Interview on Al Jazeera Television

QUESTION: Secretary Armitage, thank you for being with us.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Thank you for having me.

QUESTION: Let me start first with the latest bombing in Iraq within Baghdad on Wednesday or in Basra Thursday. People are worried now about what would be the scenario of Iraq, especially after June 30th, there was to be that this U.S. Administration is out, and the (inaudible) come back and say the U.S. invasion made Iraq a magnet for terrorists and terrorism.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, first of all, let me express great relief that Al Jazeera has suffered no personal injuries yesterday in the terrible car bombing, although I know your property was damaged.

On the question of what to expect, we certainly expect as we move to 1 July or June 30th, an uptick in the violence because those who want to see Iraq go in another direction can't stand the thought of Iraqis actually making their own decisions about their own futures.

After two decades of repression and brutality -- and I think all the neighbors of Iraq would say that was the case in Iraq -- it's natural that there would be different opinions in Iraq. What is unnatural is having foreign fighters who are trying to take advantage of it, and are becoming increasingly nervous that an Iraq that is able to make her own decisions, actually will bring the winds of change through the entire Middle East.

QUESTION: If the U.S. will continue to protect the Iraqis or provide security for them as of July 1st, or maybe the security will be for the 100,000 U.S. troops stationed there?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: No, we certainly believe that the three U.S. divisions and the two multinational divisions will be required after 1 July. We do believe that the Iraqi Governing Council, or the interim government at the time, will want them there to continue to provide security and to continue to root out both former regime elements, as well as foreign fighters.

So, yes, we will be continuing after 1 July, in a military fashion.

QUESTION: Mr. Armitage, let me ask about the question that people have asked on the anniversary, was the Iraq threat or Saddam Hussein threat an imminent threat, as the Administration tried to portray at that time? Couldn't you wait a few months for the Europeans or the UN to come along with you and to help you, instead of that unilateral approach?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, I've got several answers to your question. The first is that our President had described Iraq as a gathering storm, a gathering threat; and particularly, in the wake of what happened on 9/11 here, he was not willing to gamble and to wait, number one.

Number two, from our point of view, the UN, United Nations Security Council, United States waited 12 years for Saddam Hussein to simply live up to what agreements he had made and what agreements were required from the UN Security Council resolution, and for whatever reason, he and his colleagues did not make that decision.

And third, I would dispute the notion that this was unilateral. We went in with four major allies. We now are joined by 24 countries, and they would be just as surprised to find that they don't count for anything. They're standing right alongside of us. They're fighting right alongside of us; and occasionally, they're taking casualties right alongside of us.

QUESTION: Hans Blix issued remarks and also for sale (inaudible) a book --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Yes.

QUESTION: -- in which he's making the argument that the WMD was not really that important or that clear, and the U.S. for political reasons wanted to use the WMD as a pretext or excuse in order to get into Iraq for just regime change.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, Dr. Blix's book has not been read by myself. I saw excerpts in the press. I also saw an interview with Dr. Blix, where he said, he, himself, thought that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and he was a little frustrated that he had not been able to find it.

So no matter what he says about pretext or not, the fact of the matter is he, himself, thought that Iraq had WMD, in his own words, he has said so.

QUESTION: So you think that all what Secretary Powell said on February 5th, about one month or six weeks before the war, was accurate in regard to Iraq's position of WMD's or claims of position?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Yeah. I would say it was accurate, given the intelligence at the time, not only the U.S. intelligence, but the intelligence services of many of our friends had the same information. So it was accurate regarding the intelligence received.

As we found out, some elements of this turned out to be not true, and, of course, this was inadvertent on the part of Secretary Powell. Given the intelligence we all had, his statements were accurate, accurately reflecting the intelligence.

QUESTION: The same for the President in his State of the Union speech?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, yeah, I think so, sure.

QUESTION: And Niger and the yellow cake?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, Niger, we've had a real -- the yellow cake -- a real difference of opinion. And, as you know, some of our National Security Council have stood up and said they made a mistake, and that that famous 16-word phrase should not have been in the State of the Union.

