these very serious allegations of a more recent nature in the POGO documents, I mean, we have been – as I say, we have been communicating with Congress. I know that Congress does have concerns. And we’ve also been talking to the contractors too asking them to redress some of these deficiencies.

QUESTION: Well, has the IG been looking into it since 2007, since the --

MR. KELLY: That I don’t know.

QUESTION: Well, because if they have, and it’s been two years and nothing has been done, that would suggest that you have a problem.

MR. KELLY: Yeah. Well, I just don’t know the answer to the question of when they actually started investigating.

QUESTION: That’s –

QUESTION: Well, you know, can I just make – this is unwarranted advice, but you know, you have all this stuff, you know it’s coming out, the briefing gets delayed by an hour.

MR. KELLY: Right. Well --

QUESTION: One would think that someone in the IG’s office or in a legal office or somewhere that come up – you had to anticipate these questions coming.

MR. KELLY: I – Matt, I have told you what I know. And I’ve talked to the IG Office, I’ve talked to the Office of Diplomatic Security. I understand that they have been looking into certain deficiencies in their performance. And then as soon as we got these documents relating to – the documents that you see in the POGO report, those were turned over as well.

QUESTION: They’ve been on a congressman – they’ve been on Senator McCaskill’s website for months, since June.

MR. KELLY: All of these documents?

QUESTION: Yeah.

MR. KELLY: Yeah. Sorry, I wasn’t aware of that.

QUESTION: No, I mean, not the photos of these – of this lewd – not the photos of the lewd behavior. But I mean, all of these complaints that are in the report, you’ve been --

MR. KELLY: Yeah.

QUESTION: -- making to the contractor yourself over the past two years.

MR. KELLY: All right, all right. I really – I’ve told you really all that I know, and then – and I can’t really address a lot of these issue because they’re under investigation.

QUESTION: Just back to the issue of contract – of oversight of contractors, I mean, obviously, there was a huge issue of oversight over Blackwater.

MR. KELLY: Right.

QUESTION: And there were major revisions to the procedures and all of that stuff. Didn’t at that time, considering this was going on concurrently, I mean, isn’t there a need to kind of reevaluate all of contractor oversight of the State Department, not just in particular instances where there’s a – where there’s a case of abuse?

MR. KELLY: Yeah. Well, I – I don’t know if you recall, but the Secretary herself, and I think in one of her town halls, has said that it is her view that we have to lessen our reliance on contractors for security of our embassies. And so she’s asked for a review of the whole system. Whether or not we can move to banning them, I mean, I would highly, highly doubt that. There are contracts involved, and there’s also the whole issue, as I said before, of the importance of protecting our people. And this is not something that we can do overnight.

QUESTION: Could you explain – just a factual matter – what part of the security ArmorGroup is responsible for, where their responsibility ends and DS begins?

MR. KELLY: Yeah.

QUESTION: Whether the U.S. military has any role in protecting that compound.

MR. KELLY: Yeah, yeah.

QUESTION: And of course, there are also Afghan military forces --

MR. KELLY: Right, right.

QUESTION: -- on the perimeter as well.

MR. KELLY: Yeah, yeah. I can only address that in a very general way from my own experience as a Foreign Service officer serving overseas, and I haven’t served in Kabul. But I know that the – it’s the Regional Security Office which is in charge of security basically of our perimeter, and that is usually local guards that provide that. There’s also, of course, the Marine security guard program, and they – they’re more responsible for protection of classified information and also protection of the chancery. There’s also, of course, protection of Americans themselves. A number of embassies, including at least one I served at, had a residential security program as well, where you had local guards at our residences.

So that’s just kind of a general overview. But obviously, in a place like Kabul, it has its own challenges, to put it mildly. And there’s also coordination with the military as well.

QUESTION: Could you take that question and give us an outline of what they do there, their area of --

QUESTION: Specifically what their area --

MR. KELLY: Can you repeat the exact question that I’m taking?

QUESTION: Well, the exact question is exactly what is ArmorGroup responsible for?

MR. KELLY: Okay.

QUESTION: We were told it’s what they call static security and they don’t do the so-called close protection --

MR. KELLY: Yeah.

QUESTION: -- of moving around with the ambassador.

MR. KELLY: Right.

QUESTION: But that they are fairly – that they are in charge of, except for the most outer entry point, but really all the entry points, checking cars and all that.

MR. KELLY: Okay.

QUESTION: But if you could just describe that and what is DS’s role.

MR. KELLY: Sure. I mean, DS’s role, I think, is mainly to over – the oversight of the guard program. But that’s a good question, and we’ll get you the info on it.

QUESTION: And what is the oversight of this particular contractor? Does DS have an oversight of that contractor? Because in the whole Blackwater situation there was a lot of complaints that DS didn’t have enough oversight over the contractors. So who specifically --

MR. KELLY: Well, I do have a specific answer to that question.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR. KELLY: The contracting officer is assigned here in Washington, D.C., and that person has overall responsibility for oversight of the contract and participates in weekly meetings between the program office and AGNA, or the ArmorGroup. And this person is also the one who has interactions on a more frequent basis --

QUESTION: From here?

MR. KELLY: From here in Washington.

QUESTION: So there’s no adult supervision of this contractor on the ground?

MR. KELLY: I’m getting to that.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR. KELLY: In Kabul, there are two assistant Regional Security Officers designated as the contracting officer’s representative and assistant contracting officer representative, respectively. There is also always a duty RSO who deals with the routine guard force matters such as access requests and on-compound events.

So that’s – I guess that goes some way to answer your question. Right? It does appear that they do have the guard force responsibility.

QUESTION: Meaning the Armour Guard force?

MR. KELLY: Well, I mean, it’s an embassy guard force, and Armour has the contract for it.

Can we --

QUESTION: To guard the perimeter of the embassy? Is that what they do?

MR. KELLY: Well, let’s find out exactly.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR. KELLY: New subject?

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

MR. KELLY: Okay.

QUESTION: In Pakistan, the nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan said he has been set free from the court. Do you have any comment on that?

MR. KELLY: Just a moment. Our concern over the potential for proliferation activities by Mr. Khan are well known to the Pakistani Government. We believe that he remains a proliferation risk. We’re following this closely, and of course, the Pakistani Government, as I say, is well aware of our concerns about Mr. Khan.

QUESTION: So why do you think he still remains a proliferation risk? Has been something come to your notice about this?

MR. KELLY: I’m sorry, say that one more time.

QUESTION: Why do you think so he still remains a risk to the international community?

MR. KELLY: Well, I just – his activities, I think, are well known. And we have concerns about them, and we’ve made those concerns known to the Pakistani Government.

QUESTION: When was the last time that you raised this with the Pakistanis?

MR. KELLY: I’m not sure of the answer to that.

QUESTION: Well, has it – I mean, this popped up last week or --

MR. KELLY: I think it popped up on Friday.

QUESTION: Friday. Exactly.

MR. KELLY: Yeah. I just – I don’t have an exact answer to that question. I’m sure we’ve had frequent contact with the government through our Embassy in Islamabad.

QUESTION: Related?

QUESTION: Do you believe that he’s just under house arrest and that he is still now in a position where he is not a proliferation risk given the measures that have been taken about his movement and his access to information?

MR. KELLY: Yeah. Arshad, I just don’t have the information to be able to answer that question.

QUESTION: Related?

MR. KELLY: Related? Okay.

QUESTION: Yeah. The Bureau of Atomic Scientists confirms that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is increasing 60 to somewhere to 70 to 90, and yesterday in Geneva, they refused to discuss disarmament, saying their national security is not being respected. Do you have a response to that?

MR. KELLY: I’m not aware of that report, so I don’t have a response to it. Yeah.

QUESTION: New topic?

MR. KELLY: Okay.

QUESTION: Can I go back to Pakistan?

QUESTION: Yeah.

QUESTION: Have you ever discussed with – State Department ever discussed with the Justice Department attempts to prosecute him? Isn’t there enough evidence in some countries, even in the U.S., to have him prosecuted for violation of various laws?

MR. KELLY: I’m not aware of that either. I’m afraid I don’t have an answer to that question.

QUESTION: One more on –

QUESTION: On Iran?

MR. KELLY: Iran?

QUESTION: Yeah.

QUESTION: No. One more on –

MR. KELLY: One more on A.Q. Khan?

QUESTION: There are some reports also in Pakistan that recently Pakistan has upgraded its missiles, and maybe A.Q. Khan has a hand, which was sold by the U.S. And is there any reaction from India to the State Department?