QUESTION: The presence of 100,000 U.S. troops, or at least 100,000, in Iraq, and continue to be there, would that consider constrained on what the U.S. can do with Iran, in regard to the nuclear fire -- fight because U.S. might be perceived as worried about the safety of their troops if they anger the Iranians?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: No. First of all, let me make clear, we've got no plans, military plans for Iran at all, and we're very satisfied with the discussions that the IAEA is having with the Iraqis in a recently completed meeting in Vienna, I think made it crystal clear that Iran, thus far, has not been completely above board and honest with the IAEA.

And as we move to June, and the Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, and we'll see if Iran can find the wherewithal to have a full, complete and honest declaration -- we hope so.

QUESTION: And if they were sent to the Security Council, the U.S. will be willing to prepare for them what they did for Iraq for the Iranians?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, we have not made any decision about going to the Security Council or not, certainly, in advance of the June board meeting of the IAEA. We had good discussions with Dr. ElBaradei, the Director General, yesterday and the day before, even including discussions with President Bush, and we are quite satisfied with the direction he's taking the IAEA in his discussions with the Iranians.

QUESTION: It has been reported that Dr. ElBaradei was encouraging and has been encourage the U.S. to get into dialogue with the Iranians, that there is a perception that the Iranians are using their nuclear fire just as a bargaining chip to improve relations with the U.S., and you, in particular, are one of the people against any kind of dialogue with the Iranians.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: That I am against it?

QUESTION: Reportedly.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, that's very strange. I was the one who testified on Capital Hill that regime change was not our policy. And I made it crystal clear that we are perfectly willing to talk to the Iranians on issues of mutual concern, and we do. We talk about the question of Afghanistan. We talk about the question of terrorism, and particularly, al-Qaida, who are under some sort of surveillance, if not house arrest in Iran.

So we have plenty of time for dialogue and we're not opposed, but we wanted to be on issues that we both can agree are important to us.

Finally, I think you must take note of the reaction of the United States and the international community when Iran suffered a terrible tragedy within an earthquake. We responded just strictly as a humanitarian matter, not as a political matter, but we were right out of box. And I called the Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations. I found him in Tehran. And President Bush had authorized for me to make an offer of generous humanitarian assistance, which I did, and he accepted.

So there are plenty of opportunities for dialogue with Iran.

QUESTION: Is that the same case with Syria, especially in a radio interview, you were talking about President Bashar Assad and saying that until now you are not convinced that he is like his father; his father was able to take decisions. You don't think that young Assad is the same, at least, for now, you think that he's at a fork in the road, and can either go and have a fine life or can be very isolated as the only Baath Party left in the region.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I said exactly that. And what is your question?

QUESTION: Is there an ultimatum or exactly how Bashar Assad could have a fine life exactly? What is your roadmap for him?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: It's not him personally. It's the whole people of Syria. But the neighborhood has changed, it's quite clear. Gone is the other Baath Party. That's first of all. Second of all, it's unfortunate, there is violence right now in Lebanon with the Kurds, in Syria with Kurdi. We call on, of course, both governments there to exercise restraint and don't respond with -- to legitimate political demonstrations with violence.

When I say that Mr. Assad could have a fine life, I don't mean for him personally, I mean for his people. They can join the general improving economy in the world and be part of it, with low economy, and be part of the solutions to the problems of the area and not be seen as one of the elements of the problem.

And the reason I say that is because of Syria's support for Hamas and Hezbollah. So many years after the Taif Accords of 1989, Syrian troops still occupy Lebanon. And so it seems to me that it's time for the leadership in Syria to make a decision about changing their ways.

QUESTION: And do you expect of them to respond that quick? I mean, you are almost -- for the last two weeks now, the Administration is saying the sanctions on Syria it's about coming soon, soon. I don't know. How soon are we talking about? And how quick do you expect of them to change behavior in order to stop the sanctions?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, I think it's unfortunate that we have come to a situation where our laws require sanction. I note that Secretary Powell traveled to Damascus about a year ago, last May, to visit with President Assad, and he had a very full and frank, and yet, friendly discussions and made all of these points clear, and yet we've seen there were no threats involved.