MR. KELLY: Well, I don’t – yeah, I think you’ll have to talk to the Government of India if they’ve had any reaction to these press reports. I mean, we’re – we’ve seen these reports in The New York Times. We take the possibility of any potential violations of obligations entered into pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act – we take these allegations very seriously. We have engaged the Government of Pakistan at the highest levels. We recently negotiated an agreement in principle to establish mutually agreed inspections to address possible modifications to any arms that we’ve transferred, and we’ve notified Congress of potential violations of obligations entered in pursuant to the Arms Control Export Control Act to ensure that key leaders are provided information on U.S. efforts to address them.

QUESTION: I’m sorry. Before the press – I mean, in the press in The New York Times, did Ambassador Holbrooke during his trip to Pakistan raise these questions with the Pakistani authorities?

MR. KELLY: Well, first of all, I’m not – I’m just – I’m talking in very general terms. I’m not addressing these – this particular allegation. And I’m not aware of any representations by Ambassador Holbrooke.

QUESTION: On Iran?

MR. KELLY: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: Iran says that it has prepared a counter-offer to your offer. I’m wondering if you’ve heard – if anyone in the P-5+1 has heard from the Iranians. Will this offer be discussed tomorrow at the political directors meeting, and will there be an Iranian representative there?

MR. KELLY: Well --

QUESTION: Were you expecting one?

MR. KELLY: First of all, we’re not expecting any Iranian representative tomorrow in Frankfurt. There is a – as you know, this is a meeting of the six political directors from the P-5+1 countries. And of course, the main item on the agenda is Iran’s nuclear program.

We’ve seen these press reports that they’re developing a new proposal. We have not received any proposal. We would review any proposal that they give us seriously, and in the spirit of mutual respect we would welcome the Iranian Government’s constructive response to the P-5+1 to their April 2009 invitation to meet face-to-face.

Moving forward with these discussions could begin to bring Iran into compliance with its international obligations and create confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programs.

QUESTION: But just to be clear, you haven’t seen an offer or --

MR. KELLY: No, we have not.

QUESTION: Okay.

QUESTION: And none of the other members of the P-5+1 --

MR. KELLY: Not to my knowledge.

QUESTION: Okay.

QUESTION: Can I ask you about al-Megrahi’s return to Libya?

MR. KELLY: Any other on Iran?

QUESTION: Yeah.

QUESTION: Yeah.

MR. KELLY: Yeah.

QUESTION: What is your sense about – from their – what they’ve said? Are they willing to meet, or it’s just that they’re saying that they have a package to offer? Because --

MR. KELLY: We don’t have any understanding of that. I mean, all we’ve seen is what you’ve seen, is that there is one Iranian press report that purported to quote their Iranian – the Iranian nuclear negotiator that there was a new proposal. But we haven’t seen any new proposal and we haven’t received any answer to our proposals, the P-5+1 – the issues outlined in their declaration of April and our proposal to engage with them and talk about these issues, the nuclear issues.

QUESTION: When Jalili made his announcement, he blamed --

MR. KELLY: I don’t think he – did he make an announcement, though? I --

QUESTION: To the press in Iran.

MR. KELLY: Okay. Okay.

QUESTION: He blamed the West for the talks when they stopped last year, saying that the West did not want to go further because of what was going on in the world, the financial crisis, the Georgian war, and so on and so forth. So they basically put the blame on the suspension of the talks on the West.

MR. KELLY: Yeah.

QUESTION: Would you agree with that?

MR. KELLY: No. Look, I mean, we’re prepared to respond to some kind of meaningful response. We’re not going to respond to something that’s made through the media. The offer of the P-5+1 remains on the table, and we’re – we can respond to that when they respond officially. In the meantime, as we saw in the most recent IAEA report, they are not complying with their obligations to the international community and their behavior remains a matter of deep concern to us. And I’ll just say what I’ve said before, that we provided a path whereby they can become a full and respected member of the international community, and it’s up to them as to whether or not they want to choose that path.

QUESTION: One last one --

QUESTION: This is Iran-related. Have you – are you going to be on the nuclear issue?

QUESTION: Yeah. Still on the nuclear stuff, yeah.

QUESTION: Go ahead.

QUESTION: Thank you. Look, Ian, why shouldn’t one regard these reports of a new proposal that just happened to surface on the eve of a P-5+1 meeting and about three weeks in advance of the UN General Assembly when this is going to be a major subject of --

MR. KELLY: Yeah.

QUESTION: -- topic of conversation, why shouldn’t one regard this as something other than an effort by the Iranians to blunt the U.S. push to consider additional sanctions?

MR. KELLY: It may well be, but it’s just nothing that we can respond to because it’s not done – they still haven’t officially responded to our various initiatives.

QUESTION: And they haven’t given you anything, just not – not just they haven’t responded officially?

MR. KELLY: Well, to the best of my knowledge --

QUESTION: Yeah.

MR. KELLY: -- we have not received a response.

QUESTION: What would you consider a meaningful response?

MR. KELLY: A response that said we understand that we have certain obligations that we have to adhere to, and that they welcome a reengagement with us in the P-5+1 context to try and address some of these concerns that we have.

QUESTION: Have you heard anything from the Russians and the Chinese yet about what they --

MR. KELLY: Regarding the most recent press reports, you mean?

QUESTION: Yeah.

MR. KELLY: I’m not aware that we have received anything from the Russians (inaudible).

QUESTION: Because, related to Arshad’s question, it seems that, you know, oftentimes in the past on the cusp of big meetings or events, the Iranians have come out with statements like this talking about proposals which appear to be designed entirely to isolate the Russians and the China – or to keep the Chinese and the Russians from getting – from getting on board with the rest of the group on sanctions.

MR. KELLY: Yeah, yeah.

QUESTION: You don’t see that this --

MR. KELLY: You’re asking me to speculate on what their motives might be for this one statement being made to the media. It may well be, but it would be just speculation on my part.

QUESTION: Why do you keep – why do you keep referring to this as, you know, made to the media or press reports or some kind of --

MR. KELLY: Because we’re still waiting for an official response. They’re not talking to us. They’re talking to the media.

QUESTION: Well, you don’t think when Jalili gets up there as the chief negotiator and makes it – like what you’re doing right now, what you’re – you’ve given us the official --

MR. KELLY: I’m not a negotiator.

QUESTION: You gave the official U.S. – you gave the official State Department response to us about these allegations of the Afghan Embassy.

MR. KELLY: That’s my job.

QUESTION: Why isn’t Jalili?

MR. KELLY: Well, Mr. Jalili is their representative?

QUESTION: He’s a representative of the Iranian Government.

MR. KELLY: Right.

QUESTION: He’s a spokesman for the government.

MR. KELLY: Yeah, but I’m a spokesman. This is what I do. I talk to you guys. We’re waiting for him to respond officially to our --

QUESTION: Fair enough. Well, fair enough. But you get Bill Burns down here and tell us something, we’re going to report it as you said this, and the Iranians aren’t going to say, “Well, that’s just a press report.” They’ll take it as coming from – it’s coming from the government.

QUESTION: You said – you said from this podium – or not you, but previous spokesmen have said from the podium that we’ve present – we’re getting ready to present an offer to the Iranians. I mean, how do we know?

MR. KELLY: Yeah. We have made an offer to the Iranians and we made them --

QUESTION: I know, but – but before you did it, you told – you announced that you were doing it.

MR. KELLY: All right, look. This is very simple. They – all they need to do is respond to our proposal in some serious and official way.

QUESTION: Through what channel would you expect that to come through?

MR. KELLY: The – we don’t have an embassy in Tehran, but our partners in the P-5+1 have embassies.

QUESTION: Another one on Iran, if --

MR. KELLY: Yeah.

QUESTION: The Iranian president has apparently decided to come to the UNGA, participate there. Has he applied for a visa? And if so, is it anywhere close?

MR. KELLY: Actually, I’m not aware that he has. I understand that he does plan to come. He’s come in years past. I mean, I would have every expectation that he would receive a visa under our obligations, under our agreement with the UN.

QUESTION: On Iran again.

MR. KELLY: Yeah.

QUESTION: Anything new on the three Americans held there?

MR. KELLY: No, I’m afraid I don’t. I’m sorry to say I don’t have any --

QUESTION: This was – nothing from the --

MR. KELLY: -- further information on consular access or information on their welfare or whereabouts, which is, of course, very distressing to their families and of great concern to us.

QUESTION: Can we go back to powerful world leaders who plan to come to the UN? (Laughter.) Is there any movement on Qadhafi yet?