It's not our business to make a threat. We just pointed out the obvious to President Assad. And from May till now, we have got no response. So it's not just the last two weeks, it's the last 10 months.

QUESTION: So sanctions imminent?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I'd say there will be firm sanctions in the not-too-distant future. I don't want to haggle over words like "imminent," because they have to be defined.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: Secretary Armitage, let me move to Libya. And here, people are -- some analysts consider that a lesson from the Iraq war for the U.S. is that no longer talking about regime change with Iran or Libya or even Syria. They are talking about behavior change, and that is the case of Libya, and mainly because of the -- what they was faced in Iraq that did not expect before?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: No. First of all, Mr. Qadhafi made up his own mind to change the direction of Libya, based on a number of factors, and it wasn't simply the fact that the coalition had come to war in Iraq. It was more complicated than that, though, certainly, I don't think the fact that we were willing to go to war in Iraq was lost on the leadership of Libya.

We have never said that "one size fits all," and regime change was not necessarily our policy. Had Saddam Hussein simply lived up to the requirements of the UN Security Council resolutions, had he done that, he would still be in Baghdad.

So sometimes, you have to take a bold leadership role, as we did in Iraq. Other times, you can work diplomatically, as we're doing in North Korea, as we did with Libya, alongside our UK allies.

QUESTION: So is this not -- is not in Baghdad right now, Saddam Hussein?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I didn't say where he was. But I meant he would be sitting in power in Baghdad.

QUESTION: In power in Baghdad. Is he talking? I mean, you had some -- in some interviews you were talking about -- you characterized a little bit how he is talking now, was that cooperating or not?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: What I have said is that he's quite wily and quite intelligent and seems to be enjoying the discussions with his interlocutor. Beyond that, I didn't say exactly what he's saying, and I don't think that's my point right now.

QUESTION: What - just measure - of discussions or topics of discussions?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: No, I think we are involved in interrogations of Saddam Hussein, and I'll just keep the information to myself.

QUESTION: Okay, my last question, and a few words about democracy and Greater Middle East. Now people are talking about that the U.S. because of what the -- got the reaction from the Arab world, the Europeans might not introduce the Greater Middle East Initiative into the G-8 meeting in June. How true is that? And is there a change in U.S. dealing with some Arab countries when it comes to civil society and crackdown on civil society, like, State Department being very curious about Saudi Arabia?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Now, first of all, I think that there has been a misperception about the -- what we call the GME, the Greater Middle East Initiative. The misperception was that the United States had some plan, and that we would, from the top down, it would force democracy on different states. That's ridiculous.

We understand and respect several things: First of all, each of the states in the Middle East have a unique culture and a unique history, and it's to be valued and treasured. Second of all, there are already, in every state in the region, varying degrees of reform. Some are more farther along the line of some states than others. And our view is that where there is reform, then we, in the international community, should be willing to assist it, and aid it, and help it, but in no way can we direct it.

We have an American democracy, and the British have a British democracy. There will be democracies in the Middle East, but they'll be unique and culturally adapted democracies, and so this is, this seems to me a worthy thing.

And by the way, I would note, the other day, I saw an announcement about reform coming from Alexandria, Egypt, which I thought was one of the farthest reaching statements that I've seen in 20-odd years of dealing with the Middle East, clearly indicative that civil society is desirous of greater freedoms, greater transparency, more say in their lives, and these are all good things.

QUESTION: So the G-8 is discussing the Greater Middle East Initiative?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: The G-8 is discussing it. What the G-8 leaders finally decide to do - to see how the majority - will be up to them. I like my job, so I won't try to predict what our bosses will do. But we'll discuss it, sure.

QUESTION: Thank you very much, Secretary Richard Armitage. Thanks so much.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Thank you very much.

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