MR. KELLY: Not that I’m aware of, Matt.

QUESTION: All right. And then the segue into that is what do you make of these – the release of these letters in Britain about al-Megrahi --

MR. KELLY: Well, this is – as I said --

QUESTION: -- release?

MR. KELLY: As I said yesterday, this is a – this has been a matter for the UK Government and the Scottish authorities to make. They consulted with us with respect to the release of certain documents relating to the U.S. view. And our views, of course, are well known. I mean, the – those views are that we strongly oppose any outcome that would result in the transfer of Mr. Megrahi to Libya.

QUESTION: Did the U.S. Government believe that the – they had – it had a commitment from the British Government that Megrahi would not be released?

MR. KELLY: I think we’ve said all along that we understood that this was a matter for the Scottish executive to decide. The – our interlocutors in London made it clear that this was a matter for their justice officials to --

QUESTION: Did you seek such a commitment?

MR. KELLY: Well, we’ve told you that we – on many different occasions --

QUESTION: Well, you said you didn’t want him released.

MR. KELLY: -- on many different occasions at very high levels have made our views known to the Scottish authorities, including Secretary Clinton.

QUESTION: We understand that there was, if not a written, then at least a reasonably solemn, informal agreement between the then-Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and the then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder that he would not be released.

MR. KELLY: That I’m not sure about. I’m not sure of any kind of agreement in the past between our Department of Justice and the British authorities.

QUESTION: We understand that there was such an agreement. If we can accept that there is no written document --

MR. KELLY: I think there was an understanding that he would serve out his sentence in Scotland. But --

QUESTION: Is the Department --

MR. KELLY: -- I don’t know if I would characterize that as an agreement. If you’re talking about some specific agreement relating to a previous attorney general, I think you have to ask the Department of Justice.

QUESTION: A previous deputy attorney general who is now the attorney general, by coincidence. But is the Department comfortable with the fact that even if a – there is no written agreement that has been broken, nonetheless, a significant agreement between two close allies has been broken?

MR. KELLY: Well, we’ve said many times that we disagreed strenuously with the decision of the Scottish authorities to release him and allow him to return to Libya. And it won’t be the first disagreement we’ve had with a close ally and it won’t be the last. But this is – but whether or not it’s – I don’t know if I’d characterize it as an agreement. There was an understanding that we had that he would serve out his sentence. But the British Government has also let us know that because of their policy of devolution and allowing Scotland to be responsible for its own home affairs, that it was a decision for the Scottish Executive to make. So there’s been complete transparency throughout.

QUESTION: Well, it was their decision to make. I mean, yes it was a Scottish decision to make, but as we’ve seen from all these documents that are coming out, that the British intervene to the Scots to --

MR. KELLY: I have to refer you to the British authorities.

QUESTION: You don’t feel like the Brits sold you out?

MR. KELLY: No, I don’t feel like the Brits sold me out.

QUESTION: Even though it’s (inaudible) that under the terms of the devolution that foreign policy remains a matter for the UK Government as opposed to the Scottish authorities?

MR. KELLY: I just have to refer you to the Government of Britain for issues like that.

QUESTION: Of course, it’s up to them in the end how they play this. But how does the Department feel?

MR. KELLY: Well, it’s been very clear how we feel. We – this was a – we just think it was the wrong decision. I mean, that – nobody’s trying to hide that.

Yeah, go ahead, Michel.

QUESTION: Different subject. Do you have any time and date for Senator Mitchell’s meeting with the Israeli delegation?

MR. KELLY: Yes, I do. Just a moment. All right. I know what – I know what the answer is. It’s not in here. But the answer is that they’re going to meet tomorrow in New York. The Israeli side will be represented by the deputy chief – is it the deputy chief?

STAFF: Defense ministry chief of staff.

MR. KELLY: Defense ministry chief of staff, Michael Herzog. And we hope to have further details on the meeting and whatever media arrangements there are, I hope, later today.

QUESTION: Is Molcho, Zitzhas Molcho, who is Prime Minister Netanyahu – one of his key aides, coming as well?

MR. KELLY: That I don’t know, Arshad. You’ll have to ask --

QUESTION: You don’t have the time and place?

MR. KELLY: The place is – well, the place is in New York. But the exact --

QUESTION: It’s a big state, Ian.

MR. KELLY: Yeah, I know it is. New York City.

QUESTION: That’s a big city – (laughter) – I hear.

MR. KELLY: It’s a great city, too.

QUESTION: Near the UN?

MR. KELLY: Not as good as Chicago, but it’s a great city.

QUESTION: Is it going to be at USUN?

MR. KELLY: That I don’t know. But we’ll find out. You know in the past that they have had a camera spray and statements afterwards, so I would expect that – that model to be followed.

QUESTION: You expect they will have statements afterwards?

MR. KELLY: I do expect that.

QUESTION: You expect that to be coming from here or coming from them up there?

MR. KELLY: Both.

QUESTION: You mean a written statement?

MR. KELLY: Yeah. Maybe I should stop right there and say that we’ll get you further information.

QUESTION: That leaves me – I’m a little concerned about that, because from what I understand, this meeting is not going to be on the early side; it’s going to be on the late side. And that means --

MR. KELLY: That’s probably right.

QUESTION: Yeah. And that means that – are we going to be waiting around until 2 o’clock in the morning for it?

MR. KELLY: No, you won’t, Matt.

QUESTION: And is it --

MR. KELLY: I will call you personally when I have --

QUESTION: Before 2 o’clock?

QUESTION: If you would --

MR. KELLY: I’m not staying up that late.

QUESTION: You can call me and I’ll call Matt. (Laughter.) I promise. But --

MR. KELLY: That’s one of the better lines I’ve heard. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: I’m not sure you’re on camera here. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Listen, what do – when you said statements, you meant a written statement. You don’t expect anybody to come out and talk in front of a camera?

MR. KELLY: No, I don’t. I --

QUESTION: Okay.

MR. KELLY: And again, these are my personal expectations. I don’t know this for a fact. But we’ll get you --

QUESTION: Okay. And this meeting’s in preparation for another Mitchell trip to Jerusalem and a meeting with Ehud Barak. Is that right?

MR. KELLY: We’ll have more information about regional travel very soon.

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: Do you have any more information as a follow-up to the story last night on CBS about the Afghan ministry of defense being in contact with one of the Afghans arrested in an incident earlier this week in which a U.S. soldier was killed and a journalist injured?

MR. KELLY: No. I really – I don’t have any information on that. I’ll take one more question.

QUESTION: Bosworth?

QUESTION: Quick one.

MR. KELLY: Bosworth. I don’t have any information on, but we will have information about his travel soon as well.

QUESTION: A quick one --

QUESTION: One on Syria/Iraq. How do you view the escalation in tension between the two countries after August 19^th bombs in Baghdad?

MR. KELLY: You’re asking about Syria?

QUESTION: Syria and Iraq, yeah.

MR. KELLY: Yeah, okay. And this will be the last one, okay, and then we can talk – we can talk afterwards.

QUESTION: Can I have one more, please?

MR. KELLY: Sorry?

QUESTION: Can I have one more, please?

MR. KELLY: I am such a softie.

QUESTION: There’s a lot going on.

MR. KELLY: I know there’s a lot going on. Uh-oh. Yeah, I’m afraid I don’t have that information on Syria.

Okay, go ahead. We’ll get you the information. I know I have it. It’s just not --

QUESTION: Japanese new government, DPJ, says they will reexamine the role of U.S. military bases and U.S. military forces. And what is U.S. current position on that?

MR. KELLY: Yeah. I have really nothing to add from what I said yesterday. Our relationship with Japan is a – one of the cornerstones of peace and security in Asia. It’s one of the most important relationships that we have. We’re going to welcome the opportunity to work with the new government and we’ve – with the view to building on our past successes and developing very productive relations for the future. But beyond that --

QUESTION: How about Futenma issues?

MR. KELLY: Sorry?

QUESTION: Futenma issues.

MR. KELLY: Oh, as I say, I don’t have anything to add to what I said yesterday.

QUESTION: Well, wait a minute.

MR. KELLY: Thanks.

QUESTION: Can you give us a little bit of an idea of what your involvement was in the agreement between Armenia and Turkey to start talks to establish diplomatic relations?

MR. KELLY: That was, I think, mostly worked out bilaterally between the two governments through the facilitation of the Swiss. Of course, we took a great interest in the talks.

QUESTION: Thank you.

(The briefing was concluded at 2:18 p.m.)

DPB # 148

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